To participate in the operation, the troops of three fronts were involved: Leningrad (commander - Army General L.A. Govorov), Volkhov (commander - Army General K.A. Meretskov) and part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic (commander - Army General M.M. Popov). The Red Banner Baltic Fleet (commander - Admiral V.F. Tributs), Ladoga (commander - Rear Admiral V.S. Cherokov) and Onega (commander - Captain 1st Rank N.V. Antonov) military flotillas, aviation long-range (commander - Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov) and partisan formations.

The plan of the operation provided for the coordinated simultaneous strikes of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to defeat the troops of the 18th German Army, and the active actions of the 2nd Baltic Front to tie down the main forces of the 16th German Army and the operational reserves of Army Group North. Subsequently, the troops of the three interacting fronts were to develop the offensive in the Narva, Pskov and Idritsa directions, defeat the troops of the 16th Army, complete the liberation of the Leningrad Region and create conditions for the expulsion of the fascist invaders from the Soviet Baltic. The main feature of the plan of the SVGK was that it was planned to strike not only from the outside, but also from the inside of the besieged city, as well as from the limited Oranienbaum bridgehead.

The commander of the Leningrad Front decided to break through the enemy defenses with a strike by two armies - the 2nd shock from the Oranienbaum bridgehead and the 42nd from the Pulkovo area - towards each other, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in the Ropsha, Krasnoe Selo, Strelna area. Subsequently, these armies will develop an offensive against Narva, Kingisepp, and advance in the Luga direction with the troops of the 67th Army. The commander of the Volkhov Front decided to break through the enemy defenses with the forces of one 59th Army, but in two sectors - north and south of Novgorod, to surround and destroy his Novgorod grouping. Subsequently, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Leningrad Front, complete the defeat of the main forces of the 18th German Army. At the same time, at the beginning of the operation, the troops of the 8th and 54th armies were to conduct holding operations, and with the withdrawal of the enemy, they would proceed to pursue him in the Luga direction.

By decision of the commander of the 2nd Baltic Front, the troops of the 1st shock, 22nd, 6th guards and 3rd shock armies were to defeat the enemy north of Nevel, and then advance on Idritsa.

The next feature of the preparation was the planning of the use of artillery. Numerous groups of artillery were created. Coastal, railway and naval artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was involved in artillery support for the offensive of the 2nd shock and 42nd armies.

To conduct accurate fire near the front edge, a correction post was created. Only on the first day of the operation that began, shells from 130-mm main-caliber guns destroyed two artillery batteries, defeated the headquarters of an infantry regiment, and suppressed several long-term firing points. In the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, for the first time, mobile groups of tank troops began to be created. Tank breakthrough regiments and tank flamethrower battalions (about half of all tanks) were assigned to rifle divisions as tanks for direct infantry support. Tank brigades remained at the disposal of corps commanders or army commanders to develop success in the depths of the enemy's defenses.

The Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation took place in three stages. The first stage - from January 14 to 30 - the defeat of the flanks of the 18th German army and the development of the offensive along the entire front. The second stage - from January 31 to February 15 - the development of the offensive in the Narva and Luga directions, the defeat of the Luga grouping of the enemy. The third stage - from February 15 to March 1 - the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Pskov and Ostrovsky directions and the completion of the defeat of the main forces of the 18th Army.

The offensive on the Leningrad Front began on January 14 (Krasnoselsko-Ropsha operation). After a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky) went on the offensive from the Oranienbaum bridgehead. In the zone of the 42nd Army (commander - Colonel-General I. I. Maslennikov) on this day, the most durable enemy defenses were destroyed by artillery. Troops of the 42nd Army launched an offensive on 15 January.

During the first two days of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army broke through the main enemy defense line south of Oranienbaum and advanced 6 km. Increasing their efforts by bringing into battle the second echelons of the corps, the troops of the shock group of the front on January 16 continued to expand the breakthrough along the front and in depth. To break through the second line of defense on January 17, mobile groups (two reinforced tank brigades) were introduced into the battle. The command of the 18th Army, having used up all the reserves, was forced on January 17 to begin the withdrawal of its troops.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the 2nd shock army liberated Ropsha on January 19, the troops of the 42nd army - Krasnoye Selo. By the end of January 19, mobile army groups united in the Russko-Vysotsky area (south of Ropsha) and completed the encirclement of the remnants of the defeated enemy grouping. The lag of rifle units from mobile groups allowed enemy troops to continue to exit the encirclement during the night of January 20. On January 21, 1944, the encircled group was completely destroyed.

On the night of January 21, the troops of the 67th Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.P. Sviridov) went on the offensive, pursuing the enemy, who had begun the withdrawal of troops from the Mginsk ledge. On the same day, they liberated the city and the large railway junction Mga, which the Nazis called the "eastern castle" of the blockade of Leningrad.

Building on the success achieved, the armies of the Leningrad Front began advancing in the western and southwestern directions to Kingisepp and Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina). On January 22, the Nazis were able to shell Leningrad for the last time. Already on January 24, the cities of Pushkin and Slutsk (Pavlovsk) were liberated, on January 26, Krasnogvardeysk was taken. With the fall of the Gatchina junction of resistance, the entire German fascist Northern Wall of Defense collapsed. The blockade of Leningrad was completely lifted.

On the Volkhov Front, the 59th Army (commander - Lieutenant General I. T. Korovnikov) launched an offensive on January 14, conducting the Novgorod-Luga operation. The main strike force, advancing from the bridgehead on the Volkhov River north of Novgorod, on the first day only managed to penetrate the enemy defenses to a depth of 600–1000 m. Events developed much more successfully south of Lake Ilmen in an auxiliary direction. With a sudden night attack, they captured several enemy strongholds and by the end of January 14 they had created a bridgehead up to 6 km along the front and up to 4 km in depth. To develop success, the 372nd Rifle Division and an armored battalion from the second echelon were transferred to this bridgehead.

Moving knee-deep in the mud, dragging guns, mortars and ammunition in their arms, the Soviet soldiers, overcoming all difficulties, broke the enemy’s resistance, and on January 20 both groups of the 59th Army united, surrounding the remnants of the enemy units that did not have time to retreat. On the same day, Novgorod was liberated and the encircled enemy troops were liquidated.

On January 21, the armies of the right wing of the front began pursuing the retreating enemy. Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the Volkhov Front reached the Luga defensive line by January 30, completing the first stage of the strategic operation.

Thus, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at the first stage of the operation solved the most difficult tasks: they broke through the prepared defenses of the enemy, who knew about the upcoming offensive and took the necessary measures to repel it, advanced 30-90 km, inflicted a heavy defeat on 12 divisions, completely liberated Leningrad from blockade. Conditions were created for the final defeat of the 18th Army.

Encouraged by the successes achieved, in early February, without any operational pause, the Soviet troops began the second stage of the operation, launching an offensive in the direction of the cities of Narva and Luga.

Fulfilling the assigned tasks, the formations of the 2nd shock army crossed the Luga River in the Kingisepp, Ivanovskoye sector and captured this city on February 1. Building on their success, they also crossed the Narva River, captured two bridgeheads in the area of ​​​​the city of Narva and began fighting for their expansion. Thus, the coast of the Baltic Sea was cleared of the enemy, the Soviet troops entered the territory of the Estonian SSR. The troops of the 42nd Army on February 4, in close cooperation with the partisans, liberated the city of Gdov and reached the eastern coast of Lake Peipsi. The troops of the 67th Army, developing a strike on the city of Luga, by the end of February 8, covered the Luga grouping of the enemy from the west and north.

The offensive of the troops of the Volkhov Front in the Luga direction developed in more difficult conditions. The Nazi command, seeing in the actions of the front the main threat to encircle the troops of the 18th Army, sought at all costs to contain the offensive of the Soviet troops on the city of Luga. On the right flank of the 8th Army on February 1, the enemy counterattacked with two divisions.

By the end of February 15, the troops completed the tasks of the second stage of the operation. The enemy suffered significant damage. Soviet troops reached the Narva River and captured bridgeheads on its left bank. To the south, they moved to the eastern shore of Lake Peipsi, to the cities of Plyussa and Shimsk.

The tragic page of the Leningrad-Novgorod operation was the landing of amphibious assault forces in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Merekul. By order of the commander of the Leningrad Front, to assist the advancing troops of the 2nd Shock Army, on the night of February 14, a battalion of submachine gunners, reinforced by a rifle company of the 260th Marine Brigade of the Baltic Fleet, was landed on the coast of Narva Bay in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthis settlement. General management was carried out by the commander of the Island Naval Base, Rear Admiral G. V. Zhukov. For the landing, a landing detachment (4 armored boats and 8 small hunters), a minesweeper group (10 minesweepers) and a detachment of artillery support ships (3 gunboats and 8 minesweepers) were formed. Air cover was assigned to the 1st Guards Fighter Aviation Division of the fleet. Despite the heavy ice conditions, the ships approached the enemy shore and began landing.

The landing troops operated in three groups, making their way to the Auvere railway station to join the troops of the 2nd shock army. The Marines, armed with small arms and grenades, fought selflessly. The paratroopers made their way to the settlements of Merekul and Udria. Then the Nazis moved artillery and tanks against them. Meanwhile, the offensive of the 2nd shock army, launched on February 11, developed slowly. The units of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps only managed to capture Auvere on February 17th. The paratroopers had to wage an unequal battle against a significantly superior enemy. Their losses were very heavy.

The third stage of the operation began on February 15, 1944. By February 16, the 2nd Shock Army continued to conduct combat operations to expand its bridgeheads and capture the city of Narva. On the Pskov direction, the troops of the 42nd, 67th, 8th and 54th armies continued to pursue the enemy.

In the second half of February, the troops of both fronts were able to achieve new successes. On the Narva River, the 2nd shock army expanded the captured bridgehead to 35 km along the front and up to 15 km in depth, creating favorable conditions for the operation to liberate Soviet Estonia. The troops of the left wing of the Leningrad Front continued to pursue the enemy in the Pskov direction. Having traveled 50-160 km in 15 days, they reached the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area in early March. Using the success of their neighbors, the armies of the right wing of the 2nd Baltic Front wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 180 km and also reached the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area.

The resistance of the enemy at the line of Pskov, Novorzhev, Pustoshka was so fierce that the Soviet troops were forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive. The Leningrad-Novgorod operation ended.

As a result of the offensive, Soviet troops liberated the territory of almost the entire Leningrad and part of the Kalinin regions from the invaders, completely lifted the blockade from Leningrad, and entered Estonia. The basing area of ​​the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland has expanded significantly. Favorable conditions were created for defeating the enemy in the Baltic states and in areas north of Leningrad. Army Group North suffered a heavy defeat.

The victory near Leningrad and Novgorod marked the beginning of the largest offensive operations of the Soviet troops, carried out by them throughout 1944 and predetermined the final and complete defeat of Nazi Germany.



Soviet soldiers raise the red flag over the liberated Gatchina, January 26, 1944

When planning military operations for the winter of 1944, the purpose of the operations of the Soviet troops in the northwestern direction was the defeat of the German Army Group North, the complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad, the liberation of the Leningrad Region from the enemy, and the creation of favorable conditions for the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Baltic states.

