The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 16, 1997 “On Priority Measures for Reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Improving Their Structure” substantiates the need for military reform and determines the stages, content and timing of military reforms. The military reform is carried out in two stages.

At the first stage(until 2000) there was a noticeable reduction in the number of armed forces. By the end of 1998, it amounted to 1.2 million servicemen. At the same time, the process of optimizing the structure of the combat strength of the Armed Forces was going on. In the second half of 1997, the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), the Military Space Forces (VKS) and the Rocket and Space Defense Forces (RKO) were united. Created qualitatively new Strategic Rocket Forces. Further, in 1998, the Air Force (VVS) and the Air Defense Forces (Air Defense) were merged. Created qualitatively new Air Force. During the reform there were significant changes in Navy, although its overall structure is preserved. Major changes have taken place in ground forces.On the basis of formations and units of the reduced composition and personnel, storage bases for weapons and military equipment (BKhVT) were created. What is important from a mobilization point of view. The military-industrial complex is being reformed. Conditions are being created for the military-technical re-equipment of the army and navy. Through the merger of educational institutions and their transformation, a fundamental reorganization of the military education system.

However, after the completion of the first stage of the military reform, the improvement of the country's military organization slowed down noticeably.

The year 2000 was a turning point in terms of reform. Twice - in August and November - the Security Council considered issues of military development. The system of functioning of the Armed Forces was recognized not only as unbalanced, but inefficient. Solid, serious work has been done, taking into account the forecasts for the development of the Armed Forces and the country's economy. The amounts of funding up to 2010 were determined, broken down by years and items of expenditure. Aircraft construction plan until 2005 ., which is a complex of more than 30 interrelated documents, signed by the President of the Russian Federation.

In the next three to four years, the size of the army and navy will decrease by 365,000 servicemen and 120,000 civilian specialists. However, the reduction of the army and navy will in no way affect the quality of the permanent readiness units. The main task of the transformations is the ability to localize the armed conflict in strategic areas. Since we now have six such directions, and seven military districts, the PriVO and UrVO are planned to be merged into one military district.

The largest structural change will be the transition of the Armed Forces to a three-service basis: the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy - according to the principle of "three elements". And on the basis of the Strategic Missile Forces, two branches of the Armed Forces will be created: the Strategic Missile Forces and the one formed by merging the Military Space Forces with the Missile and Space Defense Forces.

A decision was also made to reduce the so-called military formations of other ministries and departments (including the reduction of military departments at state educational institutions of higher professional education).

It is clear that the reform process will not be limited to these measures. Much will still have to be changed - be it the social sphere, military education or science. However, the first decisive step in the right direction has been taken.

Reference: if in the 1990s the Russian Armed Forces did not emerge from a protracted crisis, then the national armies of the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty and the Union of Independent States (CIS) found themselves in a much more difficult situation. Almost everywhere there is a sharp decline in combat training and the level of combat readiness of troops. Despite the presence of often a significant amount of weapons, only a very small proportion of it is suitable for combat use (with the exception of the Armed Forces of Belarus).

A significant part of the equipment is in storage, and in dismantled form. So, from helicopters of army aviation only a few are able to rise into the air. In parts of the Air Force, serviceable aircraft are less than 30%. Many types of weapons (90%) are obsolete, there are practically no modern types of military equipment in the national armies. The entire fleet of combat vehicles and vehicles does not have batteries. Combat training has become conditional, since at best 5-15% of fuels and lubricants are allocated for the exit of military equipment from the park.

One of the main reasons for this state of affairs is considered to be the weakness and incompetence of the national military elite, the top commanding personnel of the strategic and operational-tactical levels.

Many officers and generals of titular nationalities, hastily promoted to the highest leadership positions in their armies, do not have the necessary service experience and military education, even at the operational-tactical level.

Finally, the new states simply do not have enough funds. If, for example, the entire annual Ukrainian military budget as a whole is enough to maintain only one combat-ready division according to NATO standards, then in the rest of the republics of the former USSR the situation is even worse.

findings:

The heirs of centuries-old military glory - the Russian Armed Forces have a well-founded structure - consist of branches, branches of the armed forces, each of which performs tasks according to its intended purpose. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are equipped with modern, efficient weapons, for the most part superior to analogues of foreign armies.

Changes in the military-political situation, tasks and conditions of the country's military security dictate the need for a comprehensive military reform.

III. FINAL PART ………….. 5 min. 1. Recall the topic, what issues were considered, the objectives of the lesson, how they were achieved. 2.Answer students' questions 3.Announce the final grades for students who were surveyed during the lesson, mark those who excelled, indicate general shortcomings. 4. Announce the topic of the next lesson, the venue. 5. Announcement of the task for self-studying, indicating the literature: a) To study according to the abstract: - the purpose, composition and tasks of the main types of the Armed Forces and the branches of the Ground Forces; - the concept of association, connection, part, subdivision; - the content of the stages of the military reform of the Armed Forces. b) Write in a workbook: - from a slide projector and know by heart the scheme of the composition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; - from the Combat Charter of the SV, part 2 and know by heart the abbreviation of the abbreviations of motorized rifle, tank and artillery units.

