East Prussia was an important foothold for the Germans. Heavily fortified, it was considered equally suitable for defense and offensive. The borders of East Prussia were clad in iron and concrete, the border land was cut with trenches and military engineering structures. To protect East Prussia, the German command had three armies that were part of Army Group Center and numbered 41 divisions. There was also a significant number of various military units and institutions: police, serfs, training, reserve, technical and rear, which significantly increased the total number of troops.

In October 1944, after a short respite, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the 1st Baltic Front, received the task of defeating the enemy's Tilsit-Gumbinnen grouping and capturing Koenigsberg. The 3rd Guards Artillery Division was supposed to support the offensive of the 65th Rifle Corps, which had the task of breaking through the enemy defenses that covered the borders of East Prussia, and, advancing along the Bolshie Shelva-Stallupenen railway, cross the border and capture the city of Stallupenen on the second day.

On the morning of October 16, the troops went on the offensive and, breaking through the heavily fortified enemy defenses in the Insterburg direction, began to slowly move forward, and by the end of the day came close to the state border. On the second day of the operation, after a powerful artillery fire attack on objects located on Prussian soil, units of the 65th Rifle Corps attacked enemy positions, broke into the territory of East Prussia and occupied several settlements. The battles went on around the clock, every meter of the earth had to be beaten off. On October 18, after a short artillery preparation, the formations of the corps again attacked the enemy. The battle broke out for the city of Eidtkunen. By evening he was taken. It was the first German city taken by the Soviet troops.

Despite Hitler's stern demand not to leave positions without an order, the German troops, under the blows of the Red Army, were forced to retreat deep into East Prussia. On October 23, units of the 144th Rifle Division, supported by the 7th and 22nd Guards Brigades, entered the northeastern outskirts of the city of Stallupenen. Rifle units on the night of October 24 captured this city.

For ten days of intense fighting, from October 16 to 25, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, wedged into East Prussia, advanced 30 kilometers. The troops captured a number of settlements and, having cut the Pilkallen-Stallupenen railway, reached the line of Wiltauten, Schaaren, Myllunen. Here the enemy put up even more stubborn resistance. The Soviet troops suspended the offensive and, by order of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, went over to temporary defense. The 3rd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, after a slight regrouping, took up battle formations in the Ossinen, Lapiskenen, Gross Dagutelen, Drusken zone. Most of its batteries took up anti-tank defenses.

In November 1944, work began on the plan for the winter-spring campaign of 1945 at the General Staff and Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Red Army was given the decisive task of finally crushing fascist Germany and victoriously ending the Great Patriotic War. By the end of November, the development of the plan for the East Prussian offensive operation was basically completed. According to the plan, its overall goal was to cut off the troops of Army Group Center, defending in East Prussia (from November 26, 1944 - Army Group North), from the rest of the German armies, press them to the sea, dismember and destroy in parts.

2 Beginning of the East Prussian offensive

On the evening of January 12, it snowed, a blizzard began. Soviet troops, having taken their starting positions, prepared for the offensive. On the morning of January 13, shelling began. Artillery preparation lasted two hours. Due to the fog that hung over the troops, air combat operations were excluded, and the pilots were unable to provide assistance to the advancing infantry.

Artillery fire was fired simultaneously throughout the entire depth of the main line of defense. Small-caliber guns, firing direct fire, fired on the first line of trenches, destroying manpower and firepower. Medium-caliber artillery destroyed the second and third defensive lines. Larger guns smashed the second echelons, rear areas and areas of concentration of reserves, located 12-15 kilometers from the front line, destroyed solid wood-and-earth and reinforced concrete structures. The Germans stubbornly defended their positions. On the first day of the offensive, the 72nd Rifle Corps advanced only two kilometers, the 65th Rifle Corps advanced about four.

At dawn on January 14, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the 5th Army resumed the offensive and, having knocked the enemy out of their positions, began to slowly move west. The Nazis dozens of times rushed to the counterattack. But all their attempts to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops were reflected by well-aimed artillery fire. The enemy retreated to previously prepared positions.

3 Insterburg operation

The troops of the Red Army, overcoming resistance, approached the intermediate line of enemy defense, based on Duden, Yentkutkampen, Kattenau, where they met such fierce resistance that the infantry had to lie low. Artillerymen promptly launched a ten-minute massive attack on the main nodes of resistance, and the advanced units of the army again went forward. By the end of January 14, the troops captured the heavily fortified settlements of Duden, Yentkutkampen, Kattenau and sent a blow to Kussen.

For four days of bloody fighting, army troops broke into more than ten trenches. Having gone to a depth of up to 15 kilometers, they approached the second intermediate line of enemy defense - the Gumbinnen fortified area. It took five days to gnaw through the positions of the Gumbinnen forefield, and only on January 17 the troops were able to start storming its main zone. With the capture of this line, a free path to Insterburg was opened before the troops of the front. The Germans understood this, and therefore provided truly fanatical resistance. All approaches to settlements were mined, pitted with trenches and surrounded by a dense network of wire fences, each village was turned into a strong stronghold. But the approaches to the highway connecting Kussen with Gumbinnen were especially strongly fortified, covered with a deep anti-tank ditch and various obstacles.

On the morning of January 19, after a powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the 5th Army again went on the offensive and, overcoming enemy resistance, began to slowly move forward. By the end of the day, advanced units, with the assistance of artillery, captured several strongholds. The most successful offensive that day was the 72nd Rifle Corps, which advanced more than 10 kilometers. Now his troops came close to the last line of the Gumbinnen fortified region, which ran along the line of Pazhleigen, Wittgirren, Mallvisken, Schmilgen and Gumbinnen. The 45th Rifle Corps started a battle for Abshrutten, Ederkemen, and its 184th Rifle Division reached the eastern bank of the Aimenis River in the Uzhbollen area. =

In seven days, the army, having broken through four heavily fortified defensive lines, advanced 30 kilometers and captured hundreds of settlements, including Kattenau, Kussen, Kraupishken. At the same time, the 28th Army (the neighbor on the left) also captured several strongholds and reached the approaches to the large administrative center of East Prussia - Gumbinnen.

On the morning of January 21, more than a thousand guns and mortars brought down tons of metal on the Insterburg fortifications. The artillery cannonade lasted an hour, after which the rifle divisions, breaking the enemy's resistance, rushed forward. Under the blows of the Soviet troops, throwing fortifications, the Germans quickly retreated to the city center. The solid front was broken, the balls took on a focal character, now subsiding, now flaring up. On January 22, army troops completely captured one of the largest cities in East Prussia - the fortress city of Insterburg.

On January 23, the enemy, having lost almost all of its external defensive lines after the surrender of Insterburg, began to retreat to the Baltic Sea. Hiding behind rearguards, reinforced tanks and self-propelled artillery, he still continued to snarl.

By order of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the 5th Army, changing direction, went to Kreuzburg. On the night of January 23, the 65th Rifle Corps also received a new task: to reach the northern bank of the Pregel River, force it and develop an offensive on Ilmsdorf on the Plibishken, Simonen front.

By February 1, the advanced units of the 5th Army reached the line of Koenigsberg, Kreuzburg, Preussish-Eylau. Having met fierce resistance from the enemy, they were forced to temporarily go on the defensive in order to prepare forces and means for a new assault.

4 Mlavsko-Elbing operation

By the beginning of the East Prussian offensive, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front occupied the line of the Augustow Canal, the Beaver and Nareva rivers. Bridgeheads were at Augustow, Ruzhan and Serotsk. The main blow was to be delivered from the Ruzhany bridgehead by the 3rd, 48th, 2nd shock armies and the 5th Guards Tank Army on Marienburg. The 65th and 70th armies struck from the Serotsky bridgehead to the northwest. The 49th Army struck at Myshinets. There were well-modernized field installations and anti-tank barriers of German troops. Old fortresses (Mlava, Modlin, Elbing, Marienburg, Torun) strengthened the defense.

The terrain and the defense of the German troops did not allow breaking through in one continuous area. Therefore, between the sections of the breakthrough was from 5 to 21 km. In these areas, areas of high artillery density were created - 180-300 guns per 1 km of the front.

On January 14, 1945, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive. The Germans offered stubborn resistance, undertaking counterattacks. But the troops, with the help of two tank and mechanized corps, broke through the main line of defense on January 15, and by the end of January 16 they advanced 10-25 km and completed the breakthrough of the entire tactical defense of the Nazis. In connection with the improvement of the weather from January 16, Soviet aviation began to operate actively. During the day, she made more than 2,500 sorties.

On January 17, in the zone of the 48th Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the gap. During the day, the tank army increased the depth of the breakthrough to 60 km and reached the Mlavsky fortified area. In the early days, up to 85% of the front's aviation forces were involved in assisting the successful offensive of the tank army. Therefore, several concentrated air strikes were carried out on the railway junctions of Ortelsburg, Allenstein and Neidenburg. The concentration of the main efforts of aviation on the right wing of the front made it possible to disrupt the regrouping of the Germans and provide effective support to the tank army. The rapid offensive of Soviet tanks thwarted the counterattack of the Nazis, which was being prepared from the areas of Ciechanow and Pshasnysh.

Developing the offensive, Soviet troops bypassed the Mlava fortified area from the north and south and captured Mlava by the morning of January 19. The troops of the left wing of the front by this time had reached the approaches to Plonsk and captured Modlin. The main forces and reserves of the 2nd German Army were destroyed.

On the morning of January 19, the troops of the center and left wing of the front, with the active support of aviation, went over to the pursuit of German troops, deeply covering the right flank of the East Prussian grouping. Under the threat of encirclement, on January 22, the German command began the withdrawal of troops from the Masurian Lakes region to the northwest. However, already on January 25, the mobile formations of the Red Army, bypassing Elbing from the east, reached the Frichess Haff Bay and cut off the main land communications of Army Group Center. The Germans could communicate with the troops operating beyond the Vistula only along the Frische-Nerung spit.

On January 26, formations of the 2nd shock army broke into Marienburg. By this time, the troops of the left wing of the front had reached the Vistula and, in the Bromberg area, captured a bridgehead on its western bank.

5 Hejlsberg operation

On February 10, 1945, the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an operation to destroy the largest German grouping concentrated around the Heilsberg fortified area, southwest of Koenigsberg. The general idea of ​​the operation was as follows. The 5th Guards Tank Army was to advance along the Frichess-Haff Bay in order to prevent the withdrawal of the Heilsber group to the Frische-Nerung Spit (Baltic / Vistula Spit), and also to exclude the evacuation of German troops by sea. The main forces of the front were to advance in the general direction of Heiligenbeil and the city of Deutsch-Thirau.

At the beginning of the operation, the offensive developed extremely slowly. The reason for this was immediately many factors: the stretching of the rear, the short time for preparing the offensive, the extremely dense defense of the enemy, besides, bad weather did not allow the use of aviation. About 20 German divisions resisted our troops here, gradually squeezing the encirclement. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were supported by the aviation of the 1st Air Army. The greatest success was achieved by the 28th Army, which was able to capture a large defensive stronghold and an important transport hub - the city of Preussisch-Eylau. But this did not change the overall picture. The pace of advance did not exceed 2 kilometers per day.

Particularly fierce battles unfolded for the transport hub and the powerful stronghold of the defense of the city of Melzak. The assault on the city lasted four days. It was only on February 17 that Melzac was captured.

On March 13, the 3rd Belorussian Front resumed offensive operations against enemy troops blockaded southwest of Koenigsberg. The operation resumed after a 40-minute artillery preparation, at the initial stage it was not possible to connect aviation, the weather did not allow it. But, despite all the difficulties and the stubborn resistance of the German troops, the defense was broken through.

By mid-March, Soviet troops came close to the city of Deutsch-Thirau. The enemy desperately resisted, the battles were stubborn. On the approach to the city, the enemy organized a well-planned defense: to the right of the road at a dominant height were four anti-tank defense batteries on direct fire, to the left in the forest three self-propelled guns and two anti-tank guns were camouflaged. It was impossible to get around the height because of the heavily swampy terrain around it. It remained only to knock the enemy out of the forest and from a height. At dawn on March 16, the tank company went on a breakthrough. In this battle, 70 enemy soldiers, one self-propelled and 15 anti-tank guns were destroyed. A few days later, another city was taken - Ludwigsort.

On March 18, after some improvement in weather conditions, aviation of the 1st and 3rd air armies joined the offensive. This circumstance significantly increased the pressure on the German defense. The bridgehead occupied by the Heilsber Group was steadily narrowing. By the sixth day of the offensive, it did not exceed 30 kilometers along the front and 10 kilometers in depth, which allowed our troops to completely shoot through it with artillery.

On March 20, 1945, the top military leadership of the Wehrmacht decided to evacuate the 4th Army by sea to the Pillau (Baltiysk) region. However, the troops of the Red Army, intensifying the onslaught, thwarted the plans of the German command.

On March 26, 1945, German troops began laying down their arms. On March 29, the Heilsber grouping of the Wehrmacht ceased to exist, and the entire southern shore of the Frichess Huff Bay came under the control of Soviet troops.

6 Königsberg operation

The German command took all possible measures to prepare the fortress city of Koenigsberg for long-term resistance under the siege. The city had underground factories, numerous military arsenals and warehouses. In Konigsberg, the Germans had three rings of defense. The first - 6-8 kilometers from the city center - consisted of trenches, an anti-tank ditch, barbed wire and minefields. On this ring there were 15 forts (built by 1882) with garrisons of 150-200 people, with 12-15 guns. The second ring of defense ran along the outskirts of the city and consisted of stone buildings, barricades, firing points at crossroads and minefields. The third ring, in the center of the city, consisted of 9 bastions, towers and ravelins (built in the 17th century and rebuilt in 1843-1873).

The garrison of the fortress city consisted of approximately 130 thousand people. It was armed with about 4,000 guns and mortars, as well as over 100 tanks and assault guns. To strike at Koenigsberg, Soviet troops concentrated 137,000 soldiers and officers, over 5,000 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,400 aircraft in the city area.

