The policy of collective security is characterized. The activities of the USSR to create a system of collective security in Europe

After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, first of all, the European powers, which suffered innumerable victims and losses as a result of the war. In order to prevent the threat of a new similar war and create a system of international law that regulates relations between states at a fundamentally different level than it was before, the first international organization in the history of Europe, the League of Nations, was created.

The Soviet state developed high activity on the diplomatic front. In 1934, the USSR became a member of the League of Nations (however, in 1939, due to the war unleashed by Stalin with Finland, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations).

In parallel with the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, the so-called "streak of diplomatic recognition" of the Soviet Union takes place. During this period, the USSR establishes diplomatic relations with a number of states. On November 16, 1933, normal diplomatic relations are established with the United States, in 1934 - with Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other countries.

The USSR developed a collective security project, which was based on the equality of all participants in the proposed regional agreement and on universalism, consisting in the fact that the system being created included all the states of the covered region without exception. The parties to the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense.

At the beginning of 1934, the Soviet Union came up with a convention on the definition of the attacking side (aggressor), which emphasized that aggression is an invasion of the territory of another country with or without a declaration of war, as well as bombardment of the territory of other countries, attacks on ships, blockade of coasts or ports. The governments of the leading powers reacted coldly to the Soviet project. However, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and later Finland signed this document. Kara-Murza S.G. Soviet civilization Volume I [Electronic resource]: - Access mode: - http://www.kara-murza.ru

The USSR concluded collective security treaties with France and Czechoslovakia. According to the Mutual Assistance Treaty between the USSR and Czechoslovakia of May 16, 1935, the parties agreed to immediately provide each other with assistance in case of an attack by a European state - provided that assistance to the victim of the attack would be provided by France.

In 1936-1941. there is a further complication of the international situation. In October 1935, Italy attacked Ethiopia. In August 1936, the fascist governments of Germany and Italy openly intervened in the internal affairs of Spain, supporting Franco's rebellion. In the fall of 1936, Japan and Nazi Germany signed an "anti-Comintern pact" directed against the USSR. Italy soon joined this pact. Sudden German attack on the USSR (myth or reality) [Electronic resource]: - Access mode: - http://www.antiqstar.ru

The leadership of the Soviet Union was convinced that fascist aggression could be stopped by collective actions of peace-loving states.

On April 17, 1939, the Soviet government proposed that the Western powers conclude a tripartite mutual assistance treaty based on equality of obligations. This provided for the provision of assistance to the states located between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. England, however, was not going to conclude a mutual assistance pact and tried to secure unilateral obligations with the USSR, Poland and Romania. In the summer of 1939, the USSR proposed to Britain and France a military convention providing for joint action by the armed forces of the three states in the event of aggression. The ruling circles of England and France, who did not believe Stalin, did not respond to this proposal. The USSR failed to reach an agreement with the Western powers. Both sides are to blame for this. The Soviet side did not have enough restraint, it showed haste, overestimated the degree of hostility of the Western powers to the USSR and the possibility of their collusion with Nazi Germany. The Western powers did not have a sincere desire to move closer to the USSR, which can be explained, apparently, by various reasons, including fears of possible betrayal, and the inhumane policy of the Stalinist leadership, contrary to his assurances on the world stage, and underestimation of his strength as a possible ally in the fight against the fascist bloc, and a deep hostility towards a country of a different socio-economic formation. Foreign policy of the USSR in the prewar years [Electronic resource]: - Access mode: - http://www.ronl.ru The international position of the country continued to have a catastrophic effect of the avalanche of mass repressions brought down by the Stalinist leadership on party and military personnel, diplomats, and figures science and art. The analytical apparatus of the diplomatic, military and intelligence services of all countries closely followed the unprecedented events in the USSR, and estimated the potential and strength of the country. Almost all observers came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was incapable of large-scale foreign policy measures.

So, it was not possible to create a reliable system of collective security in Europe, the threat of foreign policy isolation hung over the USSR, and the Stalinist leadership began to look for a new ally.

Summing up this chapter, we can conclude that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in 30 years. (until 1939) can be considered an example of the desire to prevent war. However, the policy of "small wars" in which the Soviet Union joined, as well as its unexpected "friendship" with Germany, also could not but cause condemnation from the world community.

In general, the proposals for the creation of a collective security system were a significant contribution to the development of the theory and to the establishment in practice of the principles of peaceful coexistence, because the very essence of collective security is conditioned and determined by the principles of peaceful coexistence, involves the collective cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preventing war and the preservation of the world.

Despite the fact that in the pre-war years the Soviet Union took significant steps to avert the threat of war, Stalin's internal policy of genocide towards his own people was also reflected in the imperialist inclinations manifested in the implementation of the foreign policy of the USSR, which brought together all the peace initiatives of our state to a null result.

For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933.

The collective security project was based on the equality of all participants in the proposed regional agreement and on universalism, which consisted in the fact that the system being created included all the states of the covered region without exception. The participants in the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense.

The Soviet Union, in the implementation of its idea of collective security, proposed the conclusion of an Eastern Pact, which would give security guarantees to all European countries and would eliminate "the feeling of uncertainty about security experienced everywhere, uncertainty about non-violation of peace in general and in particular in Europe." The Eastern Pact was to include Germany, the USSR, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Czechoslovakia. All participants in the pact, in the event of an attack on one of them, were supposed to automatically provide military assistance to the side that was attacked. France, without signing the Eastern Pact, took upon itself the guarantee of its implementation. This meant that if any of the parties to the pact were to comply with the decision to help the side that was attacked, France would be obliged to act itself. At the same time, the USSR assumed the obligation to guarantee the Locarno Pact, in which it did not participate. This meant that in the event of its violation (meaning a violation by Germany) and the refusal of any of the guarantors of the Locarno Pact (Great Britain and Italy) to come to the aid of the side that was attacked, the USSR had to come out on its own. Thus, the shortcomings and one-sidedness of the Locarno Treaties were "corrected". With such a system in place, it would be difficult for Germany to attempt to violate both its western and eastern borders.

The Soviet proposals also provided for mutual consultations between the participants in the pact in the event of a threat of attack on any of the participants.

