For three years, Belarus was under the yoke of the enemy. The occupants plundered the territory of the republic: cities were devastated, more than a million buildings in the countryside were burned, and 7 thousand schools were turned into ruins. The Nazis killed more than two million prisoners of war and civilians. In fact, there was no family in the Byelorussian SSR that did not suffer from the Nazis. White Russia was one of the most affected territories of the Union. But people did not lose heart and resisted. Knowing that in the East the Red Army repulsed the enemy's onslaught on Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, defeated the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge, and liberated the regions of Ukraine, the Belarusian partisans were preparing for decisive action. By the summer of 1944, approximately 140 thousand partisans were operating on the territory of Belarus. The general leadership of the partisans was carried out by the underground organizations of the Communist Party of the BSSR, headed by Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, who at the same time was the head of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement of the USSR. It should be noted that contemporaries noted his amazing honesty, responsibility and deep analytical abilities. Stalin highly appreciated Ponomarenko, some researchers believe that the leader wanted to make him his successor.
A few days before the start of the operation to liberate Belarus, partisan detachments delivered a series of sensitive blows against the Germans. The partisans destroyed their transport infrastructure, communication lines, actually paralyzed the rear of the enemy at the most crucial moment. During the operation, the partisans attacked individual enemy units and attacked the rear structures of the Germans.
Operation preparation
The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed back in April. The general plan of the General Staff was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of the capital of the BSSR and completely liberate Belarus. It was a very ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire enemy army group was planned very rarely during World War II. It was one of the largest operations in the entire war of mankind.
By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had achieved impressive success in Ukraine - the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, the Soviet forces carried out a number of successful offensive operations, liberating most of the territory of the republic. But things were worse in the Belarusian direction: the front line approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge ledge that was turned deep into the USSR, the so-called. "Belarusian balcony".
In July 1944, the German industry reached the highest point of its development in this war - in the first half of the year, the Reich factories produced more than 16 thousand aircraft, 8.3 thousand assault guns. Berlin carried out several mobilizations, and the strength of its armed forces was 324 divisions and 5 brigades. Army Group Center, which defended Belarus, had 850-900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft. In addition, at the second stage of the battle, Army Group Center was supported by formations of the right flank of Army Group North and the left flank of Army Group Northern Ukraine, as well as reserves from the Western Front and various sectors of the Eastern Front. The Army Group "Center" included 4 armies: the 2nd field army, it held the Pinsk and Pripyat region (commander Walter Weiss); The 9th field army, it defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk (Hans Jordan, after June 27 - Nikolaus von Forman); The 4th Field Army (Kurt von Tippelskirch, after June 30, the army was commanded by Vinzenz Müller) and the 3rd Panzer Army (Georg Reinhardt), which occupied the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, as well as a bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, formations of the 3rd Panzer Army occupied the Vitebsk region. The commander of Army Group Center was Field Marshal Ernst Busch (on June 28, Bush was replaced by Walter Model). His chief of staff was Hans Krebs.
If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the headquarters of the Reich ground forces had a completely wrong idea about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign of 1944. Adolf Hitler and the High Command of the Wehrmacht believed that a major Soviet offensive should still be expected in Ukraine, north or south of the Carpathians (most likely north). It was believed that from the area south of Kovel, Soviet troops would strike towards the Baltic Sea, trying to cut off Army Groups Center and North from Germany. Large forces were allocated to parry a possible threat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of heavy tanks "Tiger". And the Army Group "Center" had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and one battalion of heavy tanks. In addition, they feared an attack on Romania - on the oil fields of Ploiesti. In April, the command of Army Group Center submitted to the top leadership a proposal to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to better positions beyond the Berezina. But this plan was rejected, Army Group Center was ordered to defend in the same positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense, a possible struggle in the environment. For engineering work, forced labor of local residents was widely used. , radio intelligence and German agents could not reveal the preparations by the Soviet command for a major operation in Belarus. Army Groups Center and North were predicted to have a "calm summer"; the situation inspired so little concern that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the Red Army operation. But, it should be noted that the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, and the Nazis managed to create a developed defense system. It included "fortress" cities, numerous field fortifications, bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable positions for artillery and machine guns. The Germans assigned a large role to natural obstacles - wooded and swampy terrain, many rivers and streams.
Red Army. Stalin made the final decision to conduct the summer campaign, including the Belarusian operation, at the end of April. Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov was instructed to organize work in the General Staff on planning operations. The plan to liberate Belarus received a code name - Operation Bagration. On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of an offensive operation plan. A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov and G. K. Zhukov were called to the Headquarters. On May 22, the commanders of the fronts, I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, and K. K. Rokossovsky, were received at Headquarters to hear their views on the operation. The coordination of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to Vasilevsky and Zhukov, they left for the troops in early June.
The rate provided for the application of three powerful blows. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts advanced in the general direction towards Vilnius. The troops of the two fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, develop an offensive to the west and cover the left-flank grouping of the Borisov-Minsk group of German forces. The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to defeat the Bobruisk group of Germans. Then develop the offensive in the direction of Slutsk-Baranovichi and cover the Minsk group of German troops from the south and south-west. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left-flank grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was to move in the general direction towards Minsk.
From the Soviet side, about 1 million 200 thousand people participated in the operation as part of four fronts: the 1st Baltic Front (General of the Army Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan); 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky); 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov); 1st Belorussian Front (General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky). The coordinator of the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts was Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and the coordinator of the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts was the chief of the General Staff Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky. Took part in the operation and the Dnieper military.
Preparation of the Belarusian operation (from left to right) Varennikov I. S., Zhukov G. K., Kazakov V. I., Rokossovsky K. K. 1st Belorussian Front. 1944
Operation "Bagration" was supposed to solve several important tasks:
Completely clear the Moscow direction from German troops, since the leading edge of the "Belarusian ledge" was 80 kilometers from Smolensk. The configuration of the front line in the BSSR was a huge arc extended to the east with an area of almost 250 thousand square kilometers. The arc stretched from Vitebsk in the north and Pinsk in the south to the Smolensk and Gomel regions, hanging over the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The German high command attached great importance to this territory - it protected the distant approaches to Poland and East Prussia. In addition, Hitler still cherished plans for a victorious war if a “miracle” was created, or if major geopolitical changes took place. From the bridgehead in Belarus, it was possible to strike at Moscow again.