The Soviet troops in the northwestern direction were opposed by the 18th and 16th German armies. By the beginning of 1944, the enemy had prepared in his zones several defensive lines, echeloned in depth, on which strong centers of resistance and strong points with a developed system of trenches and cut-off positions were created. The total depth of the enemy's defense reached 260 km.

According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK), the troops of the Leningrad (general of the army) and Volkhov (general of the army) fronts, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet (admiral) during the operation, which later became known as the Leningrad-Novgorod, were to defeat the flank groups of the 18th the German army in the areas southwest of Leningrad and Novgorod, to develop an offensive on Kingisepp and Luga and, in the end, strike at the Narva and Pskov directions. The troops of the 2nd Baltic Front (colonel general) were entrusted with the task of destroying the enemy grouping north of Nevel, and then, by attacking the troops of the left wing in the Idritsa direction, to attract the main forces of the 16th German army, to prevent the transfer of its formations to Leningrad and Novgorod .

The tasks set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed the basis of the plans for the Krasnoselsko-Ropsha offensive operation of the troops of the Leningrad and Novgorod-Luga operations of the troops of the Volkhov fronts.

In accordance with the decision of the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front to conduct the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky offensive operation, it was supposed to strike in converging directions on Ropsha with the forces of the 2nd shock army from the coastal bridgehead and the 42nd army from the Pulkovo region in order to encircle and defeat the enemy grouping (3- th Panzer Corps "SS" and the 50th Army Corps) in the area of ​​Peterhof, Krasnoe Selo, Ropsha. Subsequently, it was envisaged that the main forces develop an offensive against Kingisepp, and part of the forces - against Krasnogvardeysk and Mgu.

Formations of the 2nd shock (lieutenant general) and 42nd (general) armies went on the offensive during January 14-15. As a result of three days of fighting, the 2nd shock army "completely broke through the tactical depth of defense south of Oranienbaum", but the 42nd army, having met strong enemy resistance, wedged into its defenses northwest of Pushkin only 1.5-4.5 km.

Soviet fighters are machine-gunning the enemy next to the Detskoe Selo station building. Leningrad region. January 1944

In the following days, the strike force of the front continued to develop the offensive in the Ropshinsky and Krasnoselsky directions. To eliminate its breakthrough, the German command brought into the battle first tactical and then operational reserves. However, these measures did not make it possible to remove the threat of encirclement of the 18th Army, and on January 17 its formations began to withdraw from the Krasnoye Selo area.

In order to develop success, mobile groups of the 2nd shock and 42nd armies were introduced into the battle. However, due to the fact that the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone was not completed, the mobile group of the 42nd Army (two reinforced tank brigades), when approaching the enemy’s third position, came under heavy artillery and mortar fire and was subjected to counterattacks. Having lost up to 70 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS) per day, she was unable to complete her task and was withdrawn from the battle.

On January 19, in order to build up the force of the strike, the commander of the 42nd Army introduced the second echelon (reinforced rifle corps) and again the mobile group into the breakthrough. This led to success. Surrounding and destroying the enemy rearguards, under the cover of which the German command tried to withdraw its troops, the mobile units of the 2nd shock and 42nd armies liberated Ropsha and Krasnoe Selo. By the end of the day, they completed the encirclement of the Peterhof-Strelninskaya enemy grouping, and the next day they eliminated most of it. After that, the enemy command, fearing the encirclement of the main forces of the 18th Army, began to withdraw them from the Mginsky ledge.

In the current situation, the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front decided to cut off the enemy's withdrawal routes and defeat him in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front. In carrying out this task, the 2nd shock and 42nd armies, after a partial regrouping, continued the offensive in the Kingisepp and Red Guard directions. On the night of January 21, the 67th Army of Lieutenant General of Artillery also went on the offensive. Their formations, developing success, on January 24 captured the cities of Pushkin and Slutsk, and two days later - Krasnogvardeisky. By the end of January 30, the main forces of the front, operating in the Kingisepp direction, advanced 60-100 km from Leningrad, reached the line of the river. Luga, in some areas crossed it and captured bridgeheads on the left bank.

Simultaneously with the troops of the Leningrad Front, units of the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive on January 14, starting the Novgorod-Luga operation.

Its task was to strike with the forces of two groupings in directions converging on Ljubolyady in order to defeat the Novgorod grouping of the enemy and liberate Novgorod. Subsequently, it was planned, developing success in the western and southwestern directions, to seize the city of Luga and cut off the withdrawal routes of German troops towards Pskov. The 8th and 54th armies were to attract enemy forces in the Tosno and Luban directions and prevent their transfer to Novgorod.

Map of the Leningrad-Novgorod operation in 1944

The main forces of the 59th Army, Lieutenant General, advancing from the bridgehead on the river. Volkhov, on the first day wedged into the defense of the German troops only 600-1000 m. Ilmen and a sudden night attack to capture a number of enemy strongholds. The commander of the 59th Army, in order to build up the force of strikes, introduced additional forces into the battle in the breakthrough sectors. As a result, it was possible to break through the enemy's main line of defense both north and south of Novgorod.

In the following days, despite the increased resistance of the German troops, the formations of the 59th Army, supported by artillery and aviation, continued to slowly move forward. However, the slow pace of the offensive (5-6 km per day) did not allow the encirclement of the enemy grouping to be completed in a short time. His command had the ability to maneuver reserves, transferring them from unattacked areas.

On January 16, the formations of the 54th Army of the Lieutenant General went on the offensive in the Luban direction, which made it difficult for the German command to begin the transfer of troops to the Novgorod direction. On January 18, the second echelon of the 59th Army (reinforced rifle corps) was introduced into the battle with the task of defeating, together with the 54th Army, the enemy grouping, which occupied the defenses in the Lyuban and Chudov regions.

Convinced of the failure of further resistance and fearing encirclement, on January 18, the enemy began to withdraw his forces from the Novgorod region to the west. However, by that time the only road along which the German troops could withdraw was already under the influence of the formations of the 59th Army. On January 20, both of its groupings united, surrounding the scattered parts of the enemy.

Captured German soldiers on the streets of Leningrad

Having repelled all their attempts to break out of the encirclement, as well as enemy attacks from outside, the formations of the 59th Army, together with the 7th Rifle Corps, brought into battle from the front reserve, on January 20 completed "the destruction of scattered groups of enemy infantry surrounded in the forests west of Novgorod" and took over the city.

At the same time, the troops of the Volkhov Front continued their offensive in the Tosno, Luban and Luga directions, during which they advanced from 3 to 12 km in a number of sectors and liberated the city of Mga. Based on this, on January 22, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded from General of the Army K.A. Meretskov to increase the pace of advancement of the armies of the left wing and, in cooperation with the Leningrad Front, to seize Luga no later than January 29-30.

On January 22, formations of the 59th Army captured Gruzino, the last enemy bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Volkhov. Continuing his pursuit, the formations of the 54th Army liberated the cities of Tosno, Lyuban, Chudovo during January 26-29, cleared the Oktyabrskaya Railway and the Leningrad Highway from the enemy.

On January 27, 1944, a salute was given in the city in honor of the valiant troops of the Red Army, who liberated Leningrad from the Nazi blockade. The day January 27 is defined by Federal Law No. 32-FZ of March 13, 1995 “On the Days of Military Glory and Memorable Dates of Russia” in the current edition as “The day of the complete liberation by the Soviet troops of the city of Leningrad from the blockade of its Nazi troops (1944)” .

Monument "Broken Ring" of the Green Belt of Glory of the Defenders of Leningrad

At the same time, the German command managed to withdraw part of the forces of the 18th Army to a pre-prepared line along the river. Meadows, as well as transfer one tank division here. By January 30, the armies of the Volkhov Front, having covered 60-100 km with battles, found themselves in front of a powerful defensive line of the enemy.

In early February, formations of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, pursuing the enemy, crossed the river. Luga and February 1 captured the city of Kingisepp. Developing success, they captured two bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Narva and began fighting for their expansion. At the same time, formations of the 42nd Army crossed the river. Luga and went to the Gdov region.

However, the troops of the left wing of the Volkhov Front did not complete the task of capturing the Luga node of enemy resistance. In this regard, the Stavka entrusted it to the Leningrad Front. The commander of his troops, General of the Army L.A. Govorov appointed the 67th Army, Lieutenant General of Artillery V.P., to capture the city of Luga. Sviridov.

Fierce battles between groups of two fronts for Luga continued for several days. Only on February 12, formations of the 67th and 59th armies were able to liberate the city and complete the defeat of the enemy operating here. After that, the Volkhov Front, on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, was disbanded. From February 15, his armies were transferred to the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts.

At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front (Colonel-General M.M. Popov) were fighting south of Lake Ilmen. The front was ordered with the forces of two armies (at least 20 rifle divisions) to break through the defenses of the German troops, to capture the crossings across the river. Great, and in the future, together with the left wing of the Leningrad Front, defeat the enemy's Ostrov grouping.

On February 18, the 1st shock army of Lieutenant General of the 2nd Baltic Front broke the enemy's resistance and captured the city of Staraya Russa. The 22nd army of the lieutenant general, having gone on the offensive on February 19, by the end of the day wedged into the defense of the German troops and created a threat of breaking through their defense to the full depth. Overcoming enemy resistance at a number of intermediate lines, by the end of February 26, their formations had completely cleared the Luga-Dno-Novosokolniki railway of the enemy.

On February 26, they went on the offensive without completing the regrouping of the formation of the 10th Guards and 3rd shock armies of the lieutenant general and colonel general. But they were able to achieve only minor tactical successes in certain areas.

In the second half of February, the offensive zone of the Soviet troops expanded south of Lake Ilmen to the Novosokolniki and Pustoshka regions. By the end of the month, they advanced up to 180 km in the Pskov and Novorzhev directions and reached the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area and to the south of it - to the Novorzhev-Pustoshka line. However, for a further offensive, the fronts in the northwestern direction no longer had the necessary forces and means at their disposal.

As a result of the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses and, conducting an offensive in a wooded and swampy area, threw him back 220-280 km from Leningrad. At the same time, up to 30 German divisions were defeated. During the offensive, Soviet troops liberated from the invaders almost the entire Leningrad, Novgorod regions, part of the Kalinin region and entered the territory of Estonia. The offensive of the Red Army in the north-western direction made it impossible for the German command to use the forces of the Army Group North for the transfer to the south, where the main blow was delivered by the Soviet troops in the winter campaign of 1944.

At the same time, the large spatial scope and intensity of hostilities, fierce enemy resistance and difficult terrain conditions led to significant losses on the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts. They amounted to 313,953 people, including 76,686 irrevocably, 462 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,832 guns and mortars, and 260 aircraft.

