1942, Defense of the Caucasus
The situation in the Caucasian direction in July 1942 and measures to strengthen the defense of the Caucasus

The Caucasus is an important economic region. On the eve of the war, a large fuel and energy base was created here. The share of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia accounted for 86.5 percent of the all-Union oil production, 65 percent of natural gas, and 56.5 percent of manganese ore. The Baku region produced almost three-quarters of all oil produced in the USSR. The Caucasus is the richest agricultural land.

The geographical position of the Caucasus determines its strategic importance. In the pre-war period, a significant foreign trade turnover of the Soviet Union was carried out through the Caucasus and ports on the Black and Caspian Seas. During the war years, trade routes through the Persian Gulf, Iran, the Caspian Sea, took second place after the Northern Sea Route in the supply of weapons, strategic raw materials from the United States and the countries of the British Empire.

By the summer of 1942, with the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, the economic base of the Soviet Union had sharply narrowed: steel production had decreased by more than 10 million tons per year; grain harvest - more than three times; mobilization resources decreased due to the occupation of part of Soviet territory by the enemy. Under these conditions, the defense of the Caucasus acquired vital importance for the Soviet state. The Soviet Supreme High Command entrusted it to the troops of the Southern, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts.

During the period of deterioration of the situation on the Don, the Headquarters demanded from the troops, and above all from the command of the Southern Front, not to allow the enemy to cross to the left bank of the river. By a directive of July 22, 1942, the commander of the Southern Front was tasked with immediately occupying the southern bank of the Don from Konstantinovsky to Bataysk. All parts of the North Caucasian Front, defending in this sector, were transferred to the command of the commander of the Southern Front, under his leadership the aviation of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts was united, which was entrusted with the task of destroying enemy crossings from Konstantinovsky to the mouth of the Don. The line of defense along the banks of the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Konstantinovsky (exclusively) was occupied by the troops of the 51st Army of the North Caucasian Front, which, on July 25, were transferred to the Southern Front. The actions of the troops of this army were supported from the air by aviation of the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front.

Thus, from July 25, the troops of the Southern Front under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky took up defense along the left bank of the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Azov. The front included seven combined arms armies. All of them were small and numbered a total of about 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, 2160 guns and mortars. In the first echelon of the front, the width of which was about 320 km, were the 51st, 37th, 12th and 18th armies. The 56th Army, after the battles for Rostov, was withdrawn to the second echelon. The reserve of the front consisted of rifle and cavalry divisions located in the zone of the 37th Army in the area west of the village of Vesely, as well as the remnants of the 9th and 24th armies, weakened in the battles for the Donbass, which were concentrated in the area of ​​Salsk. The troops of the front were supported by the 4th Air Army under the command of General K. A. Vershinin, which had 130 aircraft.

The southern front was tasked with destroying the enemy who had broken through to the left bank of the Don, and, having restored the situation, firmly take up the defense from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Azov. Subsequent events showed that such a task turned out to be unbearable for the Southern Front: there were only 17-20 thousand people in the armies of the left wing. Only the 51st Army, whose defense front reached 170 km, had 40 thousand people. All this did not allow achieving the necessary density of forces and means in defense. The armies were stretched along the front and did not have the opportunity to create strong second echelons and reserves. There was not enough artillery. Not a single gun remained in the artillery units of the 37th Army, there was not enough ammunition. Army artillery had from 0.3 to 3 rounds of ammunition for anti-tank guns, up to 3 rounds of ammunition for guns of caliber 76 mm and larger, and up to 1 round of ammunition for mortars. There were not enough hand grenades, rifle cartridges. Due to a lack of fuel, the aviation of the 4th Air Army was forced to drastically reduce the number of sorties.

The armies of the first echelon of the front went over to the defensive hastily, under continuous blows from superior enemy forces, and occupied lines that were not fully prepared in terms of engineering. Only in the zone of the 51st Army was it possible to prepare the defensive line by 50-60 percent. Engineering structures on the front from Tsimlyanskaya to the Sea of ​​Azov, built earlier by the forces of the North Caucasian Military District, were flooded with water during spring floods, and many of them could not be used by the retreating troops.

A difficult situation was created with the logistics. The planned supply was disrupted. The troops received food mainly from local resources. During the withdrawal, the control of formations and units was disrupted, communications were often interrupted: there was no wired connection, and the radio was not always skillfully used.

A responsible task was assigned to the troops of the North Caucasian Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny. The front included the 47th army, the 1st separate rifle and 17th cavalry corps. They defended the northeastern and eastern coasts of the Azov and Black Seas from Azov to Lazarevsky. The 5th air army of the front, commanded by General S.K. Goryunov, had only about 100 aircraft. The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla were operationally subordinate to the front.

The Transcaucasian Front, commanded by General I.V. Tyulenev, defended the Black Sea coast from Lazarevsky to Batumi and the border with Turkey. Part of his troops were located in Northern Iran and covered the Iranian-Turkish border. The front included the 45th and 46th armies and the 15th cavalry corps. In the Makhachkala region, the newly formed 44th Army covered the Baku direction from the north. The aviation of the front consisted of 14 regiments, which had 164 serviceable combat aircraft. In addition, 3 reserve aviation regiments and 8 aviation schools were deployed in Transcaucasia, which had a total of 232 serviceable combat aircraft.

By the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the formations of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts were not fully staffed. There were also no necessary reserves. The commander of the Transcaucasian Front had in his reserve a rifle division, a tank brigade, and four artillery and mortar regiments. Therefore, in a directive dated July 8, 1942, the Headquarters demanded that the commanders of the troops of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts “...use all opportunities to create reserves at the expense of internal resources ..., having them on prepared defensive lines or in anti-tank areas and in advance aiming for a counterattack in the directions of the most likely appearance of the enemy.

The Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, despite the losses suffered in the first year of the war, maintained superiority in ships. However, with the loss of Sevastopol - the main naval base on the Black Sea - and the Crimean Peninsula, the situation for the Black Sea Fleet became much more complicated. The fleet began to be based on the Caucasian ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Poti, which had a small ship repair base, while many ships needed urgent repairs. The relocation of German aviation to the Crimea allowed it to strike at ships and naval bases of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet was forced to use poorly equipped Caucasian airfields and even unpaved areas, which limited its use, especially in rainy weather. There was an acute shortage of fighter aircraft for reliable cover for ships operating at sea. The Azov military flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, together with the ground forces, carried out the task of defending the eastern coast of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov.

By July 25, 1942, the fascist troops, advancing in the direction of the Caucasus, reached the Don from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the river. The enemy managed to capture bridgeheads in the areas of Tsimlyanskaya, Nikolaevskaya, Razdorskaya and Bataysk. The capture of the bridgeheads and the presence of a strong grouping, far superior to the Soviet troops on the Lower Don, allowed the German command to start an offensive operation to capture the Caucasus virtually without a pause. The plan for the operation called "Edelweiss" was contained in the OKB directive No. 45 of July 23, 1942.

The implementation of the plan was entrusted to Army Group A, commanded by Field Marshal V. List. It consisted of the 1st Panzer Army (eleven divisions), the 4th Panzer Army (three panzer divisions), the 17th Army (fifteen divisions, infantry and cavalry brigades), the Romanian 3rd Army (seven divisions) and the in the Crimea, the 11th Army (fifteen divisions).

The 17th Army, the 1st and 4th Tank Armies acted in the first echelon against the Southern Front from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the Don. The enemy grouping included 167 thousand people, 1130 tanks, 4540 guns and mortars, up to 1 thousand combat aircraft of the 4th air fleet. The enemy achieved significant superiority over the troops of the Southern Front: in personnel - 1.5 times; guns and mortars - in 2.1; tanks - in 9.3; aircraft - 7.7 times.

The main strike force of the enemy, consisting of three tank corps (40th, 3rd and 57th), acted against the troops of the center of the Southern Front in the Salsk direction.

The immediate task of Army Group A was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov and Novocherkassk. It was planned to inflict two attacks in converging directions on Tikhoretsk: the main one - by large forces of tank and mechanized formations of the 1st and 4th tank armies from the bridgeheads in the areas of Konstantinovsky and Tsimlyanskaya, the auxiliary - by the forces of the 17th Army after forcing the Don near Rostov and from the bridgehead in the Bataysk region.

After the capture of the North Caucasus, the enemy planned to develop an offensive on Tuapse and Batumi in order to enter the Transcaucasus and deprive the Black Sea Fleet of its bases. The offensive of the Nazis in this direction was facilitated by the 42nd Army Corps of the 11th Army, which was supposed to strike through the Kerch Strait on Krasnodar and Novorossiysk.

The mountain and chasseur divisions were given the task of forcing the Kuban River, capturing the Maikop and Armavir regions, the mountain passes of the western part of the Main Caucasian Range, and advancing into Transcaucasia.

The main forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies were to advance through Stavropol towards Grozny and Makhachkala and capture the Baku oil region. Part of the forces were supposed to take the passes through the Main Caucasian Range on the Military Ossetian and Military Georgian roads with a subsequent exit to the Transcaucasus.

Thus, at the first stage of the operation according to the Edelweiss plan, the Nazi command intended to capture the North Caucasus, and at the second - Transcaucasia, bypassing the Main Caucasian Range from the west and east and at the same time overcoming it from the north through the passes. The command of the Wehrmacht hoped to force Turkey to enter the war with the Soviet Union by the release of its troops in the Transcaucasus. At the same time, the Nazis pinned great hopes on the fact that they would be able to quarrel the peoples of the Caucasus, destroy their friendship with the Russians and other fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union and take advantage of this to strengthen their dominance in the Caucasus.

Ensuring the offensive of the troops of the left wing of Army Group A was entrusted to Army Group B, which attacked Stalingrad. After capturing the city, part of its tank and motorized troops were to advance along the Volga with the task of reaching Astrakhan and paralyzing traffic along the river. The right wing of the troops of Army Group A was supported by the naval forces located on the Black Sea. Their task was to ensure the crossing of the Kerch Strait for the ground forces and to deprive the Soviet fleet of the opportunity to strike at the German troops advancing along the coast in a southeast direction. The main headquarters of the German naval forces was also tasked with preparing light ships for transfer to the Caspian Sea to disrupt sea communications.

The existing superiority in tanks and artillery allowed the German command to create large strike groups in certain areas, and primarily tank ones, and in the event of a breakthrough in defense, to conduct an offensive at a high pace, especially in the North Caucasus. The great advantage of the enemy in the conduct of hostilities both on land and at sea was superiority in aviation. Due to the paucity of fighter aviation in the air armies of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts and the weak air defense, enemy aircraft often acted with impunity.

The balance of forces, unfavorable for the Soviet troops, was aggravated by the difficulties of logistical support for the formations operating in the Caucasian direction. In the summer of 1942, the country's industry was still unable to fully meet the needs of the Soviet army. She just completed the restructuring of military production. The lack of fuel, food, technical equipment made it impossible to quickly make up for losses. In addition, a large amount of military equipment, weapons and ammunition was required for the armies operating in the Stalingrad direction, which was turning into the center of the struggle on the Soviet-German front.

The rear units and institutions of the Southern Front, when leaving the Donbass and crossing the Don, suffered heavy losses in vehicles. The supply of troops from the rear of the country became more difficult. The railway lines connecting the Caucasus with the center of the country were cut by the enemy. The railway communications of the Stalingrad direction carried out the supply of reserves to the Stalingrad region and the evacuation of material values ​​from the North Caucasus. The ports on the Caspian Sea were not adapted for loading and unloading military equipment. All this slowed down transportation from Astrakhan, Guriev, Krasnovodsk to the ports of the western coast of the Caspian Sea by more than 1.5-2 times.

The delivery of the necessary funds to the front was hampered by the accumulation of a huge number of people on highways and railways, bridges and crossings, at railway stations in the North Caucasus, as well as industrial equipment, agricultural products and livestock evacuated into the depths of the Caucasus from the regions of the Don, Kuban and Stavropol. The automobile and horse-drawn transport, mobilized from the national economy, was not effectively used for the transportation of goods.

The preparation of the territory of the Caucasus as a theater of military operations began before the Great Patriotic War and continued throughout 1941.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by a directive dated October 2, 1941, demanded that the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District immediately begin organizing the defense of the Caucasus from the north, building field fortified lines on the Taman Peninsula and strengthening the defense of the Black Sea bases and ports from land. On October 9, she indicated the specific lines of defense that should have been built by November 25. On November 22, the Headquarters once again drew the attention of the district command to accelerating the construction of defensive lines, primarily on the Taman Peninsula and in the areas of fleet bases and ports on the Black Sea coast. She demanded "defensive work in the port areas ... to be carried out not only from the sea, but also from land, coordinating the defense system with representatives of the Navy."

Back in November - December 1941, the construction of field fortified lines on the Lower Don from Nizhnechirskaya to Azov, along the Kuma and Manych rivers, began. However, there were shortcomings in the preparation of defensive lines in the North Caucasus until the spring of 1942: engineering work was developed slowly; the main positions of the defensive lines were chosen in the floodplains of the Lower Don and Kuban rivers, in the spring they were flooded with water, as a result of which some of the structures collapsed and their restoration was delayed until mid-summer; work was carried out on a wide 700-kilometer front, which dispersed the already insignificant forces and means of the district; not enough attention was paid to the creation of defense in depth in the most important operational areas.

In the spring and especially at the beginning of the summer of 1942, when the Nazi troops were getting closer to Rostov and there was a direct threat of an enemy attack on the Caucasus from the north, the Headquarters and the Military Council of the North Caucasian Military District (since May 19, 1942 - North- Caucasian Front) took more decisive measures to strengthen the defense of the North Caucasus.

On April 3, the territory of the North Caucasus was divided into eleven combat sectors. The defense of each of them was assigned to the formations, units and military establishments stationed within the boundaries of these sections. In district centers and militarily important settlements on the territory of the district, 138 destruction battalions were formed, mainly from those liable for military service who received a deferment from conscription. The main task of the battalions was to, in cooperation with units and subunits of the NKVD troops and the police, eliminate possible enemy airborne assault and sabotage groups.

In order to create a defense in depth from the north, in May the construction of defensive lines between the Don and Kuban, along the Terek and on the outer defensive contours around Tikhoretsk, Voroshilovsk (Stavropol), Grozny, Mineralnye Vody and Krasnodar began. On June 16, the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front decided to equip 580 battalion defense areas on these lines. However, by the beginning of hostilities in the North Caucasus, there were less than one third of the planned number. Significant shortcomings of the defensive lines were their poor anti-tank training and insufficient camouflage.

On July 19, the General Staff pointed out to the headquarters of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts the shortcomings in the organization of defense, the lack of proper management of engineering work and the low quality of the prepared lines. The directive noted that the troops are slowly restoring the flooded structures on the Lower Don, units and formations do not have close contacts with local authorities, which also slows down the conduct of defensive work.

In order to organize defense in the Stavropol direction, on July 23, the commander of the troops of the Southern Front set the task of the 8th sapper army, which consisted of 8 sapper brigades and 19 construction battalions, to build a line along the banks of the Sal, Susat, Podpolnaya rivers by July 28. The 25th Department of Defense Construction was to prepare a line along the southern bank of the Manych Canal, along the Manych and Nizhny Don rivers. To protect large administrative and industrial centers, it was planned to create special defensive regions: Makhachkala, Groznensky, Ordzhonikidzevsky. The basis of the troops in these areas were divisions of the NKVD. The improvement of the borders on the coast of the Taman Peninsula continued.

At the same time, the defense of the Main Caucasian Range and the Baku direction was strengthened: formations and units of the 46th and 44th armies built fortifications on the roads and passes; the main forces of the 44th Army prepared lines in the Baku direction along the Terek and Sulak rivers, equipped the Derbent and Samur positions and built two intermediate lines.

Despite the measures taken, the defensive lines in the North Caucasus and the Main Caucasian Range were not ready for the start of the battle due to lack of time. Engineering and construction work had to be carried out during the battle under the continuous influence of aviation and strong tank and mechanized enemy groups.

To strengthen the defense of the Caucasus, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command also carried out other measures. New formations and units were formed in the Transcaucasian Military District, which on May 1, 1942 was again renamed the Transcaucasian Front. The air defense of the most important objects and industrial regions of the Caucasus was strengthened. Based on the decision of the State Defense Committee, adopted on November 9, 1941, the Rostov, Krasnodar and Grozny air defense divisional regions were formed. In April 1942, due to the increased threat of air raids, the Baku Air Defense Corps was transformed into the Baku Air Defense Army under the command of General P. M. Beskrovnov. However, the cover of these objects by fighter aircraft was insufficient. As of August 1, there was only one fighter aviation regiment each to solve the problems of air defense of Grozny and Krasnodar. The Baku Air Defense Army consisted of 5 fighter aviation regiments.