If the trainees have no questions, ask 1-2 questions on the topic covered. Pay attention to the fact that the assignment will be checked by a control flight at the next lesson.

stages and main content of the reform
All reforms in the Russian Army took place as a result of the country's major military defeats in the struggle for freedom and independence. Military reforms of Ivan the Terrible at the end of the 17th - beginning of the 18th centuries. were caused by the need to strengthen the Russian army in connection with the creation of a single state and protection from the raids of neighbors. Peter the Great creates a regular army and navy on the basis of recruitment. After powerful defeats from the northern neighbors, after the defeat of Russia from the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. the country is in need of another military reform. After the military defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. the government of Nicholas II made an attempt to carry out another military reform (1905–1912), etc.

The main goal of the latest military reforms is the creation of a highly equipped armed forces with the necessary military deterrence potential.

When planning the reform, the country's leadership took into account the difficult socio-economic situation in Russia, the limited possibilities for financing reform measures.

The entire reform was planned to be implemented in a time period of 8-10 years, which is divided into 2 stages.

At the first stage (1997–2000), it was planned to move from five branches of the Armed Forces to four branches.

The implementation of this stage of reforms took place under the powerful approval of the Western states, which saw their interests in this, the NATO member countries, which allocated money for the disposal (destruction) of Soviet defense and attack systems. In the period 1997-1998, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces were merged. The ground forces were reformed, and the structures of the Navy were streamlined. All this boiled down to the creation of a limited number of combat-ready formations and units, the expansion of the functions and sphere of influence of the remaining, staffed with people and equipped with modern technology.

The first stage of the military reform was completed with the optimization of the entire structure of the Russian Armed Forces.

The second stage of the reform should bring the following results:

- transition to a three-service structure of the Armed Forces;

- creation of multifunctional new types of weapons for strategic, operational and tactical purposes;

- creation of a scientific, technical and technological basis for the rearmament of the Russian Army;

- the transformation of the Military Space Forces into an independent branch of the military.

As a result of the reform, the capabilities of the Armed Forces should increase in fulfilling the tasks of strategic deterrence, preventing and repulsing aggression against Russia and its allies, localizing and neutralizing local conflicts and wars, as well as implementing Russia's international obligations.

To solve these tasks, the Russian Armed Forces must include:

- nuclear deterrence forces (SNF) - to keep nuclear powers from the possible deployment of a nuclear war, as well as other states with powerful conventional weapons from non-nuclear wars;

- forces of non-nuclear deterrence to keep potential aggressor states from unleashing non-nuclear wars;

- mobile forces - for the speedy resolution of military conflicts;

- information forces - to counter a potential adversary in an information war.

These tasks should be solved by the already reformed branches of the Russian Armed Forces.

A radical transformation of the system of international relations, the adoption of a new military doctrine, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, a focus on qualitative parameters in defense construction - these and many other factors dictate the need for military reform in Russia. Therefore, military reform became an imperative of social and political practice in Russia after the end of "cold war". The need for military reform in the Russian Federation is due to geopolitical changes. It is geopolitical features that predetermine the significant scale of transformations that must be carried out in the context of large-scale socio-economic reforms.

The armed forces inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR were created as a means of confrontation in "cold war" and in many ways do not meet the requirements for modern armed forces. The Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for local and ethnic conflicts, the weak technical equipment of the Russian army, the insufficient professionalism of soldiers and officers are affecting. One of the main problems of the Russian army was insufficient funding "human resource", as well as ineffective mechanisms for the social protection of military personnel. All these problems and many others cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army - in order to solve the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces, it is necessary to implement military reform as a comprehensive series of measures aimed at radically transforming the RF Armed Forces.

The military reform should not be identified with the reform of the Armed Forces, since the reform of the Armed Forces is considered as an integral part of the reform of the entire military construction in the country. In this context, we should also note some other problems that accompany the implementation of the process of military reform in modern Russia, which, one way or another, require close study.

The crisis of the Russian army worsened in the late 1980s. By the end of the 80s. spending on the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of a multimillion-strong army exacerbated the economic crisis. The underestimation of the factor of the unpreparedness of the Russian army to repel threats to global, regional and national security has led to miscalculations in the ongoing military reform in Russia. It should also be noted that all these factors create the prerequisites for the implementation of military reform in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Russian army.

As the main negative factors that predetermined the decrease in the combat readiness of the Soviet, and then the Russian army, K. Cirulis and V. Bazhanov indicate:
1. The irreconcilable contradiction of the corrupt caste with the rest of the officer mass;
2. Alienation between the generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers;
3. "Hazing", which created a tendency to criminalize the army and a system of ugly informal relationships;
4. Intensive development of equipment and weapons, which exacerbated the contradiction between the need to increase the professionalism of personnel and outdated methods of combat training and its organization;
5. The decline in the prestige of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation due to the involvement of servicemen of combat specialties in household work, which led to a decrease in combat readiness.

