Test work on the topic:

Option 1

1. The highest authority in Russia in March-October 1917.

a) provisional government

b) Petrograd Soviet

c) Congress of Soviets

d) Constituent Assembly

2. When was a separate peace treaty concluded with Germany?

3. Provisional government in 1917 ...

a) declared a desire to make peace with Germany;

b) announced the continuation of the war with Germany;

c) gave land to the peasants;

d) introduced an 8-hour working day;

a) Down with the Provisional Government!

b) All power to the Soviets!

c) Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat!

d) an armed uprising.

5. At the Second Congress of Soviets was:

a) abolished the monarchy

b) the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets was proclaimed

c) a coalition of parties has been created

d) a declaration on an armed uprising was adopted

6. What is the main provision of the Decree on Land:

a) the return to the peasants of "cuts"

b) liquidation of landownership

c) permission for private ownership of land

d) cancellation of redemption payments

1) February 25, 1917 a) Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets

2) March 3, 1917 b) a general strike in Petrograd

3) October 26, 1917 c) the monarchy in Russia ceased to exist

D) Kornilov rebellion

8. What is the reason for the April crisis in the power of the Provisional Government:

c) announcement by the Petrograd Soviet of Order No. 1 on the army and navy

In February 1917, disturbances began in Petrograd caused by food shortages, strikes at enterprises. On February 26-27, mass demonstrations took place in the city. The emperor stood at the head of the army and hoped that he could keep the situation under control. Nicholas II ordered General Khabalov to suppress the unrest.

However, the troops went over to the side of the demonstrators, and the tsar himself had to sign an act of renunciation on March 2 in favor of brother Michael. On March 3, Mikhail Romanov abdicated on behalf of the entire Romanov dynasty. Give at least three reasons that could serve as the basis for Nicholas II's refusal to fight. Indicate at least two consequences for the Russian army of the events of February-March 1917.

10. There is the following point of view on the conclusion of the Brest Peace with Germany in the spring of 1918:The signing of peace is a betrayal of Russia's interests.

Test work on the topic:

Russia in 1917. From February to October"

Option 2

1. Mark the most popular slogan in Russian society in the fall of 1917.

a) "All power to the Constituent Assembly!"

b) "All power to the Soviets!"

c) "Land - to the peasants!"

d) "Down with the capitalist ministers!"

2. During the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia:

a) a republic was proclaimed;

b) the Constituent Assembly was convened;

c) the nationalization of the land was proclaimed;

d) the monarchy was overthrown;

3. The consequence of the defeat of the troops of L.G. Kornilov is:

b) Bolshevization of the Soviets;

c) strengthening of the right forces;

d) strengthening the position of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries;

4. Russia was proclaimed a republic:

5. The Bolshevik organ for the preparation of an armed uprising was called:

a) VRK

b) Central Committee

c) SNK

d) Cheka

a) the beginning of the Civil War

b) Russia's withdrawal from the war

c) reduction of the Russian army and weapons

d) the free exit of peoples from Russia

7. Match (date - event):

1) March 2, 1917 a) the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed

2) October 25, 1917 b) demonstration in Petrograd

3) February 23, 1917 c) abdication of Nicholas II

D) socialist revolution

8. What is the reason for the July crisis in the power of the Provisional Government:

a) Milyukov's note on the war to a victorious end

b) the unsuccessful offensive of the Russian army at the front

c) an attempt to withdraw some units from the capital to the front

d) the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks.

9. Review the historical situation and answer the questions.

In February-March 1918, a serious split emerged in the coalition government of the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs over the issue of negotiating with Germany for a separate peace. The leader of the Bolsheviks, V. I. Lenin, believed that peace with Germany should be signed on any terms. The Left SRs and part of the Bolsheviks believed that signing peace with the "imperialist" government of Germany would be a betrayal of the ideas of the revolution. However, negotiations continued and peace was signed. Why did V. I. Lenin insist on making peace? Give at least three reasons. What consequences for the internal political life of Soviet Russia did the conclusion of peace have? List at least three consequences.

10. There is the following point of view on the reasons for the Bolsheviks coming to power in October 1917:

The Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917 due to the fact that their program turned out to be the most understandable and close to the population, as well as due to better organization and a course towards an immediate solution of the urgent problems facing the country.

Using historical knowledge, give two arguments supporting this assessment and two arguments refuting it. Indicate which of the arguments you have given support this point of view, and which refute it.

11. Make a political portrait (optional)

a) V.I. Lenin b) A.F. Kerensky c) L.G. Kornilov d) L.D. Trotsky

In Petrograd, as the beginning of the Civil War in Russia, which created exceptionally favorable ideological, political, social and geopolitical conditions for the further formation and strengthening of the Bolshevik regime. It was then that the communist ideology, the dictatorship of the proletariat, finally won, the main trends that previously led Russia along the Western path of development changed.

The situation the day before

Formally, the Soviets had already established power throughout the country and exercised practical control in some (rather important) matters. Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were created, and "democratic" elections to the Moscow Duma were held. Elections to local self-government bodies and to the Constituent Assembly were also planned, but, firstly, the difficult internal political situation in the country led to a permanent postponement, and secondly, regular delays in the approval of the regulatory framework at all levels.