With the release of fascist troops to the Don, the question arose of the evacuation of material values ​​from the North Caucasus. In a short time, with the active participation of the population, a huge amount of national economic property, equipment of industrial enterprises and food was exported. First of all, the equipment of oil fields and oil refineries was evacuated. It was sent to the Volga region, Bashkiria and Central Asia to expand oil production and refining in these areas. Crude oil from Maykop was transported to the Grozny refineries, and from there finished products went directly to the front.

The Baku oil workers found themselves in the most difficult conditions. The export of oil became possible only through the Caspian Sea. But there were not enough tankers, and the Caspian Shipping Company could not cope with such a task. There were not enough tanks to store oil. Despite this, its mining continued, the hollows of the mountains were turned into a kind of storage.

Agricultural workers worked selflessly to harvest a rich harvest in a timely manner. Work in the fields did not stop until the approach of the enemy. Grain was sent by echelons to the rear of the country, transferred to the troops of the Soviet army and partially to workers and collective farmers. Stocks of bread were created for partisan detachments. Tractors and combines, free from harvesting, were distilled under their own power into the depths of the Caucasus. The cattle were taken to the foothills; the horse composition was sent mainly to staff the cavalry, artillery and rear units of the Soviet army.

The evacuation of material assets was carried out by the Caspian merchant shipping company and the ships of the Caspian military flotilla. The bulk of the cargo was sent through the Makhachkala, Baku, Astrakhan ports to Guryev and Krasnovodsk. However, due to the lack of transport, the constant impact of enemy aircraft, as well as its rapid advance, it was not possible to take everything out. The remaining material assets were destroyed: the motors of tractors and combines were disabled, grain was burned in the fields and barns, industrial equipment was destroyed, oil wells, oil pumping compressors, railway depots and other structures were rendered unusable.

The approaching danger rallied the Soviet people, aroused in everyone the desire to give all their strength to defeat the enemy. Under the leadership of the Ordzhonikidzevsky Regional Committee of the Party, whose first secretary was a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks M. A. Suslov, and the Krasnodar Regional Committee of the Party, headed by First Secretary P. I. Seleznev, local party and Soviet bodies prepared the underground, formed partisan detachments. As a result of their continuous painstaking work, together with the command and political bodies of the fronts, the combat unity of the front and rear was created. By the heroic efforts of the fighters, commanders and workers, every effort was made to bleed, stop, and then crush the hordes of Nazi invaders.

The beginning of the battle for the Caucasus. North Caucasian defensive operation

The defensive battle in the North Caucasus began on July 25, 1942, at the turn of the Don River in the strip from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth. The fascist German troops, with the support of aviation and artillery, began to implement the Edelweiss plan. The fighting between the Don and the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range continued until 17 August.

Fierce fighting broke out in the center of the Southern Front, where the troops of the left flank of the 51st and 37th armies were defending. Here the tank and mechanized units of the 4th and 1st tank armies of the enemy advanced.

The 51st Army under the command of General T.K. Kolomiets courageously met the enemy and successfully repulsed the attacks throughout the day.

A very difficult situation arose in the defense zone of the 37th Army, commanded by General P. M. Kozlov. When it retreated to the left bank of the Don, many units and subunits, as well as the civilian population, accumulated at the crossings. Due to the insufficient number of anti-aircraft artillery and aviation, the crossings were not reliably covered. Therefore, enemy aircraft acted with impunity. The fascist German troops managed to break through to the area of ​​the Lower and Upper Salt.

In the area of ​​​​the village of Aksayskaya, the enemy tried to force the Don and advance on Olginskaya. Here, against the small units of the 12th Army, commanded by General A. A. Grechko, there were two motorized, one tank division and two tank regiments. However, all attempts by the Nazis to force the Don were thwarted.

In the zone of the 18th Army of General F.V. Kamkov, the enemy managed to break through to Bataysk.

Despite the steadfastness and courage of the soldiers and officers, the troops of the Southern Front were unable to delay the further advance of the superior enemy forces. The 1st Panzer Army of General E. Kleist continued to develop the offensive in the direction of the village of Vesely, and the 17th Army of General R. Ruoff along the railway to Yegorlykskaya. In the defense zone of the 51st Army, separate enemy mobile groups broke through to the Sal River.

As a result, already on the first day of the fighting, the situation in the entire zone of operations of the Southern Front deteriorated sharply. There was a real threat of an enemy breakthrough into the Salsk area. With its successful development, the enemy got the opportunity to cut the Southern Front into two parts and open the way for his tank grouping to reach the rear of the main forces of the Soviet troops, who continued to hold positions south of Rostov.

The Nazi command took all measures to encircle the Soviet formations south of Rostov. On July 27, General A. Heusinger, Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, conveyed the following to the Chief of Staff of Army Group A, General G. Greiffenberg: than he will be surrounded by the advancing left flank of the army group.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Southern Front foresaw such actions of the enemy. Therefore, in order to improve the operational situation, it was decided to withdraw on the night of July 28 formations of the left wing of the front to the line passing along the southern bank of the Kagalnik River and the Manych Canal.

In the meantime, the enemy, under the cover of large air forces, transferred formations of seven corps to the left bank of the Don and created an overwhelming superiority there, especially in tanks and artillery. By the end of the day on July 28, large gaps had formed between the armies of the Southern Front. The front of defense was violated. The troops could no longer hold back the onslaught of the enemy and continued to retreat to the south. With the entry of enemy tank and motorized formations into the Zadonsk and Salsk steppes and into the expanses of the Krasnodar Territory, there was an immediate threat of his breakthrough into the depths of the Caucasus.

The situation called for urgent action. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to unite the efforts of all the troops stationed in the North Caucasus. According to the directive of July 28, the Southern and North Caucasian Fronts were merged into one North Caucasian Front. Marshal S. M. Budyonny was appointed commander of the front, and General A. I. Antonov was appointed chief of staff. The Military Council included: S. M. Budyonny, L. M. Kaganovich, L. R. Korniets, I. S. Isakov and P. I. Seleznev. The directive of the Stavka stated: “The Stavka sets the main task of the North Caucasian Front by a stubborn struggle not only to stop the further advance of the enemy to the south on the occupied lines, but by all means to take active actions to return Bataysk and restore the situation along the southern bank of the river. Don". At the same time, the Headquarters demanded that part of the front forces be allocated to occupy the line along the southern bank of the Kuban River, the Krasnodar bypass to Temizhbekskaya (30 km east of Kropotkin).

Fulfilling the instructions of the Headquarters, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, in order to improve command and control of troops, by his directive of July 28, divided the troops of the front into two operational groups - Don and Primorsky. The Don Operational Group under the command of General R. Ya. Malinovsky included the 51st, 37th and 12th armies. She covered the Stavropol direction. The aviation support of the group was assigned to the 4th Air Army. The Primorsky operational group under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko united the 18th, 56th and 47th armies, the 1st separate rifle and 17th cavalry corps. The group was supported by the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base of the Black Sea Fleet and the 5th Air Army. Its task was to defend the Krasnodar direction and the Taman Peninsula. The offices of the 9th and 24th armies were ordered to be deployed respectively in Nalchik and Grozny.

The soldiers of the North Caucasian Front continued to put up stubborn resistance to the enemy, and he failed to encircle the Soviet troops south of Rostov. But the situation in the North Caucasus remained tense.

On July 30, the troops of the front were read the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 227 dated July 28, 1942. “All the commanders participated in explaining the order of the People's Commissar,” wrote the former head of the political department of the 47th Army, General M. Kh. Kalashnik. They spoke at service meetings, party and Komsomol meetings, held conversations with the fighters, delivered heated, mobilizing speeches at rallies before the battles. The main burden of responsibility for bringing the requirements of the order to each defender of the Motherland lay on the party-political apparatus of the troops. To strengthen the party stratum in the units operating on the front line, and to clarify the requirements of the order, the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front sent 1,400 communists from the rear units and 200 political workers. From the party organizations of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, more than 6 thousand communists were sent to strengthen the political apparatus in the troops. Four special shock detachments of 500 communists and Komsomol members each were created to reinforce the most dangerous areas. The formation of detachments was entrusted to General V.F. Vorobyov, Brigadier Commissar L.I. Brezhnev, Colonels V.I. Rozhkov and S.I. Svintsov.

The measures taken by the Headquarters, the Military Council of the Front, and the regional party organizations to strengthen the morale of Soviet soldiers played an important role in the course of the defense of the Caucasus.

However, the turning point in the fight against the enemy was not achieved immediately. Possessing overwhelming superiority in tanks, aviation and artillery, the enemy continued to push the Soviet troops along the entire front. He stubbornly rushed to Salsk, where strong formations of the 48th Panzer Corps were sent. The defense of the troops of the Don group was poorly organized and almost completely unprepared in engineering terms. The rear units lost contact with the active troops. Therefore, during the tense period of fighting, the formations of the group had almost no ammunition. By the end of July, the situation on the front of the Don Group became especially complicated. The 51st Army was cut off from the main forces of the front, the connection between the army headquarters and the headquarters of the group and the front was broken. Therefore, on July 31, the Stavka transferred the 51st Army to the Stalingrad Front. As a result, a new dividing line was established between the Stalingrad and North Caucasian fronts, which passed through Nikolaevskaya, Remontnoye, Astrakhan.

The failure of the attempt to capture Stalingrad on the move forced the Nazi command on July 31 to turn the 4th Panzer Army (except for the 40th Panzer Corps, transferred to the 1st Panzer Army) from the Caucasian direction to Stalingrad and transfer it to Army Group B. This weakened the enemy troops operating in the North Caucasus. However, the enemy still had enough strength to continue the offensive. By wedging the 40th Panzer Corps into the gaps between the 51st and 37th Armies, and the 57th Panzer Corps between the 12th and 37th Armies, it created a threat to cover the right flank of the Primorskaya Group. To avoid encirclement, the troops of the Primorsky Group left their positions on the Kagalnik River and retreated to the line of the Eya and Kugoeya rivers.

On August 2, large forces of the Nazi troops, supported by almost 200 tanks, resumed their offensive against Salsk and by the end of the day captured the settlements of Krasnaya Polyana, Zhukovka, and Rassypnoye.

In connection with the situation that had arisen, on August 3 the Military Council of the Front decided to withdraw the Don Group across the Kuban River. Acting in tank attack groups, the enemy overcame the resistance of the rearguard units of the 37th Army and on August 5 captured Voroshilovsk. Then he slowed down the offensive in the southeast direction, hiding behind the 40th Panzer Corps from the east, in order to regroup the troops. The 37th Army managed to break away from the enemy and, by the end of August 5, retreated beyond the Kalaus and Yankul rivers. On the same day, the 12th Army was included in the Primorsky Group. This ended the defensive operation of the Don group in the Stavropol direction.

The situation was also difficult on the left wing of the North Caucasian Front, where the Primorsky Group of Forces was defending. On July 28, the 18th and 56th armies took over the main blow of the 17th army of the enemy. The enemy, having reached the Kagalnik River, was unable to break through the front of the defense of the Soviet troops on the left bank of this river and was forced to bring the 44th Army Corps into battle.

In order to finally stop the advance of the Nazi troops, the commander of the North Caucasian Front ordered the 18th Army on July 30 to launch a counterattack in the direction of Olginskaya (30 km east of Bataysk) and in cooperation with the 12th Army and the 17th Cavalry Corps, which was supposed to strike at Bataysk, restore the situation on the Don. The 56th Army was withdrawn to the line along the southern bank of the Kuban River and to the Krasnodar defensive bypass.

The measures taken by the Headquarters and the Military Council of the front significantly improved the position of the Primorsky Group. Nevertheless, the superiority in forces and means on its right wing remained on the side of the enemy: in personnel - 1.4 times, in tanks - absolute, in guns and mortars - 3 times. Enemy aircraft dominated the air. The front of defense of the Soviet troops was also violated. During the retreat, a gap formed between the Don and Primorsk groups, into which the enemy introduced the 13th Panzer Division and the Viking SS motorized division and struck in the direction of Armavir. There was a threat of envelopment of the troops of the right wing of the Primorsky group. Therefore, on August 3, the front commander ordered them to be taken to the left bank of the Kuban.

On August 5, the Headquarters ordered the front commander to firmly cover the Maikop area and the Maykop-Tuapse road in order to prevent the enemy from reaching the Black Sea coast and isolating the Primorsky Group of Forces.

On August 6, the 17th army of the enemy rushed to Krasnodar. For several days, the small formations of the 56th Army of General A.I. Ryzhov and the fighters of the Krasnodar detachment of the people's militia courageously repulsed the onslaught of the infantry and motorized divisions of the 5th Army Corps.

Especially fierce battles flared up in the area of ​​the Pashkovskaya crossing, where the 30th Irkutsk Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Colonel B. N. Arshintsev fought selflessly. Being in a semi-encirclement, experiencing an acute shortage of ammunition, the division repelled all enemy attacks. And only on August 12, by order of the command, she left Krasnodar, blowing up the Pashkovskaya ferry and retreating to the left bank of the Kuban.

Until August 10, the Azov coast was defended by the Azov military flotilla. Primorsko-Akhtarskaya, her main base, she held until the arrival of the forces defending Yeysk. On August 10, having blown up military installations, the flotilla was evacuated. Ships and vessels delivered to Temryuk over

4 thousand fighters, 30 coastal defense guns and other equipment, as well as 1670 tons of various cargoes.

The fascist German command decided to encircle the Soviet troops south of the Kuban. To this end, the 1st Panzer Army struck Maykop through Armavir in order to break through to Tuapse. On August 6, with powerful air support, the enemy captured Armavir in battle and continued the attack on Maykop. For four days there were fierce battles on the borders of the Kuban, Laba, Belaya rivers. By the end of August 9, the mobile units of the 1st Panzer Army broke into Maikop. The Nazis hoped to seize fuel and oil, but all stocks were removed in advance, the boreholes were clogged, and the equipment was partially evacuated, partially buried in the ground.

Having captured Maykop, the enemy launched violent attacks in the Tuapse direction, trying to reach the Black Sea coast. On August 10, the Headquarters indicated to the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front: “In connection with the situation that has developed, the most important and dangerous for the North Caucasian Front and the Black Sea coast at the moment is the direction from Maykop to Tuapse. With the enemy's entry into the Tuapse region, the 47th Army and all front troops located in the Krasnodar region will be cut off and captured.

The commander of the troops of the North Caucasian Front decided: the 17th Cavalry Corps to concentrate southeast of Krasnodar, the 12th Army to gain a foothold on the left bank of the Laba River, the 32nd Guards Rifle Division to cross on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet to the area north of Tuapse and, together with 236 th Rifle Division to take up defense in several lines in depth to cover the road from Maykop to Tuapse.

On August 12, the enemy managed to capture Belorechenskaya, and on August 13, Tverskaya. His further advance was halted.

For three weeks of fighting (from July 25 to August 17), the enemy forced the troops of the North Caucasian Front to withdraw from the Don to the foothills of the northwestern part of the Main Caucasian Range. This phase of the fighting was extremely difficult. Soviet troops failed to fulfill the directive of the Stavka to restore the situation on the Don.

The commander of the North Caucasian Front did not have sufficient reserves with which to reinforce the first echelon of troops in the most dangerous sectors. There were no large mobile formations, while the Nazis had more than 40 percent tank and motorized divisions. Often this allowed them to get ahead of the Soviet troops when occupying defense lines. The small number of its aviation had a negative effect on the actions of the North Caucasian Front. By maintaining air supremacy, the enemy had a fairly effective impact on the defending armies, especially in open areas. The command and staffs of the front and armies often lost control of the troops. The formations and units were in dire need of ammunition, fuel, and food.

And yet, despite this, the Nazis were unable to encircle the Soviet grouping between the Don and Kuban. The heroic defenders of the Caucasus defended Tuapse and blocked the enemy's path to the Black Sea. Retreating, the troops of the North Caucasian Front in fierce battles exhausted the enemy, destroyed his manpower and equipment. According to the headquarters of Army Group A, the losses of the Nazis during this period amounted to about 54 thousand soldiers and officers.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command timely revealed the plans of the enemy, accurately determined the directions of his possible strikes and provided assistance to the troops. She took urgent measures to strengthen the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts at the expense of her reserves with weapons, tanks and anti-aircraft guns, communications, fighter and bomber aircraft.

