Germany and the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. The reasons

wars, plans and goals of Germany and the USSR in the war

Problems of the history of the Great Patriotic War in historical science. The Great Patriotic War, despite the huge number of works devoted to it, in many respects remains a blank spot for historians. At present, with the opening of archives and the appearance of new documents, the understanding of previously unknown facts and events of the war is expanding, however, many materials, especially those relating to international relations in 1939-40, continue to remain closed. Some controversial issues:

1. Who started the Second World War:

- imperialist countries with the aim of redividing the world;

- exclusively German fascism, all other participants are its victims;

- Stalin and his desire to build world socialism.

2. Was Stalin preparing an attack on Germany!

- V. Suvorov (V. Rezun) and the researchers who support him prove that the Soviet Union is the main culprit and instigator of the Second World War, because. the main goal of the foreign policy of the Bolshevik leadership was the implementation of the "world revolution". V. Suvorov's general conclusion is that Hitler's treacherous attack on the USSR is declared a preventive (warning) strike.

- Most scientists (see: Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker" // Soviet historiography. M., 1996) do not agree with this statement. The Soviet Union did not prepare an attack in 1941, because. I just wasn't ready for war.

3. The problem of the "surprise" attack of Germany on the USSR:

- why the Stalinist leadership ignored the information coming from various sources (foreign intelligence, military intelligence, defectors, diplomatic channels) about the impending German attack on the USSR;

- why the Red Army was unprepared for war;

- why a reliable defense was not created along the western border;

- why did the catastrophe of the initial period of the war occur.

4. Reasons for the defeat in the spring and summer of 1942 G.The Germans reached the Caucasus and the Volga. A number of data make us re-evaluate the main battles of the war, cooperation within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition, the situation in the rear, the history of the partisan movement and the underground. Many problems await further study.

5. The problem of collaborationism and the resistance movement. The Nazis in the occupied territory sought to create a support for themselves among the local population. Collaborationism (from the French word "collaboration") has become a serious problem that has long been hushed up in historical research. About 1 million Soviet citizens fought on the side of Germany in one form or another. They did this for various reasons: out of hatred for the Soviet regime, in the hope of reviving the Russian state, out of fear for their lives. The most famous was the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), headed by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who commanded the 2nd shock army on the Volkhov front and was taken prisoner in the summer of 1942. Most of the traitors served in the police and auxiliary units of the German army.

The majority of the population rejected cooperation with the invaders. This became the basis of the mass resistance movement. It manifested itself in various forms: harboring escaped prisoners of war and Jews, helping partisans and underground workers, armed struggle against the enemy.

6. Losses of the USSR in the war. Stalin calls the figure 7 million, Khrushchev - 20 million, Gorbachev - 27-28 million (this figure is also confirmed by historians, both ours and foreign ones). Some experts also talk about big losses (up to 36 million people). About half of all human losses in World War II are accounted for by the USSR.

7. The price of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Until the beginning of the 90s. this problem has not been studied in the domestic literature at all. Now scientists are deciding who to attribute to the victims of this war, what causes great human losses from the USSR and other problems. Scientists are dismayed by the lack of a unified methodology and methodology for calculating the cost of victory. Much in this matter depends on the political preferences of historians.

The main reason for the war is obvious - the desire of Germany to conquer "living space", capturing the resource base of the USSR. Autumn 1940 Nazi Germany to achieve your goal - establishing world domination it was necessary to destroy the British Empire and destroy the Soviet Union, while avoiding a war on two fronts. The leadership of the Reich was faced with the question of whether to continue the already protracted war with England, which the Soviet government could use to strengthen the military potential and security of its country, or first defeat the USSR with lightning speed, and after victory, attack England with all its might. Hitler accepted the second option.

The most important task of Hitler's diplomacy was to exclude a war in Europe on two fronts. For this, a complex diplomatic combination was conceived:

- to interest Stalin in negotiations on the further development of cooperation, to mislead him and keep the secret of the planned surprise attack on the Soviet Union;

- to conduct negotiations with the USSR in a sharply anti-British spirit and to obtain from the Soviet side a document hostile in its content to Great Britain (the latter should have served as material evidence of the "anti-British" intentions of the Soviet government);

- send your high representative to England and, using the above anti-British document, try to irritate the St. James Court with the behavior of the USSR and agree with London, if not on peace, then at least that the British government will not open a second front in Europe during the German-Soviet war (flight of R. Hess in May 1941).