During the preparations for the elections, the capital was separated into a separate district. Seventeen districts were formed in Moscow instead of the previously existing four. In the September 24 elections, the Bolsheviks received most of the seats in the district councils, some of the deputies were on the lists of the Kadet Party, and some - of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

By mid-autumn 1917, local government bodies were finally formed in the capital and provinces. Elections to the Assembly were held at the end of October. Earlier, representatives of the Bolsheviks won the elections to city and district councils. The difference between Moscow and Petrograd then consisted in the fact that in the northern capital the Soviet of Workers' Deputies united with the Soviet of Soldiers, where the Socialist-Revolutionaries held strong positions. The Petrograd Soviet was divided into workers' and soldiers'.

The Moscow authorities made attempts to unite the two Soviets, as happened in Petrograd. However, here the leadership acted more cautiously than the Central Committee. A few days before the start of the armed uprising in Petrograd, it opposed the seizure of power with the use of weapons.

Preparation of the uprising

Different sources of historical data give different information about the plan of the uprising. In the twenties of the last century, some fairly well-known memoirists and historians asserted with complete confidence that the October armed uprising in Petrograd was carefully planned and prepared in advance. Other (no less authoritative) records said that there was no definite plan of action at all. Practically all later sources have finally settled on the fact that there was no plan in reality, and the historical events in Petrograd developed absolutely spontaneously.

The beginning of the uprising

On the night of October 25, 1917, historically significant events began to develop in Petrograd aimed at eliminating the Provisional Government - the highest body of state power in Russia between the February and October revolutions, and transferring all power to the Soviets. So, the main reason for the armed uprising in Petrograd was the mediocre management of the country, first by the tsar, then by the Provisional Government. Of course, there were accompanying reasons: the unresolved issue of land ownership, the harsh living and working conditions of workers, the complete illiteracy of the common people, as well as the First World War with its losses and the unfavorable situation on the fronts.

The beginning of the armed uprising in Petrograd in Moscow was learned at noon on October 25 from the delegates V. Nogin and V. Milyutin, who sent a telegram. The Petrograd Soviet had already become the main stage of events.

Almost immediately, a meeting of the leading centers of the Bolsheviks was held, where a body was formed to lead the uprising, the so-called Combat Center. First, the Combat Center patrols occupied the local post office. The regiment remained to guard the Kremlin, the State Bank and the Treasury, the arsenals of small arms and hand weapons. At first, the regiment refused to give soldiers at the disposal of the Combat Center without an order from the district headquarters and the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, but later two companies nevertheless went on missions from the center.

A special meeting of the Duma, at which it was discussed how the city authorities should react to the aggressive policy of the Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, took place on the evening of November 25. The Bolsheviks were also present at the meeting, but during the discussion they left the Duma building. At the meeting, it was decided to create a COB (Committee of Public Security) to protect against the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Cadets and other unfavorable parties and groups of people.

The COB included representatives of the Postal and Telegraph Union (which, by the way, was led by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries), city and zemstvo self-government, organizations of railway workers, and Soviets of Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The Duma, led by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, became the center of resistance of the Socialist-Revolutionaries. They acted from the position of defending the Provisional Government, but in the case of a forceful solution of the issue, they could rely only on a part of the junkers and officers.

In the evening of the same day, a plenum of both capital Soviets was held. He was elected MRC (Military Revolutionary Center) to support the armed uprising in Petrograd. The center consisted of seven people: four Bolsheviks and representatives of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries. In the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee (in contrast to the Petrograd one), the Mensheviks took an active part in the work, and in general in the capital the split into the Bolshevik and Menshevik parties was less acute. Less decisive than in Petrograd, the nature of the actions of the Military Revolutionary Committee in Moscow was also influenced by the fact that Lenin was then absent from the capital.

By order of the Military Revolutionary Committee, parts of the Moscow garrison were put on alert and now they were obliged to carry out only the orders of the Military Revolutionary Center and no one else. Almost immediately, a decree was issued to stop the publication of newspapers of the Provisional Government, which was carried out successfully - on the morning of October 26, only Izvestia and Social Democrat were published.

Subsequently, the capital’s Military Revolutionary Committee created regional centers to support the October uprising in Petrograd, put the military on alert, who took the side of the Bolsheviks and their allies, elected a temporary governing body that controlled the actions of the regimental and other military committees, and took measures to arm the 10- 12 thousand people - Red Guard workers. An unfavorable factor was that significant forces of anti-Bolshevik Junkers were concentrated in the capital.

Thus, without preparation, the armed uprising in Petrograd began. Further events developed no less actively.

combat readiness

On the night of October 26, the Moscow Committee brought all parts of the garrison to full combat readiness. All those who were on the lists of the reserve regiment were called to the Kremlin, and the workers were given more than one and a half thousand rifles with cartridges.

Konstantin Ryabtsev, commander of the Moscow Military District, contacted Headquarters and asked to send troops loyal to the Provisional Government from the front to the capital. At the same time, he began negotiations with the Moscow Military Revolutionary Committee.

The day after the date of the armed uprising in Petrograd (October 25, 1917), Moscow was still recovering from the events and no active measures were taken.