The commanders of the fronts, armies and their staffs began to carry out the instructions of the Headquarters more quickly, to take energetic measures in order to delay the advance of the Nazi troops.

During this most crucial period of the battle for the Caucasus, the party organizations of the autonomous and union republics, under the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, did a great deal of work to mobilize internal resources for the needs of the front. At many enterprises, the production of ammunition, weapons and equipment began (mainly for the troops of the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts).

The military councils of the fronts and armies, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of units and formations carried out a lot of educational work in the troops, aimed at maintaining a high political and moral state of the personnel, at raising the morale of the troops and ensuring reliable protection of the defensive lines that covered the Caucasus. A huge army of propagandists and agitators daily explained to the soldiers the domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the just nature of the Great Patriotic War, the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist one, the requirements of the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. home front and feats of arms on the fronts, brought up the personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship of the peoples of the USSR and proletarian internationalism.

The main motto of all party-political work in the troops was the call of the party: "Stand to the death, not a step back without the order of the commander!" As a result, it was possible to strengthen the political and moral state of the troops, discipline in units, and increase the stability of the defense. Operating in difficult conditions, experiencing interruptions in the supply of ammunition and food, without sleep and rest, the heroic defenders of the Caucasus, in the forefront of which were communists and Komsomol members, showed stamina, courage and courage in the fight against the enemy, striving at all costs not to to allow the advance of the enemy into the depths of the Caucasus. The troops of the North Caucasian Front, having detained the enemy, made it possible for the Transcaucasian Front to timely take up defense along the Terek and Baksan rivers in the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range and cover Transcaucasia from the north.

Regrouping forces, the enemy tried to achieve success in the areas of Novorossiysk, Malgobek and on the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. The tense defensive battles of the Soviet troops that unfolded here continued until September 28.

In connection with the aggravation of the situation in the Caucasus, the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters took urgent measures to strengthen its defense. The directive of the Stavka to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front of August 20 indicated that the enemy, seeking to invade the borders of Transcaucasia, would not confine himself to the actions of large forces in the main directions. “The enemy, having specially trained mountain units, will use every road and path through the Caucasus Range to penetrate into Transcaucasia, acting both in large forces and in separate groups of thugs-saboteurs. Those commanders are profoundly mistaken, - the directive stressed, - who think that the Caucasus Range in itself is an impenetrable barrier for the enemy. Everyone must firmly remember that only that line is impassable, which is skillfully prepared for defense and stubbornly defended ... "

Along with the creation of a solid defense in the main operational directions, the headquarters demanded to strengthen the defense of the Main Caucasian Range, and especially the Georgian Military, Military Ossetian and Military Sukhumi roads, in order to exclude any possibility of enemy penetration in these directions. The directive also indicated specific urgent measures to strengthen the defense of the Caucasus.

The number of engineer troops in the Transcaucasian Front increased. By the beginning of September, he already had 146 engineer and engineer battalions, that is, six times more than by August 1, 1942. There were 63,686 people in these units - seven times more than on August 1. The number of engineering units increased due to the staffing of the retreating engineering troops of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts.

In addition to the troops, local residents were also involved in the construction of defensive lines. On September 16, the State Defense Committee adopted a special decision to mobilize 90 thousand people of the local population for the construction of the Makhachkala, Derbent and Baku defensive lines. Hard work began to boil on the thousand-kilometer front. Under heavy bombing, fortifications were erected, stone barriers were built on the roads and paths of high mountain passes, sappers prepared blockages in the wooded foothills, dug trenches on the banks of the Urukh and Terek.

The commander of the Transcaucasian Front, in a directive dated August 3, set the following tasks for the troops. The 44th Army under the command of General I.E. Petrov was ordered to create a defense in depth on the approaches to Grozny and Baku from the north and northwest and, in cooperation with the Caspian military flotilla, to prevent the enemy from forcing the Terek in the area from the mouth to Chervlennaya. The army group of General V.N. Kurdyumov, consisting of four rifle divisions and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, take up defense along the Terek and Urukh rivers. Particular attention was paid to covering the approaches to Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, the Georgian Military and Ossetian Military Highways. The 46th Army was entrusted with the defense of the passes through the western part of the Main Caucasian Range and the Black Sea coast from Lazarevsky to the mouth of the Sarp River, as well as covering the border with Turkey up to Mount Uch-Tepelyar. The 45th Army and the 15th Cavalry Corps were to stop any attempt to violate the state border with Turkey and Iran.

Five reserve rifle brigades, military schools and several artillery and mortar units were allocated to the front reserve. Their task was to eliminate possible enemy airborne assaults in the rear of the Transcaucasian Front.

The aviation of the front received the task of covering the troops and forbidding the landing of sea and air assault forces.

To reinforce the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, significant forces were allocated from the Stavka reserve. From August 6 to September, the Transcaucasian Front received 2 guards rifle corps and 11 separate rifle brigades. Transportation of connections was carried out from Astrakhan and Krasnovodsk across the Caspian Sea to Makhachkala. The Stavka placed at the disposal of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front 840 vehicles, which to some extent facilitated the transfer of reserves.

The concentration of large forces for defense along the Terek and Urukh rivers and the large distance of the front headquarters from this line required the creation of a separate command and control body. On August 8, on the orders of the Headquarters, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front was created in the 44th and 9th armies, the 11th Guards Rifle Corps. General I. I. Maslennikov was appointed commander of the Northern Group of Forces. On August 11, the 37th Army of the North Caucasian Front was included in it, and the Don Group of Forces was disbanded.

Thus, by mid-August 1942, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front regrouped their forces and organized the defense of the Caucasus from the north. A second line of defense was created along the Terek and Urukh rivers, on the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. Particular attention was paid to covering the Baku direction and the approaches to Grozny.

With the exit of the Nazi troops to the foothills of the western part of the Main Caucasian Range, the command of Army Group "A" reported to Hitler's headquarters that the Soviet troops were no longer capable of putting up stubborn resistance. “The command of the army group is of the opinion that this resistance [in the Novorossiysk region] can be broken with a strong onslaught. Also, strong enemy units in the Terek bend can only offer temporary resistance to the massive offensive of German formations. And further: “It seems that the enemy along the entire front has put all the forces at his disposal on the front line and that after breaking through this line, the enemy’s resistance will be broken.”

In the current situation, the main command of the ground forces decided to regroup the forces of Army Group A, and then continue the attack on the Caucasus simultaneously in three directions: the 17th Army - along the Black Sea coast from Anapa to Poti and then to Batumi; 49th mountain rifle corps - through the Main Caucasian Range to Sukhumi and Kutaisi; 1st Panzer Army - from the areas of Pyatigorsk and Prokhladny to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny, Makhachkala, Baku.

On August 23, the enemy began to implement a plan to complete the capture of the Caucasus. On this day, two tank and infantry divisions of Army Group A went on the offensive directly to Mozdok. For three days, the combined detachment of Major Korneev and the cadets of the Rostov Artillery School, together with units of the 26th Reserve Rifle Brigade, fought fierce battles, but under pressure from superior enemy forces, they were forced to leave Mozdok and retreat to the right bank of the Terek. In the future, the enemy intended to seize the crossings over the Terek with strong detachments and secure an initial bridgehead for an attack on Ordzhonikidze.

Simultaneously with the attack on Mozdok, the German 23rd Panzer Division attacked Prokhladny from the north and east. Having captured it, on August 25, the enemy launched an offensive to the south along the Prokhladny - Ordzhonikidze railway. However, all his attempts to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops were unsuccessful. The Nazis were forced to stop the offensive in the Prokhladny area and begin preparing an attack on Malgobek. There was a serious threat of a breakthrough of the enemy's tank and mechanized forces to the Grozny and Baku oil regions.

To prevent this threat, a new 58th army was formed in the Makhachkala region, consisting of four rifle divisions, a rifle brigade and two artillery regiments under the command of General V. A. Khomenko. This made it possible to significantly strengthen the position of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front. By the end of August, it included the 9th, 37th, 44th and 58th Army, which was in the second echelon. As a result, the Soviet command managed to create a general superiority in forces and means, except for tanks and aircraft, on the entire front of the Northern Group of Forces. But these forces and means were distributed evenly along the entire front. Of the 2356 guns and mortars available in the direction of the enemy's main attack, in the Malgobek area, at the beginning of the fighting there were only 237 guns and mortars. The Nazis outnumbered the Soviet troops here in tanks by 4.2 times, in artillery - by 6.5 times.

On the morning of September 2, the enemy began to cross the Terek near Mozdok. Having captured a small foothold on the southern bank of the river, the Nazi troops dealt a strong blow on the night of September 4 and advanced 10 km south of Mozdok. Soviet soldiers put up stubborn resistance, repeatedly turning to counterattacks in order to restore their positions.

Warriors of the 4th Air Army under the command of General K. A. Vershinin fought in close cooperation with the ground forces. Only on September 6, in the areas of Predmostny and Kizlyar, where the enemy captured a small foothold, they made 460 sorties. Thanks to the good interaction between aviation and ground forces, the enemy tank attack was repelled. At the foot of the ridge, up to 30 wrecked and burned tanks remained, half of which were destroyed by aircraft.

The Mozdok area became a "valley of death" for the Nazis. Until the end of September, the enemy lost more than 6 thousand soldiers and officers and a large amount of equipment. The stubborn resistance and counterattacks of the Soviet troops sharply weakened the advancing enemy units.

Hitler's headquarters expressed dissatisfaction with the actions of Army Group A. Field Marshal V. List was removed from the post of group commander. Some commanders of tank divisions were also removed, who failed to encircle the Soviet troops between the Don and Kuban. All this testified to the impending crisis of Hitler's strategy for mastering the Caucasus. However, the fascist leadership did not lose hope for success. It still counted on the capture of the Grozny oil region. Hitler demanded that the 1st Panzer Army take Grozny as soon as possible. After all, on September 1, the command of this army, setting out the plan of attack on Baku, informed the commander of Army Group A that "advance from Grozny is possible from September 6, and from Makhachkala - September 16." September was drawing to a close, and the 1st Panzer Army had advanced only slightly south of Mozdok.

The Nazi command began to look for new ways and means to capture Grozny. The motorized division of the SS "Viking" was transferred from the Tuapse direction to reinforce the Mozdok grouping. The enemy now decided to advance through the Elkhotovsky Gates (along the valley along the Terek) in the direction of Ordzhonikidze and along the Prokhladny-Grozny railway along the valley of the Sunzha River to Grozny. On September 24, his tank and motorized formations resumed their attacks. After four days of stubborn fighting, they managed to capture Elkhotovo, but they could not break through to Grozny and were forced to abandon further attacks.

During the period of fierce fighting from 1 to 28 September, the enemy suffered heavy losses. Throwing large infantry forces and up to 300 tanks into the offensive, General Kleist, an ardent supporter of tank ramming, was confident that the divisions of his 1st Panzer Army would break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and easily break through to Grozny. However, the 1st Panzer Army was defeated in the Mozdok direction. The plan of the Nazi command to seize the Grozny and Baku oil regions was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the defenders of the Caucasus.

Simultaneously with the fierce battles of the Northern Group of Forces in the Mozdok direction, Soviet troops fought defensive battles in the Novorossiysk region. Here the enemy decided to take revenge for the failure of his first attempt to break through the defenses in the Tuapse direction. At first, he intended to capture Novorossiysk, then develop an offensive on Tuapse and Sukhumi along the Black Sea coast. Having carried out a regrouping of troops, the fascist German command concentrated two infantry and three cavalry divisions for the offensive on Novorossiysk, and five infantry and two motorized divisions in the Tuapse direction.

The approaches to Novorossiysk from the north and northeast were defended by the 47th Army of General G.P. Kotov. She was also supposed to defend the Taman Peninsula. Between the 47th Army and the troops of the 56th Army, which retreated to the south, a gap of about 40 km formed. Fearing for this direction, on August 10, the Headquarters ordered the command of the North Caucasian Front to organize a strong defense of Novorossiysk, removing the 77th rifle division from the Taman Peninsula.

In order to combine the efforts of the troops and the fleet defending Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula, the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front on August 17 decided to create the Novorossiysk defensive region, which included the troops of the 47th Army, the 216th Infantry Division of the 56th Army, Azov military flotilla, Temryuk, Kerch, Novorossiysk naval bases and a combined aviation group (237th air division and parts of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force). The command of the Novorossiysk defensive region (NOR) was assigned to the commander of the 47th Army, General G.P. Kotov. Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, commander of the Azov military flotilla, was appointed his deputy for the marine unit. On the evening of August 18, this decision was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region were faced with the task of preventing the Nazis from breaking through to Novorossiysk both from land and from the sea. The defense of Novorossiysk from the sea was assigned to coastal artillery, ships of the naval base and fleet aviation. To solve this problem, 87 guns, 2 gunboats, 26 ships of the protection of the water area, 17 torpedo boats and other watercraft, 112 aircraft of the naval air group were involved. The air defense of Novorossiysk was carried out by a fighter aviation regiment, 84 anti-aircraft guns and about 50 anti-aircraft machine guns.

In total, by August 18, the Novorossiysk defensive region consisted of about 15 thousand fighters. In the direction of the main attack of the enemy there were 2200 people, 36 guns, 30 mortars and 36 tanks. The enemy forces numbered 27 thousand people, 260 guns, 172 mortars, 64 tanks and assault guns. In the ports of Kerch and Feodosia, the enemy had 15 torpedo boats, 30 self-propelled barges and other vessels. 150 aircraft (60 fighters and 90 bombers) were based at the airfields of Kerch and Marfovka; there were 12 seaplanes in the Feodosiya Gulf.

On August 19, the Nazi troops went over to the offensive. Despite the huge numerical superiority, only by the end of August 24 they were able to capture the city of Temryuk, and on August 31 - Anapa. Parts of the marines defending the Taman Peninsula were cut off from the main forces of the 47th Army, and the ships of the Azov military flotilla were forced to break into the Black Sea.

For the convenience of managing the troops operating in the Caucasus and improving their supply, the Headquarters, by a directive of September 1, transformed the North Caucasian Front into the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front under the command of General Ya. T. Cherevichenko. The group included troops of the 12th, 18th, 47th, 56th armies and the 4th guards cavalry corps, which continued to carry out their previous combat missions. From the air, the Black Sea Group was supported by the 5th Air Army and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet became operationally subordinate to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front.

On September 3, enemy troops began crossing from the Crimea to the Taman Peninsula. The position of the defending units of the Marine Corps became even more complicated, and two days later they were evacuated to Gelendzhik.

The evacuation of Soviet troops from the Taman Peninsula and the concentration of enemy forces on it created a real threat of the capture of Novorossiysk from the west. The directive of the Transcaucasian Front of September 6 stated: “The fighting that has unfolded in the Novorossiysk direction is becoming more intense every hour. Everything shows that the enemy is suffering heavy losses, but is throwing fresh forces into this sector of the front, with the aim of capturing this large and convenient seaport, advantageous for further actions along the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea.

Parts of the NOR, protecting the approaches to Novorossiysk, must, sparing no effort and life, defend their positions, destroying the enemy by all means and means.

Novorossiysk and its region cannot be abandoned by us, and the enemy must not appear on the shores of the Tsemess Gulf.

This is the order of the Supreme Commander comrade. Stalin.

In this task, the 47th Army and all the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region should be assisted in every possible way by the command of the Black Sea Group. All for the defense of Novorossiysk…”

In order to stop the advance of the enemy towards Novorossiysk, the Military Council of the front ordered to urgently transfer to the city to reinforce the 47th Army the 16th Separate Rifle Brigade and two battalions of the 81st Separate Marine Rifle Brigade from the 12th Army, the Rifle Regiment of the 318th Rifle divisions from Gelendzhik and a regiment of marines from Poti, as well as to provide the troops of the army with ammunition. On September 8, General A. A. Grechko was appointed commander of the 47th Army and the troops of the Novorossiysk defensive region instead of General G.P. Kotov.

On the evening of September 7, the Headquarters approved the front's measures to strengthen the defense of Novorossiysk. However, in the morning of the same day, the Nazis broke through to the northern outskirts of the city. For three days there were fierce battles. But the forces were unequal, and on September 9, the 47th Army was forced to leave most of Novorossiysk.