Vladimir Fesenko, Senior Researcher
2nd Directorate of the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

	Leningrad and Kalinin regions of the RSFSR, the eastern part of Estonia.
	Red Army victory
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
L. A. Govorov	Georg von Küchler
K. A. Meretskov	Walter Model
V. F. Tributs
M. M. Popov
Side forces
Leningrad, Volkhov, 2nd Baltic fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - a total of 1,252,000 people (according to other sources, about 900,000 soldiers and officers).	16th and 18th Armies of Army Group North - about 500,000 in total.
76,686 killed and missing. Total: 313,953 soldiers	From 01/01/44 to 02/28/44 Army Group "North" 13,410 were killed, 52,237 were wounded, 11,329 were missing, a total of 76,976. According to Soviet data, more than 90,000 were killed, 7,200 prisoners and 464 tanks in a month of fighting

(January 14 - March 1, 1944) - a strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts, carried out in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation, with the aim of defeating the German Army Group North, completely lifting the blockade of Leningrad and liberation of the Leningrad region.

As a result of the operation, Soviet troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the 16th and 18th German armies, pushed the enemy back from Leningrad by 220-280 kilometers, and south of Lake Ilmen by 180 kilometers, almost completely liberated the Leningrad Region, the western part of the Kalinin Region and entered the the territory of Estonia.

Side forces

USSR

Leningrad Front- commander: Army General L. A. Govorov, chief of staff, Lieutenant General D. N. Gusev:

• 2nd Shock Army - Commander: Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky.
• 42nd Army - Commander: Colonel General I. I. Maslennikov, from March 14 to 24 V. Z. Romanovsky, from the end of March - V. P. Sviridov.
• 67th Army - commander: Lieutenant General V.P. Sviridov, from the end of March - Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky.
• 13th Air Army - Commander: Colonel General of Aviation S. D. Rybalchenko.

Volkhov Front(since 02/15/1944 - disbanded) - commander: Army General K. A. Meretskov, chief of staff, Lieutenant General F. P. Ozerov:

• 54th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General S. V. Roginsky.
• 8th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General F. N. Starikov.
• 59th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General I. T. Korovnikov.
• 14th Air Army (from the end of February - in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) - Commander: Lieutenant General of Aviation I.P. Zhuravlev.

2nd Baltic Front- commander: Army General M. M. Popov, chief of staff, Lieutenant General L. M. Sandalov.

• 1st Shock Army (from 02/02/1944 to 02/15/1944 - as part of the Volkhov Front) - commander: Lieutenant General G.P. Korotkov, from April 1, com. Colonel General N. E. Chibisov.
• 3rd shock army - commander: Colonel General N. E. Chibisov, from April 1, com. Lieutenant General V. A. Yushkevich.
• 22nd Army - Commander: Lieutenant General V. A. Yushkevich, from April 1, com. G. P. Korotkov.
• 6th Guards Army (as part of the front - until February 6) - commander: Colonel General I. M. Chistyakov.
• 10th Guards Army - commander: Lieutenant General A. V. Sukhomlin, since January 21, Lieutenant General M. I. Kazakov.
• 15th Air Army - Commander: Lieutenant General of Aviation N. F. Naumenko.

Baltic Fleet- Commander: Admiral VF Tributs.

Long range aviation- Commander: Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov.

Germany

Army Group North- commander: Field Marshal Georg von Küchler, from February 1, Colonel General Walter Model, from the end of March - Cavalry General Georg Lindemann.

• 18th Army - Commander: Cavalry General Georg Lindemann, since the end of March - Artillery General Herbert Loch: 3rd SS Panzer Corps, 26th, 28th, 38th, 50th, 54th Army Corps.
• 16th Army - Commander: Colonel General H. Hansen: 1st, 2nd, 8th, 10th, 43rd Army Corps and 6th SS Corps.
• 1st Air Fleet - Commander: General K. Pflugbeil.

Front-line operations within the framework of a strategic operation

• Krasnoselsko-Ropshinskaya (14.01.-30.01.1944) - Leningrad Front;
• Novgorod-Luga (14.01-15.02.1944) - Volkhov Front;
• Kingiseppsko-Gdovskaya (01.02-01.03.1944) - Leningrad Front;
• Starorussko-Novorzhevskaya (18.02-01.03.1944) - 2nd Baltic Front.

In German historiography, the military operations of the Army Group North in the period from February 2 to August 10, 1944 are referred to as the "battle for the Narva bridgehead" (German. Schlacht um den Brückenkopf von Narva).

The situation before the start of the operation

In 1943, as a result of a series of operations, the Soviet troops, having broken through the blockade, seized the initiative in the northwestern direction, but failed to completely free Leningrad from the enemy siege.

In the autumn of 1943, after the victory in the Battle of Kursk, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned a number of major strategic offensive operations with the aim of completely liberating Soviet territory. Including it was planned to launch a large-scale offensive in the North-West direction. The goals of this operation, which was supposed to involve the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin and Western fronts, were the defeat of the German Army Group North and the liberation of the Baltic states. The offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, which were faced with the task of completely liberating Leningrad from the enemy blockade, was to become part of this strategic plan.

Realizing that the general situation on the Eastern Front was not in favor of the German troops and it would be extremely difficult to repel the next offensive of the Soviet troops, the command of Army Group North in the fall of 1943 began to develop a retreat plan to new defensive positions. At the turn of the Narva River - Lake Peipus - Pskov - Ostrov - Idritsa, a powerful defense line was built, which received the name "Panther". The command of Army Group North planned to carry out a retreat from Leningrad in several stages from mid-January to the spring of 1944. To this end, a number of intermediate defense lines were prepared in the depths of the defense of the 18th Army (the lines "Autostrada", "Oredezhskaya", "Ingermanlandskaya", "Luzhskaya", etc.).

However, the continuation of the blockade was of great importance for Germany, since it still made it possible to tie down significant forces of the Soviet troops and the Baltic Fleet, firmly cover the approaches to the Baltic and its naval bases, maintain freedom of action for the German fleet in the Baltic Sea and ensure sea communications with Sweden and Finland .

For this reason, at the end of 1943, Army Group North was ordered to continue the blockade of Leningrad. In addition, A. Hitler believed that the Soviet troops did not have enough forces for a large-scale operation near Leningrad, and the commander of the 18th Army, G. Lindeman, assured him that the troops would be able to repel a new Soviet offensive.

Plan of attack near Leningrad

In early September, the Military Councils of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began developing plans for a large-scale joint offensive, which were presented at meetings at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on September 9 and 14.

It was planned to carry out two operations with the aim of defeating the flank groupings of the 18th German Army, encircling the main enemy forces and preventing their retreat to new defensive lines.

According to the proposals of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the main blow was to be delivered by the 42nd Army from the Pulkovo area and the Primorsky Operational Group from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in the general direction to Krasnoye Selo, where it was supposed to unite and form a common front. In the future, after the 67th Army went on the offensive, it was planned to liberate Krasnogvardeysk and continue the offensive in the directions to Luga and Kingisepp.

The military council of the Volkhov Front planned to deliver the main blow from the Novgorod region in the direction of Luga, where it was planned to link up with the troops of the Leningrad Front and thus encircle the main forces of the 18th Army. In the future, it was planned to develop an offensive against Pskov and Ostrov.

Given that, according to intelligence information in the fall of 1943, the German troops of the 18th Army were preparing to retreat to new defensive lines, the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts were ordered to be ready, if necessary, to immediately go on the offensive in order to pursue the enemy and prevent his organized waste. In the future, the Soviet command, given the possibility of such a development of events, developed two versions of the offensive plan. According to the first option, under the code name "Neva-1", Soviet troops near Leningrad were to constantly probe the enemy's defenses, actively conduct reconnaissance and immediately begin pursuing the enemy in the event of his withdrawal. The second version of the plan, called "Neva-2", was developed taking into account the fact that the German troops would continue to hold their positions.

Encirclement Plan of Army Group North

Preparations for the offensive of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began at the very beginning of September 1943. At the same time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff were preparing a plan for a larger operation with a main attack on the southern and southeastern approaches to the Baltic in order to encircle the entire Army Group North. The implementation of this plan would greatly facilitate the task of the Soviet troops in the battles to liberate Leningrad from the enemy blockade.

Given the possibility of the retreat of the 18th German Army to the Panther line, in October 1943, it was decided to conduct an operation at the junction of the German Army Groups North and Center in order to cut off German troops in the North-West direction from the rest of the enemy forces in land and from the territory of East Prussia. The newly formed Baltic Front was given the task of advancing on the Idritsa direction, and the troops of the Kalinin Front - on Vitebsk. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 30218 of October 8, 1943 stated in particular:

At the same time, orders were given to prepare for an offensive by the troops of the North-Western Front in the direction of the Dno - Pskov, and the Volkhov Front was to strike at Novgorod, and then at Luga. In the end, it was supposed, by the joint efforts of several fronts, to destroy in parts the entire Army Group North, to liberate the Leningrad Region, Estonia and Latvia.

However, the offensive of the Kalinin (Nevelsk operation) and the Baltic fronts achieved only local successes and did not receive further development. On October 20, 1943, the Kalinin and Baltic fronts were renamed the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts (the North-Western Front was disbanded), which until the end of 1943 fought in the Vitebsk and Idritsa directions. The Soviet command hoped that after regrouping and a significant reinforcement of the troops of the two fronts, they would still be able to capture Gorodok and Vitebsk, and then rush to Polotsk, Dvinsk, and Riga. Despite some successes (the Gorodok operation), it was not possible to implement the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff. The Soviet troops were never able to defeat the enemy in this direction and create an advantageous operational position for subsequent offensive operations.

The final plan of the Leningrad-Novgorod operation

At the end of 1943, when it became finally clear that it was not possible to implement the large-scale encirclement plan for Army Group North, the Soviet command decided to deliver the main blow in the North-Western direction near Leningrad, especially since the offensive plan for the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts had long been developed and the troops systematically prepared for its implementation. The Soviet command expected that the elimination of the blockade of Leningrad would finally change the situation in the Baltic direction in favor of the Soviet troops.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided, along with the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, to involve the 2nd Baltic Front in the upcoming operation. The troops of this front were tasked with defeating the enemy in the Nevel area, and then, developing an offensive on Idritsa and north of Novosokolniki, cut the enemy's main communications, pin down the main forces of the 16th Army and prevent their transfer to reinforce the 18th Army. Subsequently, it was supposed to launch an offensive in the direction of Opochka and Sebezh. In the event of a successful offensive in the Idritsa direction against the 16th German Army, it would still be possible to surround the entire Army Group North and complete the operation with the liberation of Latvia and Estonia.

Thus, according to the final plan of the Soviet command, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts at the first stage of the operation were to defeat the 18th army of the enemy, and the 2nd Baltic Front was to tie up the forces of the 16th army and the operational reserves of Army Group North by active actions . Subsequently, the troops of three fronts, advancing on the Narva, Pskov and Idritsa directions, were supposed to defeat the 16th German army, complete the liberation of the Leningrad region and create conditions for a further offensive into the Baltic states.

balance of power

USSR

At the beginning of 1944, the German troops, without starting a retreat to the Panther line, continued to firmly hold the defense near Leningrad, relying on a powerful defensive system that had been improved for more than two years. Under these conditions, the Soviet troops could achieve success only by concentrating forces and assets in narrow areas of breaking through the enemy's defenses and by carefully planning the operation. Since the troops of Leningradsky and Volkhovsky had more than four months to prepare for the operation, by the beginning of 1944 they managed to create a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment.

