From 1917 to 1991, many books were published in the USSR that proved the advantages of the Soviet way of life in all its manifestations. And the history of the past was embellished in such a way that now you don’t understand where the truth is and where the fiction is. And only today historians, and even then with considerable difficulty, are gradually beginning to get to the truth ...

MOIARUSSIA will try to figure it out, referring to a professional historian and expert in such matters.

WHO WIN THE BATTLE OF BORODINO?

What's question? Are not the words of General Yermolov written even in school textbooks: "The French army crashed against the Russian"? It was we who defeated Napoleon, not he us! All this, of course, is true. But if you look not only at the textbook, but also, for example, on the Internet, you can see how the information found there differs. The data on the number of troops on the battlefield do not match, and even in the notes of eyewitnesses of this battle there are serious discrepancies.

For example, there is evidence that Napoleon at Borodino had 135 thousand soldiers, while Kutuzov - 120. But other figures: the French - 133.8, the Russians - 154.8 thousand people. And which ones are true? Moreover, the same number includes 11 thousand Cossacks and 28.5 thousand militias. That is, numerically, we, it seems, in this case were superior to the French, but qualitatively they were superior to us, since the combat capabilities of the militias were small. But in all sources the number of guns is the same: we have 640 guns and the French have 587.

This means that we had 53 more guns, which at that time was a big force.

There is evidence that in the French army only 10% of the guns could shoot at 1000 meters, and the rest - at 600-700.

But in the Russian army there were more heavy guns capable of firing at 1200 m. In addition, it is easier to defend than to attack, especially on fortifications, even mediocre ones. Therefore, the losses of the attackers were always greater than those of the defenders!

Now let's look at the results of the battle.

The French themselves estimated their losses at 28 thousand people. Some books say that Napoleon lost 50, and Kutuzov - 44 thousand soldiers. However, there are other data that are directly opposite, and there is still no clarity on this important issue!

MAYBE A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE?

It is known that Napoleon began his biography as an artillery officer and that he received good knowledge in this area, which he later often used in battles. Choosing the direction of the main attack, Bonaparte assembled a battery of a hundred or more guns, which ensured the continuity of fire.

The fact is that the then smooth-bore guns were reloaded rather slowly, and the batteries were fired not in one gulp, but with guns in turn. And if there were few guns in such a battery, then its commander had to wait until the servants loaded them all. When the last of the cannons of Napoleon's "great batteries" fired, the first was already loaded, so they fired continuously. Bonaparte acted in exactly the same way in the battle of Borodino.

But the Russian army used its guns more traditionally. Several dozen cannons were installed on the Semyonovsky flashes, on the Kurgan height and in many other places. However, their total number nowhere reached a hundred guns. Moreover, on the orders of Kutuzov, 305 guns were withdrawn to the reserve near the village of Psarevo, where they remained until the end of the battle. It is clear that the wrecked guns were constantly replaced by those standing in reserve.

However, in reality, this led to the fact that their total number (especially at the beginning of the battle) turned out to be less for us than for Napoleon. By the time of the decisive attack on the fleches by the French, 400 guns were hitting them, but 300 answered them.

In addition, then there was no radio or mobile communications ... While the adjutants on horseback managed to transmit the appropriate order, while a certain number of horse-drawn guns reached the place, while the horses were unharnessed and taken to cover, and the guns themselves began to shoot , quite a lot of time has passed. That is, our numerical advantage in artillery did not play any role in this battle!

CALCULATIONS AND CALCULATIONS

However, after all, we still do not know the effectiveness of the firing of our and French artillery, and this is a very important indicator. But it turns out that such comparative tests were carried out and gave very similar results. Why this is so is very easy to explain. The thing is that both the French and the Russians were armed with guns close in their combat qualities, based on the design of General Griboval. When shooting at a target, the percentage of canister bullets that hit it was approximately the same: at a distance of 600-650 meters, an average of eight hits.

But this means that one artillery company in one salvo would have had about a hundred hits and could disable up to two infantry platoons, which attacked in close formation, and even at full height!

Now suppose that about a third of all the shots fired on the Borodino field were grape shots. It can be calculated that they would put out of action 240 thousand people, while the actual losses were three times less.

This suggests that the accuracy of fire in combat conditions was greatly reduced due to smoke, enemy return fire, and also due to the fact that people in combat conditions are in a state of extreme stress.

"SHOOTING RARELY, YES ACUTE!"

So, the human factor had a great influence on the shooting results. In the "General Rules for Artillery in a Field Battle", introduced just before the start of World War II, Major General A.I. Kutaisov wrote:

“In a field battle, shots over 500 fathoms (over 1000 meters. - Approx. Ed.) are doubtful, over 300 (from 600 to 1000) are quite accurate, and over 200 and 100 (from 400 and 200 to 600) are deadly. Therefore, when the enemy is still at the first distance, you should shoot at him rarely in order to have time to aim the gun more accurately, in the second more often and finally strike with all possible speed in order to overturn and destroy him.

That is, the main requirement was still to shoot rarely, but accurately. At the same time, the combat experience of Russian artillerymen of the 18th century, who, even during the Battle of Gross-Jegersdorf, fired over the head of their troops, did not find application in the Battle of Borodino.

Accuracy in battle was greatly reduced, because the gunners, having taken up a firing position, were in a hurry to open fire, which led to less careful aiming. In addition, each next shot could only occur a minute after the previous one.

And during this time, the enemy column at a quick pace managed to pass almost 50 meters.

This means that if an artillery company fired volleys with buckshot, and each volley destroyed two enemy platoons, then from a distance of 600 meters, firing 12 volleys, this company would destroy an entire regiment of infantry, which really did not happen.

WHAT WOULD BE IF…

Thus, we can conclude that the artillery fire during the Battle of Borodino, although it was unprecedented for that time, was still not as effective as it could be, due to a number of circumstances.

The French fired more than 60,000 shots in this battle, that is, during the 15 hours of the battle, their artillery fired about 67 shells every minute.

At the same time, from the French side, the fire was more frequent and intense, especially at the initial stage of the battle. And here we begin to understand that, although the French army "crashed against the Russian", it could have "crashed" even more if it were not for our artillery reserve of 305 guns, which immediately put the Russian army at a disadvantage in terms of towards French!

It turned out that, having 53 guns more than the French, we did not get an advantage in artillery anywhere and could not suppress the opposing ones with fire. us French batteries.