The political atmosphere at the beginning of 1934, in connection with the continuous growth of Hitlerite aggression, gave a significant amount of reason to fear that the independence of the Baltic states might be threatened by Germany. The Soviet proposal of 27 April on commitments to "constantly take into account in its foreign policy the obligation to preserve the independence and inviolability of the Baltic republics and to refrain from any action that could prejudice this independence" was thus aimed at creating a calmer atmosphere in Eastern Europe and at the same time to reveal the real intentions of Nazi Germany. These intentions, in particular, were revealed in the Hugenberg memorandum, announced at the world economic conference in London in 1933. The refusal of the German government to accept the proposal of the USSR on the grounds that there was no need to protect these states in the absence of such a threat revealed Hitler's true goals in relation to the Baltic countries.

Also related to the draft Eastern Regional Pact are the declarations of the Soviet government about the agreement to guarantee the borders of Germany, made in London and Berlin. The proposal made by Germany in the spring of 1934 received a response only on September 12, 1934. Germany categorically refused to take part in the projected pact, referring to its unequal position on the question of armaments. Two days after the German refusal, Poland refused. Of the participants in the projected pact, only Czechoslovakia unconditionally joined this project. As for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, they took a vacillating position, while Finland generally evaded any response to the Franco-Soviet proposal. The negative position of Germany and Poland disrupted the signing of the Eastern Pact. Laval also played an active role in this disruption, inheriting the portfolio of the French Foreign Minister after Barthou's assassination.

According to the plan for the Eastern Pact, the security system created by it was also to be supplemented by the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. The position of the USSR on this issue was determined in a conversation with I.V. Stalin with the American correspondent Duranty, which took place on December 25, 1933. Despite the colossal shortcomings of the League of Nations, the USSR, in principle, did not object to its support, because, as Stalin said in the said conversation, “The League can turn out to be a kind of hillock on the way to at least somewhat complicating the cause of war and facilitating to some extent the cause of peace” .

The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations acquired a special character due to the fact that in 1933 two aggressive states, Germany and Japan, left the League.

The usual procedure for the entry of individual states into the League, namely the request of the respective government for admission to the League, was naturally unacceptable to the Soviet Union as a great power. That is why from the very beginning it was agreed in the relevant negotiations that the USSR could enter the League of Nations only as a result of the Assembly's request to the Soviet Union. In order to be sure of the subsequent vote, it was necessary that this invitation be signed by at least two-thirds of the members of the League of Nations, for admission to the League requires a two-thirds majority. In view of the fact that the League at that time consisted of 51 states, it was necessary, therefore, that the invitation be signed by 34 states. As a result of negotiations conducted by French Foreign Minister Barthou and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Benes, an invitation signed by representatives of 30 states was sent.

In this case, the reference to a position of neutrality covered up the fear of these countries of Germany, which could consider the invitation of the USSR to join the League of Nations after Germany itself had left the League, as an unfriendly step towards her. In September 1934, the USSR was officially admitted to the League of Nations. At the same time, during the negotiations, the question of granting the USSR a permanent seat in the Council of the League, which did not raise doubts, was resolved.

This was the direct result of both the general international situation in 1934 and the growing role and importance of the Soviet Union as a factor in peace. One of the immediate reasons that influenced, for example, the decision of Romania and Czechoslovakia to establish normal relations with the USSR was the Franco-Soviet rapprochement of 1933-1934. For a number of years, France not only did not contribute to the normalization of relations between the USSR and the countries of the Little Entente, but, on the contrary, in every way prevented any attempts to achieve this normalization. In 1934, France was interested not only in its own rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but also in creating an entire security system, a system that would include both France's allies in the person of the Little Entente and the USSR. Under these conditions, French diplomacy not only does not prevent the normalization of relations between the countries of the Little Entente and the USSR, but, on the contrary, in every possible way activates these relations. Under the direct influence of French diplomacy, the conference of foreign ministers of the countries of the Little Entente, which took place in Zagreb (Yugoslavia) on January 22, 1934, decided “on the timeliness of the resumption by the member states of the Little Entente of normal diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as soon as the necessary diplomatic relations are available. and political conditions.

Despite the fact that some participating countries agreed to conclude an Eastern Regional Pact, as a result of Germany's open opposition, Poland's objections and England's maneuvers, which continued the policy of German aspirations to the East, this idea in 1933-1935. failed to implement.

In the meantime, having become convinced of the unwillingness of a number of Western countries to conclude an Eastern Pact, the Soviet Union, in addition to the idea of a multilateral regional agreement, attempted to sign bilateral agreements on mutual assistance with a number of states. The significance of these treaties in terms of combating the threat of war in Europe was great.

In 1933, in parallel with the negotiations on the Eastern Pact and on the question of the USSR's entry into the League of Nations, negotiations began on the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance. The TASS report on the conversations between the Soviet leaders and the French Foreign Minister stated that the efforts of both countries are directed "toward one essential goal - to maintain peace through the organization of collective security."

The Soviet-Czechoslovak Mutual Assistance Treaty of May 16, 1935 was completely identical to the Soviet-French Pact of May 2, 1935, with the exception of Art. 2, introduced at the request of the Czechoslovak side, which stated that the parties to the treaty would come to the aid of each other only if France came to the aid of a state that had become a victim of aggression. Thus, the operation of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was made dependent on the behavior of France. The then Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Beneš, sincerely strove for rapprochement with the USSR and believed that such rapprochement was entirely in the fundamental interests of Czechoslovak security. That is why, unlike the Franco-Soviet pact, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was almost immediately ratified and the exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Moscow on June 9, 1935, during Beneš's visit to the capital of the USSR.

Mutual assistance treaties represented a further stage (compared to non-aggression treaties) in the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states in different social systems and could become important elements in the creation of a collective security system aimed at preserving European peace. Unfortunately, however, these treaties failed to play their part in preventing war. The Soviet-French treaty was not supplemented by an appropriate military convention that would have made it possible to ensure military cooperation between the two countries.

The treaty also did not provide for automatic actions, which significantly reduced its capabilities and effectiveness.

As for the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, its implementation was hampered by a clause that made the entry into force of the mutual obligations of both parties dependent on the actions of France. In France in the late 1930s the tendency to strive not to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressor, but to conciliation with it, to the connivance of the actions of German fascism, was becoming more and more fixed.

