Alexander Zhibrov/ Kirovograd photo from the author's archive

Major A.Dudkin

At the end of December 1979, a squadron of Yak-28R aircraft from the 39th Separate Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment (ORAL) flew from the Balkhash airfield to the Mary 2 airfield. Soon this unit began to carry out reconnaissance flights over Afghanistan. The author served in the 39th ORAL as a Yak 28R pilot and participated in those events, which he described in the article “Dove of Peace over Afghanistan”, placed in “AiV”, No. 3 "98. Now we offer readers one more of his material , telling about the combat work in the Afghan sky of another unit of the 39th regiment.

In early January 1980, the commander of the 39th ORAP was given the next task - to form an operational group of four MiG-25RB and immediately send it to the Karshi airfield (TurkVO).

By January 4, four "twenty-fifths" were prepared with various sets of reconnaissance equipment and the personnel of the group were selected. It included five pilots: the commander of the operational group, deputy. c-ra of the 39th ORAP p / p-k Mufazalov, commander of the 1st AE, Mr. Gennady Shcherbinin, flight commander, Mr. Anatoly Lopatin, head. air-fire and tactical training Mr. Anatoly Dudkin, Art. pilot Mr. Andrey Dobrynin.

An application for a flight had already been submitted, but, as is often the case in aviation, the weather intervened in the events. It was foggy, it was snowing, and the group had to sit ready for more than a week in the recreation room near the TV, chess and backgammon. Weather conditions improved only after January 12, and four crews immediately flew to Karshi. About 30 technical personnel and Mr. Dobrynin arrived there on the An-12.

In fact, preparations for aerial reconnaissance flights began immediately. The group had two main tasks: electronic intelligence (RTR) along the borders with Iran and Pakistan; aerial photography of designated areas of the area.

The most "heavy" test turned out with the placement of the group. The commander of the local 87th ORAP, as a senior aviation chief, allocated an abandoned toilet or washbasin 3x4 m in size for its headquarters, where work began after a 3-hour "repair". The flight and technical staff were placed in a barracks devoid of any amenities for 150 people. The work of pilots is generally associated with great psycho-physical stress, and the crews of such an aircraft as the MiG-25, even more so. Remembering that trip, the MiG pilots then liked to compare their conditions in preparation for flights and rest with those of their overseas colleagues flying the SR-71 and U-2 (a detailed article appeared in the Foreign Military Review, which provided abundant food for thought). For our group, “everything was easier,” and they earned “more”: everyone got field money for 1 ruble. 50 kop. per day + allowance*. Moreover, the pilots of the Yakov group who were sitting in Mary paid 1 rub. for a hotel, and MiG pilots were not charged for Spartan housing, and they "rowed money with a shovel."

Combat work began as soon as the weather allowed. Particularly impressive was the first flight, which was carried out by Mr. Dudkin, who received the task of conducting RTR along the border at an altitude of 9000 m. Over the years of service, he was repeatedly “lucky” for special cases: only in recent years, the engine stopped 3 or 4 times in flight; when landing on an aircraft that had undergone routine maintenance at the TEC, a wheel fell off; during the alignment, the engine speed involuntarily increased to the “maximum”, etc. So at that time another test fell on Anatoly's lot. Twilight was beginning, a fighter regiment was being built at the airfield, which, it seems, was even specially tightened to watch the spectacular takeoff of the MiG-25. And I must say, the spectacle exceeded all expectations. The fact is that when preparing the aircraft for departure, the technician skewedly closed the neck of the fuel tank in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe keels. When the pilot taxied to the runway and gave the engines maximum thrust, the fuel knocked out the cover and went into the tail. Then Dudkin turned on the afterburner, and an impressive picture appeared before the eyes of the astonished "public": a MiG-25 takes off, and behind it a "afterburner" torch 30-35 meters long stretches!

"Money content (salary) of the flight commander at that time amounted to a little more than 400 rubles per month. "" Standard approach with a flight in a circle, the so-called box.

The flights were led by Mr. Shcherbinin, next to whom at the KDP was the p / p-k Mufazalov and someone from the local regiment. While they were assessing the situation, the plane took off from the runway. The local chief advised: “He has a fire, let him turn away and jump!”. But. confident in the high qualifications of their pilot, the officers of the 39th ORAP made a different decision. As a result, the command followed: "Perform a 2x180" approach and land immediately!

And so Tolya Dudkin began to bridge on the runway. An experienced pilot, who was then about 40 years old, was able to cleanly grind an aircraft with a large flight weight (almost 40 tons) at a speed of 450-440 km / h. The fire stopped after the afterburner was turned off. The landing gear survived, the parachute burned in the container came out, and the plane rolled out at least 200-300 meters, but remained intact. The pilot, only by opening the lantern and looking at the keels, realized what was the matter: "The tail was smoking and all ... was in kerosene."

Our group had no more incidents in the air, but two incidents occurred on the ground. In February, a conscript died after drinking denatured alcohol instead of alcohol by mistake. Two weeks later, the commander of the 87th ORAP around midnight went around the "posts" at the airfield and he wanted to look into the window of our group headquarters. And there, four pilots had just poured 100 grams each ... What motivated the regiment commander - I don’t know, but in order to look out the window from the street, I had to find a crack in the blackout that covered it, and even try not to fall. The vigilant colonel broke into the headquarters, accused the MiG-25 pilots of wholesale drunkenness (although only two had time to sip), took them away as “things. dock "bottle and shouting" I will call Moscow "ran away. He only got through to the district headquarters in Alma-Ata, raised a fuss, and soon four pilots of the 39th ORAP were replaced. The houses did not make strong organizational conclusions, but they were shaken at the party meeting.

Our MiGs did not fly over Afghanistan for a long time. The flights were carried out sporadically, along the borders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and in modes that did not reveal all the advantages of the aircraft: mainly, at an altitude of 9000 m. , MiG-21R, An-30, too expensive, and risky. At the end of March or in early April, the group returned home - to Balkhash. In total, she had about 30 sorties on her account.

Mastering the MiG-25 in the Armed Forces of the USSR was entrusted to the Centers for Combat Employment and Retraining of Flight Personnel in Lipetsk (Frontline Aviation) and Savostleyka (Air Defense Aviation). The leading combat units were the 47th Separate Guards Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment (OGRAP) in Shatalovo near Moscow and the interceptor regiment in Pravdinsk (Gorky, now Nizhny Novgorod region). Subsequently, air units stationed in various regions of the vast country, as well as located on the territory of Poland and the GDR, where groups of Soviet troops were located, were armed with new aircraft. Almost all armies and air defense districts received interceptors. For example, in the 8th separate army there were four air units armed with MiG-25s: the 146th GIAP in Vasilkov near Kyiv, the 738th IAP in Zaporozhye, the 933rd IAP in Dnepropetrovsk and the 83rd IAP in Rostov. According to the state, each regiment of a three-squadron was supposed to have 30 combat vehicles and 4-6 “sparks”. In front-line aviation, MiG-25s entered separate reconnaissance aviation regiments and were represented in most military districts and groups of forces abroad. So, in the Carpathian Military District, the “twenty-fifths” were located in Kolomyia, the 48th OGRAP, in the Central Asian - the 39th ORAP (Balkhash), in the Northern Group of Forces - the 164th OGRAP (Brzheg, then Kshiva). The aircraft fleet of such regiments was mixed: as a rule, one squadron flew the Yak-28R, the other flew MiGs, with several modifications that differed in target equipment. MiG-25BM electronic countermeasure aircraft were assembled in three squadrons, which became part of the 931st OGRAP (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Werneuchen), the 10th ORAP (Belarusian Military District, Shchuchin) and the 115th separate EW air regiment (Northern Group of Forces , Brzeg).