Even two hundred-gun batteries mounted on the left flank of the Russian troops, firing point-blank at the attacking French, would most likely inflict much greater losses on them than those that actually were. And if some of the guns fired over the heads of our troops, then ... here we can already talk about losses that are completely unacceptable for the French.

In any case, today a number of historians conclusively assert that the losses of the Russian troops were not less, but 1.5-2 times more than those of the French. And that it was precisely because of this circumstance that our army was forced to retreat the next day. And although there are simply no people who would not make mistakes, it must be admitted that there were undoubtedly mistakes on the part of Kutuzov in this battle, even if in the end the war against Russia was lost by Bonaparte.

Tell me, uncle, it's not for nothing that Moscow, burned down by fire, was given to the French?

Lermontov

The Battle of Borodino was the main battle in the War of 1812. For the first time, the legend of the invincibility of Napoleon's army was dispelled, and a decisive contribution was made to changing the size of the French army due to the fact that the latter, due to large-scale casualties, ceased to have a clear numerical advantage over the Russian army. In the framework of today's article, we will talk about the battle of Borodino on August 26, 1812, consider its course, the balance of forces and means, study the opinion of historians on this issue and analyze what consequences this battle had for the Patriotic War and for the fate of the two powers: Russia and France.

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History of the battle

The Patriotic War of 1812 at the initial stage developed extremely negatively for the Russian army, which constantly retreated, refusing to accept a general battle. This course of events was perceived by the army extremely negatively, since the soldiers wanted to take the battle as soon as possible to defeat the enemy army. Commander-in-Chief Barclay de Tolly was well aware that in an open general battle, the Napoleonic army, which was considered invincible in Europe, would have a colossal advantage. Therefore, he chose the tactics of retreat, in order to wear down the enemy troops, and only then accept the battle. This course of events did not inspire confidence among the soldiers, as a result of which Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief. As a result, several significant events took place that predetermined the prerequisites for the Battle of Borodino:

• Napoleon's army advanced inland with great complications. The Russian generals refused a general battle, but actively got involved in small battles, and the partisans were also very active. Therefore, by the time Borodino began (late August - early September), Bonaparte's army was no longer so formidable and significantly exhausted.
• Reserves were brought up from the depths of the country. Therefore, Kutuzov's army was already comparable in number to the French army, which allowed the commander in chief to consider the possibility of practically entering the battle.

Alexander 1, who by that time, at the request of the army, had left the post of commander in chief, allowed Kutuzov to make his own decisions, insistently demanded that the general accept the battle as soon as possible and stop the advance of Napoleon's army inland. As a result, on August 22, 1812, the Russian army began to retreat from Smolensk in the direction of the village of Borodino, which is located 125 kilometers from Moscow. The place was ideal to take the fight, as excellent defense could be organized in the Borodino area. Kutuzov understood that Napoleon was only a few days away, so he threw all his strength into fortifying this area and taking the most advantageous positions.

The balance of forces and means

Surprisingly, most historians who study the Battle of Borodino are still arguing about the exact number of troops on the opposing sides. The general trends in this matter are such that the newer the study, the more data showing that the Russian army had a slight advantage. However, if we consider the Soviet encyclopedias, then the following data is presented there, in which the participants in the Battle of Borodino are presented:

• Russian army. Commander - Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. At his disposal were up to 120 thousand people, of which 72 thousand were foot soldiers. The army had a large artillery corps with 640 guns.
• French army. Commander - Napoleon Bonaparte. The French emperor brought a corps of 138 thousand soldiers with 587 guns to Borodino. Some historians note that Napoleon had reserves of up to 18 thousand people, which the French emperor kept to the last and did not use them in the battle.

Very important is the opinion of one of the participants in the Battle of Borodino, the Marquis of Chambray, who provided data that France put up the best European army for this battle, which included soldiers with extensive experience in military operations. On the part of Russia, according to his observations, recruits and volunteers were at their core, who, in their entire appearance, indicated that military affairs were not the main thing for them. Chambray also pointed to the fact that Bonaparte had a large advantage in the field of heavy cavalry, which gave him some advantages during the battle.

Tasks of the parties before the battle

Since June 1812, Napoleon has been looking for opportunities for a general battle with the Russian army. A well-known catchphrase that Napoleon expressed as a simple general in revolutionary France: "The main thing is to impose battles on the enemy, and then we'll see." This simple phrase reflects the whole genius of Napoleon, who, in terms of making lightning-fast decisions, was perhaps the best strategist of his generation (especially after the death of Suvorov). It was this principle that the French commander in chief wanted to apply in Russia. The Battle of Borodino provided such an opportunity.

Kutuzov's tasks were simple - he needed active defense. With its help, the commander-in-chief wanted to inflict the maximum possible losses on the enemy and at the same time save his army for further battle. Kutuzov planned the Battle of Borodino as one of the stages of the Patriotic War, which was supposed to make a radical change in the course of the confrontation.

On the eve of the battle

Kutuzov took up a position, which is an arc passing through Shevardino on the left flank, Borodino in the center, the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

On August 24, 1812, 2 days before the decisive battle, the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt took place. This redoubt was commanded by General Gorchakov, who had 11,000 men under his command. To the south, with a corps of 6,000 men, was General Karpov, who covered the old Smolensk road. Napoleon set the Shevardinsky redoubt as the initial target of his strike, since it was as far as possible from the main grouping of Russian troops. According to the plan of the French emperor, Shevardino should have been surrounded, thereby withdrawing the army of General Gorchakov from the battle. To do this, the French army in the attack consisted of three columns:

• Marshal Murat. Bonaparte's favorite led a cavalry corps to hit Shevardino's right flank.
• Generals Davout and Ney led the infantry in the center.
• Junot, also one of the best generals in France, was moving along the old Smolensk road with his guards.

The battle began on the afternoon of 5 September. Twice the French unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses. Toward evening, when night began to fall on the Borodino field, the French attack was successful, but the reserves of the Russian army that came up made it possible to repel the enemy and defend the Shevardino redoubt. The resumption of the battle was not beneficial for the Russian army, and Kutuzov ordered a retreat to the Semyonovsky ravine.

