The role of military force in the foreign policy of countries is undergoing significant changes. The nature of these changes is largely determined by the new alignment of forces formed after the collapse of the USSR, the development of new technologies and forms of warfare, the disruption of the previously existing system of international relations, and the evolution of the views of the leading military powers on the methods and forms of the use of force.

The economic interests of countries become dominant. If earlier it was still possible to talk about the prevalence of ideological interests in some states, then after the collapse of the USSR, the virtual disappearance of the camp of socialism, China's increasing transition to the rails of a market economy, the struggle for economic dividends became the driving force behind the politics of almost all countries of the world. In the conditions of limited world resources, their growing scarcity as a result of population growth and world production, more and more countries are building their foreign policy on the principle of “first we will eat yours, and then I will eat mine”. NATO has included in the list of priorities the energy security of the bloc's members.

Due to the fact that economic interests become the main ones in the politics of countries, the struggle for natural resources will intensify. A striking example is the Arctic, the resources of which are already claimed by countries that do not even have access to it. China, in particular, has begun building a navy capable of operating in northern latitudes. The West is saying more and more loudly that the resources of some countries, including Russia, should belong not to them alone, but to the entire world community. Even forced, including with the use of military force, redistribution of national wealth is allowed. NATO already in its founding documents ("Guaranteed access to the public domain", etc.) requires a "fair" distribution of world resources.

The period of the "unipolar" world order with the undoubted military and political dominance of the United States is gradually ending. The United States will remain the world's most powerful player, but will increasingly have to rely on key allies and partners to guide its policies.

Speaking of a multipolar world, one should keep in mind that a multipolar system is less stable and has a large number of degrees of freedom. The more world poles, the more conflicts and blood.

At the heart of modern US foreign policy is the desire to maintain global leadership. The main document that plays the role of defense doctrine is called “Sustaining the Global Leadership of the United States: Defense Priorities in the 21st Century”.

In an effort to ensure military superiority over any potential adversary, the United States is trying to get away from the existing concept of strategic deterrence in relations with Russia. Created "lightning global strike" command. This is not a command responsible for rapid single non-nuclear strikes on a global scale (using, for example, individual ICBMs in conventional equipment), as many claim and believe, but a first strike command, strategic offensive operations using all nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. It is easy to verify this by referring not to declared political documents, but to specific doctrines and instructions for the US Armed Forces. The global missile defense being created, according to the internal documents of the US Armed Forces, should provide guaranteed defense only for the United States and its forces. The task of protecting allies and partners is present only in political declarative documents and is included there artificially, only to calm them down, and after they have begun to grumble.

In the near future, Washington will continue to seek common ground for interaction with our country in settling the Iranian and Korean problems. It is also driven to this by the need to contain China's claims to the role of a new superpower. The US political leadership would like to make the Russian Federation their partner in the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation; a member of international coalitions carrying out peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; a reliable supplier of energy resources to international markets; an employee in the implementation of large, financially demanding space programs (for example, a flight to Mars), which are ambiguously perceived by the American society.

The United States, gradually leaving the European continent for the Asia-Pacific region, is entrusting the supervision of Russia to the Europeans. This is openly spoken in the US Congress. Washington will continue to exercise general leadership, while specific steps to bring Russia closer to the West on the basis of the values ​​of the latter are entrusted to Europe. The purpose of such a rapprochement is to maximally bind the Russian Federation to the West and turn it into a country that is not a potential adversary, to which it is now ranked in official American documents. If we translate such a policy into simple language, then we should simply be strangled in an embrace.

Such an approach was recently proclaimed by Washington as an official policy towards adversaries, providing for their maximum involvement in cooperation and thus re-education on US values. If a potential adversary resists, then tougher measures are applied to him, up to military force.

The United States will continue to strengthen bilateral and multilateral military cooperation aimed at ensuring dominance in regions that are important to them (Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, Central Asia).

It is likely that regional military blocs will be created with the participation of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Persian Gulf. For example, the United States has already considered the possibility of forming a "mini-NATO" in the Asia-Pacific region on the basis of the "USA-Japan-South Korea-Australia" alliance. In addition, other configurations were analyzed: "USA-Taiwan-Philippines", "USA-Japan-South Korea-India". The main focus of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region is counteraction to China.

A military bloc with the participation of the monarchies and the United States may appear in the foreseeable future in the Persian Gulf. He is needed here to control the zone of vital US interests. The joint air defense and missile defense systems of the Persian Gulf countries and the corresponding command structures are already being created.

The US-led NATO bloc is transforming from European to global. NATO expansion will continue, including with the involvement of non-European states, in order to build up capabilities for global power projection, confrontation with the PRC and containment of Russia. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and even Colombia are already among NATO's global partners.

The North Atlantic Alliance is still regarded by the United States as the most important power institution for the implementation of the foreign policy and military strategy of the United States. It was the United States that initiated the transformation of NATO, which provides for a significant expansion of the bloc's geographic boundaries and functions, in particular, ensuring energy security. Since the United States managed to seize the initiative in reforming NATO, the transformation of the latter is focused, first of all, on a significant increase in its military capabilities, and not on the “politicization” advocated by the Europeans and in which the United States saw the danger of the alliance losing its viability. As a result of the reform, NATO should turn into an organization that, in the American sense, ensures security not only in Europe, but also in the world.

A NATO “triad” is beginning to form, repeating the American “triad” (offensive weapons - defensive weapons - supporting infrastructure), the course towards the creation of which was actually proclaimed in 2012 at the alliance's summit in Chicago.