Unsatisfactory combat readiness is associated with the transition from the form of organization of the army inherent in the command-administrative system of the Soviet type to the form of organization of the army of a democratic state. However, the events of the early 1990s prevented the rapid implementation of military reforms. In the 1990s military reform was not carried out. The state policy of reducing military spending without reforming the Armed Forces led to the collapse of the army. The lack of funding for the Armed Forces has led to the use of emergency reserves.

The military reform programs being developed had political significance, and military reform in practice meant a theoretical, methodological, organizational and legal basis. However, the successful implementation of the military reform in the late 1990s. were hampered by insufficient funding, a lack of funds and a lack of political will to implement the planned measures. During the period of the military reform from 1992 to 2001, which can be called, in the words of L. Peven "a decade of missed opportunities", its main tasks were not fulfilled:
- high combat readiness of troops is not ensured;
- effective measures for the social security of servicemen have not been developed.

The aspect of the gradual transition of the Russian army to a contract basis for staffing positions deserves special attention. In the context of military reform in Russia, this process can be seen as affecting not only the organization of the Russian army, but also affecting Russian society. This leads to the effective use of the latest equipment by contractors and the improvement of the professionalism of military personnel and the Russian army as a whole. However, the initial cost of maintaining contract soldiers is much higher than the cost of conscript soldiers. The first experiments on the formation of military units from contract soldiers were carried out in the early 1990s. The first unsuccessful experiment in transferring the army to a contract system for recruiting privates and sergeants in Russia began in 1992. The peak of the unsuccessful experiment came in the summer - autumn of 1993 - the experiment failed due to insufficient funding and the absence of a social package of benefits for contract soldiers.

However, even now material rewards and social benefits for contractors are minimal. It can be assumed that, provided that favorable socio-economic conditions are provided for a significant part of the conscripts, this type of service in the Armed Forces can become an attractive and prestigious type of public service. An important role in the growth of motivation to serve under the contract can be played by positive advertising in the media. Support for the transition to a professional army is significantly higher among groups with higher social resources and the potential to implement them.

The introduction of alternative civil service (ACS) has become an important event in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation. Perhaps in the future, the ACS Institute will be replenished with a large number of potential participants, the number of which can be measured in tens and hundreds of thousands. Jobs for those mobilized as part of the alternative civilian service can be found in orphanages and homes, nursing homes, and disabled people. These jobs, as a rule, are characterized by relatively difficult working conditions and are not prestigious and unattractive for most of the traditional workers, but the social demand for the volume of such work is increasing. Military reforms are met with support in Russian society, especially among those categories of conscripts and other social groups who receive social benefits or advantages as a result of the introduction of the recruitment of the alternative civilian service. The problem of assessing the socio-economic consequences of recruiting the composition of the alternative civilian service is difficult to predict in the long term. It should be assumed that many social groups will benefit from these innovations. However, in its current form, these transformations cannot solve the main problem of the Russian army - the plight of soldiers (called for military service) and officers.

Social aspects of the military reform of the Russian Armed Forces

In post-reform Russia, complex, contradictory and often unpredictable social processes have a significant impact not only on certain social groups in Russian society, but also on servicemen and their families. Indeed, one of the main problems of the Russian army was insufficient funding. "human resource", ineffective mechanisms of social protection of soldiers and officers. All these and many other problems cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army. Therefore, in order to solve the numerous social problems of the Russian army, it is necessary to implement comprehensive measures, the purpose of which is to take targeted actions aimed at radically transforming the system of social protection of Russian military personnel.

The low wages of the military and insufficient funding for the maintenance of the army have become one of the important problems that need to be addressed immediately. In this regard, economic measures of the Government were adopted or are planned to be adopted, the purpose of which is to replace the benefits of military personnel with monetary compensation. Calculated for 2002-2010. The program "State housing certificates" partly contributed to the solution of this problem. The functioning of the mortgage system for officers will solve the housing problem for many servicemen.

Having considered the main aspects of the military reform and the impact of its social aspects on Russian society, we can come to the following conclusions:
1. Russia, as a great power on which international security depends, must have a combat-ready army that meets the most modern requirements. The need to counter terrorist threats and repel the threats of potential aggressors obliges military personnel to constantly improve the military-technical equipment of the army.
2. A very negative social climate has developed in the modern Russian army, cases of "hazing relationship". To increase public confidence in the army, it is necessary to curb bullying. Frequent cases of violation of fundamental human rights in the army determine the negative attitude of many conscripts to military service. Numerous illegal ways of evading military conscription are widespread.
3. The military reform carried out in Russia for more than a century and a half has become one of the key events in Russian social and political life. It has a great influence on Russian society and affects the interests of many social groups and lobbies.
4. The most urgent problem of military reform has a rational solution feasible for the Russian economy and society. Since 2001, it has entered the accelerated implementation process. The successful implementation of the military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will make it possible to move to a new system of troop recruitment without prejudice to the combat capabilities of military units, ensure the necessary number of trained reserves, eliminate many aspects of social tension in society, which is characteristic of the current conscription system, and ensure Russian society's support for reforms.

