With a light foot on the hand of "fast" Heinz, one of the real episodes that occurred at the very beginning of the Second World War became a persistent myth. Apparently Guderian had to demonstrate the all-destroying technical power of the valiant Wehrmacht. Well, at the same time, the backwardness of the opponents of the Millennium Reich. Guderian writes: "The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the design data and methods of action of our tanks, attacked them with melee weapons and suffered monstrous losses."
His words are happily picked up by both sides. According to the German version, the Polish cavalry mistook the German tanks for mock-ups and boldly rushed with their bare heels on a saber saber on the tanks in cavalry formation. According to the Polish version, the cavalrymen in the tragic time for Greater Poland showed exceptional courage, going into an unequal battle against mechanical armored monsters, demonstrating a rare stupidity, a real chivalrous spirit.
In fact, everything was much more prosaic.
The battle near Kroyants, which took place on September 1, 1939, formed the basis of the story of a cavalry charge. Guderian's memoirs speak of a cavalry charge on 3 September. Historian A. Isaev describes the battle as follows: the Polish 18th Pomeranian Lancers fought a defensive battle in the morning of September 1. In the afternoon, the regiment was ordered to attack the German infantry from the rear and then retreat back. The maneuver detachment of the regiment (1st and 2nd squadrons and two platoons of the 3rd and 4th squadrons) was supposed to enter the infantry from the rear, and after the attack, retreat to the Polish fortifications in the town of Rytel.
The detachment discovered that the German battalion was located on a halt 300-400 m from the edge of the forest. It was decided to attack, using the effect of surprise. The commander of the 18th regiment, Colonel Mastalezh, took part in the attack. The cavalrymen merrily cut down with their sabers the infantrymen who were taken by surprise and fled, until German armored vehicles appeared from the forest, opening machine-gun fire. Also, one German gun entered the battle. The Poles were forced to retreat, having suffered heavy losses, half of the riders survived. According to modern data, after a cavalry attack, three officers (including the regiment commander) and 23 lancers were killed, one officer and about 50 lancers were wounded.
Thus, the cavalrymen did not attack the tanks, but cut down the gaping Fritzian infantrymen until they themselves were fired upon by armored vehicles, after which they had to tick.
But no one was interested in the facts. The myth turned out to be beneficial to both sides. So in the film by A. Wajda "Flying" in 1959 there is an episode with this insanely brave attack :-):
A fairly well-known Polish artist, Jerzy Kossak, painted an epic painting in 1939. "Battle of Kutno". As a creative intellectual, Jerzy didn’t know a damn thing about tanks in particular, and about the war in general, and had a very distant impression. Therefore, it delivers everything here - from firing a pistol at a triplex, German tankers surrendering under the mighty pressure of a lancer, and ending with a pike blow in the forehead to an unknown armored monster, clearly crawling out of the artist's hungover fantasies:
Apparently realizing that he got excited with the imperishable, in 1943 Kossak redrawn his masterpiece:
I must say right away that this did not help much:
But on the other hand, the battle was captured on an epic canvas. Although, to justify the Fritz artist, it must be said that this work was drawn by him for the magazine Der pimpf for October 1939. Some explanations - Der Pimpf is the magazine of the German youth organization Jungvolk (Hitler Youth for the smallest).
What is remarkable in turn this masterpiece? The one that drives the Polish lancers with pissed rags, attacks the Polish cavalry tank Neubaufahrzeug, A prototype of a Rheinmetall heavy tank according to the terms of reference dated 1933. 5 units were produced, two of non-armored steel, three quite combat vehicles. All battle tanks (let me remind you 3 units!) Fought in 1940 in Norway as part of the 40th Special Purpose Tank Battalion (Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V.40), 1 of them was lost in battle with the British on April 26, 1940 (according to other sources, 21.04 .40). The other two were scrapped by the Hans for metal in 1942.