The common nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Alliance are being formed. There is an actual unification of the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain. Considering that British nuclear forces have long been practically united with the US strategic nuclear forces, the creation of NATO collective nuclear forces, which the United States needs in the face of nuclear arms reductions and growing confrontation with China and Russia, is taking place.

The United States, together with NATO member countries, will step up efforts to counter adversaries with the help of "soft power", that is, through their internal destabilization, collapse or the establishment of controlled regimes. A good example is Ukraine, where, with the tacit consent of the United States, Germany begins to play the leading role, hiding behind the banner of the EU and trying to seriously strengthen its economic positions, and then, possibly, political ones. As you know, Germany has already quietly carried out the economic occupation of almost all the former socialist countries of Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Baltic countries).

Despite rather ambitious statements, the approach of the NATO leadership to interaction with Moscow will remain the same and will be in the nature of a compromise between the interests of the allies, who insist on the use of an “active deterrence” strategy against Russia, and members of the bloc, who advocate deepening bilateral cooperation. On the whole, it is possible to predict a model of "pragmatic partnership" between NATO and the Russian Federation, based not on common values, but on mutual interests.

In the foreseeable future, uncertainty will remain in the project of building a "united" Europe. The amorphism of the current EU as an independent global political player will continue. However, if earlier the United States did not allow Europe to become independent in matters of defense, now, apparently, their position will change. With the center of gravity of American policy shifting to Asia, Washington will begin to "pressure" the Europeans more and more in order to build up their military muscles. Thus, at the 2013 summit of the heads of state and government of the 28 EU member states, where defense issues were the main ones, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen even said that the United States could lose interest in participating in NATO if Europe does not increase its defense spending to 2% of GDP.

It is likely that Sweden and Finland will join NATO in 5-7 years. This will not happen under current governments. The majority of the population of both countries is against joining the North Atlantic Alliance, but the corresponding pressure will melt, gradually changing public opinion in favor of membership in the alliance.

By 2016, Finland will in fact cease to be a neutral state. Formally, without joining the North Atlantic Alliance, it will become a member of the NATO Response Force.

The role of the most active conductor of American interests in the Old World will continue to be played by Poland, which will be assisted by the Baltic countries and some other former socialist states in which the United States has a strong position.

To regulate the rapprochement between Russia and Western European countries on the basis of Western values, the promoters of American interests in Europe will continue to artificially escalate tensions on the continent. Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership program, of which Poland is the most active promoter, efforts will continue to remove such former Soviet republics as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova from the influence of Russia and create on their basis a buffer zone, a kind of “wall” separating Russia from Western Europe.

Apparently, it is necessary to prepare for a serious destabilization of the situation in Moldova and its further rocking in Ukraine, their rapprochement with NATO. Moldova has long been processed in the corresponding direction by a member of the alliance - Romania, and Ukraine is agitated "in chorus" by the United States, Germany, Poland and Great Britain. Ukraine and Moldova have proclaimed a course towards rapprochement with Europe, but, as you know, in order to become a member of the EU, one must first become a member of NATO. All former socialist states were first forced to join NATO, and only then allowed to become a member of the EU. At one time, the EU intended to suspend the admission of new members, to which the NATO leadership reacted sharply negatively. In the end, the EU decision was reversed and the parallel enlargement of NATO and the EU continued.

Moldova's course towards the West will certainly lead to an aggravation of the situation around Transnistria, possibly to a defrost of the conflict.

The military-political situation in the Caucasus region is becoming more and more complicated, which is primarily due to the desire of the United States to remove Russia from the ranks of significant geopolitical players in the entire Caucasus region and form a geostrategic corridor for direct access of Western countries to the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia. Measures are being taken to draw Georgia and Azerbaijan into NATO, to create a military foothold in the Caspian region for an attack on Iran. At the same time, the military-political leadership of Georgia and Azerbaijan expects help from Brussels in solving their territorial problems.

Probably, at the next NATO summit in London, another step will be taken towards the admission of Georgia and Azerbaijan to the alliance. Apparently, the possibility of Georgia's admission to this organization without Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot be ruled out. And in the case of Azerbaijan, one can expect an aggravation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, followed by the introduction of Western peacekeepers there.

The next option for resolving the conflict, which is being promoted by the United States and is already being discussed in Yerevan and Baku, is very likely. Turkey opens border with Armenia. Azerbaijan recognizes a certain sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh and receives certain regions for this, providing it with a transport corridor to Turkey, from the operation of which Armenia will also receive income. As a result, the United States will receive an additional direct access through the Caucasus to the Caspian region and Central Asia, the grounds for the presence of a Russian military base in Armenia will disappear and the question of its withdrawal will be raised.

It cannot be ruled out that the forces currently fighting on the side of the opposition in Syria will not end up in the Transcaucasus or the North Caucasus in the future.

The Georgian leadership does not intend to put up with the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and will continue to take steps to create conditions for their return. As the main direction of achieving this goal, it is planned to use the strategy "Involvement through cooperation", which primarily involves the strengthening of economic ties. Surely, at some stage in the development of Georgia's cooperation with its former republics, the question of further stay on the territory of the last Russian military bases will arise.

In connection with the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, including through Azerbaijan and Georgia, American military bases will apparently appear in these countries. American generals, for example, speak openly about this.

As for Turkey, it is pursuing a policy leading to a split in the South Caucasus and the creation of a Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia axis in the region. The purpose of such a policy is to transform the emerging economic bloc of the three states into a military-political union. However, it should be noted that Russia, the US and the EU, considering the Caucasus as a single region, do not support such a policy of Turkey.