Complete the liberation of the entire Belarusian territory, parts of Lithuania and Poland.
Reach the Baltic coast and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the German front at the junctions of Army Groups "Center" and "North" and isolate these German groups from each other.
To create profitable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive operations in the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine, in the Warsaw and East Prussian directions.
Main milestones of the operation
The operation was carried out in two stages. At the first stage (June 23-July 4, 1944) the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk front offensive operations were carried out. At the second stage of Operation Bagration (July 5–August 29, 1944), Vilnius, Shauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets front-line offensive operations were carried out.
The first stage of the operation
The offensive began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, the Red Army successfully broke through the German defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five enemy divisions to the west of the city. The liquidation of the Vitebsk "cauldron" was completed by the morning of June 27, on the same day Orsha was released. With the destruction of the Vitebsk German grouping, a key position on the left flank of the defense of Army Group Center was captured. The northern flank of the Army Group "Center" was actually destroyed, more than 40 thousand Germans died and 17 thousand people were captured. In the Orsha direction, after breaking through the German defenses, the Soviet command brought the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, Rotmistrov's tankers cleared Borisov of the Nazis. The withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the Borisov region led to significant operational success: the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group Center was cut off from the 4th Field Army. The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing in the Mogilev direction broke through the powerful and deeply echeloned defense of the Germans, which the enemy had prepared along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers. On June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The withdrawal of the 4th German Army lost organization, the enemy lost up to 33 thousand killed and captured.
The Bobruisk offensive operation was supposed to create a southern "pincer" of the huge encirclement conceived by the Soviet Headquarters. This operation was entirely carried out by the most powerful of the fronts - the 1st Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht resisted the offensive of the Red Army. We had to advance through very difficult terrain - swamps. The blow was struck on June 24: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th army of Batov (reinforced by the 1st Don tank corps) moved, from the east to the west the 3rd army of Gorbatov advanced with the 9th tank body. For a quick breakthrough in the Slutsk direction, the 28th Army of Luchinsky and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of Pliev were used. The armies of Batov and Luchinsky quickly broke through the defenses of the stunned enemy (the Russians made their way through the swamp, which was considered impassable). But the 3rd army of Gorbatov had to literally bite into the orders of the Germans. The commander of the 9th Army, Hans Jordan, threw his main reserve against her - the 20th Panzer Division. But soon he had to redirect his reserve to the southern flank of the defense. The 20th Panzer Division was unable to close the gap. On June 27, the main forces of the 9th Field Army fell into the "boiler". General Jordan was replaced by von Forman, but this could not save the situation. Attempts to deblockade from the outside and from the inside failed. Panic reigned in encircled Bobruisk, and on the 27th its assault began. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was completely liberated. The Germans lost 74 thousand people killed and captured. As a result of the defeat of the 9th Army, both flanks of Army Group Center were open, and the road to Minsk was free from the northeast and southeast.
On June 29, the 1st Baltic Front attacked Polotsk. The 6th Guards Army of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov bypassed the city from the south (the guards of the 6th Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th shock army of Malyshev - from the north. Butkov's 1st Panzer Corps liberated the city of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. Then, with a sudden attack, the tankers seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina. But it did not work out to take the Germans into the "ring" - Karl Hilpert, who commanded the garrison of the city, arbitrarily left the "fortress", without waiting for the withdrawal routes to be cut by the Russian troops. Polotsk was occupied on July 4th. As a result of the Polotsk operation, the German command lost a strong stronghold and a railway junction. In addition, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of the German Army Group North were outflanked from the south and were under the threat of a flank strike.
The German command, trying to rectify the situation, replaced the commander of Army Group Center Bush with Field Marshal Walter Model. He was considered a master of defensive operations. Reserve units were sent to Belarus, including the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.
The 4th German Army, in the face of the threat of imminent encirclement, retreated across the Berezina River. The situation was extremely difficult: the flanks were open, the retreating columns were subjected to constant Soviet air strikes and partisan attacks. The pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was located directly in front of the 4th Army, was not strong, since the plans of the Soviet command did not include the expulsion of German troops from the future "boiler".
The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two main directions: to the southwest (toward Minsk) and west (to Vileyka). The 1st Belorussian Front advanced on Slutsk, Nesvizh and Minsk. German resistance was weak, the main forces were defeated. On June 30, Slutsk was taken, and on July 2, Nesvizh, the escape routes to the southwest were cut off for the Germans. By July 2, tank units of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Minsk. The advancing units of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to endure a fierce battle with the 5th German Panzer Division (reinforced by a battalion of heavy tanks), which arrived in the Borisov region on June 26-28. This division was full-blooded, did not participate in hostilities for several months. In the course of several bloody battles, the last one took place on July 1-2 north-west of Minsk, the tank division lost almost all its tanks and was driven back. On July 3, Burdeyny's 2nd Panzer Corps broke into Minsk from the northwest. At the same time, advanced units of Rokossovsky approached the city from the south. The German garrison was not numerous and did not last long, Minsk was liberated by lunchtime. As a result, units of the 4th Army and units of other armies that joined it fell into the encirclement. The Red Army actually avenged the "cauldrons" of 1941. The encircled were not able to organize a long resistance - the area of the encirclement was shot through with artillery fire, it was constantly bombed, the ammunition ran out, there was no outside help. The Germans fought until July 8-9, made several desperate attempts to break through, but were defeated everywhere. July 8 and. about. commander of the army, the commander of the XII Army Corps Vinzenz Müller signed the surrender. Even before July 12, there was a “cleansing operation”, the Germans lost 72 thousand killed and more than 35 thousand were captured.
The poverty of the road network in Belarus and the swampy and wooded terrain led to the fact that many kilometers of columns of German troops crowded together on just two major highways - Zhlobin and Rogachev, where they were subjected to massive attacks by the Soviet 16th Air Army. Some German units were practically destroyed on the Zhlobin highway.
Photo of destroyed German equipment from the area of the bridge across the Berezina.