German tanks Nb.Fz. (Neubaufahrzeug) in the yard of the Rheinmetall AG plant in Düsseldorf, before being shipped to Norway 
German multi-turreted tank Neubaufahrzeug (Nb.Fz.) of the 40th Special Purpose Tank Battalion (Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V.40), on Oslo street. In the background, a small command vehicle Kleiner Panzerbefehlswagen Sd.Kfz.265 (Kl.Pz.Bf.Wg.), created on the basis of the light tank Pz.Kpfw.I Ausf.B.
Destroyed German heavy multi-turret tank Neubaufahrzeug (Nb.Fz.) of the 40th Special Purpose Tank Battalion (Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V.40) on the road in the Ringsaker area.
Accordingly, these "heavy" tanks in Poland could not be. And in general, there were no tanks from the German side in this battle, there were armored vehicles.
Here is such a mythical episode used in propaganda by both sides.
There is no irony in the title. This article will give examples of how Soviet cavalry formations beat the Nazi panzer divisions and panzercorps in the tail and mane.
During the years of the notorious perestroika, one can recall how its "foremen" hysterically stigmatized the "hard-nosed cavalrymen" who interfered with the creation of a mighty tank Red Army. And, they say, that's the only reason the Red Army suffered severe defeats at the beginning of the war.
But time passed, the archives opened and amazing things began. It suddenly became clear that very often it was the cavalry formations of the Red Army that fought much more successfully against German tank and motorized formations than tankers. And their counterattacks put the Germans in a critical position. And it turned out that the tankers, acting precisely together with the cavalry, achieved much more success than acting independently.
This is September 1941. The 24th motorized army corps of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian broke into the rear of the Soviet Southwestern Front. "Fast Heinz", unlike Kleist and Manstein, did not get hit in the teeth in June near Brody and Rovno or in July near Soltsy. And so the Nazi general felt very comfortable. And he followed with the headquarters of his tank group on the heels of the 24th motorized corps. And suddenly, on September 17-21, in the Romne region, this German corps receives a furious blow. Guderian himself admitted in his memoirs that he experienced a very unpleasant sensation when the cavalry almost broke through to his command post. This counterattack was inflicted by the 2nd Cavalry Corps of General Belov together with
1st Guards Rifle Division (former 100th Rifle) and 1st Tank Brigade. And gave a brutal beating to the Germans.
And after that, Guderian continued to get. On September 30, at Shtepovka, Belov's 2nd Cavalry Corps, together with the 1st Guards Moscow Proletarian Motorized Rifle and the same 1st Tank Brigade, inflicted severe damage on the 25th Motorized Division of the 2nd Tank Army (as Guderian's tank group became known). As a result, this division, instead of taking part in the attack on Moscow, was forced to lick its wounds for several days.
But Guderian's troubles did not end there again. With the 2nd Cavalry Corps (since November 26, 1941 - the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) on November 25, 1941, the 17th Tank Division of his tank army collided near Kashira. The cavalrymen were ahead of the Nazis in the exit to Kashira by just a few hours, having made an exhausting 100-km march from the area west of Serpukhov in less than a day. But, having gone out to Kashira, the cavalrymen did not sit on the defensive on the morning of November 26, but launched a counterattack on the 17th Panzer Division. Stunned by the unexpected blow, the Germans backed away. The 173rd Rifle Division (3,500 men and a 176.2 mm cannon), units of the 112th Panzer Division (several dozen light tanks
T-26), then the 9th tank brigade and two separate tank battalions entered the battle. The strength of the blows steadily increased. And if in other sectors of the front near Moscow the Germans tried to advance until December 5, then near Kashira Belov's cavalry, together with infantrymen and tankers, drove them back already on November 26.