The initial positions of the Russian and French troops

On August 25, 1812, both sides carried out general preparations for the battle. The troops were busy finishing the defensive positions, the generals were trying to learn something new about the plans of the enemy. Kutuzov's army took up defense in the form of an obtuse triangle. The right flank of the Russian troops passed along the Kolocha River. Barclay de Tolly was responsible for the defense of this section, whose army numbered 76 thousand people with 480 guns. The most dangerous position was on the left flank, where there was no natural barrier. This section of the front was commanded by General Bagration, who had 34,000 men and 156 guns at his disposal. The problem of the left flank acquired significant relevance after the loss of the village of Shevardino on September 5. The position of the Russian army met the following tasks:

• The right flank, where the main forces of the army were grouped, reliably covered the path to Moscow.
• The right flank made it possible to deliver active and powerful blows to the rear and flank of the enemy.
• The location of the Russian army was deep enough, which left ample room for maneuver.
• The first line of defense was occupied by infantry, the second line of defense was occupied by cavalry, and reserves were placed on the third line. The well-known phrase

reserves should be kept as long as possible. Whoever retains the most reserves by the end of the battle will be the winner.

Kutuzov

In fact, Kutuzov provoked Napoleon to attack on the left flank of his defense. Only as many troops were concentrated here as they could successfully defend against the French army. Kutuzov repeated that the French would not be able to resist the temptation to attack a weak redoubt, but as soon as they had problems and they resorted to the help of their reserves, it would be possible to put their army behind them and in the flank.

Napoleon, who conducted reconnaissance on August 25, also noted the weakness of the left flank of the defense of the Russian army. Therefore, it was decided to strike here the main blow. In order to divert the attention of the Russian generals from the left flank, simultaneously with the attack on Bagration's position, an attack on Borodino was to begin in order to further capture the left bank of the Kolocha River. After mastering these lines, it was planned to transfer the main forces of the French army to the right flank of the Russian defense, and deliver a massive blow to the army of Barclay De Tolly. Having solved this problem, by the evening of August 25, about 115 thousand people of the French army were concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe left flank of the defense of the Russian army. 20 thousand people lined up in front of the right flank.

The specifics of the defense that Kutuzov used was that the Battle of Borodino was supposed to force the French to go on a frontal attack, since the general front of the defense occupied by Kutuzov's army was very extensive. Therefore, it was almost impossible to get around him from the flank.

It is noted that on the night before the battle, Kutuzov reinforced the left flank of his defense with the infantry corps of General Tuchkov, and also transferred 168 artillery pieces to Bagration's army. This was due to the fact that Napoleon had already concentrated very large forces in this direction.

Day of the Battle of Borodino

The battle of Borodino began on August 26, 1812 in the early morning at 5:30. As planned, the main blow was inflicted by the French on the left flag of the defense of the Russian army.

Artillery shelling of Bagration's positions began, in which more than 100 guns took part. At the same time, the corps of General Delzon began a maneuver with a strike at the center of the Russian army, at the village of Borodino. The village was under the protection of the chasseur regiment, which could not resist the French army for a long time, the number of which in this sector of the front exceeded the Russian army by 4 times. The Jaeger regiment was forced to retreat and take up defensive positions on the right bank of the Kolocha River. The attacks of the French general, who wanted to move even further deep into the defense, were unsuccessful.

Bagration flushes

Bagration's flushes were located along the entire left flank of the defense, forming the first redoubt. After half an hour of artillery preparation, at 6 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon gave the order to launch an attack on Bagration's fleches. The French army was commanded by Generals Deshay and Compana. They planned to strike at the southernmost flush, going out to the Utitsky Forest for this. However, as soon as the French army began to line up in battle order, Bagration's Jaeger regiment opened fire and went on the attack, disrupting the first stage of the offensive operation.

The next attack began at 8 o'clock in the morning. At this time, a second attack on the southern flush began. Both French generals increased the number of their troops and went on the offensive. Bagration, in order to defend his position, sent the army of General Neversky, as well as Novorossiysk dragoons, to his southern flank. The French were forced to retreat, having suffered serious losses. During this battle, both generals who led the army to storm were seriously wounded.

The third attack was carried out by the infantry units of Marshal Ney, as well as the cavalry of Marshal Murat. Bagration noticed this maneuver of the French in time, giving the order to Raevsky, who was in the central part of the flushes, to move from the front line to the second echelon of defense. This position was reinforced by the division of General Konovnitsyn. The attack of the French army began after a massive artillery preparation. The French infantry struck between flushes. This time the attack was successful, and by 10 o'clock in the morning the French managed to capture the southern line of defense. This was followed by a counterattack undertaken by the division of Konovnitsyn, as a result of which it was possible to recapture the lost positions. At the same time, the corps of General Junot managed to bypass the left flank of the defense through the Utitsky forest. As a result of this maneuver, the French general actually ended up in the rear of the Russian army. Captain Zakharov, who commanded the 1st cavalry battery, noticed the enemy and struck. At the same time, infantry regiments arrived at the scene of the battle and pushed General Junot back to their original position. More than a thousand people lost the French in this battle. In the future, historical information about Junot's corps is contradictory: Russian textbooks say that this corps was completely destroyed in the next attack of the Russian army, while French historians claim that the general participated in the Battle of Borodino until its very end.

4 assault on Bagration's flushes began at 11 o'clock. In the battle, Napoleon used 45 thousand troops, cavalry and more than 300 guns. At that time, Bagration had less than 20 thousand people at his disposal. At the very beginning of this assault, Bagration was wounded in the thigh and was forced to leave the army, which had a negative impact on morale. The Russian army began to retreat. General Konovnitsyn assumed command of the defense. He could not resist Napoleon, and decided to retreat. As a result, the flushes remained with the French. The retreat was carried out to the Semenovsky stream, where more than 300 guns were installed. The large number of the second echelon of defense, as well as a large number of artillery forced Napoleon to change the original plan and cancel the attack on the move. The direction of the main attack was shifted from the left flank of the defense of the Russian army to its central part, commanded by General Raevsky. The purpose of this strike was to capture the artillery. The attack of the left flank by the infantry did not stop. The fourth attack on the Bagrationovskaya flushes was also unsuccessful for the French army, which was forced to retreat behind the Semyonovsky stream. It should be noted that the position of the artillery was extremely important. Throughout the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon made attempts to capture the enemy's artillery. By the end of the battle, he managed to take these positions.