Troops Leningrad front occupied the defense around Leningrad from the Gulf of Finland to the Neva, as well as on the Oranienbaum bridgehead (where the transfer of the 2nd shock army began in the fall of 1943) and along the southern coast of Lake Ladoga from Moscow Dubrovka to Gontova Lipka. Before the start of the operation, the 2nd shock, 42nd, 67th armies included 30 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades and 3 fortified areas, as well as a large number of artillery and engineering units totaling 417,600 soldiers and officers. In addition, there were 89,600 people in the units and subunits of the Baltic Fleet, which was tasked with supporting the offensive of the front troops.

Troops Volkhov Front occupied the line from Gontovaya Lipka to Lezno, and further along the Volkhov River to Lake Ilmen. By the time the operation began, the 59th, 8th and 54th armies included 22 rifle divisions, 6 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 14 tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and battalions, 2 fortified areas, as well as a large number of artillery and mortar formations - a total of about 260,000 soldiers and officers (according to other sources, 297,860 people).

By the beginning of 1944 the troops 2nd Baltic Front occupied the line from Lake Ilmen to Lake Nescherda. The 6th, 10th Guards, 1st, 3rd shock and 22nd armies included 45 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 1 fortified area, as well as artillery and engineering units. Only the 1st shock army consisted of 54,900 soldiers and officers.

In total, Soviet troops before the start of the operation numbered 1,252,000 people (according to other sources, about 900,000 soldiers and officers), 20,183 guns and mortars, 1,580 tanks and self-propelled guns. Air support for the upcoming offensive was to be carried out by the 13th (including the aviation of the Baltic Fleet and the Leningrad Air Defense Army), the 14th and 15th air armies - a total of 1386 aircraft, including 330 long-range aviation aircraft.

For the first time, numerous partisan formations were supposed to actively contribute to the offensive of regular units in the northwestern direction. Only in the Leningrad Region, 13 partisan brigades with a total number of about 35,000 fighters and commanders operated, which were tasked with "expanding the centers of popular uprisings", "destroying the local governments of the occupying authorities", "saving the population from destruction and export to Germany", intensifying military operations on the highway and railway communications of the enemy.

Germany

The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were opposed by the 18th German Army, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front - by the 16th Army.

The 18th Army, which occupied the defense near Leningrad from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ilmen, consisted of 19 divisions and 3 brigades in 6 army corps. Occupying the frontiers from Lake Ilmen to Nevel, the 16th German Army consisted of 21 divisions and 1 brigade, consisting of 5 army corps.

According to Soviet data, the entire Army Group North consisted of 741,000 soldiers and officers, 10,070 guns and mortars, 385 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 370 aircraft of the 1st Air Fleet.

According to German sources, on October 14, 1943, Army Group North had 601,000 men, 146 tanks, and 2,389 field guns (not counting anti-tank and mortars).

The course of hostilities, January 1944

The offensive of the Leningrad Front

On January 14, units of the 2nd shock army were the first to attack the enemy from the Oranienbaum bridgehead, and a day later the troops of the 42nd army joined the offensive, striking from the Pulkovo area. Both Soviet armies advanced in the general direction towards Krasnoye Selo and Ropsha.

In the first days of the offensive, the Soviet troops achieved only minor successes, meeting the stubborn resistance of the German troops of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps and the 50th Army Corps. Despite this, the formations of the two armies, gradually introducing additional forces into battle, stubbornly moved towards each other and by January 20 united in the Ropsha area. The German units that did not have time to retreat were destroyed or captured.

On January 21, the German units of the 26th Army Corps in the Mga region, fearing encirclement, began to retreat to an intermediate defensive line on the railway line and the Leningrad-Moscow highway (the Avtostrada line). Having discovered the enemy's withdrawal, the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front and the 8th Army of the Volkhov Front launched an offensive and by the evening of January 21 they took Mga, and soon completely took control of the Kirov Railway. However, it was not possible to develop an offensive in this area immediately. German troops entrenched themselves at the time line and offered fierce resistance.

The retreat of the German troops from the Mgi region forced the command of the Leningrad Front to somewhat change the plan for the further offensive and abandon the operation to encircle the Mginsk enemy grouping. The main task of the front, according to the adjusted plan, was the capture of Krasnogvardeysk. Then it was supposed to use the forces of the 2nd shock and 42nd army to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kingisepp and Narva. At the same time, the 67th Army, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front, was to take control of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, and then facilitate the offensive against Krasnogvardeisk.

Continuing the offensive, the troops of the 42nd Army, after several days of fierce fighting, liberated Krasnogvardeysk on January 26 and, developing the offensive, advanced 50 kilometers by January 30, reached the Luga River and occupied a bridgehead on its western bank in the Ivanovskoye - Bolshoy Sabsk area .

A little earlier, on January 24, units of the 42nd Army, with the assistance of the 67th Army, liberated the cities of Pushkin and Slutsk (Pavlovsk). Pursuing the retreating enemy, units of the 67th Army advanced along the line Tosno - Vyritsa - Siversky, but only on January 29 they captured Vyritsa, and on January 30 - Siversky.

The 2nd shock army, bypassing Krasnogvardeysk, began advancing in the direction of Narva on January 21. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by January 30, army formations reached the Luga River in the Kingisepp and Kotlov regions and captured a number of bridgeheads on its left bank.

The offensive of the Volkhov front

On January 14, units of the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive, delivering the main blow from a bridgehead on the Volkhov River 30 kilometers north of Novgorod, and an auxiliary blow south of Novgorod, forcing Lake Ilmen on the ice. After several days of fierce fighting, by January 17, Soviet troops broke into the enemy's main line of defense and continued to develop the offensive. On January 20, units of the 59th Army liberated Novgorod and on the same day closed the encirclement around the German units that did not have time to retreat west in the direction of Batetsky.

On January 16, units of the 54th Army went on the offensive in the Chudovo-Lyuban region. Despite the fact that by January 20, units of the army managed to move forward only 5 kilometers, with their active actions they pinned down significant forces of German troops and forced the 26th German army corps, under the threat of encirclement, to begin withdrawing from the Mgi area.

On January 22, the Military Council of the Volkhov Front submitted to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command "a plan for the development of the Novgorod-Luga operation." The main goals of the front troops were the liberation of Luga by the forces of the 59th Army, as well as the October Railway by joint actions of the 8th and 54th armies.

Having approved the proposed plan, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command ordered the troops of the front to capture Luga no later than January 29-30, and Lyuban - January 23-24. For more effective actions, the front commander was allowed to transfer units of the 8th army to the 54th army, and transfer the headquarters to the left flank of the front in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bLake Ilmen.

The rapid offensive on Luga gave the Soviet troops a chance to encircle a significant part of the 18th Army, which was retreating from the Chudovo, Lyuban, and Tosno regions. For this reason, the 59th Army immediately after the liberation of Novgorod immediately continued the offensive, delivering the main blow along the Novgorod-Luga railway through the Batetskaya station, and auxiliary ones in the directions of Finev Luga (on the right flank) and Shimsk (on the left flank).

The German command, realizing the seriousness of the situation, managed to quickly strengthen its grouping in the Luga area. Having met stubborn resistance, the main forces of the 59th Army failed to liberate Luga by the end of January, as was prescribed by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Significantly more success was achieved by the left-flank units of the army (from January 25 under the command of the headquarters of the 8th army), which, in a few days of fierce fighting, made significant progress in the western and south-western directions, cut the Leningrad-Dno railway in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Peredolskaya station and the Luga highway - Shimsk in the area of ​​​​the village of Medved, and also cleared the northern coast of Lake Ilmen from the enemy and reached the outskirts of Shimsk.

At the same time, fighting continued on the line of the Oktyabrskaya railway, where, after uniting all the troops operating in the area, under the command of the headquarters of the 54th Army, Soviet troops liberated Tosno, Lyuban, Chudovo and by January 29 completely took control of this strategically important railway.

Two days before the start of the offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, on January 12, they began their part of the operation of connecting the 2nd Baltic Front, attacking the positions of the 16th German army.

Parts of the 3rd shock army were tasked with breaking through the enemy defenses in the Pustoshka area and developing an offensive towards Opochka, and parts of the 22nd army were tasked with bypassing Novosokolniki from the north and reaching the Nasva-Mayevo line. In addition, the 10th Guards Army, transferred from the Western Front, was redeployed to the left flank of the front. The army was to strike from the line of Lake Nescherdo - Gusino in the direction of Zilupe, bypassing Idritsa from the south and south-west.

The troops of the 2nd Baltic Front at the end of 1943 conducted a number of local operations in the Nevel area and did not have time to properly prepare for the January offensive. The armies had to advance on unfamiliar and difficult to pass wooded and swampy terrain, without knowledge of the situation, system and features of the enemy's defense. Moreover, by the time the offensive began, the 10th Guards Army was on the march and was introduced into battle in parts. All these factors predetermined the unsuccessful development of the combat operations of the front.

By the end of January 16, units of the 10th Guards Army, which included 9 rifle divisions, as well as a large number of artillery and tank units, managed to advance only 5-10 kilometers. The German units opposing them (one regiment of the 132nd Infantry Division, two separate penal battalions and six artillery batteries), despite their small numbers, offered fierce resistance.

The offensive of the 3rd Shock Army in the area of ​​Pustoshka and the 6th Guards and 22nd Armies in the area of ​​Novosokolniki also developed with great difficulty. The only significant success was the capture of the Nasva station by units of the 22nd Army, which drove out the 331st German Infantry Division from there on January 14. Developing success, by January 18, units of the army captured the 10-kilometer section of the Novosokolniki-Dno railway, which was the main road communication of the 16th German army.

On January 16, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command expressed to M. M. Popov its extreme dissatisfaction with the slow development of the offensive of the front formations and the especially unsuccessful actions of the 10th Guards Army. Soon, the commander of the army, A. V. Sukhomlin, was removed from his post “as he had not done his job,” and General M. I. Kazakov was appointed in his place.

Front commander M. M. Popov explained the failure of the operation in his report to I. V. Stalin:

Front commander M. M. Popov proposed not to continue the operation in the offensive sector of the 10th Guards Army, but to concentrate all the efforts of the front in the direction of Nasva - Novorzhev in order to quickly connect with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved this proposal, giving the troops of the front a week to regroup their forces.

The position of the parties by the end of January 1944

By the end of January, by joint efforts, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts pushed the enemy back from the city by 70-100 kilometers and freed the main communications between the city and the country. These successes made it possible on January 27 to announce to the whole world that Leningrad was completely liberated from the enemy blockade. Although the operation did not develop as rapidly as planned, the troops of the two fronts created the prerequisites for a further successful offensive.

At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front did not achieve success in January, but nevertheless, with their active actions, they fettered the main forces of the 16th German army, which contributed to the success of the offensive near Leningrad and Novgorod.