The second stage of the operation
The Germans tried to stabilize the situation. The head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Kurt Zeitzler, proposed to transfer Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with the help of its troops. But this plan was rejected by Hitler for political reasons (relations with the Finns). In addition, the naval command opposed - the withdrawal from the Baltic worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden, led to the loss of a number of naval bases and strongholds in the Baltic. As a result, Zeitzler resigned and was replaced by Heinz Guderian. Model, for his part, tried to erect a new defensive line that ran from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi in order to close a hole in the front about 400 km wide. But for this he had only one whole army - the 2nd and the remnants of other armies. Therefore, the German command had to transfer significant forces to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and from the West. Until July 16, 46 divisions were sent to Belarus, but these troops were not brought into battle immediately, in parts, often "from the wheels", and therefore they could not quickly turn the tide.
From July 5 to July 20, 1944, the Vilnius operation was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. The Germans did not have a continuous front of defense in the Vilnius direction. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps of Obukhov reached the city and began to encircle it. An attempt to take the city on the move failed. On the night of July 8, new German forces were brought up to Vilnius. On July 8-9, the city was completely surrounded and its assault was launched. German attempts to unblock the city from the western direction were repulsed. The last centers of resistance were crushed in Vilnius on 13 July. Up to 8 thousand Germans were destroyed, 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. On July 15, units of the front occupied several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Neman. Until the 20th, there were battles for bridgeheads.
On July 28, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on a new offensive - they were aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki. On July 30, the German defense along the Neman was broken through; on August 1, the Germans left Kaunas so as not to be surrounded. Then the Germans received reinforcements and went on a counteroffensive - the battles went on with varying success until the end of August. The front did not reach several kilometers to the border of East Prussia.
Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front received the task of reaching the sea to cut off the North group. In the Dvina direction, the Germans were initially able to hold back the offensive, since the front was regrouping forces and waiting for reserves. Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right only on July 27th. On the same day they took Siauliai. By July 30, the front managed to separate the two enemy army groups from each other - the advanced units of the Red Army cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic in the Tukums region. On July 31 Jelgava was captured. The 1st Baltic Front went to the sea. The Germans began to try to reconnect with Army Group North. The fighting went on with varying success, and at the end of August there was a break in the battles.
The 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to the west - to Novogrudok, and then Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th army of Grishin and the 50th army of Boldin participated in the destruction of the Minsk "boiler", therefore, on July 5, only one army, the 33rd, went on the offensive. The 33rd Army advanced without encountering much resistance, covering 120-125 km in five days. On July 8, Novogrudok was liberated, on the 9th the army reached the Neman River. On July 10, the 50th Army joined the offensive and the troops crossed the Neman. On July 16, Grodno was liberated, the Germans were already putting up fierce resistance, a series of counterattacks was repulsed. The German command tried to stop the Soviet troops, but they did not have enough strength for this. July 27 Bialystok was recaptured. Soviet soldiers reached the pre-war border of the Soviet Union. The front was unable to carry out significant encirclements, since it did not have large mobile formations (tank, mechanized, cavalry corps) in its composition. On August 14, Osovets and the bridgehead beyond the Narew were occupied.
The 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Baranovichi-Brest. Almost immediately, the advancing units collided with German reserves: the 4th Panzer Division, the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, the 28th Light Infantry Division, and other formations went. July 5-6 was a fierce battle. Gradually, the German forces were crushed, they were inferior in number. In addition, the Soviet front was supported by powerful Air Force formations, which inflicted strong blows on the Germans. On July 6, Kovel was liberated. On July 8, after a fierce battle, Baranovichi was taken. On July 14 they took Pinsk, on the 20th Kobrin. On July 20, units of Rokossovsky crossed the Bug on the move. The Germans did not have time to create a line of defense along it. On July 25, a “cauldron” was created near Brest, but on the 28th, the remnants of the encircled German group broke out of it (the Germans lost 7 thousand people killed). It should be noted that the battles were fierce, there were few prisoners, but a lot of Germans were killed.
On July 22, units of the 2nd Panzer Army (which was attached to the front during the second phase of the operation) reached Lublin. On July 23, the assault on the city began, but due to the lack of infantry, it dragged on, the city was finally taken by the morning of the 25th. In late July - early August, Rokossovsky's front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula.
Operation results
As a result of the two-month offensive of the Red Army, White Russia was completely cleared of the Nazis, part of the Baltic states and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, on a front of 1100 kilometers, the advance of troops to a depth of up to 600 kilometers was achieved.
It was a major defeat for the Wehrmacht. There is even an opinion that it was the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Army Group Center was defeated, Army Group North was threatened with defeat. The powerful line of defense in Belarus, protected by natural barriers (swamps, rivers), has been broken. The German reserves were depleted, which had to be thrown into battle in order to close the "hole".
An excellent groundwork has been created for a future offensive into Poland and further into Germany. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of the capital of Poland (Magnushevsky and Pulawsky). In addition, during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front occupied a bridgehead near Sandomierz.
Operation Bagration was a triumph of Soviet military art. The Red Army "answered" for the "boilers" of 1941.
The Soviet army lost up to 178.5 thousand dead, missing and captured, as well as 587.3 thousand wounded and sick. The total losses of the Germans are about 400 thousand people (according to other sources, more than 500 thousand).
During the course, several large-scale military offensive campaigns of the Soviet troops were carried out. One of the key was the operation "Bagration" (1944). The campaign was named in honor of the Patriotic War of 1812. Let us further consider how Operation Bagration (1944) took place. The main lines of advance of the Soviet troops will be briefly described.
preliminary stage
On the third anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR, the military campaign "Bagration" began. years spent on the Soviet troops managed to break through the German defenses in many areas. In this they were actively supported by the partisans. The offensive operations of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were intensive. With the actions of these units, the military campaign "Bagration" - the operation (1944; the leader and coordinator of the plan - G.K. Zhukov) began. The commanders were Rokossovsky, Chernyakhovsky, Zakharov, Bagramyan. In the area of Vilnius, Brest, Vitebsk, Bobruisk and east of Minsk, enemy groups were surrounded and eliminated. Several successful offensives were carried out. As a result of the battles, a significant part of Belarus was liberated, the capital of the country - Minsk, the territory of Lithuania, the eastern regions of Poland. Soviet troops reached the borders of East Prussia.