Battle for Utitsky Forest

The Utitsky forest was of great strategic importance for the Russian army. On August 25, on the eve of the battle, Kutuzov noted the importance of this direction, which blocked the old Smolensk road. An infantry corps under the command of General Tuchkov was stationed here. The total number of troops in this area was about 12 thousand people. The army was located covertly in order to suddenly strike at the right moment on the enemy's flank. On September 7, the infantry corps of the French army, commanded by one of Napoleon's favorites, General Poniatowski, advanced in the direction of the Utitsky Kurgan in order to outflank the Russian army. Tuchkov took up defense on the Kurgan, and blocked the further course of the French. Only by 11 o'clock in the morning, when General Junot arrived to help Poniatowski, the French delivered a decisive blow to the mound and captured it. The Russian General Tuchkov launched a counterattack, and at the cost of his own life managed to return the barrow. The command of the corps was taken by General Baggovut, who held this position. As soon as the main forces of the Russian army withdrew to the Semenovsky ravine, the Utitsky Kurgan, it was decided to retreat.

Raid of Platov and Uvarov

At the moment of the onset of a critical moment on the left flank of the defense of the Russian army during the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov decided to let the army of Generals Uvarov and Platov into battle. As part of the Cossack cavalry, they were supposed to go around the French positions on the right, striking in the rear. The cavalry consisted of 2.5 thousand people. At 12 noon, the army advanced. Having crossed the Kolocha River, the cavalry attacked the infantry regiments of the Italian army. This blow, which was led by General Uvarov, was intended to impose a fight on the French and divert their attention. At this moment, General Platov managed to go unnoticed along the flank and go behind enemy lines. This was followed by a simultaneous attack by two Russian armies, which brought panic into the actions of the French. As a result, Napoleon was forced to transfer part of the troops that stormed the Raevsky battery in order to repel the attack of the cavalry of the Russian generals, who went to the rear. The battle of the cavalry with the French troops lasted several hours, and by four o'clock in the afternoon Uvarov and Platov returned their troops to their original positions.

The practical significance of the Cossack raid led by Platov and Uvarov is almost impossible to overestimate. This raid gave the Russian army 2 hours to reinforce a reserve position for an artillery battery. Of course, this raid did not bring a military victory, but the French, who saw the enemy in their own rear, were no longer acting so decisively.

Raevsky battery

The specificity of the terrain of the Borodino field was due to the fact that in its very center a hill towered, which made it possible to control and shell the entire surrounding territory. It was an ideal place to place artillery, which Kutuzov took advantage of. In this place, the famous Raevsky battery was deployed, which consisted of 18 guns, and General Raevsky himself was supposed to protect this height with the help of an infantry regiment. The attack on the battery began at 9 o'clock in the morning. Having struck at the center of the Russian positions, Bonaparte pursued the goal of complicating the movement of the enemy army. During the first offensive of the French, the unit of General Raevsky was transferred to defend the Bagrationov flashes, but the first attack of the enemy on the battery was successfully repulsed without the participation of the infantry. Eugene Beauharnais, who was in command of the French offensive in this sector, saw the weakness of the artillery position and immediately delivered another blow to this corps. Kutuzov transferred here all the reserves of artillery and cavalry. Despite this, the French army managed to suppress the Russian defenses and penetrate into his stronghold. At this moment, a counterattack of the Russian troops was carried out, during which they managed to recapture the redoubt. General Beauharnais was taken prisoner. Of the 3,100 French who attacked the battery, only 300 survived.

The position of the battery was extremely dangerous, so Kutuzov gave the order to redeploy the guns to the second line of defense. General Barclay de Tolly sent an additional corps of General Likhachev to protect Raevsky's battery. Napoleon's original plan of attack has lost its relevance. The French emperor abandoned massive attacks on the left flank of the enemy, and directed his main attack on the central part of the defense, on the Raevsky battery. At this moment, the Russian cavalry went to the rear of the Napoleonic army, which slowed down the French advance by 2 hours. During this time, the defensive position of the battery was further strengthened.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, 150 guns of the French army opened fire on Raevsky's battery, and almost immediately the infantry went on the offensive. The battle lasted about an hour and, according to its results, Raevsky's battery fell. The original plan of Napoleon counted on the fact that the capture of the battery would lead to cardinal changes in the balance of forces near the central part of the defense of the Russian troops. This did not turn out, he had to abandon the idea of ​​\u200b\u200ba offensive in the center. By the evening of August 26, Napoleon's army had not been able to achieve a decisive advantage in at least one of the sectors of the front. Napoleon did not see the essential prerequisites for victory in the battle, so he did not dare to use his reserves in the battle. He hoped to the last to exhaust the Russian army with his main forces, to achieve a clear advantage in one of the sectors of the front, and then to bring fresh forces into battle.

End of the battle

After the fall of Raevsky's battery, Bonaparte abandoned further ideas of storming the central part of the enemy's defenses. There were no more significant events in this direction of the Borodino field. On the left flank, the French continued their attacks, which did not lead to anything. General Dokhturov, who replaced Bagration, repelled all enemy attacks. The right flank of the defense, commanded by Barclay de Tolly, had no significant events, only sluggish attempts at artillery shelling were made. These attempts continued until 7 pm, after which Bonaparte retreated to Gorki to give the army a rest. It was expected that this was a short pause before the decisive battle. The French were preparing to continue the battle in the morning. However, at 12 o'clock at night Kutuzov refused to continue the battle further, and sent his army beyond Mozhaisk. This was necessary in order to give the army a rest and replenish its human reserves.

Thus ended the Battle of Borodino. Until now, historians from different countries are arguing about which army won this battle. Domestic historians talk about the victory of Kutuzov, Western historians talk about the victory of Napoleon. The most correct thing to say is that during the Battle of Borodino there was a draw. Each army got what it wanted: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow, and Kutuzov inflicted significant losses on the French.

Results of the confrontation

The victims in the Kutuzov army during the Battle of Borodino are described differently by various historians. At its core, the researchers of this battle come to the conclusion that the Russian army lost about 45 thousand people on the battlefield. This figure takes into account not only the dead, but also the wounded, as well as those taken prisoner. Napoleon's army, as part of the battle on August 26, lost a little less than 51 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. Comparable losses of both countries are explained by many scholars by the fact that both armies regularly changed their roles. The course of the battle changed very often. At first, the French attacked, and Kutuzov gave the order to the troops to take up defense, after which the Russian army went on the counteroffensive. At certain stages of the battle, Napoleonic generals managed to achieve local victories and take the necessary lines. Now the French were on the defensive, and the Russian generals were on the offensive. And so the roles changed dozens of times in the course of one day.

The battle of Borodino did not produce a winner. However, the myth of the invincibility of the Napoleonic army was dispelled. Further continuation of the general battle for the Russian army was undesirable, since at the end of the day on August 26, Napoleon still had untouched reserves, with a total number of up to 12 thousand people. These reserves, against the backdrop of a tired Russian army, could have a significant impact on the result. Therefore, having retreated beyond Moscow, on September 1, 1812, a council was held in Fili, at which it was decided to allow Napoleon to occupy Moscow.