Equally unsuccessful were the attempts of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with England and mobilize the League of Nations. Already at the beginning of 1935, Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles (clause on the prohibition of weapons), which did not lead to any serious consequences for it. On the issue of the Italian attack on Abyssinia at the end of 1934-1935, although an urgent conference of the League of Nations was convened, it also did not decide anything. Adopted later, at the insistence of several countries, the sanctions against the aggression of Italy, provided for in Art. 16 of the League Charter were too lenient, and in July 1936 they were canceled. A number of other incidents also remained virtually unnoticed.

The pinnacle of the policy of condoning aggression was the Munich Pact between the leaders of Britain and France and the leaders of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. soviet republic politics security

The text of the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 established certain methods and conditions for the rejection of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia in favor of Germany "according to the agreement in principle" reached by the heads of four states: Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. Each of the parties "declared itself responsible for taking the necessary measures" to fulfill the contract. The list of these measures included the immediate evacuation of the Sudetenland from October 1 to 10, the release of all Sudeten Germans from military and police duties for four weeks, etc.

In September 1938, taking advantage of the difficult situation of Czechoslovakia, during the so-called Sudeten crisis, the Polish government decided to capture some areas of Czechoslovakia. On September 21, 1938, the Polish envoy in Prague presented the Czechoslovak government with demands for secession from Czechoslovakia and annexation to Poland of areas that the Polish government considered Polish. On September 23, the Polish envoy demanded an immediate response from the Czechoslovak government to this demand. On September 24, railway communication between Poland and Czechoslovakia was completely stopped.

The action of the Soviet government was aimed at providing diplomatic support to the Czech government. Despite the defiant tone of the Polish government's response to the submissions of the USSR government, Poland did not dare to immediately take action against Czechoslovakia. Only after the Munich Conference, namely on October 2, Poland captured the Teschensky district. This was done due to the fact that at the Munich Conference Chamberlain and Daladier completely "surrendered" to Hitler.

Germany demanded from the Czechoslovak government the recognition of the separation of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the dissolution of the Czechoslovak army, the abolition of the post of president of the republic and the establishment of a regent-ruler in her place.

On March 15, Czechoslovak President Hácha (who replaced the resigned Beneš) and Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky were summoned to Berlin to see Hitler. While they were driving there, German troops crossed the border of Czechoslovakia and began to occupy one city after another. When Gakh and Khvalkovsky came to Hitler, the latter, in the presence of Ribbentrop, suggested that they sign an agreement on the accession of the Czech Republic to Germany.
On March 16, 1939, the Slovak Prime Minister Tissot sent a telegram to Hitler asking him to take Slovakia under his protection. In addition to the USSR and the USA, all countries recognized the accession of Czechoslovakia to Germany.

The capture of Czechoslovakia by Hitler on March 15, 1939, the sharp aggravation of Polish-German relations and the economic agreement imposed on Romania, which turned Romania into a virtual vassal of Germany, led to some change in the position of Chamberlain, and after him Daladier. In the preceding period, stubbornly refusing negotiations repeatedly proposed by the Soviet government on the issue of strengthening the system of collective security, the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier in mid-April 1939 themselves made the USSR an offer to start negotiations on the creation of a tripartite peace front. The Soviet government accepted this proposal. In May 1939, negotiations began in Moscow between representatives of the USSR, Great Britain and France. These negotiations continued until August 23, 1939, with no results. The failure of these negotiations was caused by the position of the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier, who in reality did not at all seek to create a peace front directed against the German aggressor. With the help of Moscow negotiations, Chamberlain and Daladier intended to put political pressure on non-Hitler and force him to compromise with England and France. That is why the negotiations, which began in Moscow in May 1939, dragged on for so long and ultimately ended in failure. Specifically, the negotiations ran into certain difficulties, namely, Great Britain and France demanded that the USSR participate in treaties that provided for the immediate entry into the war of the Soviet Union in the event of aggression against these two countries and did not at all imply their mandatory assistance in the event of an attack on the allies of the USSR - the Baltic states . And this despite the fact that Chamberlain, in his speech on June 8, admitted that "the demands of the Russians that these states be included in the tripartite guarantee are well founded." Further, it was strange that Poland, which could be the direct object of German aggression and whose security guarantees were discussed during the negotiations, itself stubbornly refused to participate in these negotiations, and the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier did nothing to get her to them attract.

The position of the USSR during the negotiations in Moscow was determined and recorded in the speech of V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 31, 1939. These conditions remained unchanged throughout the entire negotiation process and were as follows: “The conclusion between England, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, which is exclusively defensive in nature; England, France and the USSR guaranteeing the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including without exception all the European countries bordering the USSR, against attack by an aggressor; the conclusion of a concrete agreement between Britain, France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of immediate and effective assistance to be rendered to each other and to the guaranteed states in the event of an attack by an aggressor.

In the second stage of the negotiations, Chamberlain and Daladier were forced to make concessions and agree to a guarantee against Hitler's possible aggression against the Baltic countries. However, in making this concession, they agreed only to a guarantee against direct aggression, i.e. direct armed attack by Germany on the Baltic countries, while at the same time refusing any guarantees in the event of the so-called "indirect aggression", that is, a pro-Hitler coup, as a result of which the actual capture of the Baltic countries by "peaceful" means could take place.

It should be noted that while during the negotiations with Hitler in 1938 Chamberlain traveled to Germany three times, negotiations in Moscow on the part of England and France were entrusted only to the respective ambassadors. This could not but affect the nature of the negotiations, as well as their pace. This suggests that the British and French did not want an agreement with the USSR based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, that is, the entire burden of obligations was formed on the USSR.

When, during the last stage of the negotiations, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, special negotiations were launched in parallel on the question of a military convention between the three states, then on the part of England and France they were entrusted to military representatives of little authority, who either did not have mandates to sign a military convention at all. or their mandates were manifestly inadequate.

All these and a number of other circumstances led to the fact that the negotiations in Moscow in the spring and summer of 1939 - the last attempt to create a system that would guarantee European countries from the aggression of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy - ended in failure.