Pilots were retrained for the new materiel from a variety of aircraft, including those so dissimilar in flight and takeoff and landing characteristics as the MiG-17 and Yak-27. This process caused the least difficulty for those who had previously served on the Su-9 or Su-7, from which the MiG-25 favorably differed in greater “volatility”, lower landing speed and better visibility from the cockpit. It was more difficult for pilots accustomed to light fighters. Piloting the "twenty-fifth" required a lot of effort - the load on the handle reached 16 kgf, so many got used to working with the pitch control not of the RUS itself, but with the trimmer effect joystick located on it, even the holes were rubbed on the thumb of flight gloves. In terms of maneuverability, the heavy MiG was closer to the bombers. He had an operational limit on overload 4.4 d, and on the angle of attack 14 °. Although complex aerobatics was not included in the combat training program, but what fighter pilot would resist the temptation to spin the "barrel" on such a powerful aircraft! Therefore, in many air defense regiments, commanders even encouraged the initiative of their subordinates, who mastered the elements of aerobatics.

There were many cases of stalling in combat units, although the aircraft "warned" the pilot about approaching a dangerous regime by the occurrence of shaking. Basically, they were allowed by insufficiently experienced pilots, but there were incidents with aces. For example, on July 16, 1984, a MiG-25PU from the 933rd IAP crashed, in which lieutenant V. Semenov and Mr. A. Lemesh died. In this fatal flight, Lemesh had to work out in a closed cockpit the removal of the aircraft from a difficult situation at high altitude. As a result of an error in piloting, the car fell into a tailspin, from which it was able to be pulled out, but then one of the pilots pulled the control stick, the plane fell down again, and there was no longer enough height to pull it out again. The crew did not have time to eject. Stalling during landing approach was a particular danger. It was worth allowing a loss of speed, and the MiG began to “crumble”. If the pilot lacked experience or he lost his cool, then a series of further mistakes followed: the engines - for afterburner and the control stick - for themselves. At the same time, the situation only worsened, because. before turning on the afterburner, the nozzles opened, a short-term failure of thrust occurred, at the same time the aircraft lifted its nose and lost speed even more. The collapse became inevitable. At best, this led to the loss of the car, but disasters also occurred. So, on July 8, 1980, a pilot of the 146th GIAP st. Lieutenant A. Rassolov. Because of the fear of losing speed, the pilots, as a rule, landed "twenty-fifths" not at the 290 km / h provided for by the instructions, but at 300-320 km / h and even more.

The R15B-300 engines were distinguished by immoderate gluttony, had low throttle response (the exit from idle flight to “maximum” took at least 14 s), but were considered very reliable. There are many cases when they continued to work after falling into the air intakes of birds, and even hefty wild geese. However, the power plant presented unpleasant surprises. The former commander of the 146th GIAP A.M. Andreev. “On May 28, 1987, we flew in pairs at an altitude of about 12,000 m, and in front, about 30 kilometers and 3,000 meters higher, there was a “spark” from our regiment, which was piloted by Mr. Markov and Mr. Chernyshev. Of course, we did not see this plane, but we suddenly noticed a contrail, which was very uncharacteristic for such a high altitude. From the radio conversations it became clear that the Spark had one engine out of order, and there was a fuel leak. Obviously, the fire did not start due to lack of oxygen at high altitude. Having released the wingman, I began to catch up with the emergency vehicle in order to accompany it. It was decided to land at the Popelnya dispersal airfield, but it was not necessary ... Chernyshev and Markov began to descend, and when I caught up with them, the altitude was already about 11,000. 25 had a feature: at supersonic speed, react to sliding with vigorous heeling, which was very difficult to fend off). The pilots with difficulty eliminated the roll, and then I see how the left nozzle flares up, and then the right one. All! It is necessary to eject, because at any second an explosion can occur. Having received the command, the crew safely left the plane, which immediately lowered its nose and dived into the clouds. He fell 5-8 km from Popelnya, and did not explode and practically did not burn, because. almost all the kerosene leaked out in the air. During the investigation of the accident, it turned out that due to a manufacturing defect, the compressor straightener was destroyed, the fragments of which went along the engine path, destroying everything in its path.

Aircraft electronic countermeasures MiG-25BM from the 4th TsBPiPLS. Lipetsk, late 1980s

MiG-25 PDS interceptors from the 146th GIAP. Vasilkov, mid-1980s.

Events unfolded even more dramatically on July 31, 1987, during night flights at the airfield of the 48th OGRAP in Kolomyia. During takeoff on the MiG-25RB, which was piloted by Mr. Yu.M. Light, both engines caught fire. Fueled by 80%, the plane managed to accelerate to 360 km / h by that time. Let us turn to the memories of this pilot. “Performed takeoff. He removed the landing gear, flaps, turned off the afterburners, reported to the flight director (RP) about what had happened. The height at that time was 800 m. At the command of the RP, he turned on the fuel drain and began to land according to the standard scheme (box). Before the passage of the long-range drive, the third tank exploded, in which, after draining the kerosene, a lot of fuel vapor remained, turning it into a bomb. The plane reared up and then began to enter a downward spiral. He did not react to the actions of the authorities, communication with the Republic of Poland ceased. At an altitude of 220 m, at a speed of 400 km / h and a left bank of 60 °, I ejected. The parachute filled up. The plane rolled over and crashed on the reverse course, landing under a residential building under construction. Luckily no one was hurt on the ground." The commission of inquiry into this incident came to the conclusion that the fire started due to the destruction of the union nut of one of the fuel lines. During the "debriefing" the commander of the 14th VA, Lieutenant General E.V. Tsokolaev called the killers those who sent the plane to land in a circle, as a result of which the car was in the air for 20 minutes. It should also be noted that the damage caused to the local population was estimated at 39,000 rubles. and fully compensated, and the destroyed house was restored by military builders.

The pilots got used to all the features of the aircraft quite quickly and, on the whole, rated it very highly. It was considered an honor to fly on the fastest and highest aircraft, they were proud of such service. Combat training was carried out intensively, no one saved kerosene at that time, and an annual flying time of 100 hours was the norm for a pilot. Approximately 10% of flights were carried out with acceleration to the maximum values ​​of M and reaching the ceiling. In such modes, the pilots of the reconnaissance regiments worked out not only photography, but also stratospheric bombing, which was carried out in automatic or semi-automatic mode using the Peleng system, which brought the aircraft to the desired point 40 km from the target, and the pilot had only to press the combat button. Let us turn once again to the memoirs of Yu.M. Legkov. “This aircraft justified itself as a bomber very well, especially the aircraft of the latest series, equipped with the Peleng-DM system. The effectiveness of practical bombing from the stratosphere was excellent. Of course, the free-falling 500-kg bombs used on the MiG-25 were not intended for pinpoint impact, and hits with deviations of 1000-1200 m from the center of the target were considered excellent. This is not surprising, because in the event of war, the “twenty-fifths” were to strike at large industrial facilities, cities, hitting the territory of which such powerful ammunition would inevitably cause serious destruction. What can we say about the use of nuclear weapons!