Work with personnel

Referring to the authoritative studies of domestic experts in the field of military construction and military management, B.L. Belyakov singles out the problems of educating the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and also focuses his research interest on the substantive characteristics of their influence. He points out that the problems of modern military education cause such a factor as the disintegration of the relatively effective system of educational work that previously functioned in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and has developed over decades, including the strengthening of military discipline, with servicemen of various ethnic groups and nations, along with introducing a confessional factor into the military environment.

Slow and protracted phased creation of a new system of indoctrination work that does not meet the main goals and objectives of the concept of transition to a unitary system of indoctrination work in military collectives of various branches of the Armed Forces. This slow process of transition to a unitary system of education, in his opinion, also hinders more efficient and well-coordinated work of the command and commanders of military units, as well as the system of bureaucratic departments of educational work to unite and conduct educational work in multinational or multi-ethnic military collectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the absence in the Armed Forces of a scientifically and conceptually substantiated system and training program for specialists in the humanities (philologists, ethnologists and historians) specially trained to conduct socially oriented work (information, educational, etc.) with military personnel of various ethnic groups and nationalities inhabiting the Russian Federation.

In the 70s of the last century, there were no serious interethnic or interethnic conflicts in the Soviet army, and the grandfather structure prevailed in the system of social relations in army collectives. Later, when solidarity in army collectives on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or compatriotism acquired a large-scale character, the compatriot-status system of social relations in many cases prevailed in army collectives over the traditional "grandfather" and even destroy the latter. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased national homogeneity of the Russian army, the criminal system came to the fore.

In the modern Russian army, many commanders and their educational assistants need to work and act mainly in extraordinary conditions and with some elements of innovation and even, under certain conditions, the risk of solving urgent problems and tasks of increased pedagogical complexity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account that some commanders have lost their former ideological and moral and value orientations of the traditional system of educational work that has developed in the Russian and Soviet army, and new spiritual values ​​in educational activities have not been formed. Unsuccessful experiments with the search for a national idea, an ostentatious appeal to national and ethno-confessional sources, a drop in the standard of living of a significant number of the country's population led to social and legal vulnerability and uncertainty about the future for a significant number of the military. All these factors have a negative effect on the pedagogical activity of officers in the army in strengthening military discipline in military collectives. It should also be noted that the solution of many of the above problems and challenges is possible by referring to the theoretical, conceptual and practical methods of sociological science and involving professional sociologists in eliminating the consequences of these dysfunctional phenomena in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Along with this they read:
Politics and military reform
Army reform
MTC with France

Browser -Observer 2003 № 6 (1 6 1 )

MILITARY REFORM IN RUSSIA

Oleg Lisov,

Head of Sector VIMI

The first attempts at a serious and systematic reform of the Armed Forces of our state in recent decades were made in the 70s, when, on the instructions of the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov, an entire army (28th, stationed in Belarus). After being knocked together and fully equipped with new equipment, she took part in the Zapad-81 maneuvers, showing excellent results at that time. Unfortunately, this experience was not used, and the subsequent period of stagnation and the so-called "perestroika" did not allow the country's leadership to continue to reform the army.

In the past 10 years, in all sectors of Russian society, and primarily in Russian politicians, debates about the need to reduce the army and reform the Russian Armed Forces have not subsided. The leadership of the country is hesitant (or out of ignorance, or out of fear?) Attempts are being made to do something in this direction, but there are still no significant and, most importantly, positive results from these attempts. At the same time, the Armed Forces are finally losing their combat readiness and combat capability, the best, youngest and most promising officers are leaving the army, equipment is aging, the number of accidents is growing sharply, and the prestige of the Armed Forces has fallen to the lowest level. Service in the army has become not an honorable duty and duty (as it is written in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and as it should be), but almost a shame.

The military reform carried out in Russia since the middle of 1997 was designed to adapt the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the new military needs of the state and to its changed economic opportunities. However, the financial and economic collapse of August 1998 interrupted the civilized military reform program and delayed its implementation for many years.

Regulatory Framework for the Reform

Until 1998, the guiding document for determining the strategy for reforming the Armed Forces was the "Plan for Reform and Construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", approved by the President, which was then replaced by the "Fundamentals (Concept) of the State Policy on the Military Development of Russia for the Period Until 2005", approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation in July 1998 In accordance with this document, unfortunately, each power department developed its own internal plans for reforming the forces, which then had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and combined into a common document in order to ensure a systematic process of reforming, building and strengthening according to a single plan Russian military security. In accordance with this plan, some organizational and staffing measures were carried out, but over time it turned out that the measures taken did not achieve the tasks set, and many of the transformations did not improve, but, on the contrary, worsened the country's security organization system and required cancellation or replacement with new ones (Table 1). one).