Main front lines
(operation of 1944) assumed 2 stages. They included several offensive campaigns of the Soviet troops. The direction of the operation "Bagration" in 1944 at the first stage was as follows:
- Vitebsk.
- Orsha.
- Mogilev.
- Bobruisk.
- Polotsk.
- Minsk.
This stage took place from June 23 to July 4. From July 5 to August 29, the offensive was also carried out on several fronts. At the second stage, operations were planned:
- Vilnius.
- Siauliai.
- Bialystok.
- Lublin-Brestskaya.
- Kaunas.
- Osovetskaya.
Vitebsk-Orsha offensive
In this sector, the defense was occupied by the 3rd Panzer Army, commanded by Reinhardt. Directly at Vitebsk stood its 53rd Army Corps. They were commanded by Gen. Gollwitzer. Near Orsha was the 17th corps of the 4th field army. In June 1944, Operation Bagration was carried out with the help of reconnaissance. Thanks to her, the Soviet troops managed to penetrate the German defenses and take the first trenches. On June 23, the Russian command struck the main blow. The key role belonged to the 43rd and 39th armies. The first covered the western side of Vitebsk, the second - the southern. The 39th Army had almost no superiority in numbers, however, the high concentration of forces in the sector made it possible to create a significant local advantage during the initial stage of the implementation of the Bagration plan. The operation (1944) near Vitebsk and Orsha was generally successful. Quite quickly managed to break through the western part of the defense and the southern front. The 6th Corps, located on the south side of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Over the following days, the commanders of divisions and the corps itself were killed. The remaining units, having lost contact with each other, moved in small groups to the west.
Liberation of cities
On June 24, units of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Dvina. Army Group North tried to counterattack. However, their breakthrough was unsuccessful. Corps Group D was surrounded in Beshenkovichi. To the south of Vitebsk, Oslikovsky's mechanized cavalry brigade was introduced. His group began to move quickly enough to the southwest.
In June 1944, the operation "Bagration" was carried out rather slowly in the Orsha sector. This was due to the fact that one of the strongest German infantry divisions, the assault 78th, was located here. She was much better equipped than the rest, had support for 50 self-propelled guns. Parts of the 14th motorized division were also located here.
However, the Russian command continued to implement the Bagration plan. The 1944 operation of the year involved the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Soviet soldiers cut the railroad from Orsha to the west near Tolochin. The Germans were forced to either leave the city or die in the "boiler".
On the morning of June 27, Orsha was cleared of the invaders. 5th Guards the tank army began to advance towards Borisov. On June 27, Vitebsk was also liberated in the morning. Here, the German grouping was defending itself, having been subjected to artillery and air strikes the day before. The invaders made several attempts to break through the encirclement. 26.06 one of them was successful. However, a few hours later, about 5 thousand Germans were again surrounded.
Breakthrough Results
Thanks to the offensive actions of the Soviet troops, the 53rd German Corps was almost completely destroyed. 200 people managed to break through to the fascist units. According to Haupt's notes, almost all of them were wounded. The Soviet troops also managed to defeat parts of the 6th Corps and Group D. This became possible thanks to the coordinated implementation of the first stage of the Bagration plan. The 1944 operation near Orsha and Vitebsk made it possible to eliminate the northern flank of the Center. This was the first step towards further complete encirclement of the group.
Fighting near Mogilev
This part of the front was considered auxiliary. On June 23, effective artillery preparation was carried out. The forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began to force the river. Pronya. The defensive line of the Germans passed along it. Operation "Bagration" in June 1944 took place with the active use of artillery. The enemy was almost completely crushed by it. In the Mogilev direction, sappers quickly built 78 bridges for the passage of infantry and 4 heavy 60-ton crossings for equipment.
A few hours later, the number of most of the German companies decreased from 80-100 to 15-20 people. But units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the river. Bass is quite organized. Operation "Bagration" in June 1944 continued from the south and north of Mogilev. On June 27, the city was surrounded and taken by attack the next day. About 2 thousand prisoners were captured in Mogilev. Among them was the commander of the 12th Infantry Division Bamler, as well as the commandant von Ermansdorf. The latter was subsequently found guilty of a large number of serious crimes and hanged. The German retreat gradually became more and more disorganized. Until June 29, 33,000 German soldiers and 20 tanks were destroyed and captured.
Bobruisk
Operation "Bagration" (1944) assumed the formation of the southern "pincer" of a large-scale encirclement. This action was carried out by the most powerful and numerous Belorussian Front, commanded by Rokossovsky. Initially, the right flank participated in the offensive. He was resisted by the 9th field army of Gen. Jordan. The task of eliminating the enemy was solved by creating a local "cauldron" near Bobruisk.
The offensive began from the south on 24.06. Operation "Bagration" in 1944 assumed the use of aviation here. However, weather conditions significantly complicated her actions. In addition, the terrain itself was not very favorable for the offensive. The Soviet troops had to overcome a fairly large marshy swamp. However, this path was chosen deliberately, since the German defense was weak on this side. On June 27, the interception of roads from Bobruisk to the north and west took place. Key German forces were surrounded. The diameter of the ring was approximately 25 km. The operation to liberate Bobruisk ended successfully. During the offensive, two corps were destroyed - the 35th Army Corps and the 41st Tank Corps. The defeat of the 9th Army made it possible to open the road to Minsk from the northeast and southeast.
Fighting near Polotsk
This direction caused serious concern among the Russian command. Bagramyan began to eliminate the problem. In fact, there was no break between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. The main enemy was the 3rd Panzer Army, the forces of the "North" (16th Field Army). The Germans had 2 infantry divisions in reserve. The Polotsk operation did not end with such a rout as near Vitebsk. However, it made it possible to deprive the enemy of a stronghold, a railway junction. As a result, the threat to the 1st Baltic Front was removed, and Army Group North was outflanked from the south, which meant a blow to the flank.