In the combat training of fighters, much attention was paid to intercepting high-altitude targets moving at high supersonic speed, which were the same MiG-25s. They imitated the American strategic reconnaissance aircraft SR-71, which by the time the "twenty-fifths" was used in the Soviet air defense system was the only NATO aircraft operating at such altitudes and speeds. The MiG-25 could not keep up with the Black Bird, and the Black Bird had to be hit either on the backlog or on a collision course, while the approach speed was more than 1.5 km / s, and the pilot had only 10-15 s to complete start. Once a year, air defense regiments flew to the training grounds for real target shooting. Far from all pilots had to carry them out, and rarely did any of them manage to carry out a dozen launches in their entire career. According to reports, the pilots of the "twenty-fifths" never had to use weapons against intruder aircraft. Less often than others, they were raised to intercept automatic balloons, probably, hunting for "balls" on such an aircraft was too expensive.

But the service of the MiG-25 reconnaissance actually began with a combat episode, after which legends about the Russian superplane spread throughout the world. As you know, the Soviet Union provided significant assistance to the Arab states that were constantly at war with Israel. Military equipment was generously supplied to the Middle East, and large groups of advisers and military specialists were also sent. In this situation, at the initiative of the MAP, it was decided to send five of the latest MiG-25R / RB to Egypt (one of which was considered a reserve) and test them there in real combat conditions. For this, the 63rd separate aviation detachment was formed, which was headed by an experienced test pilot, colonel A.S. Bezhe-vets. In addition to military pilots, representatives of the aviation industry, incl. deputy Minister A.V. Minaev, Deputy chief designer of OKB-155 L. Shengelaya and test pilot of the Gorky aircraft plant V.G. Gordienko. In the early spring of 1971, semi-disassembled aircraft were transported by An-22 transport aircraft to the Cairo West airfield, located 17 km from the Egyptian capital. After their assembly by factory specialists, Gordienko flew around. He recalls: “Preparation for the first flight was tense, rather nervous. The airfield is full of equipment, there is nowhere to turn, and even the constant threat of the Israeli Mirages ... But, fortunately, everything went well, without excesses.

Scouts MiG-25RB (right) and MiG-25RBF with an external fuel tank from the 164th OGRAP. MiG-25RBF goes on a reconnaissance flight over the Baltic Sea. Krzywy (Poland), autumn 1991

Training MiG-25RU from the 48th OGRAP. Kolomyia, late 1980s.

Warm air purge of the cabin compartment

Pilot in high-altitude compensating suit

The Twenty-fifths were very vulnerable during takeoff and landing, so at these stages of the flight they decided to cover them with MiG-21 units piloted by Soviet pilots. “I had to taxi to the runway without any commands,” continues Gordienko. “The first pair of MiG-21s passes over me at 20 meters, I take off after them, and the next pair of cover comes from behind at 4-5 kilometers. The rest at this time are upstairs, waiting. After takeoff, at an altitude of 50 m, I try to get away from the airfield by 50-70 km, this is so that it would be impossible to detect where I was taking off from, we thought so naively, and then I go up. Of course, the MiGs could not keep up with me and had to cut my route from the inside. After completing the task, I descend to a height of 300-400 m, brake, immediately release the landing gear and sit down. Almost all of our flights took place according to this scheme ... Everything is like in war. In total, Gordienko performed 19 sorties over the territory of Egypt. One of them had an unfortunate incident. “Somehow, in the confusion, only half of the fuel was filled. Well, as always, I take off, gain altitude, then I look, but the fuel is already running out and it is impossible to conduct radio exchange. I had to sit down. Everything worked out, but the scandal about this was grandiose.

Although the MiG-25 pilots were forbidden to go on the air, one day they had to get in touch. “It was decided: in the event of an emergency on board, call the number “013”, which meant “I’m going for an emergency landing. And then the group commander Alexander Savvich Bezhevets took off, and at that time I was on the flight control tower. Immediately after takeoff, one main landing gear did not retract, it jammed in an intermediate position, after 3-4 minutes, “013” is heard from the speaker. We realized that Sasha would land in an emergency. We look, makes a circle, drains fuel, comes in for landing. But everything worked out, the car did not catch fire, it just scribbled along the strip a little. Sanya, of course, got out of the cockpit pale, and then, for the only time, Arab pilots approached us and, in solidarity, shook Sanya's hand.

Combat sorties began in May, which were carried out only by military pilots. First, they worked on "their" territory in the frontline zone, then on the occupied Sinai Peninsula, and then on Israel itself, even climbing into the airspace over Tel Aviv. The raids took place at an altitude of more than 20 km with acceleration to a speed of M = 2.5-2.8. The scouts bypassed the areas where the Nike-Hercules and Hawk air defense systems were supposed to be deployed. The Israelis constantly raised large groups of F-4 Phantom fighters to intercept the MiGs, but they were unable to get the miracle plane. Remaining invulnerable, Soviet pilots brought unique photographic films from each flight. As Gordienko recalls, “the quality of the pictures was amazing. I once passed over the airfield in Benesueta, where our MiG-21s were, and from a height of more than 20,000 m I took a few shots. So clearly the boats in the bay and even the oars launched into the water were clearly visible. The 63rd detachment worked in Egypt until the summer of 1972. During this time, one rotation of personnel took place. (For more details, see Aero-Hobby, No. 4 "94, pp. 18-21.) The data obtained by Soviet aviators were used in planning the Doomsday War, which began on October 6, 1973 with a massive attack by the Egyptian Air Force on Israeli positions in Sinai.

At the height of this conflict, the 154th separate air squadron, formed on the basis of the 47th OGRAP, was sent to Egypt, which was deployed on the same Cairo West. It was headed by the regiment commander, Lieutenant N. Chudin. The unit included four MiG-25RB. Starting from October 18, the pilots of the "twenty-fifth" carried out 4 sorties over the front line, providing the command with valuable intelligence information. The detachment continued its activities after the armistice. The situation remained tense, the parties pulled up reserves to the separation line, and on December 15 a pair of MiG-25s was sent to reconnaissance of enemy forces. When the Soviet planes were already on their way home, the Israelis managed to quite successfully intercept four Phantoms, one of which fired two missiles from the maximum distance at the trailing car of Mr. V. Mashtakov. The phenomenal speed data of the MiG made it possible this time to avoid defeat: the missiles self-destructed far behind it. This mission to Egypt ended in August 1974, and the following year, the "twenty-fifths" made another short voyage to the banks of the Nile.