The German units of the 18th Army, although they suffered heavy losses, managed, retreating from one intermediate line to another, to avoid encirclement and retained a significant part of their combat potential. At the same time, the position of the 18th Army remained threatening. The loss of Krasnogvardeysk led to the collapse of the solid front of the German defense - the "main grouping" of the army (about 14 divisions) retreated from the east, northeast and north to Luga, and the "Western grouping" (about 5-6 divisions), breaking up into separate unrelated among themselves small battle groups, retreated west to Narva.

For this reason, the defense of Luga became a top priority for the German command, which concentrated significant forces in this area (12th tank, 4 infantry divisions, 6 combat groups of infantry divisions and the remnants of 6 divisions and brigades), which made it possible to suspend the offensive of the Soviet troops. However, realizing that it was impossible to hold this line for a long time, the commander of Army Group North, G. von Küchler, on January 30, at a meeting with A. Hitler, asked for permission to withdraw troops to the Panther line, but was refused. A. Hitler believed that it was necessary to keep the "Luga line" and stabilize the front. Since G. von Küchler considered the order impossible, he was dismissed. V. Model was appointed the new commander of Army Group North.

The course of hostilities, February 1-15, 1944

The offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts on Luga

In early February, the troops of the two fronts continued the offensive. The Leningrad Front struck with the forces of the 2nd shock and 42nd armies on Narva, and with the forces of the 67th army - on Luga from the north and northwest. The main task of the Volkhov Front still remained the capture of Luga, which was attacked by the 59th and 8th armies from the east, and the 54th from the northeast. In addition, the 1st Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front was included in the front on February 2.

The commander of the Leningrad Front, L. A. Govorov, believed that the main efforts should be concentrated on the Narva direction, since this would allow the liberation of Estonia to begin immediately. However, fierce battles in the Luga region forced the command of the Leningrad Front on February 1 to slightly change the task of the 2nd Army, which now had to, advancing in the direction of Gdov - Pskov, bypass Luga from the west and cut off enemy communications.

The offensive of the 42nd Army, continued in early February, developed successfully. The formations of the army, practically without resistance, advanced significantly, liberated Lyady, Sara-Gora, Gdov, and on February 4 reached the coast of Lake Peipsi. From these positions, the army had to perform a detour maneuver, take Plyussa, Struga Krasnye, cut the Luga-Pskov road and, together with the 67th Army, destroy the Luga enemy grouping.

The successful offensive of the 42nd Army west of Luga again endangered the encirclement of a significant part of the forces of the 18th German Army. Understanding this, the commander of the Army Group "North" V. Model ordered the 18th Army to keep communications between Luga and Pskov at any cost. To accomplish this task, all available forces and reserves were assembled, including those from the 16th Army.

The German troops failed to fully implement the planned plan, but during the fierce battles that ensued, they managed to slow down the offensive of the 42nd Army and keep communications on the Luga-Pskov line.

At this time, the troops of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, as well as the troops of the 54th, 59th and 8th armies of the Volkhov Fronts, continued their offensive on Luga. In addition, the 1st Shock Army was tasked with breaking through the enemy defenses south of Staraya Russa, linking up with the troops of the 8th Army and encircling part of the forces of the 16th German Army southwest of Lake Ilmen.

The offensive of the Soviet troops on Luga continued to develop with great difficulty - the enemy put up fierce resistance and made constant counterattacks. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops did not succeed in encircling the German troops either in the Luga area or in the area southwest of Lake Ilmen, the main forces of the 18th Army were put in a critical situation. In the current situation, V. Model was forced to give an order to his troops to begin a retreat from Luga towards Pskov.

On February 12, Luga was finally taken by units of the 67th and 59th armies. After the completion of the battles for the city of Luga, on February 13, 1944, the Volkhov Front was disbanded by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220023. The 54th, 59th and 8th Armies were transferred to the Leningrad Front, the 1st Shock Army was transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front. Front management was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The offensive of the 2nd shock army on Narva

On the night of February 1, units of the 109th Rifle Corps (transferred to the 2nd Shock Army from the 42nd Army), with the support of the 152nd Tank Brigade, after artillery preparation, attacked and, thanks to a skillful detour, stormed Kingisepp. Despite the fact that the German troops failed to organize a defense along the Luga River, the rearguard detachments managed to slow down the advance of the Soviet troops with the stubborn defense of Kingisepp, which allowed the main forces of the 54th Army Corps and the 3rd SS Panzer Corps to take up a strong defense along the western bank of the Narva River .

Pursuing the retreating enemy, two corps of the 2nd shock army by February 3 reached the Narva River. The 43rd Rifle Corps crossed the river north of the city of Narva and occupied two bridgeheads on its opposite bank, and the 122nd Rifle Corps, having crossed the river, captured two bridgeheads south of the city. Having beaten off all the enemy counterattacks, the Soviet units firmly entrenched themselves in the bridgeheads. However, the German troops, who received the Feldherrnhalle Panzer-Grenadier Division from the Army Group Center and one regiment of the 58th Infantry Division to strengthen the defense in this area, managed to hold the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Narva River near Ivangorod .

On February 11, the troops of the 2nd shock army launched a large-scale offensive with the aim of expanding the bridgeheads on the western bank of the Narva River, reaching the line of Iyhvi - Atsalam - Kaupsi and subsequent offensive in the direction of Rakvere. The formations of the army were reinforced by the 30th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, to support the main attack, it was planned to land troops from the 115th and 260th marine brigades northwest of Narva with the forces of the Baltic Fleet.

The German high command considered Narva "the gateway to Germany" and attached great importance to this section of the front. For this reason, the German troops, united under a single command in the Sponheimer Task Force (named after the commander of the 54th Army Corps, Otto Sponheimer), were preparing to defend the line on the Narva River to the last opportunity.

For several days of fierce fighting, Soviet troops managed to achieve only local successes. Parts of the 43rd Rifle Corps, striking northwest of Narva, managed to move forward 2 kilometers on a 4-kilometer front. Further advance was halted by stubborn resistance from the 227th Infantry Division and the SS Netherlands Brigade. To the south-west of the city, units of the 109th and 122nd rifle corps were advancing, which together managed to advance up to 12 kilometers, but could not achieve more. The German units of the 17th Infantry Division, the Feldherrnhalle Panzergrenadier Division and the Norland SS Division managed to stop the advance of the Soviet troops in this direction as well. The offensive of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps developed more successfully, parts of which by February 17 cut the railroad and the Narva-Jyhvi highway and took Auvere by storm. However, here, too, stubborn resistance and constant enemy counterattacks forced the Soviet troops to suspend the offensive.

The attempt to land troops north of Auvere on the night of February 13-14 (Merikula landing) ended tragically. Only about 450 people managed to land on the shore. Finding themselves without communication and fire support, a small landing force was surrounded and after 4 days almost completely destroyed - the few survivors managed to get through to their own.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command was extremely dissatisfied with the failure near Narva. On February 14, by directive No. 220025, the commander of the Leningrad Front was ordered to take the city of Narva no later than February 17, 1944, since "this is required by the situation, both military and political."

Having received reinforcements from the 124th rifle corps from the front reserve and regrouping forces, the troops of the 2nd shock army again went on the offensive. Fierce fighting continued until the end of February, but the Soviet troops only managed to expand the bridgehead south of Narva to 35 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep. It was not possible to completely crack the German defenses and achieve decisive success. The German units of the Sponheimer Task Force (since February 23 - the Narva Task Force under the command of J. Frisner) managed to repel all the attacks of the Soviet troops.

At the end of February, in addition to the 2nd shock army, the commander of the Leningrad Front, with the permission of the Supreme Command Headquarters, transferred the 8th and 59th armies to the Narva direction. On February 22, by directive No. 220035, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task, by concentrating the grouping in 9 rifle corps, to go on the offensive again, crack the German defenses in the Narva region and develop the offensive with one army on Pärnu, and with two armies - to the south in the direction of Viljandi - Valga - Tartu - Vyra.

The offensive of the 2nd Baltic Front

At the end of January, the three armies of the 2nd Baltic Front were tasked with defeating the enemy grouping in the Novosokolniki region and reaching the line east of the lakes Uscho - Ale - Bolshoi Elm. If successful, the Soviet troops, bypassing Pustoshka and Idritsa, were able to continue the offensive on Opochka.

The main blow was delivered by the 10th Guards Army in the Shisherino - Antonovo sector (south of the Novosokolniki - Maevo highway). On the right flank of the general offensive in the direction of Maevo, the 6th Guards Army advanced, and on the left flank, south of Nasva, towards units of the 10th Guards Army, units of the 22nd Army.

Soviet troops had absolute superiority over the enemy in manpower and firepower. So, for example, the 10th Guards Army, which consisted of 14 rifle divisions and a large number of tank and artillery units, was opposed by parts of the 83rd and 23rd German infantry divisions and several separate battalions. However, the German troops were able to organize a solid defense, the basis of which was a well-organized system of resistance centers in settlements and on the heights dominating the area.

On the morning of January 31, after artillery preparation on a narrow sector of the front, only 7.5 kilometers wide, units of three rifle corps of the 10th Guards Army went on the offensive. On the first day of the offensive, the first line of enemy defense was broken through throughout, and units of the 15th Guards Rifle Corps, moving forward 6 kilometers, reached the Novosokolniki-Mayevo highway. In the following days, the offensive of the units of the 10th Guards Army developed less successfully, largely due to the fact that the 6th Guards Army, operating on the right, failed to achieve any significant success. Only on February 7, having introduced the second echelon into battle, units of the 15th Guards Rifle Corps managed to build on their success and connect with units of the 22nd Army in the area of ​​the Minkino state farm. Fearing encirclement, the German troops were forced to hastily leave their positions in the Novosokolniki ledge area.

According to the commander of the 10th Guards Army M. I. Kazakov, the further offensive according to the previous plan was futile, since the German troops, having received significant reinforcements, firmly occupied new defensive lines. However, the front commander M. M. Popov insisted on continuing the operation. Having concentrated the main forces in the Shetkovo area, on February 11, units of the 10th Guards Army continued their offensive in a northwestern direction. In the following days, Struga, Veshnaya, Ivanovo and other settlements were liberated, but the offensive did not develop further and was stopped on February 16. Thus, in the first half of February, the main forces of the 2nd Baltic Front, advancing 15-20 kilometers and, having liberated the city of Novosokolniki, reached the Nasva-Maevo line.

The course of hostilities, February 16 - March 1, 1944

The offensive of the Leningrad Front on Pskov and Ostrov

After the fall of the Luga line, the main forces of the 18th German Army began to retreat in the direction of Pskov. Since, for this reason, there was a threat of Soviet troops entering the flank and rear of the 16th Army, V. Model was forced to give the order to begin a general retreat to the Panther line. For an organized retreat, units of the 18th Army were supposed to hold the line of Pskov Lake - Strugi Krasnye - Shimsk for some time, and only after the withdrawal of units of the 16th Army to the west gradually retreat to Pskov and Ostrov. The task of securing the flanks at the junction of the two armies was assigned to the Frisner Task Force.