The main measures of the military reform of the Russian Federation, carried out until 2005

Stages and main activities on reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation	Solved goals, tasks and possible consequences
Stage 1 - until 2000
(Significant reductions in the personnel of the troops, reduction (enlargement) of military districts, changes in the structure of troops and the organization of military command).
Reducing the number of personnel of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation from 420 thousand people. up to 348 thousand people	Improving the efficiency of command and control
Reformation of the High Command of the Ground Forces.	Significant downsizing.
The inclusion of the military space forces (VKS) and the rocket and space defense forces (RKO) into the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN).	Reducing the number of administrative staff.
Formation of a new independent type of troops from the VKC and RKO - space and its transfer to the Air Force of the Russian Federation.	Reducing the cost of maintaining the management team.
Strategic Missile Forces - reorganization from a type of troops to a type of troops.	Reducing the cost of R&D and scientific development.
Completion of the formation of the structure of the RF Armed Forces, consisting of four branches - Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force and strategic forces.	Elimination of parallelism in the work of military headquarters and leadership.
The merger of the Air Force and Air Defense of the country into one branch of the RF Armed Forces - the Air Force.
Establishment of a unified system of military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation into strategic directions: North-Western - within the boundaries of the Leningrad Military District; Western - within the boundaries of the Moscow Military District; Southwestern - within the boundaries of the North Caucasian Military District; the Siberian Military District and the Far East - within the boundaries of the Far Eastern Military District (5 military districts).
Stage 2 - until 2002
(Reducing the number, increasing funding, increasing combat readiness, transferring some units to contract service).
Reconstruction of the High Command of the Ground Forces (2001).	Increasing the combat readiness and combat capability of units and formations.
Increased combat readiness, modernization and development of new types and types of weapons.	Reforming and strengthening the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation.
Creation of parts and connections of "constant readiness":	Preservation of the officer corps.
three divisions and four brigades of "permanent readiness" have been formed in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasian and Siberian military districts, which are manned by at least 80% personnel, 100% armed, trained and constantly subject to increased requirements).	Raising the social and moral status of a serviceman.
Steps to increase the number of contract soldiers in the Armed Forces.
Raising the social status and rights of military personnel.
Experimental transfer of the Airborne Division to a contract basis, followed by the study of experience and its implementation in other troops.
Development and adoption of the Law "On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS)".
Stage 3 - until 2005
(Increased "constant readiness" units and formations, increased purchases of military equipment. Transfer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the entire state defense system to the principle of "effective sufficiency").
Concentration of efforts and funds on a gradual increase in the number of formations and units of "permanent readiness" (such units and formations should be created in all branches of the Armed Forces. It was planned to have up to 10 full-blooded divisions in the Ground Forces).	Improving the efficiency of troops and military equipment.
Improving the structure of command and control of the troops.	Strengthening the role and place of the military-industrial complex in the country's defense system.
Transfer of the Armed Forces proper to a three-species organization structure (land, air-space, sea).
Modernization and improvement of weapons and military equipment.	Increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces, strengthening the process of rearmament of the army, the introduction of new types and models of weapons and military equipment.
An increase in the purchase of weapons and military equipment, their enhanced and effective introduction of troops.	Implementation of the constitutional right of a citizen to an alternative service.
Preparation of a regulatory, organizational, staffing and socio-economic justification for the introduction of an alternative civilian service (ACS) in the Russian Federation, along with compulsory military service (the ACS law has been put into effect in the Russian Federation only since 2004).	Fulfillment of assumed international obligations.
Creation of a single rear of the Armed Forces for the army, navy, aviation, troops of the Russian Emergencies Ministry, border, internal and railway troops.	Reducing the number of conscripts.
100% provision of the Armed Forces with all resources (combat, financial, etc.).	Scientific and technical development of new models of technology and the development of this technology.

In addition, over time, it became clear that reforms in law enforcement agencies were and are being carried out by certain groups of certain officials who are not interested in them, and their actions are often based not on scientifically developed and well-verified calculations, but on their purely personal feelings, accumulated experience and knowledge. The results of such work are the annual reduction in numbers, the merger and division of the branches and branches of the armed forces, the enlargement of districts, the reorganization of the administrative apparatus, the reform of military formations, the elimination of scientific schools and the entire system of training scientific personnel, the reduction of military schools and academies. But where is the expected result - a positive effect? Such implementation of organizational and staff measures does not solve the main task - strengthening the military security of the state, but, on the contrary, weakens it and aggravates the position of the Russian Armed Forces. The results of each reform have an extremely painful effect not only on the personnel, their moral and psychological state and financial situation, but on the most important thing - the combat capability and combat readiness of forces and means for the defense of the state. An analysis of the measures taken as part of the reform of the Russian military machine shows that the effectiveness (efficiency) of many measures taken until recently, frankly, does not correspond to the initial calculations - there are no extra financial resources, no reduction in numbers, no reduction in costs. As a result, combat readiness is not increased, and some measures remain experiments and earlier decisions are canceled or replaced by others (for example, the liquidation and re-establishment of the Main Command of the Ground Forces). From such measures, at first, the efficiency of the functioning of the entire military organism is sharply reduced, then there is a loss of the best, most experienced part of the personnel of the troops, and, finally, a partial or complete loss of combat readiness of units and formations. So, if by the beginning of the 90s there were 80 combat-ready formations in the ground forces, then in 2002 - 20 formations of the ground forces and 15 in other types of armed forces eke out a miserable existence, of which only one 42nd division in Chechnya is responsible these increased requirements.