Retreat of the 4th Army
After the defeat of the southern and northern flanks near Bobruisk and Vitebsk, the Germans were squeezed into a rectangle. Its eastern wall was formed by the Drut River, the western by the Berezina. Soviet troops were stationed from the north and south. To the west was Minsk. It was in this direction that the main blows of the Soviet forces were aimed. From the flanks, the 4th Army had virtually no cover. Gene. von Tippelskirch ordered a retreat across the Berezina. To do this, I had to use a dirt road from Mogilev. On the only bridge, the German forces tried to cross to the west bank, experiencing constant fire from bombers and attack aircraft. The military police were supposed to regulate the crossing, but they themselves withdrew from this task. In addition, partisans were active in this area. They carried out constant attacks on the positions of the Germans. The situation for the enemy was further complicated by the fact that groups from broken units in other sectors, including from near Vitebsk, joined the crossing units. In this regard, the retreat of the 4th Army was slow and was accompanied by heavy losses.
Battle from the south side of Minsk
In the offensive, mobile groups were in the lead - tank, mechanized and cavalry-mechanized formations. Part of Pliev quickly began to advance towards Slutsk. His group went to the city in the evening of 29.06. Due to the fact that the Germans suffered heavy losses in front of the 1st Belorussian Front, they offered little resistance. Slutsk itself was defended by formations of the 35th and 102nd divisions. They put up organized resistance. Then Pliev launched an attack from three flanks at the same time. This attack was successful, and by 11 am on June 30, the city was cleared of the Germans. By July 2, Pliev's cavalry-mechanized units occupied Nesvizh, cutting off the group's path to the southeast. The breakthrough came fairly quickly. Resistance was provided by small unorganized groups of Germans.
Battle for Minsk
German mobile reserves began to arrive at the front. They were withdrawn mainly from units operating in Ukraine. The 5th Panzer Division arrived first. She posed a fairly serious threat, taking into account the fact that over the past few months she had hardly participated in the battles. The division was well equipped, re-equipped and reinforced with the 505th heavy battalion. However, the enemy's weak point here was the infantry. It consisted either of security or of divisions that had suffered significant losses. A serious battle took place on the northwestern side of Minsk. Enemy tankers announced the elimination of 295 Soviet vehicles. However, there is no doubt that they themselves suffered serious losses. The 5th division was reduced to 18 tanks, all the "tigers" of the 505th battalion were lost. Thus, the connection lost the opportunity to influence the course of the battle. 2nd Guards Corps on July 1 approached the outskirts of Minsk. Having made a detour, he broke into the city from the northwest side. At the same time, a Rokossovsky detachment approached from the south, the 5th Panzer Army from the north, and detachments of combined arms forces from the east. The defense of Minsk did not last long. The city was badly destroyed by the Germans already in 1941. Retreating, the enemy additionally blew up the structures.
Collapse of the 4th Army
The German group was surrounded, but still made attempts to break through to the west. The Nazis even went into battle with bladed weapons. The command of the 4th Army fled to the west, as a result of which the actual control was carried out instead of von Tippelskirch by the head of the 12th Army Corps, Müller. On July 8-9, the resistance of the Germans in the Minsk "cauldron" was finally broken. The cleansing lasted until the 12th: regular units, together with partisans, neutralized small groups of the enemy in the forests. After that, hostilities east of Minsk ended.
Second phase
After the completion of the first stage, the operation "Bagration" (1944), in short, assumed the maximum consolidation of the success achieved. At the same time, the German army tried to restore the front. At the second stage, the Soviet units had to fight the German reserves. At the same time, personnel changes took place in the leadership of the army of the Third Reich. After the expulsion of the Germans from Polotsk, Bagramyan was given a new task. The 1st Baltic Front was to carry out an offensive to the northwest, towards Daugavpils, and to the west - to Sventsyany and Kaunas. The plan was to break through to the Baltic and block the communications of the Sever Army formations from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. After the flank shifts, fierce battles began. German troops, meanwhile, continued their counterattacks. On August 20, the attack on Tukums began from the east and west. For a short period, the Germans managed to restore communication between parts of the "Center" and "North". However, the attacks of the 3rd Panzer Army at Siauliai were unsuccessful. At the end of August, there was a break in the battles. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of the offensive operation "Bagration".
In the late spring of 1944, relative calm reigned on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, having suffered major defeats during the winter-spring battles, strengthened the defense, and the Red Army rested and gathered strength for the next blow.
Looking at the map of the fighting of that time, you can see on it two large projections of the front line. The first is on the territory of Ukraine, south of the Pripyat River. The second, far to the east, is in Belarus, with a border along the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This ledge was called the "Belarusian balcony", and after a discussion that took place at the end of April 1944 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to fall upon it with all the might of the Red Army troops. The operation to liberate Belarus received the code name "Bagration".
The German command did not foresee such a turn. The terrain in Belarus was wooded and swampy, with a large number of lakes and rivers and a rather poorly developed road network. The use of large tank and mechanized formations here, from the point of view of the Nazi generals, was difficult. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was preparing to repel the Soviet offensive on the territory of Ukraine, concentrating much more impressive forces there than in Belarus. So, under the command of the army group "Northern Ukraine" were seven tank divisions and four battalions of tanks "Tiger". And in the subordination of the Army Group "Center" - only one tank, two panzer-grenadier divisions and one battalion of "Tigers". In total, Ernst Busch, who commanded the Central Army Group, had 1.2 million people, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9,500 guns and mortars, and 1,350 aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.
The Germans created a fairly powerful and layered defense in Belarus. Since 1943, the construction of fortified positions has been underway, often based on natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, swamps, hills. Some cities at the most important communication nodes were declared fortresses. These included, in particular, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev and others. The defensive lines were equipped with bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable artillery and machine-gun positions.
According to the operational plan of the Soviet high command, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front, were to defeat the enemy forces in Belarus. The total number of Soviet troops in the operation was approximately 2.4 million people, more than 5,000 tanks, about 36,000 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 16th air armies (more than 5,000 aircraft). Thus, the Red Army achieved a significant, and in many respects, overwhelming superiority over enemy troops.
In order to keep the preparations for the offensive secret, the command of the Red Army prepared and carried out a huge amount of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of forces and to mislead the enemy. Parts moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence. During daylight hours, the troops stopped, settling in the forests and carefully disguised themselves. In parallel, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, reconnaissance was carried out in combat in the areas of responsibility of the fronts that did not take part in the Bagration operation, whole echelons with models of military equipment were taken from Belarus to the rear. In general, the measures achieved their goal, although the preparations for the offensive of the Red Army were not completely hidden. So, prisoners captured in the zone of action of the 3rd Belorussian Front said that the command of the German troops noted the strengthening of the Soviet units and expected active actions from the Red Army. But the time of the beginning of the operation, the number of Soviet troops and the exact direction of the strike remained unsolved.