MiG-25PDS accident from the 146th GIAP. Vasilkov, March 12, 1984 The reason was the spontaneous cleaning of the landing gear on takeoff

MiG-25BM from the 10th ORAP. The same plane after the accident on September 19, 1986. The cause was an engine fire. Pilot G. Shepelev successfully ejected at an altitude of more than 16000 m, while the seat that worked properly separated from him at an altitude of 3000 m

Subsequently, the MiG-25 pilots conducted various types of reconnaissance, flying along the border of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. Thus, they were engaged in activities similar to the work of American colleagues who piloted the SR-71. Sometimes MiGs flew into the airspace of neighboring states. For example, the Iranian authorities have repeatedly reported such incidents, and once a MiG-25 was intercepted by a pair of F-14s, which reached the launch distance of their long-range Phoenix missiles, but it did not come to their use. In January 1980, it was decided to use "twenty-fifths" in Afghanistan. For this purpose, the operational group of the 39th ORAP, which included four aircraft with various sets of reconnaissance equipment, was transferred to the Karshi airfield located in Turkmenistan. It was headed by Deputy commander of the regiment, lieutenant Mufazalov. The flights were carried out along the border of Afghanistan, mainly at an altitude of up to 9000 m and subsonic speed. However, the combat work of this unit did not last very long: after completing about 30 sorties, he was recalled home. (For more details, see "AiV", No. 6 "2002, p. 40.) It must be emphasized that among other reconnaissance aircraft of front-line aviation, the MiG-25 stood out not only in flight characteristics, but also in the capabilities of its equipment, especially designed for conducting radio reconnaissance. This allowed the "twenty-fifth" to remain an effective means of army intelligence until the end of operation.

The weapon system of the MiG-25P also gave this aircraft advantages over other modern Soviet interceptors. For example, the version of the Smerch radar installed on the "twenty-fifth" made it possible to detect a target at a distance almost twice as large as a similar station of the heavy Tu-128. However, the characteristics of the R-40 missiles were at the level not only of the R-4 - the "main caliber" of the Tupolev machine, but also of the R-98 used on the Su-15. The use of the Sapphire station on the MiG-25PD made the aircraft even more "sighted" and able to work on targets against the background of the ground. The range of application of the R-40RD has increased. The R-60 missile, which replenished the interceptor's arsenal, significantly increased its combat potential. When firing into the rear hemisphere, it had almost the same launch range as the R-40T and significantly surpassed it in terms of the destructive ability of the warhead, although it weighed almost 10 times less. However, time passed, and the obsolescence of the MiG-25 weapons became more and more noticeable, especially against the background of the 4th generation Su-27 and MiG-31 fighters. Nevertheless, the "twenty-fifths" continued to be in service and survived the collapse of the USSR in combat formation.

MiG-25RBF from the 931st OGRAP is prepared to roll out of cover. Werneuchen (Germany), 1991

The usual resting place for technicians was the huge air intakes and nozzles of the MiG-25

The vast majority of failures on both the "twenty-fifth" interceptors and reconnaissance aircraft were related to electronics. However, this picture is also typical for other aircraft created at that time, incl. and abroad. A distinctive feature of the MiG-25 family was leaks in the welds of the fuel tanks, which appeared in many aircraft after 10-12 years of operation. As a rule, such defects in the fuselage tanks were eliminated by factory welders right in the shelves, but it was possible to cope with a leak in the wing only under the conditions of ARZ. Often the planes continued to fly with tiny cracks, while droplets of kerosene collected on the ground along the wing seams, like perspiration on the body of a tired mighty living creature. Microcracks invisible to the eye also appeared on the side surfaces of the cockpit glazing, which sometimes caused the destruction of a part of the canopy during flight at high altitude and speed. A pressure helmet and a high-altitude compensating suit saved the pilot, but at such a moment the person experienced serious stress.

During ground handling, the aircraft was not considered difficult. However, the replacement of even small failed parts was a very laborious process that took a lot of time. What can we say about the replacement of the huge wheels of the main landing gear, which seemed to make the aircraft related to the Belarus tractor. This operation required lifting the entire machine with special jacks, it was performed by four people who rarely managed to manage faster than 3 hours. Sometimes such a procedure had to be performed after one landing of a young pilot, although the wheels of experienced pilots safely survived 30 landings. The most time-consuming operations were performed in the regimental TEC. For example, engines were replaced there, which took 2-3 days.

The suspension of R-40 missiles was supposed to be carried out using winches mounted on pylons, but much more often this was done manually, using the “hey, uh!” method. Having strained themselves, eight fellows took on their shoulders a “toy” that weighed half a ton and, under the strict guidance of one of the gunsmiths, they hooked it to the APU. They filmed it the same way. The operations required the coordinated work of the entire team, because the mistake of even one “player” could damage an expensive rocket (one glass of a thermal seeker cost as many Zhiguli). And there were many such cases. P-40s were dropped, hit against pylons, but most often the warheads of the missiles, which stumbled upon the APA, tankers, tractors and other vehicles "piloted" by dashing airfield aces, suffered.

At the time the MiG-25 was delivered to the troops, it was the heaviest combat aircraft of front-line aviation and air defense (it weighed 2-4 times more than others, with the exception of the Tu-128). With narrow wheels, it created heavy loads on the concrete pavement of airfields, so often the runway plates and taxiways cracked under its weight. Rolling out onto the ground threatened with great trouble, especially during the spring snowmelt and autumn rains: at low speed the plane simply went into the ground along the wheel hubs, and at high speed it could be seriously injured, leaving its “legs” in soft ground.

The story about the MiG-25 cannot do without the “alcohol-containing” part. 180 liters of SHS (40-45% alcohol-water mixture) - for cooling the generator, 50 liters of pure product - for cooling the radar (on reconnaissance aircraft - up to 90 liters for cooling the special equipment compartment) and 5 liters - for the anti-icing system of the canopy made the aircraft the most popular among personnel. The nickname "deli" is firmly entrenched in him and will be preserved for centuries. In the first years of SVS operation, it was supposed to write off 60 liters per flight hour, gradually this rate was reduced several times, but still, each aircraft technician had access to an almost inexhaustible source of miraculous moisture. This made it possible to satisfy the needs of organisms tired by the service, as well as to solve all sorts of everyday issues. In a country of total shortage, alcohol was the true universal equivalent, and everyone who served in the "twenty-fifths" regiment can tell about the well-established system of exchanging "liquid currency" for various household goods. It acquired a special scope during the Gorbachev anti-alcohol campaign, when it became a problem to get alcohol in stores. However, not every Slavic soul managed to happily survive the abundance of gratuitous booze - the “sea of ​​​​vodka” ruined the fate of many officers and ensigns who plunged into it.

In general, the MiG-25 became a landmark aircraft for the Soviet Air Force and Air Defense Aviation. He allowed combat work to be carried out at altitudes and speeds that until recently seemed fantastic. The machine, no doubt, played a significant role in strengthening the country's defense capability. Obviously, the fact that the Americans abandoned the production of the B-70, removed the B-58 from service and significantly reduced the production of the SR-71, is the merit of this aircraft.

The editors and the author express their sincere gratitude for the help provided in the preparation of the article, A.M. Andreev, N.N. Ganze, S.A. Grachev, Yu.M. Legkov, A.V. Matusevich, V.D. Matsepon, V.V. Migunov, A.V. Nalivaiko, O.E. Square, G.E. Khmelnitsky and employees of the Zaporizhia ARZ “MiGremont”. Also used is an unpublished interview that the late V.S. Savin took in 1992 with test pilot V.G. Gordienko.

MiG-25RBS (ser. No. 02045127, built in 1976) from the 48th OGRAP of the Ukrainian Air Force. In 2001, the aircraft became an exhibit of the aviation museum in Vinnitsa. Emblems, colored stripes and arrows were not applied on the inner surfaces of the keels.