The composition of the contingent of conscripts called up for military service is also interesting - 89% of young men of military age either evade service or are released from it in various ways - they fall ill, give birth to more than 2 children, go on the run, go abroad, etc.

Of the 11% of those drafted, mainly from remote areas and remote areas, 7% have a primary education, 30% have a secondary education, and 40% have never studied and practically did not work, and only about 20% meet the requirements.

An analysis of the first stage of the military reform in Russia allowed "attentive" researchers from the London Institute for Strategic Studies in their report "The Military Balance 1999-2000." draw very pessimistic and rather amateurish conclusions. Their meaning is as follows: "the general state of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, with the exception of nuclear ones, remains low due to a lack of funds for the training, maintenance and purchase of weapons. However, despite the difficulties in 1999, the RF Armed Forces demonstrated higher than seemingly capable of deploying large combined forces." At what expense and with what efforts?

Main Directions for the Implementation of the Reform

As experience and practice show, the main thing in solving the most complex and enormous problem of our state - reforming its Armed Forces - should be a systematic approach. This primarily includes:

Correct formulation of the political tasks facing the state and the Armed Forces;

Scientific definition of the future image of the Armed Forces (what should be the Armed Forces);

Optimal reformation of those parts and connections that exist at the time of reformation;

Gradual construction and creation of new units and formations for the successful defense of the country and the possible conduct of war for the next 10, 20, 30 and more years.

Reforms in the Armed Forces, as a rule, are carried out in four main areas - changing the command and control system of the Armed Forces, changing the recruitment system, changing the system of training and education, changing the system for equipping troops with weapons, military equipment, various types of allowances and maintenance. This has not been done in our Armed Forces until recently. Military science claims that there are three states of the level of combat readiness of any military unit or formation - combat-ready, limited combat-ready and non-combat-ready. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces introduced the fourth category - the supercritical level of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - such is the current state of our Armed Forces.

It is well known that all the above tasks should be defined and formulated in the main state documents - the "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" - a political document that defines the main directions of state policy in the field of ensuring the security of the individual, society, state and the country's security from external and internal threats; "Concepts of the National Security of the Russian Federation" - a political document that defines the military-political, military-strategic and military-economic foundations for ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and a number of other fundamental regulatory and legal planning, executive acts. Unfortunately, these legal documents began to appear only in 2000. We can assume that from that moment on, on the basis of a whole package of such legal acts, systematic work began in our country to reform its Armed Forces.

Economic aspects of military reform

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of the Russian Federation and its entry into the perestroika era, the military spending of the state began to decline sharply, and if in 1992 they amounted to 5.56% of GDP, then in 2002 - approximately - 2.5% of domestic gross product, and in 2003 - 2.65%. Moreover, the decrease in expenditures occurred synchronously and was accompanied by an indiscriminate reduction in the number of the Russian Armed Forces, squandering and destruction of weapons and military equipment (Table 2). In practice, real spending on national defense, taking into account inflation, the war in Chechnya and a number of other economic and environmental consequences and other negative aspects of our history, according to experts, has decreased by 70-75% in recent years.

Recognizing the importance and necessity of a clear and mandatory implementation of military reforms in the power structures of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation has finally designated the allocated allocations for its implementation as a separate line in the budget. Moreover, if in 2001 only 4.5 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, then in 2002 it was already 16.544 billion rubles, i.e., practically, the amount was increased almost 4 times, and in 2003 - 15.8 billion rubles Next year, this amount should be more significant, and moreover, the country's leadership stipulates that an increase in appropriations for these purposes is possible.

Appropriations for the national defense of the Russian Federation in 1992-2003.

Indicators
GDP, billion rubles
Actual spending on national defense, billion rubles
Actual allocations, % of GDP

The main element of the reform of the Armed Forces, unfortunately, in accordance with the decisions taken, was and remains a radical reduction in the number of troops. Of the total number of personnel of law enforcement agencies, 2 million 360 thousand people. military and 960 thousand people. civilian personnel should be fired about 600 thousand people. Of the actual Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the number of which is 1 million 200 thousand people. (Table 3), 365 thousand people should be dismissed, and about 140 thousand people from other power structures. and 14.5 thousand people. civilian personnel. As of January 1, 2002, the strength of the RF Armed Forces was 1.274 million servicemen. Subsequently, some politicians propose to increase the strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 600-800 thousand people, however, it is scientifically justified that for a reliable organization of the military security of the state, the strength of the Armed Forces of any country should be 1% of the population. According to the calculations of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russia should have an Armed Forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, which will reliably ensure the protection of borders and the military security of the state and fully fit into the framework of its financial capabilities.