Martial law

Officers who were ready to resist the Bolsheviks gathered on October 27 at the Alexander Military School under the command of the head of headquarters of the Moscow District. There were about three hundred supporters of the provisional government. At the same time, the term "White Guard" was first used - this name was given to a volunteer detachment of students. In the evening of the same day, the only representative of the Provisional Government, S. Prokopovich, arrived in Moscow.

At the same time, the COB received confirmation from Stalin about the withdrawal of regiments from the front line and the direction of troops to Petrograd. Martial law was declared in the city. An ultimatum was put forward by the MRC, they demanded that the committee disband, surrender the Kremlin and disband the revolutionary-minded units, but the representatives of the committee took away only a few companies. According to other sources, the VRK answered the ultimatum with a categorical refusal.

Also on October 27, the cadets launched an attack on a detachment of Dvinians who were trying to break through the blockade to the city council. Of the 150 people, 45 were killed or wounded. The junkers also raided one of the regional MRCs, after which they stopped on the Garden Ring, seizing the telephone exchange, mail and telegraph.

Capture of the Kremlin

The next morning, Ryabtsev demanded that the VRK surrender the Kremlin, saying that the city was completely controlled by the "whites". The head of the Military Revolutionary Committee, not knowing what the situation is in reality, and having no connection with the allies, decided to make concessions and surrender the Kremlin. When the soldiers began to disarm, two companies of junkers entered the Kremlin. The soldiers, seeing the insignificant forces of the opponents, made an attempt to take up arms again, but this failed. Moreover, many were then killed.

According to other data, recorded from the words of direct participants in the events, when the prisoners handed over their weapons, they were shot, and those who tried to escape were bayoneted. According to various estimates, from fifty to three hundred soldiers were considered dead.

After that, the position of the committee became very difficult. The MRC was cut off from the allies, who were pushed back to the outskirts of the city, telephone communication was impossible, and the KOB employees received free access to small arms and hand weapons, which were stored in the arsenal in the Kremlin.

At the call of the VRC, a general strike began. The brigade, company, command, regimental committees that gathered at the Polytechnic Museum proposed to dissolve the Council and hold elections again, as well as support the Military Revolutionary Committee. A "Council of Ten" was created to contact the committees. By the end of the day, revolutionary-minded forces occupied the center of the city. The armed uprising in Petrograd was gaining momentum.

Attempted truce

In the last days of October, a struggle for the center of the capital unfolded. Trenches were dug, barricades were erected, battles were going on for the Stone and Crimean bridges. The workers (armed Red Guards), a number of infantry units and artillery took part in the battles during the armed uprising in Petrograd in 1917. By the way, the anti-Bolshevik forces did not have artillery.

In the morning of October 29, the Bolsheviks began to attack the main directions: the square, Leontievsky lane, Krymskaya square, a powder warehouse, Aleksandrovsky and Kursk-Nizhny Novgorod stations, the main telegraph and post office.

By evening, three buildings of the Alekseevsky School were also occupied. The revolutionary troops began shelling the Metropol Hotel and occupied the central telephone exchange. Fire was also fired at the Nicholas Palace and the Spassky Gates.

Both sides played for time, but on October 29 a truce was concluded. The Committee of Public Safety and the Military Revolutionary Committee began negotiations, as a result of which an agreement was reached on a ceasefire from 12 noon on October 29 for a day on the following conditions:

• the dissolution of both the VRC and the COB;
• subordination of all troops to the commander of the district;
• organization of a democratic authority;
• bringing those responsible to justice;
• complete disarmament of both "whites" and "reds".

Subsequently, the conditions were not met, the truce was violated.

Artillery bombardment

In the following days, both sides built up their forces, several more attempts were made to conclude a truce, but they were unsuccessful. The Military Revolutionary Committee demanded that the COB surrender individual buildings, and the COB also put forward its own demands in response. Artillery shelling began on November 1, intensified the next day. On the night of November 2, the cadets themselves left the Kremlin.

Later, the bishop, who examined the Kremlin, discovered a number of damages to several cathedrals (Assumption, Nikolo-Gostunsky, Annunciation), the Ivan the Great Bell Tower, some Kremlin towers, and the famous clock on Spasskaya stopped. Rumors circulated among the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison at that time, greatly exaggerating the scale of destruction in Moscow. It was alleged that the Assumption Cathedral and St. Basil's Cathedral were allegedly damaged, and the Kremlin was completely burned down.

Upon learning of the artillery shelling, the head of the Petrograd Soviet, Lunacharsky, resigned. He stated that he could not come to terms with "thousands of victims" and bitterness to "bestial malice." Then Lenin turned to Lunacharsky, after which he corrected his speech, published in the New Life newspaper.

In early November, a delegation from the COB went to negotiate with the Military Revolutionary Committee. The committee agreed to the surrender of the prisoners on the condition that they hand over their weapons. After that, resistance ceased in Moscow. At seventeen o'clock on November 2, the counter-revolution signed the capitulation, and four hours later the revolutionary committee ordered a ceasefire.

Resistance

The order of the Military Revolutionary Committee was addressed, however, not to all citizens, but only to controlled troops. So the fighting continued throughout the night of November 3, in some areas the "whites" even still resisted and even tried to advance. The Kremlin was finally taken by the “reds” on the afternoon of the third of November.