Military significance of the battle

The Battle of Borodino was the bloodiest battle in the history of the 19th century. Each side lost about 25 percent of its army. In one day, the opponents fired more than 130,000 shots. The totality of all these facts later led to the fact that Bonaparte in his memoirs called the Battle of Borodino the largest of his battles. However, Bonaparte failed to achieve the desired results. The illustrious commander, accustomed exclusively to victories, formally did not lose this battle, but did not win either.

Being on the island of St. Helena and drawing up a personal autobiography, Napoleon wrote the following lines about the Battle of Borodino:

The battle for Moscow is the most important battle in my life. The Russians had the upper hand in everything: they had 170 thousand people, an advantage in cavalry, artillery and terrain, which they knew very well. Despite this, we won. The heroes of France are Generals Ney, Murat and Poniatowski. They own the laurels of the winners of the Moscow battle.

Bonaparte

These lines clearly show that Napoleon himself considered the battle of Borodino as his own victory. But such lines should be studied exclusively in the light of the personality of Napoleon, who, while on the island of St. Helena, greatly exaggerated the events of the past days. For example, in 1817, the former emperor of France said that in the Battle of Borodino he had 80 thousand soldiers, and the enemy had a huge army of 250 thousand. Of course, these figures were dictated only by Napoleon's personal conceit, and have nothing to do with real history.

Kutuzov also assessed the Battle of Borodino as his own victory. In his note to Emperor Alexander 1, he wrote:

On the 26th, the world saw the bloodiest battle in its history. Never before has recent history seen so much blood. A perfectly matched battlefield, and an enemy that came to attack but was forced to defend.

Kutuzov

Alexander 1, under the influence of this note, and also trying to reassure his people, announced the Battle of Borodino as a victory for the Russian army. Largely because of this, in the future, domestic historians also always represented Borodino as a victory for Russian weapons.

The main result of the Battle of Borodino was that Napoleon, who was famous for having won all the general battles, managed to force the Russian army to accept the battle, but failed to defeat it. The absence of a significant victory in the general battle, taking into account the specifics of the Patriotic War of 1812, led to the fact that France did not receive any significant advantages from this battle.

Literature

• History of Russia in the 19th century. P.N. Zyryanov. Moscow, 1999.
• Napoleon Bonaparte. A.Z. Manfred. Sukhumi, 1989.
• Hike to Russia. F. Segur. 2003.
• Borodino: documents, letters, memoirs. Moscow, 1962.
• Alexander 1 and Napoleon. ON THE. Trotsky. Moscow, 1994.

Panorama of the Battle of Borodino

Myths about the Battle of Borodino

"Excellent" position near the village of Borodino

F.N. Glinka in his "Letters of a Russian officer" says:

“How easy it is to please a soldier! You must show only him that you care about his fate, that you delve into his condition, that you demand from him what is necessary and nothing superfluous. When the Most Serene Prince went around the regiments for the first time, the soldiers began to fuss, began to clear, stretch and line up. "No need! None of this is needed! - said the prince. - I came only to see if you are healthy, my children! A soldier on a campaign does not think about panache: he needs to rest after work and prepare for victory. On another occasion, seeing that some general’s convoy was hindering the march of the regiments, he immediately ordered the road to be cleared and said loudly: “Every step of the road is dear to a soldier on a campaign, as soon as he comes, he will have more rest!” Such words of the commander-in-chief filled the entire army with power of attorney and love for him. “That’s what our “father” came to, the soldiers said, “he knows all our needs: how not to fight with him”<…>

It is said that the last time the Serene Highness inspected the shelves, an eagle appeared in the air and hovered over it. The prince bared his adorned head with gray hair; the whole army shouted "ypa!". On the same day, the commander-in-chief ordered to serve in all regiments the prayer service of the Smolensk Mother of God and for her icon, which was with the army, to make a new decent kivot. All this delights soldiers and everyone!

Sounds beautiful, touching, patriotic…

Nevertheless, having taken command of the united Russian army, M.I. Kutuzov, from whom everyone expected a decisive change in the course of the war, ordered ... to continue the retreat.

"The position in which I stopped at the village of Borodino<…>one of the best, which can only be found on flat places.

In fact, such a statement looks as strange as the location of the Russian troops.

It, to put it mildly, looks rather strange: the main part of the army stood on the right flank, on the banks of the Kolocha River, and was practically useless in this place, since there was no one against it, on the other side of the river. At the same time, Napoleon concentrated his main forces in the center and on his right flank, that is, much south of the village of Borodino, where the Russian troops had relatively few.

British observer General Robert Wilson relates:

“The ubiquitous Kolotsky stream, flowing through a deep ravine, covered the front of the right flank and part of the center to the very village of Borodino.

The left flank began at the hills above Borodino, behind the village of Semenovsky, in a more open area, but crossed by deep ravines and thickets of shrubs, which made it difficult to advance in close formation.

To the right of the position, near the forest, earthen fortifications were built.

On the hills in front of Gorki - in the right center of the position - there were two heavily fortified redoubts that dominated Borodino, Kolocha and the large, so-called New Smolenskaya road, which, passing through Borodino, Gorki and the center of the army, led to Mozhaisk. Four hundred yards from the Gorki battery, another battery was advanced, with 1,200 men.

The weakest was the left flank - a bastioned battery with curtains, located on the heights in front of the plain. This battery connected the center and the left flank.

The village of Semenovskoye, located in front of the front of the left flank, was burned in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in it. Here it was supposed to build a strong redoubt, but this fortification remained only barely outlined.

In front of the ruins of the village, there was a deep ravine, behind which there were flashes, or redans, designed to support the advanced rangers, and near the village of Shevardino, on a hill between two copses, there was another fortification to protect the village of Semenovsky.

The location of the troops before the battle of Borodino

General L.L. Bennigsen does not try to hide his indignation. He's writing:

“Look at the plan for this battle. Note, first of all, the vast space our troops occupied (this was the greatest mistake that could be made in anticipation of an attack from Napoleon, whose system of operations is well known and against which more effective measures could therefore be taken.<…>). From the last battery on our right flank to the last battery on the left flank, or to the 3rd Corps, which was under the command of Lieutenant General Tuchkov, who stood on the Old Smolensk road, there were more than ten miles, so that the troops, or reserves, located on one flank, or even in the center, could not come up in time to support the other wing - which happened on August 26, despite the fact that the enemy had already indicated on August 24 (September 5) the intention to attack our left flank. I expressed my opinion to Prince Kutuzov, but everything remained as before.