On April 2, 1945, the 3rd Belorussian Front, in preparation for the assault on Koenigsberg, began an operation to destroy defenses and long-term fortified firing points. The massive artillery bombardment lasted 4 days. The aviation of the front and the Baltic Fleet also participated in the operation.

On April 6 at 12 noon, after a powerful artillery attack on the advanced positions of the Germans, the Sotsk troops went on the offensive. The formations of the 11th Army of General Galitsky and the 43rd Army of General Beloborodov went on the offensive. At noon, after an artillery and air raid, the infantry went on the attack. By the end of the day, the forces of the 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards Army were able to break through the fortifications of the outer contour of Koenigsberg and reach the outskirts of the city. On April 7, fierce battles for the city continued. By evening, more than 100 city blocks were cleared of the enemy, 2 forts were captured.

On the morning of April 8, the weather improved, which made it possible to use aviation in full force. 500 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army brought down a real hail of powerful bombs. Having received support from the air, the assault troops of the armies moved steadily towards the city center. During this day, another 130 city blocks were cleared of German troops, and 3 forts were taken. By the evening of April 8, the main station and the port of the city were cleared of the enemy.

During the entire offensive, a lot of work had to be done by sapper-engineer formations. In the city, not only roads were mined, but also large buildings, the undermining of which was supposed to create powerful blockages. As soon as a house or enterprise could be liberated from the enemy, sappers immediately set about clearing it.

On the night of April 9, the Soviet armies advancing from the north and south united, thereby the Königsberg group was cut in two.

On April 9, 1945, the commandant of the fortress, General O. Lash, ordered the surrender. During April 9-10, Soviet troops accepted the surrender of the German garrison. Nevertheless, for several more days our subunits had to resist enemy units that did not want to lay down their arms.

7 Zemland operation

After the assault on Koenigsberg, only the Zemland task force remained in East Prussia, which occupied the defenses on the peninsula of the same name. In total, the strength of the German group reached about 65 thousand soldiers and officers, supported by 12,000 guns and mortars, as well as approximately 160 tanks and self-propelled guns. The peninsula was well fortified, and abounded with strongholds of resistance.

By April 11, 1945, the Red Army troops concentrated to break through the German defenses on the Zemland Peninsula. Four armies were involved in the operation: the 5th, 39th, 43rd and 11th Guards, in which there were over 110 thousand soldiers and officers, 5200 guns and mortars, 451 rocket artillery installations, 324 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.

On the night of April 12, Vasilevsky, the front commander, suggested that the German troops lay down their arms. There was no response from the German command.

At 8 am on April 13, after a powerful artillery raid, the troops of the front went on the offensive. Already on April 14, under the onslaught of Soviet troops, German troops began to retreat to the port city of Pillau. By April 15, the northwestern part of the peninsula was completely cleared of German troops.

On April 17, the port city of Fishhausen (Primorsk) was taken by a swift blow of the 39th and 43rd armies. By April 20, the remnants of German troops with a total strength of about 20 thousand people were entrenched in the Pillau area. Relying on a defensive line well prepared in engineering terms, the Germans put up stubborn resistance. The Germans fought with the bitterness of the doomed, they had nowhere to retreat. In addition, in its northern part, the peninsula was very narrow, which completely leveled the advantage of the advancing forces. For 6 days there were fierce battles for Pillau. On April 25, Soviet troops still managed to break into the outskirts of the city. By the evening of the same day, the red flag of victory was raised over the last bastion of East Prussia.

With the end of the Zemland operation, the East Prussian operation also ended. The campaign lasted 103 days and became the longest operation of the last year of the War.

In October 1944, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky carried out the Gumbinnen-Goldap operation. During the operation, Soviet troops broke through several German defensive lines, entered East Prussia and achieved a deep advance, but they failed to defeat the enemy grouping. The first attempt by the Soviet troops to defeat the East Prussian enemy grouping and take Königsberg led only to partial success. In East Prussia, German troops, relying on powerful defenses, offered exceptionally skillful and stubborn resistance.

The situation

By the beginning of September 1944, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, during the Belorussian strategic offensive operation (Operation Bagration), reached the near approaches to the borders of the most important German region - East Prussia. In September - October 1944, the main hostilities went north, where Soviet troops carried out the Baltic offensive operation (). Chernyakhovsky's troops, in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of August 29, 1944, began to equip positions along the Raseiniai - Raudane - Vilkavishkis - Lyubavas line. From north to south, the troops of the 39th, 5th, 11th guards, 28th and 31st armies were located.

The German command on this 200-kilometer section of the Eastern Front had 12 infantry divisions of the 3rd Panzer and 4th Armies. They were reinforced by various reinforcement units and separate units. This made it possible to quite well cover the main Gumbinnen-Insterburg operational direction. However, almost all German troops were located in the first echelon. Despite the importance of East Prussia for Germany, the German command could not allocate even minimal forces to the operational reserve. The heavy fighting of the summer campaign resulted in huge losses. In addition, stubborn battles continued in other directions. The German command expected that the Red Army, if it went on the offensive, would strike the main blow in the Siauliai-Raseiniai sector, that is, in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front. Also, high hopes were placed on the defensive system of East Prussia and on the developed system of unpaved highways and railways, airfields. Developed communications allowed the German command to quickly transfer troops to the breakthrough area, which were located at a considerable distance from it. At the same time, the developed airfield network made it possible, even with a lack of aircraft, to create a significant grouping in the desired area, using the airfields of Tilsit, Insterburg, Gerdauen, Letzen and Koenigsberg.

On September 24, 1944, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front received an order to organize an offensive in the Memel direction in order to reach the Baltic Sea and cut off the withdrawal routes of Army Group North troops from the Baltic. On October 5, Soviet troops went on the offensive and five days later they reached the Baltic coast and the border of East Prussia. The troops of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front also took part in the Memel operation. The 39th Army traveled about 60 km in six days and invaded East Prussia in the Tuarage-Sudargi sector. The 5th Army advancing south reached the Sloviki area. As a result, conditions were created for the further offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in East Prussia.

Map source: Galitsky K. N. In the battles for East Prussia

German forces and defense system

The German command, in order to prevent further deterioration of the strategic situation in the entire northern direction, sought to strengthen the defense in the area of ​​Tilsit and Koenigsberg. In the first half of October, the control of the parachute-tank corps of the Luftwaffe "Hermann Goering" with the 2nd parachute-motorized division (2nd parachute tank grenadier division "Hermann Goering") was hastily transferred from Germany to the Tilsit region. In the Shillenen area, the 349th Infantry Division, which had arrived from the 4th Army, and one regiment of the 367th Infantry Division, were introduced into the first echelon. Formations of the 20th Panzer Division were transferred to the Schillen direction from the reserve of the command of the ground forces. By October 14, the 61st Infantry Division was transferred from Courland to the Gumbinnen area. The German infantry began to prepare defensive positions east of the city.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the German 4th Army under the command of General of the Infantry Friedrich Hossbach and the 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Colonel General Erhard Raus. They were part of Army Group Center under the command of Colonel General Georg Hans Reinhardt. Taking into account the forces transferred to their disposal, the German 4th and 3rd tank armies were significantly strengthened. The troops of the army of Raus held the defense in the northern, seaside direction - from Palanga (the Baltic coast) to Sudarga. The army consisted of 9 divisions and 1 motorized brigade. The formations of the left flank and center of Hossbach's army occupied positions from Sudarga to Augustow. Here the defense was held by 9 divisions, one tank and one cavalry brigades. The remaining formations of the 4th Field Army held positions in front of the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front. The right flank of Hossbach's army closed the approaches to East Prussia from the southeast.

The German command was going to defend East Prussia - the most important part of the German Empire, to the last soldier. It should be noted that the combat area, due to its natural conditions, was convenient for defense. East Prussia was saturated with natural obstacles, especially rivers, which narrowed the possibilities for maneuver of our large military groupings, slowed down the pace of their movement and allowed the enemy to retreat, to organize defense on new, pre-prepared lines.

East Prussia. Autumn 1944

German troops had in East Prussia, both ancient, medieval fortifications, and relatively new ones, from the time of the First World War. After the defeat of Germany in the war of 1914-1918. the Entente powers forced Berlin to destroy the defensive lines in the west, but in East Prussia they were allowed to remain. As a result, the old fortifications were not only preserved, but also significantly expanded. Since 1922, the Germans resumed work on equipping defensive structures in East Prussia and continued them until 1941.

In 1943, having suffered crushing defeats near Stalingrad and on the Kursk Bulge, the German command launched work in the border zone to improve the old and build new defensive lines. As the situation on the Eastern Front worsened and the Soviet troops approached the borders of the Third Reich, these works were carried out even more actively. To equip defensive lines, they used both field troops and the special construction organization Todt, as well as the local population and prisoners of war (up to 150 thousand people).

When erecting fortifications, German engineers skillfully took into account the peculiarities of the terrain. All the main defensive lines, located 15-20 km from one another, tried to equip along the ridges of the dominant heights, the banks of reservoirs, ravines and other natural obstacles. All major settlements were prepared for all-round defense. Defensive structures were covered with rubble, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers, minefields. So, the average density of mining was 1500-2000 minutes per 1 km of the front. The defense was created in such a way that if one line was lost, the Wehrmacht could immediately gain a foothold on the other, and the Soviet troops had to organize an assault on a new defensive line.

In the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front there were three fortified areas - Ilmenhorst, Heilsberg, Letzensky, as well as the Königsberg fortress. In total, on the outskirts of Königsberg, there are nine fortified zones, up to 150 km deep. Immediately before the state border, German troops equipped an additional field-type fortifications with a total depth of 16-20 km, which consisted of one main and two intermediate defensive lines. It was a kind of foreground of the defensive zone of East Prussia. The additional lane was supposed to exhaust, bleed the Soviet troops so that they could be stopped on the main line.

The border defensive zone consisted of two defensive zones with a total depth of 6-10 km. The most powerful defense was in the Stallupene-Gumbinnen direction, near the Kaunas-Insterburg road. So, here, only on an 18-kilometer stretch, the Germans had 59 reinforced concrete structures (24 pillboxes, 29 shelters and 6 command and observation posts). The cities of Shtallupenen, Gumbinnen, Goldap, Darkemen and some large settlements were turned into serious centers of resistance. The German Fuhrer repeatedly personally visited the defensive lines in East Prussia, raising the morale of the soldiers. Almost all of East Prussia was turned into one huge fortified area.

Operation plan and preparation

The exit of Soviet troops in the central direction to the Narew and Vistula rivers by mid-September 1944 created the conditions for an offensive along the shortest Warsaw direction to the most important centers of the Third Reich. However, for this it was necessary not only to break the resistance of significant enemy forces, but also to solve the problem of the East Prussian grouping of the Wehrmacht. In order to improve the offensive capabilities in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to conduct an operation in East Prussia in order to weaken the enemy forces in the Warsaw direction, pulling German reserves from there to the Tilsit-Königsberg direction, and if the operation was successful, take Königsberg, the most important stronghold of Germany on east.

On October 3, 1944, the Headquarters instructed the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front to prepare and conduct an offensive operation in order to defeat the Wehrmacht's Tilsit-Insterburg grouping and capture Königsberg. By the beginning of hostilities, the 3rd Belorussian Front had 6 armies (including one air army). In total, about 400 thousand people. Directly at the point of impact were the troops of three armies (5th, 11th Guards and 28th).

The main blow was to be delivered by the adjacent flanks of the 5th and 11th Guards Armies from the Vilkavishkis area to Stallupenen, Gumbinnen, Insterburg and further to Koenigsberg. On the 8th-10th day of the operation, the Soviet troops planned to reach the line Insterburg - Darkemen - Goldap. Further, the troops of the two armies were to advance on Allenburg and Preis-Eylau, and also to allocate forces for an offensive from the south to Königsberg. The 28th Army was in the second echelon of the front. The 39th Army was to reinforce the main attack on the right wing of the front, and the 31st Army on the left wing.

By decision of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Chernyakhovsky, a strike force from the 5th, 11th Guards and 28th armies (27 divisions) struck at a front section of 22-24 km. This made it possible to create an artillery density of 200-220 barrels and at least 25-30 tanks per 1 km of the front. After breaking through the enemy defenses and defeating the main forces of the left wing of the 4th German army, the Soviet troops, in cooperation with the forces of the 39th and 31st armies, were to occupy Insterburg and advance into the Preis-Eylau area. Further, in cooperation with the forces of the 1st Baltic Front, they planned to capture Königsberg. In the second echelon of the front, in addition to the formations of the 28th Army, there was the 2nd Separate Guards Tank Tatsinsky Corps. By October 14, the troops of the front were to complete preparations for the operation.

Thus, from the very beginning, the plan of operation had weaknesses. The forces of one front could not destroy the defenses of the huge East Prussian fortified area. The plan of the Gumbinnen-Goldap operation was reduced to one main blow in the Gumbinnen direction. The German command expected a strike in this direction, the main defensive fortifications of the Wehrmacht were located here. Already on October 14, the German command began to take measures to strengthen the defense in the Gumbinnen direction. A blow in this direction led to unnecessary losses in people and equipment, to a loss in the pace of the offensive. The flank armies - the 39th and 31st, had an excess number of troops for an auxiliary offensive. The front command abandoned concentric strikes with the aim of encircling the enemy in his operational defense zone. In general, the front experienced a shortage of mobile formations necessary for the development of an offensive after breaking through the enemy defenses, tanks and large-caliber artillery.

Operation start. Breakthrough of the border line of defense

Starting from October 10-12, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front began to move to the forefront. Command, headquarters occupied advanced command and observation posts, artillery - areas of firing positions. The starting position was occupied by divisions of the first and second echelons and tank units. The main role in breaking through the German defenses was to be played by the 11th Guards Army.

On the night of October 16, Soviet aviation began to strike at enemy strongholds and firing positions. At the same time, the search groups of the divisions of the first echelon clarified the position of the enemy on the front line of defense and captured the “tongues”. The reconnaissance detachments of the advanced divisions were the first to enter the battle. They found that the German command did not withdraw troops, and the soldiers still occupy the main line of defense and are concentrated mainly in the second and third lines of trenches. Additional enemy firing points were discovered. The German command, suspecting the beginning of the Soviet offensive, responded with artillery shelling of Soviet positions.