On the same day, a manifesto was officially published, which proclaimed the full power of the Soviets of Deputies in the capital - such was the victory of the armed uprising in Petrograd. It is believed that the revolutionary forces lost about a thousand people during the uprising. However, the exact number of victims is unknown.

The reaction of the ROC

In those days, the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church was taking place in Moscow. The priests called on the warring parties to stop the confrontation in order to avoid casualties. They were also asked not to allow acts of revenge and cruel reprisals, in all cases to preserve the lives of the prisoners and the vanquished. The cathedral urged not to expose the greatest shrine - the Kremlin, as well as Moscow cathedrals not to shelling.

Some priests in those days became orderlies. Under crossfire, they provided first aid to the wounded and bandaged the victims. The Council also decided to act as an intermediary in the negotiations between the warring parties. After the end of the confrontation, the church began to assess the damage and bury all the dead.

human losses

After the complete end of the armed confrontation, the Military Revolutionary Committee decided to organize a mass burial of the dead near the Kremlin walls. Funeral events were scheduled for November 10. The day before the funeral, newspapers published the routes of the funeral processions so that those who wish could say goodbye to the dead. On the day of the funeral, 238 people were buried in mass graves. But the names of only 57 of them are precisely known.

The Russian Orthodox Church condemned the mass burial under the walls of the Kremlin. The Bolsheviks were accused of insulting the shrine and the church.

The dead supporters of the Provisional Government were buried at the Fraternal Cemetery. Strongly impressed by the funeral service and the funeral procession, the Russian and Soviet artist, director and poet A. Vertinsky wrote the song "What I Have to Say."

After 78 years, a memorial cross and a crown of barbed wire were installed on the territory of the cemetery. Now the cross is in the Church of All Saints.

Results

The results of the armed uprising in Petrograd are the establishment of the power of the Soviets and the coming division of the world into two opposing camps - capitalist and socialist. As a result of this armed uprising, the old government was completely destroyed, and a completely new era began in the modern history of Russia.

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution. It became a logical continuation of the uprising and a turning point in Russian history. These events have not yet acquired an unambiguous assessment. In the year of the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution, other organizations like it plan to support the trend of reconciliation of modern society with the landmark events of those years.

The creation of a new coalition government coincided with the beginning of the activity of the Petrograd Soviet of the new convocation. L.D. became the Chairman of its Executive Committee. Trotsky is one of the key figures in the unfolding events. From May 1917, that is, from the moment of his return from exile, Trotsky was constantly in the thick of the political struggle as the undisputed leader. After the July days, he joined the Bolsheviks and greatly contributed to the growth of the party's popularity.

In the ranks of the Bolsheviks there were lively disputes over the question of power. From about mid-September, Lenin resolutely put on the agenda the task of armed struggle for the immediate transfer of power to the Soviets, or rather, the speedy seizure of power by the Bolsheviks through an armed uprising. This is evidenced by his letter to the Central Committee, known as "The Bolsheviks must take power." At first, Lenin's course did not meet with understanding among the rest of the Bolshevik leadership. On the question of power among the Bolshevik leaders, there was more fermentation of minds than certain tactical attitudes. Part of the Bolsheviks connected the solution of the problem with the convocation of the Second Congress of Soviets, scheduled for October 20. Zinoviev called the forthcoming congress the new "master of the Russian land." (Before, the tsar liked to call himself that way, then this definition was inherited by the Constituent Assembly). Closest to the views of Lenin was the position of Trotsky, who, while not denying the need for an armed seizure of power, at the same time sought to give it a form of legitimacy in the person of the Congress of Soviets. Such opinions that reached Lenin met with sharp opposition from him. In another letter from Lenin to members of the Central Committee, PC, MK and Soviets, it was said: “Waiting for the Congress of Soviets is complete idiocy, because it means missing weeks, and now weeks or even days decide everything ...” Concerning Trotsky’s position, the letter said: “Convoke "Congress of Soviets on October 20 to decide to "take power" - how does this differ from the "appointment" of an insurrection in a stupid way?" Thus, the entire content of Lenin's messages is permeated with a sense of the decisiveness of the moment.

Later, Trotsky explained Lenin's haste and stubbornness by ignorance of the real situation in Petrograd. Indeed, it seemed that power, as it were, was falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The Petrograd Soviet actually becomes the legal headquarters for the preparation of an armed uprising. However, Lenin's fears can be understood in connection with the presence in the Bolshevik leadership of a strong opposition to the question of the uprising.

On October 7, the meeting of the Pre-Parliament opened. At it, Kerensky called for the consolidation of all forces to get out of the grave crisis, into which the country was sinking more and more. However, no specific steps were proposed to exit it. At the meeting, Trotsky announced the declaration of the Bolsheviks, where the Pre-Parliament was compared with the Bulygin Duma and it was announced that they were leaving the meeting. This meant that in the struggle for the power of the Soviets, the Bolshevik Party headed for a final break with other Soviet parties.

All these days were evidence of Trotsky's triumph. Huge crowds of people flocked to his performances, he was literally carried in their arms. Meanwhile, Lenin returned illegally to Petrograd. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on October 10, under the influence of Lenin and Trotsky, a decision was made to directly prepare for the uprising. Only Zinoviev and Kamenev opposed.