Now fast forward to February 1943. These days, the German command, having gathered large forces of tanks and motorized infantry, organized a counteroffensive in the Donbass and near Kharkov. And so the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Das Reich" attacked the positions of the Soviet troops. She managed to crush the defense of the Soviet rifle units, to defeat the approaching tank units. But when the SS division attacked units of the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps, the SS men received a fierce rebuff. They never managed to cope with the cavalry. Skillfully maneuvering, the cavalry constantly evaded the blows of the SS, caught them in "fire bags", and delivered sudden counterattacks. As a result, the Das Reich division got out of harm's way from the area where the cavalrymen were defending.
Now let's look at the end of July - the beginning of August 1943. Soviet troops are advancing on the Germans, dug in on the Oryol bridgehead. The 11th Guards Army broke through the defenses of the enemy troops on the northern face of the Oryol salient. Mobile formations were introduced into the gap - the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, the 1st and 5th Tank Corps, then the 25th Tank Corps and the 4th Tank Army. The Germans were forced to hastily transfer tank formations to a threatening direction. Among other formations, the elite tank-grenadier division "Grossdeutschland" arrived from Belgorod. And on July 25, she took part in the counterattack of the German troops near Karachev.
At the time of entry into battle in the division "Grossdeutschland" there were 195 tanks - 84 Pz.Kpfw. IV, 96 Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" ("Panther") and 15 Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf. E "Tiger" ("Tiger"). By the end of August 2, the division remained combat-ready: Pz.Kpfw. IV - 28, Pz.Kpfw. V "Panther" ("Panther") - 32 and Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf. E "Tiger" ("Tiger") - 5, total - 65 tanks. Thus, during the nine-day battles, the losses of the division amounted to more than 65% of military equipment (56 Pz.Kpfw. IV, 64 Pz.Kpfw. V and 10 Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf. E). At the same time, from the Soviet side, this division was opposed by formations of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, reinforced by anti-tank artillery. And in a week + two days of fighting against cavalrymen, Grossdeutchland lost MORE armored vehicles than fighting against Katukov's 1st Panzer Army during Operation Citadel.
In general, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. wrote very warmly about the cavalrymen. Rokossovsky in his memoirs. At the same time, he emphasized that cavalrymen almost never went to saber attacks on horseback. Basically, they attacked the enemy on foot. Saber attacks were very rare, only when the cavalrymen acted in the depths of the enemy's defenses and attacked his rear units. And Rokossovsky especially noted that after the cavalry divisions received enough artillery, their mobility acquired special value. During the day, the cavalry division could go up to 60-70 kilometers and be ready to immediately join the battle, while the 40-kilometer transition completely exhausted the infantry unit moving on foot, and it needed time to rest, then to join the battle. At the same time, compared with a tank or mechanized formation, cavalrymen were less demanding on roads, bridges and fords across rivers, and, if necessary, could move almost off-road.
Therefore, it must be admitted that the formation of dozens of "light" cavalry divisions in the second half of 1941 was completely justified. Yes, these divisions were not particularly suitable for the offensive. But on the other hand, they were an ideal tool for parrying the breakthroughs of German troops in a strategic defense. Travel 60-70 kilometers per day, go to the area of the German breakthrough, take up defensive lines on the move, engage in battle and conduct mobile defense, slowing down the pace of the German offensive, the cavalry divisions could do it perfectly. And in cooperation with tank brigades, cavalrymen turned into an ideal means of conducting maneuverable defense.
Unfortunately, during the years of the notorious perestroika, the so-called. the superintendents managed to silence those who did not agree with their demagogy when they poured mud on the Soviet cavalrymen. The excessive secrecy of military archives also played a negative role. Many archival funds of the Ministry of Defense relating to the combat operations of the same cavalry formations were declassified only at the end of the 90s of the twentieth century. And this made it difficult to expose the insinuations of the "foremen of perestroika", who sucked fabrications out of their fingers, they say, "one person, crystal honest, told him."
But as soon as the archives were opened, it turned out that in 1941-1942, and even in 1943, Soviet cavalrymen fought with German tank and motorized formations often much more successfully than tank brigades and even corps. The cavalrymen did not rush into frontal counterattacks on German tanks, they constantly maneuvered, launched counterattacks on the flanks, acted on the rear of the Germans, destroying vehicles with ammunition and fuel, without which a tank or motorized division very quickly turned into infantry, reinforced by tanks as fixed firing points. And lost all its penetrating and striking power.