A particularly great threat to the German troops was the continued offensive of the 42nd Army, the 123rd Rifle Corps of which advanced on Pskov, and the 116th on Plyussa and Strugi Krasnye. At the same time, the 108th Corps remained on the eastern shore of Lake Pskov to protect the right flank of the army. However, the offensive of the 42nd Army in different directions and on a wide sector of the front led to the dispersal of forces, which allowed the German units of the 126th Infantry, 12th Tank and 9th Airfield Divisions to contain the Soviet offensive at the line of the Lochkina River - Lyubotezh - Gridino. Moreover, on February 16, units of the 11th Infantry Division and the Krocher Task Force managed to drive out the 129th, 90th Rifle Divisions and the 5th Ski Brigade from the bridgehead on the western shore of Lake Peipus.

In the current situation, the 116th Rifle Corps, which separated more than 40 kilometers from the main forces of the 42nd Army, was transferred to the 67th Army, which was advancing along the Luga-Pskov railway. Formations of the 67th Army, albeit slowly, but stubbornly moved forward, overcoming the resistance of the 24th Infantry, 12th and 13th airfield divisions of the 28th Army Corps. On February 18, the 46th Rifle Division, together with the 9th and 6th partisan brigades, after several days of fierce fighting, liberated Plyussa, and on February 23, units of the 67th Army, together with the 6th and 11th partisan brigades, captured the district center of Strugi Krasnye.

On February 22, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive No. 220035, set the task for the three armies of the left wing of the Leningrad Front to force the Velikaya River and capture Ostrov, and then develop an offensive against Riga.

After the capture of Struga Krasny, the last intermediate line of defense of the 18th Army in front of the Panther line was broken through and the German troops were forced to accelerate their retreat to Pskov and Ostrov.

Continuing the offensive, the units of the 67th Army advanced 90 kilometers by the end of February, crossed the Cheryokha River, cut the Pskov-Opochka railway and reached the northeastern and eastern edge of the German defense of the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area.

At the same time, pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the 42nd Army liberated Seredka on February 24 and on February 29 reached the main defensive line of the enemy's Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area, where they were forced to suspend the offensive.

In connection with the retreat of the 16th Army, the fighting at the junction of the two German armies in the area west of Lake Ilmen acquired special significance. The 8th and 54th armies operated in this area. The troops of the 54th Army were tasked with reaching the line Utorgosh - Soltsy - Shimsk no later than February 19, and the 8th Army was tasked with cutting the Medved - Nikolaevo road. The common goal of the two armies was to establish contact with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front as quickly as possible and prevent the organized retreat of the 16th Army.

The German units of the Frisner Task Force, operating at the junction of the two armies and covering the withdrawal of units of the 16th Army, put up stubborn resistance for several days. Thus, the 28th Jaeger Division held back the offensive of the 8th Army in the area of ​​Bolshoy Utorgosh - Nikolaevo for five days, units of the 10th Army Corps held back the offensive of the 54th Army on the Shelon and Mshaga rivers for three days. Only after several days of fierce fighting did the Soviet units force the enemy to retreat to the west.

Chasing the hastily retreating enemy, on February 24, units of the 54th Army, uniting with the troops of the 1st Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front, after two days of fierce fighting, captured the city of Dno, and on February 26 they liberated the city of Porkhov. Developing the offensive, units of the army in the next three days advanced another 65 kilometers and reached the eastern part of the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area.

The offensive of the 2nd Baltic Front

By mid-February, the most favorable situation had been created for the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front. The fall of the "Luga line" and the advance of the troops of the Leningrad Front to Pskov and Ostrov created a real threat to the left flank and rear of the 16th Army.

Given the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to undertake a large-scale operation with the forces of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts at the junction of Army Groups North and Center. The 2nd Baltic Front was tasked with delivering the main blow in the Opochka-Zilupe direction, and then, advancing on Karsava, defeat the enemy's island grouping together with the left wing of the Leningrad Front.

According to the offensive plan, the 3rd shock and 10th guards armies were to deliver the main blow of the front, and the 1st shock and 22nd armies were tasked with pinning down enemy forces in secondary sectors. However, the retreat of the 16th German army forced the Soviet troops to go on the offensive ahead of schedule. On February 18, having belatedly discovered the withdrawal of enemy troops, units of the 1st shock in the area of ​​​​Staraya Russa went on the offensive, and a day later - the 22nd army in the area of ​​Kholm. The rest of the armies, which had not yet completed the regrouping, joined the offensive later.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, units of the 1st Shock Army liberated Staraya Russa and, having established an elbow connection with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, continued the offensive and took Dno on February 24, and Novorzhev on February 29. At the same time, units of the 22nd Army liberated Kholm on February 21, and Dedovichi on February 25.

On February 26, part of the forces of the 10th Guards and 3rd Shock Armies joined the offensive, which, moving forward up to 18 kilometers, liberated Pustoshka, but could not achieve more.

Thus, by the beginning of March, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front reached the Panther line. In total, in the second half of February, the 1st Shock Army advanced 180 kilometers from Staraya Russa to the Velikaya River, the 22nd Army - 125 kilometers from Kholm to Novorzhev, and parts of the 10th Guards and 3rd Shock Army - 30 kilometers from Mayev to Pustoshka. However, the German troops of the 16th Army, having managed to withdraw most of the manpower and equipment from under attack, took up a strong defense at the Ostrov - Pushkinskie Gory - Idritsa line and stopped the further advance of the Soviet armies.

The position of the parties at the beginning of March 1944

By the beginning of March 1944, the Soviet troops of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts reached the line Narva - Lake Peipus - Pskov - Ostrov - Idritsa. Having pulled all available forces to the Panther line, parts of the German 16th and 18th armies took up a strong defense and intended to stop the Soviet offensive into the Baltic states.

March 1, 1944 is considered the day of the end of the entire Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation, since, as is often stated, the Soviet troops by this day, by order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, went over to the defensive at the achieved lines. However, the troops of the two Soviet fronts continued the offensive without an operational pause. In the official historiography, only the "Pskov offensive operation" (March 9 - April 15, 1944) of the Leningrad Front was noted, which was carried out by the forces of the 42nd, 67th, 54th and 13th air armies (total number of 173,120 people) from the goal of liberating Pskov and Ostrov. The operations of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, parts of which tried to break through the Panther line at the Ostrov-Idritsa line in March-April, and the Leningrad Front (2nd shock, 8th and 59th armies) in the Narva region in the list of front-line transactions are not marked.

It can be argued that the Soviet command, not having complete information about the power of the Panther line, expected to immediately break through the German defenses and continue the offensive into the Baltic states. However, by the beginning of March, the Soviet troops, after almost two months of continuous offensive, were in dire need of rest and replenishment. For example, in many rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front, by this time the number had been reduced to 2500-3500 people. The chief of staff of the 2nd Baltic Front, L.M. Sandalov, in his memoirs noted the following result of the unsuccessful military operations of the Soviet troops in March - April:

The course of hostilities, March - April 1944

The fighting of the Leningrad Front in the Narva region

Having not achieved success in the Narva direction in the second half of February, the troops of the Leningrad Front suspended hostilities. However, the Soviet command was not going to abandon the original plans and, after regrouping forces and means, they intended to continue the offensive, break through the enemy defenses between Lake Peipsi and the Gulf of Finland and develop an offensive into Estonia. It was planned to start the operation with the forces of the 2nd shock army on February 25, and on February 28 to strike with the forces of the 59th army. Then, in order to develop the initial success, it was supposed to bring into battle units of the 8th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, which was transferred from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Since the 59th and 8th armies did not have time to complete their concentration by the scheduled date, a new offensive began only on March 1. Units of the 2nd shock army went on the offensive, from the eastern front of the "Auvere bridgehead" in the direction of Narva, and units of the 59th armies, striking with the forces of the 43rd and 109th rifle corps in the direction of the Narva-Tallinn railway in order to exit in the rear of the entire enemy Narva grouping.

Artillery support for the offensive was insufficient and the Soviet units were met with heavy enemy fire. The offensive stalled, and after a few days of fierce fighting, it was suspended in the offensive zone of the 2nd shock army. At the same time, the 59th Army continued its attempts to break through the enemy defenses, but was unable to achieve significant success. Moreover, on the night of March 7, German troops liquidated the bridgehead north of Narva near the village of Vepskylä, which was defended by the 378th rifle division and the 34th artillery and machine-gun battalion. The last Soviet foothold north of Narva was thus lost.

On March 18, having received reinforcements from the 6th Rifle Corps from the 8th Army, the 2nd Shock Army again went on the offensive. The only significant success was achieved by the 256th Rifle Division, which managed to cut the strategically important railway to Tallinn west of Narva. In other areas, significant results were not achieved.

On March 24, the front commander, L. A. Govorov, requested permission from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to suspend the offensive for 3-4 weeks in order to carefully prepare a new operation. At this time, the German command, concerned about the next Soviet offensive, decided to launch a counterattack and completely dislodge the Soviet troops from the western bank of the Narva River.

On March 26, the Narva task force, with the forces of the 227th, 11th, 170th and 58th infantry divisions, suddenly went on the offensive. Fierce battles continued for more than two weeks until April 10-12, and, despite repeated attacks by the enemy, units of the 59th and 2nd shock armies basically held their positions on the Auveres bridgehead southwest of Narva.

On April 19, the 3rd SS Panzer Corps and units of the 54th Army Corps launched a new offensive in order to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead south of Narva in the Auvere area. Units of the 8th Army, which replaced the formations of the 59th Army in this area on April 10, repulsed 17 German attacks only on the first day of the offensive, but still, after five days of fierce fighting, they were forced to leave part of the bridgehead between Auvere - Vanamyisa.

Despite the fact that the German counteroffensive did not achieve its goal, the command of the Leningrad Front was forced to abandon the offensive in the Narva direction for a long time - until July 1944. Moreover, it was decided to create a reserve line of defense along the Luga River.

The commander of the 2nd shock army, I. I. Fedyuninsky, noted in his memoirs, explaining the unsuccessful actions in the battles for Narva:

The offensive of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts on Pskov, Ostrov and Idritsa.

In early March 1944, the 42nd and 67th Armies of the Leningrad Front received an order to "liberate Pskov and Ostrov no later than March 10."

However, the troops of the front failed to complete the task. The fighting, which took on an exceptionally fierce character, continued for several weeks. The commander of the 46th Infantry Division of the 110th Corps of the 67th Army S. N. Borshchev recalled:

On March 1, the 176th and 314th regiments of the division, after a short artillery preparation, went on the offensive. Overcoming the strong resistance of the enemy, repelling counterattacks, they fought literally for every meter of their native land. The settlements of Volkovo, Gorushka-Rodionovo and Letnevo passed several times from hand to hand. For 3 days of stubborn fighting, parts of our division advanced only 10 kilometers and reached the line of the Mnoga River - to the very front edge of the enemy’s heavily fortified, deeply echeloned defense, which he called the “Panther” line.

The Soviet troops managed to achieve the only relative success south of Pskov, where they managed to break through the enemy defenses, move forward 13 kilometers and cut the Pskov-Ostrov railway.