October coup

The Military Revolutionary Committee (VRC) created under the Petrograd Soviet, headed by the Left Socialist-Revolutionary P.E., became the organ for the preparation of the uprising. Lasimir. (The Left SRs at that time were close to the Bolsheviks on the issue of power). Officially, the body was created to counteract the withdrawal of revolutionary units from the Petrograd garrison. The Military Revolutionary Committee openly declared the incompetence of the government's actions without the committee's signature, appointed commissars to enterprises and institutions, and armed detachments of workers - the Red Guard. The forces of these detachments, as well as the garrison and the Kronstadt sailors, systematically seized the key objects of the city. The hope was that by the time the Second Congress of Soviets opened, this task would have been solved and the congress would only have to sanction a real transfer of power to the Soviets.

In response to the actions of the VRC, the ministers of the Provisional Government filed a complaint with the Pre-Parliament. On October 24, Kerensky demanded from him special powers in the fight against the Bolsheviks. In response, the deputies demanded to announce the beginning of agrarian reform and peace negotiations, and thereby bring down the intensity of passions. These days have demonstrated the helplessness and impotence of the Provisional Government. At the decisive moment, he actually had no support. The available forces that it could have in Petrograd - several small detachments of junkers, a detachment of invalids and a women's battalion - were mainly concentrated in the Winter Palace. Not relying on them, Kerensky left Petrograd on the morning of October 25 to bring loyal troops to the rescue.

In the meantime, on the night of October 25, by order of the Military Revolutionary Committee, railway stations, bridges were occupied, and in the morning - telephone and telegraph. At 10 o'clock the Military Revolutionary Committee issued an appeal on the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the transfer of power to the Soviets. By evening, the General Staff and the Winter Palace were besieged. On the night of October 25-26, the palace was taken. The ministers who were in it were arrested and taken to the Peter and Paul Fortress.

When the whole city was actually in the hands of the Bolsheviks, on October 25 at 22:00. 40 min. The II All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opened. According to the lists, 670 delegates were elected to the congress, representing about 17 million voters: 338 delegates were Bolsheviks, another 100 were their allies - the Left Social Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries announced a declaration of non-recognition of the powers of the congress and retired to the premises of the City Duma, where, together with a part of the deputies of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the previous convocation, the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Soviets and members of other organizations, they announced the creation of a "Committee for the Salvation of the Motherland and the Revolution."

In their absence, the congress adopted the Decree on Peace, in which it was proposed that all belligerents make peace on the basis of the restoration of the pre-war status quo. The Decree on Land was also adopted, drawn up on the basis of a summary of 242 peasant orders, which set out the peasants' ideas about agrarian reform. The decree abolished private ownership of land. It was transferred to the jurisdiction of land committees (peasant organizations that arose in 1917).

At another meeting on October 26, the congress elected the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of a new convocation. It included 62 Bolsheviks and 29 Left Social Revolutionaries. A certain number of seats were reserved in case other Soviet parties returned. The composition of the new government was approved - the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), which consisted entirely of Bolsheviks, since the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries still hesitated on the issue of joining the SNK. Lenin became the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

"Triumphal procession of Soviet power"

The victory of the uprising in Petrograd did not yet mean the victory of the Bolsheviks on the scale of the whole country, and, taking into account the chaos and anarchy that reigned in it, was superficial and top-notch. The further process of spreading Bolshevik power was not easy and painless, although, following Lenin, it used to be called "the triumphal march of Soviet power." It was a kind of reflection of the victorious euphoria. In fact, everything was not so simple. The process gradually developed into a civil war with a certain balance of forces fighting in it.

The establishment of Soviet power took place in the context of increasing centrifugal tendencies and the disintegration of the country, deepening economic chaos, and growing social and political tension. These factors, as a rule, are not sufficiently taken into account by historians. The proclamation of Soviet power in large cities and industrial centers did not yet mean its extension to counties and volosts. Far from everywhere there were still Soviets, the former bodies existed and functioned. In a number of places, the new government had to be planted by armed expeditions from the center and strongholds of the Bolsheviks.

In the very first days after the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks had to repel the attack on Petrograd by the troops of Kerensky-Krasnov, and in the capital to suppress the uprising of the Junkers. By the forces of the Red Guard and the revolutionary-minded units of the Petrograd garrison, this task was solved quickly and successfully.

More difficult for the Bolsheviks was the task of winning over to their side military units, both operating at the fronts and stationed in the rear garrisons. The Northwestern Front, which passed through the territory of the Baltic states and Finland, as well as the Baltic Fleet and the Petrograd garrison, were under the strong influence of the Bolsheviks even before October, and at the time of the coup, they actually constituted its armed support. With the participation of the troops, the establishment of Soviet power on the northwestern borders of Russia and the formation of the Soviet republics (Estland, Latgale) took place. A huge role in these events was played by the corps of the Latvian Riflemen, whose entire subsequent fate turned out to be closely connected with the Bolsheviks. The Latvian riflemen became the strike force of the new regime and the forge of its leading cadres.

In mid-September - early October 1917. Russia has come close to a great historical milestone. An armed uprising became not only possible, but also necessary in order to overthrow the domination of capital, save the country from an impending catastrophe, and enter new historical paths.