Nevertheless, the measures taken by the Front's Military Council yielded positive results. The new army commander, General A. A. Grechko, as well as the newly appointed member of the Military Council, regimental commissar E. E. Maltsev and the chief of staff, General A. G. Ermolaev, made a lot of efforts during these tense days to stop the enemy in the area of ​​​​the cement plant " October" on the southeastern outskirts of the city. The 305th and 14th Marine Battalions and units of the 83rd Separate Marine Rifle Brigade stubbornly defended themselves here and stopped the enemy. The enemy's attempt to develop an offensive on Tuapse along the coast was not successful.

However, the fascist German command did not give up its intention to break through along the Black Sea coast to Tuapse in order to link up with the 57th Tank and 44th Army Corps, which were advancing on Tuapse from the north. In the Abinskaya area, the enemy concentrated the 3rd Romanian mountain rifle division. On September 19, after strong aviation preparation, she went on the offensive and, in three days of bloody battles, at the cost of heavy losses, captured several heights and wedged into the defenses of the Soviet troops to a depth of 6 km.

The NOR command decided to inflict two converging blows on the flanks of the enemy grouping that had penetrated, surround it and destroy it. For this purpose, an infantry division and two combined marine brigades were involved. In the fierce battles that flared up from September 22 to 26, the 3rd Romanian Mountain Rifle Division was almost completely destroyed. She lost up to 8 thousand soldiers and officers killed, wounded and captured.

In the Novorossiysk direction, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive and no longer made attempts to attack here with large forces. He failed to use the Novorossiysk port as his naval base, since the eastern shore of the Tsemess Bay was occupied by Soviet troops, who constantly bombarded the bay with machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire.

The heroic defenders of Novorossiysk stopped the advance of the enemy along the Black Sea coast in Transcaucasia. Their feat is immortalized in the memory of the people. Near the highway on the southeastern outskirts of Novorossiysk, a railroad car, a relic of the Great Patriotic War, is riddled with bullets and shell fragments on a pedestal. It says: “Here, on September 11, 1942, the valiant soldiers of the units of the Soviet Army and the Black Sea Fleet blocked the enemy’s path to the Caucasus, and after 360 days, in cooperation with the amphibious assault and units from Malaya Zemlya, began the assault on Novorossiysk and on September 16, 1943, defeating the Nazi troops liberated the city.

In recognition of the merits of the defenders of the Caucasus, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 15, 1973, Novorossiysk was awarded the honorary title "Hero City" with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. On the same day, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev, in an address to the workers of Novorossiysk, wrote: “This truly historic act expresses gratitude and gratitude to the Soviet people, party and government, gives a high assessment of the feats of arms of all those who, not sparing life , showed unparalleled courage, steadfastness and heroism at the walls of the city, blocking the enemy's path to the pearl of the Soviet south - the North Caucasus.

Back in late August, the command of Army Group A believed that after breaking through the defenses of the Soviet Army troops near Novorossiysk, their resistance would be broken. However, his hopes were not justified, and after the capture of most of Novorossiysk, it received a "fundamental order from the Fuhrer for a defensive battle."

Simultaneously with the fighting in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, fierce battles began in mid-August with units of the 46th Army of the Transcaucasian Front in the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. The German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps operated here, consisting of two mountain rifle and two light infantry divisions. In addition, for operations in the mountain passes, the command of Army Group "A" aimed two Romanian mountain rifle divisions. By the time the Nazis reached the Main Caucasian Range, not only the northern slopes, but also many passes were not occupied by Soviet units, and there were almost no defensive structures on the occupied ones. This was explained by the fact that the troops of the army were scattered on a large front and some commanders did not attach due importance to the preparation of the passes for defense, considering the Main Caucasian Range an insurmountable obstacle for the enemy.

In connection with the imminent threat of a breakthrough by the Nazis through the Main Caucasian Range to the Black Sea coast, the command of the Transcaucasian Front, in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of August 20, hastily began to push troops to the passes and organize their defense. The belated advance, poor logistics, unsatisfactory organization of reconnaissance and communications extremely complicated the situation on the mountain passes. The population, party and Soviet bodies came to the aid of the soldiers. The help and experience of local residents were widely used to transport food and ammunition to the passes. They delivered to the passes more than 60,000 different things from military depots, about a million rifle cartridges, 4,000 hand grenades, 2,000 cartridges for anti-tank rifles and a large number of mines and shells. Mountain infantry detachments under the guidance of climbing instructors were sent to the most inaccessible areas. For each direction, in order to strengthen the defense of the passes, senior officials of the Council of People's Commissars, regional committees and the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia were allocated. All these measures significantly improved the provision of troops at the passes and their defense.

By mid-August, units of the 1st German mountain division "Edelweiss" approached the Klukhor pass. The fighting continued here until the onset of winter, and only in January 1943 was the enemy driven back.

On August 18, the Nazis reached the southern slopes of Elbrus, captured the Hotyu-tau, Chiper-azau passes and the Krugozor and Shelter of Eleven tourist bases. The Nazi mountain shooters decided to set up two flags on the top of Elbrus. They have been preparing for this operation for a long time and carefully. The ascent was carried out by several Alpine companies. In the second half of August, they managed to reach the goal, "but this significant achievement of mountaineering," according to the former Hitlerite general Tippelskirch, "had neither tactical, nor even more strategic significance." Fascist flags did not have long to fly on the highest mountain of the Caucasus. In mid-February 1943, Soviet soldiers under the leadership of lieutenants N. A. Gusak, N. P. Morenz, military engineer 3rd rank A. M. Gusev and senior political officer A. A. Tettov hoisted the Soviet Red Flag over Elbrus.

Taking advantage of a significant superiority in firepower, on September 7 the enemy captured the Marukh pass. Parts of the 46th army of General K. N. Leselidze repeatedly made attempts to return the pass, but to no avail. The Nazis continued to hold him until the transition of the Soviet troops to the offensive in January 1943.

In the Sanchar direction, the enemy, having concentrated more than a regiment of the 4th Mountain Rifle Division in the valley of the Laba River, went on the offensive on August 24 and, having captured the Sancharo Pass, began to move south. To restore the situation, the Military Council of the 46th Army created the Sancharskaya group of troops as part of the 307th regiment of the 61st rifle division, two battalions of the 155th and 51st rifle brigades, the 25th border regiment of the NKVD, the combined regiment of the NKVD and detachment 1 th Tbilisi Infantry School. She stopped the Nazis, and then threw them back to the northern bank of the Bzyb River. On October 16, units of the Sanchar group went on the offensive and by October 20 captured the group of Sanchar passes. The remnants of the Nazi troops retreated to the northern slopes of the Main Caucasian Range. Enemy attempts to overcome the Main Caucasian Range through the Umpyrsky and Belorechensky passes were repulsed.

The fascist invaders, planning to penetrate into the Transcaucasus through the Main Caucasian Range, had high hopes that they would be able to deceive, bribe the local residents and win them over to their side. But the peoples of the Caucasus, like all Soviet people, sparing no effort and life itself, fought in the name of victory over the enemy. The highlanders, especially the Svans, excellent climbers, led the Soviet soldiers along unknown paths, showed them ways to bypass the enemy's flanks to strike from the rear.

In the deep autumn of 1942, thanks to the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops and the holding of important events by the military councils of the front and the 46th Army, as well as local party and Soviet bodies to strengthen the defense of the passes, the Nazi offensive was stopped. The threat of the enemy entering the Transcaucasus in this direction was eliminated.

Tuapse and Nalchik defensive operations

By the end of September 1942, the situation in the North Caucasus had somewhat stabilized. Soviet troops inflicted great damage on the enemy, stopped his advance in the Caucasian direction. Hitler's plan for a breakthrough in Transcaucasia was thwarted. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command bought time to accumulate reserves and strengthen the Transcaucasian Front with them.

The exhausted enemy troops were no longer able to advance on a wide front. The Nazi command could not transfer reserves to the Caucasus from near Stalingrad. Drawn into heavy fighting on the banks of the Volga, the 6th and 4th tank armies of the Wehrmacht, the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies themselves needed reinforcements. “From mid-August, it became clear,” writes the former Hitlerite General G. Dörr in his book “The March on Stalingrad,” that operations in southern Russia did not go according to plan; the army, instead of a "victorious march", was moving forward with difficulty. In this situation, it is customary to throw reserves into battle or change the plan of operation. But the Nazi command had no reserves.

Nevertheless, the command of the Wehrmacht did not intend to abandon plans to capture the Caucasus. By the end of September, Army Group A had 29 divisions. It was decided to deliver successive strikes by the forces of the 17th Army on Tuapse, and then the 1st Tank Army - on Ordzhonikidze. In the Tuapse direction, the enemy hoped to reach the Black Sea coast in the Tuapse region, cut off the Black Sea Group of Forces from the main forces of the Transcaucasian Front, deprive the Black Sea Fleet of bases and ports, and free up part of its forces for transfer to other sectors of the front. The 1st Panzer Army was to break through to the Grozny oil region. The fascist German command attached great importance to the implementation of such a plan. In a conversation with Keitel on September 18, 1942, Hitler, analyzing the situation in the Caucasus, emphasized: "The decisive thing is a breakthrough in Tuapse, and then blocking the Georgian Military Highway and a breakthrough to the Caspian Sea."

Thus, the Soviet troops had to carry out two defensive operations in these areas: Tuapse and Nalchik. They were carried out in close operational communication, in difficult conditions of mountainous and wooded terrain, and ended in the defeat of the shock groups of the 17th and 1st German tank armies.

The Tuapse defensive operation began on September 25 and continued until December 20. Even during the fighting in the Novorossiysk region, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command demanded that the front command not weaken the defense in the Tuapse direction. On her instructions, the defense of the Black Sea Group of Forces was strengthened from the north and along the Black Sea coast from Novorossiysk to Sochi. The Tuapse defensive region was created, and two rifle divisions and two rifle brigades were transferred from the reserve of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front to reinforce the Black Sea Group. The defense of the eastern shore of the Tsemess Bay, passes and mountain passes through the Main Caucasian Range was strengthened.

The Black Sea Group of Forces, whose defense front was about 250 km, included the 18th, 56th, and 47th armies (the 12th army was disbanded, and its personnel were transferred to replenish the first three armies). In total, these armies had 109,134 men, 515 guns and 637 mortars. The troops of the Black Sea Group were supported by the aviation of the 5th Air Army (71 aircraft) and partially by the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet.

The command of the German 17th Army planned an offensive through the Main Caucasian Range from the Khadyzhenskaya region in the direction of Tuapse. The essence of the plan consisted in delivering two blows in converging directions with the aim of encircling the main forces of the 18th Army northeast of Shaumyan. The main blow was planned from the Neftegorsk region to Shaumyan and the auxiliary one - from the Goryachiy Klyuch region to Shaumyan. To deliver the main blow, the Tuapse group was created, mainly from mountain rifle and light infantry divisions, specially equipped and trained for long-term combat operations in the mountains. In total, the 17th Army had 162,396 men, 147 tanks and assault guns, 1,316 guns, and 950 mortars. Its troops were supported by the 4th Aviation Corps of the 4th Air Fleet, which had 350 aircraft. The balance of forces, therefore, was in favor of the enemy, who outnumbered the troops of the Black Sea Group: in personnel - 1.5 times, in guns - 2.6 times, in mortars - 1.5 times, in tanks - absolutely, in aircraft - 5 times.

On September 25, after two days of air strikes on communications and combat formations of the 18th Army, the enemy went on the offensive.

Having not achieved success during the first two days, the fascist German command threw the divisional group of General X. Lanz into battle against the formations of the center of the 18th Army. By the end of September 30, its units managed to penetrate the defenses of the 18th Army to a depth of 5-10 km.

The fighting was carried out simultaneously in several directions. Particularly fierce battles were fought for communications, which were extremely important for operations in mountainous conditions. On the right flank of the 56th Army of the Transcaucasian Front, the enemy advanced to a depth of 8 km. His further offensive was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops.

In order to eliminate the threat looming over Tuapse, on October 4, the Headquarters assigned the commander of the Transcaucasian Front the specific task of restoring the situation in the breakthrough sectors. She demanded to immediately destroy the enemy in the Sosnovka area, firmly cover the Perevalny, Shaumyan direction and restore the situation in the Kotlovina area. In the future, the Black Sea group was supposed to strike from the Rozhet, Maratuki area in the direction of the Red Cemetery and from the White Clay area to Pervomaisky, Khadyzhenskaya. At the same time, the headquarters indicated what additional forces needed to be attracted to solve the task.

Fulfilling the requirements of the Stavka, the front command regrouped troops, reinforcing them in the enemy's offensive directions and creating appropriate groupings for delivering counterattacks.

By the end of October 9, the 18th Army stopped the advance of the Nazis in all directions with counterattacks. Their attempt to break through to Tuapse failed. The enemy lost more than 10 thousand soldiers and officers.

On October 14, the enemy resumed the offensive simultaneously from the east to Shaumyan, Sadovoye and from the area east of Fanagoriysky to Sadovoye in order to encircle the main grouping of troops of the 18th Army and break through to Tuapse. By the end of October 15, its units were forced to withdraw to the southern outskirts of Shaumyan and the railway bridge near Ostrovskaya Shchel. The troops of the right flank of the 56th Army were also somewhat pushed back - here the Nazis tried to reach the Sadovoye area. Attempts by the Nazis to go on the offensive in other sectors of the front were not successful.

In connection with the intensification of enemy operations in the Tuapse direction, the Headquarters, in a directive dated October 15, ordered the commander of the Transcaucasian Front to focus on the Black Sea group. She demanded to reinforce the 18th Army with three guards rifle brigades from the reserve of the Northern Group, and to create a reserve by transferring three rifle brigades from Baku. At the direction of the Headquarters, a cavalry division was transferred from the 46th Army to the Tuapse direction, and a mountain rifle division that arrived in the front was concentrated in the Tuapse area. Four anti-tank artillery regiments, two air defense regiments and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion of 85-mm guns were sent to the front. Six infantry divisions were understaffed. Three of them were ordered to be deployed on the Black Sea coast in the area of ​​Novomikhailovsky, Tuapse, Lazarevskoye. These events were timely. On October 16 and 17, the Nazis, continuing the offensive, captured the Shaumyan area and started fighting for the Elisavetpolsky pass. At the junction of the 56th and 18th armies, they advanced deep into the defenses of the Soviet troops and tried to capture Mount Kochkanova.

On October 17, the commander of the Black Sea Group, General I.E. Petrov, and the Chief of Staff of the Transcaucasian Front, General P.I. Bodin, went to the troops and on the spot resolved a number of issues on the organization of sustainable defense and control of the 18th and 56th armies. The measures taken contributed to the creation of conditions for inflicting powerful counterattacks on the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Shaumyan area.

The command and staffs of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Group of Forces strengthened the military order in formations and units and improved the management of combat operations. They paid special attention to the 18th Army, which was defending in the Tuapse direction, and General A. A. Grechko became its commander on October 19.

Much attention was paid to party political work, which was carried out under the leadership of the front commander, General I.V. Tyulenev, a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar P.I. Efimov, and the head of the political department, Regimental Commissar A.F. Khromov. The main efforts of the party organs were directed towards ensuring that the soldiers fulfill their combat missions. The mobilization of the communists and Komsomol members of Tuapse was carried out. Political workers were sent to the party organizations of the units to explain the need to detain the enemy at any cost and prevent him from reaching the city.

The measures taken made it possible to stop the enemy offensive by the end of October 23. He failed to capture Mount Oplepen and Maratuki.

He did not achieve success in the areas of Saray Gory and Mount Kochkanova. However, the advanced units of the Nazis were in the valley of the Tuapsinka River, from which a little more than 30 km remained to Tuapse.

Soviet troops were finishing preparations for delivering counterattacks on the flanks of the enemy grouping that had broken through. On October 24, the 383rd and 353rd rifle divisions struck and began to slowly advance in the northern and northeastern directions. On October 27, the troops of the right flank of the 56th Army launched a counterattack on the enemy. As a result of stubborn fighting in a mountainous wooded area, the Nazis were driven back across the Pshish River. By the end of October, with the arrival of new formations in the Black Sea Group, the balance of forces and means began to change in favor of the Soviet troops.

From October 31, the fascist German troops were forced to stop offensive operations and go on the defensive. The German 17th Army had used up all its reserves. The commander of army group "A" did not have reserves either. In addition, during this period, the 1st Panzer Army also suffered heavy losses in the Ordzhonikidze area.