October 16, 1944 at 9 a.m. 30 min. artillery preparation began. The main artillery forces were concentrated in the breakthrough areas of the 11th Guards and 5th Army under the command of Kuzma Galitsky and Nikolai Krylov. First, a volley of guards mortars covered the enemy positions, then all the artillery opened fire. Army artillery fired to a depth of 5 km, and long-range artillery struck to a depth of 10 km. After 70 minutes of continuous fire, the artillery moved the fire into the depths of the enemy's defenses. The guns, which were placed on direct fire, continued to fire at enemy positions on the front line. At 11 o'clock the final stage of artillery preparation began. Again, the main focus of the gunners was on the front line of the German defenses. Artillery fire supplemented the crushing blow of the aircraft of the 1st Air Army under the command of Timofey Khryukin.

At 11 o'clock the infantry and tanks went on the offensive. The troops followed the barrage and were supported from the air by attack aircraft. Due to the morning fog, visibility was limited, so part of the enemy firing positions survived. German guns, mortars and machine guns opened rapid fire on the battle formations of the advancing troops of the first echelon. Therefore, the remaining firing positions of the enemy had to be subjected to additional artillery and air strikes. The battle immediately took on an extremely stubborn and protracted character. The Germans stubbornly resisted.

The advanced divisions of the 11th Guards Army, breaking through the first and second lines of trenches, rushed to the third, where the main enemy forces were located. Here the Germans had a significant number of artillery batteries, including anti-tank guns, and did their best to prevent the Soviet troops from breaking through into the depths of their defense. However, at 12 noon. 30 min. Soviet troops also occupied the third line of trenches. Tank units played an important role in breaking through the German defenses.

Further progress stalled. Parts of the enemy's 549th and 561st infantry divisions, which were on the defensive in the first echelon, withdrew to an intermediate line, where regimental and divisional reserves were already deployed. At the same time, tanks, assault guns and anti-tank artillery were brought up from the depths of the German defense. Having occupied pre-prepared and well-camouflaged positions, the German troops gave a powerful rebuff to the advancing Soviet units. They also successfully used tank and artillery ambushes to fight Soviet armored vehicles. Therefore, units of the Soviet 153rd tank brigade suffered serious losses. The attacks of the infantry units also bogged down. The German command pulled up additional infantry units and a tank battalion to the place of the planned breakthrough. At the same time, the Germans regrouped field artillery, and it began to support its troops from the depths of the defense. German aviation also became more active.

The Soviet command organized an air strike. At 13 o'clock. 30 min. units of the 26th and 31st divisions went on the attack with tanks of the 153rd brigade, supported by two regiments of self-propelled guns and attack aircraft from the air. However, the Soviet troops suffered heavy losses and were unable to break through the German defenses. In addition, the Germans organized several strong counterattacks. The German command tried at all costs to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops and continued to bring new forces into battle. Only after the second echelons of the corps were brought into battle was the offensive continued.

By 15 o'clock the 11th army of Galitsky advanced 4-6 km in depth and up to 10-13 km along the front. The Germans continued to resist fiercely, but were forced to retreat to new positions. The German command, having determined the place of the breakthrough, transferred additional forces to the battle area and began to prepare a counterattack. The command of the 11th Guards Army, in order to maintain the pace of the offensive, brought into battle an army mobile group - the 1st Guards Rifle Division and the 213th Tank Brigade. The beginning of its offensive was supported by artillery and air strikes. The Germans responded with strong counterattacks. The 213th brigade suffered heavy losses. So, during a fierce battle, the brigade commander, Colonel M. M. Klimenko, the commanders of the 1st and 2nd battalions, captains G.P. Sergeychuk and N.A. Kurbatov, fell. In the 2nd Battalion, all company commanders died a heroic death. The 1st Guards Division also failed to have a significant impact on the development of the offensive. The command of the division lost control of the battle, the artillery lagged behind. The infantry, without the support of artillery and tanks, was unable to develop the offensive.

During the day of heavy fighting, Galitsky's army broke through the enemy's front in a 10 km section and advanced 8-10 km deep into his defenses. The enemy's main line of defense was overcome. However, the Soviet forces were unable to breach the operational integrity of the German defenses. The German command quickly transferred reserves, consolidated its battle formations in the main direction, regrouped artillery and organized strong counterattacks. In fact, the Soviet troops were forced to attack the strong positions of the enemy head-on, gnaw through his defenses meter by meter, and organize assaults on new fortified lines and strongholds. The Germans were pressed, but they could not inflict a decisive defeat on them.

On October 17, the 11th Guards Army, repulsing fierce enemy counterattacks (the German command brought up additional forces, including the 103rd tank brigade and the Norge tank battalion), stormed the heavily fortified Virbalis defense center. By the end of the day, the troops of the army of Galitsky in the center and on the left flank broke through the second intermediate line of defense of the enemy and moved forward 16 km. The right flank of the army advanced 14 km. In just two days, the army expanded the breakthrough to 30 km. The German command reacted to the successes of the Soviet troops by the fact that on October 17, the emerging tank corps "Hermann Goering" was given the task of reaching the area in the Gumbinnen area (the first units began to be transferred as early as October 14).

The neighboring 5th Army also went on the offensive on October 16, broke through the enemy defenses in a 10-kilometer section, and advanced 10-16 km in two days of heavy fighting. On October 17, the 31st Army went on the offensive. She advanced 8 km in a day of fighting.

On October 18, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, continuing to fight heavy battles with enemy forces and repel numerous counterattacks, by the evening took the large Kibartai stronghold and broke through the enemy’s border line of defense, entering the territory of East Prussia. During the day, the troops of the Galitsky army advanced 6-8 km to the west and reached the German line of defense along the Pissa River. Thus, in three days of intense battle, the formations of the 11th Guards Army advanced 22-30 km in depth, the breakthrough front reached 35 km. The army troops broke through the main and two intermediate lines of enemy defense. The neighboring 5th and 31st armies advanced 15-28 km by the end of October 18. At this, the first stage of the Gumbinnen-Goldap operation was completed.

One of the most significant operations carried out by the Red Army in 1945 was the assault on Königsberg and the liberation of East Prussia.

Fortifications of the Grolman upper front, the Oberteich bastion after the surrender /

Fortifications of the Grolman upper front, Oberteich bastion. Courtyard.

Troops of the 10th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front occupy the city of Mühlhausen (now the Polish city of Mlynary) during the Mlavsko-Elbing operation.

German soldiers and officers taken prisoner during the assault on Koenigsberg.

A column of German prisoners is walking along the Hindenburg-Strasse in the city of Insterburg (East Prussia), towards the Lutheran Church (now the city of Chernyakhovsk, Lenin Street).

Soviet soldiers carry the weapons of their dead comrades after the battle in East Prussia.

Soviet soldiers are learning to overcome the barbed wire.

Soviet officers visiting one of the forts in the occupied Koenigsberg.

Machine-gun crew MG-42 firing near the railway station of the city of Goldap in battles with Soviet troops.

Ships in the frozen harbor of Pillau (now Baltiysk, Kaliningrad region of Russia), late January 1945.

Koenigsberg, Tragheim district after the assault, damaged building.

German grenadiers are moving towards the last Soviet positions near the railway station of the city of Goldap.

Koenigsberg. Barracks Kronprinz, tower.

Koenigsberg, one of the fortifications.

The air support ship "Hans Albrecht Wedel" receives refugees in the harbor of Pillau.

Advanced German detachments enter the city of Goldap in East Prussia, which was previously occupied by Soviet troops.

Koenigsberg, panorama of the ruins of the city.

The corpse of a German woman killed by an explosion in Metgethen in East Prussia.

The Pz.Kpfw. belonging to the 5th Panzer Division. V Ausf. G "Panther" on the street of the town of Goldap.

A German soldier hanged on the outskirts of Königsberg for looting. The inscription in German "Plündern wird mit-dem Tode bestraft!" translates as "Whoever robs will be executed!"

A Soviet soldier in a German Sdkfz 250 armored personnel carrier on a street in Koenigsberg.

Units of the German 5th Panzer Division are moving forward for a counterattack against the Soviet troops. District Kattenau, East Prussia. Tank Pz.Kpfw ahead. V Panther.

Koenigsberg, barricade on the street.

A battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns is preparing to repel a Soviet tank attack. East Prussia, mid-February 1945.

German positions on the outskirts of Koenigsberg. The inscription reads: "We will defend Koenigsberg." Propaganda photo.

Soviet self-propelled guns ISU-122S is fighting in Koenigsberg. 3rd Belorussian Front, April 1945.

German sentry on the bridge in the center of Koenigsberg.

A Soviet motorcyclist passes German self-propelled guns StuG IV and 105-mm howitzers abandoned on the road.

A German landing ship evacuating troops from the Heiligenbeil pocket enters the harbor of Pillau.

Koenigsberg, blown up pillbox.

Destroyed German self-propelled gun StuG III Ausf. G against the background of the Kronprinz tower, Königsberg.

Koenigsberg, panorama from the Don tower.

Kenisberg, April 1945. View of the Royal Castle

German StuG III assault gun shot down in Koenigsberg. In the foreground is a dead German soldier.

German vehicles on Mitteltragheim street in Koenigsberg after the assault. To the right and left are StuG III assault guns, in the background is a JgdPz IV tank destroyer.

Grolman upper front, Grolman bastion. Before the surrender of the fortress, it housed the headquarters of the 367th Wehrmacht Infantry Division.

On the street of the port of Pillau. German soldiers being evacuated leave their weapons and equipment before being loaded onto ships.

A German 88 mm FlaK 36/37 anti-aircraft gun abandoned on the outskirts of Koenigsberg.

Koenigsberg, panorama. Don Tower, Rossgarten Gate.

Königsberg, German bunker in the Horst Wessel Park area.

Unfinished barricade on Duke Albrecht Alley in Königsberg (now Telman Street).

Koenigsberg, destroyed German artillery battery.

German prisoners at the Sackheim Gate of Koenigsberg.

Koenigsberg, German trenches.

German machine-gun crew in position in Koenigsberg near the Don tower.

German refugees on Pillau Street pass by a column of Soviet self-propelled guns SU-76M.

Konigsberg, Friedrichsburg Gate after the assault.

Koenigsberg, Wrangel tower, moat.

View from the Don Tower to the Oberteich (Upper Pond), Koenigsberg.

On the street of Koenigsberg after the assault.

Koenigsberg, Wrangel tower after the surrender.

Corporal I.A. Gureev at the post at the border marker in East Prussia.

Soviet unit in a street fight in Koenigsberg.

Traffic controller sergeant Anya Karavaeva on the way to Koenigsberg.

Soviet soldiers in the city of Allenstein (now the city of Olsztyn in Poland) in East Prussia.

Artillerymen of Lieutenant Sofronov's Guards are fighting on Avaider Alley in Koenigsberg (now - Alley of the Brave).

The result of an air strike on German positions in East Prussia.

Soviet soldiers are fighting on the outskirts of Koenigsberg. 3rd Belorussian Front.

Soviet armored boat No. 214 in the Konigsberg Canal after the battle with a German tank.

German collection point for defective captured armored vehicles in the Königsberg area.

Evacuation of the remnants of the division "Grossdeutschland" in the area of ​​Pillau.

Abandoned in Koenigsberg German technology. In the foreground is a 150 mm sFH 18 howitzer.

Koenigsberg. Bridge across the moat to Rossgarten Gate. Don tower in the background

Abandoned German 105-mm howitzer le.F.H.18/40 in position in Königsberg.

A German soldier lights a cigarette at a StuG IV self-propelled gun.

A destroyed German tank Pz.Kpfw is on fire. V Ausf. G "Panther". 3rd Belorussian Front.

Soldiers of the Grossdeutschland division are loaded onto makeshift rafts to cross the Frisches Haff Bay (now the Kaliningrad Bay). Balga Peninsula, Cape Kalholz.

Soldiers of the division "Grossdeutschland" in positions on the Balga Peninsula.

Meeting of Soviet soldiers on the border with East Prussia. 3rd Belorussian Front.

The bow of a German transport sinking as a result of an attack by Baltic Fleet aircraft off the coast of East Prussia.

The pilot-observer of the reconnaissance aircraft Henschel Hs.126 takes pictures of the area during a training flight.

Destroyed German assault gun StuG IV. East Prussia, February 1945.

Seeing Soviet soldiers from Koenigsberg.

The Germans inspect a wrecked Soviet T-34-85 tank in the village of Nemmersdorf.

Tank "Panther" from the 5th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht in Goldap.

German soldiers armed with Panzerfaust grenade launchers next to the MG 151/20 aircraft gun in the infantry version.

A column of German Panther tanks is moving towards the front in East Prussia.

Broken cars on the street taken by storm Koenigsberg. Soviet soldiers are in the background.

Troops of the Soviet 10th Panzer Corps and the bodies of German soldiers on Mühlhausen Street.

Soviet sappers walk down the street of the burning Insterburg in East Prussia.

A column of Soviet IS-2 tanks on a road in East Prussia. 1st Belorussian Front.

A Soviet officer inspects a German self-propelled gun "Jagdpanther" shot down in East Prussia.

Soviet soldiers are sleeping, resting after the battles, right on the street of Koenigsberg, taken by storm.

Koenigsberg, anti-tank barriers.

German refugees with a baby in Königsberg.

A short rally in the 8th company after reaching the state border of the USSR.

A group of pilots of the Normandy-Neman air regiment near the Yak-3 fighter in East Prussia.

A sixteen-year-old Volkssturm soldier armed with an MP 40 submachine gun. East Prussia.

Construction of fortifications, East Prussia, mid-July 1944.

Refugees from Königsberg moving towards Pillau, mid-February 1945.

German soldiers at a halt near Pillau.

German quad anti-aircraft gun FlaK 38, mounted on a tractor. Fischhausen (now Primorsk), East Prussia.

Civilians and a captured German soldier on Pillau Street during garbage collection after the end of the fighting for the city.

Boats of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under repair in Pillau (now the city of Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad region of Russia).