There are agreements between Turkey and Georgia on the creation of joint military units to protect strategic communications, seaports, oil pipelines, railways, and airports.

Turkey oversees the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan (military education programs, operational work, conducting exercises to the level of the regiment, reforming the Armed Forces in order to create a small professional army, recreating the Air Force and Navy, military intelligence). The United States objects to the actual subordination of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces to Turkey and the military-political integration of these countries on an exclusively bilateral basis.

As for Iran, the decline in tension around it, apparently, will not last long. In the event of large-scale military operations against Iran, Tehran will certainly use all its capabilities to deliver retaliatory strikes, including on the territories from which the United States will operate.

And these may be the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The problem of the international military presence in the Caspian region has recently come to the fore in the context of the struggle for its hydrocarbon resources. The Caspian is included in the list of zones of "vital interests" of the United States, which, in the event of certain unfavorable foreign policy conditions for the Russian Federation, may contribute to the emergence of NATO military forces in the region.

An increase in tension and destabilization of the situation in Central Asia should be expected. Here the interests of such leading players as Russia, the USA and China intersect. They show interest in the region of India, Europe. The competition for resources and transport corridors is intensifying here. In addition, the time is coming when the leaders of the Central Asian republics, due to their advanced age, will be forced to leave the stage, and a new generation of politicians will come to replace them. In particular, a serious aggravation of the situation under such a scenario is possible in Kazakhstan. New waves of the economic crisis, as well as the partial withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014, followed by a surge of tension outside the country, could also accelerate regional destabilization.

The United States and its NATO allies think with horror that after leaving Afghanistan, the vacuum created there could fill China and spread its influence to the entire region. Western countries are passionately seeking Russian help in containing China.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) needs to prepare for the aggravation of the situation in Central Asia. At the same time, the reform of the armed forces of the CSTO and CIS member states in accordance with NATO standards, the training of military personnel of the former Soviet republics in the West, and the purchase of weapons and military equipment there pose a potential danger to Russia. All this facilitates the process of accession of the Commonwealth countries to NATO, reduces Russian military exports and generally reduces Moscow's influence in the near abroad.

Unfortunately, within the framework of the CSTO, common conceptual approaches to military development have not been developed. In particular, not only are national military doctrines not coordinated between member states, but they are often developed with the participation of specialists from countries belonging to other military-political blocs. The organization does not have an approved interstate language of communication, which significantly complicates the command and control of troops and hinders the development of cooperation. There is no understanding of common threats that could become the locomotive for the development of the CSTO.

Under these conditions, each of the states that are members of the organization seeks to independently determine its own hierarchy of security threats and challenges, which differ significantly from the threat systems of other member countries.

There is no clarity in the management of the regional groupings of troops (forces) created within the framework of the CSTO. Thus, the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), the decision to create which was made in February 2009, is subordinate exclusively to the national commands of their states, and only if necessary, the procedure for coordinating their use begins, which, in the conditions of ongoing hostilities, excludes the timeliness of the use of CRRF. .

I would like the efforts made by the CSTO leadership to be implemented faster in building up the power of the organization.

Gradually, the Asia-Pacific region, and not Europe, becomes the "center of gravity" of world politics and economics. The "pivot" of the new geopolitical game is the American-Chinese relations, which are already significantly influencing the nature of transatlantic relations. While the United States sees China as a threat, the Europeans see it in many ways as an additional huge market.

The formation of China as the second world military and economic power will continue, which, according to some estimates, by the 2030s. of the current century will displace the United States from the leading positions.

If you look at the Asia-Pacific countries with which the United States is actively strengthening military cooperation (and these are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, India), then the conclusion is that Washington is building a containment belt around China.

India and Japan are likely to become leading players not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the world. Even now, India is demonstrating rapid progress in almost all spheres of state activity, and Japan, relying on the already existing economic potential of a global scale, is heading for its so-called military and foreign policy “normalization”. The Ministry of Defense has been created, the law on the prohibition of the export of weapons is being revised. In the foreseeable future in Japan, apparently, the Constitution will also be revised, which restrains military development in the country.

Potential hotspots in the Asia-Pacific region, where conflicts may arise with the participation of leading world powers, are the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the border between India and China, the Strait of Malacca and the hydrocarbon transportation route in the Indian Ocean.

The influence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region is decreasing, China is growing. The foreign policy of Japan and South Korea is becoming more and more independent. All countries in the region are trying to establish good neighborly relations with China, increasingly forgetting about the United States.

It is possible that in 5-10 years the situation in East Asia will significantly destabilize if urgent measures are not taken to create a security system. However, the prospects for creating a common security system are illusory here, since the countries pursue too different goals.

China, apparently, is ready to turn the SCO into a military-political union, but without formalizing such a transformation, so as not to provoke a sharp response and aggravate the situation in the region. The PRC is not able to stand up to the US and its allies on its own and needs Russia's help. To strengthen regional security, it is necessary, apparently, to create mechanisms for interaction between the SCO and the CSTO, to form appropriate structures.

The main goal of Washington's strategy in East Asia is to maintain and strengthen the US-centric order. This strategy is based on allied relations, primarily with Japan and South Korea, which make it possible to maintain forward-based forces in the region.

The rise of the PRC poses a great risk to the regional interests of the United States, Japan, South Korea and some other countries. In American society, for example, there is no unity over what is best for the US: a rich and peaceful China, or a decaying and chaotic China.