But the opinion of General A.P. Yermolov:

“The weakness of the left wing in comparison with other parts of the position was palpable, while the fortifications on it were negligible, and in the shortness of time it was impossible to make them better.”

Having examined the Russian positions two days before the battle, Prince Bagration wrote to F.V. Rostopchin:

“We all choose places and find worse and worse.”

They say that this unfortunate position was not even chosen by M.I. Kutuzov, and Colonel K.F. Toll, appointed by the commander-in-chief to the post of quartermaster general.

In any case, General L.L. Bennigsen, in his Notes, states that "Colonel Tol mastered the mind of Prince Kutuzov, whom his obesity did not allow him to carry out reconnaissance of the area either before the battle or after it."

The conclusion is made by the chief quartermaster of the 6th corps I.P. Liprandi:

“As for a position in a general sense, then describe it in detail and calculate its disadvantages and advantages<…>it would be redundant. I will only note one thing, that in the entire space from Tsarev Zaimishch, where Kutuzov arrived, to Moscow, there was not a single position that, after all the shortcomings attributed to Borodinskaya, would be better for us. And to give the battle to Moscow, for the reasons of the commander in chief, it was necessary.

Nevertheless, in his report to Emperor M.B. Barclay de Tolly reported:

“We finally arrived on August 22 in a position at Borodino. It was advantageous in the center and right flank, but the left wing<…>was absolutely not supported by anything and was surrounded by bushes at a distance of a rifle shot.

But Mikhail Illarionovich was not at all embarrassed by all this. He assured Emperor Alexander:

“The weak point of this position, which is on the left flank, I will try to correct with art.”

How he succeeds, we'll see...

This text is an introductory piece. From the author's book

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Historian Yevgeny Ponasenkov on the next anniversary of the Battle of Borodino.

Knowledge about history is drawn from documents, analyzed with the help of logic, and conclusions are compared with what we understand from our own experience. All my life I have been researching the topic of the war of 1812, participated in dozens of scientific conferences, as well as in talk shows on TV and radio: and I will try to write this article in extremely simple and clear terms, using exclusively primary sources, and not “water” and conjectures ( what my "opponents" are famous for).

It must be stated: among scientists today there are no two opinions - the battle of Borodino is the defeat of the Russian army and the victory of Napoleon. Some budget-dependent comrades are still trying by demagogic means to call it “not quite a complete defeat of the Russians”, or “only a tactical victory for Napoleon”, but the Russian army lost almost half of the regular troops, soon after the battle it completely decomposed (thousands of marauders who plundered their own villages and were the first to plunder Moscow), and the "shrine" - Moscow was forced to surrender without a fight at the mercy of the winner. Army M.I. Kutuzova fled so fast that about 30,000 Russian wounded were abandoned there (after which his own Governor-General F.V. Rostopchin burned the city, and Kutuzov himself contributed to this by ordering the fire tool to be taken out). The hourly (!) story of the burning of the city has already been described by me in a past documentary study, and now we will consider sources relating to the goals, plans and estimates of M.I. Kutuzov regarding the Battle of Borodino (that is, exclusively his direct speech in personal letters and in official documents of the headquarters, not French sources and not later texts).

I will quote primary sources, documents: they must forever bury the nonsense of cheap demagogues who, taking advantage of the ignorance of ordinary readers, hang noodles on their ears, trying to suggest that Kutuzov did not want to defend Moscow from the very beginning (although he was appointed with the obligation to do so). At the same time, I will immediately emphasize: you never know what the mediocre general did not want to defend: his duty is to win battles and defend his native land, all the more an item of colossal material, political and moral significance. In addition, you will learn Kutuzov's own criterion for evaluating Borodin as a victory or defeat for the Russians.

So, on the day of arrival at the army (August 17 according to the old style - the 29th according to the new one), the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M.I. Kutuzov wrote to F.V. Rostopchin: “In my opinion, the loss of Russia is connected with the loss of Moscow” (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. M., 1955, vol. 4, part 1, p. 90).

The next day, Kutuzov assured Field Marshal N.I. Saltykov and the tsar himself that he would give battle to Napoleon for the sake of saving Moscow. A day later, he writes to the commander of the Moldavian army (since recently it has become known as the Danube) Admiral P.V. Chichagov: “My real subject is the salvation of Moscow” (Ibid., pp. 97, 106, 113).

I.I. Markov (the head of the Moscow militia), the day before the Battle of Borodino, handed over to F.V. Rostopchin is Kutuzov’s definition: “He (Napoleon - my note, E.P.) cannot be allowed to reach Moscow. Let him go, all of Russia will be his ”(People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents. M., 1962, p. 71).

Moreover, as if specifically for historians, Kutuzov personally formulated his own criterion for defeat, failure - and this is a retreat. In the official disposition of September 5 (August 24 according to the old style), he wrote: commander-in-chief (Barclay and Bagration - my note, E.P.) and along which armies will have to retreat ”(M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents ... p. 129).

I will strongly repeat the only documented criterion for evaluating the outcome of the battle, formulated personally by Kutuzov, moreover, officially and in writing: “... if I am defeated, I will go to Moscow, and there I will defend the Capital” / from a letter to Rostopchin dated September 3 - August 22. under Art. style / (Moscow in 1812. Memoirs, letters and official documents from the collection of the written sources department of the State Historical Museum. M., 2012, p. 297).

The circumstances of the battle itself, the number and loss of troops (the Russians had more - and managed to lose more, because M.I. Kutuzov first positioned the army categorically incorrectly, and then did not actually command ...) we have already considered in my recent study.

Let's continue the analysis of the results of the battle. Many Russian soldiers, who left us written testimonies, recognized Borodino as a defeat for their army - and a victory for Napoleon. Among them, for example, the brave and principled A.P. Yermolov, who declared: “the enemy has won” (Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912. M., 1912, vol. IV, p. 29).

Soon after the battle, the adjutant of Vladimir Ivanovich Levenshtern (1777-1858), officer Fadeev, wrote to A.D. Bestuzhev Ryumin "The enemy will certainly enter Moscow, because our army has completely died." The Governor-General of Moscow, Rostopchin, reported: “I wrote a note to the Minister of Police that I do not understand this victory, because our armies retreated to Mozhaisk ...” (Ibid.).