On October 13, 1940, Moscow received an offer from Germany to take part in negotiations on the accession of the Soviet Union to the Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan), and the participation of the USSR in the redistribution of the world, primarily in the division of British possessions and spheres of influence of England.

November 12 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov arrived in Berlin . During the negotiations, he tried to find out German intentions regarding European security and the reaction of the German leadership to the desire of the Soviet Union to set up its military bases in Bulgaria, take control of the Dardanelles, spread its influence in the Balkans, and prevent the German presence in Finland.

Hitler avoided resolving the issues raised by Stalin, but confirmed Germany's desire to see the USSR among its allies and its participation in the division of the British inheritance.

Stalin, confident that Hitler would not dare to go to war on two fronts, decided to dictate his terms of the game.On November 25, Moscow handed over its conditions to Berlin four power agreement –"Pact of Four" on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance:

1) the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland;

2) the conclusion in the near future of a pact of mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria, which, due to its geographical position, is in the sphere of security of the Black Sea borders of the USSR, and the organization of a naval base in the area of ​​the Bosporus and the Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease;

3) recognition as a sphere of interests of the USSR the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction to the Persian Gulf;

4) Japan to give up its concession rights for coal and oil in northern Sakhalin on the terms of fair compensation.

If Hitler expressed his proposals orally, then the Soviet leadership formalized theirs in documents. From that moment on, Hitler lost all interest in further negotiations. From that moment on, the course for war with the USSR was finally taken.

Germany.On December 18, Hitler signed Directive No. 21 - a plan for conducting a military campaign against the USSR (plan "Barbarossa").

The main military goal of the "Eastern campaign" was supposed to be to defeat Soviet Russia in a fleeting campaign, so that in a war on two fronts it would be possible to fall upon another enemy (England) with full force. When developing operational-strategic war plan in the East, the German command proceeded from the following premises:

– the exceptional size of Russia's territory makes it absolutely impossible to conquer it completely;

– to achieve victory in the war against the USSR, it is enough to reach the most important operational-strategic milestone, namely lines Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan – the Caucasus, which will rule out the practical possibility for Russia to provide military resistance, since the army will be cut off from its most important bases, primarily from oil;

– to solve this problem, a quick defeat of the Red Army is necessary, which must be carried out within a time frame that does not allow the possibility of a war on two fronts;

– Japan's simultaneous actions in the Far East will force The Soviet Union is fighting on two fronts. However, the main task Japan considered unleashing a war with the United States and, thereby, diverting them from military operations in Europe.

The plan provided for the defeat of the Soviet troops during one short campaign of 8 weeks (maximum 5 months). The immediate and at the same time the most important task was the destruction of Soviet troops in the border zone and preventing their withdrawal beyond the Dnieper and the Western Dvina (Pskov – Minsk – Kyiv), which should have led to complete disorganization and made it possible to avoid intense battles in the future. Up to 3 weeks were allotted for the first stage of the operation.

Follow-up task - the capture of Leningrad, Moscow and Donbass, the main industrial regions of the USSR. At this stage, aviation was supposed to completely destroy the industrial base of the USSR and deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity to continue the war.

The ultimate goal of the campaign an exit was set in 7-8 weeks to the Arkhangelsk line – R. Volga – Astrakhan.If necessary, the last industrial region remaining with the Russians in the Urals was to be paralyzed by aviation.

In the future, it was necessary to fulfill the plan "Ost" - a plan for the dismemberment of the European territory of the USSR after the war and the exploitation of its natural resources - provided for the destruction of a significant part of the population of the USSR (it was supposed to leave 50-60 million people out of 140 million people to serve the true Aryans).

On June 15, 1941 the Wehrmacht numbered 7,329 thousand people, and up to 900 thousand people accounted for the civilian staff of the Wehrmacht and various paramilitary formations. The Wehrmacht had 208 divisions. These troops had over 88,000 guns and mortars, 6,300 tanks and assault guns, and about 7,000 aircraft. Taking advantage of the absence of a land front in Europe, Germany was able to deploy the most combat-ready part of its armed forces on the border with the USSR.