And when the Red Army seized the strategic initiative and drove the Nazis to the West, cavalry-mechanized groups operated with invariable success on all fronts. So, in the Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz and Yassy-Kishinev strategic offensive operations, 5 cavalry-mechanized groups participated: KMG of the 1st Belorussian Front (4th Guards Cavalry and 1st Mechanized Corps), KMG of the 3rd Belorussian Front (3 1st Guards Cavalry and 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps), two KMGs of the 1st Ukrainian Front (1st Guards Cavalry and 25th Tank Corps; 6th Guards Cavalry and 31st Tank Corps), KMG of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (23rd Tank and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps). Already during the Belarusian operation, another cavalry-mechanized group was created: the 2nd Guards Cavalry and 11th Tank Corps. And the names of the KMG commanders I.A. Plieva and N.S. Oslikovsky became legendary. The 1st Guards KMG of General Pliev (4th and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps and the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps) especially distinguished themselves in battles in Hungary.
And it is no coincidence that by the end of the war, ALL seven cavalry corps and the entire 21 cavalry division of the Army in the Field were GUARDS. No other branch of the military could boast that all of its formations in the Army in the Field bear the rank of Guards.
Andrey RAIZFELD
Andrey RAIZFELD
The mythologists of the Great Patriotic War and World War II generally gave birth to a fairy tale that the cavalry in this war was a relic of the past and was preserved in the Red Army only thanks to the cavalry marshals - Budyonny, Voroshilov, and Stalin, who allegedly did not understand the role of mechanization in the army and overestimated the role of the cavalry divisions.
But the opinion about the overestimation of the role of the cavalry in the Red Army is not true. Before the war, the number of cavalry was constantly falling. According to the report of the People's Commissar of Defense to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the fall of 1937, the long-term plan for the development of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army for 1938-1942 spoke of the reduction and disbandment of a significant part of the cavalry. As a result, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, out of the 32 cavalry divisions and 7 corps directorates in 1938, 4 corps directorates and 13 divisions remained. Some cavalry units were reorganized into mechanized ones; so, the 4th cavalry corps, management and the 34th cavalry division became the basis of the 8th mechanized corps of D. I. Ryabtsev (before that the commander of the cavalry corps).
The theory of combat use of cavalry in the USSR
The theory of the combat use of cavalry in the USSR was created by quite sensible people; so, in 1922, the work “Cavalry: Cavalry Essays” was published, which belonged to Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov - a colonel, a cavalryman of the tsarist army, who headed the General Staff in the USSR. He published in the Union the first study on the tactics of the cavalry, it caused a wide discussion of the red commanders. In his work, Shaposhnikov reduced equestrian combat to exceptions, and combined combat should become the norm - a maneuver by horsemen, and the actual combat on foot. The organization was supposed to become closer to the infantry, the weapons were strengthened, becoming similar to the infantry - rifles with a bayonet, revolvers, grenades, carbines, the number of machine guns was increased, artillery units were strengthened (the cavalry should have howitzers and anti-aircraft guns), armored vehicles were attached, including tanks. The cavalry was supposed to be supported by aviation from the air.
Marshal Budyonny was not a "narrow-minded" cavalryman, but quite sensibly argued that the role of the cavalry would increase in the event of a mobile war, this is its scope. That is why it was necessary to maintain a powerful cavalry in the Red Army.
The combat charter of the cavalry attributed the offensive in the cavalry formation only in the case of a "favorable situation", that is, if there is shelter from enemy fire, it is weak or there is no enemy fire. The horse actually became a vehicle, while the cavalry fought on foot.