One of several MiG-25BMs received by the Iraqi Air Force in 1986-88. The aircraft was used in the Iran-Iraq war

MiG-25RBF (ser. No. 02032317) from the 931st OGRAP of the USSR Air Force. Germany, Werneuchen, 1991

MiG-25PDS (built in 1977) from the 933rd Air Defense IAP of the USSR. Dnepropetrovsk, 1984-86

Regiment commanders

In the active army:

• 06/22/41 - 06/28/41 (39 bap)
• 04.10.41 - 06.11.41 (39 bap)
• 12/16/42 - 04/04/43 (39 bap)
• 04/04/43 - 05/09/45 (39 units)

Formed in 1936 in Stary Bykhov as 39 bap. He was armed with SB bombers.

During the entire pre-war period, he took part in all air parades over Moscow.

In September 1939 he participated in the capture of Eastern Poland.

In the winter of 1939-40. participated in the war with Finland.

Before the start of the war, he was part of the 10th garden, based in Pinsk, Zhabitsy.

By 06/22/41, he was armed with 43 SB aircraft (including 2 faulty ones), as well as 9 Pe-2, which the crews had not yet mastered.

On June 22, 1941, the airfield in Pinsk was bombed four times. 25 SBs and 5 Pe-2s burned down on the ground. At 07:18 SB, they attacked the crossings across the Bug near the village of Melnik. When returning, German fighter attacks shot down all the aircraft of the group. On the same day, the regiment received an order to evacuate to the Gomel region.

In the autumn of 1941, the remnants of the regiment operated near Moscow, based in Ramenskoye. By October, one aircraft remained in the unit. In mid-October 1941, the regiment was sent to Engels for reorganization, where it received Pe-2 aircraft.

Since December 1942, he was part of 202 bad.

04/04/43 converted to 39 orap.

In February 1942, for distinction in the battles for the liberation of the city of Nikopol, the regiment was given the honorary name Nikopol.

In April 1945, the regiment was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky for exemplary performance of command assignments in battles against the Nazi invaders during the capture of Budapest.

In 1954, the regiment was based in the city of Samarkand of the Uzbek SSR. In 1952-53 switched from Pe-2 propeller-driven aircraft to Il-28R jet aircraft. Due to the limited capabilities of the airfield for jet aircraft in 1956, the regiment was relocated to the city of Fergana of the Uz.SSR. In 1960, due to the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces, 39 orap was disbanded and 334 orae was created on its basis with the transfer of the Banner of the Regiment to it and the preservation of the military unit number 53898. . In 1968, 334 orae were redeployed to the city of Balkhash. And on its basis, 39 units were again restored. In peaceful days, 39 oraps and 334 orae made a great contribution to the creation of topographic maps of the highland regions of the Central Asian republics by performing aerial photography.

Another gorgeous photo report by the famous Kazakhstani journalist Grigory Bedenko is published on the Internet resource Voxpopuli.kz. The aviation training center, located in the city of Balkhash, on the northern coast of Kazakhstan's largest lake, trains young pilots for the air force. Read more about how the process is built.



In general, the journalists do not really indulge the Balkhash Aviation Center with their attention. It's a long way to go here, there is no special news - a daily routine service: flights, maintenance, arrival and departure of cadets. The guys were not averse to showing off in front of the camera.








Major Bakyt Nurbaevich Dzhumanov, deputy commander of military unit 53898 for ideological and educational work. The political officer carefully took care of me during the shooting and really wanted to get a good report. He commanded the aircraft flying in the air, guiding them for the best angles.

On this day, the flights were simple: takeoff, climb up to 600 meters, exit to the circle at a speed of 300 km/h. Then a simulated landing. This is when the plane touches the runway with all three wheels, but does not slow down, but runs along the runway and takes off again. It takes about 15 minutes for one lap (take-off and landing), 20 - together with taxiing to the parking lot.
Below is a very atmospheric video taken from the L-39. On the left, the lake, the city of the same name, is clearly visible. The Balkhash Mining and Metallurgical Plant smokes. Then, after a right turn, the board passes over a huge quarry where copper ore is mined in an open pit.

Flights continue in two shifts: the first from 7:00 to 13:00, the second - from 15:00 to 21:00. The second is attended by more experienced cadets who have received permission to fly at night.


The training aviation center of the SVO was created on the basis of the 39th separate reconnaissance aviation regiment, which was relocated to Balkhash in 1967. The regiment itself was formed back in 1937 in the city of Bykhov (Belarus). The pilots of this combat unit fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Then she was relocated to Osh (Kyrgyzstan).




In 2002, the L-39 squadron, which is part of the 715th Fighter Aviation Regiment, was relocated here from the Lugovaya airbase (Zhambyl region). MiG-25s had by then been withdrawn from service in Kazakhstan.


Today, the main task of the Center is the training of cadets who study at the military institute of the Air Defense Forces (Aktobe), and the training of the aircrew of combat units of the Northern Military District.


L-39s were transferred to the Kazakh Air Force from Russia in the 90s. Today, our fleet of these aircraft consists of 17 aircraft. All of them are in operational condition.


Preparing an aircraft for a flight is a rather painstaking job for the technical staff of the Center. The L-39 has a lot of hatches with connectors that need to be opened and closed. The instructor and cadet sitting in the cockpit must also be connected to communication systems, an oxygen system, and carefully fastened to the ejection seat. Everything is like in a combat fighter. And at the same time, much easier.


After servicing the aircraft, the pilot-instructor signs in a special journal.




While the planes are being serviced, the instructors explain their mistakes to the cadets.

Samat Mukaev (pictured right), squadron navigator, captain. Samat comes from the village of Martuk, Aktobe region, he is 30 years old. Graduated from the Military Institute of the Northern Military District in 2007. By distribution, he ended up in the Balkhash Training Aviation Center, and has been serving here since then. More than 5 years engaged in instructor activities. The total flight time for the L-39 is 800 hours.

VOX: Samat, how do you work with cadets?

- Cadets arrive to us, and they begin ground training - these are theoretical disciplines that they pass before the start of flights. Then, after passing the tests, they receive permission to fly. The first flights are introductory - acquaintance with the equipment of the airfield, with the maneuverability of the aircraft. In the future, they begin to fly in a circle and continue to fly until the first independent flight is completed. After they perform the first solo flight in a circle, they move on to flights in the zone for simple and complex aerobatics, flights at low altitude, as well as flights for group flying, en route and for combat use.

VOX: How is the communication on board?

- In flight there is continuous contact with the cadet. We constantly ask about the state of health, suggest the details of the flight, what to look for. The very first and most important thing: the cadet must learn to think in three dimensions - to get a visual orientation and correlate it with the readings of the instruments. At first, all flights are performed by the instructor, the cadet watches. Then the cadet controls the aircraft, and we control its actions. If he does something wrong, we intervene in management.


Currently, 34 cadets of the 3rd year of the Military Institute of the Northern Military District are studying at the Center.


Cadets are divided into 12 groups, each with 3 people. 12 instructors fly directly with the cadets.All cadets live in the unit for about 6 months.


Once a week on Sundays they are allowed to go on leave to the city. Usually from morning until noon.
There is a strict ban on alcohol during the leave.





The airfield of the Balkhash Training Aviation Center, in addition to its main function, serves as a jump base for military aircraft and helicopters. During his stay in the unit, he managed to remove the military EC-145 . One arrived from Semey, the second went to Astana.These machines are built in Kazakhstan.

The commander asked to take a group photo. To do this, the cadets had to push the plane to the right point - the light was quite hard.

Askar Izbasov, colonel, commander of the Balkhash Aviation Training Center.