Together with Germany, her allies were preparing for the war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Croatia, who allocated their troops to wage the war.

The total number of invading troops was 5,500 thousand people, over 47 thousand guns and mortars, 5 thousand aircraft and about 4,500 tanks and assault guns.

After Germany became the mistress of Europe, its economy received powerful doping, as it could use the economic opportunities of all of Europe. B Thanks to the robbery of the captured countries of Europe for a total of 9 billion pounds sterling, the country doubled its pre-war national income. By June 1941, almost 6.5 thousand industrial enterprises of the occupied European countries were fulfilling German military orders. In France alone, more than 80% of aircraft manufacturing enterprises, 70% of the metalworking industry and 40% of metallurgy worked for the Reich. Romania gave 60% of oil, and Sweden - 30% of iron ore. Machine tools, equipment, strategic raw materials, materials, oil products, vehicles were actively exported from the occupied countries. Considering the great importance of railway transport in the upcoming war, by May 1941 Germany had 27.4 thousand locomotives and 790 thousand freight cars, a wide network of railways and highways.

The occupied territories served as a source of cheap labor. The divisions of the Wehrmacht and the German allies were equipped with a significant number of captured weapons and equipment.A certain part of the resources went to create strategic reserves.

Soviet Union. Although Stalin hoped to avoid war, preparations for it went on in all areas affecting the state's defense capability. The following steps have been taken:

in economics

– with the outbreak of World War II, defense spending increased sharply (in 1940 they reached an all-time high level of 32.6%. The growth rate of defense spending was more than twice the growth rate of total budget spending.

– there was a rapid re-equipment of production for the production of modern types of weapons (for the three pre-war years, the annual increase in military production amounted to 39%, while at the same time only 13% in the entire industry);

– the produced types of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, equipment and food made it possible to provide the Red Army in wartime states with 9 million people;

– significant reserves of the state reserve have been created (accumulation of ferrous, non-ferrous and rare metals, oil, coal, fabrics, raw leather and food);

– due to a sharp increase in the size of the army and the expansion of production since June 1940 the state introduces 8-hour working day and seven-day working week, criminal liability for being late for more than 20 minutes , prohibits unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises and institutions, the transition from agriculture to industry without the permission of the administration;

– to increase the number of workers in production and train qualified personnel, the network of factory schools was significantly expanded, and the number of students in high school was reduced through the introduction of paid education in secondary schools and universities(labor reserves increased to 1 million people annually);

– the number of working women has significantly increased (41% of the number of workers employed in industry, absolute - in agriculture).

in the military

- to increase the size of the Red Army and Navy in September 1939, universal military duty is introduced, and the draft age is reduced from 21 to 18 years;

- a covert re-staffing of units is being carried out (in April-May 1941, under the cover of "large training camps", about 800 thousand people were called up, and officers were released from military schools ahead of schedule);

- in February 1941, a new mobilization plan (MP-41) was adopted, calculated until 1942 (the size of the wartime army was brought up to 8.9 million people, aircraft - up to 32.6 thousand, tanks - up to 37 thousand , armored vehicles - up to 10.7 thousand, tractors - up to 91 thousand and cars - up to 600 thousand). The plan was grandiose, but, unfortunately, was not supported by industry;

- all armored troops, rifle divisions, airborne brigades, engineering units were transferred to the new states, they were regrouped and redeployed. However, the simultaneous deployment and formation of a large number of formations and units in a short time did not lead to an increase, but to a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the army;

– the construction of fortified areas on the new state border proceeded at an accelerated pace;

- Combat training in the Red Army units and military training of the population became more active.

In determining the plan for a future war many factors were taken into account: the nature of the future war, the geographical position of our country, the characteristics of the armed forces of potential adversaries – Germany and Japan.

General intent the use of the main forces was to first stage by active defense to firmly cover our borders during the period of concentration of Soviet troops and prevent the enemy from invading the USSR; on the second stage with two counter attacks from the left flank of the Western Special and the right flank of the Kyiv Special Military Districts, encircle and destroy the main forces of Germany and reach the river. Vistula, complete the mobilization and subsequently go on a general offensive along the entire front.