Thus, the period 1933-1938. passed under the sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to implement a collective security system as a whole or for individual elements in order to prevent the outbreak of war.

The policy of appeasing the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to reach an agreement with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.

The development and adoption of joint collective measures to ensure security turned out to be a much deeper and more complex element of peaceful coexistence than the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries with different social systems and even the development of trade and economic ties between them.

After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, first of all, the European powers, which suffered innumerable victims and losses as a result of the war.

Attempts to find a definition of the attacking side began almost from the moment the League of Nations was created. The Charter of the League of Nations uses the concept of aggression and aggressor, however, the concept itself is not deciphered. So, for example, Art. Article 16 of the League Charter speaks of international sanctions against the attacking side, but does not define the attacking side itself. During a number of years of the existence of the League, various commissions worked, which unsuccessfully tried to define the concept of the attacking side. In the absence of a generally accepted definition, the right to determine the attacking side in each individual conflict belonged to the Council of the League of Nations.

In the early 1930s The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of this or that conflict between the USSR and any other country. Proceeding from these considerations, already during this period, the Soviet Union put forward proposals to a number of European states for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with the aim of "strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of the "deep world crisis now being experienced." Soviet proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact and peaceful settlement of conflicts are accepted and implemented at this time by far not by all countries (among the countries that accepted this proposal were Germany, France, Finland, Turkey, the Baltic states, Romania, Persia and Afghanistan). All these treaties were identical and guaranteed the mutual inviolability of the borders and territories of both states; an obligation not to participate in any treaties, agreements and conventions that are clearly hostile to the other party, etc.

Over time, given the strengthening of aggressive tendencies in international politics, the question arises of the need to define the concepts of aggression and the attacking side. For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the issue of the need to conclude a special convention to determine the attacking side at the disarmament conference in December 1932. The Soviet draft definition of the attacking side provided for the recognition of such a state in an international conflict as “the first to declare war on another state; whose armed forces, even without a declaration of war, invade the territory of another state; whose land, sea or air forces will land or enter the borders of another state or knowingly attack the ships or aircraft of the latter without the permission of its government or violate the conditions of such permission; which will establish a naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state," while "no consideration of a political, strategic or economic order, as well as reference to a significant amount of invested capital or other special interests that may exist in this territory, nor the denial of its distinctive signs of the state cannot justify an attack.”

On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally submitted to the Conference Bureau. By decision of the general commission of the conference, a special subcommittee was formed under the chairmanship of the Greek delegate of the well-known lawyer Politis, which worked in May 1933. The Soviet draft, with some relatively minor amendments, was adopted by this subcommittee on May 24, 1933. The Soviet government decided to use the stay in London during the Economic Conference of a number of foreign ministers and offered to sign the said convention. On July 3 and 4, 1933, an identical convention was signed between the USSR and Lithuania. Finland later joined the convention of July 3, 1933. Thus, eleven states accepted the definition of aggression proposed by the Soviet Union. The participation of Turkey and Romania in two conventions of identical content is explained by the desire of the countries that were part of the Balkan Entente (Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece) and the Little Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) to sign a special convention as a single complex of states. This was another step in an attempt to create an effective security system in Europe.

However, at this time there is an increasing destabilization of the situation and the growth of aggressive tendencies in international relations. It takes very little time for totalitarian fascist regimes to be established in Italy and Germany. Under these conditions, the topic of creating a new system of international security, which could prevent the already quite real threat of war, acquires particular relevance.

For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933. On December 29, 1933, in a speech at the IV session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. Litvinov outlined the new directions of Soviet foreign policy for the coming years, the essence of which was as follows:

non-aggression and neutrality in any conflict. For the Soviet Union of 1933, broken by a terrible famine, the passive resistance of tens of millions of peasants (a conscripted contingent in case of war), purges of the party, the prospect of being drawn into the war would mean, as Litvinov made it clear, a real catastrophe;

appeasement policy towards Germany and Japan, despite the aggressive and anti-Soviet course of their foreign policy in previous years. This policy was to be pursued until it became evidence of weakness; in any case, state interests should have prevailed over ideological solidarity: “We, of course, have our own opinion about the German regime, we, of course, are sensitive to the suffering of our German comrades, but the last thing you can reproach us, Marxists, is that we allow the feeling of dominating our politics"

participation, free from illusions, in efforts to create a system of collective security, with the hope that the League of Nations "can play its role more effectively than in previous years in preventing or localizing conflicts";

openness towards Western democracies - also without any particular illusions, given that in these countries, due to the frequent change of governments, there is no continuity in the field of foreign policy; in addition, the presence of strong pacifist and defeatist currents, reflecting the distrust of the working people of these countries in the ruling classes and politicians, was fraught with the fact that these countries could “sacrifice their national interests to please the private interests of the ruling classes.”

The Soviet proposals also provided for mutual consultations between the participants in the pact in the event of a threat of attack on any of the participants.

Laval's foreign policy was quite different from that of his predecessor. On the question of the Eastern Pact, Laval's tactics were as follows: in view of the mood of French public opinion, which at that moment was in the vast majority in favor of bringing the negotiations on the Eastern Pact to a conclusion, Laval continued to make reassuring public assurances in this direction. At the same time, he made it clear to Germany that he was ready to make a direct agreement with her and at the same time with Poland. One of the options for such an agreement was Laval's project on a tripartite guarantee pact (France, Poland, Germany). It goes without saying that such a guarantee pact would be directed against the USSR. The intentions of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs were clear to the Soviet Union, which aimed to neutralize such intrigues: on December 11, 1934, Czechoslovakia joined the Franco-Soviet agreement of December 5, 1934. This agreement involved informing the other parties to the agreement about any proposals from other states to negotiate "which could prejudice the preparation and conclusion of the Eastern Regional Pact, or an agreement contrary to the spirit that guides both governments."

The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations acquired a special character due to the fact that in 1933 two aggressive states, Germany and Japan, left the League.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, referring to their position of neutrality, evaded signing the general invitation sent to the USSR, and limited themselves to a statement that their delegates in the League would vote for the admission of the USSR to the League, and separate notices expressing their benevolent attitude to the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. In this case, the reference to a position of neutrality covered up the fear of these countries of Germany, which could consider the invitation of the USSR to join the League of Nations after Germany itself had left the League, as an unfriendly step towards her. In September 1934, the USSR was officially admitted to the League of Nations. At the same time, during the negotiations, the question of granting the USSR a permanent seat in the Council of the League, which did not raise doubts, was resolved.