And yet, in mid-November, the enemy made another, last, attempt to reach Tuapse through Georgievskoye. By November 23, he had penetrated the defenses in the center of the 18th Army to a depth of 8 km and along the front to 10 km. Its further advance in this direction was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops.

The commander of the Black Sea Group of Forces decided to intercept communications with a counterattack on the flanks of the enemy who had broken through and, having surrounded him, destroy him. In accordance with the decision, two strike groups were created. Each included a rifle division and a rifle brigade.

On November 26, the troops of both groups went on the offensive. They operated in difficult conditions of mountainous and wooded terrain. Due to heavy fog, visibility sometimes did not exceed twenty meters. But, despite all the difficulties, by December 17, the enemy grouping was liquidated, and its remnants were thrown back across the Pshish River. Thus, the last threat of a breakthrough of the Nazi troops to Tuapse was eliminated.

During the Tuapse defensive operation, intense battles were waged by the 5th Air Army. The enemy had a three- to five-fold numerical superiority in the air. And yet, in October - December, more than 11,300 sorties were made, 175 air battles were carried out, 99 fascist aircraft were shot down and 32 destroyed at airfields.

Marines, coastal artillery, aviation and ships of the Black Sea Fleet took an active part in the Tuapse defensive operation. Fulfilling the instructions of the Headquarters and the Military Council of the front, warships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet in September - November transferred three rifle brigades, a cavalry and mountain rifle division, artillery and other units to the Tuapse defensive area. In total, they delivered 52,844 people and 57,796 tons of cargo and evacuated more than 2,500 wounded to Poti.

The Tuapse defensive operation of the Black Sea group ended, preparations for the offensive began. The enemy, who tried three times to break through to Tuapse, suffered heavy losses and was forced to go over to the defensive on the entire front of the Black Sea Group.

A month after the start of the Tuapse defensive operation, on October 25, the Nazi troops launched a new offensive in the Nalchik direction. The Nalchik defensive operation began - the last defensive operation of the Transcaucasian Front, which lasted until November 12.

The northern group of troops of this front occupied the defense in a strip about 350 km wide, having in its composition the 9th, 37th, 44th and 58th armies, two separate rifle and cavalry corps, two cavalry divisions and the 4th air army.

The main grouping of Soviet troops was in the Grozny and Ordzhonikidze directions, while in the Nalchik direction the 37th Army, weakened by battles, was defending, against which the enemy planned to deliver the main blow. Here, on a six-kilometer breakthrough section, he created a threefold superiority in people, elevenfold in guns, tenfold in mortars, and absolute superiority in tanks.

The command of the Transcaucasian Front did not expect an offensive in the Nalchik direction. Therefore, there was a weak group of Soviet troops here. Larger forces were concentrated in the zone of the 9th Army of General K. A. Koroteev, where an offensive operation was being prepared. The military councils of the 37th Army and the Northern Group of Forces failed to unravel the enemy's plan, despite intelligence reports from the 9th and 37th armies about the regrouping they were carrying out. It was considered as an event to strengthen the defense.

The offensive of the troops of the Northern Group in the Malgobek-Mozdok direction was planned to begin on November 3. However, on October 25, early in the morning, about 70 enemy aircraft made a powerful raid on the troops and headquarters of the 37th Army, located in Dolinskoye. The communication of the Northern Group with the army headquarters was interrupted. At 10 o'clock the 2nd Romanian mountain rifle division, reinforced by German units, after a short but heavy fire raid, went on the offensive. During the day, the enemy managed to advance in some areas up to 8 km. On the morning of October 26, he resumed the offensive and in the afternoon approached Nalchik. The Nazis believed that the Soviet troops would no longer be able to stop them. On the same day, the headquarters of Army Group A reported to Hitler's headquarters: “In the area of ​​the 1st Panzer Army, the attack on Nalchik, apparently, took the enemy by surprise. Panzer divisions advanced as far as Psygansu already on the first day, some of their units turned north and created the prerequisites for the encirclement of approximately four enemy divisions. The destruction of this group should be completed in a few days. The enemy is pushed back into the mountains. It seems that the advance of tank forces in the south, and then eastward to Vladikavkaz [Ordzhonikidze] will open up broad prospects ... "

The enemy continued to push the 37th Army to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. A gap formed between its parts in the section from Urukh to Chikola. The road to Ordzhonikidze was opened to the Nazis. The command of the Northern Group, trying to stop their advance, put forward on the night of October 30 a tank brigade reinforced with anti-tank artillery to the Digora area, and a rifle division from the 58th Army to the area at the mouth of the Ardon River, Suadag. This made it possible to slow down the advance of the enemy. However, the situation remained tense.

Overcoming the resistance of the Soviet troops, on November 1, the Germans occupied Alagir and crossed the Ardon River. Their aircraft heavily bombarded Ordzhonikidze. Fierce battles broke out in the air, in which 18 enemy aircraft were shot down and 12 damaged.

Five regiments of anti-tank artillery and three regiments of rocket artillery were transferred to the Ordzhonikidze area from the 9th Army and the reserve of the commander of the Northern Group of Forces. Rifle formations were also strengthened.

On the morning of November 2, the enemy, with the support of almost 100 tanks, broke through the outer contour of the Ordzhonikidze defensive area in the Fiagdon sector (20 km west of Ordzhonikidze), Dzuarikau and reached the suburb of Ordzhonikidze. By the end of the day, he captured Gisel.

The Soviet troops could not hold back the onslaught of a strong tank group, and yet they did everything to stop the advance of the enemy. In the Fiagdon area, units of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps under the command of General I.P. Rosly, having knocked out 30 German tanks, did not move away from the walls of the city.

In these difficult autumn days, a heavy load fell on the pilots of the 4th Air Army. Despite the bad weather, they made about 2,200 sorties in the Nalchik direction and within 12 days conducted about 100 air battles, during which they shot down 60 enemy aircraft.

The Nazis continued to rush to Ordzhonikidze. Having captured Gisel and concentrated up to 150 tanks in this area, on November 3 and 4 they tried to expand the breakthrough, but were thrown back everywhere with heavy losses for them. On November 4, the headquarters of the 1st German Panzer Army informed the headquarters of Army Group A that “the attack on Vladikavkaz would have to be suspended until the area south of the Terek River was cleared of the enemy and this eliminated the danger of a blow to the flank and rear of tank divisions. However, it was not tactical considerations that caused the Nazis to halt their offensive against Ordzhonikidze. They were forced to this by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet soldiers and the people's militia, as well as heavy losses.

November 5, the enemy was stopped. Now the fascist German command was thinking not about the persecution of the Soviet troops, but about saving their own. On that day, the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Army received an order that said: “... on the entire Eastern Front on the Russian revolutionary holiday of November 7, major offensive operations should be expected; The Fuhrer expresses the hope that the troops will defend every inch of the earth to the last man.

The narrow bag in which the enemy troops found themselves near Ordzhonikidze was pulled tighter and tighter by units arriving from the reserve of the Northern Group of Forces. There was a real possibility of complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy in the Gizel area. The commander of the Northern Group of Forces decided to launch a counterattack with three rifle and four tank brigades. The main forces of the group received tasks of a defensive nature. This decision was influenced by the caution of the command and fears for the Grozny direction, the desire to cover it with defense in depth.

On the morning of November 6, the 11th Guards Rifle Corps attacked Dzuarikau along the eastern bank of the Fiagdon River with two rifle and two tank brigades. At noon, the 10th Guards Rifle Corps, with one rifle and two tank brigades, launched an attack on Gizel. Thanks to the successful advance of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, the main forces of the 23rd Panzer Division of the Nazis were almost completely surrounded. They had only a narrow corridor in the Mairamadag area, no more than 3 km wide. The enemy made desperate attempts to break out of the bag and save his group.

Fierce battles broke out in the Suar Gorge beyond Mayramadag (12 km west of Ordzhonikidze), where the 34th separate rifle brigade of Colonel A.V. Vorozhishchev, formed from cadets of naval schools, defended. For more than ten days, the sailors heroically defended the frontier. They did not allow the enemy to capture Mairamadag and penetrate into the Suar Gorge. He could not help his group, surrounded in Gizel.

On the morning of November 11, the troops of the left flank of the 9th Army broke the resistance of the Nazi rearguards, captured Gizel, and in the afternoon occupied Novaya Saniba. The next day, the 9th Army reached the line of the Mayramadag and Fiagdon rivers. Its further advance was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who organized defense along the western bank of the Fiagdon River.

The Nalchik defensive operation of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front ended with the defeat of the Gizel German fascist group. 140 tanks, 70 guns of various calibers and other trophies were captured. On the battlefield, the enemy left over 5 thousand soldiers and officers killed.

The underestimation of the forces and capabilities of the Transcaucasian Front and the resilience of the Soviet soldiers led to the failure of the plans of the command of the German 1st Panzer Army. Its formations were unable to overcome the defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth and develop tactical success into an operational one. With the defeat of the enemy on the outskirts of Ordzhonikidze, his last attempt to break through to the Grozny and Baku oil regions, as well as in Transcaucasia, failed.

The Nalchik defensive operation took place during the period of fierce fighting near Stalingrad. The unprecedented resilience of the Soviet soldiers did not allow the enemy to capture the city on the Volga. The fascist German command was looking for new reserves to strengthen their Stalingrad grouping. It intended to take these reserves from the Caucasian direction as well.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front to tie up the German 1st Panzer Army by active actions and prevent the Nazi command from transferring troops from Army Group A to Stalingrad.

Fulfilling the instructions of the Stavka, the Northern Group of Forces in the second half of November and in December 1942 launched several counterattacks in the Mozdok and Nalchik directions. However, due to a lack of forces and means, these counterattacks did not bring the expected success.

On December 11, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command indicated to the commander of the Northern Group of Forces: “The enemy has already transferred part of his forces from the area of ​​\u200b\u200byour troops to the north and thereby weakened himself. Judging by the course of the operation near Stalingrad, the enemy will continue to transfer part of his forces to the north. The unauthorized retreat of the enemy on the northern bank of the Terek cannot be considered an accident. Thus, a favorable situation was created for the offensive of all your troops. Your task is to seize the moment and act boldly.”

But the command of the Northern Group of Forces hesitated. The enemy managed to withdraw the tank and motorized divisions from the battle and throw them into the Kotelnikovsky area to help the encircled 6th Army. And yet, as a result of counterattacks, the Northern Group significantly improved its positions by the end of December and created the conditions for a strike on the flank and rear of the main forces of the 1st German Panzer Army.

The results of the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus

The defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus lasted five months. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to reach the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range and the Terek River. Yielding to the enemy in the number of aircraft, tanks and artillery, the Soviet troops withstood the enemy's blow and did not give him the opportunity to break through to Baku, the Transcaucasus and the Black Sea coast. The plans of the fascist German command, designed to seize the Grozny and Baku oil regions, to enslave the peoples of the Caucasus, were thwarted. The plans of the leadership of fascist Germany, by means of a breakthrough in the Transcaucasus, to draw Turkey into the war against the Soviet Union, unite with their troops operating in North Africa, and then continue aggression in order to enslave the countries of the Near and Middle East, failed. Thus, Hitler's Edelweiss plan failed.

The defense of the Caucasus was carried out in close connection with the actions of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, which had an exceptional influence on the course of the struggle in the Caucasus. In turn, the battles that took place here influenced the situation in the Battle of Stalingrad. The firm leadership of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the clear assignment of tasks to the troops operating in the Caucasus, the implementation of a number of important measures by the party and the Soviet government to strengthen the fronts and mobilize the local population were the most important factors that contributed to building up resistance to the enemy.

At the beginning of the battle for the Caucasus, the main burden of the fight against the enemy fell on the North Caucasian Front, which included formations and formations of the Southern Front weakened in battles. The command of the North Caucasian Front took the necessary measures and managed to strengthen discipline in the troops, increase their combat effectiveness and organize stubborn resistance to the Nazi invaders. Armored and motorized formations of the German Army Group "A" were forced to slow down the pace of the offensive already in mid-August. Thus, conditions were created for the preparation of defense in depth by the troops of the Transcaucasian Front.

In September, the onslaught of the enemy in the Caucasian direction began to weaken. He could no longer continue the offensive on the entire front, but was forced to try to break through the defenses of the defenders of the Caucasus in certain directions. But these attempts were also unsuccessful.

During the period of defensive battles in the Caucasus, Army Group A lost more than 100 thousand people. Everywhere her troops were eventually forced to go on the defensive. Stubborn defensive battles, and then the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, not only did not allow the German command to strengthen its Caucasian grouping, but also forced it to withdraw some formations from the Caucasian direction and transfer them to Stalingrad to the rescue of the encircled 6th and partially 4th tank armies .

During the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus, battles unfolded along the front from 320 to 1000 km and to a depth of 400 to 800 km. Significant forces and means of the parties were drawn into them.

In the course of the defense of the Caucasus, Soviet troops gained extensive experience in combat operations in mountainous and wooded areas.

The battles in the mountains were fought mainly for valleys, roads and mountain passes; large gaps often formed between the defending units and subunits. The defense zone of a rifle division reached 20-25 km, and in high mountainous areas - up to 90 km. Such wide bands forced the divisions to form battle formations in one echelon. The defense of the passes required the retention of not only the passes themselves, but also the roads approaching them, as well as the dominant heights, which helped prevent the enemy from penetrating into the rear of the defending units.

The forward detachments played a big role. With their active actions, they delayed the enemy and thereby created the conditions for the main forces to organize defense.

The Grozny, Makhachkala, Ordzhonikidzev, Sukhum and Tbilisi rifle divisions of the internal troops of the NKVD bravely fought on the main directions of the enemy's offensive in the Caucasus.

Parts of the border troops (23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 32nd and 95th border regiments) also made their feasible contribution to the defense of the Caucasus. Together with units of the internal troops of the NKVD and the troops of the Soviet army, they participated in the defense of the cities of Grozny, Ordzhonikidze, Novorossiysk and others, in the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range (Azishsky, Belorechensky, Klukhorsky and others). As on other fronts, they carried out combat service as part of the rear guard troops of the army in the field.

In the successful outcome of the defensive battles in the Caucasus for the Soviet troops, party-political work was of great importance. All the activities of the communists and Komsomol members at that time were aimed at increasing the combat capability of units and formations, at strengthening the moral and political state of the personnel, at instilling in them stamina, discipline and organization.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the central committees of the communist parties of the Union republics and local party bodies showed constant concern for strengthening the troops, supplying them with everything necessary, and actively influenced the activities of political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations.

The Soviet army preserved the Caucasus for the motherland with its large economic resources and important communications linking the USSR with the countries of the Middle East and through them with the allies.

The Nazis were not destined to achieve their economic goals either. They never managed to get oil from Maykop and Grozny.

The hopes of the fascists that the Caucasian peoples would be "disloyal" to the Soviet regime did not come true. Representatives of more than 60 nationalities of the Caucasus, finding themselves in the occupied territory, rose to fight the enemy. Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Ossetians, representatives of many other peoples of the USSR fought in partisan detachments, in underground organizations and groups.

The increased stubbornness of the Soviet troops on the defensive, the heroism of the Soviet people in the rear, and the expansion of the struggle in the occupied territory of the Caucasus were the main factors that contributed to the subsequent transition of the Soviet army to the offensive and, ultimately, the expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the North Caucasus.

Fights for oil and the mountains of Elbrus

military operation

Beginning of Operation Edelweiss

"The day will come, with a decisive blow
The people will go to battle for the last time.
And then we'll say that it's not for nothing
We fought to the death for the Caucasus"
Baksan song

The importance of the Caucasus for the Soviet Union can hardly be overestimated. Grozny, Maikop and Baku oil-bearing regions provided about 90% of oil production in the USSR. The region also had deposits of tungsten-molybdenum ores strategically important for the military industry, and with the loss of Ukrainian black soil, the importance of the Kuban and the Caucasus in providing the country with food, especially grain, increased. After the loss of Sevastopol, the ports of Poti, Sukhumi and Batumi became the main bases for the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov and Caspian flotillas. The importance of this region was also due to the fact that about half of the lend-lease supplies went through the Soviet-Iranian border. Thus, the loss of the Caucasus could fatally affect the outcome of not only the Great Patriotic War, but the entire Second World War.

By the end of the spring of 1942, the military-strategic position of our troops on the southern front of the Soviet-German front had deteriorated sharply. The initiative, captured after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, was lost with the failure of the Kharkov offensive operation. The armies of the Southern and Southwestern fronts were extremely weakened. The current situation allowed Hitler to return to plans to seize the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, which were not implemented in 1941. The new plan to capture the region was codenamed "Edelweiss".