The military-political leadership of the country mistakenly believed that the main direction of fascist actions would be the south. A powerful grouping of Soviet troops begins to be created in Ukraine.

By June 22, 1941 the Soviet armed forces were about 5,770 thousand people. The ground forces had 303 divisions (61 tank, 31 mechanized, 13 cavalry), 16 airborne and 3 rifle brigades. The troops were armed with St. 117 thousand guns and mortars, over 25 thousand tanks and over 24 thousand aircraft.

The western border of the Soviet Union at a front of up to 4.5 thousand km and in depth up to 500 km was covered by the troops of the Leningrad (commanded by Lieutenant General M.N. Popov), Baltic Special (commanded by Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov), Western Special (commander General of the Army D.G. Pavlov), Kyiv Special (commander Colonel General M.P. Kirponos) and Odessa (commanderColonel General Ya.T. Cherevichenko ) military districts. The defense of the sea coast was assigned to the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets. They included 170 divisions and 2 brigades, which included St. 3 million people (2,700 thousand – in the Red Army, 216 thousand people – in the Navy and 154 thousand – in the troops NKVD), 57 thousand guns and mortars, about 14 thousand tanks and over 10 thousand aircraft.

The western grouping of Soviet troops was echeloned - in the first echelon 56 divisions, in the second - 52, in the third - 62. Directly on the border there were only individual rifle and engineering units and border detachments. In the areas of concentration of troops of the second and third echelons, there was an active transfer of parts of the internal districts.

Thus, the balance of forces on the western borders of the USSR suggests that the Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy only in personnel (1: 1.8), and in weapons they were superior to him (guns and mortars – 1.2:1, tanks – 3:1, aircraft – 2:1).

In Russian historiography, there are widespread assertions that the main fleet of our military equipment was significantly inferior in quality to the German one. For example, it was argued that, apart from the T-34 and KB, all other tanks were obsolete, unable to fight on equal terms with enemy tanks. However, a comparison of the tactical and technical data of Soviet and German tanks and the course of hostilities in 1941 showed that German equipment did not have any significant superiority. At the same time, the T-34 and especially the KB significantly outnumbered all types of Wehrmacht tanks. Moreover, it turned out that the German troops did not have at all the means that would allow them to fight on an equal footing with these types of tanks of the Red Army. However, it should be noted that the Wehrmacht's tank troops had the experience of modern mobile warfare, clear interaction with other branches of the armed forces on the battlefield, which allowed them to gain a certain qualitative superiority over the Soviet tank forces, which did not complete the next reorganization and were often forced to engage in battles without support not only aviation, but also infantry or artillery.

Thus, the Wehrmacht did not have a clear qualitative superiority of technology, as well as its quantitative superiority. However, the training of personnel and the operation of this equipment in the Wehrmacht were higher than in the Red Army. Even before the war, Soviet designers managed to create equipment that became the basis for future qualitative superiority over the German one, but the Red Army had yet to learn how to beat the enemy with this equipment, and this study was long and difficult.

In the face of the growing threat of a German attack, the Soviet command was looking for the most favorable way for the Red Army to enter the war. In order to protect the Armed Forces from a possible surprise attack by the enemy, the leadership of the General Staff proposed to carry out a number of measures in advance for the covert mobilization of troops, especially the armies of the High Command reserve. This is confirmed by the working materials developed on May 15, 1941, on the operational use of the Armed Forces. In them, among other things, it was proposed to inflict on the enemy preemptive (preventive) strike . The main idea was that the Red Army, under the cover of troops deployed to the border of the western border districts, would complete the concentration of forces intended for the war in the theater of operations and go over to a sudden decisive offensive, which would lead to the defeat of the main and most combat-ready forces of the Wehrmacht. However, the recommendations for inflicting a preemptive strike, even in conditions of direct preparation of the enemy for aggression, contradicted the nature of the Soviet military doctrine and the policy pursued by the Soviet Union immediately on the eve of the war. In addition, the Soviet Armed Forces were not ready for such decisive action.