Unlike Barthou, his successor, the new French Foreign Minister, who took office in October 1934, Laval did not at all seek to ensure collective security and looked at the Franco-Soviet pact only as an instrument in his policy of dealing with the aggressor. After his visit to Moscow while passing through Warsaw, Laval explained to the Polish Foreign Minister Beck that "the Franco-Soviet pact aims not so much to attract help from the Soviet Union or to help it against possible aggression, but to prevent a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union." This was necessary for Laval in order to frighten Hitler with rapprochement with the USSR, to force him to an agreement with France.

During the negotiations conducted by Laval (October 1934 - May 1935), the latter tried in every possible way to eliminate the automaticity of mutual assistance (in the event of aggression), which the USSR insisted on, and to subordinate this assistance to the complex and intricate procedure of the League of Nations. The result of such lengthy negotiations was the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty on May 2, 1935. The text of the treaty provided for the need “to start immediate consultations in order to take measures if the USSR or France were the subject of a threat or danger of attack by any European state; provide mutual assistance and support to each other in the event that the USSR or France would be the subject of an unprovoked attack by any European state.

However, Laval's true policy was also revealed in his systematic avoidance of concluding a military convention, without which the pact on mutual assistance would lose its concrete content and would have stumbled upon a number of significant obstacles in its application. Such a convention was not signed either at the time of the conclusion of the pact, or during the entire period of its validity. Finally, it is important to note that, having signed the mutual assistance pact, Laval was by no means in a hurry to ratify it. He made the very ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact a new means of blackmail in an attempt to reach an agreement with Nazi Germany. The pact was ratified after Laval's resignation by Sarro's cabinet (the Chamber of Deputies ratified the Franco-Soviet pact on February 27, 1936, and the Senate on March 12, 1936).

In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs said in June 1935 that "we can, not without a sense of pride, congratulate ourselves that we were the first to fully implement and complete one of those measures of collective security, without which peace cannot be secured in Europe at the present time.

As a result of these illegal actions of the aggressor countries and the lack of a corresponding reaction to them, the entire Versailles-Washington system of international relations was actually destroyed. All attempts by the USSR to influence the course of events in any way did not lead to anything. Thus, Litvinov made a number of accusatory speeches at the conferences of the League of Nations, which stated that “although the Soviet Union is formally not interested in cases of violation of international agreements by Germany and Italy due to its non-participation in the violated treaties, these circumstances do not prevent it from finding its place in among those members of the Council who most resolutely record their indignation at the violation of international obligations, condemn it and join in the most effective means of preventing such violations in the future. The USSR, thus, expressed its disagreement with attempts to “fight for peace without upholding at the same time the inviolability of international obligations; to fight for a collective security organization without taking collective measures against the violation of these obligations" and disagreement with the possibility of preserving the League of Nations "if it does not comply with its own decisions, but teaches the aggressors not to reckon with any of its recommendations, any of its warnings, with any of her threats" and "passing by violations of these treaties or getting off with verbal protests and not taking more effective measures." But that didn't have any effect either. It was obvious that the League of Nations had already ended its existence as any effective instrument of international politics.

The pinnacle of the policy of condoning aggression was the Munich Pact between the leaders of Britain and France and the leaders of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

The inevitable immediate result of the Munich Agreement was Hitler's takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. On March 14, with the help of Hitler, an "independent" Slovak state was created. Czech troops were removed from the territory of Slovakia. On the same day, the Hungarian government announced that it insisted on the annexation of the Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary (by the beginning of 1939, Hungary had completely entered the fairway of the foreign policy of Germany and Italy, having completely lost its independence of policy). Germany demanded from the Czechoslovak government the recognition of the separation of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the dissolution of the Czechoslovak army, the abolition of the post of president of the republic and the establishment of a regent-ruler in her place.

On March 15, Czechoslovak President Hácha (who replaced the resigned Beneš) and Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky were summoned to Berlin to see Hitler. While they were driving there, German troops crossed the border of Czechoslovakia and began to occupy one city after another. When Gakh and Khvalkovsky came to Hitler, the latter, in the presence of Ribbentrop, suggested that they sign an agreement on the accession of the Czech Republic to Germany.

On March 16, 1939, the Slovak Prime Minister Tissot sent a telegram to Hitler asking him to take Slovakia under his protection. In addition to the USSR and the USA, all countries recognized the accession of Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to implement a collective security system as a whole or for individual elements in order to prevent the outbreak of war.

EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA AND PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY (1814-1945)

Basova Valeria Leonidovna

undergraduate, department of history, SUSU (NRU), Chelyabinsk

Krivonogova Svetlana Anatolievna

scientific supervisor, Ph.D. ist. Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of History, South Ural State University (NRU), Chelyabinsk

The problem of creating a stable system of international relations, the conditions for peaceful interaction between European powers has long worried great philosophers, scientists, cultural figures and politicians. Such interest manifested itself in the works of the French thinker J.J. Rousseau, Czech King Podebrad, Duke de Sully.

Collective security is a problem on a global scale, the specificity of which lies in the fact that it affects the interests of the entire community and requires joint efforts to solve it. The transformation of the ideas of creating a system of collective security is a historically complex process. This explains the presence in modern historical science of different points of view on this issue. The phenomenon of "collective security" appeared relatively recently. It was first introduced in 1922 as part of the work of the League of Nations and meant the cooperation of states in maintaining international peace and suppressing acts of aggression. Over time, the essence of the concept has been transformed and supplemented with the development of international relations and international law. In the modern sense, the term "collective security" is interpreted as a system for maintaining security, both on a global and regional scale, provided by the joint concerted efforts of all states. Thus, the concept of "collective security" is the leading one in the system of international relations and requires appropriate attention.