The main tasks of this operation were reflected in Directive No. 45, signed by Hitler on July 23, 1942, namely: the capture of the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea and Black Sea ports, the liquidation of the Black Sea Fleet, the seizure of the Grozny and Maikop oil fields. Further, the operation involved the advance of troops in the Transcaucasus and the capture of the Baku oil fields. For these purposes, Army Group "South" was divided into groups "A" and "B". Army Group A was supposed to carry out Operation Edelweiss, Army Group B was tasked with striking in the direction of Stalingrad and further on Astrakhan (Operation Heron), in order to cover Group A from the north and capture all transport routes between the southern and central regions of the USSR.

The troops of the Red Army, as part of countering the plans of the German command, began the Caucasian defensive operation.
By the beginning of the German offensive, Army Group A, under the command of Field Marshal List, significantly outnumbered the Soviet forces in the number of soldiers and officers, and especially in the number of tanks, guns, mortars and aircraft. The balance of forces not in favor of the USSR was determined both by serious losses during the Kharkov operation, and by the skillful actions of intelligence and counterintelligence of the Wehrmacht, who managed to convince the Soviet military leadership that the main theater of military operations for 1942 would be the Moscow direction, where the main forces of the Red Army. In addition, the possibility of strengthening our grouping on this sector of the front was severely limited: 27 Turkish divisions deployed on the Soviet-Turkish border were forced to keep significant forces there; the likelihood of Japanese aggression, fettered a powerful group in the Far East.

The Germans, on the contrary, in the absence of a second front, managed to significantly strengthen their southern grouping at the expense of the Romanian, Slovak and Italian divisions. In such an extremely difficult situation for our country, the battle for the Caucasus began.

After the loss of Rostov-on-Don on July 23, 1942, the armies of the Southern Front withdrew to the left bank of the Don and occupied the lines from the village of Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to the mouth of the Don. The swiftness of the German offensive did not allow to properly prepare a defensive line along the Don River, the order to create it was given by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command only on July 11, 1942.

On July 25, 1942, the Germans launched Operation Edelweiss.. The entire power of Army Group A fell upon the Southern Front. The superiority of German troops in tanks, guns and aircraft was overwhelming. The lack of anti-aircraft artillery and aviation allowed German aircraft to bomb our troops with virtually impunity.

Already on the first day of the offensive, the Germans broke through our defenses in the zone of the 18th Army, commanded by General Kamkov. On July 26, having received two divisions as reinforcements, the troops of the 18th and 37th armies tried to regain their lost positions with a counterattack. The counteroffensive ended in failure and further complicated the position of the Red Army on this sector of the front.

With the breakthrough of German such divisions on July 27 in the Salsk region, the threat of dissection loomed over the Southern Front. On the night of July 28, our troops began to withdraw troops to the area of ​​the Kagalnik River and the Manych Canal. Unfortunately, the organized retreat failed. German aviation with continuous air strikes finally broke the defensive formations of our armies, communication with many units was lost. In fact, the Southern Front ceased to exist. Almost without resistance, the German units began forcing the Don along the entire offensive zone.

On July 28, by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the remaining formations of the Southern Front were merged with the troops of the North Caucasian Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny. The newly formed front was divided into two operational groups. The Don Group (51st Army, 37th Army, 12th Army and 4th Air Army) under the command of R.Ya. Malinovsky was supposed to cover the Stavropol direction. Primorsky group (18th army, 56th army, 47th army, 1st rifle corps, 17th cavalry corps and 5th air army with the support of the Azov military flotilla) under the command of Colonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko defended the Krasnodar direction. The Soviet military leadership understood that it will be extremely difficult to stop enemy tank groups in the steppe expanses. The construction of fortified areas began in the regions of Nalchik and Grozny. The 9th and 24th armies were sent there from the front. The 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front. All these measures were designed to improve the management of the front, which stretched for almost a thousand kilometers. At the same time, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front received the task of occupying and preparing for defense the approaches to the Caucasus Range from the north.

On July 31, believing that the Soviet front in the Caucasian direction was completely collapsed, Hitler decided to transfer the entire 4th Panzer Army of Colonel General Hoth to Stalingrad. Only one tank corps from the 4th Army was left in the Caucasian direction. This maneuver significantly weakened the offensive potential of Army Group A, but the superiority of the German troops in technology remained huge and the Wehrmacht armies were rapidly moving towards the Caucasus. Anticipating a quick victory on the Caucasian front, Hitler created special cartels for the restoration and further development of Soviet oil fields. Concessions for the right to extract raw materials were distributed among German companies, and aviation was forbidden to bomb oil-bearing regions.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership took all possible measures to prevent the loss of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Together with military measures, there was a mass evacuation of all valuable equipment, especially from oil wells and oil refineries. Crude oil was taken away from the front line, to the Grozny refineries. Everything that could not be taken out was being prepared for destruction.. Along with the equipment, horses, grain, cattle were taken out - the Germans should not have got anything. At the same time, extensive propaganda and explanatory work was carried out among the population, partisan groups and militia detachments were formed in the cities, and Cossack units were formed in the villages.

At the end of July, it became clear that it would not be possible to organize a serious defense in the open steppe area. The only possible solution in such a situation was, while maintaining order, to retreat to the Kuban and Terek rivers and wear down the enemy in defensive battles.

On August 1, at the request of the commander of the Stavropol garrison to strengthen the defense of the city, Budyonny replied:

«... it is necessary to defend Voroshilovsk, but there are not enough forces ...»

The Don Task Force retreated beyond the Kuban. Having wedged between two groups of the North Caucasian Front, on August 3 the enemy approached Stavropol (then Voroshilovsk). The remaining small garrison of the city, almost without ammunition and artillery, tried to stop the German offensive at least for a while, giving time to the main forces to gain a foothold on new lines of defense. Fierce street fighting broke out in the city, but the forces were too unequal. By the evening of the same day, the city fell.

From a report dated August 3, 1942, received by the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Lieutenant General Kurdyumov:

“... On August 3, the enemy occupied the city of Voroshilovsk. The city was defended by the 15th reserve regiment - a total of 500 people and the 26th motorcycle regiment - 200 people ...

The remnants of the 15th and 26th regiments in the amount of 300 people by 22 o'clock went to the village. Temnolessky. People are armed only with rifles, there are no other weapons ...»

After the capture of Stavropol, the Germans halted their offensive in the southeast direction. Despite the loss of the city, complete victory, that is, the destruction of the Don group, the German troops failed to achieve. The 37th Army broke away from the enemy and by August 5 retreated beyond the Kalaus and Yankul rivers, while the 12th Army withdrew to the Kuban River with battles.

In the Krasnodar direction, where the Primorsky group of the North Caucasian Front was defending, the situation was no less difficult. Particularly fierce battles went for the village of Kushchevskaya, which changed hands three times. The Cossacks of the 17th Cavalry Corps under the command of Lieutenant General N.Ya. Kirichenko were able to seriously disrupt the plans of the German command. Having taken up a circular defense around the village of Shkurinskaya, the cavalrymen forced the Germans to change the direction of the blow.

The command of the Wehrmacht, bypassing the 17th cavalry corps, concentrated forces against the 18th and 12th armies of the Primorsky group. On August 6, from the Voroshilovsk (Stavropol) region, the German troops launched an offensive against Armavir with the forces of the 1st Panzer Army, and, moving in the direction of Maykop and further to Tuapse, were to reach the Black Sea coast. On the same day, the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht also struck in the Krasnodar direction in order to reach Novorossiysk.

August 7 Armavir fell. On August 10, the Germans broke into Maykop, hoping to seize fuel and oil. Neither one nor the other was in the city. All stocks of raw materials were removed or burned, wells were clogged, oil refineries were blown up or evacuated.

Later, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command pointed out to Budyonny:

« Ensure that all our troops act like the 17th Cavalry Corps»

At the same time, fierce fighting broke out in the Krasnodar region. The Krasnodar defensive line was not prepared, some of the units turned out to be without ammunition at all, and the troops were withdrawn across the Kuban River. The remaining units until August 12 fought fierce street battles. Only by direct order of the command did the last units retreat beyond the Kuban, blowing up the Pashkovskaya ferry behind them. August 12 Krasnodar fell.

At the same time, the Azov Flotilla, leaving its bases in Yeysk, was relocated to Temryuk to cover Novorossiysk.

On August 17, having not received Maikop oil and having failed to break through to Tuapse, Army Group A temporarily ceased active hostilities. German forces began to experience serious supply problems.

From the memoirs of General of the Infantry Kurt von Tipelskirch:

“... On August 8, the Maykop region was captured - the first, smallest and thoroughly destroyed oil region by the Russians. At the same time, two tank corps north of the middle reaches of the Kuban turned to the southeast in order to move towards a more important goal - the Grozny region. However, even during this advance, the first difficulties arose with the supply of troops, which then became chronic and gradually turned into a real disaster. Sometimes an acute shortage of fuel even forced to deliver it by air. Communications were so lengthened that the convoys that brought fuel themselves spent most of their cargo on the way. Sometimes it came to a paradox: camel caravans were used to transport fuel. When the mobile formations advancing on Grozny reached Pyatigorsk on August 9, they had to wait for fuel there for several weeks, and in the meantime the Russians were gathering new forces and strengthening their aviation ... "

From July 25 to August 17, the enemy was able to advance 600 km, but he could not achieve his main goal - the defeat of our armies and a breakthrough in the Transcaucasus.

Elbrus on fire

Regrouping forces, the enemy tried to achieve success in the areas of Novorossiysk, Malgobek and on the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. The tense defensive battles of the Soviet troops that unfolded here continued until November 1942.

Significant forces were thrown into the construction of defensive lines in the main directions of the upcoming enemy strikes: on the Transcaucasian Front, the number of engineering troops increased by 6-7 times compared to the beginning of August, in addition, the local population was mobilized to build fortifications. Significant forces were also allocated from the Stavka reserve. By mid-August 1942, the troops of the Transcaucasian Front regrouped their forces and organized the defense of the Caucasus from the north. A second line of defense was created along the Terek and Urukh rivers, on the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. Particular attention was paid to covering the Baku direction and the approaches to Grozny.

At this stage of the operation, according to the Edelweiss plan, the Nazi command intended to capture the Transcaucasus, bypassing the Main Caucasian Range from the west and east and at the same time overcoming it from the north through the passes, and thus reach the border with Turkey and Iran. Although these countries were not formally on the side of the Nazi coalition, but in 1942 there was a real threat that Turkish troops would invade the territory of the Caucasus with the successful advance of the German units. Yes, and in Iran, the Reich, as best he could, supported and escalated anti-Soviet sentiments. In addition, the Germans made a lot of efforts to sow discord among the Caucasian peoples in the region, to play on separatist sentiments.

The enemy launched an attack on the Caucasus in three directions at once:

1) to Novorossiysk;
2) along the Black Sea coast in the direction of Anapa - Poti - Batumi;
2) through the Main Caucasian Range to Sukhumi, Kutaisi, Grozny and Baku. Thus, the fighting moved from the plains of the Don and Kuban to the foothills of the Caucasus.

In the first half of August, German troops advanced into the Caucasian Mineralnye Vody region. On August 11, the enemy occupied Cherkessk and established control over the bridge located there across the Kuban River. Not meeting strong resistance, the enemy rushed to the passes of the central part of the Main Caucasian Range and soon the advanced German detachments were already at the foot of the mountains. The path to the passes from Sancharo to Elbrus turned out to be open.

On August 14, the advanced units of the German 49th mountain rifle corps of the Edelweiss mountain rifle division entered into battle with small units of the 46th army, covering the passes in the central and western parts of the Main Caucasian Range. German Alpine shooters were recruited from the best climbers and skiers, had special mountain equipment and weapons, warm clothing, pack transport - mules. They could move quickly in the mountains, climb glaciers and snowy passes, while our soldiers did not always have the necessary equipment and weapons, in addition, many of them were in the mountains for the first time. Protecting the passes proved to be no easy task. Not all officers knew the peculiarities of warfare in the mountains.

Here is how A.P. Ivanchenko, a participant in those events, recalled the beginning of the battles for the passes:

“On the fifteenth of August, the regiment received an order to march. Late in the evening we passed the village of Zakharovka and stopped for the night in a valley with rare shrubs. This was our last rest, and then we prepared for battles for two days: we received ammunition, horses, donkeys, pack saddles for them. We received dry rations - several kilograms of crackers, 800 grams of herring and 300 grams of sugar per person. We were told that it was for ten days. Within a few days, the supplies ran out, and everyone ate what they found in the forest and in the clearings.

But it was even worse for us when we climbed onto the ice. It's hard to breathe - the air is rarefied, cold, hungry. Everyone's legs are worn. The vaunted English boots with thick soles were barely enough for this transition: the leather of the soles was rotten like cork and was falling apart before our eyes. Many of us were left in the same footcloths, since the supply in those early days had not yet been established.

The pass met us severely. It is dark, there are bare stones all around, no fires can be lit, and there is no food. Overcoats and caps were no longer heated. They put up a guard and began to while away the time until morning. The next day we were lucky: some shepherd from the locals, I don’t remember his last name now, drove a flock of sheep to us, which he miraculously managed to save from the Germans. He said that three of his comrades were killed in the process.

We were given a kilogram or a half of lamb. There was nowhere to cook or fry, they ate raw meat. On the morning of the first of September we went over the pass.

By August 15, separate German units had already captured the passes and bases near Elbrus, their further goal was the Baksan Gorge, along which our units retreated, and through which it was possible to reach the Soviet rear.

To the west of Elbrus, due to poorly organized defense, on August 17, the Germans occupied the Klukhor Pass, which became known to the headquarters of the 46th Army only on the third day. At the end of August 1942, L.P. Beria arrived in Tbilisi from Moscow to organize the defense of the passes.. Having assessed the situation and displaced the offending officers, he created a task force of the NKVD troops, the leadership of which he entrusted to General Petrov. Rifle divisions of the internal troops of the NKVD were deployed on the main directions of the enemy's offensive. To equip the army units with fighters capable of navigating in a difficult mountainous environment, climbers and skiers began to be sent from all over the country to the Transcaucasian Front. However, the troops still experienced great difficulties in transporting ammunition, food and equipment. It took time to achieve any results.

On the night of August 17, a detachment of German military climbers set off from the Hotyu-tau pass to the slopes of Elbrus to the "Shelter of Eleven" and to the meteorological station. From there, on August 21, a group of German Alpine shooters under the command of Captain Grotto climbed Elbrus and hoisted the division flag on both of its peaks. However, instead of gratitude, the German climbers received a penalty. The fact is that Hitler wanted to see a flag with a swastika on the highest peak in Europe. They had no choice but to climb once again to a height of 5,642 meters and put up the desired flag.

This achievement was presented by the Ministry of Propaganda as a sign of the inevitable conquest of the Caucasus. The top of the mountain was supposed to be called "Hitler's Peak".

German newspapers wrote:

“At the highest point of Europe, the top of Elbrus, the German flag flutters, it will soon appear on Kazbek. The conquered Elbrus crowns the end of the fallen Caucasus"

A little to the west, other units of the German 49th Mountain Rifle Corps were already fighting the Soviet troops on the southern slopes of the Klukhor Pass. By the end of the month, the enemy reached the northern slopes of the Marukh Pass and captured the Umporg Pass. Heavy bloody battles were fought on the Sanchar pass. On September 5, 1942, the Nazis captured the Marukh Pass with a surprise attack from three sides.

Only by the end of September 1942, having pulled up significant forces to the passes, the command of the Transcaucasian Front managed to stabilize the situation. Positional mountain battles began, which continued with varying success until the end of December 1942. Our troops did not succeed in knocking down the German mountain shooters and rangers from the passes. In turn, the commander of the 49th German Corps, General Konrad, no longer had the strength to continue the offensive and break into the Transcaucasus.

On August 23, German troops launched an offensive against Mozdok in order to break through to the oil-bearing regions of Grozny and Makhachkala. This sector was to be defended by the 1st Tank, 4th Air, 37th and 9th Armies. Soldiers and commanders of armored trains showed unparalleled stamina, heroism and courage.