According to the adopted National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, the level of spending on national security (this includes defense) should be approximately 5.1% of GDP, and in the opinion of our President, this figure should not exceed 3.5% of the gross domestic product. The main task for the Armed Forces at this stage is the creation of units and formations of "permanent readiness" in all types and arms of the troops. Such a task was set by the President of the Russian Federation at a meeting with the high military command in July 2002. In the near future, the Ground Forces will have 10 full-blooded divisions of "permanent readiness", and in other types of the Armed Forces the number of such formations is planned to be increased

Indicators	population
Composition of the RF Armed Forces
Total population
Officers and ensigns (midshipmen)
Soldiers and sergeants, (sailors and foremen); (conscription service)
Ensigns (midshipmen), sergeants and soldiers (foremen and sailors); (contract service)

Another, no less important direction of the reform is the creation of combat-ready units and formations with the involvement of a larger number of contract soldiers. According to many experts, with the current level of technological development, this can be done only by transferring the Armed Forces to a contract basis. Such experiments are already underway. Such an experiment is being carried out in the Pskov Airborne Division. According to conservative estimates, the transfer of only one division to a contract basis is estimated at 3-3.5 billion rubles, and the entire Armed Forces at 150-200 billion rubles. This is only a translation.

No one has yet calculated how much the maintenance of such troops will cost. Definitely, as world experience shows, it is impossible to solve all the problems of the army with the help of contract soldiers. According to the experience of most European countries, the staffing of the Armed Forces in these countries is twofold - by contract and by conscription. Foreign experts unequivocally consider this model of recruiting the army to be the best and have long since abandoned the fully mercenary Armed Forces. And this is the right decision.

The third important direction of reforming the Armed Forces is the development and adoption of a completely new legal act for our country, allowing young people called up for military service to perform non-military, as well as civilian - alternative service. The adoption of such a document will entail the creation of a whole state system for organizing such a service and, probably, will require large expenses. On July 24, 2002, the President of the Russian Federation signed the new Federal Law "On Alternative Civilian Service in the Russian Federation (ACS)", which will come into force in our country as early as January 2004.

The appearance of such an unusual document for our country is dictated by the provision of Russian citizens with the right to alternative service, which is written in Article 59 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal laws "On military duty and military service" and "On Defense". After the adoption of the Law "On Alternative Civil Service", it will be necessary to develop and adopt a regulation on the passage of alternative civilian service (ACS), adapt it to the conditions of individual regions, determine the executive authority that will exercise this control and be responsible for the performance of this service by a person. This will certainly require new expenses.

Some calculated data

1998-1999 On behalf of the President of the Russian Federation and the government of the country, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, together with a number of research institutes, conducted a comprehensive scientific study "Forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2010." All work was based on the scientifically based number of the Armed Forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, the existing volumes of monetary allowance, the norms for the supply of clothing and food, the established level of medical and other types of allowance, maintenance and support.

In table. 3, 4 and 5 show the results of these studies. Despite the considerable time that has elapsed since the publication of these data, with minor amendments, they could be used for further developments.

The results of the forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the RF Armed Forces for the period up to 2010 indicate that even if the most successful option for the development of the Russian economy is implemented, the Ministry of Defense of the country will be able to receive financial resources in the required amounts only starting from 2005. This circumstance is clearly will require a revision of some deadlines for the implementation of the most important measures of the military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

billion rubles (in 1998 prices)

		preparation	Purchases of weapons and military equipment		Builder-

Table 5

Required distribution of total expenses of the RF Ministry of Defense

for the intended purpose in 1988-2005.

		preparation	Purchases of weapons and military equipment		Builder-

Some Conclusions

1. Despite a number of negative aspects (sometimes weak theoretical justification of the event, the lack of sufficient and real funding, the unwillingness of some top leaders to carry out unpopular transformations, an improperly organized and incompletely carried out event, etc.), the Russian Federation continues to carry out a number of organizational, staffing, structural, financial and social transformations in line with the military reform of its Armed Forces.

2. The annual increase in funding for the course of the military reform (from 4.5 billion rubles in 2001 to 16.5 billion rubles in 2002) gives new impetus to its continuation and expansion.

3. In the course of the ongoing reform in the RF Armed Forces, three new divisions and four new brigades of "permanent readiness" have already been created and are functioning in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts. They are staffed by at least 80% of personnel, 100% of property and weapons, and they are constantly subject to increased requirements. It is planned to have such parts and connections in all types of aircraft.

4. The President of the Russian Federation set the main task for the leadership of the Armed Forces - to create units and formations of "permanent readiness" in all types of the Armed Forces. In particular, it is planned to have 10 such formations in the Ground Forces, and the very construction of the Armed Forces and the entire defense of the country should be carried out according to the principle of "effective sufficiency."

5. Practical steps to create units and formations manned on a contract basis (transfer of the Pskov division of the Airborne Forces) should give a practical result in the further expansion of this experiment to all types and branches of the Armed Forces.

6. When reforming units and formations, it is necessary to use the experience and miscalculations revealed during the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya, NATO military operations in Yugoslavia and the US Armed Forces in Afghanistan, and possibly future battles in Iraq.

7. With the adoption by the leadership of the Russian Federation in 2002 of the Federal Law "On Alternative Civilian Service in the Russian Federation (ATS)" and its entry into force in January 2004, the process of consolidating legislative norms in the state for the exercise by Russian citizens of their rights and obligations continues (currently military service only 11% of the draft contingent, 89% of young men of military age evade military service).