On September 15, Lenin addressed the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), the Petrograd and Moscow committees with a call for an armed uprising. The leader of Bolshevism believed that Europe was on the eve of a "worldwide proletarian revolution" and that the balance of forces in the country was favorable for an armed seizure of power. Delay will give the opponents of the revolutionary upheaval the opportunity to regroup their forces, and the moment will be lost. However, even the most radical members of the Central Committee did not support Lenin. Everyone was convinced that the conditions for an uprising were not yet ripe and that only a congress of Soviets could give the new government a legal character. Two weeks later, Lenin resorted to an ultimatum: he threatened to withdraw from the Central Committee, reserving the freedom to agitate among the lower ranks at the party congress. In a statement submitted to the Central Committee, L.B. Kamenev stated: “Leaving the Pre-Parliament “predetermines the party’s tactics for the near future in a direction that I personally consider very dangerous for the party.” He meant an armed uprising.

Lenin's firmness and perseverance had their effect. Some of the Bolshevik leaders revised their positions. On October 7, after Trotsky's statement about the counter-revolutionary nature of the Provisional Government and the Pre-Parliament, or the Democratic Conference, a representative body convened to search for ways of social compromise, the Bolsheviks left the Pre-Parliament. Trotsky, in spite of the open obstruction of the right side of the Pre-Parliament, read out the declaration on the departure of the Bolsheviks. It ended with the words: “Leaving the Provisional Council, we appeal to the vigilance and courage of the workers, soldiers and peasants of all Russia. Petrograd is in danger! The revolution is in danger! The people are in danger! The government exacerbates this danger. The ruling parties help him. Only the people themselves can save themselves and the country. We appeal to the people. All power to the Soviets! All power to the people! Long live immediate, honest, democratic peace!” The departure of the Bolsheviks from the Pre-Parliament was one of the most important events of 1917. It meant that in their struggle to transfer power to the Soviets they were irrevocably breaking with other socialist parties that had not yet decided to break the bloc with the bourgeoisie. And already on October 8 and until October 25, Petrograd was engulfed in rumors about an armed uprising being prepared by the Bolsheviks.

In reality, however, the final course towards an armed seizure of power was adopted at the meetings of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on October 10 and 15 after heated discussions. From the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) on October 10, 1917: “Comrade. Lenin states that since the beginning of September there has been a certain indifference to the question of the uprising. Meanwhile, this is unacceptable if we are seriously raising the slogan of the seizure of power by the Soviets. Therefore, it has long been necessary to pay attention to the technical side of the issue. Now, apparently, time has been significantly lost. Nevertheless, the issue is very acute, and the decisive moment is near. The uprising was opposed by L.B. Kamenev and G.V. Zinoviev, who argued that power should be taken peacefully, using elections to the Constituent Assembly, relying on the Bolshevik Soviets. “... There are no data for an uprising,” Kamenev asserted, “now ... Two tactics are fighting here: the tactics of a conspiracy and the tactics of faith in the Russian revolution.” Unable to publish their views in the Bolshevik press, Kamenev and Zinoviev placed their article condemning the idea of ​​an armed coup in the pages of Novaya Zhizn. This article indirectly confirmed the information about the preparation of the Bolshevik uprising and excited public opinion. From a letter from Lenin to members of the Bolshevik Party: “Comrades! I have not yet had the opportunity to receive the St. Petersburg newspapers of Wednesday, October 18th. When the full text of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's speech in the non-Party newspaper Novaya Zhizn was handed over to me by telephone, I refused to believe it. But doubts proved impossible, and I am forced to take the opportunity to deliver this letter to the members of the party by Thursday evening or Friday morning, for it would be a crime to remain silent in the face of the fact of such an unheard-of strike-breaking ... Difficult times. Tough task. Severe change. And yet the problem will be solved, the workers will rally, the peasant uprising and the extreme impatience of the soldiers at the front will do their job! Let us rally our ranks more closely—the proletariat must win!” Lenin called Kamenev and Zinoviev traitors and demanded that both be expelled from the party. The Central Committee limited itself to forbidding them to publicly oppose the decisions of the central body.

The Provisional Government, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the leadership of various political parties met continuously, trying to prevent the impending uprising. But due to internal disagreements and splits, they could not resist the energetic offensive line of the Bolsheviks. The Cadets tried to organize the creation of armed formations capable of resisting the workers' Red Guard, and stepped up work in the army. However, the results of their efforts were not enough to give a tough rebuff to the Bolsheviks. The Menshevik-Internationalists and the Left SRs, trying to prevent the uprising and at the same time prevent the counter-revolution, passed a resolution on October 24 at a meeting of the Pre-Parliament, in which they demanded that the Provisional Government immediately announce the beginning of peace negotiations with Germany and the transfer of land to the peasants. Kerensky's resolution was rejected.

The provisional government took measures to neutralize the revolutionary troops in Petrograd. Kerensky ordered that units of the Petrograd garrison, which had become unreliable, be sent to the front. But this measure was too late: the soldiers refused to obey the order and declared their support for the Soviets and distrust of the government. The sailors of the Baltic Fleet at the end of September announced their disobedience to government orders.