German auxiliary ship "Franken" after the attack of Il-2 attack aircraft of the KBF Air Force.

Explosion of bombs on the German ship "Franken" as a result of the attack of Il-2 attack aircraft of the KBF Air Force

A breach from a heavy shell in the wall of the Oberteich bastion of the fortifications of the Grolman Upper Front of Koenigsberg.

The bodies of two German women and three children allegedly killed by Soviet soldiers in the town of Metgeten in East Prussia in January-February 1945. Propaganda German photo.

Transportation of the Soviet 280-mm mortar Br-5 in East Prussia.

Distribution of food to Soviet soldiers in Pillau after the end of the fighting for the city.

Soviet soldiers pass through a German settlement on the outskirts of Koenigsberg.

Broken German assault gun StuG IV on the streets of the city of Allenstein (now Olsztyn, Poland.)

Soviet infantry, supported by self-propelled guns SU-76, attacked German positions in the area of ​​Koenigsberg.

A column of self-propelled guns SU-85 on the march in East Prussia.

Sign "Autoroute to Berlin" on one of the roads of East Prussia.

Explosion on the tanker "Sassnitz". The tanker with a cargo of fuel was sunk on March 26, 1945, 30 miles from Liepaja by aircraft of the 51st Mine-Torpedo Aviation Regiment and the 11th Assault Air Division of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet.

Air Force KBF aircraft bombardment of German transports and port facilities of Pillau.

The German ship-floating base hydroaviation "Boelcke" ("Boelcke"), attacked by the Il-2 squadron of the 7th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet, 7.5 km southeast of Cape Hel.

Abandoned in East Prussia self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshyuts".

The new tactics, of course, did not cancel the traditional means of defense. These included, in particular, mobile reserves. However, East Prussia did not escape the general trend towards the withdrawal of tank formations to fight for Hungary. Since Christmas 1944, Hungary has become just the Fuhrer's "fixed idea". The 4th SS Panzer Corps Gille was sent there from Warsaw, and the 20th Panzer Division was withdrawn from the 3rd Panzer Army of Raus. At the same time, it should be noted that Routh exaggerates somewhat, assessing the capabilities of his troops. Thus, he states: "In East Prussia in January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Army had only 50 tanks and about 400 artillery pieces with a complete lack of air support." At 50 tanks, he estimates the number of vehicles transferred to him shortly before the start of the Soviet offensive by the 5th Panzer Division. In fact, on January 1, 1945, the 5th Panzer Division consisted of 32 Pz.IV (+1 in short-term repairs), 40 Pz.V "Panther" (+7), 25 Pz.Jag.IV (+7), 310 APC (+25) and 9 self-propelled anti-tank guns. The number of personnel of the division (more than 15 thousand people) almost completely corresponded to the state. The combat readiness of the 5th Panzer Division was rated at the highest score - "I". This meant that it was suitable for any offensive action, not to mention defense. Prior to that, it was in the reserve of the 4th Army, and it is not clear why its combat effectiveness should have noticeably decreased during the period of an obvious lull on the front in early January 1945. The 20th Panzer Division, previously listed in the Routh reserve, had a combat capability rating of "II / I ”, i.e. slightly below the newly arrived replacement.

Routh's groans about the "total absence" of air support are also not very convincing. The German 6th Air Fleet, responsible for East Prussia and Poland, had 822 combat-ready aircraft on January 10, 1945, more than any other air fleet on the Eastern Front. Directly in the strip of the 3rd tank army of Raus in Insterburg, the III group of the 51st fighter squadron "Melders" was stationed - 38 (29 combat-ready) Bf109G on January 10, 1945. Also in East Prussia in January, units of the 3rd squadron of attack aircraft SchG3 were based.

In general, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army is very disingenuous in assessing the real defensive capabilities of his troops. In addition to the 5th Panzer Division, the 2nd Parachute Panzergrenadier Division "Hermann Goering" with 29 "Sturmgeshyuts" was subordinate to him. In general, in contrast to the beginning of the war, when the bulk of armored vehicles were concentrated in tank divisions, the final period of the war was characterized by its distribution among formations of all types. That is, tanks and self-propelled guns were distributed in 1945 among infantry, tank and motorized divisions, as well as individual units and formations. The “separate units and formations” primarily include the brigades of the Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns (see table). These brigades were attached to infantry divisions operating in key areas of defense and offensive. Unlike the most common Soviet SU-76 self-propelled guns, the German Sturmgeshütz were a dangerous opponent for any Soviet tank. Basically, in 1945, in the ranks of the Shtug brigades and divisions, there were self-propelled guns with a 48-caliber 75-mm gun.

Table

As we can see, accounting for assault gun brigades immediately gives us more than 100 armored units in the 3rd Panzer Army. In addition, since 1944, the Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns were included in the Wehrmacht infantry divisions. So, in the 1st Infantry Division, which was in the direction of the main attack of the 3rd Belorussian Front, there were 9 combat-ready StuGIIIs and another self-propelled guns were under repair. In total, in the formations subordinate to Raus, 213 Sturmgenshütz self-propelled guns of all types (StuGIII, StuGIV and StuH) were listed as combat-ready on 12/30/44 or 01/15/45. In a word, the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Army frankly comes down when he talks about the means he had to counter the Soviet offensive. The defending German units had quite numerous, strong and hardly vulnerable to artillery anti-tank weapons.

2nd Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, consisting of seven combined arms armies, one tank army, one mechanized, two tank and one cavalry corps and one air army, received the task by directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220274 of November 28, 1944. - On the 11th day of the offensive, take control of the Myshinets, Willenberg, Naydenburg, Dzialdovo, Bezhun, Bielsk, Plock line and then advance in the general direction to Nowe Miasto, Marienburg.

The front delivered the main blow from the Rozhany bridgehead with the forces of four combined arms armies, one tank army, one tank and one mechanized corps in the general direction to Pshasnysh, Mlava, Lidzbark. The supply of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front from the north was supposed to be carried out by the offensive of one combined arms army on Myshinets.

The front was to strike the second blow with the forces of two combined arms armies and one tank corps from the Serotsky bridgehead in the general direction of Naselsk, Belsk. In order to assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Warsaw grouping, the 2nd Belorussian Front was tasked with part of its forces to strike around Modlin from the west.

In eight armies and front-line units of the 2nd Belorussian Front, there were 665,340 people by the beginning of the operation. Taking into account the rear units and institutions, as well as the Air Force, the number of Rokossovsky's troops was 881,500 people. 1186 tanks and 789 self-propelled guns were subordinate to the front, including 257 tanks and 19 ° self-propelled guns in the 5th Guards Tank Army and 607 tanks and 151 self-propelled guns in tank, mechanized and cavalry corps of front subordination. The 2nd Belorussian Front had 6,051 guns of 76.2 mm and above, 2,088 anti-tank guns, 970 rocket artillery installations, and 5,911 mortars of 82 mm and 120 mm caliber.

The enemy of the 3rd Belorussian Front was the 2nd Army. Although it did not have the portly name "tank", its capabilities were quite comparable to the Routh army. Its mobile reserve was the 7th Panzer Division. It was not the strongest tank formation at that time. On January 1, it consisted of 27 PzIV, 28 Pz.V "Panther" and 249 armored personnel carriers. Also in the zone of the 2nd Army, the tank corps "Grossdeutschland" could be involved. His fate will be discussed below.

Traditionally for the Wehrmacht in 1945, a considerable amount of armored vehicles was concentrated in separate parts (see table).

Table

In addition, Sturmgeshyuts self-propelled guns were in abundance in the composition of the infantry formations of the 2nd Army. So, in the direction of the main attack of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 7th Infantry Division had 13 StuGIV. In total, the 2nd Army had 149 Sturmgeshuts self-propelled guns (in brigades and divisions of infantry divisions).

The operation began on January 13 with the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The next day, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched an offensive. Low cloud cover and dense fog in the first days of the operation did not allow the use of aircraft and reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire, which could not but affect the rate of penetration of the enemy's tactical defense zone. This was already almost commonplace for the operations of the Red Army in winter campaigns. With poor visibility, both the brilliant "Uranus" and the unsuccessful "Mars" began. However, in East Prussia the situation was almost the worst. According to the figurative expression of the commander of the 39th Army, I.I. Lyudnikov, then it was "nothing is visible beyond the gun barrel." The weather was favorable in only one respect - the frost-bound ground provided complete cross-country ability for tanks in almost any off-road terrain.

The assault on East Prussia by Chernyakhovsky's troops was preceded by several days of war of nerves. Raus recalled: “From Lvov’s experience, I knew that strong nerves and cold calculation were required in order not to tire our small troops with premature retreats and not suffer heavy losses from artillery fire if such an order was late. On January 11, we noticed a clear decrease in Russian combat activity, and troop movements were noticeably reduced. The soldiers of the 3rd Panzer Army were nervous, waiting for the order to withdraw, which would save them from the furious fire of enemy artillery, but I did not give this order.

The next day, January 12, seemed even more peaceful and calm. The war of nerves has reached its climax. Raus later wrote: “Our observers did not notice any signs that would allow us to determine the day the Red Army offensive began. On the other hand, radio interception data and reports from night reconnaissance aircraft left no doubt that large columns of Russian troops were moving towards concentration points, artillery batteries had taken up their positions, and tank units had advanced to their starting lines. Therefore, I decided on January 12 at 20.00 to transmit the code order "Winter Solstice", according to which the retreat began. The evacuation of the first two lines went quietly, and our troops took up combat positions. After 3 hours, General Mautsky (commander of the XXVI Corps) informed me that the movement was completed, he was at the new command post and the communication system was working normally. Information about the upcoming offensive and the time of its start also came from several defectors from the Soviet side. It is difficult to say what motivated these people in January 1945, when they moved towards the German trenches, but there were indeed such cases.

Tanks T-34-85 on the street of one of the cities of East Prussia.

Being practically certain that the Soviet offensive was about to begin, the Germans also conducted artillery counter-preparation. It was one of the few cases of counter-training during the entire war. Raus recalled: "I immediately gave the order to the artillery of the 3rd Panzer Army at 05.30 to open fire, concentrating it on the two main collection areas of the Soviet infantry." Soviet sources confirm this event. Commander of the 11th Guards Army K.N. Galitsky recalled: “I hear the growing rumble of frequent artillery fire and the roar of close explosions. He looked at the dial - the fourth hour. Really preempted?! Some projectiles burst very close. This is guessed not only by the sounds, but also by the crimson flashes on the gray waves of fog. According to Galitsky, "as a result of a preemptive fire strike by the Germans, units of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army suffered some losses in the area of ​​Schilleningken, Schvirgallen."

The experience of the war was tracked on both sides of the front. The Soviet command knew about the possible withdrawal of the Germans from the advanced positions. Therefore, the offensive of the first echelons of the rifle corps of the 39th and 5th armies was preceded by the actions of the forward battalions. The battle of the advanced battalions, which began at 6.00 am on January 13, managed to establish that only insignificant enemy forces occupied the first trench, and its main forces were withdrawn to the second and third trenches. This information made it possible to make some amendments to the artillery preparation plan.

At 11.00, after artillery preparation, the infantry and tanks of the shock group of the front went on the offensive. It immediately became clear that the artillery did not decide the course of the battle. A significant part of the enemy's firepower remained unsuppressed. They had to be knocked out by means of the advancing infantry. Therefore, the offensive of the shock group of the front on the first day of the operation developed extremely slowly. By the end of the day, the troops of the 39th and 5th armies had captured only the second and partly the third trenches, wedged into the enemy defenses for 2–3 km. The offensive developed more successfully in the zone of the 28th Army. By the end of the day, the troops of General Luchinsky advanced up to 7 km, and only the 54th Guards Rifle Division broke through the main line of defense, although it did not complete the task of the day. On the first day of the offensive, not a single formation of the front's shock group completed the tasks laid down in the operation plan.

In positional battles, the causes of failure are most often hidden at the tactical level, in the plane of action of small subunits. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the events of the first day of fighting, descending to the tactical level. The 144th Rifle Division of the 5th Army received a breakthrough section 2 km wide. The depth of the task of the day for the division was six times greater - 12 km. The total number of personnel of the division on January 13 was 6545 people. The divisions were assigned to the 81st Separate Heavy Tank Regiment (16 IS tanks) and the 953rd Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (15 SU-76s). The division was also assigned a company of minesweeper tanks. The average density of artillery in the breakthrough areas reached 225 guns and mortars and 18 NPP tanks per 1 km of the front.

The offensive of the division began on the morning of 13 January. After artillery preparation, which lasted 1 hour and 40 minutes, the 81st tank and 953rd self-propelled artillery regiments began to attack from their original positions. With the approach of tanks and self-propelled guns to the advanced trenches, the 612th and 449th rifle regiments of the division went on the offensive. The 785th Rifle Regiment was in the second echelon.

At 11.00 battalions of the first echelon broke into the first trench on the move. Moving forward, parts of the division reached the second trench. It was covered from the front with barbed wire on low steel stakes, anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. Here they met organized resistance from enemy infantry, as well as heavy artillery and mortar fire. The division's advance was delayed. During the battle, it was found that the enemy in the first trench had only cover (up to 1/3 of the forces), and on the night of January 13 he withdrew the main forces to the second trench. At the same time, it turned out that during the artillery preparation, manpower and firepower in the second trench were not sufficiently suppressed.

Raus wrote about these events: “Only at 10.00 (Berlin time) advanced enemy units approached the main combat position. All the guns of General Matzka fell upon them, as well as the Nebelwerfer brigade, and the Russian infantry lay down. Strictly speaking, "lay down" did not last long. The commander of the 144th division reported the situation to the corps commander and asked him to suppress enemy artillery in the zone and on the flanks of the division with the fire of the corps artillery group. Artillery was also ordered to unleash its power on enemy firing points in the second trench and the nearest depth. After artillery treatment of enemy firing points at the encountered enemy positions, the regiments of the first echelon resumed the offensive and broke into the second trench. Soon the third trench succumbed to the onslaught of the infantry. However, further artillery had to change positions and by 17.00 the advance stopped. The regiments of the first echelon of the 144th division, having prepared an attack in a limited time, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, attacked the second position of the enemy. However, they no longer had success, retreated to their original position and began to gain a foothold, conducting a firefight and reconnaissance of the enemy.