Before the start of the operation, Belarusian partisans became more active, committing a large number of sabotage on the communications of the Nazis. More than 40,000 rails were blown up between 20 and 23 July alone. In general, the actions of the partisans created a number of difficulties for the Germans, but they still did not cause critical damage to the railway network, which was directly stated even by such an authority in reconnaissance and sabotage as I. G. Starinov.
Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 and was carried out in two stages. The first stage included the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations.
The Vitebsk-Orsha operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Baltic Front of Army General I. Bagramyan, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies, hit at the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The 4th shock army was to advance on Polotsk.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel General I. Chernyakhovsky, attacked Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and at Borisov with units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. To develop the operational success of the front, the horse-mechanized group of N. Oslikovsky (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov were intended.
After artillery preparation on June 23, the troops of the fronts went on the offensive. During the first day, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front managed to advance 16 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense, with the exception of the Polotsk direction, where the 4th shock army met fierce resistance and had little success. The width of the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack was about 50 kilometers.
The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant success in the Bogushevsky direction, breaking through the German defense line more than 50 kilometers wide and capturing three serviceable bridges across the Luchesa River. For the Vitebsk grouping of the Nazis, there was a threat of the formation of a "cauldron". The commander of the German troops requested permission to withdraw, but the Wehrmacht command considered Vitebsk a fortress, and the retreat was not allowed.
During June 24-26, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy troops near Vitebsk and completely destroyed the German division that was covering the city. Four more divisions tried to break through to the west, however, with the exception of a small number of disorganized units, they did not succeed. On June 27, the encircled Germans capitulated. About 10 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.
Orsha was also liberated on June 27. The forces of the Red Army entered the Orsha-Minsk highway. On June 28, Lepel was released. In total, at the first stage, parts of the two fronts advanced to a distance of 80 to 150 km.
The Mogilev operation began on June 23. It was conducted by the 2nd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General Zakharov. During the first two days, Soviet troops advanced about 30 kilometers. Then the Germans began to retreat to the western bank of the Dnieper. Their pursuit was carried out by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27, Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper, and on June 28, Mogilev was liberated. The German 12th Infantry Division, which was defending in the city, was destroyed. A large number of prisoners and trophies were captured. The German units retreated to Minsk under the blows of the attack aircraft of the front. Soviet troops were moving towards the Berezina River.
The Bobruisk operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. According to the plan of the front commander, the blow was delivered in converging directions from Rogachev and Parichi with a general direction to Bobruisk in order to encircle and destroy the German group in this city. After the capture of Bobruisk, it was planned to develop an offensive against Pukhovichi and Slutsk. From the air, the advancing troops were supported by about 2,000 aircraft.
The offensive was carried out in an impenetrable wooded and swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. The troops had to go through training in order to learn how to walk on bogshoes, overcome water obstacles on improvised means, and also build gati. On June 24, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Soviet troops went on the attack and by the middle of the day broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The timely introduction of mechanized units into battle made it possible to reach a breakthrough depth of up to 20 km in some areas.
On June 27, the Bobruisk group of Germans was completely surrounded. There were about 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers in the ring. Leaving part of the forces to destroy the enemy, the front began to develop an offensive against Osipovichi and Slutsk. The encircled units attempted to break through to the north. A fierce battle took place in the area of the village of Titovka, during which the Nazis, under cover of artillery, regardless of losses, tried to break through the Soviet front. To hold back the onslaught, it was decided to use bombers. More than 500 aircraft continuously bombed the concentration of German troops for an hour and a half. Leaving the equipment, the Germans tried to break through to Bobruisk, but were unsuccessful. On June 28, the remnants of the German forces surrendered.
By this time, it was clear that Army Group Center was on the verge of defeat. German troops suffered huge losses in killed and captured, a large amount of equipment was destroyed and captured by Soviet forces. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops ranged from 80 to 150 kilometers. Conditions were created for the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center. On June 28, Commander Ernst Busch was removed from his post, and Field Marshal Walter Model took his place.
Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the Berezina River. In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were ordered to force the river and, bypassing the strongholds of the Nazis, develop a swift offensive against the capital of the BSSR.
On June 29, the advanced detachments of the Red Army captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina and in some areas deepened into the enemy’s defenses by 5-10 kilometers. On June 30, the main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1, the 11th Guards Army broke into the city of Borisov from the south and southwest, freeing it by 15:00. On the same day, Begoml and Pleschenitsy were liberated.
On July 2, Soviet troops cut off most of the retreat routes for the Minsk grouping of the enemy. The cities of Vileyka, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, Krasnoe were taken. Thus, the Germans were cut off from all major communications.
On the night of July 3, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky, ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. Rotmistrov, in cooperation with the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, to attack Minsk from the north and northwest direction and by the end of the day on July 3rd completely take over the city.
On July 3, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops broke into Minsk. The battles for the city were fought by the 71st and 36th rifle corps of the 31st Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the tankers of the Tatsinsky Guards Corps. From the southern and southeastern outskirts, the offensive against the Belarusian capital was supported by units of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By 13:00 the city was liberated.
As mentioned above, Polotsk became a big obstacle for the Soviet troops. The Germans turned it into a powerful defense center and concentrated six infantry divisions near the city. The 1st Baltic Front, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, in converging directions from the south and northeast, was to surround and destroy the German troops.
The Polotsk operation began on June 29. By the evening of July 1, the Soviet units managed to cover the flanks of the German group and reach the outskirts of Polotsk. Violent street fighting ensued, lasting until 4 July. On this day the city was liberated. The forces of the left wing of the front, pursuing the retreating German units, went west for another 110 kilometers, reaching the border of Lithuania.
The first stage of Operation Bagration brought Army Group Center to the brink of disaster. The total advance of the Red Army in 12 days amounted to 225-280 kilometers. A gap about 400 kilometers wide was formed in the German defense, and it was already very difficult to fully cover it. Nevertheless, the Germans tried to stabilize the situation by relying on individual counterattacks in key areas. At the same time, Model was building a new line of defense, including at the expense of units transferred from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. But even those 46 divisions that were sent to the "catastrophe zone" did not significantly affect the state of affairs.