Meanwhile, on October 12, on the initiative of Trotsky, the Petrograd Soviet created the Military Revolutionary Committee (VRC), which consisted of Bolsheviks and Left Social Revolutionaries and became the headquarters for the preparation of an armed uprising. In response to Kerensky's attempt to draw the few troops loyal to the Provisional Government to the capital, on September 20 the Military Revolutionary Committee sent its commissars to all military units of the Petrograd garrison. Orders not signed by them were declared invalid. On September 22, the Provisional Government finally lost control over the capital's garrison. Only a few units of the junkers, Cossacks, etc. kept loyalty to him. Kerensky, overestimating the forces remaining at his disposal, gave the order on the night of October 24 to occupy Smolny, close the Bolshevik newspapers Soldat and Rabochy Put, and arrest members of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee.

On the morning of October 24, the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and the Military Revolutionary Committee, in response to the destruction of the printing house of the Rabochy Put newspaper by the junkers, took measures to defend and neutralize parts of the Provisional Government. Gradually, active defense turned into an offensive, and by the evening of October 24, armed detachments of the Red Guard, revolutionary soldiers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet occupied the most important military and strategic points in the capital - railway stations, bridges, power plants, telegraph. By the morning of October 25, the troops of the Military Revolutionary Committee had captured most of the key objects of Petrograd, in the afternoon they surrounded the Mariinsky Palace and dispersed the Pre-Parliament that was sitting there. By this time, Kerensky had left Petrograd, going to the headquarters of the Northern Front in Pskov to bring punitive troops from there. At 10 o'clock in the morning, on the initiative of Lenin, the appeal of the Military Revolutionary Committee "To the citizens of Russia" was published (Fig. 5). It announced the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the transfer of power into the hands of the Bolsheviks. It should be noted that the majority of Petrograd residents were not even aware of the coup taking place in the city. On the eve of the capital lived a normal life: enterprises, shops, restaurants, theaters were working. The armed uprising developed practically without bloodshed.

However, the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government met, had not yet been taken. The leaders of the Military Revolutionary Committee sought to avoid unnecessary casualties and preferred to wait until the ranks of government troops, who were clearly not inclined to protect the ministers in the palace, were finally thinned out. At 7 pm, the ministers were given an ultimatum to surrender. After its departure at 21:40, blank artillery shots were fired from the Peter and Paul Fortress and from the Aurora cruiser. Part of the guards of the Winter Palace - cadets, Cossacks and half a company of the women's battalion then surrendered. The remaining ultimatum was again presented, and after refusing to surrender, the shelling began again. The defenders of the palace were completely demoralized and did not offer organized resistance. Detachments of the Military Revolutionary Committee entered Zimny ​​and at about 2 a.m. arrested the ministers of the Provisional Government. The victory of the Bolsheviks was complete and almost bloodless. During the armed assault on the palace, only 6 people were killed. At the same time, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in the capital did not yet mean their complete and final victory throughout the country, plunged into political chaos. The armed uprising, in fact, had the character of an apex and illegitimate coup d'état. Therefore, it was extremely important for the leaders of the Bolsheviks to consolidate their success on the formal legal basis for the establishment of Soviet power in the country (Fig. 6).

In this regard, when practically all of Petrograd was already under the control of the Military Revolutionary Committee, at about 11 pm the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opened. Of the 670 congress delegates, representing about 17 million Russian citizens, about half (338 seats) belonged to the Bolsheviks. Therefore, it was extremely important for the leaders of Bolshevism to win over some of the delegates of the left-wing socialist parties to their side.

At first, the congress almost unanimously supported the proposal of the Menshevik-internationalist Yu.O. Martov on the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the start of negotiations to create a coalition democratic government. But the emerging unity of the socialist front of Russia was destroyed by several speeches by the Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries, who severely criticized the actions of the Military Revolutionary Committee and the Bolsheviks, calling the uprising in the capital an adventure and a conspiracy leading to civil war. Having received no support, the Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bundists left the congress, resigned their powers and thereby strengthened the position of those Bolsheviks who were not inclined to compromise. The last opportunity to reach an agreement between the socialist parties collapsed after Trotsky's fiery speech, in which he sharply ridiculed the position of Martov and his supporters. The indignant Menshevik-internationalists also left the congress. Lenin issued an appeal that proclaimed the establishment of the power of the Soviets in Russia: "The Congress decides: all power in the localities passes to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies ..."

Thus the victory of the socialist revolution was secured. Thus the overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie was decreed and the creation of the world's first state of workers and peasants became a fact. On the evening of October 26, the congress adopted the first documents of the new government - the decrees "On Peace" and "On Land", and also formed a temporary workers' and peasants' government - the Council of People's Commissars (SNK), which consisted mainly of Bolsheviks, since the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries still hesitated on the question of joining the SNK. V.I. Lenin.

In September, hiding from the bloodhounds of the Provisional Government, Lenin lived in Helsingfors, Finland.

From here, Lenin closely followed the development of the revolution and sent his directives to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.

Between September 12 and 14, Lenin sent two directive letters to the Central Committee of the party: "The Bolsheviks must take power" and "Marxism and the uprising." In his first letter, Lenin wrote that, having gained a majority in both capital Soviets, the Bolsheviks could and should take state power into their own hands: Petersburg and in Moscow (with the region), the conquest of power, the overthrow of the government.