Japan seeks to limit the influence of the United States and China in the region, trying to create a Japan-centric community in East Asia by entering into economic agreements with Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, building an economic bloc based on the yen.

China is not yet interested in the destruction of the US-Japanese alliance, because, according to Beijing, having left the American tutelage, Japan will sharply intensify military construction, expand its zone of interests, which will seriously complicate the situation in the region.

Tokyo supports the peaceful reunification of the two Koreas and the improvement of relations between China and Taiwan. The probability of Japan's creation of nuclear weapons will depend on the further development of the situation in the region. Those military operations in which the Japanese Armed Forces are participating today are carried out within the framework of the fight against terrorism and are essentially peacekeeping, which does not require a change in the country's Constitution. However, in the foreseeable future, amendments to it will apparently be made, since the leadership of Japan intends to expand the possibilities of using the national armed forces abroad.

The level of Japanese-American interaction has approached the level of cooperation between the United States and NATO allies.

It is believed in South Korea that the United States is increasingly sacrificing its interests if it is necessary for them. One of these possible "victims" is the withdrawal of American troops from the country, which is advocated by many in Washington. The departure of the Americans will increase tension in relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and it is not excluded that the Republic of Korea (ROK) will initiate its own game against Japan and China in order to survive. If, at the same time, the US military presence in Japan remains, the ROK may become neutral or enter into an alliance with the PRC.

Many in South Korea believe that Beijing is opposed to the unification of the two Koreas, because it does not want the nuclear power of the North to combine with the economic power of the South and the emergence of a new powerful player at its side. Since the keys to solving the problem of the North Korean nuclear program, discussed in the framework of the six-party talks, are held by the United States and China, the meetings will be held more than once, because the main persons involved are not interested in completing them, since this will remove one of the important obstacles to the reunification of peoples.

The United States is trying to draw Russia into the process of further reductions in nuclear weapons, which, given NATO's significant superiority in high-precision and conventional weapons, will only increase the existing military imbalance.

The propaganda campaign of the international non-governmental organization Global Zero is gaining momentum, calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Everyone understands the unreality of such a situation in any foreseeable future, however, this initiative was officially supported by US President Barack Obama.

The US and its NATO allies are seriously considering a new treaty to limit conventional forces in Europe, the main goal of which is to make the Russian Armed Forces and their exercises "visible". The allies are very worried about the lack of information about the RF Armed Forces.

The United States is actively building up its military space activities. Currently, the US Armed Forces are already 90% dependent on space systems - this is reported by representatives of the Pentagon. Operational instructions have already been issued on the use of force in space, from space - on the ground, from the ground - in the direction of space. Space systems that can become space weapons are undergoing flight tests. At the same time, the United States does not intend to conclude any agreements in the field of limiting military space activities.

What should Russia do? First of all, get stronger. In addition, to pursue a policy of active neutrality, which implies equidistance from centers of power such as the United States and China, and the active promotion of initiatives that contribute to strengthening global security.

The transition from the exhausting, hardest war for the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. almost without interruption to confrontation and the Cold War extremely severe impact on the internal environment. The USSR, along with the United States, became one of the centers of the bipolar world, but the political weight and ambitions of the victorious country were diametrically opposed to its economic capabilities. Conducting global world politics as a counterbalance to the United States absorbed all the national economic resources of the Soviet Union. The confrontation in the international arena required more and more new means, was disastrous for the ruined country with a huge unprofitable and militarized economy. The Cold War maintained a mobilization spirit in society, the country's human and natural resources continued to be sacrificed to the arms race. Ideological blinkers did not allow the country's leadership to see the fatal nature of the confrontation, the understanding came extremely slowly that there could be no winners in the nuclear race.

2. Post-war national economy Priorities of economic policy

The war created a completely new economic situation. In the liberated territory, industry was almost completely destroyed, the material and technical base of agriculture presented a miserable picture, and enormous damage was inflicted on railway communications. Almost all of the country's resources were concentrated in defense enterprises, most of which received a "second birth" after the evacuation in the east of the country. It was here that the weapons of victory were forged, factories and factories worked at full capacity.

The transition to a peaceful life required simultaneously restore the destroyed economy and transfer industrial production to a “peaceful way”. It was natural to want to quickly establish a peaceful life - to restore the housing stock, to increase the production of food and consumer goods, which were sorely lacking. Again, they had to rely only on their own strength and internal resources. Ultimately, everything depended on the nature and depth of the conversion of military production. How far the Soviet Union could afford to go along the path of disarmament depended entirely on the prospect of a new war. The sharp deterioration in the international situation at the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946 coincided with the discussion of the priorities for the development of the national economy for the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950). Of course, their definition turned out to be highly dependent on the new foreign policy situation, which dictated the ratio of the military and civilian sectors of the economy.

While maintaining a high share of military products, the development of heavy industry was naturally placed at the forefront. But even in this situation, it was possible to speed up the pace of development of the “A” group to a greater or lesser extent, to revive the organization of production and distribution. The ideologist of this “smooth”, more liberal version was N.A. Voznesensky, who was supported by Zhdanov in the Politburo. In the report on the fourth five-year plan, Voznesensky, in fact, for the first time, stated the need to include economic levers (price, money, credit, profit, and a number of others) in the process of managing a planned economy. However, good wishes remained only on paper.