During the day, the 144th division managed to advance only 3 km in depth. The reason for the failure to complete the tasks was simple. The reconnaissance failed to reveal the withdrawal of the main enemy forces from the first trench, as a result of which the main efforts of the artillery were concentrated on the first trench. The commission of the headquarters of the 5th Army, which tested the effectiveness of artillery and mortar fire during the period of artillery preparation, established that the first trench of the enemy was subjected to the greatest fire impact. So, direct hits in the first trench fell through 50–70 m, and in the second trench they were noted as an exception - out of 14 targets to be destroyed (observation posts, dugouts, etc.), only four had one direct hit each.

From the very beginning, the operation plan provided for the continuation of hostilities at night. Long winter nights gave the Germans the opportunity to organize defense at a new frontier. In this regard, the corps commander ordered the commander of the 144th Infantry Division to capture the city of Kattenau during the night, located at a height dominating the surrounding area. This would set the stage for the second echelon of the corps to be brought into action the next morning. To capture Kattenau, the division commander decided to introduce his second echelon - the 785th rifle regiment. Preparations for a night attack were carried out in a hurry, tasks for units and subunits were set in the dark, mainly on the map. The interaction of infantry with artillery and neighbors was not clearly organized. The regiment of the second echelon did not reconnoiter the routes to the initial area for the attack in advance. The units of the regiment reached their starting positions late. Here they came under enemy artillery fire. Under fire, some commanders, including the regimental commander, were wounded and out of action. As a result, the attack of the 785th Infantry Regiment failed, and the regiment was withdrawn to the rear to be put in order. The division did not fulfill the task of capturing Kattenau.

Similar shortcomings were in other armies. The commander of the 39th Army, Lyudnikov, noted in his order: “Combat control in formations was organized according to a template, without taking into account the changed weather. In conditions of fog, instead of the maximum approach to the forward units, the controls broke away from them, there was no observation of the battlefield. Tanks and self-propelled artillery lagged behind the infantry and were not pushed through. Companies and battalions were not given the necessary amount of artillery for direct fire. As a result, firing points that interfered with movement were not suppressed.

Considering all this, the front commander demanded: “By the morning of January 14, 1945, to establish clear control at all levels and the interaction of all branches of the military. Command and observation posts of divisional and regimental commanders should be brought as close as possible to combat formations. Reinforce companies as much as possible with direct-fire escort guns. Have all sapper equipment in infantry combat formations and ensure proper guidance for them to quickly clear minefields.

Surrender of the remnants of the Allenstein garrison.

On the morning of January 14, the mobile reserve of the German 3rd Panzer Army, the 5th Panzer Division, pulled up from the depths. Its units launched a series of strong counterattacks. As a result, the shock grouping of the front resumed the offensive only at 12.30. The intensified enemy fire and frequent counterattacks delayed the advance of the infantry, which led to its lagging behind the tanks and the slow pace of the offensive. Therefore, during the day of January 14, the strike force of the front advanced only 1–2 km.

The slow advance deprived the Soviet troops of the main advantage of the side with the initiative - the uncertainty of its plans for the defender. Having determined the direction of the main attack of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the German command began to withdraw its units from passive sectors and transfer them to the breakthrough sector. So, for example, units of the 56th Infantry Division were pulled up to the breakthrough site from the Schillenen area. During the preparation of the offensive, units of the 152nd UR covered themselves from it. Now the passivity of the UR allowed the Germans to freely withdraw troops from this area. From the Gumbinnen area, units of the 61st Infantry Division were brought up to the breakthrough site. In addition, brigades of assault guns and anti-tank artillery were traditionally transferred for the Germans.

Nevertheless, the superiority in forces and the experience gained by 1945 and the technique of warfare did their job. Overcoming enemy resistance, the front's strike force broke through the main line of defense by the end of January 15. During the three days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front only managed to break through the enemy's main line of defense and advance in depth from 6 to 10 km. At the same time, the enemy, at the expense of his reserves and units that had withdrawn from the main line of defense, managed to occupy the second line of defense (the Gumbinnen defensive line).

At 11.40 on January 16, the troops of the front resumed the offensive, but this time the enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance. The progress was extremely slow. Fierce battles ensued for every house, for every section of the trench and strong point. Only by 13.00 the troops of the 5th Army captured the first trench of the Gumbinnen defensive line, but again met stubborn enemy resistance in front of the second trench. The Soviet infantry and tanks, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles and repulsing counterattacks, hardly moved forward. There was a clear threat that the offensive might stop, despite the fact that the enemy defenses were already thoroughly shaken. A new strong push was required, which would ensure a breakthrough of the weakened, but still retaining the ability to resist defense and would allow the second echelon (11th Guards Army and 1st Tank Corps) to be brought into battle. Chernyakhovsky decided to use the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of General A.S. Burdeyny. It was a strong connection with strong traditions, a veteran of Stalingrad, Kursk and Bagration. General Burdeyny received an order to strike in the zone of the 5th Army. However, the advancing tanks met strong fire resistance from the enemy and started protracted battles with him, while suffering heavy losses. By the end of the day, the tank brigades of the corps advanced only 1–1.5 km.

During the four days of the Soviet offensive, although the enemy's tactical defense zone was not broken through, the defenders suffered significant losses and exhausted their reserves. This circumstance forced the German command to decide on the withdrawal of the left wing of the XXVI Army Corps, which was defending the line south of the river. Neman. Thus, the length of the defensive line was reduced, and infantry units were released. They were supposed to be used against the shock group of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In addition, this section of the German defense was deeply outflanked by the penetration of the troops of the Soviet 39th Army.

The withdrawal of troops from a well-established line of defense is a complex maneuver that requires a lot of organizational work. Noticing the retreat of the enemy, the 39th Army immediately began to pursue. Also, the direction of introducing another reserve of Chernyakhovsky into battle was changed - the 1st tank corps of General V.V. Butkov. At first, they planned to throw him against the same line as Burdeiny's corps, that is, in the zone of the 5th army. Most likely, this would lead to senseless losses. Despite the often arising desire of commanders and commanders to bring into battle "one more battalion", after the impact of which the enemy's defense should collapse, most often these inputs resembled throwing fresh firewood into the stove. Instead, Butkov's tanks were brought into the flank and rear of the retreating XXVI German Corps in the zone of the 39th Army on the morning of January 18. The offensive developed successfully. A few hours later, the tanks crossed the Inster River and cut the Tilsit-Insterburg railway. On the night of January 19, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was deployed in the same direction.

The 39th Army, using the success of the 1st Tank Corps, accelerated its advance on January 18th. Having fought up to 20 km, she also went out with her main forces to the river. Inter. The troops of the 5th and 28th armies on that day advanced to a depth of 3 to 8 km. Aviation played its role in undermining the enemy's defenses. Since January 16, the weather has improved significantly. This made it possible to actively use the aviation of the 1st Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin, which made 3468 sorties on January 16 and 17. Routh noted with annoyance: “The threat became even more serious, as Russian aircraft appeared, and immediately in large quantities. They bombed cities, roads, command posts, artillery positions - in general, everything that only moved.

By the end of January 18, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, as a result of six days of intense fighting, broke through the enemy defenses in the Königsberg direction north of Gumbinnen to a depth of 20-30 km and along the front up to 65 km. This created the conditions for the entry into battle of the second echelon of the front - the 11th Guards Army and the development of an offensive on Königsberg. This result was achieved only on the sixth day of the operation, while according to the plan of the front, the withdrawal of troops on the river. Inster was envisaged on the third day of the offensive.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive on January 14, a day later than their neighbor. Here the Germans could also use the above technique with a retreat to the second trench (position) described above. However, Rokossovsky had reason to believe that this would not happen. Later in his memoirs, he described the course of his thoughts as follows:

“It happened more than once before that the enemy, even before our artillery preparation, withdrew his troops into the depths so that we would use up ammunition in an empty place. Now he is unlikely to go for it. He has a strong position, replete with strongholds and permanent fortifications with forts, it is true, of the old type, but well adapted for defense. A voluntary withdrawal of the enemy from these positions would only make our task easier. And he, of course, will not dare to leave them. Well, we will pick out the Nazis from their concrete holes. We have enough strength."

However, the process of "picking out" was not easy. The reason for this, as on the 3rd Belorussian Front, was the fog brought from the Baltic. Front commander K.K. Rokossovsky recalled:

“On January 14, a few hours before the start of artillery preparation, I, members of the Military Council, commanders of artillery, armored forces, air army, and the head of the engineering troops of the front arrived at the observation post. It has already dawned, but nothing is visible: everything is hidden by a veil of fog and wet snow. The weather is disgusting, and the forecasters did not promise any improvement. And the time was approaching for the departure of bombers to strike at the enemy's defenses. After consulting with K.A. Vershinin (commander of the air army. - A.I.), I give the order to cancel all actions of aviation. Let the weather down! It’s good that we didn’t particularly count on it, although until the last hour we cherished the hope of using aviation.

At 10:00 a.m. artillery preparation began. Due to thick fog, which limited visibility to 150-200 m, the results of artillery fire were not observed, and the air preparation for the attack had to be abandoned. After a fifteen-minute fire raid on the forward edge and the most important objects in the tactical depth of the enemy's defense, the advanced battalions went on the attack. They quickly overcame the minefields and barbed wire of the enemy and broke into his first trench. By 1100 hours, the advanced battalions had captured the second line of trenches, and in some areas even the third.

At 11.25 am, the first-echelon rifle divisions, supported by artillery and in cooperation with tanks, went on the offensive. Due to poor observation conditions, a significant part of the enemy artillery and mortars was not suppressed. The advancing troops, overcoming the strong fire resistance of the enemy and suffering heavy losses, slowly moved forward. By the end of the day, the troops of the 3rd, 48th and 2nd shock armies, advancing from the Rozhany bridgehead, wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 3 to 6 km. The troops of the 65th and 70th armies, advancing from the Serotsky bridgehead, fought all day in the enemy's main line of defense. The advance of their troops into the depth of the enemy's defense did not exceed 3-5 km.

Unlike the Vistula bridgeheads, which were quickly "opened" on the same days by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, East Prussia stubbornly resisted the onslaught of the Soviet troops. In the front line of Rokossovsky, the strike groups did not fulfill the tasks set on the first day of the offensive, just like in his neighbor Chernyakhovsky. Instead of the advance rate of 10–12 km planned on the first day of the operation, the troops advanced only to a depth of 3–6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was not broken through in any of the offensive sectors. The slow pace of the offensive, as in the 3rd Belorussian Front, was due to a number of subjective and objective reasons. First of all, due to poor meteorological conditions, the front could not use its advantage in aviation, which on that day was completely inactive. Meteorological conditions also significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. The strengthening of the German defense with heavy tanks also played a role. At the junction of the 2nd shock and 48th armies, the fresh 507th battalion of heavy tanks operated, numbering 51 combat-ready "tigers" by the start of the fighting (namely, "tiger", not "King Tiger"). Two companies of this battalion supported the 7th Infantry Division, another company supported the 299th Infantry Division. The tankers of the 507th "tiger" battalion announced the destruction of 66 Soviet tanks in the first two days of fighting, without their losses. Knowing about the presence of "tigers" in the defending 507th battalion, to read the words in Rokossovsky's memoirs "strongly helped her (infantry. - A.I.) SU-76 self-propelled guns”, frankly, creepy. Also in the zone of the Soviet offensive, three brigades of "Sturmgeshyutsev" (190, 276 and 209th) operated.

The SU-76 convoy enters the streets of Mühlhausen. Only a few kilometers are left to the Frisch Gaff Bay.

The not too high rate of penetration of the defense forced Rokossovsky to resort to a tried and tested method - "breaking through" the enemy's defense with tank formations. The question of whether or not to use the success development echelon to break the defense was discussed at a meeting of the command staff of the Red Army in December 1940. It caused a lively discussion. During the war, each commander decided what to do according to the situation. I.S. Konev. In January, Rokossovsky followed his path. In order to speed up the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, by order of the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, on January 15, the 8th Guards Tank Corps (in the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock Army) and the 1st Guards Tank Corps (in the offensive zone 65 th army). This was only the first step: from the morning of the next day, that is, on January 16, the 8th mechanized corps was brought into battle in the 48th Army zone. The corps were introduced into battle at a depth of about 5 km from the former front line in stripes up to 6 km wide.

The large mass of tanks was a strong argument. Overcoming enemy resistance, the 8th and 1st Guards Tank Corps, with their forward detachments, together with the infantry, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main line of defense on January 15, advancing to a depth of 5 to 8 km during the day of the battle.

However, by and large, the use of tank and mechanized corps was justified. The fact is that January 15 was also marked by the introduction of mobile defense reserves into battle. Fighting them only with close infantry support tanks would not be the best solution. More precisely, the German command launched its first reserve, the 7th Panzer Division, into counterattacks on January 14th. To the east of the city of Pshasnysh, on January 15, the German command used another of its mobile reserves - the tank-grenadier division "Grossdeutschland". It was an elite formation of the Wehrmacht, on January 10, the division consisted of 60 Panthers, 19 Tigers, 36 light and 189 medium armored personnel carriers. "Grossdeutschland" was also subordinated to a battalion of radio-controlled tankettes with 26 "Sturmgeshütz" as control vehicles. This division was the first of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps, the reserve of Army Group Centre. The introduction of other divisions of the corps could significantly complicate the conditions of the Soviet offensive.

However, the success of the 1st Belorussian Front still influenced its northern neighbor. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, General Otto Heidkemper, wrote in his diary:

"January 15. At 3:00 am, General Wenck, by telephone from the army headquarters in Zossen, ordered me to immediately send the Grossdeutschland Panzer Corps to Army Group A. I informed Wenck that the transfer of our last reserves would spell disaster. This means a breakthrough by the Russians of the defense of the 2nd Army, to which we will not be able to oppose anything. Wenk replied that a breakthrough had already taken place south of the Vistula and that this rapid release of reserves was more relevant there. I objected that in that case we should hold out here and the enemy would soon be bogged down in the south. But Wenck only became more restless and impatient. He said that there was no need to wake the commander (Army Group Center. - A.I. ), protests are meaningless, the movement is carried out on the personal orders of the Führer.