But the advanced detachments of the Red Army, put up against the enemy, were forced to retreat, and the enemy captured Mozdok with a swift blow and rushed to Malgobek. This city was strategically important as one of the oil industrial areas, having mastered which the Germans would have secured a foothold for a further offensive on Grozny, and in the event of an operational pause, Malgobek would have become a good base for them. On the morning of September 2, the Germans began crossing the Terek south of the city. Having captured a small foothold on the southern bank of the river, German troops dealt a strong blow on the night of September 4, and advanced 10 km south of Mozdok, reaching the foot of the Tersky Range. Here the enemy met a strong rebuff at the Nogai-Mirza-Terskaya line and weakened the onslaught for a while. The relative calm did not last long: having transferred the motorized division of the SS “Viking” from the Tuapse direction, the Germans resumed the offensive.

By the third decade of September, the fighting was getting closer to Malgobek. Soviet units at the cost of huge losses held back the onslaught of the 1st Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht. Its commander, Paul von Kleist, was forced to use all his reserves, and by the end of September his troops were severely exhausted. In addition, the problem of supplying them with fuel became more and more acute in the German units.

At the end of September, a fierce battle broke out for the city. The soldiers of the Red Army fought with great stubbornness for Malgobek, which changed hands 14 times, but still our armies were able to hold this line, and the enemy abandoned the idea of ​​​​continuing the offensive in this direction. In addition, our troops managed to pin down and wear down significant enemy forces and not allow them to reinforce Army Group B advancing on Stalingrad. However, the established lull on the eastern face of the Transcaucasian Front was temporary. Having abandoned the attack on Grozny from Malgobek, the German command began to strengthen its grouping in the Ordzhonikidze direction.

BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS 1942–43, a set of defensive (July 25–December 31, 1942) and offensive (January 1–October 9, 1943) operations of owls. troops carried out in order to defend the Caucasus and defeat the German-fascists who invaded its borders. troops. As part of the battle for the Caucasus, owls. The troops carried out operations: the strategic defensive North Caucasian 1942, the strategic offensive North Caucasian 1943, the Novorossiysk-Taman 1943 and the front-line offensive Krasnodar 1943.

He plans. guidelines for waging war against the USSR, the North Caucasus occupied one of the central places. This was primarily due to the need to make up for the shortage of oil for the German industry, which she could compensate for at the expense of the North Caucasian fields. In the Plan of the Department of Defense of the country of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), drawn up in May 1941, it was concluded that "Army Group South should, having captured the Donetsk region, throw the necessary forces along the oil pipelines to Maykop - Grozny as soon as possible, and later also to Baku" . In addition, through the North Caucasus it. the army opened the way to Transcaucasia and further to Iran, also rich in oil. However, in 1941 the enemy failed to complete this task. He was stopped in the region of Rostov-on-Don, and having received a sensitive blow in the Rostov offensive operation of 1941, he was forced to retreat to the Donbass and go on the defensive.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the Caucasian direction became the main one in his plans. guides. The enemy's plan was to surround and destroy the owls. troops south and southeast of Rostov, take control of the North Caucasus, then bypass the Main Caucasian Range with one group from the west, capturing Novorossiysk and Tuapse, and the other from the east, capturing Grozny and Baku. At the same time, it was planned to overcome the Caucasus Range in its central part along the passes and reach the regions of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi. With access to the Transcaucasus, the enemy hoped to seize the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, ensure complete dominance in the Black Sea, establish direct contact with the Turkish army, involve Turkey in the war against the USSR, and also create conditions for the invasion of the Near and Middle East. This plan is not. strategists appropriated the name of a beautiful mountain flower - "Edelweiss".

By July 25, owls. troops, unable to contain the enemy offensive during the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad operation of 1942, withdrew to the river. Don and left Rostov-on-Don. The enemy also managed to capture several bridgeheads on the left bank of the Don. For the attack on the Caucasus, it. the command allocated army group "A" consisting of 17A, 1TA, 4TA, Romanian 3A and part of the 4VF forces - a total of 167 thousand people, St. 1.1 thousand tanks, more than 4.5 thousand op. and mortars, up to 1 thousand aircraft. In coastal areas, ground forces supported the naval forces of Germany and Romania. The enemy was opposed by the troops of the Southern Front, which had 51A, 37A, 12A and 18A in the first echelon, supported by 4VA aviation. In total, the front consisted of approx. 112 thousand people, 121 tanks, approx. 2.2 thousand op. and mortars, 130 aircraft. On the Taman Peninsula, it occupied the defense of 47A of the North Caucasian Front.

On July 25, the enemy launched an offensive from bridgeheads in the lower reaches of the Don. Owls. troops, unable to hold back the blow, began to retreat to the south and southeast. The threat of its capture by the enemy hung over the Caucasus. Under these conditions, the local population provided active assistance to the troops. Almost 10,000 residents of cities and villages in the Caucasus built defensive lines, built roads and bridges, and took part in supplying the troops with ammunition and food. Many urban industrial enterprises produced weapons and ammunition. Material assets and the civilian population were evacuated from the most dangerous areas.

On July 28, a unified North Caucasian Front was formed from the troops of the Southern and North Caucasian fronts under the command of Marshal Sov. Soyuz S.M. Budyonny. The Black Sea Fleet (Vice Adm. F.S. Oktyabrsky) and the Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Adm. S.G. Gorshkov) were operationally subordinate to him.

With a significant superiority in forces and means, the enemy quickly developed the offensive. Despite the fact that at the end of July he turned most of the 4TA towards the Stalingrad direction, a significant advantage was on his side. July 31, the enemy captured Salsk, August 5 - Tikhoretsk, August 9 - Maikop, August 12 - Krasnodar. The open steppe terrain allowed the enemy to effectively use superiority in tanks and aircraft. However, as it moves deeper into the Caucasus, the resistance of the owls. troops increased. This contributed to a large extent Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227.

After the battles on the river Manych command of him. The 40th Panzer Corps noted: “The stubbornness of the enemy can be illustrated by the fact that in the floodplains individual arrows up to their throats in the water, without any hope of retreat, fight to the last bullet; that arrows located in nests equipped in a stone dam can only be destroyed in close combat. Field fortifications and shores are defended with equal tenacity.

But in the open steppe terrain, rifle divisions could do little against enemy tank formations. Therefore, at the beginning of August, owls. the command decided to deploy on the river. Terek of a new defensive grouping at the expense of the forces of the Transcaucasian Front (General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev). The troops of the front were ordered to take up defense along the river. Terek, Urukh and the passes of the Main Caucasian Range, as well as to create a multi-lane defense in the direction of Grozny, Makhachkala. As a result of the measures taken, by mid-August the enemy's offensive was stopped in the foothills of the Caucasus Range, he began to regroup his troops to develop an offensive in the Transcaucasus. The owls were also preparing to repel the blows of the enemy. command. Defensive lines were built, the troops were replenished with personnel and materiel.

On August 19, the enemy launched an offensive against Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula. On August 31, he captured Anapa, on September 7 he broke into Novorossiysk, captured the railway station, then the port, but could not completely capture the city. Repeated attempts by the enemy to knock out owls. troops from Novorossiysk were unsuccessful. September 26 here he went on the defensive. On September 1, the Germans launched an offensive in the Mozdok-Malgobek direction, trying to reach Makhachkala through Grozny, and then reach Baku along the coast of the Caspian Sea. They managed to push the owls. troops, but the enemy could not break through their defenses. On September 28, the enemy was forced to go on the defensive.

On September 25, enemy formations tried to break through to the Black Sea coast through Tuapse. But the stubborn resistance of the owls. troops did not allow them to do so. On November 23, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive in this direction as well. By December 17, his group, wedged into the owls. defense in the Georgievsk area, 18A was defeated by counterattacks and by December 20 was driven back beyond the river. Pshish.

The Germans made their last attempt to overcome the Main Caucasian Range on October 25 through Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz). Having crushed the defense of owls with a sudden blow. troops, on October 28 they captured Nalchik. Weakened in previous owl battles. troops were able to stop them only on the outskirts of Ordzhonikidze. During the counterattacks, they defeated 2 German. tank divisions, causing significant damage to the enemy and forcing him to go on the defensive.

As a result of the defensive period of the battle for the Caucasus, owls. troops left most of the territory of the North Caucasus and retreated to the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. However, they did not give the enemy the opportunity to break through to Baku, the Transcaucasus and the Black Sea coast. The Edelweiss plan remained unfulfilled.

By the end of December 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad 1942–43. Owls. the troops, having thwarted the enemy’s attempt to release the group surrounded by Stalingrad, developed an offensive to the west. By this time, the troops of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts in their areas of operations outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, guns and mortars - by 2.1, tanks - by 1.8, combat aircraft - by 1.7 times. With this in mind, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned an offensive operation. It was envisaged to strike the troops of both fronts from the northeast and southwest to dismember and defeat the main forces of Army Group A, preventing the withdrawal of its troops from the North Caucasus. The success of the operation depended primarily on the actions of the troops of the Southern Front in the Rostov and Salsk directions and the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front in the Krasnodar and Tikhoretsk directions. The task of the northern group of this front was to, by going over to a swift offensive, to press the enemy to the Main Caucasian Range.

January 1st troops began to advance. On the same day. the command, seeking to avoid the encirclement of its troops in the North Caucasus, began to withdraw them under the cover of strong rearguards from the Mozdok region. The offensive of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front did not develop - the enemy managed to break away. The persecution began only on January 3, was carried out indecisively and disorganized.

On January 4, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command pointed out to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front the shortcomings in command and control and specified the tasks. The directive noted: “The northern group of Maslennikov is turning into a reserve group with the task of light pursuit. It is unprofitable for us to push the enemy out of the North Caucasus. It is more profitable for us to detain him in order to encircle him with a blow from the Black Sea group.

Thus, the main efforts of the front were concentrated in the zone of the Black Sea Group of Forces. However, due to the delay in regrouping, its offensive began only on January 16 and developed extremely slowly. The enemy offered stubborn resistance, clinging to every settlement, for every line.

At the same time, the Northern Group of Forces, pursuing the retreating enemy, successfully moved forward. By the end of January 24, she had liberated Mozdok, Pyatigorsk, Armavir; on the same day, the group was transformed into the North Caucasian Front under the command of General Lieutenant. I.I. Maslennikov. On February 5, the Black Sea Group of Forces also joined the front, which during the offensive was able to advance only 30 km and was forced to suspend it.

On February 9, the North Caucasian Front launched the Krasnodar offensive operation, during which Krasnodar was liberated on February 12. The enemy, stubbornly resisting, withdrew his formations and units to the lower reaches of the Kuban and to the Taman Peninsula. On the night of February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed southwest of Novorossiysk, in the Myskhako area, an amphibious assault, which captured a small bridgehead. Extended by February 10 to 30 sq. km, he subsequently played an important role in the liberation of Novorossiysk (see. "Small land").

At the end of March, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan for a new offensive operation of the North Caucasian Front to defeat the German troops remaining in the North Caucasus. troops. The offensive began on 4 April. In all directions, the troops encountered strong resistance. Having achieved air superiority, the enemy unleashed powerful bombing and assault strikes on the advancing. On April 6, the offensive was suspended. It resumed on April 14 after the regrouping of troops. The troops of the North Caucasian Front failed to break through the Gotenkopf line of defense (Goth's Head, in Russian literature - the Blue Line), prepared in advance by the enemy. Since April 17, active hostilities have ceased in most sectors of the front. At the same time, fierce air battles unfolded (see. Air battles in the Kuban 1943).

In the summer of 1943 Kr. the army launched an offensive in the central and southwestern directions of the Sov.-German. front, which created favorable conditions for the resumption of the offensive in the North Caucasus. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the North Caucasian Front (Regiment General I.E. Petrov) to conduct an offensive Novorossiysk-Taman operation. It began on the night of September 10 with a powerful artillery and aviation preparation and an amphibious landing in the port of Novorossiysk. On September 11 and 14, the main forces of the front went on the offensive. By the morning of September 16, owls. troops captured Novorossiysk by storm. By the beginning of October, the enemy was driven back to the Taman Peninsula. On October 3, the city of Taman was liberated, and by October 9, the entire Taman Peninsula was cleared of the enemy. Thus, the enemy was completely expelled from the North Caucasus, the battle for the Caucasus was over.

The victory in the battle for the Caucasus was of great military and political importance. As a result of the expulsion of the enemy from the North Caucasus, conditions were created for the liberation of Crimea, the basing of the Black Sea Fleet improved, the country could again use the rich North Caucasian oil fields. During the period of the onset of Kr. the army passed with battles approx. 800 km, freed an area of ​​approx. 200 thousand sq. km.

Enemy plans to destroy owls. troops, the capture of the richest grain regions, oil sources, penetration into the regions of the Near and Middle East were finally thwarted. The hopes of the fascists to destroy the friendship of the peoples of the Caucasus with other fraternal peoples of the Soviets did not come true. Union.

Enemy losses only during the offensive operations of owls. troops amounted to 281 thousand soldiers and officers, approx. 1.4 thousand tanks, 2 thousand aircraft, more than 7 thousand op. and mortars, 22,000 vehicles, and many other military equipment and property. Irrecoverable losses of owls. troops during the period of the battle for the Caucasus - St. 344 thousand people, sanitary - more than 605 thousand people.

Owls. the state highly appreciated the feat of arms of the defenders of the Caucasus. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 1, 1944 established the medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus", which was awarded to approx. 600 thousand people. Many units and formations were awarded the honorary names of Anapa, Kuban, Novorossiysk, Taman, Temryuk. Novorossiysk for outstanding services to the Motherland, mass heroism, courage and steadfastness shown by its workers and soldiers Kr. army and navy in Vel. Fatherland war, 9/14/1973 was awarded the honorary title of "Hero City". By decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, the cities of Vladikavkaz, Malgobek (both October 8, 2007), Rostov-on-Don, Tuapse (both May 5, 2008) and Nalchik (3/25/2010) were awarded the honorary title "City of Military Glory".

Research Institute (Military History) VAGSh RF Armed Forces

Defense of the Caucasus (Battle for the Caucasus) is a major defensive and offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the second period of the Great Patriotic War in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia.

The operation took place in two stages: from July 25 to December 31, 1942, an offensive was carried out by the German army, which managed to capture part of the territories; From December 31 to October 9, 1943, Soviet troops, having launched a counteroffensive, forced the Nazis to retreat and recaptured the territories occupied by the enemy.

By the beginning of autumn, most of the Kuban and the North Caucasus had been conquered by the enemy, but after the Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazis retreated, as they suffered significant losses. They feared that they would be surrounded. But, unfortunately, the operation planned by the Soviet High Command, as a result of which the enemy was to be surrounded and defeated on the territory of the Kuban, failed, and the Nazis evacuated to the Crimea.

The situation on the eve of the battle

The German command, seeing that the Soviet troops, after unsuccessful battles near Kharkov, could not provide a worthy rebuff, decided to attack the Caucasus. The capture of the Caucasus, as well as Ukraine, was very important for the enemy, since the Caucasus and Kuban had large reserves of oil and grain, which could provide the enemy with significant support for further military operations on the territory of the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that Hitler counted on the fact that by going to the sea, he would be able to turn to Turkey for help.

After Rostov-on-Don was captured by the enemy, our Headquarters could communicate with the Caucasus only by sea or by rail, which passed through Stalingrad. However, the Germans suffered a crushing defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, so later they were never able to conquer the Caucasus, since they suffered significant losses on the Volga.

From battle to battle

During the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus, the Nazi army captured such cities as Stavropol, Armavir, Maikop, Krasnodar, Elista, Mozdok. Part of Novorossiysk was also captured. However, in September 1942, in the area of ​​Malgobek, the enemy met resistance from the Soviet troops and was stopped by them. During the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus, the enemy managed to approach the foothills of the Caucasus Range and the Terek River. However, the Soviet army was able to stop this offensive in time, the Nazis suffered significant losses here, in fact, most of the German army was destroyed. Hitler's hopes for Turkey's help were not justified either.

The second part of the battle for the Caucasus was the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops. They not only recaptured the territories previously occupied by the enemy, but also completely liberated North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, the Rostov Region, the Stavropol Territory and other regions. Oil and grain reserves became ours again, and this gave a huge advantage in the course of hostilities.

But still, despite the serious successes of our troops, the main goal that Stalin set for the Soviet army - to capture and destroy the Germans in the Kuban - was not achieved. The Germans relocated to the Crimea, but the Caucasus again became ours.

The meaning and results of the battle for the Caucasus

The significance and results of the battle for the Caucasus are great. The Soviet army not only began to return the occupied territories and captured people, but also very noticeably strengthened its power. Now she could fight on equal terms with the enemy. The liberation of such an important strategic region as the Caucasus is one of the greatest victories of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. The further victorious march of our army, now to the West, began precisely with the victory at Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus.