1. 1899-1919 considered as a period of formation of the prerequisites for the creation of a collective security system, the emergence of the first local projects containing some principles of collective action. The beginning of this process was laid by the first Hague Conference (1899), which discussed the issues of a peaceful solution to international clashes, and completed by the formation of the League of Nations, as an international organization within the framework of the new world order;

2. 1919-1922 - the period of development and introduction into scientific circulation of the concept of collective security, the legal consolidation of its basic principles;

3. 1922-1933 - the emergence of the principle of countering the aggressor, the definition of the concept of "aggressor";

4. 1933-1945 - manifestation of the failure of the principles of collective security within the framework of the League of Nations, the development of new ones and the improvement of existing ones and their legal consolidation in the conditions of the formation and activities of the UN.

This periodization shows the gradual introduction of the principles of collective security into the practice of international relations, their improvement and active use within the existing system of international relations.

The first experience of implementing the ideas of peaceful regulation, which showed the need to develop the principles of collective security, is the subject of controversy among historians and politicians. However, there is no doubt that the international relations of the period before the outbreak of the First World War were in need of reorganization. Local associations were effective only in conditions of regional clashes between states and did not pretend to regulate the situation in the world. They did not contain the principles of collective security in their pure form, but only their individual aspects. However, it should be borne in mind that the experience gained within the framework of these local formations was laid in the foundation of the League of Nations.

Consideration of projects for the creation of the League of Nations is the most important aspect of this study, since the problems that arose during the formation period will subsequently become the reasons for the failure of the League. The variety of proposals for the structure and activities of the first international organization of its kind, of course, demonstrates the interest of countries in the further development of the principles of collective security in international relations. However, upon a detailed study of each project, we come to the conclusion that all of them contained those aspects that, to one degree or another, brought great benefits to one or a small group of states. In addition, the League of Nations, with all the diversity of its participants, included the maximum number for 1934 of only 58 countries. Thus, not all states of the world participated in the regulation of conflicts and had the right to speak out at the Council of the League. It should be taken into account that the League of Nations, according to the Charter, divided the countries into groups, some of which were absolutely from the mechanism of regulation and decision-making.

However, the contribution of the League of Nations to ensuring security within the framework of the Versailles-Washington system of international relations, of course, cannot be underestimated. First of all, it should be noted that it was the first organization of its kind built on the principles of collective security, which means that its work experience is invaluable in the further formation of international relations systems.

Undoubtedly, the League of Nations took measures to resolve the situation in the world, but practically from the first years of its existence, shortcomings in the structure appeared. Some aspects in the Charter were practically ignored, others were not specified, which made it possible to circumvent the principles of collective security and pursue a policy of priority of one's own interests over those of others. First of all, this concerned the countries that received the right to vote and resolve issues. In fact, the mechanisms for regulating international relations were concentrated in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. The colonial system was destroyed only in words, but in practice the Mandatory system was its direct successor.

The interwar period showed the failure of the Versailles-Washington system in general and the League of Nations in particular. The restrictions enshrined in the Charter of the League were used by countries as a defense of their interests. So, Germany in 1933 withdrew from the League of Nations, presenting an infringement of its rights on the issue of disarmament. The inconsistency of actions and the lack of concretization of the most important aspects of collective security led to another redistribution of the world. The maturing of revanchist sentiments in Germany and Italy, which originated back in the 1920s on the basis of the Versailles Peace Treaty, led to an increase in contradictions within the League of Nations and an inevitable turn in international relations towards the deployment of hostilities.

The introduction by the Soviet Union into international law of the concept of "aggressor" could not stabilize the situation. The growth of international contradictions within the framework of the League of Nations led to the withdrawal or exclusion of some countries from its composition. In fact, the exit from the League unleashed the hands of the aggressor countries and provided complete freedom of action. This is one of the reasons for the formation of hotbeds of war.

Thus, we can conclude that the League of Nations from the very beginning of its work was doomed to failure, because it did not contain specific principles of collective security, and also did not stipulate measures to prevent the activities of countries that did not comply with the terms of the Charter. Consequently, the causes of the Second World War lie in the Treaty of Versailles, which does not reflect all sides and aspects of international relations, as well as in the activities of the League of Nations, which is unable to regulate the processes taking place from 1920 to 1938.

However, we should not forget that the United States of America was not included in the League of Nations, although it was created according to the project of Woodrow Wilson. This position of the United States left them outside the system, but did not completely exclude them. The Americans did not become outside observers, but rather the opposite - they led the system without participating in it. Therefore, we should talk about parallel developing directions of international relations of this period: states that are members of the League of Nations and not members of it.

In this direction, international relations developed very intensively, in no way inferior to the League of Nations. The countries actively developed the ideas of collective security, trying to ensure the maximum possible positive situation in Europe. The Briand-Kelogah Pact, touching upon the issues of renunciation of war, gave guarantees for the regulation of conflict situations through diplomatic means. An addition to it was a conference on disarmament, held at the initiative of the USSR, at which Litvinov proposed a project for collective security. The participants in the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense. However, the growing revanchist sentiment in Germany and Italy prevented the stabilization of the situation in Europe. The inability to stop the aggression led to the emergence of hotbeds of war. The principles of collective security were not reflected in the plans of the participants in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

However, the war served as a stimulus for the development of a new theory of international relations. Taking into account the mistakes of the past made it possible to develop stronger principles of collective security. The anti-Hitler coalition tried to combine these principles and the practice of conducting coordinated military operations. However, despite the success of joint efforts, the coalition countries pursued their goals in the conditions of war. That is why the foundations formulated within the framework of this interstate association could operate only in the conditions of the existence of an external enemy. We should also not forget about the existence of contradictions within the coalition, which gave rise to disputes, for example, on the opening of the Second Front. Thus, the Anti-Hitler coalition could exist only during the war and had no continuation after the end of hostilities.

The idea of creating a new international organization, which was developing in parallel with the Anti-Hitler coalition, made it possible for countries to work out the basic principles for the activities of the United Nations. The existing experience in building a system of international relations gained in the interwar period played a big role. Revising the essence of the concept of "collective security", expanding its basic principles and taking into account the mistakes of the past laid a solid foundation for the new organization. Detailed consideration of all aspects of international relations in a number of documents of a series of international conferences on the structure of the world after the end of World War II. There is a separation of the war from the further development of international relations in order to exclude the manifestation of revanchist sentiments. Much attention is paid to the problem of disarmament on equal terms, regardless of the status of the country.