8. As the experience and practice of building and reforming the Armed Forces of other states shows, such negative decisions and mistakes are always present in the implementation of such grandiose transformations as military reform. To reduce them, you need:

Participation in the transformation process of a large number of disinterested participants (experts);

A competent approach and scientifically based development of the essence, course and final results of any event being implemented;

Practical consolidation of the obtained results directly in the troops;

Evaluation and use of the experience gained for the implementation of further steps in the reform process.

9. The purposeful nature of military construction in the new changed conditions requires a rather complex and well-developed system of planning and implementation of the entire process of this construction. To do this, it is necessary to have a package of specially developed legal acts that define the goals, tasks and functional responsibilities of various state bodies in managing military organizational development and, in general, strengthening the combat power of the state. For further, purposeful and legalized work to put into practice the planned measures to reform the Russian Armed Forces, it would be advisable to adopt the Law of the Russian Federation "On Military Reform" - which defines the basic principles, stages, boundaries, norms and rules of military organizational development.

Every year the modernization of the Russian Armed Forces is gaining momentum. New models of weapons are being approved, the infrastructure of the army is being improved, and the professional skills of servicemen are growing significantly. So for now the question is rearmament reforms of the RF Armed Forces 2018 still remains open.

There are doubts in certain circles that the military reform program of 2008-2020 will be completed on time. In view of the economic crisis and rapidly changing conditions in the country, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the reform.

The problem of the need for such a reform was voiced shortly before 2008 and was presented only as one of the possible directions for future reformation. A set of measures, divided into several stages, is designed to change and improve the structure, size and composition of a military organization that is strategically important for the country - the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Stages of rearmament:

• Stage I - was held in the period from 2008 to 2011 inclusive.
• Stage II - began in 2012 and ended in 2015.
• Stage III - planned for the period from 2016 to 2020 inclusive.

Organizational and staff maneuvers

At the first stage, organizational and staffing activities were carried out aimed at improving management, optimizing the number and carrying out the reform of military education.

One of the main directions of the first stage of the reformation was the transition from a system consisting of four links (that is, "military district - army - division - regiment") to a system that includes only three links: "military district - operational command - brigade".

The number of military districts has been reduced, each of which has its own reserve command. In the course of the rearmament reform, the number of military units was also reduced.

Reduction degree:

• Ground forces - by 90%;
• Navy - by 49%;
• Air Force - by 48%;
• Strategic Missile Forces - by 33%;
• Airborne troops - by 17%;
• Space troops - by 15%.

A significant part of the rearmament was the reduction in the number of military personnel. Most of all, officers “fell” under the reformation: from about 300 thousand people, the number of officers was almost halved.

It must be said that the optimization of the number was determined to be unsuccessful. The actions of the military department led to complex problems: the professional part of the junior staff of the army command was completely destroyed. Experts, by the way, recognized the program for the replacement of ensigns by sergeants as a failure.

It is expected that the ensigns will return to the units and in the required composition. By the beginning of 2018, the military department plans to increase the size of the Russian army. So, the total number of officers will be 220 thousand people, ensigns and midshipmen - about 50 thousand people, military contractors - 425 thousand people, conscripts - 300 thousand people. A significant number of conscripts testify to.

The reform of military education implies the reduction of some military institutes and universities, and instead, scientific centers have been formed under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

Optimization of the social security of military personnel

The second stage of the reformation, which included the solution of social issues, was aimed at such activities: providing housing, increasing material allowance, advanced training and professional retraining.

At the moment, the number of servicemen who are not provided with housing has significantly decreased compared to 2009. Unfortunately, not everything went smoothly. In the first years of the second stage, this issue was successfully resolved, but since 2012, the number of people who are not provided with their own apartment has been growing inexorably.

The liquidation of the queue for housing, according to the plan of the Ministry of Defense, was to be carried out by 2013. However, this process was not implemented for a number of serious reasons. In such conditions, the department made the only right decision instead of housing to issue a lump-sum cash payment to those on the waiting list.

The increase in the material allowance of military personnel took place in 2012. Salaries were increased by almost 3 times, and military pensions also increased. All allowances and additional payments that were valid before the reformation were canceled, and completely new additional payments were introduced instead.

All contract servicemen, according to the professional retraining reform, were required to take special “survival courses” aimed at improving their skills. Retraining of officers is carried out when a serviceman is appointed to a position.

Rearmament reform now

At present, the third stage of the reform of the rearmament of the Russian Armed Forces is underway. As of 2016, the total share of new weapons in the RF Armed Forces was 47%, while, according to the plan, this figure should have been only at the level of 30%. For the army, this means obtaining an additional number of modern tanks, small arms and other types of weapons.

The ultimate goal of the reform is to bring the number of modern weapons to 70% by 2020. Thus, the modernization of the army of the Russian Federation must be completed on time and in full.

In addition to technical improvement, the rearmament reform contributed to raising the level of combat training of military personnel, conducting large-scale exercises, forming new military institutions and units, optimizing the structure of the military forces, etc.

The best assessment of the current state of affairs can be the opinion of our sworn "friends" from the West, who emphasize the ever-increasing military power of our country.