A number of factors led to the rejection in practice of the proposed more balanced model of economic development already in the course of the implementation of the plan. The intensification of international confrontation played a key role, which turned the production of weapons into a condition of bipolar equilibrium. Of great importance was also the fact that the implementation of the five-year plan fell on the shoulders of the party economic nomenklatura and the directors' corps, which grew up during the years of the "socialist offensive." This generation of Soviet leaders with mother's milk imbibed idiosyncrasy to any concepts reminiscent of capitalism, such as "credit" and "profit". They had a fresh memory of the struggle against the right deviation, they had neither the ability nor the desire to put into practice the proposed innovations. The sudden death of Zhdanov, the regrouping of political forces in the highest echelon of power, the arrest and execution of Voznesensky also played an important role in determining the economic strategy. In addition, Stalin confirmed the pre-war course of building a communist society in the next 20-30 years, which provoked a return to the forced pace that had become a reality since 1948.

After the Crimean War, England, taking advantage of the weakening of Russia, intensified its expansionist aspirations near its southern borders, seeking to gain a foothold in Persia. In the Persian Gulf, at the insistence of Palmerston, at the beginning of 1857, English troops were landed. Under the threat of British occupation, the Shah of Persia signed a trade treaty beneficial to England.

The struggle between Russia and England for influence on Persia and Turkey was also fought in the Caucasus. It can be said that the Turkish and Persian issues in Russia's foreign policy were to some extent a Caucasian issue. British agents in the Caucasus supported the mountaineers' struggle against Russia in every possible way, supplying them with everything they needed. England wanted to drag out the Caucasian war as much as possible in order to deplete the military and economic resources of the Russian Empire. In 1857, it was planned to send several English ships to the Caucasus with a large cargo of military equipment for the highlanders.

However, Russian diplomats became aware of this. Gorchakov took a number of measures to combat the intrigues of British and Turkish agents on the Caucasian coast. In a special memorandum, he outlined his views on the Caucasian war and its connection with the political course of Russia in the West, pointing out that Russia's foreign policy in the East is closely connected with its policy in the West. It was said that it was necessary to maintain large forces both in the Caucasus and on the western border in order to demonstrate to the Western powers that Russia was ready to defend its interests in all directions.

Considerable attention was paid to Russia's policy towards Turkey and the Balkans. Russian consulates were restored in Moldavia, Wallachia and Turkey. On June 30, 1856, Gorchakov sent Privy Councilor Butenev, who knew Turkey and the Balkans well, to Constantinople with a special assignment to the Sultan. On July 7, 1856, a commission was appointed to clarify the borders with Asiatic Turkey. At the same time, a Russian representative was sent to Bucharest to carefully study the internal state of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. But as Russia was weakened by the Crimean War, Gorchakov tried to be cautious in his foreign policy in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Initially, it seemed that France, which did not receive territorial benefits in the Crimean War and dreamed of expanding its borders by annexing the left bank of the Rhine, Nice and Savoy, could become Russia's ally. Long before the Paris Congress, Gorchakov dreamed of a close alliance with France. Count P. D. Kiselev, a supporter of rapprochement with this country, was appointed Russian ambassador to France. The interests of Russia and France coincided in many respects. The foundations of Russia's foreign policy promulgated by Gorchakov after the Paris Congress corresponded to the diplomatic plans of Napoleon III. The common position was taken by both countries in relation to Austria. Russia was outraged by the hostile position taken by Austria towards it during the years of the Crimean War. Napoleon III was looking in Russia for some counterbalance to the further strengthening of England, although he was not going to break England at that time. In addition, Russia, like France, was interested in weakening the influence of Turkey, Austria and England in the Middle East. During the meeting between Napoleon III and Alexander II in Stuttgart in 1857, cooperation between the two countries was initiated. Gorchakov, in his note on the secret negotiations in Stuttgart, gave a detailed description of the international situation preceding the conclusion of the Franco-Russian treaty of 1859. Its essence was that neither England, nor Russia, nor France were going to support Austria. Alexander II declared to the representative of Napoleon III that he was ready to provide him with diplomatic support in the war with Austria.

The first result of the beginning rapprochement between France and Russia was the successful overcoming of another crisis in the Balkans. This crisis was connected with events in Serbia (namely, with the ongoing dynastic confrontation between Obrenović and Karđorđeorgievich) and in the Danube Principalities.

In Serbia, the Assembly deposed at the end of 1858 Prince Alexander Karageogrievich, blaming him for the fact that Serbia adhered to neutrality during the Crimean War. Instead, Milos Obrenovic was re-elected. There was a threat of military intervention by Austria and Turkey. Back in April 1858, Turkish military operations began against Montenegro, where the 20,000th Ottoman army invaded. However, already on May 13, she was defeated at Grakhov. Turkey agreed to a suspension of hostilities, but achieved international recognition of Montenegro as part of its territory. Russian and French squadrons were sent to the Balkan coast of the Adriatic Sea. As a result of the joint actions of St. Petersburg and Paris, the Serbian and Montenegrin issues received a peaceful resolution: the Sultan was forced to make concessions and agree to a peaceful settlement of disputed border issues in favor of Montenegro and recognize the change of dynasty in Serbia. After the death of Milos in 1860, his son Mikhail again became the prince.

The Russian-French rapprochement also contributed to the withdrawal of Turkish and Austrian troops from the territory of the Danubian principalities in 1857, which allowed them to restore self-government and proceed to the process of unification, which caused particular support from Napoleon III. In January 1859, elections of rulers were held in Moldavia and Wallachia. Colonel Alexander Ioan Cuza was elected to both thrones, which violated the provisions of the 1856 treaty, and Porta, as an exception, granted Prince Cuza a double investiture on December 23, 1861.