The field manual of 1939 noted that the cavalry units should be used in conjunction with tank units, motorized infantry, and aviation; in the development of breakthroughs, in raids behind enemy lines, in the pursuit of the enemy. Cavalrymen, dismounted, could hold the terrain, but it was assigned at the first opportunity to replace them, saving them for maneuver.
Shaposhnikov, Boris Mikhailovich
Combat use of cavalry
Horses were used for movement, before the battle they were taken away by horse breeders (several people in each squadron), cavalrymen fought like ordinary infantry. Attacking enemy positions in cavalry formation, with increased firepower, was suicide, and senseless, our commanders did not suffer from such nonsense. The famous carts also remained, but before the battle the machine gun was removed, the horses were taken away with the cart. Horse attack and cutting the enemy with a saber became an exception. Many fighters never went on horseback during the war and did not hack anyone.
In fact, the caval units became a kind of motorized infantry, only on horseback. This had its advantages, the cavalry passed where armored vehicles could not pass, cars - in forests, mountainous terrain. Soviet cavalrymen attacking the positions of the Wehrmacht with sabers unsheathed is a myth.
Horse guards of General Oslikovsky at the review, 1944
The myth of the Polish cavalry attacking the tanks of the Wehrmacht
The myth was created by Guderian in his memoirs: “The Polish Pomeranian cavalry brigade, due to ignorance of the constructive data and methods of action of our tankers, attacked them cold and suffered monstrous losses.” Apparently, this plot fit well into the idea of the racial superiority of the "Nordic race" over the "subhuman" Slavs, who were smart enough to attack tanks on horseback.
His message was then creatively developed in fiction, Pikul, for example, in his book "The Square of the Fallen Fighters."
In reality, the Polish cavalry, like the Soviet one, had instructions that the cavalry marches on horseback, and the battle is on foot. Naturally, there could be an exception if you are chasing a demoralized enemy or taking him by surprise.
The 18th Pomeranian Lancers took part in the battle near Kroyants. On August 22, 1939, he received an order to mobilize, on the 25th it was completed. The regiment consisted of more than 800 people, two 37-mm anti-tank guns, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 heavy machine guns, 18 light machine guns, 2 motorcycles, 2 radio stations. Then it was reinforced with a battery with 4 75-mm cannons and two heavy machine guns.
On September 1, the regiment met the enemy on the border and fought a defensive battle in the first half of the day, in the afternoon the regiment received an order to launch a counterattack and, taking advantage of the enemy’s hitch, withdraw. For the counterattack, two squadrons and two platoons were allocated, they were brought into a mobile detachment, he was given the task of reaching the rear of the German infantry by seven in the evening and attacking it, and then retreating behind the front line.
During a roundabout maneuver, the reconnaissance of the Poles discovered a battalion of German infantry, which was on a halt 300-400 meters from the edge of the forest. The Polish commanders decided to attack in cavalry formation, using the effect of surprise. The attack was led by the commander of the regiment, Colonel Mastalezh, at the signal of the trumpet, the Poles attacked. The Germans did not expect a blow and were taken by surprise, and ran, the Poles began to cut them down. But the Poles did not notice the armored vehicles hidden in the forest, now they took them by surprise. They left the forest and opened fire from machine guns (that is, there were no tanks), they were supported by one gun, the Poles were defeated. They retreated with 26 dead, including a colonel, and about 50 wounded.
Most of the losses of the 18th regiment on September 1 suffered in a defensive battle - up to 60% of the composition, two anti-tank guns, several machine guns. The image invented by Guderian and developed by other authors has nothing to do with reality. The 18th Pomeranian Lancers (or rather, part of it) attacked the gaping German infantry, not tanks, and was attacked by German armored vehicles when chopping down the Germans. But, having suffered losses, the cavalry retreated and was not completely destroyed.
Sources:
Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk, 1999.
Isaev A.V. Antisuvorov. Ten myths of World War II. M., 2004.
Soviet cavalry. Military - ist. essay / A. Ya. Soshnikov, P. N. Dmitriev, A. S. Arutyunov et al. M., 1984.