VOX: Askar Gadylshievich, tell us about the training program.

- Cadets of the second, third and fourth years study from February to September, they are here. The program includes flights to develop piloting techniques: flying in a circle, then simple and then complex aerobatics. For cadets who are trained on the topics of front-line aviation and military transport aviation, the program further diverges. This occurs after the cadet performs the first solo sortie in the L-39. Usually somewhere after the 77th flight - at the level of 14 hours. The cadet achieves certain skills. First, we allow him to the simplest piloting - flying in a circle. Then, depending on the specialization: flights along the route, for combat use, flights at night, in adverse weather conditions. Almost all Kazakh military pilots who serve in combat units of the Air Force have been trained by us. Only a few officers were trained in Russia, Krasnodar and Turkey. There is one pilot trained in India. Our flight instructor staff has a fairly high level, and in the future we can train young pilots within the framework of the CSTO.

VOX: Are there any special approaches?

“We train young pilots so that they not only gain in-depth knowledge, but also can selflessly take risks if the need arises. We will make every effort to make these guys the kind of fighters that are needed to protect our great country. We have the 9th territory in the world, and it is very difficult to keep it in such a difficult situation that has developed in the world today. We need some special qualities of people.

Now, without aviation, no military operations are inconceivable. All modern armed conflicts began with an air offensive operation. Saddam Hussein, having a huge number of ground forces, still lost the war in Iraq. The situation in Syria. I am sure that aviation is the future.

VOX: Your planes are still Soviet-made. How long will they be in use?

— Our planes have been overhauled at factories in the Czech Republic and Ukraine. Their resource has been extended for many years. There are, of course, modern vehicles - many modern vehicles that could be purchased, but the L-39 still allows us to solve the tasks that are assigned to the training structures of the Ministry of Defense. This is a general trend. For example, in the United States, where 5th generation vehicles are already in service, they still use archaic equipment for training people - the F-5A fighter, which participated in the Vietnam War.

VOX: Nevertheless, the re-equipment of the Kazakh army is underway. Our military leadership is eyeing the latest Russian Yak-130. This plane will fly to Astana in June for the KADEX-2016 exhibition.

- Of course, in the future they will replace the L-39. There is such a possibility. Of course, if we have the opportunity to purchase such machines, and they show themselves well in operation in other countries, then we will gladly accept them. The problem of our country is the climate. He is very complicated. It is still difficult to say how the Yak-130 will behave in such conditions. In any case, they will come to us - and we will have to exploit them. Therefore, this aircraft must be properly studied and tested before buying it.

The interval between takeoffs of the two sides is minimal.Takeoffs and landings are practiced to automatism.

Anvar Shangireev 22. He comes from the city of Kapchagay, Almaty region. Studying in the 4th year of the Military Institute of the North-Eastern Military District. The internship has been taking place in Balkhash for the second year.

- This airfield is complicated by the fact that there is a large body of water nearby. Due to the temperature difference, the wind is constantly changing. The weather is changing. There is cloudiness, but after 15 minutes it is gone. Every time you need to adapt to these ever-changing conditions. But, on the other hand, this situation has a positive effect on the process of training young pilots - we learn to make decisions quickly.

Memoirs of a pilot Yak-28R

On the evening of December 24, 1979, our 39th ORAP, based at the Balkhash airfield, was alerted. Eight crews from the Yak-28R squadron were prepared maps for the flight along the Balkhash-Mary route and "recommended" to take maps of Afghanistan of various scales. The official cause of the commotion was the exercise, for participation in which it was necessary to fly to Turkmenistan for only a few days. The New Year was on the nose, which they were going to celebrate at home, and the wives even began to order what to bring from the south. Obviously, only the commander of the regiment, Colonel Yu.A. Timchenko, and his deputy, Lieutenant A.N. Barsukov, knew the real task. .

On the morning of December 25, eight crews flew to the Ma-ry-2 airfield, becoming the operational group of the 39th ORAP. Flight crew composition:

The commander of the group p / p-k A.N. Barsukov, the head of intelligence of the regiment, Mr. P. Tsvetinsky;
- commander of the 2nd AE p / p-k V.I. Gorbashevsky, navigator of the AE Mr. N.V. Zyablov;
- Deputy AE commander Mr. P.P. Shemonaev, deputy. AE navigator Dr. V. Gorbatov;
- Deputy AE commander for political affairs, Mr. V.N. Shishkin, early. communications of the regiment, Mr. P.K.Tupaev;
- flight commander, Mr. V.P. Roslyakov, flight navigator, senior officer V. Gabidulin;
- flight commander, Mr. A. Khomenko, flight navigator, senior l-t S. Bobrov;
- flight commander, Mr. A.P. Saganovsky, early. PDS Regiment K-nG. Yagofarov;
- art. pilot st.l-t V. Sukhanov, st. navigator st. Lieutenant A. Kisloe.

The level of crew training was very high. All had 1st class and a total flight time of 800 to 2100 hours. Two-thirds served in Germany, and this is a real school in all respects. Among the pilots in piloting technique, the p / p-ki Barsukov and Gorbashevsky, Mr. Shemonaev and Shishkin, Mr. Roslyakov, who could afford everything that the aircraft was capable of, were especially distinguished. In special honor were flights at extremely low altitude (LMA) at 5-15 meters from the ground.

The group included 25-30 technical personnel, led by the deputy squadron commander for the IAS, Mr. Stelmakh. In Mary, they were transferred to the AN-12, and later, replacements were made among the ground personnel once or twice a month. Aircraft also changed: those that had serious malfunctions or developed an inter-regular resource were distilled to Balkhash. 7-9 of our Yaks were constantly in the Mayors, two of them - in the night version and one training, and the "spark" was almost never used, because. weather reconnaissance was not carried out, and a new pilot had to be taken out only once. I became this pilot, having got into the group, in general, by accident. Officially, only pilots of the 1st and 2nd classes were involved in the fighting, I had the 3rd, but several landings at the UMP were not enough to get the 2nd. And when the political officer in the group fell ill, they promised me that they would record the missing number of landings far from their home base. I first drove a couple of boards to Mary, and then stayed there. P / p-to Barsukov drove me on the Yak-28U along the Mary-Kushka-Herat-Mary route to get acquainted with the combat area, and from the next day, with Mr. Tupaev, we began to participate in reconnaissance flights. In March, Senior Lieutenant Ershov, who arrived from the 149th BAP, replaced my navigator.

The group began work almost immediately upon arrival. Before the New Year, 4-5 flights were carried out, the main task of which was to photograph the airfields of the DRA and, along the way, to conduct aerial reconnaissance. The flights were carried out without any maneuvering, at an average altitude (2000-4000 m), and after development, the pilots were surprised to notice air defense batteries and fighters on photographic plates.

New Year's Eve "out of grief" was celebrated very violently. There was fog all over the area, and combat work was not expected. But on January 2 at 23.30 the alarm sounded. In the gorge southeast of Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans blocked a motorized rifle battalion, which suffered very heavy losses. Due to fog at all airfields, aviation could not support him. Then it was decided to send reconnaissance aircraft from Mary and Karshi with a set of equipment for night photography SOU-2. The Yakov crews were given the task of passing at low altitude over the disposition of troops with a working SDA to demoralize the enemy. Shemonaev - Gorbatov and Shishkin - Tupaev went on a mission. They gave 30 minutes to prepare, and the navigators had to draw the route already in the air. In the target area, the lower edge of the clouds was at an altitude of 5000 m, which somewhat facilitated the task. In general, our crews flew quite successfully, although on one plane the SDA did not turn on. Information about the effectiveness of this raid was not received by the group.