In connection with the brewing military conflict in the late 1850s. between France and Austria on the Italian question, the French emperor Napoleon III sought support from Russia. Russia willingly went for rapprochement with France in order to tear it away from the anti-Russian bloc. On March 3, 1859, a secret treaty was concluded between Russia and France in Paris, according to which Russia pledged to remain neutral during the war between France and Austria. Russia also pledged to keep Prussia from intervening in the war. Having secured itself against the intervention of other powers, France openly led matters to aggravate the conflict and, with a clever maneuver, provoked Austria into declaring war. In April 1859, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia declared war on Austria. But Napoleon III's attempt to draw Russia into a military conflict failed, although Russia was interested in weakening Austria. Russia undertook only to put up an army of 4 corps on the border with Austria in order to neutralize the 150,000-strong Austrian grouping in Galicia. Russia also promised to take a benevolent neutrality to France and to contribute to the preservation of neutrality by other powers, and above all by Prussia. France promised in return to negotiate with Austria on changes to existing treaties. However, Russia failed to comply with the demands for a military demonstration near the Austrian borders. The reason was the fact that it took at least five and a half months to concentrate 4 buildings. An attempt to mobilize in Volyn ended in failure: only 30 thousand people were gathered. Gorchakov's proposal to transfer part of the 300,000-strong Caucasian army to the west ran into opposition from the governor A.I. Baryatinsky and therefore was not implemented. As a result, the Austrians began to transfer troops from Galicia to Italy, leaving only a 30,000-strong corps there. Yet the neutrality of Russia facilitated the victory of France and Sardinia over Austria. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Russia and France did not support the political demarche of Great Britain and Prussia, who took the initiative to unilaterally disarm Sardinia, fearing that France would become too strong. Austrian diplomacy proved unable to play a long game. She failed to prevent the outbreak of the war, which began on April 29 and was marked by a number of defeats of the Austrian army. The defeat of Austria served as a signal for a revolutionary struggle in Italy for its national unification. Only Napoleon III's fear of the Italian national liberation movement saved Austria from complete collapse. On July 12, 1859, the Treaty of Villafranca was concluded, which ended the war.

The Caucasian army, after the conclusion of the Paris Peace, stepped up efforts to pacify Chechnya and Circassia. The situation was complicated by the fact that there was almost no sea blockade of the coast. Because of this, the Russians managed to intercept no more than 2% of military contraband. In 1857, the Circassian coast reached 2.5 - 3 thousand Turkish small-draft ships, in 1858 - about 800. However, the successes of the Russian troops, on the one hand, and the fatigue of the local population from continuous hostilities, on the other, began to bear fruit. Demand for military goods began to fall, and in 1859 the number of ships that illegally passed to the Caucasian coast was reduced to 198. This, accordingly, affected the course of hostilities. In 1858, Shamil once again proposed negotiations, hoping in this way to gain time. However, Baryatinsky answered with a decisive refusal, and then on August 25, 1859, Shamil, being surrounded in the high-mountainous village of Gunib, surrendered.

However, after the Franco-Italian-Austrian war of 1859, serious complications arose in relations between Russia and France. Napoleon III did not fulfill his promises in relation to Russia, citing the fact that she could not prevent the transfer of Austrian troops from Galicia, but thereby undermined the confidence in him on the part of Gorchakov and Alexander II. However, the parties maintained a semblance of cooperation. Gorchakov hoped that in the future there would be a transition from appearance to a real and mutually beneficial alliance. However, Alexander II began to doubt the possibility of such a prospect. Brunnov expressed the idea that it is best not to have the emperor of France "neither among friends, nor among enemies." But the Russian emperor said that "it would be more useful to have him among allies if we could rely on him."

On October 10 - 14 (22 - 26), 1860, Alexander II met with the Austrian emperor and the Prussian prince-regent in Warsaw, where Franz Joseph was invited as a sign of reconciliation. The Russian emperor refused to give any guarantees of the security and integrity of Austria in the event of a new Austro-Italian war, a clash with France or an uprising in Hungary, offering to resolve all disputes, primarily in Italy, by reaching an agreement with France. Appeals to conservative unity were again not accepted, although they were made against the backdrop of another rise in the Polish national movement. Thus, Russia still remained faithful to the course of rapprochement with France, despite the gap that had begun to emerge.

Russo-French rapprochement was again brought to life by complications in the East. In 1861, after the death of Sultan Abdul-Mejid, Abdul-Azis ascended the throne, pursuing a policy of brutal suppression of anti-Ottoman uprisings in Syria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. A series of crises began again in the Balkan Peninsula.

In the summer of 1861, Turkish troops began a blockade of Montenegro, which provided assistance to the rebel Serbs in Herzegovina. France and Russia once again supported the Montenegrins. Thanks to their efforts, the blockade of Montenegro was actually thwarted: the principality continued to receive food, ammunition and weapons from both countries. The following year, the Turks invaded the territory of Montenegro and devastated a significant part of it. However, the Montenegrins put up a heroic resistance and once again managed to thwart plans to establish Turkish control over their country.

At the same time, a crisis arose in Serbia. On June 15, 1862, the soldiers of the Turkish garrison stationed in the Belgrade fortress of Kale Meydan killed a Serb. The indignant residents of Belgrade blocked and besieged the fortress, in response, the artillery of the fortress fired a 5-hour shelling of the city.