The UN Charter regulates a wide range of issues, and the structure of the administrative apparatus excludes the existence of a colonial system in the world. The equality of the countries that are members of the United Nations is a fundamental principle of the existence of the organization. Thus, the prevailing in the period 1939-1945. The Yalta-Postdam system of international relations has absorbed elements of both positive and negative experience of previous attempts to create a system based on the principles of collective security. Despite the inconsistency in the direction of policy, the countries managed to reach a consensus and build a new model of international cooperation. The creation and, for the most part, the successful activity of the United Nations is at present the guarantor of the stability of the international community.

The basis of the international relations that are taking shape in our time was laid back in the period from 1814 to 1945. Therefore, having studied the evolution of the idea and practice of collective security, we came to the conclusion that the modern system of collective security is based on its main principles:

·reduction of armaments discussed in the Hague Convention and further developed in the Versailles Peace Treaty;

• peaceful regulation of conflicts, originating in the work of the Congress of Vienna and enshrined in the Washington Conference;

the importance of the personal presence of the heads of state at the negotiations, which became mandatory in the 19th century.

Thus, studying the experience of the past, taking into account mistakes and unquestioning adherence to the principles of collective security are the most important aspects of the successful development of international relations.

Bibliography:

1.Zakharova N.V. Legal issues of ensuring collective security in Europe: monograph. M., 1959. - 110 p.

2. Ilyukhina R.M. The League of nations. 1919-1934: monograph. M., 1982. - 357 p.

3. Sobakin V.K. Collective security is a guarantee of peaceful coexistence: a monograph. M.: ed. IMO, 1962 - 518 p.

4. Tsygankov P.A. International relations: textbook. M.: New school, 1996. - 590 p.

1. Galicia-Volyn principality South-Western Russia

2. Novgorod land North-Western Russia

3. Vladimir-Suzdal Principality of North-Eastern Russia

6 The struggle of Russia with the conquerors in the 13th century. Tatar-Mongol yoke and its influence on the fate of Russian lands.

1 They had very good cavalry

2 The Mongol-Tatar army had no rear. Feed once a day, hand-me-down food

3 High military art

4 The most severe discipline.

1. Destruction of productive forces

1. Deep economic crisis

10. Causes, course and consequences of the Time of Troubles in the early 17th century.

11. Domestic and foreign policy under the first Romanovs. Cathedral Code of 1649.

12. Formation of Russian absolutism. Peter's transformations1.

13 Peter 1 began preparations for war immediately after returning from the Great Embassy. In 1699, the Northern Union was created, which included: Russia, the Commonwealth, Denmark and Saxony.

14. Palace coups.

1. There is a tendency to strengthen absolutism. The personality of the monarch plays an important role

1764 - secularization of church lands, seizure of part of the lands from the church; the role of the church was reduced, and the corvée was replaced by cash dues.

16. Culture of the 18th century.

18. Russia's foreign policy in the early 19th century. Patriotic War of 1812

19. Movement of the Decembrists.

20. Domestic and foreign policy of Russia during the reign of Nicholas 1.

21. Culture of Russia in the first half of the 19th century.

22. Socio-political thought in Russia in the 30-50s of the 19th century.

23. Peasant reform of 1861: the reasons for the abolition of serfdom, the content and consequences of the reform.

February 19, 1861 - Alexander II signed the Manifesto on the abolition of serfdom.

24. Industrial revolution; acceleration of the process of industrialization in the 19th century and its consequences. Alexander's liberal reforms in Russia.

25. Populism in Russia: character, content, stages of development, currents and leaders.

26. Socio-economic development of post-reform Russia. Counter-reforms of the 80s - early 90s.

27. Socio-economic development of Russia at the turn of the 19th-20th century. Witte's reforms.

28. International relations in the late 19th - early 20th century. Formation of the triple alliance and the Entente. Russo-Japanese War: Causes, Character, Consequences.

29. The first Russian revolution of 1905-1907: causes, character. Change of policy. Systems of Russia: creation of polit. Party, Mr. Thought

III stage. From January 1906 to June 3, 1907 - the recession and retreat of the revolution. Main events: peasant unrest, sailors' uprising, national liberation movement in Poland, Finland, Ukraine.

31. Russia in the First World War 1914-1918.

1. Chauvinism and nationalism in most countries

3. The desire to extinguish the conflict within the country.

32. The crisis of the autocracy and the February Revolution in Russia in 1917. Dual power.

33. Domestic and foreign policy of the Provisional Government March-October 1917.

35. Civil war. Russian emigration.

36 Formation of the USSR (briefly)

December 30, 1922 At the 1st Congress of Soviets, the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was proclaimed. The Congress adopted the Declaration and the Treaty.

37. Socio-economic development of the USSR: industrialization, collectivization, cultural revolution. First five-year plans

38. The struggle of the USSR for peace and collective security.

39 of the USSR on the eve and in the initial period of the Second World War.

November 20, 1942 The Stalingrad Front came out. The offensive for the Germans was unexpected. As a result, the German group near Stalingrad was surrounded.

40. The USSR in the post-war years 1945-1953: economy, social and political life, culture, foreign policy. Cold War.

42. The beginning of the de-Stalinization of society

43. Period of stagnation. USSR in 1964-1984

1. L.I. Brezhnev - General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;

2. A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in October 1980. He was replaced by N.A. Tikhonov

3. M.A. Suslov, who was in charge of ideological work.

44. The USSR during the years of perestroika 1985-1991. The collapse of the ss.

45. Yeltsin decade. 1993 constitution

38. The struggle of the USSR for peace and collective security.

In 1937 the capitalist world was engulfed in a new economic crisis, which aggravated all the contradictions of capitalism.

The main force of imperialist reaction was the aggressive military side of Germany, Italy and Japan, which launched active preparations for war. The goal of these states was a new redistribution of the world.

To stop the impending war, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of a collective security system. However, the initiative of the USSR was not supported. The governments of Britain, France and the USA, contrary to the fundamental interests of the peoples, made a deal with the aggressors. The behavior of the leading capitalist powers predetermined the further tragic course of events. In 1938, Austria became a victim of fascist aggression. The governments of Britain, France and the USA did not take any measures to curb the aggressor. Austria was occupied by German troops and incorporated into the German Empire. Germany and Italy openly intervened in the Spanish Civil War and helped to overthrow the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic in March 1939 and establish a fascist dictatorship in the country.