In the end, a compromise was made. As part of the Great Germany tank corps, two divisions went to the Lodz region to rescue the collapsed front. These were the Brandenburg Panzergrenadier Division (formed in the autumn of 1944) and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. Already involved in the battle, the division "Grossdeutschland" remained in East Prussia. However, in any case, the withdrawal of two mobile formations from the defenders of East Prussia was a serious blow to the defensive capabilities of Army Group Center. The counterattack of the “Great Germany” that was left alone was not successful, and in the future the division retreated to the north, conducting containment battles. The counterattacks of the 7th Panzer Division in the Ciechanów area were also unsuccessful.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front achieved their greatest success during January 16. On this day, they advanced 10–25 km, completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone. Moreover, the troops of the 2nd shock army captured a large enemy stronghold on the right bank of the river. Narew - the city of Pultusk, and the 65th Army captured the stronghold of Naselsk and cut the Ciechanow-Modlin railway.

The successful offensive of the ground forces on January 16 was facilitated by massive strikes by assault and bomber aircraft of the 4th Air Army of Colonel General of Aviation K.A. Vershinin. In connection with the improvement of the weather, the aviation of the front carried out more than 2,500 sorties that day and dropped about 1,800 tons of bombs.

Thus, as a result of three days of fighting, the troops of the front broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy on the front of 60 km and advanced to a depth of 30 km. The nearest operational reserves of the enemy were destroyed. All this created favorable conditions for the introduction of a tank army into the breakthrough and the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one.

By the time the enemy's tactical defense zone was breached, the 5th Guards Tank Army concentrated in a waiting area north of Vyshkow, having made a 150-kilometer march in two nights (January 14 and 15). Prior to that, she was quite far from the front, on the Bialystok meridian. This both kept its very presence secret, and misled the enemy as to the direction of its use. On the afternoon of January 16, Rokossovsky ordered the commander of the tank army, Colonel General of the Tank Forces V.T. Volsky to be ready on the morning of January 17 to send troops into a breakthrough in the 48th Army zone. The task of Volsky's army was to develop the offensive in the general direction of Mlawa, Lidzbark approximately along the axis of the Warsaw-Marienburg railway. The main forces of the tank army were supposed to reach the Mlawa region by the morning of January 18, and by the morning of January 19 to capture Naidenburg, Dzialdov.

At 12.00 on January 17, the 5th Guards Tank Army began to enter the gap and at 15.00 at the turn of Zalese, Paluki passed the battle formations of the troops of the first echelon of the 48th Army. The entry of the tank army into the gap was provided by the assault aviation corps and artillery of the 48th army. From the point of view of the use of tank armies in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, this was an almost unprecedented move. Most often, tank armies were introduced not even into a breakthrough, but into battle. When entering the breakthrough, this happened on the second day of the operation at most. Here the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the gap only on the fourth day of the offensive.

Self-propelled guns SU-85 on the shore of the Frisch-Gaff Bay in Tolkemite. East Prussia is cut off.

Late entry into battle at the same time gave undoubted advantages. By the time the tank army advanced to the line of entry into the breakthrough, the 8th mechanized corps captured the Grudusk road junction and entrenched itself on it. The 8th Guards Tank Corps captured a large road junction Ciechanow and, in cooperation with the aviation division supporting it, tied up the enemy's 7th tank division in battle. Combined-arms formations of the 48th and 3rd armies advancing behind the 8th mechanized corps tied up "Great Germany" in battle. All this provided very favorable conditions for the actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which, without encountering serious resistance, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, advancing up to 60 km in the first day.

The powerful tank fist naturally created the conditions for the rapid advance of the combined arms armies of the Rokossovsky shock group. Having traveled 15 km in a day of fighting, the troops of the front captured large enemy points - the cities of Ciechanow and Nowe Miasto (15 km northwest of Nasielsk).

On January 18, continuing to develop the offensive in the Mlava direction, the main grouping of the front bypassed the Mlava fortified area from the north and south, and by the morning of January 19, tank troops, in cooperation with formations of the 48th Army, captured the city of Mlava. It was a city whose name is associated with one of the first battles of World War II. Long before the events described, in the first days of September 1939, German tank units suffered heavy losses in battles with Polish units that had settled in the fortifications of the Mlavsky UR. The Germans failed to repeat this battle, turning it 180 degrees. Mlava was taken quickly enough, and the German 2nd Army failed to cling to its fortifications.

Thus, by the end of January 18, the strike groups of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts completely broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and created conditions for the development of success in the directions of Königsberg and Marienburg. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 20 to 30 km and along the front up to 65 km, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - to a depth of 30 to 60 km and along the front up to 110 km. The average rate of breaking through the enemy defenses was: for the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front - 3-5 km per day, and for the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - from 6 to 12 km per day. As we can see, the difference in rates is quite noticeable.

The heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer fires a salvo with her main caliber.

The difficult conditions of the situation and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, who relied on heavily fortified terrain, caused relatively high losses among the advancing troops. So, for example, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front during the period of breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy lost over 37 thousand killed and wounded; troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front - more than 27,200 people. Absolute numbers should not be misleading. The average daily loss of people in the 2nd Belorussian Front reached almost 1.3% of the combat strength of the front. On the 3rd Belorussian Front, the situation was noticeably worse. Of the six combined arms armies, three armies (39th, 5th and 28th) advanced in the direction of the main attack. The average daily losses in these armies amounted to over 1.5% of their combat strength. The 5th Army suffered the greatest losses (12,769 men). Its average daily losses reached 2.2%.

Nevertheless, the defense of the German 2nd and 3rd tank armies was broken through. The enemy, having been defeated in the tactical defense zone in the directions of the main attacks of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts and having committed all available reserves into battle, began to withdraw. The commanders of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts took measures to organize and pursue the enemy in the Koenigsberg and Marienburg directions. The second stage of the operation began. The flying weather that had settled since January 19 allowed the aviation of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts to launch more active combat operations.

On the morning of January 19, the troops of the center and left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front proceeded to pursue the defeated 2nd German Army. The tanks and motorized infantry of the 5th Guards Tank Army, rushing north, reached Neidenburg by the end of the day and thus crossed the border of East Prussia. The troops of the 48th and 2nd shock armies also successfully pursued the enemy. On this day, their main forces advanced up to 30 km and reached the line of Dzyaldovo, Bezhun.

The situation was so favorable that opportunities opened up not only for tanks, but also for cavalry. Rokossovsky decided to use the success in the 48th Army's zone and introduce Oslikovsky's 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps into the gap in this direction. Based on the plan of the operation and the current situation, the corps was given the task of reaching the line of Willenberg, Neidenburg by January 20 and subsequently advancing on Allenstein. On the morning of January 19, the corps was introduced into the breakthrough. At 17.00 he captured Yanov and led the attack on Allenstein. Breaking away from the advanced units of the 3rd and 48th armies by 20-25 km, the corps significantly contributed to the success of these armies.

The 4th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground forces. During January 19, she flew 1,820 bomber and attack aircraft sorties.

A particularly important role at this stage of operations was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army. She was to be the first to go to the Frisch-Gaff Bay in the Elbing area and cut off all land communications of the East Prussian enemy grouping.

Fulfilling the assigned tasks, on January 20, the troops of the front captured the junctions of the highways and railways of Niedenburg and Lidzbark. The 5th Guards Tank Army, after capturing Naidenburg, developed an offensive on Osterode. The troops of the left wing of the front advanced more than 40 km in a day, capturing the cities of Serpts, Belsk, Vyshogrud. The rapid advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front led to the loss of the last trump cards by the Germans. From the composition of the 507th battalion of "tigers" during the retreat, 19 tanks were lost or even simply blown up by the crews due to breakdowns or lack of fuel. By January 21, out of 51 "tigers" by the beginning of the Soviet offensive, 29 vehicles remained in service. Soon, they also melted away in the chaos of the retreat - on January 30, only 7 tanks remained in service. Most of the lost tanks were abandoned or blown up during the withdrawal by their own crews.

Aviation of the 2nd Belorussian Front on January 20 also successfully supported the troops, making 1744 sorties per day.

As a result of the rapid advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the Elbing, and the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Koenigsberg directions, a situation was created in which the German 4th Army, which had previously operated in the Masurian Lakes region, was deeply engulfed from the flanks. The position of the 4th Army caused a heated discussion between the command of Army Group Center and the High Command. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center Geidkemper wrote in his diary:

"January 20th. The situation in which the 4th Army holds its forward position now looks completely absurd. At 8.30 pm the chief (commander of Army Group Center Georg Reinhardt. - A.I.) again explained to the Fuhrer the reasons that make the retreat of the 4th Army an urgent necessity. “My Fuhrer,” the chief began, “serious concern for East Prussia compels me to turn to you personally again. In my judgment, we must reckon with a large-scale attack on East Prussia. The captured map of the enemy shows that the Russian 5th Guards Tank Army with four tank corps is marching on Danzig. The forces of the 2nd Army that we can oppose to this are so weak that they cannot hold out. The second danger now is an enemy breakthrough in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army. If the Russian Guards Tank Army breaks through, we will be attacked in the rear, where there are no troops at all. Hitler's reply was lightning fast: "It is a long discussion whether the waste of power is released or not." He stayed with his mind."

As a result, the withdrawal of the 4th Army was again prohibited. In compensation, Hitler promised the command of Army Group Center the 4th Panzer Division, transported by sea from Courland. It was difficult to object to such a proposal - the mobile formation was obviously better than the infantry divisions released as a result of the withdrawal of the 4th Army. Later that day, Reinhardt approached Guderian with the same question of recusal, but was again refused. On January 21, everything happened again. This time, only Guderian fought off Reinhardt's insistent requests, persuading the commander of Army Group Center to follow Hitler's orders. The promised 4th Panzer Division had not yet arrived. However, her arrival could not radically change the situation. Only on the morning of January 22, during another conversation with Hitler, did Reinhardt manage to snatch permission to withdraw the 4th Army. From the lips of the Fuhrer, finally, the words "I give permission to withdraw ..." sounded.

According to Soviet data, the withdrawal of the 4th Army from the line of Gumbinnen, Augustow, Lomzha began already on the night of January 22. Perhaps the army commander Hossbach began to withdraw on his own initiative. The retreat of the enemy in a northwestern direction was timely detected by the reconnaissance of the 50th Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Rokossovsky, with undisguised annoyance, wrote in his memoirs: “The command of the 50th Army did not notice this maneuver in time and continued to report to the front headquarters that the enemy was holding on tight. Only two days later, reconnaissance in force showed that there was an empty place in front of the army. The last small groups of Nazis hurriedly left to the north. Such an omission could not be forgiven the commander. The chief of staff, General F.P., took command of the 50th Army. Ozerov".

So he lost the post of commander I.V. Boldin, who in June 1941 was deputy commander of the Western Front. The exit from the Minsk "cauldron" made it a kind of "unsinkable" for a long time. Despite serious claims, in particular, from G.K. Zhukov, he retained his position. The omission with the withdrawal of Hossbach's army was the last straw. The untimely transition to persecution was not an empty formality. The stretching of the no longer existing front made Rokossovsky not use the 49th Army very rationally.

To ensure the withdrawal of the 4th Army, the enemy increased resistance on the offensive front of the Soviet 49th and 3rd armies. The troops of these two armies, overcoming the increased resistance of the enemy, advanced in a northerly direction. At the same time, on January 22, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the important Allenstein railway and highway junction. Rokossovsky wrote about this episode: “Our cavalry corps N.S. Oslikovsky, breaking ahead, flew into Allenstein (Olshtyn), where several echelons with tanks and artillery had just arrived. With a dashing attack (of course, not in cavalry formation!), Having stunned the enemy with the fire of guns and machine guns, the cavalrymen captured the echelons. It turns out that the German units were relocated from the east to close the gap made by our troops. Such use of cavalry was possible due to the fact that the front's mobile formations had moved out of the web of the enemy's defensive positions into the operational space.

During January 23 and 24, the troops of the shock group of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued the rapid pursuit of the retreating enemy units. During these two days they moved forward 50–60 km. The 5th Guards Tank Army captured Mühlhausen and started fighting on the southwestern and southeastern outskirts of Elbing. Regarding the capture of the latter, Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs: “The troops could not capture Elbing on the move. A unit of our tanks that broke into the city was surrounded. Failed to rescue him. Tankers fought to the last shell, to the last bullet. They all died heroically. I.I. Fedyuninsky had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The fighting lasted for several days, until the 2nd shock captured the city.

On January 25, the mobile formations of the strike group of the front approached the Frisch-Gaff Bay. On the left wing of the front, the troops of the 70th Army reached the eastern outskirts of the fortress city of Thorn. The enemy acting in front of the 70th Army began to withdraw his troops behind the Vistula.

With the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Frisch-Gaff Bay, the main communications of Army Group Center (3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army and XX Army Corps of the 2nd Army) were cut. However, the enemy still had the opportunity to communicate with his troops, who had retreated beyond the river. Vistula, by sea - through the Danzig Bay and along the Frisch-Nerung Spit.

On January 26, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front cleared the coast of the Frisch-Gaff Bay from the enemy, occupied the city of Marienburg, and on the left wing, blocking Thorn, crossed the Vistula and captured a bridgehead on its western bank. On January 26, Army Group Center was reorganized into two groups: Army Group North, consisting of the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army, and Army Group Vistula, which included formations of the 2nd Army. Accordingly, Army Group North was renamed Army Group Courland. On the same day, January 26, both the commander of the newly minted Army Group North, Reinhardt, and his chief of staff Geidgemper, received their resignations. These positions were surrendered to Colonel General Lothar Rendulic and Major General Natzmer respectively. The Austrian Rendulich was one of the generals who enjoyed Hitler's unconditional confidence. The commander of the 4th Army, General of the Infantry Hossbach, was also removed, he was replaced by General of the Infantry Wilhelm Müller. He was destined to become the last commander of the 4th Army.