In 1862, Baron A.F. Budberg, who replaced P.D. Kiselyov, was sent on an emergency mission to Napoleon III. Budberg was a supporter of an alliance with Prussia, but he managed to continue the work of his predecessor. As a result of the coordinated actions of Russia and France, it was possible to soften the conditions put forward by Turkey in relation to Montenegro. On August 29, 1862, a peace treaty was concluded on difficult conditions for Montenegro. However, the principality was given the opportunity for a peaceful respite. The Allies succeeded in reducing the number of Turkish fortresses in Serbia from six to four. On September 4, 1862, they were evacuated. To strengthen the Serbian army, Russia provided Serbia with a loan of 300 thousand Austrian ducats, 39.2 thousand rifles and 3 thousand sabers. In 1862, the permanent army of Serbia was 3100 people. with 12 guns, and the militia reserve - 50.5 thousand people. with 36 guns.

The calm was short-lived. In October 1862, unrest began in Athens, supported by the army. On October 10, 1862, King Otto was forced to abdicate. Thanks to the joint actions of Russia and France, it was possible to prevent the election of Prince Alfred, the son of Queen Victoria, to the Greek throne. On March 18, 1863, the National Assembly of Greece proposed that Prince Wilhelm George of Denmark become king. On 10 October 1863 he was crowned on the throne of Greece.

Only the crisis in the Danubian principalities was resolved relatively calmly. On February 5, 1862, Alexander Cuza announced the union of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, as a result of which a new state was created - Romania.

Before analyzing today's processes and trends in international relations, it seems necessary to draw some conclusions about the foreign policy situation in which Russia finds itself. First of all, it should be noted that the "Atlanticism" so stubbornly imposed in recent years is now being rejected by the Russian political elites, and this "rejection syndrome" is now becoming so obvious that it cannot be ignored in foreign policy analysis. At the same time there was a "bureaucratization" and "conservation" of foreign policy. On the one hand, this contributed to the stabilization and improvement of its professional level compared to the early 1990s. On the other hand, against the backdrop of the collapse and sharp weakening of the analytical foreign policy community, this has led to the almost complete disappearance of professional theoretical discussions on foreign policy issues and the current absence of rational alternative foreign policy conceptual models. Prior to the Yugoslav crisis, foreign policy in the internal life of the country was in the background. Because of this, today it is becoming more and more clear: not only in the economic, but also in the foreign policy strategy of the state, there is a conceptual stagnation, and on the eve of new parliamentary and presidential elections, foreign policy is also increasingly used by professional politicians for domestic political purposes. The basis of many modern foreign policy initiatives is not the national-state interests of the country, but the interests of a particular political figure associated with an increase in his pre-election rating.
The sharp decline in Russia's social prestige and financial status of the analytical community (including the foreign policy analytical community) has led to a conceptual vacuum. It is most obvious where creative thought should be raging in the most active way - in the state foreign policy department and academic institutions dealing with relevant issues. The center of foreign policy discussions moved to the parliament and the press, which means that the period of transition after the collapse of bipolarity practically ceased to be analyzed from the point of view of the theory of international relations, the theoretical scientific discussion about Russia's place in the world, the foreign policy interests of the state was curtailed or, at least, reduced to a minimum. , although the practical (applied) aspects are discussed quite actively.
Foreign policy discussions have again taken on the character of political and ideological confrontation, in which opponents often forget about the main goal - the development of rational scientific foreign policy strategies aimed at raising the status (foreign policy, economic, financial, etc.) of Russia in the world. Behind the discussion about what is coming to replace bipolarity - a monocivilizational or polycentric world, unipolarity and political and economic leadership of the only superpower, bipolarity of the superdeveloped Center and Periphery, North and South, civilizational
war, the "pushing" of the second pole ("second world") to the east and the transition of the countries of the "third world" to the rank of the "second" - the main thing was lost: an adequate and rational vision of the current situation, without which no serious long-term foreign policy "recipes" can be proposed ".
Recognition of the real state of the international system, in which there is a single dominant power (superpower) that has the desire and ability to independently influence events in all regions of the globe, that is, "pluralistic monopolarity", and not polycentrism (it is desirable, and by no means exists today reality) does not mean a "unipolar" vision. Under "pluralistic monopolarity," a superpower can clearly dominate only in the immediate vicinity of its territory. With a significant distance, even in the zone of "vital" interests, such dominance requires a very significant (if not extreme) concentration of financial, economic and military resources. In the so-called "gray" or "marginal" zones, it can be carried out with the full consent of the other leading powers in the event of confrontation with overt aggression (Kuwait); and in the absence of unanimous support from the world community, it begins to encounter significant difficulties (Iraq, Yugoslavia) and becomes a costly measure. The absence of a "strategic adversary" (the second pole) changes the configuration of the world system and makes
U U T-v U U
her unusually mobile. In such a situation, "small polarization" really "structures" the system of international relations, which increases its stability, but at the same time the likelihood of unpredictability increases, and the boundary of the transition from "small polarization" to "large" does not become more clearly defined. Today's "amorphous" and "mobile" world structures complicate foreign policy analysis and, therefore, require the calculation of various options and the development of alternative strategies.

]. It is not possible to agree with everything there, this is a very biting work, but in its own way it is interesting and remarkable, if only because it is specifically written on this topic. The book is small, first published in Paris, we have reprinted.

So, the process of creating the intelligentsia arose already in those wonderful times - in the 18th century. Oddly enough, it is associated with a decree on the freedom of the Russian nobility

The review that I tried to give today, of course, does not exhaust the topic, but gives an idea of ​​how society has been transformed. And if at the beginning of the 18th century we see reforms (the construction of a fleet, the construction of new state institutions, the organization of a new army, the introduction of new principles of administration, etc.), here we see a completely different situation. Everything settled down a little, everything got used to it, everything fell into some completely different places than Peter had planned, and a completely new situation was created. To a certain extent, it is the result of Peter's reforms. But it is completely different from what Peter wanted to do.