Gradually, the group was drawn into combat work. Everyone already understood that the business trip would drag on for a long time. Housing conditions turned out to be, as they say, better than you can imagine: double rooms in a hotel. (The personnel of another operational group of the 39th ORAP on four MiG-25RBs was in Karshi and lived in a barracks for 150 people.) By the way, in the same hotel above us lived the commander of the airbase p / p-k Morozov - the future first Minister of Defense of Ukraine . The atmosphere within our group was very good, calm. As the youngest pilot, my older comrades gave me all kinds of help. They told about the peculiarities of piloting in the mountains, especially in WWI, they advised in no case to "burrow" and not to get involved in low altitude. Such conversations were extremely useful, they made it possible to quickly gain experience, especially since in the Union in such conditions it was practically not necessary to fly. If, during the performance of the mission, the crew got into any difficult conditions due to their own fault, then later, “over a glass of tea”, he would definitely share the details. The engineering and technical staff was very attentive to even the slightest remarks from the flight crews, making every effort to eliminate the identified malfunctions. For them, the law was always the same - the plane must be in good order and ready to take off at any time.

Usually, by 17 o'clock, reconnaissance reports and combat orders came from the headquarters of the TurkVO. After that, the group commander gathered seven crews in a hotel room (the eighth one was resting), which he set a task for the next day. Mr. Tsvetinsky brought up the reconnaissance report: clusters of rebel bands, caravan routes, areas with strong air defense, etc. After that, the crews prepared for flights. We got up at 6.00, and at 8.00 the first plane took off. Behind him, with an interval of 20 minutes, others left, and by 12 o’clock everyone was already returning. If the weather allowed, two sorties were carried out per day - after clarification of the task and lunch, the crews were again in the air and returned by 16 o'clock. The flights were carried out in ordinary equipment. Before departure, they handed over documents, received a Makarov pistol and 2 clips. There were no clear recommendations on how to behave in the event of an ejection, and the main postulate in emergency situations was considered - pull with all your might to the Union, if you can’t - land on any airfield in the DRA! We always flew with the PTB, because even if the reconnaissance area was 150-200 km from the border, the duration of the flights was 1.5-2 hours. During the visual search, flights in the target area were carried out at low altitude. If, after solving a specific problem, the remaining fuel allowed, the crews "improved their skills" in the WWI, descending over the flat terrain (mainly roads and villages) to 5-10 m.

The tasks of our group included: performing aerial photography (AF) and compiling photographic schemes, photo albums of settlements, roads, airfields, passes, terrain, fortified areas, fortresses; searching for caravans and bands of rebels, photographing them and transmitting coordinates when approaching the base airfield; clarification of intelligence reports, identification of areas with strong air defense; photographic control of combat areas; detection of aircraft crash sites, etc. Considerable attention was paid to the overall control of the territory, for which there was a tacit assignment to each crew of certain areas of Afghanistan, which made it possible to notice changes in the ground situation. Very often, simply stupid tasks were received, for example, work in the southeast of the DRA. There was enough fuel to fly back and forth while flying at an altitude of 10,000 m, but you still had to conduct reconnaissance near the ground! When performing such tasks, it was necessary to save kerosene, and all the same, the planes returned to their airfield with a dangerously small balance of it. Repeatedly had to land on the Afghan jump airfields. Twice they wanted to transfer our group to Kandahar, but to take off from this airfield, located at an altitude of 1200 m, the Yak-28R needed to use afterburner, which was forbidden by a telegram from the Air Force Commander-in-Chief P.S. Kutakhov back in 1976.

Particularly difficult and dangerous tasks were considered to be on the VF of terrain in the vicinity of Fayzabad, Kabul, Jalalabad, etc. These high-mountainous places with peaks over 3500 m abounded in narrow and dark gorges, and you had to fly there at low altitude and low speed, which required jewelry piloting techniques . Very often I had to work in difficult weather conditions, because. January-February in that region is characterized by unstable weather. The decision to carry out the flights was taken by the p / p-k Barsukov after analyzing the weather report in the area of ​​​​the airfield. The weather in the DRA was rarely taken into account - basically the decision on the possibility of completing the mission under specific conditions was made by the crew. I must say that our pilots always tried to complete the task, often violating all the rules and instructions. They flew in a thunderstorm, entered the gorges under the lower edge of the clouds, descending 2000-2500 m below the mountain peaks. If it was dangerous to break through the clouds, they looked for a "window" within a radius of 40-50 km, and then, pressing close to the ground, went out to the reconnaissance area. Especially got the strongest chatter. When you go at a speed of 900 km / h, the impression is as if someone is hitting the fuselage with a sledgehammer. So, as it was shaking in Afghanistan, I have never seen anywhere in 25 years of service.

We had to make certain adjustments to our flights because of our base at the Mary-2 airfield. The fact is that fighter jets flew from there to practice missile launches at unmanned targets. Their program was designed for 10-12 days, and two regiments usually worked within a month. They always left for shooting with one course - to the north, and therefore took off only with this course, regardless of the direction of the wind. On the days of their flights, we carried out the first spread at 8.00 to the south, and the second with a tailwind was no longer performed, because. with PTB there was not enough band. Most fighter pilots had never seen the Yak-28R and reacted very interestingly to our aircraft. Hearing that we fly them in the DRA, they asked in surprise: "Why?" - and began to look for guns or missile suspensions.

Reconnaissance flights required an unconventional approach. The crews performed tasks creatively, made independent decisions, did not wait for instructions from above, tried to carefully calculate each approach for photographing. There were practically no easy tasks, and the most difficult ones were performed by the crews of the p / p-kov-Barsukov and Gorbashevsky, the crews of Roslyakov and Khomenko. The most difficult flights were chosen by the commander of the regiment, colonel Timchenko, and the navigator of the regiment, colonel Grishin, who arrived in mid-March. The term of their stay in the Mers was limited to a week, and, having completed 10-12 flights, they departed for Balkhash.

In January-February, the so-called "war of the passes" was going on - the command expected to destroy the paths in the passes with bombing and assault strikes and thus stop the movement of caravans with weapons from Pakistan and Iran. In the interests of these operations, our crews also carried out aerial photography. One of these flights almost ended tragically. On February 20 or 22, a task was received to photograph a section of the terrain in the region of the Afghan-Iranian border to the west of Herat. The crew of Roslyakov - Gabidulin calculated the route and reported that it was impossible to complete the task without violating the border. They sent a telegram to Tashkent. From there came the command - to execute without violating. The route was recalculated again and again convinced that 3-4 km of Iranian territory would have to be "grabbed". They sent another telegram. This time the answer came from Moscow: "Follow without violation." With that, the crew went on a mission.