In the second letter, Lenin demanded that the uprising be treated as an art, and that the conditions necessary for its successful outcome be seriously studied. Lenin outlined a general plan for organizing an uprising, demanding that decisive forces be gathered at a decisive point and that they would certainly go over to the offensive, bearing in mind that defense was the death of an armed uprising.

September, Lenin's letters were discussed in the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. The traitor Kamenev spoke out against Lenin's directives on the preparation of an uprising. At the suggestion of Comrade Stalin, the Central Committee decided to send Lenin's letters to the largest organizations. In the second half of September, the Bolshevik Party launched a great deal of work to prepare an armed uprising. On October 7, Lenin secretly arrived in Petrograd to lead the uprising. Stalin acquainted Lenin with the preparations for the uprising.

October, for the first time after the July events, Lenin attended a meeting of the Central Committee, where he made a report on the preparation of the uprising, suggesting that he use any suitable pretext to start it. In his report, Lenin emphasized that politically the uprising was prepared by the entire external and internal situation, including the military one: the Provisional Government decided to withdraw the revolutionary garrison from Petrograd and surrender the capital to the Germans, the Russian bourgeoisie entered into negotiations on concluding a separate peace with the German imperialists in order to strangle the Russian revolution. Lenin raised the question of the date of the uprising and its organizational military-technical preparation.

Stalin, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinsky and other members of the Central Committee supported Lenin. Only the strikebreakers of the revolution—Zinoviev and Kamenev—came out against Lenin. The Central Committee condemned these defenders of capitalism and adopted Lenin's resolution on the immediate organization of an armed insurrection and on the subordination of all party activity to this task: and from this point of view, to discuss and resolve all practical issues (the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops from St. Petersburg, the speeches of Muscovites and Minskers, etc.)."

The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party continued to prepare an armed uprising. The Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was created, which was the legal headquarters of the uprising. The backbone of the uprising was to be the Red Guard, which by October in Petrograd amounted to 12 thousand armed people. It was decided to call in the help of the revolutionary capital of the Baltic sailors from Helsingfors. Troikas were organized in every district of Petrograd to lead the uprising. In most regions, at that time, regional congresses of Soviets were taking place, which made decisions on the transfer of all power to the Soviets.

(29) October, at the suggestion of Lenin, a second meeting of the Central Committee of the party was convened together with representatives of the Petrograd Bolsheviks to familiarize the broader circles of the party with the plan of the uprising. This meeting confirmed the decision on an armed uprising. Kamenev and Zinoviev again demanded a postponement of the uprising. Comrade Stalin exposed the traitors in his speech: "What Kamenev and Zinoviev propose," he said, "objectively leads to the possibility for the counter-revolution to prepare and organise."

On the same day, the Party Center headed by Comrade Stalin was elected for the practical leadership of the uprising. Having suffered a defeat in the Central Committee, Zinoviev and Kamenev committed an unheard-of betrayal. On October 18, in the Menshevik newspaper Novaya Zhizn, they published a statement of their disagreement with the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising. It was outright treason. Lenin wrote about her: "Kamenev and Zinoviev gave Rodzianka and Kerensky the decision of the Central Committee of their party on an armed uprising and on hiding from the enemy the preparation of an armed uprising, the choice of a date for an armed uprising"

Following Kamenev and Zinoviev, Trotsky gave the enemy a term for the uprising. At a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, he declared that the Second Congress of Soviets on October 25 should take power into its own hands. This betrayal was used by Kerensky, who took a number of military measures to prevent an uprising. The Bolsheviks were preparing an armed uprising at an accelerated pace.

According to the plan developed by Comrade Stalin, it was planned that the working Urals would come to the aid of Petrograd, Ivanovo-Voznesensk would help Moscow, Belarus would disarm the front-line soldiers if they were sent against Petrograd. In preparing the uprising, Comrade Stalin was assisted by Ya.M. Sverdlov, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.M. Molotov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, M.I. Kalinin, A.A. Andreev and other comrades.

The factories were hastily working on arming and military training of workers. The Red Guard quickly formed. The workers of the Sestroretsk arms factory handed over the weapons they made to the Red Guard headquarters. The workers of the Shlisselburg gunpowder factory sent a barge with grenades down the Neva to the Red Guard headquarters in Petrograd. At the Putilov factory, a detachment of 1,500 Red Guards was on alert.

On the ground, the preparation of an armed uprising was under the leadership of Lenin's experienced students: in the Donbass - K.E. Voroshilov, in Kharkov - Artyom (Sergeev), in the Volga region - V.V. Kuibyshev, in the Urals - A.A. Zhdanov, in Polissya-L.M. Kaganovich, in Ivanovo-Voznesensk-M.V. Frunze, in the North Caucasus - S.M. Kirov. The Bolsheviks intensified their work in the Baltic Fleet and on the northern front closest to the capital.

Lenin called a meeting of the leaders of the military organization and discussed with them what ships and troops to call from Kronstadt and Helsingfors. The Military Revolutionary Committee sent its commissars to all military units to prepare the soldiers for the uprising.