With the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the coast of the Baltic Sea, to the Vistula and the capture of the city of Marienburg, the task assigned to the troops of the front by the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 220274 of November 28, 1944 was completed. front advanced on the right wing by 50-60 km, in the center and on the left wing - by 150-170 km. In the direction of operations of the main grouping of the front, the average rate of advance per day reached 18–20 km.

While the strike force of the 2nd Belorussian Front was developing an offensive to the northwest, to the Frisch-Gaff Bay and the river. Vistula, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front continued their offensive in the Koenigsberg direction. The troops of the 39th Army had the greatest advance during January 19. The depth of advance that day reached 12–25 km. The neighbors of the 39th Army in the strike force of the front were much less successful. The troops of the 5th Army, fighting heavy battles, moved forward by 6-7 km, and the troops of the 28th Army during the day managed to push the enemy by only 1-2 km.

Despite the fact that the plan of the operation went "peddling", the situation clearly required the entry into battle of the second echelon of the front - the 11th Guards Army K.N. Galitsky. It could be introduced according to the original plan of operation at the junction of the 5th and 28th armies and used to complete the breakthrough of the German defenses in the previously chosen direction. The second option was to use the success achieved on the left flank of the 39th Army. At first, the front commander was in favor of the first option, since Galitsky's army, in essence, had already concentrated on the previously chosen direction.

Galitsky later recalled his conversation with Chernyakhovsky:

“The situation has changed significantly over the four days of fighting,” I reported to the commander. - Where the introduction of our army was planned, the troops of the first echelon of the front achieved limited success. We'll have to break through the defense. I'm afraid we'll get bogged down, we'll waste our strength here, and the enemy, taking advantage of this, will bring up new troops and we will not achieve high rates of advance, as happened with the introduction of the 28th Army in October last year.

I proposed to introduce the army into the breakthrough according to the second option, i.e., 20–25 km to the north, at the junction between the 5th and 39th armies, especially since there was a serious success on the left flank of the latter - the enemy began to withdraw troops from Lazden ledge.

- Exactly, from the ledge, which is dangerous for him, you can end up in the "cauldron", - Chernyakhovsky remarked. - Where does he take him?

- Of course, to pre-prepared positions at the turn of the river. Inter, I replied. “But, according to some reports, these positions are much weaker than those that we will be forced to break through if we leave the task unchanged.”

The downside of this decision was the need to transfer army formations up to 50 km to the north. However, the advantages of the solution proposed by Galitsky outweighed the loss of time for this maneuver. As a result, Chernyakhovsky decided to introduce the 11th Guards Army on the left flank of the offensive zone of the 39th Army, from the turn of the river. Inter. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps was also heading there. As a result, the task of the army of Galitsky became the coverage of the enemy’s still firmly held Insterburg grouping from the north and west, encirclement and destruction of it in cooperation with the rest of the forces of the front. It should be noted that at the same time, the 5th Panzer Division, which became the "reinforcement" of the German defense, was reinforced by the 505th "Tiger" battalion. It consisted of 36 combat-ready "Royal Tigers" on January 19. Their 88-mm long-barreled guns in the defense could cause a lot of trouble. On the contrary, bypassing and enveloping would cause the battalion to lose their monsters due to technical malfunctions.

The 11th Guards Army received the task of deploying to the west of the river by 0600 on January 19. Inster and by the end of January 20, take control of the Aulovenen, Neunishken line. In the future, the army had to develop an offensive on Velau.

The entry into battle of the 11th Guards Army began at 14.00 on January 20. Due to the fact that the enemy troops, shot down from the line of the river. Inster by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, continued to retreat, the divisions of the first echelon of the 11th Guards Army, without deploying their main forces, immediately began an energetic pursuit.

By the evening of January 21, the 11th Guards Army advanced up to 45 km and went out with left-flank formations to the near approaches to Insterburg, and with the troops of the right flank and center - to the Pregel River, covering the enemy's Insterburg grouping from the north and west. It should be noted that only part of the forces of Galitsky's army was deployed to Insterburg. The rest continued their advance to the west. At 23.00 on January 21, after a twenty-minute artillery preparation, the left-flank 11th Guards Army launched an assault on the city, and at 2.30 on January 22 broke into its streets. At the same time, the troops of the 5th Army also launched an offensive. At 04:00 they approached the city from the northeast, and then from the east, and at 06:00 on January 22, together with formations of the 11th Guards Army, captured Insterburg.

Having lost their well-established line of defense, the German command sought to delay the advance of the Soviet troops on the Daime and Alla rivers. To this end, the enemy began a general withdrawal of his forces in front of the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The 28th, 2nd Guards armies and the 31st army went into pursuit. However, the attempts of the 3rd Panzer Army to hold on to the Daime and Alla rivers were unsuccessful. On January 23, the troops of the 43rd and 39th armies crossed the river with part of the forces. Daime, captured bridgeheads on its western bank. It was not so difficult to do this - the river was ice-bound, and when bridgeheads were formed, the Soviet infantrymen simply ran across the Daime on the ice. It turned out to be more difficult to build bridges for heavy equipment. The muddy-bottomed creek proved to be a serious obstacle in itself. As the head of the engineering troops of the front, General Baranov, later reported: “When the first test tank was passed, the supports sat down due to the muddy soil, although the seven-meter piles were driven to a depth of six meters.” As a temporary solution, they even had to blow up the ice and launch ferries from the pontoon park. Nevertheless, the river was forced, and the offensive continued. In the following days, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th Armies crossed the river. Alla.

Having crossed these rivers, the troops of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front launched an offensive directly on Königsberg. On January 26, they approached the outer defensive contour of the fortified city. In the following days, the troops of the front fought to complete the encirclement of the Königsberg grouping of the enemy and break through the outer defensive bypass of the Königsberg fortress, after overcoming which our troops advanced to the forts of the first position, and in the south even captured one of the forts. On January 30, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, bypassing Koenigsberg from the south, cut the highway leading to Elbing.

As a result of the withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the areas northwest and south of Königsberg, the East Prussian grouping was cut into three parts. The troops of the front pressed four enemy divisions to the sea on the Zemland Peninsula, about five divisions, fortress units and a large number of separate units and subunits were actually cut off from the main forces and blockaded in the Königsberg area, and, finally, the main forces of the East Prussian grouping in the Heilsberg fortified area south of Königsberg . The last grouping, which consisted mainly of units and formations of the 4th Army, is referred to in German sources as the Heilingibei "cauldron".

On January 28, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front captured the city of Memel, a large naval base and port in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. This made it possible to relocate part of the light forces of the Baltic Fleet here and to intensify the actions of the fleet to blockade both the Courland and East Prussian enemy groupings from the sea. However, the light forces of the fleet and submarines were involved for this. As a result, the coastal flank of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was periodically subjected to shelling from the sea. Moreover, with support from the sea, the Germans launched a counterattack to improve their position. Soviet air raids on the facilities of the Königsberg Sea Canal led to the fact that transport access to the harbor was impossible. Königsberg could only be supplied by sea through the port of Pillau on the Zemland Peninsula.

Accordingly, the German command attempted to restore communication between Pillau and Königsberg. To do this, a counterattack was launched in a south-western direction by the forces of the XXVIII Army Corps from the Kranz area. On January 29 and 30, the 2nd battle group of ships under the command of Vice Admiral A. Thiele was activated to support this counterattack. It included the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, destroyers Z25 and Paul Jacobi, destroyers T23 and T33. From the area of ​​​​the Nidden lighthouse, the Thiele group fired on the troops of the 39th Army. At the same time, German floating batteries, including SAT 15 (Polaris) and Zhost, fired at the tanks of our advanced units from the Königsberg Sea Canal.

With the support of the fleet, the Germans also carried out a second counterattack, connecting Königsberg with the Heilingibeyl "cauldron". From the direction of Königsberg, the battle group of the 5th Panzer Division attacked. From the direction of Brandenburg, units of the "Grossdeutschland" division advanced towards them. On January 31, the attackers linked up in the Heide area of ​​Waldenburg. However, this German success was fleeting. By February 6, the troops of the 11th Guards and 5th armies again cut off Koenigsberg from the south, and the formations of the 43rd and 39th armies threw the enemy deep into the Zemland Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) maintained its relatively high activity off the coast of East Prussia. Non-flying weather contributed to impudence, bordering on impudence. So, on February 9, 1945, the heavy cruisers Lutzow and Admiral Scheer, escorted by destroyers Z34, Z38 and destroyers T8, T23, T28, T33, T35 and T36, fired at Soviet positions on the Zemland Peninsula. The limited space on which the German units pressed to the sea were squeezed made it possible to use the same ships in different directions. On February 9 and 10, 1945, the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, the destroyer Z34 and the destroyers T23, T28 and T36 also supported the defense of the remnants of the 4th Army in the Heilingibeyl "boiler" with fire.

It should not be thought that the Baltic Fleet was simply idle. However, the losses of submarines in 1941-1942. and the lack of their full-fledged construction in besieged Leningrad significantly limited the capabilities of the Soviet Navy. What could the KBF oppose to German surface ships? On January 22, 1945, submarines L-3 (3rd rank captain V.K. Konovalov) and K-51 left Khanko. The second went to the area of ​​the Pomeranian Bay, and its actions are of no interest for our narrative. On January 31, L-3 received an order to take up a position at Cape Brewsterort, from where enemy ships had been shelling Soviet troops since January 29. The mobility of submarines of those years, frankly, left much to be desired. L-3 entered the new area only on February 2, after successfully breaking through the corridor between Königsberg and Zemland. The next day, the boat found the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer guarding the destroyer. However, shallow depths did not allow him to attack. Captain 3rd rank V.K. Konovalov decided to place mines on the probable withdrawal route of enemy ships, but only two mines came out of the mine tube. On February 4, the destroyers T28, T35 and T36 were discovered, which were firing along the coast. L-3 attacked them, but the fired torpedoes missed the target. Since the torpedoes were used up, the submarine headed for the base.

In fairness, it must be said that not all participants in the shelling from the sea could go unpunished. The floating battery "SAT 15" ("Polaris") was launched to the bottom by attack aircraft and bombers during a raid on February 5, 1945. A submarine, a patrol boat and a number of small ships were sunk by aviation in Pillau. It should also be noted that another submarine that was at sea at that time - S-13 of captain 3rd rank A.I. Marinesko - just on January 30, Wilhelm Gustlov successfully attacked. Of course, an attack by the Admiral Scheer in the Pillau area would have been more useful, but that was how fate turned out. The attention of the Soviet Navy was scattered between Danzig, Pillau and Liepaja (the main supply port for Army Group Courland).

In the last days of January, German troops sharply increased resistance on the outskirts of Königsberg. At the same time, the German command decided to push back the Soviet troops from the Frisch-Gaff Bay with strong counterattacks and provide land communications for their East Prussian grouping. To this end, in the area between Frisch Gaff and Wormditt, the enemy created comparatively strong strike groups. On the night of January 27, they launched a series of counterattacks against the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Three infantry and one panzer divisions launched a counterattack from the area east of Wormditt. To be precise, it was not a full tank division that participated in the counterattack, but the so-called battle group "von Einem" from the 24th Panzer Division, in fact a reinforced motorized infantry regiment. The von Einem group included only 14 Pz.IVs, 10 Pz.V Panthers and 10 JgPzIVs. The main forces of the 24th Panzer Division were at that time in Hungary. Another counterattack was delivered by two infantry divisions from the area southeast of Brownsburg. In addition, about two divisions of the Germans counterattacked Soviet troops west and southwest of Melzak.

Tanks T-34-85 in the suburbs of Koenigsberg.

It should be noted that at first the enemy achieved very serious successes. His troops managed to break through the extended battle formations of the 48th Army and by the middle of the day on January 27, advance to a depth of 15 to 20 km.

In order to prevent further advance of enemy groupings and restore the situation, Rokossovsky decided to regroup the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 8th Mechanized Corps into the 48th Army zone. The 8th Guards Tank Corps was sent from the front reserve against the German group advancing in the Wormditt area. By the rapid advance of these forces into the zone of the 48th Army, it was possible at first to stop, and then to defeat the enemy strike groups. By January 31, enemy formations were thrown back to their original position.

At that time, Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front was divided into two groups. One of them was advancing on the front to the west, to Pomerania. The second occupied positions with the front to the east, forming the western face of the "cauldron" for Army Group North in East Prussia. Full control of the troops in two different, moreover, gradually moving away from each other, groupings was impossible.

In the current situation, on February 9, 1945, the elimination of enemy groupings in East Prussia was entrusted to the troops of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. For ease of control, the 50th, 3rd, 48th combined-arms and 5th guards tank armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front, operating on the Heilsberg, Wormditt, Frauenburg fronts, were transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front. In order not to turn the front into an uncontrollable monster, the 43rd, 39th and 11th Guards armies of the right wing of the 3rd Belorussian Front were included in the 1st Baltic Front. The task of defeating the German troops in the area southwest of Königsberg was assigned to the 3rd Belorussian Front, and the troops of the 1st Baltic Front destroyed the Königsberg and Zemland groupings of the enemy.

Despite the fact that the troops of the two fronts faced a long and intense struggle against the blocked, but not lost combat capability, enemy, the main task of the East Prussian operation was completed. As Marshal Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs, "the Nazi command was almost completely deprived of the opportunity to strike from East Prussia against the Soviet troops advancing in the Berlin direction."

The elimination of enemy groupings in East Prussia, taking into account operational pauses, lasted two and a half months. One of the main reasons for this was that the Soviet troops and the Baltic Fleet failed to deprive the enemy groupings of all communications. For manoeuvring, the enemy could use the Danzig Bay with its ports, the Frisch-Nerung Spit, and the seaside highway running from Königsberg to Braunsberg.

The exhaustion of the Soviet troops also had a serious impact on the delay in the liquidation of the enemy. During the previous intense battles, which lasted about a month, a large number of divisions had a significant shortage in men and military equipment. Thus, the rifle divisions of some armies lost up to half of their personnel. Tank troops lost an average of up to 50% of combat vehicles. To this should be added the fact that the beginning of the spring thaw and bad meteorological conditions made it extremely difficult to use tanks and aircraft.