Tyulenev I. V. Soviet cavalry in the battles for the Motherland. M., 1957.
No sooner had the Wehrmacht launched an attack on Poland on September 1, 1939 than a strange story began. The Polish lancers, that is, the light cavalry, were strongly opposed to the German tanks. Armed with spears, they attacked the steel machines as if they were made of cardboard, and paid for their ignorance with death. Soon the German propaganda media were writing about the suicidal cavalry, the Poles, who attacked with spears and shouts. The international press picked up the episode and replicated it. 20 years later, the Polish director Andrzej Wajda, in his film Letna, created a kind of monument, dedicating it to the heroic resistance of the Poles against a superior enemy.
The unequal battle between tanks and cavalry is one of the strongest and most indelible narratives of tank warfare, writes the German historian Markus Pellmann in his dissertation Tanks and the Mechanization of War. Growing up with more and more details, the story eventually entered the history of war memories, history books and memoirs of General Heinz Guderian, who probably took part in the creation of German tank weapons. Only one step was missing before scientific publications. Hitler's biographer Joachim Fest wrote of a "deadly Donquixote". And Karl-Heinz Frieser, one of the best experts on tank warfare, mentions in his famous book Blitzkrieg Legend that Polish cavalry attacked German tanks with sabers.
Context
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The Telegraph UK 01/24/2002Did the Wehrmacht survive thanks to Stalin?
Die Welt 01/13/2017Die Welt: what stopped the Wehrmacht near Moscow?
Die Welt 07.12.2016When the Wehrmacht first turned back
Die Welt 06.09.2016Although the tank was "a significant type of land warfare weapon in the 20th century," history for a long time avoided this topic. Pellmann, scientific director of the Bundeswehr's Center for Military History and Social Sciences in Potsdam, decided to change that. The framework is quite wide, which covers both military and technical development, and the symbolic meaning of these weapons. As an example of multilateral analysis, the author proposes to analyze the unequal duel of 1939.
The place itself cannot be unequivocally determined. After the newspaper "Wehrmacht" on September 13, 1939 wrote about the "almost grotesque attack" of the Polish cavalry regiment, another propaganda newspaper added fuel to the fire in 1940. So, the German leading tanks during the offensive in the so-called corridor, that is, between Pomerania and East Prussia, was attacked by Polish cavalry. And not far from Bransk, near the Lithuanian border, a similar operation was carried out. “Everyone knows that you have only one real tank, while the rest are dummies,” the prisoner of war is quoted.
After 1945, Guderian's Memoirs of a Soldier (1951) was heavily cited. The former general wrote about the Polish cavalry brigade Pomorska, which on September 3 in Tucholsky forests, due to "ignorance of the structure and actions of our tanks, attacked with melee weapons and suffered devastating losses." After that, similar episodes in different versions were reflected in the memoirs of individual military formations.
In the documents of the German divisions, which are stored in the Federal Archives in Freiburg, Pellmann goes on the trail of "the core of this story." So, apparently, this happened in the first days of the war, when the dismounted units of German tank formations or their infantry escorts were attacked by the Polish cavalry.
But this happened in a completely different form than was then actively described. So, in the military diary of the 4th Panzer Division it was said: “We saw the enemy, the cavalry, which very skillfully and nimbly, using natural obstacles (water barriers and forests), fought in the rear.” The chronicler of the 10th Panzer Division recorded the following: “During the battle in the forest, the Pole turned out to be an extremely skillful opponent. Of particular note is the conduct of the battle of the Pomorsk cavalry brigade in the Tucholsky forests.
Indeed, in the early days of the war in Poland, a strange hybrid combat situation probably arose, writes Pelman. But it was not about irresponsible "deadly quixoticism", but about a random combination of circumstances. As a rule, Polish cavalrymen acted effectively against tankers when, covered by field fortifications, they started the battle with anti-tank guns. “Only in the journalistic discourse they began to write about the cavalry as an exciting story about the struggle of cavalrymen against tanks instead of philistine stories…,” sums up Pelmann.