And who announced the “victory” of the Russians? Who laid the foundation for the formation of a completely mentally and actually inadequate myth of “victory”, after which the army, having lost half, flees to Moscow, surrenders Moscow, and then dissolves and barely gathers in a distant camp? The answer is simple: this is still the same “Zubov’s coffee pot”, who “slept through” the entire battle, the person who is largely responsible for the terrible defeat - Kutuzov. He very, very cunningly (in the spirit of an eighteenth century courtier) wrote a beautiful report to the king with the words “the enemy has not won a single step of the earth anywhere” (which, as we already know, was an absolute, one hundred percent lie). Thus, in St. Petersburg they managed to rejoice, they reasoned that Napoleon had been stopped, that Moscow had been saved! (Patriotic war and Russian society .... p. 29).

The tsar, in false joys, granted Kutuzov a field marshal's determination and 100,000 rubles! However, when the deception about the “victory” soon became clear, Kutuzov did not return all this (although the tsar wrote him irritated letters!) ...

Let us now analyze the most important documents of eyewitnesses - letters from the soldiers of Napoleon's army, sent immediately after the battle: “Artilleryman of the Dutch army F.Sh. List expressed the hope that after the defeat on the Moskva River (as the French called the Battle of Borodino - my note, E.P.) and the actual destruction of the Russian army, Emperor Alexander I should soon sue for peace. And further: “... General Zh.L. Scherer stated in his letter: “The battle of September 7 cost the Russian army at least 50,000 people (a strikingly accurate estimate, confirmed by Russian archival records - my note, E.P.). And this is despite the fortifications and a very good position, ”and the battalion chief of the 17th regiment, J.P.M. Barrier wrote that the Russians lost 40,000 in the battle. The musician of the 35th regiment, J. Eichner, stated: “The Russians are no longer able to campaign against us, since they will never find a position, as near Smolensk and Mozhaisk. (...) the captain of the old guard K. Van Bekop, although he admitted that the French suffered heavy losses in the battle of Borodino, claimed that according to his calculations, which he made directly on the battlefield, the Russians lost six times more. ... Su-lieutenant L.F. Kuantin counted 8 dead Russians for one Frenchman. (...) ... lieutenant of the quartermaster department of the 25th regiment P.O. Paradis, who in two letters - to Mademoiselle Genevieve Bonnegras dated September 20 and to his father dated September 25 - claimed that he personally counted 20 dead Russians for one Frenchman ”(Promyslov N.V. French public opinion about Russia on the eve and during the war of 1812. M., 2016, pp. 149; 154-155).

But the main consequence of Borodin was the catastrophe of Moscow's capitulation! Soon the already mentioned battalion commander of the 17th line regiment J.P.M. Barrier wrote in a letter to his wife: “On the 14th (September, my note, E.P.) we entered Moscow. They took many prisoners in the city. Their army no longer exists. Their soldiers desert, not wanting to fight, retreating all the time and seeing themselves beaten in all cases when they decide to resist us ”(Zemtsov V.N. Battle of the Moscow River. M., 2001, p. 265).

This document categorically testifies to the state of complete defeat and decomposition of the Russian army after Borodin.

We also find information about mass desertion in many official Russian army documents (for more on this, see previous articles).

When we know the testimonies of Russians, French and outside observers, we ask ourselves: how did Napoleon himself evaluate the battle? We have a number of documentary evidence. The first is official: in the eighteenth bulletin of the Great Army, which presented a description of the Battle of Borodino as a brilliant victory for the French (“War of Feathers”: official reports on the hostilities of 1812-1814: collection of documents. St. Petersburg, 2014, p. 332 -334).

The second evidence is purely personal, intimate. In a letter to his wife Marie-Louise, Napoleon reported (immediately after the battle) that he “beat the Russians” (Castello A. Napoleon. M., 2004, p. 318). As for the fake phrase that was printed in Soviet propaganda agitations, and which migrated to the garbage Wikipedia (about “the least success was won”), this falsification was exposed three decades ago by the doctor of historical sciences N.A. Troitsky (Troitsky N.A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. M., 2007, p. 295-296).

Among other records made from the words of Napoleon already on about. Helena, there is also this (about the Russians near Borodino): “... I defeated them in a big deal at the Moscow River; with ninety thousand I attacked the Russian army ... and I defeated it utterly. Fifty thousand Russians remained on the battlefield. The Russians had the imprudence to claim that they won the battle, and, nevertheless, eight days later I entered Moscow ”(Thunderstorm of the twelfth year. M., 1991, p. 563).

Where did Kutuzov's reverse phrase about "with the loss of Moscow, the army was not lost" come from? And it’s very simple: it was said at the council in Fili by Barclay de Tolly (Yermolov A.P. Decree op., p. 205), who understood that if you give a new battle, then the already defeated army will be completely destroyed - and all the generals will either death, or tribunal. Kutuzov heard this - and with great joy he clung to this, simply joining forces with Barclay: and shifting all responsibility to him. Moreover, the decision to leave Moscow, Kutuzov, pronounced in French. The general, who lost everything, who destroyed the army, simply tried to cover up his shame with demagoguery - but with the support of state propaganda, he succeeded.

For 200 years, the war of 1812 has acquired stamps that have little in common with real events

How are historical myths born? Children's mistakes appear first. And often at the heart of the historical myth is someone's initial mistake. Unless, of course, the task of creating a historical myth was not consciously set by someone.

On one of the St. Petersburg channels flashed a story dedicated to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. In the frame - the grave of Ivan Dibich at the Volkovsky cemetery behind the back of the female correspondent. And the confident face of this girl, who tells about the exploits of Colonel Dibich near Yakubov, Klyastitsy, Golovshchina.

For those battles, the officer was awarded the Order of St. George III degree, mostly a general's award. It was only later that Ivan Dibich rose to the rank of Field Marshal, became one of 25 people in history who received the Order of St. George I degree. For successes in the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the honorary prefix "Trans-Balkan" was added to his surname by decree of the emperor. And really, who in Russia has not heard of Dibich-Zabalkansky?

It turned out that the correspondent did not hear. During the report, she spoke without a shadow of a doubt about some general Dibich-Zabolotsky.

Is this how historical myths are born? No, this is how children's mistakes appear. But let's think about whether there is a big difference between a mistake and a myth. And what underlies the historical myth. Was it someone else's original mistake? Unless, of course, the task of creating a historical myth was not consciously set by someone.