The history of the battle for the Caucasus - how the situation developed on the fronts before it began, what was the alignment of forces. How was the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus, the victories and defeats of the Soviet command. What is famous for the second stage of the battle in the Caucasus, the main battles and results.

The battle for the Caucasus 1942-1943 is a serious turning point in the course of the war

The battle for the Caucasus was decisive for the outcome of the Great Patriotic War. If the Soviet Union had lost this battle, it is quite possible that the entire Second World War would have been lost. It was one of the longest and lasted from July 25, 1942 to October 9, 1943.

Time is relentless. Today, there are very few veterans of the Second World War - participants in that great struggle against the enemy. They are trying with might and main to surround them with care and attention, especially on memorable dates of these events. Poems are dedicated to heroes, in which their exploits are sung. Children's drawing competitions are held on the theme of the battle for the Caucasus, where children often depict warriors with orders and medals. These pictures once again remind us of how important it is to protect the world.

Heroes and ordinary participants in the battle for the Caucasus can be seen in the photo on May 9 during the procession of the Immortal Regiment.

This victory came at a great cost to us. What we call a "battle" was in reality a series of military operations. The battle for the Caucasus has a strategic division into two stages - the first was defensive (during 1942), and the second offensive (from the beginning of 1943).

The military-political situation in the first half of 1942

The beginning of the military campaign of 1942 for our country developed unsuccessfully. Serious miscalculations were made in planning and conducting operations along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

Previous events

Having carried out several successful operations in the winter of 1941, in particular, near Moscow, Yelets, Rostov and other settlements, the military leadership of the Soviet Union made erroneous conclusions about the unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht army for combat operations in winter conditions (which were partly true). The military potential of the Nazi group on the Eastern Front as a whole was greatly underestimated.

Attempts to seize the initiative in the winter and spring of 1942 by conducting many private offensive operations led to failure. Thus, the Rzhev-Vyazemsky, Smolensk, Kharkov operations, also in the Crimea, the battle for the Demyansk cauldron and others in a number of cases were marked by local successes. As a result, the Soviet troops even managed to capture part of the territories, but on the whole they ended in failure with a huge number of losses in manpower and equipment.

By the summer, the Red Army switched to positional defense. Another strategic mistake was the assumption put forward by the Soviet command that the summer campaign of the Nazis would again develop in the old directions (Moscow, Leningrad), assigning secondary importance to the south. It was there that the main battles were expected. The attack on the Caucasus came as a surprise.

Significance of the Caucasus during the war

By 1942, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Crimea, Donbass were lost, Leningrad was in the blockade. The economic base of the USSR has narrowed. A number of industrial areas were lost, and the evacuated enterprises have not yet reached the required capacity. Significant agricultural areas were lost. As a result, steel production decreased by 10 million tons, grain harvest more than 3 times. Do not forget about a significant reduction in the mobilization resource due to the loss of vast territories.

Under the prevailing conditions for the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia turned out to be key industrial and agricultural regions. They accounted for 86.5% of the all-Union oil production, 65% of natural gas, 56.5% of manganese ore. In addition, the trade route through the Persian Gulf, Iran and the Caspian Sea was the second after the Northern Sea Route for Lend-Lease supplies.

The balance of forces and means before the start of the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus

For Nazi Germany, the Caucasus was also vital, mainly due to the lack of oil and oil products. The technical equipment of the army grew, and so did their consumption. Own German industry coped with difficulty. Even the captured oil-bearing territories of Europe, as well as the production of synthetic, or "ersatz fuel" from coal, alcohol, benzene, and others, could hardly meet the needs.

The plans of the German command

During the unsuccessful Kharkov offensive operation of the Soviet troops, the Nazis reached the Don and occupied Rostov. On the basis of the fascist army group "South", two army groups were created - "A" and "B".

Group "A" included 3 armies - one tank and two infantry. Their task at the first stage was to force the Don, to occupy part of the Kuban, the North Caucasus, the eastern coast of the Azov and Black Seas. On the second, they were supposed to go around the Main Caucasian Range from the west and east and go through the passes to the Transcaucasus. In addition, with access to the border of Turkey to force her to enter the war with "Soviet Russia".

Field Marshal List was appointed commander. He was instructed to solve the combat mission by the consistent implementation of the plan Operation Edelweiss. Later, List was recalled from the front by Hitler and a new commander, Colonel General Kleist, was appointed in his place. Thus, from November 1942, the reins of government passed to him.

Group "B" was intended for an attack on Stalingrad. Obviously, the Stalingrad direction was initially secondary.

3 fronts were deployed in the Caucasian direction: Southern, North Caucasian, Transcaucasian.

Southern Front had 5 armies in its composition, the task of which was to prevent the crossing of the Don and the development of an offensive against the Kuban and the Caucasus. General Malinovsky was appointed commander.

North Caucasian Front consisted of one army and two separate corps. They were tasked with defending the northeastern and eastern coasts of the Black and Azov Seas. The commander was Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyonny.

Transcaucasian Front as part of two armies and one cavalry corps, he defended the Black Sea coast with our naval bases located in Georgia. Part of the forces was located in northern Iran to cover the Iranian-Turkish border.

All three fronts were not fully equipped, there were problems with logistics.

The Black Sea Fleet experienced difficulties in connection with the loss of the Crimea and the main base - the city of Sevastopol. At this time, Novorossiysk became its replacement. In addition, enemy aircraft from the airfields of the Crimea caused significant damage.

The Caucasus, as a theater of operations, began to be equipped as early as 1941, but the work was extremely slow and inefficient. In addition, nothing was done in terms of fortification on the passes of the Main Caucasian Range. It seemed that they were not going to fight in the mountains at all. Everything had to be corrected in a short time and already in the course of hostilities.

Developments in the defense of the Caucasus

By July 25, Wehrmacht formations unexpectedly reached the Don. The Soviet units had to urgently prepare for defense.

The alignment of forces at the 1st stage of the battle

The superiority of Army Group A over the troops of the Southern Front turned out to be as follows:

• in personnel by 1.5 times;
• in tanks by 9.3 times;
• in airplanes by 7.7 times.

The superiority necessary for an offensive with a forcing of a water barrier, the enemy had only in tanks and aircraft. But the troops of the Southern Front defended a strip 320 kilometers wide, the forces were stretched out. There was no opportunity to form strong second echelons and reserves. All these prerequisites led to the fact that the Nazis in some places, by skillful maneuvering, were able to create the necessary advantage.

German offensive

In the first two days, the Nazis in some sectors of the front managed to force the Don and break through the defenses. Further, developing the offensive, enemy formations reached Bataysk. In some places, prerequisites arose for the encirclement of parts of the Southern Front. In addition, with the release of German tank units in the steppe, it became possible to cut the front into two parts.

Under these conditions, our command decided to retreat. However, due to the rapid advance of the Nazis, an organized retreat, and even more so a maneuverable defense, did not work out for our troops. The retreat turned into a rout. Thus, the combat capability of the Southern Front was partially lost, therefore July 28th it was disbanded and included in the North Caucasus.

After this date, there was a partial regrouping of both our and German troops. The Nazis continued to rapidly develop the offensive and by the end of August 19, they had practically completed their immediate task. Most of the Kuban was captured, the cities of Maykop, Stavropol, Armavir, Elista, Krasnodar fell. The Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. The Azov flotilla was forced to evacuate and subsequently became part of the Black Sea Fleet.

Fights for Novorossiysk, Malgobek and in the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range. Defense of Tuapse

The Red Army was able to organize serious resistance only on the outskirts of Tuapse, thereby preventing the encirclement of a large grouping of our troops and blocking the path to the Black Sea.

The further plans of the command of the German Army Group "A" consisted in a simultaneous offensive along three main transport arteries:

• along the Black Sea coast Anapa-Poti-Batumi;
• through the Main Caucasian Range in the direction of Sukhumi-Kutaisi;
• from the east, bypassing the ridge through Pyatigorsk-Prokhladnoye-Ordzhonikidze in the direction of Grozny, Makhachkala and Baku.

The Soviet leadership took a number of measures to increase the combat capability of the troops. First of all, the Transcaucasian Front was reinforced with two rifle corps and eleven separate rifle brigades from the Stavka reserve. A number of formations were transferred from the Makhachkala and Baku region to occupy defensive lines along the Terek and Urukh rivers.

At the end of August, Lavrenty Beria arrived in the Caucasus to carry out general leadership in the preparation of defense. According to his instructions, work was carried out on the engineering equipment of protective lines, strongholds, units of engineering barriers on the passes of the Caucasus Range, the engineering and sapper group was significantly strengthened, and the main mountain roads were prepared for collapse, flooding and destruction.

On August 19, the offensive of the German troops resumed with simultaneous attacks on Anapa and Temryuk and the Taman Peninsula. The first time to take Anapa did not work. The Germans succeeded only on 31 August. At the same time, they cut off parts of the Marine Corps from the main forces on the Taman Peninsula. As a result of partially successful actions on September 11, almost the entire Novorossiysk.Subsequent attempts to capture the city were completely unsuccessful. His the defense lasted almost a year.

On August 23, 1942, attempts began to attack Mozdok. The city fell two days later. Later, having crossed the Terek, the Germans managed to advance 10 km with heavy losses. However, this offensive was not continued. A little further they managed to go along the Prokhladnoye-Ordzhonikidze-Grozny railway in the direction of the Grozny oil region. However, the troops did not let them go further than Malgobekanashi. The Nazis were forced to go on the defensive in this sector as well.

Simultaneously with offensive actions in the Grozny and Novorossiysk directions, the Wehrmacht organized attempts to cross the Main Caucasian Range. The soldiers of the German 49th mountain rifle corps even managed to plant a fascist flag on Elbrus. In February 1943, he was removed from the mountain top and installed by the Soviet.

Toward the end of September 1942, the situation in the North Caucasus relatively stabilized, thanks to successful actions in the defense, and also due to the transfer of part of the German forces to the area of ​​the Battle of Stalingrad. The offensive potential of the enemy was exhausted. Therefore, by the end of September, the Germans made only separate attacks in the Novorossiysk and Grozny directions.

On September 25, 1942, an attempt was made to advance towards Tuapse. After five days of stubborn fighting, there was a danger of capturing the city, but the enemy was stopped by two counterattacks. Subsequently, the Germans made two more attempts - in October and November, which also failed. As a result of prolonged positional defensive battles, the enemy was stopped and forced to switch to defense in December 1942.

At the end of October, a series of successful actions allowed the enemy to capture Nalchik and Gizel. The Soviet command partially minimized these losses when they freed Gizel with counterattacks and the encirclement of a large group of Germans.

In addition, in a number of sectors of the front of the Mozdok direction during November, the prerequisites for counter-offensive operations were created. However, due to miscalculations in the development of the operation and an incorrect assessment of the enemy, until mid-December it was not possible to break into the defense of the Nazis. The offensive was delayed until January 1943.

Results of the 1st stage of the battle for the Caucasus

The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus in 1942 turned out to be very difficult and bloody for the Red Army. Our troops suffered heavy losses. Despite their stubborn resistance, the enemy continued to advance inland. The main positive results of the first stage of the battle for the Caucasus can be considered as follows:

• operation "Edelweiss" failed, the Caucasian nut was too tough for Hitler;
• the Germans never succeeded in capturing the oil-bearing regions of our country;
• The Wehrmacht was unable to break into the Middle East;
• Turkey never entered the war;
• the enemy lost more than 100 thousand killed.

The defeat of the German group during the counteroffensive

By January 1943, the Red Army managed to create an advantage in manpower and equipment in the zones of operations of the Southern and Transcaucasian fronts.

The alignment of forces at the beginning of the 2nd stage of the battle

In numerical terms, the superiority was:

• in personnel by 1.4 times;
• in guns and mortars by 2.1 times;
• in tanks by 1.8 times;
• in airplanes by 1.7 times.

There were some problems with the rear support of the fronts. First, difficult terrain, unstable weather. Secondly, the main ways of delivering materiel and personnel from the depths of the country were possible only by sea. Therefore, the main burden fell on the Caspian Flotilla and, to a lesser extent, on the Black Sea Fleet.

Both fronts had the task of encircling the enemy with coordinated strikes, supported by the Black Sea Fleet and two air armies, and not letting the enemy out of the North Caucasus and the Kuban. It was not possible to complete this task until the end.

The German command understood the complexity of the situation. In the Stalingrad direction, the Nazi troops suffered a crushing defeat. There was a risk of getting another encirclement of Army Group "A" in the North Caucasian direction. Therefore, the decision was made to retreat. It was planned to carry out a sequential withdrawal to pre-selected lines, of which there were four, with cover by strong rear guards (classic maneuverable defense).

In early January, units of the Wehrmacht began to retreat. In the beginning, the situation was favorable for the Germans. They managed to significantly break away from the Soviet troops. At this stage, our command did not have a sufficient number of mobile formations that could constrain the maneuver by actions on the flanks. There were only cavalry corps that could not cope with this task.

The Nazis managed to get ahead of our units and formations by several days. Therefore, it was decided not to disperse forces and means, but to concentrate on the right flank and go to possible retreat routes.

In the first weeks of the persecution, Pyatigorsk, Kislovodsk, and Mineralnye Vody were liberated. On January 21, Stavropol was cleared of fascist units. And yet, squeezing the enemy out of the North Caucasus was unprofitable, he had to be locked up, and our troops acted belatedly. Under these conditions, the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front on January 24 was reorganized into the North Caucasian Front under the command of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov.

The Red Army failed to immediately capture Bataysk, Krasnodar, near Tuapse the battles took on a protracted character. There were not enough forces to block the retreat of the Nazis to Rostov.

In the current situation, plans required adjustments. As a result, the Soviet command decided to focus its main efforts on preventing the enemy from retreating to Rostov, the Tamansky Peninsula and withdrawing to the Crimea through the Kerch Strait. In addition, it was necessary to capture Krasnodar as soon as possible.

On February 14, Rostov was liberated. Almost simultaneously, to the south, our troops defeated the encircled Krasnodar enemy grouping and liberated the city itself.

In the sky over the Kuban from 17 to 24 April the largest air battle unfolded, from which the Soviet aviation emerged victorious.

Decisive battles on the Taman Peninsula

The withdrawal to the Taman Peninsula could not be prevented. In this sector, the front narrowed and the enemy managed to condense the battle formations. Our troops met stubborn resistance. The Nazis concentrated on the peninsula a group of 400 thousand. At any cost, they wanted to keep this bridgehead. On its territory, the Nazis erected a well-known defensive line - the "blue line".

Soon the protracted Novorossiysk-Taman operation began, which became the final one in the battle for the Caucasus.

The fighting continued there. from February to October 1943. Nevertheless, some successes were achieved by the enemy formations here. After the beginning of the offensive of our troops in Ukraine in September of the same year, the Nazis managed to evacuate from the Taman Peninsula to the Crimea over two hundred thousand personnel, all horses, equipment and supplies of materiel.

In early February, an amphibious landing was carried out south of Novorossiysk. The Marines managed to capture part of the territories of the coastal strip. Subsequently, this bridgehead will be called "Small Land". Fierce fighting there continued until the liberation of Novorossiysk. It happened only on September 16th.

By October 9, 1943, the Taman Peninsula was completely liberated. Thus ended the battle for the Caucasus.

The inhabitants of the mountain regions helped our army as guides. The maps of that time did not fully reflect the mountain roads and trails. In addition, a paper map could not replace an experienced highlander.

After summing up the results of this great historical battle in May 1944, the Medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus"

Results of the 2nd stage of the battle for the Caucasus

The second stage of the battle for the Caucasus as a whole turned out to be positive for the Soviet Union. The results are:

• all the republics of the North Caucasus, most of the territory of the Kuban, the eastern coast of the Black and Azov Seas have been liberated;
• returned the main sown areas, Maikop oil regions;
• inflicted a major military defeat on fascist Germany.

The negative points include the fact that the Germans managed to keep most of Army Group A, it never managed to be locked up in the Caucasus.

_______________________

Our victory is woven from many battles. Among them, the battle in the Caucasus in 1942-1943 became the longest in the entire Great Patriotic War. The Russian soldier once again showed that no matter where he fought, be it the forests of the Moscow region, the swamps near Leningrad, the steppes of the Kuban or the mountains of the Caucasus, he will stand and win.

The heroic defense of the Caucasus became part of the military history of the Soviet Union, and later Russia. This battle took its rightful place in the list of feats of Russian weapons.