It is this mythical story that has become attractive due to its duality. From a German perspective, the unequal battle was evidence of ignoring the enemy and misleading ordinary soldiers due to irresponsible leadership. And from the Polish point of view, the duel is interpreted as a heroic feat.
The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.
Die yourself, but save a comrade. October 17, 1941 was a turning point in the battle of Taganrog. At dawn, hundreds of guns and mortars opened heavy fire from the western bank of the Mius, plowing the trenches of the 31st Stalingrad Rifle Division, Colonel M.I. Ozimina. Dozens of "Junkers" bombarded artillery firing positions along the embankment of the Pokrovskoye-Martsevo railway. Then, from the captured bridgeheads near the villages of Troitskoye and Nikolaevka, columns of tanks and motorized infantry of the 3rd motorized corps of the tank army, Colonel General E. von Kleist, moved to Taganrog. Crushed by a mass of armored vehicles, the thinned regiments of the Stalingraders rolled back to the city, on the outskirts of which, in the village of Severny, units of the Taganrog garrison entered the battle. Aerial reconnaissance of the Southern Front established an accumulation of up to a hundred tanks and two hundred vehicles in Troitskoye, twenty tanks on the highway near Sambek.
Over ninety tanks, having broken through the front of our units at Sambek, moved to the east. The first secretary of the regional party committee M.P. Bogdanov called Lieutenant General Remezov from Taganrog and demanded that the necessary measures be taken immediately to eliminate the breakthrough of enemy tank columns to Taganrog and Rostov. Fyodor Nikitich, who had just begun to form the 56th Separate Army, intended for the defense of the Don capital, did not have any combat-ready troops in the Taganrog direction.
Then Remezov contacted the commander of the 9th Army, General Kharitonov, to whom all parts of the Taganrog combat sector were subordinate, conveyed to him the demand of the secretary of the regional committee and his request to prevent the defeat of the Stalingrad division. Closest to the place of the breakthrough, in the area of the village of Kurlatskoye and the farms of Sadki, Buzina, Sedovsky, there were two light cavalry divisions and the 23rd rifle regiment of the 51st Order of Lenin of the Perekop Red Banner Division that had left the encirclement. At noon, Fyodor Mikhailovich Kharitonov gave a combat order to the commanders of the 66th and 68th cavalry divisions, Colonels Grigorovich and Kirichenko: having subjugated the 23rd regiment, from the line - height 82.7, Salty barrow, Kurlatskoye at 15-30 to strike at the flank enemy in the direction of Koshkino station. The commander of the German corps, General of the Panzer Forces, Baron Eberhard August von Mackensen, who was watching the progress of the offensive from the crest of one of the Mius heights, pointed out to the division commanders standing with him a dark, stirring mass rolling down from the gentle western slopes of the Salt and Armenian barrows. Excellent Zeiss optics revealed to the generals a striking picture: thousands of horsemen raced along the backfield, stretching for several kilometers along the front, at intervals between squadrons and regiments.
Dozens of machine-gun carts hurried behind them, and artillery teams with limbers and light cannons walked at a trot. The commander of the motorized division "Leibstandarte" Adolf Hitler "Obergruppenführer SS Josef Dietrich, the Fuhrer's favorite and former bodyguard, familiarly slapped Mackensen on the shoulder: "- Baron, well, just like lancers in Poland!" Wincing, Mackensen ordered the commander of the thirteenth tank division to repel the attack and singled out to reinforce the battalion of the 36th tank regiment of Oberst Esser from the fourteenth division.General Duvert immediately deployed along the Pokrovskoye-Sambek highway, the 93rd motorized regiment of Oberstleutnant Stolz, following the column. Of the six regiments, the 179th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel I. I. Lobodin, was the most organized.