Stalin still hoped to negotiate with Hitler, was afraid to provoke a German attack by his actions in preparation for war (not to repeat the situation on the eve of the First World War, when Russia accelerated the outbreak of war), believed that Hitler did not want war, but the military was pushing him to this step. Even in the face of irrefutable evidence from which it was no longer possible to brush aside, he continued to pursue the line he had chosen. From this, the half-heartedness and often illogicality of the actions of the Soviet leadership in the last days of the world:

- On June 11, the commanders of the border districts were instructed not to occupy the military and UR-ovsky units of the forefield zone (advanced defensive positions) without special orders;

- On June 12, the People's Commissar of Defense ordered that our aviation be banned from flying in the border zone 10 km from the state border;

– On June 12, the command of the border military districts, under the guise of exercises and a change in the location of summer camps, began to covertly deploy troops of the second echelons of the districts in accordance with the plans for the defense of the state border. By June 15, more than half of the divisions that made up the second echelon and reserve of the western military districts were set in motion. In total, by the beginning of the war, about 32 divisions were being advanced from the reserve of the border districts. Of these, only 4-5 divisions managed to concentrate in new areas. These activities were carried out with extreme caution and observance of camouflage measures. The People's Commissar of Defense, the General Staff and the commanders of the military border districts were warned by I.V. Stalin about personal responsibility for the consequences that may arise due to the careless actions of our troops;

- On June 14, a TASS statement followed that the rumors about Germany's intention to attack the USSR and the readiness of the Soviet Union to attack Germany were false and did not correspond to reality. Relations between the two countries are developing in the spirit of friendship and mutual trust;

– By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of June 19, it was ordered to camouflage airfields, military units and important military facilities in the western districts. The order required by July 1, 1941 to sow all airfields with grass, paint all airfield facilities, bury in the ground and especially carefully disguise gas storage facilities, categorically prohibit the linear, crowded location of aircraft and ensure their dispersal, organize by July 5 in each air base area 8-10 false airfields with mock-ups of aircraft, by July 1, camouflage warehouses, workshops, parks. Unfortunately, these important and urgent measures were not fully implemented by the beginning of the war.

Only at 23:30 on June 21, the military-political leadership of the state made a decision aimed at partially bringing the five border military districts to combat readiness. The directive prescribed the implementation of only part of the measures to bring to full combat readiness, which were determined by operational and mobilization plans. The directive, in fact, did not give permission for the full implementation of the cover plan, since it ordered "not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications." These restrictions caused bewilderment of the command in the districts, requests to Moscow followed, while only a few minutes remained before the start of the war. As a result of the belated decision, the situation for the rapid deployment of troops in the border districts has become tragic. – troops were put on alert by the enemy.

Conclusions.Thus, the German command, having deployed the bulk of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment.On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army covering forces in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If, however, we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions into the offensive, it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a solid front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. Such an arrangement of Soviet troops made it possible to smash them piece by piece. On the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create superiority over the troops of the Red Army, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern campaign was dealt. By preempting the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, by creating powerful operational groupings of fully combat-ready forces in the chosen directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative and successfully conducting the first offensive operations.

Not only Russian and French, but also German strategy had significant flaws. The German Empire countered Russia and its Western allies with the Schlieffen Plan. Count Alfred von Schlieffen was Chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1906, a fanatically dedicated professional who fought in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.

Schlieffen Plan

Based on the experience of the wars of the 19th century, German theorists aimed the army at victory in one pitched battle. Having planned to throw all their forces into battle at once and win, the Germans underestimated the role of strategic reserves.

Schlieffen developed the theory of encirclement and destruction of the enemy by crushing blows on his flanks (or one of them), followed by access to the rear. The operational idea of ​​the Schlieffen plan finally crystallized in 1905. The essence of the plan was to decide the outcome of the entire war in one strategic offensive operation (general battle). The enemy army, in this case France, was planned to be encircled from the right flank, squeezed into a “bag” and destroyed. Deprived of the army, France was forced to capitulate. The main blow was delivered through the territory of Belgium. According to natural conditions, the border of France was inconvenient for a massive invasion; a number of wooded mountains and hills ran along it - the Ardennes, Argonne, Vosges. In addition, convenient passages were blocked by powerful fortresses, which could greatly slow down the invasion and generally bury the plan for a quick war. While the German troops were busy with the fortresses, the French could complete the mobilization and launch a counteroffensive. Therefore, Schlieffen wanted to strike the main blow through the plain of Flanders (Belgium).