On July 5, the Vilnius operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were on the outskirts of the city and began to cover it. On July 8, the Germans brought reinforcements to Vilnius. About 150 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated to break through the encirclement. A significant contribution to the fact that all these attempts failed was made by the aviation of the 1st Air Army, which actively bombed the main centers of resistance of the Germans. On July 13, Vilnius was taken, and the encircled group was destroyed.
The 2nd Belorussian Front developed an offensive against Bialystok. As a reinforcement, the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov was transferred to the front. During the five days of the offensive, the Soviet troops, without experiencing strong resistance, advanced 150 kilometers, liberating the city of Novogrudok on July 8. Near Grodno, the Germans had already gathered their forces, the formations of the Red Army had to repel a number of counterattacks, but on July 16 this Belarusian city was also cleared of enemy troops. By July 27, the Red Army liberated Bialystok and reached the pre-war border of the USSR.
The 1st Belorussian Front was to defeat the enemy near Brest and Lublin with strikes bypassing the Brest fortified area and reach the Vistula River. On July 6, the Red Army took Kovel and broke through the German defensive line near Siedlce. Having traveled more than 70 kilometers until July 20, Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and entered Poland. On July 25, a cauldron formed near Brest, but the Soviet soldiers failed to completely destroy the enemy: part of the Nazi forces were able to break through. By the beginning of August, Lublin was taken by the Red Army and bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula were captured.
Operation Bagration was a grandiose victory for the Soviet troops. During the two months of the offensive, Belarus, part of the Baltic states and Poland were liberated. During the operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. 22 German generals were captured alive, 10 more were killed. Army Group Center was defeated.
When, on June 22, 1941, German troops began to invade the territory of the USSR, the main and most powerful blow was delivered by Army Group Center. The Berlin-Minsk-Smolensk line was the shortest route to Moscow, and it was in this direction that the Wehrmacht concentrated the largest and most well-armed group of troops. The complete collapse of the Soviet Western Front in the first weeks of the War made it possible to capture Minsk by June 28, and by the second half of July 1941, the whole of Soviet Belarus. A long period of occupation.
After the defeat of the German troops on the Kursk Bulge, the main focus of hostilities on the Soviet-German front shifted southward to the territory of Ukraine and the Black Sea region. It was there that the main military battles of the end of 1943 - the beginning of 1944 took place. By the spring of 1944, the entire left-bank and most of the right-bank Ukraine were liberated. In January 1944, a powerful blow was dealt by the Red Army in the northwestern direction, known as "1st Stalinist blow", as a result of which Leningrad was released.
But on the central sector of the front, the situation was not so favorable. German troops still firmly held the so-called "Panther" line: Vitebsk-Orsha-Mogilev-Zhlobin. Thus, a huge ledge, with an area of about 250 thousand square kilometers, was formed on the Soviet-German front, aimed at the central regions of the USSR. This section of the front was called "Belarusian ledge" or "Belarusian balcony".
Despite the fact that most of the German generals suggested that Hitler withdraw troops from the ledge and level the front line, the Reich Chancellor was adamant. Encouraged by the reports of scientists about the imminent appearance of a "superweapon", he still hoped to turn the tide of the War and did not want to part with such a convenient springboard. In April 1944, the command of Army Group Center presented to the top leadership of the Wehrmacht another plan to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to more convenient positions beyond the Berezina, but it was also rejected. Instead, a plan was adopted to further strengthen the positions held. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Zhlobin were turned into fortresses, capable of conducting defensive battles with complete encirclement. At the same time, additional defensive lines were built on the Panther line, fortified with pillboxes and bunkers. The natural features of the area gave even greater stability to the German defense. Vast swampy swamps, deep ravines interspersed with dense forests, many rivers and streams made the area of the Belarusian ledge impassable for heavy equipment and at the same time extremely convenient for defense. In addition, the German headquarters believed that the Red Army troops would try to build on the spring success achieved in southern Ukraine and strike either at the oil fields of Romania, or from south to north, trying to cut off Army Groups Center and North. It was on these areas that the main attention of the top military leadership of the Wehrmacht was focused. Thus, the German command made erroneous assumptions about the direction of the offensive of the Soviet troops during summer-autumn campaign of 1944. But The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had completely different plans for the summer and autumn of 1944..
At the beginning of April 1944 The General Staff began planning an offensive operation for the liberation of Belarus and Karelia, and the general plan of hostilities for this period was quite accurately voiced in a letter from I.V. Stalin written to Churchill: | “The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, organized in accordance with the agreement at the Tehran Conference, will begin by mid-June on one of the important sectors of the front. The general offensive of the Soviet troops will be deployed in stages through the successive introduction of armies into offensive operations. At the end of June and during July, offensive operations will turn into a general offensive of the Soviet troops. |
Thus, the plan for the summer campaign consisted in the consistent launch of offensive operations from north to south, that is, exactly where the enemy expected a “calm summer”. It is also worth noting that in the summer campaign, our troops not only set the task of further liberating the Motherland from the German invaders, but also, by their active actions, were supposed to help the allied troops in the landing of troops in northern France.
A key role in the entire campaign was to play Belarusian offensive operation, called "Bagration".
The general plan of the Belarusian operation was as follows: to eliminate the flank groupings of German troops defending the Panther line with converging strikes, while delivering several cutting strikes on the central part of the defensive line.
For the campaign to eliminate Army Group Center, it was decided to involve 4 fronts: 1st Belorussian (commander - General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd Belorussian (commander - Colonel General G.F. Zakharov), 3- th Belorussian (commander - Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky) and 1st Baltic (commander - General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan).
Preparation for surgery deserves special attention.. It was thanks to a well-thought-out and well-executed preparatory phase that the Red Army managed to carry out one of the most successful and large-scale offensive operations.
The primary task for the commanders of the fronts was to ensure the secrecy of the preparations for the future offensive.