Therefore, we must consider that the reforms of Peter, undoubtedly, served to create a fundamentally new situation in Russia (social, economic). But these reforms were not preserved by his successors in the way he intended them to be. Were they deliberately altered or was there some kind of underlying process? Most likely the latter. It is unlikely that Vorontsov or the businessmen of Anna Ioannovna had any plan of action. I think that they, not being able to collect the necessary amount of money for the treasury, faced with the problem of embezzlement, poorly versed in foreign policy problems, etc., tried all the time to somehow plug holes, somehow maneuver between the offended guards, fleeing peasantry and the pressure of foreign diplomats, while not forgetting their own personal needs. This process was, to a certain extent, spontaneous. But it was a natural consequence of what was done in the first quarter of the 18th century.

7. Foreign policy situation

Another issue is the foreign policy situation. Here the changes have been extremely dramatic. They, perhaps, unlike all other Peter's innovations, retained both scale and continuity. In the 17th century, Russia did not pursue an active foreign policy. Russia was of interest to the British, French, Austrians, who guessed a colossal market for raw materials here, felt the opportunity to profit from Russian timber, Russian leather, etc. Russia, however, did not interfere in their internal problems.

As a result of the Northern War, the situation changed radically. Having expelled the Swedes from the southern shores of the Baltic, Russia received the entire Baltic and took the place of Sweden in European politics. And if earlier Europe, especially Northern Europe, was afraid of Sweden, now there was no question of any Swedish threat - everyone was afraid of Russia. Peter the Great, giving his nieces and daughters in marriage to German dukes, influenced German affairs, he was active in the south, interfering in Turkish politics. Consequently, the problems of Austria were connected here. And if so, then the question arose about Poland, and for the first time the idea of ​​dividing Poland and destroying it as a state was expressed neither by Catherine nor (30) by the Prussian king Frederick the Great - it dawned on the minds of Peter's businessmen during the lifetime of this monarch.

Another thing is how this policy was implemented, how relations were built and with which specific countries. The history of the political alliances that Russia entered into is a completely different story. But the fact that Russia, now forever, has become involved in European foreign policy and has become a state exerting colossal influence on European affairs, was indeed an event, perhaps the most important in the 18th century, if we keep in mind the foreign policy aspect of Russian history. Catherine was the rightful heir to this situation, and here she fully continued the line of Peter. Therefore, it is not by chance that the activity of this empress expressed itself most clearly in foreign policy - this was the area where she achieved the greatest success. Under Alexander I, the former chancellor of Catherine, Prince Bezborodko, an outstanding diplomat of his time (despite his unpleasant human qualities), told the young diplomats of Alexander I: “I don’t know how it will be with you, but with us not a single gun in Europe fired without our permission ". This is, of course, an exaggeration, but there is some truth in it. It turned out the following: in domestic politics, especially in the peasant question, what happened was not at all what Peter thought. Russia did not become a prosperous state, the budget deficit persisted. Social problems have become perhaps even more acute. But foreign policy is largely a direct succession that can be traced from Peter himself and beyond.

1. - Personality of Catherine II. 2. - The beginning of the reign of Catherine II. 3. - State activity of Catherine II. 4. - Secularization of church lands. 5. - "Instruction" of the Legislative Commission. 6.- Laid commission . 7. - Provinces. 8. - Letters of grant to the nobility and cities.

The reign of Empress Catherine II is a very extensive and significant topic, so it seems convenient to me to divide it into two main parts: domestic and foreign policy. It is not necessary to think that Catherine was engaged first in one, and then smoothly moved on to another. Life forced her, like any person, to work in various directions, but for the convenience of understanding her activities, we will first deal with the problems of domestic politics. It will be about the legislation of Catherine, about serfdom. We will touch on the history of the Pugachev rebellion very briefly. Everyone heard something about this rebellion, the interpretation of this eerie page of our history over the past 70 years was absolutely unambiguous. On the other hand, it is natural to fall into something completely opposite on the wave of the opposite movement. I refer you to a wonderful work - to the "History of the Pugachev rebellion" by A. S. Pushkin. By seriously reading this brilliant historical work (very small in volume), you will receive solid, solid and durable information. It is not difficult to get it - in any collection of works by A. S. Pushkin, this is his only historical work.

Pushkin learned a lot from Karamzin, possessed a real historical flair and that quality that we call the culture of research. First touching on the classified, as they would say now, data on the history of the Pugachev rebellion (he was allowed to do this by the highest order of Nicholas I), Pushkin traveled around the main places of the uprising, met with those who still remembered “Pyotr Fedorovich”, as Pugachev called himself, and wrote his history. But in publishing it, he acted extremely delicately, intelligently and insightfully: in addition to his text, he published an appendix. Under Soviet rule, it was never printed for one simple reason: the appendix is ​​a list of people killed during the riot - nobles, clergy, peasants, women, old people, children, adults, soldiers, officers. This martyrology is a very accurate illustration of what happened and what Pushkin wrote his study about. At the same time, Pushkin is very scrupulous in terms of presenting facts, very accurate, and you can learn a lot from him. I must say that the official Soviet historiography, in principle, gave little. She clarified, perhaps, some individual details, but basically she exploited this topic more, resolving it from class positions. So we won't talk about it anymore.