At the end of March, Soviet troops again tried to go on the offensive. So, for example, the 110th Rifle Corps of the 67th Army was tasked with breaking through the defenses in the Dyakovo-Kuznetsovo section, cutting off the railway and highways, crossing the Velikaya River and seizing a bridgehead on its western bank. However, the offensive launched on the night of March 31 again ended without significant results.

Simultaneously with the Leningrad Front in March 1944, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, with the forces of 4 armies, launched an offensive in order to break through the Panther line between Ostrov and Idritsa.

At the end of February, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, pursuing the 16th German Army, tried to immediately break through the German defenses east of Idritsa, but were unsuccessful. On March 3, by decision of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for coordinating the actions of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts, the offensive was suspended.

S. K. Timoshenko and S. M. Shtemenko presented their plan for the further offensive to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, proposing to expand the width of the front of the upcoming offensive. Having made noticeable adjustments to the proposed plan, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front - to reach the left bank of the Velikaya River north of Idritsa and liquidate the Idritsa enemy grouping together with the 1st Baltic Front. The offensive was planned to begin on March 7-8.

Only on March 10, having completed the regrouping and received reinforcements, did the troops of the front resume their offensive. By March 18, the troops of the front managed to advance 7-9 kilometers in two sectors of the front, but they could not achieve more and the offensive was again suspended.

At the end of March, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front again went over to active operations. The greatest success was achieved by formations of the 44th Rifle Corps of the 22nd Army, which on the night of March 26 crossed the Velikaya River northwest of Pushkinskiye Gory and captured the so-called Strezhnevsky bridgehead. By March 26, the 33rd, 26th and 115th rifle divisions managed to expand the bridgehead to 5 kilometers along the front and up to 6 kilometers in depth.

On March 28-29, units of the 10th Guards Army were transferred to the bridgehead, which were tasked with expanding the bridgehead and entering the operational space. Fierce fighting continued until mid-April, but the Soviet troops only managed to expand the Strezhnevsky bridgehead to 8 kilometers along the front.

The commander of the 10th Guards Army M. I. Kazakov recalled:

On April 18, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by its directive, ordered "in view of the unsuccessful offensive" the 2nd Baltic Front "to go over to a strong defense in all sectors of the front." On the same day, recognizing the fallacy of the decision to disband the Volkhov Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by its directive, divided the Leningrad Front into two parts. The 2nd shock, 59th, 8th (on the Narva direction) and 23rd army (on the Karelian Isthmus) remained in the Leningrad Front, and the 42nd, 67th and the 54th Army, operating in the Pskov-Ostrov direction. On April 19, these two fronts were ordered to go on the defensive. The troops of all three fronts were ordered to prepare a defense in depth of at least three lines with a depth of 30-40 kilometers.

Operation results

During the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, the troops of three Soviet fronts inflicted a heavy defeat on the German 18th and 16th armies, pushing the enemy 220-280 kilometers from Leningrad, and 180 kilometers south of Lake Ilmen.

In January, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, having knocked out the enemy from positions that he had occupied for more than two years, completely liberated Leningrad from the enemy blockade. Continuing the offensive, the Soviet troops forced the enemy to retreat to the Panther line. Thus, almost the entire Leningrad region and the western part of the Kalinin region were cleared of the enemy. Many cities and towns were liberated, including Novgorod, Gatchina, Chudovo, Lyuban, Tosno, Luga, Kingisepp, Gdov, Porkhov, Staraya Russa, Novorzhev.

The main reasons for the success of the Soviet troops in January-February 1944 were the careful preparation of the operation, the sufficient concentration of forces and means, especially in the directions of the main attack, and the well-developed interaction of infantry, artillery, tank units and aviation.

At the same time, the 18th and 16th German armies, despite the heavy defeat and heavy losses, were not defeated. The German troops managed to avoid encirclement and retreated in an organized manner to previously prepared positions, retaining a significant part of their combat potential. This made it possible to stop the Soviet offensive on the Panther line. Attempts made by the Soviet troops in March-April to break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses ended almost to no avail. Thus, the Soviet troops were unable to successfully continue the offensive and solve additional tasks set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - to capture Narva, Pskov, Ostrov, and begin the liberation of Estonia and Latvia. The headquarters of the Supreme Command was especially dissatisfied with the actions of the 2nd Baltic Front. Front commander M. M. Popov was demoted and no longer commanded fronts.

The main reason for this development of events was the exhaustion of the Soviet troops, who by the end of February had been engaged in continuous combat operations in difficult weather conditions in a wooded and swampy area for almost two months and were in dire need of rest and replenishment. In addition, a large number of regroupings and rearrangements had an extremely negative impact on command and control and on the interaction of armies and fronts.

Despite the fact that the final stage of the offensive did not bring the desired result, the victory of the Soviet troops in the entire Leningrad-Novgorod operation was unconditional and was of great importance.

A German historian, and during the Second World War - a general of the Wehrmacht, K. Tippelskirch noted:

Losses

USSR

According to the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century", the total losses of Soviet troops in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation amounted to 313953 people (irretrievable losses - 76686, and sanitary - 237267). At the same time, the losses of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet for the entire period of the operation amounted to 227440 and 1461 people, respectively (of which irretrievable losses were 56564 and 169), the Volkhov Front from 14.01. to 15.02. - 50300 (of which irretrievable losses - 12011), 2nd Baltic Front from 10.02. until 01.03. - 29710 people (of which irretrievable losses - 6659), the 1st shock army from 14.01. to 10.02. - 5042 people (of which irretrievable losses - 1283). In addition, the Soviet troops during the operation lost 462 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1832 guns and mortars, 260 combat aircraft.

The figures given, apparently, are not complete and the losses of the Soviet troops during the operation were more significant. For example, the above figures take into account the losses of the 2nd Baltic Front only from February 10, although in January the troops of the front fought fierce battles against units of the 16th German Army and only the 10th Guards Army lost about 9,000 people.

In addition, according to the “report on the Novgorod-Luga operation” compiled by the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, the losses of units of this front for the period from January 14 to February 11, 1944 (including the losses of the 1st shock army from February 1 to February 10) were more than significant in comparison with those indicated above, and amounted to 62,733 people (of which 16,542 were irretrievable losses).

The exact data on the losses of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts in the hostilities in March - April 1944 are unknown, since the statistical study "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century" shows only the losses of the Leningrad Front in the "Pskov offensive operation" - 42133 people ( 10453 of them are irretrievable losses). According to the historian G. A. Shigin, in the battles for Pskov, Ostrov and Idritsa in March - April, Soviet troops of two fronts lost 110,000-120,000 people (irretrievable losses - about 30,000), and according to the American historian D. Glantz - about 200,000 killed and wounded (including losses in the battles for Narva).

Germany

The losses of the Army Group "North" during the Leningrad-Novgorod operation can only be estimated approximately. Since at the beginning of 1944 the German troops, waging heavy defensive battles, hastily retreated to the west, the accounting of losses by the headquarters of the 18th and 16th German armies was carried out sporadically. However, it can be argued that the losses of the German troops were very significant. For example, by January 29, the 18th Army had lost 14,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. According to the Russian historian A.V. Isaev, only the total losses of the 18th Army during the period of the Soviet operation to lift the blockade of Leningrad amounted to 66,000 people.

According to Soviet data, 3 German divisions were completely destroyed during the operation, and 26 were defeated. In just a month of fighting, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts destroyed 90,000 enemy soldiers and officers, and captured 7,200 people.

Chronicle of the battle

On July 10, the direct offensive of German troops on Leningrad began. For the defense of the city, the Luga Operational Group of Forces was formed.

The enemy had superiority: in infantry - 2.4 times, guns - 4 times, mortars - 5.8 times, tanks - 1.2 times, aircraft - 9.8 times.

At the end of July, the Germans reached the line of the rivers Narva, Luga, Mshaga.

On November 20, the bread ration was cut to 250 grams for workers and 125 grams for employees, dependents and children. Hunger has begun.

In January-April, our troops launched offensives in the Luban direction, and in August-September in the Sinyavinsky direction. It was not possible to break the blockade, but preparations for a new assault on the city by the enemy were thwarted.

On January 12, Operation Iskra began. Soviet troops crossed the Neva on the ice and launched an offensive in the direction of the village of Maryino.

On January 13, the distance between the advancing Leningrad and Volkhov fronts was reduced to 5 kilometers.

On January 18, Soviet troops united in the area of ​​Workers' settlements No. 1 and No. 5. The blockade of Leningrad was broken. On this day, the city of Shlisselburg was liberated. The enemy was driven back from Lake Ladoga by 11 kilometers. Soon a railway and a highway were laid along this corridor.

By the beginning of the year, on a huge arc from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ilmen, the Germans created a defense system in depth, called the Northern Wall. The Soviet command decided to conduct an operation to defeat the enemy in the region of Leningrad and Novgorod and finally lift the blockade of Leningrad.

The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were to defeat the 18th German army with simultaneous strikes and, having developed an offensive in the direction of the Baltic states, completely remove the blockade of the city on the Neva.

The Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation took place in three stages.

The first stage from January 14 to 30 is the defeat of the flanks of the 18th German Army and the development of the offensive along the entire front.

The second stage from January 31 to February 15 is the development of the offensive in the Narva and Luga directions, the defeat of the enemy's Luga grouping.

The third stage from February 15 to March 1 is the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Pskov and Ostrovsky directions and the completion of the defeat of the main forces of the Nazi 18th Army.

On January 14, the offensive began on the Leningrad Front. After a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army went on the offensive from the Oranienbaum bridgehead. On this day, the artillery destroyed the most durable defensive structures of the enemy. As a result, the Nazis suffered significant losses, their fire and control systems were violated. But our aviation was little used due to bad weather.

During the first two days of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army broke through the main enemy defense line south of Oranienbaum and advanced 6 km. Troops of the 42nd Army - 4 km south of Pulkovo.

On January 17, mobile groups (two reinforced tank brigades) were introduced into the battle. The command of the 18th German army, having used up all the reserves, is forced to begin the withdrawal of its troops.

On January 19, Soviet troops liberated Ropsha and Krasnoye Selo. By the end of the day, the encirclement of the remnants of the defeated enemy grouping was completed.

On the night of January 21, the troops of the 67th Army went on the offensive, pursuing the enemy, who had begun the withdrawal of troops from the Mginsky salient. On the same day, the city and the large Mga railway junction were liberated. Building on the success achieved, the armies of the Leningrad Front began advancing on Kingisepp and Gatchina.

Veliky Novgorod was abandoned by the Soviet troops on August 19, 1941. The path to the desired victory was long and difficult. The German occupation lasted 883 days. The most important part of the strategic Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation was the Novgorod-Luga operation, which began on January 14. It was carried out by the Volkhov Front in full force and part of the forces of the Leningrad Front. On January 20, 1944, soldiers of the Red Army hoisted a red banner on the ancient Kremlin wall of Novgorod. A salute was given in the Soviet capital in honor of the liberation of the ancient Russian city.