To this end, in the areas of the future offensive, the construction of defensive structures, the construction of fortified areas, and the preparation of cities for all-round defense began. Frontline, army and divisional newspapers published materials only on defensive topics, which created the illusion of weakening this strategic direction in terms of offensive. At stops, the echelons were immediately cordoned off by strong patrols and people were let out of the cars only by teams. The railway workers were not informed of any data, except for the numbers, about these echelons.
At the same time, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was given the following order: |
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A similar order was received by the command of the 3rd Baltic Front.
For German intelligence, the names of the picture that the military leadership of the Wehrmacht wanted to see emerged. Namely: the Red Army in the area of the "Belarusian Balcony" is not going to take active offensive actions and is preparing an offensive on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, where the greatest results were achieved during the spring military campaign.
For even more secrecy only a few people knew the full plan of the operation, and all instructions and orders were delivered only in writing or orally, without the use of telephone and radio communications.
At the same time, the build-up of strike groups of all four fronts took place only at night and in small groups.
For additional disinformation, tank armies were left in the southwestern direction. Enemy reconnaissance vigilantly followed everything that happened in the Soviet troops. This fact additionally convinced the Nazi command that the offensive was being prepared precisely here.
Measures taken to disinform German leadership were so successful that the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, went on vacation 3 days before the start of the operation.
Another important stage in the preparation of the future offensive was the training of troops in operations in difficult swampy terrain. The Red Army soldiers were trained to swim across rivers and lakes, to navigate in the forest area, swamp skis or, as they were also called, "wet shoes" were massively sent to the front. Special rafts and drags were built for artillery. Each tank was equipped with fascines (bundles of twigs, brushwood, reeds to strengthen slopes, embankments, roads through the swamp), logs or special triangles for passing through wide ditches.
Simultaneously engineering and sapper troops prepared the area for a future offensive: bridges were repaired or built, crossings were equipped, passages were made in minefields. For uninterrupted supply of the armies at the entire stage of the operation, new roads and railways were laid to the front line.
Throughout the preparatory period active reconnaissance activities were carried out both front-line reconnaissance forces and partisan detachments. The number of the latter on the territory of Belarus was about 150 thousand people, about 200 partisan brigades and separate partisan groups were formed.
During intelligence activities the main schemes of German fortifications were revealed and critical documents such as maps of minefields and maps of fortified areas have been recovered.
By mid-June, without exaggeration, the titanic work in preparation for Operation Bagration was generally completed. The units of the Red Army participating in the operation secretly concentrated on the starting lines. So, for two days on June 18-19, the 6th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov made a 110-kilometer transition and stood a few kilometers from the front line. June 20, 1944 Soviet troops prepared for the upcoming operation. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the two fronts - the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal G.K. Zhukov. That night, over 10,000 enemy communications were blown up, which seriously prevented the Germans from transferring reserves to dangerous areas of the breakthrough in a timely manner.
By the same time, the assault units of the Red Army advanced to their starting positions for the offensive. Only after the strike of the partisans did the Nazi military leadership realize where the main offensive of the Soviet troops would begin in the summer of 1944.
On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance and assault battalions of the breakthrough armies, with the support of tanks, began reconnaissance in force on almost 500 km of the front. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Ernst Busch, began a hasty transfer of German troops to the front line of defense of the Panther line.
On June 23, 1944, the first phase of the Belarusian operation began., consisting of a number of front-line operations.
In the central sector of the front, as part of the Mogilev offensive operation, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of General G.F. Zakharov launched an offensive. The front troops were faced with the task of cutting off and pinning down the enemy in the Mogilev area with the left flank, liberating the city and creating a bridgehead for the further development of the offensive. The right flank of the front was supposed to help the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and eliminate the Orsha enemy grouping.
In the north, the 1st Baltic Front under the command of General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan began the Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation. As part of this campaign, Bagramyan's troops had to deeply encircle Vitebsk from the north with one flank, thereby cutting off Army Group Center from possible assistance from Army Group North. The left flank of the front, in cooperation with the troops of Chernyakhovsky complete the encirclement of the Vitebsk group.
By June 1944, the Red Army had liberated almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. It was there, on Ukrainian soil, that the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. However, by the spring of the penultimate year of the war, the offensive of the Soviet troops slowed down: the enemy constantly transferred fresh forces from the western front, which, by imposing protracted battles, were able to stop the offensive of the Red Army.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command could not put up with such a state of affairs. At the same time, the Stavka understood perfectly well that it was impossible to throw an army into battle without careful planning of operations. That is why the General Staff and the Headquarters made the only right decision in such a situation - to change the direction of the main strikes.
By that time, the front line passed along the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. On operational maps, it looked like a wedge, the tip of which was turned deep into the Soviet Union. The area of \u200b\u200bthe "balcony", the so-called ledge, was almost 250 thousand square kilometers.
In Berlin, the offensive of the Red Army in Belarus was not expected: the military leadership of the Third Reich was sure that the offensive should be expected north of Leningrad or in the direction of "Southern Poland - the Balkans".
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the contrary, considered the complete liberation of Belarus to be the primary task of the summer-autumn campaign.
It was assumed that four Soviet fronts - 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky, G.F. Zakharova and I.D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan, - inflicting deep blows in six directions at once, they will first break through the defenses, surround and destroy enemy groups that are on the flanks, eliminate the main forces of Army Group Center and reach the Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin line.
In total, under the command of four commanders 27 armies: 20 combined arms, two tank and five air armies.
With the choice of the direction of the main attack, they quickly decided - the Minsk direction.
A rather difficult task was to break through the front in six sectors: however, the implementation of this particular decision could lead to a quick dissection of enemy forces and would make it difficult to use reserves.
On May 30, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the final plan for the Belarusian offensive operation, which received the code name "Bagration".
Up to the start of the operation, the Headquarters replenished the fronts that were supposed to take part in the offensive: more than 100 trains with manpower, fuel, ammunition, and equipment were delivered to the front every day. The result was an almost fourfold advantage of the Red Army in tanks and guns, a threefold advantage in aircraft and one and a half times in manpower: before that, in none of the offensive operations, Soviet troops had such superiority.
At the same time, the enemy, who still did not expect a large-scale offensive in the Minsk direction, was confident that any local offensive by the Soviet troops would be calmly repelled by the main forces of Army Group Center. At the same time, the German command pinned great hopes on a multi-lane, defense in depth.