After the Yak-28 descended in the reconnaissance area, it was reported from the air defense command post that a couple took off from the Iranian air base Mashhad and headed there. Soon she also dropped and, like our scout, disappeared from the radar screens. The command post fell silent, but they did not report anywhere. Roslyakov and Gabidulin worked there for 20 minutes, of course, violated the border, as expected, for 3-4 km, after which they began to return along the Gurian-Herat road. They walked at an altitude of 600 m, simultaneously conducting reconnaissance. After 5-7 minutes, the pilot looked to the left and noticed the shadow of the plane. A minute later he looked to the right - there was another shadow! Turning around sharply, Roslyakov saw a pair of F-14s with suspended missiles at 70-100 meters. Without saying a word to the navigator, he threw the plane to the ground and, clinging to it, at an altitude of 10-20 m at maximum speed began to leave towards Herat. For Gabidulin, such a sharp evolution came as a complete surprise - he calmly prepared for reconnaissance in the next area and put maps in his briefcase, which now scattered around the cockpit. "What are you doing?!" - shouted the navigator on the SPU, but in response he heard only one thing: "Shut up, shut up!!". (The pilot decided not to leave traces of the meeting with the "enemy" fighters on the aircraft's tape recorder.) To the cries of the navigator, Roslyakov maneuvered near the ground, realizing that the Tomcat missiles at such a height were not afraid of him. The Iranian pair hung on the tail all the time and continued the pursuit, even when the Yak crossed the Soviet border in the Kushka region and went further north. Only after deepening to 40-50 km, the F-14 pilots came to their senses and, waving their wings in farewell, went back to themselves at the same extremely low altitude. A couple of minutes later, after them, the Yak turned 180 ° and the crew headed for a new reconnaissance area, worked there and successfully completed the flight at their airfield. In our group, they decided not to report the incident to the top, only now we began to fly with the radar radiation warning system turned on.

In early March, our group began to receive daily flight assignments to assess the general situation in the Chagcharan area. The garrison of government troops stationed there in the fortress was constantly fired upon by dushmans, and in response, their positions were processed by Su-17s and "turntables" from Shindand.

The weather in those days was good, but one day from 11.00 suddenly there was a "cumulus" up to 6-8 points. Under these conditions, the PareSu-17 had to be completed. The pilots struck from a dive, completed the maneuver in the direction of the ridge, and only one aircraft went beyond the clouds. The wingman lacked literally a few meters - he caught on to the top of the mountain, ripped open the fuselage and exploded on the other side of the ridge. The wreckage of the plane fell on the glacier. The pilot is dead. Our crews of Gorbashevsky and Roslyakov photographed the crash site of this Su-17. Then Mr. Roslyakov took the scheme to the "dry" regiment at the Shindand airfield. In the next few days, the entire aviation of the 40th Army worked in this gorge, and for two weeks we did not receive requests for reconnaissance in that area.

The air defense of the "spirits" at that time was weak. According to reconnaissance, there were isolated cases of the use of Red AI MANPADS, capable of hitting targets moving at a speed of 700-720 km / h. Therefore, at any altitude, we flew at a speed of about 900 km / h. Areas where the enemy used small arms, including DShK, as air defense systems, tried to bypass, performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. However, with the growth of hostilities, aviation losses began to increase. Combat missions of our group were now required to be carried out only in pairs, and a repeater aircraft began to be allocated to maintain constant communication. However, to operate in formation over mountainous terrain, some preparation was necessary, and we had never flown in pairs before. Perhaps this circumstance was one of the reasons for curtailing our mission. The trip ended as unexpectedly as it began. On April 10, an order was received to return to their base in Balkhash. Over the past 4 months, each crew has completed 25 to 48 sorties. Flying skills have improved significantly. The aviators now felt confident in the mountains: south of Shindand there was a fortress that stood on a ledge of a high rock (like the Swallow's Nest), which was photographed only from below against the sky, passing under it in an inverted position. True, as the pilots themselves later said, such "competitions" almost ended in disaster twice.

A year later, almost the entire flight crew was awarded the Order of the Red Star, and the p / p-ki Barsukov and Gorbashevsky were awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. In Balkhash, 80% of the Yak-28Rs who had been in the war showed excessive play in the places where the wing consoles were attached. The reason was simple: increased loads, typical for flights with a large mass at low altitudes and at high speeds. The identified defect was reported to the district and to Moscow. However, the solution to the problem returned to the squadron level. Having refrained from flying for two weeks, they were resumed under the responsibility of the commander.

In addition to our group, the crews of the 87th ORAP, based at the Karshi airfield, flew the Yak-28R to Afghanistan. Unlike us, they worked throughout the war, fulfilling requests from the headquarters of the TurkVO and the 40th Army as they arrived. In April 1980, a link from this regiment was transferred to Kandahar, which, perhaps, was another reason for the end of our group's mission. The Yak-28R was based in Kandahar for quite a long time, while the crews changed every 5-6 months.

Participation in the Afghan epic for the 87th regiment was not without losses. On March 18, 1981, one squadron flew on alert to the Kokaydy airfield and the very next day began to carry out combat missions from there. Early in the morning, a couple taxied to the start: the leader - the flight commander, Mr. A.A. AE headquarters Mr. V.P. Bochkov with a navigator early. PDS by Mr. V.K. Kuleshov. Litvinenko brought the engine thrust to 85% of the nominal value and, after Bochkov's report on readiness, gave the command to take off. On the takeoff run, the wingman overtook the leader and took off, and the first aircraft continued to move along the runway, and its speed did not exceed 260 km / h. The edge of the runway was already visible, but the pilot did not take any action until the navigator began to shout over the SPU: "Stop taking off !!" Litvinenko removed the thrust and again, at the command of the navigator, released the parachute. But it was too late. The aircraft descended to the ground at high speed and rushed to a ditch passing 350 m from the runway. The rear landing gear broke in it, the fuel tank was pierced, after which a fire started. The Yak-28R drove another 200-250 m, broke the front support in the next ditch, jumped on a small hillock, flopped down and froze. The fire grew before our eyes. The pilot jumped out of the cockpit and rushed to the navigator, because. he, although he opened the hatch in advance, could not get out right away - his chair moved forward. After 30 seconds, Mishin managed to get out on his own, he survived the strongest stress, even managed to pull off the ZSh without unfastening the strap (later they tried to repeat such a trick in the regiment - no one succeeded!), And leaving, he closed the hatch behind him. The latter circumstance made the technicians who arrived in time for the car pretty worried, who decided that Mishin had remained in the cockpit. Meanwhile, carbon dioxide and oxygen cylinders began to burst on the plane. There were no casualties: the "rescuers" and the crew managed to run away, and only the navigator, who earned bruises, received damage. The true causes of the accident have not yet been clarified. Most likely, the pilot made a mistake - he did not bring the engines to maximum.

In the spring of 1987, the 87th ORAP lost its crew, which was carrying out the military operations of the fortified areas in the vicinity of Mazar-i-Sharif. Obviously, due to cloudiness, senior pilot M. Chisteev and navigator S.V. Povarenkov decided to complete the mission at low altitude. In the combat area, they went under the clouds, took photographs, and, in all likelihood, their Yak-28R was hit by a Stinger MANPADS missile. The plane was controlled for some time, but quickly lost kerosene - apparently, in addition to the engine, the explosion damaged the fuel tank. The crew managed to report: "The engines have stopped. I'm losing fuel. We're ejecting." Couldn't find them. The scouts left the plane over the area occupied by dushmans, and one can only guess what awaited them.

In conclusion, I want to note that, in my opinion, the Yak-28R was the most suitable aircraft for solving reconnaissance tasks in the DRA, especially in comparison with the MiG-21R.