On January 14, 1944, simultaneously with the troops of the Leningrad Front, the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive. Thus began the Novgorod-Luga offensive operation. The 59th Army under the command of Ivan Korovnikov received the task of defeating the German group in the Novgorod region, liberating Novgorod and the October Railway. The army struck with the forces of two groups in directions converging on Ljubolyady. The main forces were advancing from the bridgehead on the left bank of the Volkhov, 30 kilometers north of Novgorod, the auxiliary forces were advancing in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen, south of Novgorod. In the future, after the liberation of Novgorod, it was planned to develop success in the western and south-western directions, capture the city of Luga and cut off the escape routes of the Nazis towards Pskov. The 8th and 54th armies of the Volkhov Front were supposed to distract the enemy in the Tosno and Luban directions so that the Germans could not transfer them to the aid of the Novgorod group.

The Soviet troops were opposed by units of the 38th, 26th and 28th army corps of the 18th German army (6 infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades, 3 airfield divisions). The Germans relied on a network of strong centers of resistance, among which Novgorod, Chudovo, Lyuban, Tosno, Mga and Luga stood out in particular. In the direction of the main attack of the Red Army, the Germans had two defensive lines: the main one along the Novgorod-Chudovo highway, the second one along the Kerest River. In addition, the city itself was defended by three defensive lines. In Novgorod itself, many stone buildings were turned into long-term firing points.

German tank PzKpfw IV moving into position, Army Group North, February 1944

The Volkhov front at the beginning of the operation consisted of about 298 thousand people (according to other sources, about 260 thousand people). The 59th Army, which played the main role in the offensive, numbered about 135 thousand people, the 8th Army - 45 thousand people, the 54th Army - 67 thousand people, the 14th Air Army - more than 16 thousand people, more than 33 thousand people were in front-line formations. The VF had 3,633 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 257 aircraft.

On the first day of the offensive, the 59th army of Korovnikov did not achieve noticeable success. The Germans, relying on powerful defenses, desperately fought back. In addition, snowfall and a blizzard ruled out aviation support, and made artillery assistance ineffective. Armored vehicles were stopped by swamps. Soviet troops advanced only 600-1000 meters. The auxiliary, "southern group" of the 59th Army under the command of Major General T. A. Sviklin advanced more successfully. Soviet soldiers were able to cross the ice of Lake Ilmen at night and, with a surprise attack, captured a number of enemy strongholds and occupied a bridgehead.

The German command, fearing the encirclement of the Novgorod group, sent additional forces to this area (parts of the 290th and 24th infantry divisions, and the Nord cavalry regiment).

The commander of the 59th Army, in order to strengthen the force of the strikes, introduced additional forces from the second echelon in the northern and southern directions. As a result of fierce fighting on January 15-16, the Red Army broke through the enemy's main line of defense. The railway Novgorod - Chudovo was cut. In the following days, the troops of the 59th Army continued their slow advance. On January 18, the southern group cut the highway and the Novgorod-Shimsk railway. Parts of the northern group on January 20 reached the Novgorod-Batetsky railway. The resistance of the German troops was strong, so the pace of the offensive was low - 5-6 km per day. It is also necessary to take into account the off-road factor and the wooded and swampy terrain. This did not allow to carry out the encirclement of the Novgorod grouping of the enemy in a short time. The German command retained the ability to maneuver reserves and transfer troops from unattacked sectors of the front.

The German command, trying to rectify the situation, transferred new troops - parts of the 21st, 121st Infantry and 8th Jaeger divisions and some other units. However, the situation could not be saved. To avoid the encirclement of parts of the 38th Army Corps, the commander of the 18th Army Lindeman gave the order to leave Novgorod. The Germans, leaving heavy weapons, retreated towards Batetsky. On the morning of January 20, Soviet troops occupied Novgorod without a fight.

The Novgorod group - formations of the 28th Jaeger, 1st airfield divisions and the SS cavalry regiment "Nord", could not leave. Two groupings of the 59th Soviet Army have already joined. Having repelled all attempts to break out of the encirclement, as well as German attacks from outside the ring, units of Korovnikov's army, together with the 7th rifle corps from the front reserve, destroyed scattered enemy groups in the forests west of Novgorod. About 3 thousand Germans were taken prisoner.

On January 16, 1944, the 54th Army under the command of Sergei Roginsky went on the offensive in the Chudovo-Lyuban direction. She pinned down parts of the 26th and 28th German army corps. For several days there were fierce battles. Roginsky's army was able to advance only 5 km. The German command ordered to keep the Chudovo and Lyubani area at any cost, since important communications passed here - the October railway and the Leningrad-Moscow highway. The Mginskaya group retreated to this area, the intermediate line of defense "Autobahn" passed here.

On January 21, the 8th Army of the Volkhov Front liberated Mga. The retreat of the German troops from the Mginsk-Sinyavino ledge forced the Soviet command to adjust their plans. The 67th Army of the Leningrad Front and the troops of the Volkhov Front received the task of liberating the area of ​​the October Railway and Krasnogvardeysk. On January 22, the Military Council of the VF submitted a plan for the development of the operation to the Headquarters. Parts of the 59th Army were to liberate Luga, and the troops of the 8th and 54th armies were to liberate the Tosno and Lyuban region. He reinforced the 54th Army with units of the 8th and 67th armies and front reserves. Fierce fighting went on for several days. Only on January 26 did the Soviet troops take Tosno, on January 28 they liberated Lyuban and on January 29 Chudovo. The October Railway and the Leningrad Highway were cleared of the enemy.

By the end of January, the troops of the Volkhov Front, having overcome 60-100 km with heavy fighting, reached the Luga River. However, the German command was able to quickly strengthen its forces in the Luga area and gain a foothold on a previously prepared line. The Germans also transferred the 12th Panzer Division here.

On January 31, units of the 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front crossed Luga and began the assault on Kingisepp. On February 1, Kingisepp was released. Developing success, the army captured small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Narva. By January 27, 1944, the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front reached the Luga line. Having crossed the river, the army took Gdov on February 4 and went to Lake Peipus.

The main task of the Volkhov Front still remained the liberation of the city of Luga. The 59th and 8th armies attacked the city from the east, and the 54th army from the northeast. The offensive of the Soviet troops on Luga developed slowly. The German command gathered in the region of Pskov and Luga all available forces and reserves of the 18th and 16th armies. The commander of Army Group North, Walter Model, gave the order to hold the area at all costs. Model was appointed commander of Army Group North on 31 January, replacing Georg von Küchler, who began a general retreat despite Adolf Hitler's express ban. As a result, Soviet troops were able to liberate Luga only on February 12.

Due to the fact that the troops of the Volkhov Front could not solve the problem of capturing the Luga node of enemy resistance, the front was disbanded. On February 13, 1944, the Stavka transferred the 54th, 59th and 8th armies to the Leningrad Front, the 1st shock army (it was part of the VF from February 2 to 15) - to the 2nd Baltic Front. The Front Office was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Thus, in the course of the Novgorod-Luga operation, the Soviet troops won a victory, which to a large extent predetermined the success of the entire Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation (the first "Stalinist strike"). By February 15, the troops of the Volkhov Front, and the army of the LF, pushed the enemy back 50-120 km and reached the southern coast of Lake Peipsi. 779 cities and towns were liberated, including Novgorod and Luga. Of great importance was the liberation of such strategic communications as the Oktyabrskaya railway and the Leningrad highway.

German troops were unable to cling to the Luga line, establishing a new front line between the Ilmenskoye and Peipsi lakes. The German command had to withdraw troops to the Panther line of defense.

But the offensive of the Red Army did not develop as rapidly as originally planned. It was not possible to capture Luga in a short time and only by the forces of the VF. To solve this problem, the forces of the 42nd and 67th armies of the Leningrad Front had to be involved. This weakened the onslaught of the Leningrad Front in the Narva region. Therefore, although the German 18th Army was defeated, it still was not completely defeated and retained its combat capability. As a result, this did not allow the Soviet armies to defeat the main forces of Army Group North by the spring of 1944, break through the Panther line and proceed to the liberation of Estonia and Latvia.

Destruction of Novgorod

During the occupation, the Nazis almost completely destroyed the city. Only 40 of the 2,346 residential buildings that existed in Novgorod before the war remained. Almost all industrial enterprises were destroyed, including a foundry, mechanical, ship repair, two brick tiling plants and a sawmill. A shipyard, a railway depot, a meat processing plant, a bread processing plant, a shoe and furniture factory were also destroyed. The Nazis destroyed the city's infrastructure: water supply, water pressure and water pumping stations, telephone exchange, post office, telegraph, radio center and electrical facilities. The Germans struck at scientific, educational and cultural institutions. Before the war, Veliky Novgorod was a major Soviet scientific and cultural center. The Nazis destroyed the museum building and its art gallery; they robbed a scientific library, a photo library containing the rarest data, and a bibliographic card index of a branch of the Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; they burned down a pedagogical institute, technical schools, a pedagogical college, medical schools, 3 hospitals, a maternity hospital, a children's clinic, the main building of a psychiatric hospital, the House of the Red Army, the city theater, 2 cinemas, 5 clubs, etc. According to the data of the Extraordinary Commission on the atrocities of the fascist invaders, material damage to the city amounted to more than 11 billion rubles.

The painting "The Flight of the Nazis from Novgorod", Kukryniksy, 1944-1946.

Many unique sights and monuments were completely destroyed or badly damaged. From the Novgorod museum, which was not evacuated in time, the most valuable collections on the history of archeology and art were plundered. The destruction and losses were so great that they became an irreparable loss of part of the Russian national culture. St. George's Cathedral, built at the beginning of the 12th century, was badly damaged. Sophia Cathedral, built in the 11th century and being one of the oldest monuments of Russian architecture, a treasure of Russian culture, which had frescoes and icons of the 12th century, was destroyed. The interior of the cathedral was looted. The Church of the Annunciation on Arkazh of the XII century, with frescoes of the same century, was turned into a pillbox and barracks. The church was badly damaged. The Church of the Assumption on the Volotovo field, a monument of northern Russian architecture of the XIV-XV centuries, was turned into a pile of rubble. The Church of the Transfiguration on Ilyina Street, a monument of Novgorod architecture of the 14th century, also known for its painting by the great master Theophan the Greek, was badly damaged. Most of the frescoes were destroyed, and the rest were damaged. The Church of the Savior-Nereditsa, a monument of ancient Russian art of the 12th century, famous for Byzantine and Russian painting, was barbarously destroyed. The Novgorod Kremlin, its towers and internal structures were badly damaged. By order of the commander of the 18th German Army, Colonel General Lindemann, the Nazis dismantled and prepared a monument to the 1000th anniversary of Russia for shipment to the German Empire. The monument was dismantled, many unique sculptural images of the most prominent Russian state, military, public and cultural figures were destroyed.

The Soviet government paid special attention to the restoration of Veliky Novgorod. On November 1, 1945, the city was included in the list of fifteen settlements that were subject to priority restoration. Particular attention was paid to the restoration and restoration of historical monuments. One of the first to be restored was the Millennium of Russia monument erected in Veliky Novgorod in 1862 in honor of the millennium of Russian statehood. Already on November 5, 1944, the second solemn opening of the monument took place.

Captured German soldiers on the streets of Leningrad