The left wing at this time was supposed to hold down the enemy in battle. At the same time, it was noted that if the left wing of the German army, under pressure from the advancing forces of the French army, which planned to strike the main blow in the center of the front, would retreat, then this would even be beneficial in order to more successfully cover the enemy. The deepening of the French army into German territory will lead to even more catastrophic consequences for it, after the completion of the coverage of the right flank. Schlieffen believed that the enemy would not pass beyond the Ardennes, a wooded and hilly territory. And then the main forces will go to the rear of the French strike group and get huge Cannes, the French will be forced to capitulate.

In the east, they planned to leave an insignificant barrier. The German command was counting on the slow mobilization of the Russian army: in Germany it was planned to be completed in 10 days, in Russia it then lasted 30 days. After the defeat of France, they were going to transfer troops to the Eastern Front, using the developed network of German railways. Kaiser Wilhelm II said: "We will have lunch in Paris, and dinner in St. Petersburg." On the Eastern Front, they also dreamed of repeating Cannes: delivering converging strikes - the Germans from the north, and the Austrians from the south, from Krakow. Allied troops meet in the Warsaw area, surrounding the Russian army in Poland. The defeat and surrender of the main forces of the Russian army were to lead to the defeat of Russia. The result - a complete victory in the West and East. And in the shortest possible time.

Schlieffen did not count on a strong alliance with Italy, although this country was part of the block of the Central Powers. In 1882 Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy signed a secret Treaty of the Triple Alliance. In 1887 and 1891 the treaty was renewed and automatically renewed in 1902 and 1912. However, there was little hope for a lasting alliance with Italy. Italy wanted significant territorial concessions from Austria-Hungary and already in 1902 concluded an agreement with France, pledging to remain neutral in the event of a German attack on France. This forced Schlieffen to abandon the idea of ​​carrying out two flanking attacks involving the Italian army.

According to Schlieffen's theoretical calculations, it was necessary to deploy 35 army corps (70 infantry divisions) and 8 cavalry divisions against France, in the second echelon there were 8 more reserve corps (16 divisions). They united in 7 armies. German troops, having the axis of entry in the area of ​​Metz, Didenhofen (Thionville), had to deeply bypass the left flank of the enemy on Amiens or west of Abbeville and even along the sea coast of France, covering Paris from the northwest. Corps of 5 armies (1-5) participated in the strike, one army held the right flank. The troops remaining in Alsace and Lorraine (about 4 1/2 corps - 10 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) could retreat under the onslaught of the enemy to the line of Metz, Strasbourg and even to the Rhine. By this, the French armies were drawn into the encirclement. The French troops planned to destroy approximately in the Alsace region or press against Switzerland.

In total, Schlieffen planned to deploy 48 corps (96 infantry divisions) and 11 cavalry divisions against France. But, that was in theory. In fact, Germany by 1905 had 62 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. According to the plan of 1905, the ratio of forces north and south of Metz was 7:1. It was a risk. Thus, criticizing the balance of power between the right and left flanks of the German army, Ludendorff, a student of Schlieffen, noted in his memoirs: “Such limited forces, which were left by Schlieffen in Alsace-Lorraine without any coercive basis, could create a danger unnecessary for success, which was the most dangerous strategic game” . The French army, with skillful leadership and a certain determination, could put the German army in a very difficult position by intercepting the communication lines of the German wings.

In addition, the question arose of supplying a huge mass of troops on the right flank of the German army. So, already two weeks after the start of the offensive operation, the right wing began to feel a significant shortage of supplies, and this despite the fact that the army grouping was significantly weakened when the plan was improved by the new Chief of the General Staff, Helmut von Moltke. In addition, Schlieffen assumed that the German troops would reach the Franco-Belgian border by the 30th day from the start of mobilization. But during this considerable period of time, the French had to learn about the movement of huge masses of German troops on their left flank and, using their powerful French railway network, regroup their armies, depriving the enemy of an operational advantage.