Time passes, and the error turns into a myth, and the legend introduced into the consciousness into a stamp, which most people already perceive as a historical fact. The war of 1812 did not escape this fate, and for 200 years it has acquired myths and clichés that have little in common with real events.

Sometimes they are local in nature, without distorting the essence of the historical process. For example, a stamp associated with the death of Major General Yakov Kulnev near Klyastitsy on August 1, 1812. How now to convince many people that Kulnev was not at all the first Russian general killed in that war? A few days before the Klyastitsky battle, there was a battle near Ostrovno, in which the chief of the Rylsk Infantry Regiment, Major General Okulov, died. It's easy to find out about it. But people are trusting. And since they write in books and articles that the first dead general is Kulnev, then so be it.

Another snippet. The moral feat of General Nikolai Raevsky in the battle near Saltanovka on July 23, 1812, when, having personally led the frontal attack of the Smolensk Infantry Regiment, the corps commander Raevsky led two sons in the forefront, the youngest of whom was only 11 years old. When the legend infiltrated the masses, Raevsky himself refuted this myth. But it was too late. So until now, three Raevskys go on the attack near Saltanovka.

There are cliches-myths that affect the perception of historical events much more seriously. They work on the subconscious of people. As a result, they form a national perception of history, deform the self-esteem of the people, and correct the system of national and universal values.

The most common stereotypes about the war of 1812 are the colossal losses in the Battle of Borodino, the total fire in Moscow, the decisive role of the partisan movement, the no less decisive role of “General Frost” and the periodization of the war itself.

If we start from the thesis that everything was so, then an involuntary question arises: what, in fact, did the Russian army and commander Kutuzov do if Napoleon was knocked down by a fire, peasants with pitchforks and severe Russian cold? And also - why and with whom did Russia fight for another 15 months after the French left our borders, if the war ended on the Berezina in December 1812?

But let's go in order.

The battle of Borodino went down in history not at all because it was especially bloody, and the losses of the parties exceeded all conceivable limits. Long before Borodino, Hannibal destroyed 60,000 Romans near Cannes, using only edged weapons. Who argues, and on the Borodino field blood flowed in torrents. But speaking of losses, it is worth sticking to proven facts. And they are as follows: the total losses of the Russian side on September 5-7 in the Shevardinsky and Borodino battles, including the wounded and missing - 39 thousand. Of these, 14,000 were killed and 10,000 were missing. Our army has been reduced by one third. Indeed, before the battle, she numbered a little more than 100 thousand people in regular units, over 8 thousand Cossacks and from 10-20 thousand militias.

The French were much worse off. Of the 130-135 thousand soldiers and officers whom Napoleon brought to Borodino, a little more than half remained in the ranks. The total losses of the Great Army are estimated at 58-60 thousand bayonets and sabers. Only officers Bonaparte lost about 2 thousand people. It is interesting that modern French researchers are also convinced that the losses of Napoleon's army appearing in the studies of the 19th century are greatly underestimated.

You can debate endlessly. There are clichés on the topic of the terrible losses of the Russians, which prompted Kutuzov to surrender Moscow and which testify to the absolute superiority of the Napoleonic genius. And there are scientific methods and historical documents, with the help of which only one can find the truth.

General Caulaincourt recalled how, during a detour of the battlefield, Napoleon stopped at the Raevsky battery and saw an officer with eight dozen infantrymen. The emperor invited the officer to join his regiment. To which he, waving his hand in the direction of the redoubt, replied: "My regiment is here." Napoleon repeated the order, but the officer again pointed to the ramparts. And only then it became clear that 80 soldiers were all that was left of a regiment of several thousand.

“Moscow, burnt down by fire...” - Lermontov's brilliant lines are not at all the basis for purely historical conclusions. The poet has the right to exaggerate. In fact, the Moscow fire of 1812 did not burn down the entire capital city. A third of civil buildings and two thirds of temples survived. Therefore, radical hysterical assessments and comparisons with Stalingrad in 1943 are inappropriate. More than 70% of the inhabitants remained in the city during the occupation by the Great Army. The fact remains that the French behaved in Moscow, to put it mildly, barbarically: it was plundered, many churches were desecrated, executions of civilians were recorded.

The popular expression of Leo Tolstoy about the cudgel of the people's war made it possible in Soviet times to create a stamp about the colossal influence on the results of the 1812 campaign of the peasant partisan detachments, which destroyed the rear communications of the French, took the enemy prisoner by the thousands, depriving him of fodder and supplies. They also distorted the role of regular partisan formations, which allegedly arose on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Akhtyrsky Hussars Denis Davydov. The first army flying group in the Moscow direction appeared in August on the orders of Barclay de Tolly, and was commanded by General Winzingerode. But even earlier, the initiative was taken by the commander of the 3rd Observation Army, General Tormasov, who defended the south of the country.

From the ranks of the army, eight cavalry, five infantry regiments, 13 regiments of Cossack irregular cavalry were sent to flying detachments. I would call these units airborne sabotage, not partisan. Davydov, Figner, Dorokhov, Seslavin remained career officers and did not turn into people's avengers at all.

The peasant partisan movement made a worthy contribution to the defeat of the Great Army. But the regular army played a key role in driving out the enemy. It seems to me that by the cudgel of the people's war, Count Tolstoy did not mean Vasilisa Kozhina or even the 6,000-strong detachment of the peasant Kurin, but the general condition of the entire multi-class Russian people, including professional military men.

The next stamp is the most derogatory for the Russian army: it was not military operations, but frost that killed the Frenchman. In response, it is easier to quote Napoleon himself: “The main reasons for the unsuccessful enterprise in Russia were attributed to early and excessive cold: This is completely false. How can I think that I do not know about the date of this annual phenomenon in Russia? Not only did winter not come earlier than usual, but its arrival on October 26 (November 7, NS - "Labor") was later than it happens every year. Further, Bonaparte writes that in November a thaw began, which lasted until the remnants of the army approached the Berezina.

Denis Davydov wrote not only poetry, but also military-historical notes. It is enough to read eyewitness accounts to forget about "General Frost" forever.

And the last. Let's ask ourselves why today we celebrate the victory in the Great Patriotic War not in October, but in May? After all, the German army was removed from the USSR in October 1944. The Russian army waged war with Napoleonic France until the end of March 1814, when it victoriously entered Paris. And it is wrong to divide this war into the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign Campaigns of 1813-1814 from a historical and, most importantly, moral point of view.

By the way, General Ivan Dibich-Zabalkansky also took Paris. I cannot say the same about Dibich-Zabolotsky.