In 1938, Germany demanded from Czechoslovakia the transfer to her of the Sudetenland, populated predominantly by Germans. In September 1938 in Mungen, at a meeting of the heads of governments of Germany, Italy, France and England, it was decided to wrest from Czechoslovakia the region demanded by Germany. The representative of Czechoslovakia was not admitted to the meeting.

The head of the British government signed a declaration of mutual non-aggression with Hitler in Munich. Two months later, in December 1938, the French government signed a similar declaration.

In October 1938, the Sudetenland was annexed to Germany. In March 1939, the whole of Czechoslovakia was occupied by Germany. The USSR was the only state that did not recognize this capture. When the threat of occupation hung over Czechoslovakia, the government of the USSR declared its readiness to provide her with military support if she asked for help. However, the bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia, betraying national interests, refused the offered assistance.

In March 1939, Germany seized the port of Klaipeda and the territory adjacent to it from Lithuania. The impunity of Germany's aggressive actions encouraged fascist Italy, which in April 1939 captured Albania.

A threatening situation was also developing on the eastern borders of our country. In the summer of 1938, the Japanese military provoked an armed conflict on the Far Eastern state border of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. The Red Army, as a result of fierce battles, defeated and pushed back the aggressors. In May 1939, militarist Japan attacked the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, hoping to turn the territory of the MPR into a springboard for further aggression against the USSR. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the MPR, Soviet troops acted jointly with the Mongolian soldiers against the Japanese aggressors. After four months of stubborn fighting, the Japanese troops were utterly defeated.

In the spring of 1939, at the initiative of the Soviet government, negotiations began between the USSR, Britain and France on the conclusion of a tripartite mutual assistance pact. Negotiations, which lasted until July 1939, ended in vain due to the position taken by the Western powers. The British and French governments also opposed the conclusion of a tripartite agreement on military cooperation directed against fascist Germany. For negotiations in Moscow, they landed delegations that were not endowed with the necessary powers.

At the same time, in the summer of 1939, secret negotiations began between Britain and Germany on the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on military, economic and political issues.

By August 1939, the stubborn unwillingness of the Western powers to take effective measures to curb fascist aggression, their desire to reach an agreement with Germany, became evident.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union agreed to the German proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. In August 1939, such an agreement was concluded for a period of 10 years. By agreeing to conclude an agreement with Germany, the Soviet Union destroyed the plans to create a united anti-Soviet front of the imperialist states and frustrated the calculations of the inspirers of the Munich policy, who were striving to hasten a military clash between the USSR and Germany. The Soviet government understood that the treaty did not rid the USSR of the threat of a German military attack. However, it gave a gain in time, necessary to further strengthen the country's defense capability.

RESULTS: The XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in March 1939, determined that the USSR had entered the period of completing the construction of a socialist society and a gradual transition from socialism to communism. The congress formulated the main economic task: to overtake and overtake the main capitalist countries in per capita output. It took 10-15 years to solve this problem. The plan of the third five-year plan (1938-1942) was considered and approved at the congress.

The decisions of the congress were met with enthusiasm. New enterprises were put into operation, much attention was paid to increasing the activity of the masses. However, the moral and psychological state of society remained contradictory. On the one hand, the Soviet people were proud of their labor successes, which were constantly reported by the mass media, believed in a bright distant future, and on the other hand, mass repressions gave rise to a sense of fear and uncertainty about the future. In addition, a number of harsh measures have already been taken aimed at strengthening labor and production discipline. So, in 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued decrees “On the transition to an eight-hour working day, a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers from enterprises and institutions”, “On the prohibition of unauthorized departure from work of tractor drivers and combine operators working in machine and tractor stations”, for which absenteeism and leaving the enterprise without the permission of the administration were criminalized. Thus, the state actually attached workers and employees to the enterprise. Production rates were increased, prices were reduced, and failure to produce a minimum of workdays by collective farmers could lead to criminal prosecution. However, the attempts of the country's leadership to achieve the set goals, developing the enthusiasm of the masses and at the same time using the method of intimidation, did not give the desired result. The three-year plan of the Third Five-Year Plan was not fulfilled.

In connection with the threat of war, great importance was attached to the development of military production, especially in the East of the country. In the Volga region, in the Urals, in Siberia, there was an intensive construction of defense enterprises based on the local fuel and metallurgical base. The pace of development of the defense industry was high. If during the three years of the Third Five-Year Plan the growth of industrial production was on the whole 13.2% per year, then in the military branches it was 39%. Particular importance was attached to the creation of the latest types of military equipment. Research organizations were enlarged, design bureaus and experimental workshops were created at the leading defense plants; the so-called sharashki (special prison No. 1 in official documents) were actively operating - closed design bureaus, where repressed specialists worked (in particular, the famous aircraft designers A.N. Tupolev and P.O. Sukhoi). Promising models of military equipment were developed: the KV heavy tank, the T-34 medium tank; aircraft: Yak-1, LaGG-3, MIG-3 fighters; Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-2 bomber; rocket launchers on machines ("katish"), etc. However, it was not possible to establish the production of new equipment on a mass scale by the beginning of the war.

Since the end of the 1930s, and especially after the war with Finland, which revealed many of the weak points of the Red Army, intensive measures were taken to increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Their total number by June 1941 amounted to 5.7 million people; Rifle, tank, aviation, mechanized divisions were additionally formed, airborne troops, engineering and technical units were increased; the network of military schools expanded, 19 military academies operated, in which command personnel were trained. However, it was not possible to make up for the monstrous losses from the mass repressions of the 30s, when 80% of the senior officers of the army were destroyed. The professional level of command personnel was low, advanced methods of armed struggle were not mastered, the Soviet military doctrine was based on an offensive character and practically did not involve long-term defensive actions. All this predetermined the major defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

Portal for the student. Self-training

After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, first of all, the European powers, which suffered innumerable victims and losses as a result of the war.

38. The struggle of the USSR for peace and collective security.

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