The liquidation of the enemy groupings pressed to the sea by the Soviet troops was carried out sequentially: first, the largest enemy grouping, the Heilingibeyl “cauldron”, was defeated. This was followed by a blow to Königsberg itself. Finally, the enemy grouping on the Zemland Peninsula remained “for a snack”. The grouping of German troops, surrounded in the area to the south and southwest of Königsberg (Heilingibeyl "cauldron"), was the strongest. It consisted of fourteen infantry, two tank and one motorized divisions, two brigades, two divisional battle groups, two separate regiments, five separate battalions and several Volkssturm battalions.

To eliminate this grouping, the commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided first to cut off and destroy the enemy defending the ledge in the area of ​​Preussish Aylau, Bartenstein, Landsberg, and continue the offensive in the general direction of Heiligenbeil. In accordance with this decision, the 28th Army attacked from the northeast on Preussish Aylau with the task, together with units of the 2nd Guards Army, advancing from the east, to capture this strong point. From the south, in the general direction of Landsberg, the 31st Army was advancing, which was supposed to capture this city and develop an attack on Kanditten. The 2nd Guards Army, advancing from the east, was to cut through the enemy forces located in the ledge, liquidate them together with the 28th and 31st armies, and then advance on Augam. The 5th Army received the task of striking in the general direction of Tsinten.

On the morning of February 11, Chernyakhovsky ordered the armies that had newly entered the front to continue the offensive, striking in the directions: the 50th Army - on Kildenen; 3rd Army - to Melzak; The 48th Army was to reach the Melzak line and to the west, the 5th Guards Tank Army was tasked with continuing the offensive in the general direction of Braunsberg, capturing this stronghold and reaching the river. Passarguet.

The combat operations of the troops of the front to liquidate the Heilingibeyl “cauldron”, which began on February 10, were extremely tense. The rate of advance varied from 1.5 to 5 km per day. All attempts by the Soviet troops in the following days to split the encircled grouping into pieces were unsuccessful. The significant forces of the 4th Army concentrated on a relatively small area allowed the German command to close the breakthrough areas in a timely manner. During the twelve days of the offensive, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced on the right flank from 15 to 20 km and in the center up to 60 km.

Vasilevsky recalled: “On the night of February 18, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, after my report on the state of affairs in East Prussia, recommended that I go there to help the troops and command, emphasizing that the fastest liquidation of the enemy in East Prussia would allow us, at the expense of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, firstly, to strengthen the main, Berlin, direction and, secondly, to release the necessary part of the troops to prepare them for their transfer to the Far East. As we can see, it was no longer about a possible counterattack by the Germans, but about the release of forces for the decisive battle for Berlin. East Prussia has become a kind of giant "festung". To be precise, there were even three such "festungs": on the Samland Peninsula, in Königsberg and in the Heiliginbeil "cauldron".

On February 18, on the battlefield in the Melzak region, he was mortally wounded and soon died the commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. On February 21, the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. In order to unify the command of all forces located in East Prussia, the 1st Baltic Front was renamed the Zemland Group on February 24, which became part of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

By this time, the Soviet troops operating in East Prussia, due to losses, had a large shortage, especially in people. So, for example, in the 5th Army, the strength of rifle divisions did not exceed 2,700 people, and in the 2nd Guards Army - 2,500 people. In this regard, Vasilevsky suspended the offensive in order to replenish the troops with people, equipment and ammunition, and after that proceed to the final destruction of the encircled enemy grouping.

To accomplish this task, the front commander decided, firmly covering himself with the forces of the 48th Army from the side of Braunsberg, to launch simultaneous strikes from the east and southeast in the direction of Bladiau and Heiligenbeil in order to split the enemy forces and then destroy them. To do this, the armies were given the following tasks: the 11th Guards Army to strike in the direction of Brandenburg, the 5th Army - to Wolittnikk, the 28th Army - to Bladiau, the 2nd Guards Army - to Lenhefen, the 31st Army - to Bilskhefen, 3rd Army - to Heiligenbeil.

The armies were reinforced with artillery and tanks: the 5th and 28th armies - with an artillery division and three artillery brigades, the 3rd army - with five artillery and mortar brigades and three artillery regiments. Of the 594 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts that the front had by that time, 361 armored units were concentrated in the offensive zone of the 5th and 28th armies, and 150 armored units in the 3rd army zone. This ensured the density in the penetration areas of these armies up to 36 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the front.

Both sides tried to use the period of relative calm to solve offensive tasks of a local nature. As early as February 17, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, General of the Army I.Kh. Baghramyan to clear the Zemland Peninsula from the enemy. The offensive was supposed to start on February 20. However, the day before the planned offensive, the troops of the Zemland task force, which was reinforced by the 93rd Infantry Division deployed from Courland by sea, counterattacked: from the west - to Königsberg and from the east - towards Pillau. From the Königsberg area, the same 5th Panzer Division attacked, supported by 10 "tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The offensive of the German troops from the sea was supported by the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer, destroyers Z38, Z43, destroyers T28, T35. They fired at the troops of the 39th Army in the areas of Paise and Gross-Heidekrug on the southern coast of the Zemland Peninsula. On February 20, destroyers fired from the Koenigsberg Sea Canal, on February 23, two destroyers and a destroyer fired again at the positions of the Soviet troops. The submarine K-52 I.V., which was at that moment on a military campaign, Travkina was quite far away - in the area of ​​​​the Danzig Bay. In addition, the bulky "Katyusha" was not very suitable for attacks in shallow water. Smaller boat, Shch-309 captain of the 3rd rank P.P. Vetchinkina, on the same days was on her way to a position in the Liepaja region. Also, mines were laid in the Pillau area, the 8th mine-torpedo air division set up 12 mines here. However, their victims were not artillery ships, but the submarine U-367 (presumably).

As a result of three days of fighting, the enemy managed to push back units of the 39th Army from the coast of the bay and restore land communication between Pillau and Königsberg.

Preparations for the new operation took about 20 days. The offensive began on 13 March. After a 40-minute artillery preparation for the attack, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive. Rains, fogs and the soil turned into mud greatly complicated the actions of all branches of the armed forces. Under these conditions, aviation could not operate, the possibilities for using artillery were extremely limited, and tanks could only advance along roads. And yet, despite the unfavorable conditions and fierce resistance of the enemy, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front broke through its defenses in all main directions and slowly but surely moved forward.

Taking advantage of some improvement in the weather, our aviation took to the air on March 18 and, having made over 2,200 sorties in a day, contributed significantly to the success of the ground forces.

By March 19, the territory occupied by the enemy was reduced to 30 km along the front and 7-10 km in depth, and by March 24 it was 13 km along the front and 2-5 km in depth.

By the end of March 26, the coast of the Frisch-Gaff Bay was completely cleared of the enemy, and the largest center of resistance was eliminated. Only in the area of ​​​​Cape Kalholz did the remnants of the defeated German units linger, by March 29 they were liquidated by the troops of the 5th and 28th armies. During the February-March battles southwest of Königsberg, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front captured about 50 thousand people.

The consistent defeat of the encircled groupings also made it possible to consistently create a superiority in forces and means that guarantees success. Having completed the operation to eliminate the enemy's southern grouping, the Soviet command reinforced its troops operating near Königsberg and on the Zemland Peninsula with three armies (5th, 50th and 2nd Guards). With the concentration of the main efforts of the 3rd Belorussian Front against Koenigsberg and the Samland Peninsula, the need for the existence of the Zemland Group of Forces disappeared. The armies that were part of it were directly subordinate to the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The management of the group was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

After the elimination of the enemy grouping in the area southwest of Koenigsberg, large forces of Soviet troops were released to solve other problems. The 31st, 3rd and 28th armies were withdrawn to the reserve, which then took part in the Berlin operation. However, these armies, transferred after the battles in East Prussia, were by and large late for the battle for Berlin. In addition, the number of their rifle divisions was already quite low. The armies left to storm Königsberg did not take part in the battle for the German capital. The assault on this fortress city was accompanied by preparations for the Berlin operation.

The success of the East Prussian operation had a positive impact on the course of other operations of the 1945 campaign in Europe. In particular, cutting off the main forces of the Army Group Center from the rest of the German forces ensured the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, advancing in the Poznan direction, and with the exit of Soviet troops to the river. The Vistula north of Thorn created conditions for the East Pomeranian operation.

One of the characteristic features of this operation was the protracted nature of the fighting to break through the enemy's tactical defense zone. So, for example, breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy took five days in the 3rd Belorussian Front and three days in the 2nd Belorussian Front. Such a long duration of the breakthrough was due to a number of reasons. One of the reasons was that the Soviet troops had to break through strong defenses with a significant number of long-term structures. It should also be noted that, due to unfavorable meteorological conditions, our troops could not use their quantitative and qualitative advantage during the period of breaking through the enemy defenses. So, for example, in the first days of the breakthrough, our aviation almost did not operate. Altogether, from January 13 to 16, the aviation of both fronts, instead of the planned 22,600 sorties, made only 6,900 sorties. Poor meteorological conditions significantly reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire.

This trend continued in the future. During the period of persecution, from January 19 to 26, only 12.5% ​​of aviation capabilities were used. Unlike the Bagration, meteorological conditions limited the actions of aviation also during the period of destruction of encircled enemy groupings. So, for example, in the first six days of fighting south of Koenigsberg, aviation operated only one day (March 18).

However, in addition to tactical reasons, the reason for the long struggle for East Prussia was a number of operational and strategic miscalculations of the Soviet command.

First of all, in the course of breaking through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and developing pursuit, the Soviet troops failed to encircle and destroy individual groupings of the 2nd, 4th and 3rd tank armies of the enemy. Neither in the region of Tilsit, nor in the region of Insterburg, nor in the region of the Masurian lakes were there any large "boilers". Moreover, the encirclement was not even provided for by the plans of the Soviet command that were available at the beginning of the operation. They focused on cutting off the main enemy forces in East Prussia from Pomerania. Aimed at Koenigsberg, the 3rd Belorussian Front actually carried out the task of tying down German reserves. This was a kind of legacy of the experience of failure in 1914. Rennekampf-Chernyakhovsky saved Samsonov-Rokossovsky from counterattacks. No maneuvering along the internal lines in 1945, unlike 1914, was really observed. However, such a strategy, which did not provide for a strike in converging directions, had one significant drawback. The main forces of the Army Group "Center" managed to retreat to the Zemland Peninsula, to the Königsberg area and to the Heilsberg fortified area (Heilingibeyl "cauldron"). Using pre-prepared defensive positions and lines in these areas, the enemy was able to offer prolonged resistance.

Secondly, enemy groupings, isolated from land, were not firmly blocked by the Soviet fleet from the sea. As a result, enemy troops continuously received ammunition, fuel and other materiel from Germany. In the opposite direction, there was a stream of wounded and refugees, which, of course, had a positive effect on the morale of the troops locked up in East Prussia. They, at least for the time being, received a meaningful purpose for their actions. A well-known role in the protracted struggle was also played by the fact that the enemy groupings operating on the Zemland Peninsula, in Königsberg and in the Heilingibeyl "cauldron" could communicate with each other for a long time along the highway that ran along the Frisch-Gaff Bay. This was also a consequence of the relatively low activity of the Baltic Fleet, which allowed the enemy to support the counterattacks of battered units with naval artillery.

Thirdly, in the course of a protracted breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone and operations in the operational depth, the troops of both fronts suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment. So, for example, with the release of Soviet troops on the approaches to Königsberg, the average number of rifle divisions in the 5th Army did not exceed 2,700 people, in the 2nd Guards Army - 2,500 people, in the 48th Army - 3,500 people. By the beginning of March, each of the divisions of these armies had lost from 43 to 58% of its personnel. The situation with military equipment was not the best either. For example, in the 48th Army there were 127 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations by the beginning of the operation, in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 345. In early February, only 85 combat vehicles remained in service in the 48th Army, and in the 5th guards tank army - 155. In addition, most of the tank fleet of units and formations of the fronts had completely used up their motor resources by February 10 or had them running out.

In general, the successful assault on East Prussia cost the Red Army quite dearly. So, in the period from January 13 to February 10, the sanitary losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front amounted to 22% of the payroll of the front's personnel, and the average daily losses reached 0.76%. For comparison: in "Bagration" the average daily losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front did not exceed 0.4%. The 5th Army (44%) and the 28th Army (37%) had the greatest losses. In the course of further hostilities, the losses remained the same large. The losses of the 2nd Belorussian Front from January 14 to February 10 amounted to 15.4% of the front's payroll, and the average daily losses reached 0.55%. The 3rd, 48th, 65th and 70th armies suffered the greatest losses (from 19.5 to 24.3%).

The losses of armored vehicles were also high. For example, during the period from January 13 to March 29, the 3rd Belorussian Front irretrievably lost 1,189 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, which is over 93% of the presence of combat vehicles at the beginning of the operation. From January 17 to March 1, the 5th Guards Tank Army irretrievably lost about 60% of its combat vehicles.

At the same time, it must be said that the East Prussian operation can in no way be attributed to the successes achieved by "filling up with corpses." Artillery became the main tool for crushing the enemy. To some extent, this compensated for the low activity of aviation. Marshal Vasilevsky specifically noted this in his memoirs: “I will note in passing that the East Prussian operation for the consumption of ammunition was generally unparalleled among all operations in the history of wars. Two fronts received 13.3 million shells and mines, 620 million rounds of ammunition, 2.2 million hand grenades. Only on January 13-14, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front used up more than 1000 wagons of the main range of ammunition, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front only on January 14 - over 950 wagons. In total, both fronts used up more than 15 thousand wagons of ammunition. Another question is that in the conditions of the Second World War, artillery did not decide the outcome of the battle, but only created the conditions for the subsequent infantry battle.

In general, East Prussia became a kind of giant "festung", perhaps the largest in the history of the Second World War. Being surrounded and cut off from land communication with the rest of Germany, she nevertheless kept in isolation for a long time, chaining rather large forces of the Red Army to herself.