In a report to the political administration of the 9th Army, the military commissar of the 66th division, the battalion commissar Skakun noted: "On 10/17/41, the 179th command post covered the exit from the battle of the 31st Rifle Division in the Taganrog region. The regiment had not yet had time to dig in, when thirteen enemy tanks attacked it. But Comrade Lob alone correctly positioned firepower, he himself was on the front line of fire and, by his personal example of courage and selflessness, inspired the fighters and commanders for active hostilities.As a result, the cavalrymen successfully repelled enemy attacks, inflicted significant losses on the Nazis. on themselves, thereby ensuring the exit of parts of the 31 SD from the battle. But the watered report did not mention that after that day only the second squadron of Captain Ya.G. remained combat-ready in the regiment. Bondarenko.
The division commanders Vladimir Iosifovich Grigorovich and Nikolai Moiseevich Kirichenko could do nothing to help their horsemen, who were dying under massive fire. The crews of the 8th separate division of armored trains, Major I.A., hurried to the rescue. Sukhanov. Cruising on the stretch between the stations of Martsevo and Kosh-Kino, armored train No. 59 under the command of Captain A.D. Kharebava brought down the fire of four guns and sixteen machine guns on German tanks and motorized infantry, diverting them to himself. In a fierce battle, the steel "fortress on wheels" perished, bombarded by twenty-seven dive bombers.
Out of a hundred crew members, six wounded soldiers miraculously survived. The remnants of the cavalry and the 31st division withdrew to the east, holding back the armored divisions of the Wehrmacht. The climax was the twentieth of October. On this day, the 179th Cavalry Regiment repulsed six attacks by a motorized infantry battalion, supported by seventy tanks and fifty motorcycles with machine-gun sidecars. The cavalry of the second squadron destroyed over thirty motorcycles along with the crews, knocked out four and burned three tanks, up to an infantry company.
But the forces were too unequal. The enemy outflanked the cavalry positions and surrounded the command post. In a fleeting unequal battle, almost all the headquarters commanders, signalmen and horsemen who were at the command post were killed. Only Lieutenant Colonel Lobodin with two lieutenants managed to escape from the ring. They rode to the farm Kopani, but there were already tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy. Then the regiment commander climbed into the attic of a suburban house and mowed down a dozen and a half soldiers with machine gun fire. The Nazis turned the tank around and set fire to the house with incendiary shells. But even from the clouds of smoke, mean short bursts were heard. When the flames engulfed the roof, Lobodin jumped into the yard. He received minor shrapnel wounds and severe burns, was covered in blood. On the burnt tunic, two Orders of the Red Banner of War and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Tajik Republic shone with a scarlet sheen. The commander, who began service in the division V.I. Chapaeva, a thunderstorm of the Basmachi, with a Mauser in his left and a saber in his right hand, rushed at the enemies surrounding the yard. In the crackle of the roaring flames, several shots sounded inaudibly. Three more soldiers who rushed to Lobodin fell.
Discarding the already unnecessary pistol, Ivan Ivanovich waved his saber. Backing away, machine gunners at close range, in long bursts, literally riddled the hero. Exhausted from the fear they experienced, they doused the body with gasoline and burned it. The remains were secretly buried by local residents in the neighboring Sadki farm. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 5, 1942, I.I. Lobodin was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Posthumously.
And if the feat of Lieutenant Colonel Lobodino I.I. is known and has already been described in the literature, then one more fact, testifying to the tragedy and horror of these days on the Don land, is little known. ... The commander of the 13th Panzer Division, Major General Walter Duvert, who led the repulse of an incredible cavalry attack near the Koshkino station from the commander's T-4, fell ill with a nervous breakdown and was treated for a long time in a psychiatric clinic by the best doctors of the Reich. He was tormented by the same picture - across the endless, to the horizon, hundreds of saddled horses rush about and wildly, piercingly neigh, shying away from roaring tanks, whose sides and tracks are black with blood mixed with mud and scraps of soldier's uniforms ... Rostov-on- Don.