Alfred von Schlieffen (1833 - 1913)

Moltke's changes

Despite the significant shortcomings of the Schlieffen plan, it was still retained, although significant changes were made to it. Helmut Johann Ludwig von Moltke (Moltke Jr.), who in 1906 headed the Great General Staff of the German Empire, under pressure from disgruntled military leaders and Kaiser Wilhelm II, improved the Schlieffen Plan. Schlieffen's ideas were considered too risky, for fear of leaving too weak a grouping on the left flank of the Western Front.

The main idea of ​​the main attack on the right flank through Belgium was retained. However, the left wing was significantly reinforced to the detriment of the strike force on the right flank. Moltke's deployment plan, with which the German Empire entered the war in 1914, was as follows. In the area of ​​Metz and to the north of it, it was planned to deploy 26 1/2 corps, including reserve (and Schlieffen proposed deploying 35 and a half corps), practically all cavalry units and 17 landwehr brigades. This army group was supposed to bypass the left flank of the French armies with its right wing, advancing through Belgium, and provide its left wing with the fortified area of ​​Metz, Didenhofen. In the German center there were 11 corps (400 thousand soldiers), taking Luxembourg, they covered the right flank of the main strike force. The main strike group - 16 corps (700 thousand people), was supposed to pass Belgium, crushing two powerful fortresses of Liege and Namur along the way, force the Meuse River, take Brussels on the 19th day of mobilization and on the 28th day cross the Belgian-French border. Then the troops were to advance to the west and south, reaching Paris from the north on the 39th day. Moltke promised the Austrians that on the 40th day the German command would begin to transfer troops to the east in order to crush Russia together with the Austro-Hungarian army.

The left wing of the German army was significantly strengthened: 8 army corps were deployed in Alsace and Lorraine - 320 thousand people (according to the Schlieffen plan there were 4 and a half). As a result, the ratio of forces between the northern and southern groups began to equal 3:1 (at Schlieffen it was 7:1). Although these troops were hardly able to hold back the bulk of the French troops. But this one was not required of them. Retreating, they had to lengthen the lines of communication of the French shock forces, complicate their interaction in mountainous and wooded areas, lure the largest possible number of French troops into the area, which did not decide anything in the general course of the war, and then slam the trap.

Thus, there was a significant weakening of the right wing of the German army, a significant strengthening of the Alsace-Lorraine group. These were the most significant differences between the 1914 plan and the Schlieffen plan. In addition, if Schlieffen on the Eastern Front was going to limit himself to defense with the help of landwehr formations, then Moltke Jr. sent 3 field and 1 reserve corps to the Russian border, not counting reserve divisions, landwehr and reinforced garrisons of fortresses.

Helmut Johann Ludwig von Moltke (1848 - 1916)

The main reasons that forced the German command to change the Schlieffen plan were the following:

1) the threat of a strong blow on the left flank and the general lack of forces did not allow a radical strengthening of the right wing of the German army. The German command did not take risks, since during the active offensive of the French army the entire rear of the German armies was threatened, the French could intercept communications and disrupt the offensive on the right wing;

2) industrial circles were afraid of severe destruction and devastation of the Alsace-Lorraine region, which had become very important industrially. In 1905, when the Schlieffen plan was drawn up, he had not yet risen to such a height as in 1914. They wanted to save the area from destruction, so it could not be given away to the enemy, as Schlieffen suggested;

3) under pressure from the Prussian junkers (nobility), the high command decided to divert quite significant forces for the defense of East Prussia. The 8th Army under the command of General Maximilian von Prittwitz (200 thousand people) was deployed against the Russian Empire in East Prussia. Military considerations sacrificed the economic interests of the German Junkers;

4) an assessment of Germany's transport capabilities to supply such a huge mass of troops, which Schlieffen intended to concentrate on the right flank, showed that during the offensive it would be impossible to provide it with everything necessary.

In addition to the objective lack of forces, one can see a great influence on the German command of the German industrial bourgeoisie, as well as the Junker landlords. The German military could not ignore the interests of the nobility and the big bourgeoisie. As a result, the German Empire entered the war in 1914 with great hopes of achieving its goals, but the Second Reich simply did not have the strength and resources to implement all the tasks. In addition, the German military-political leadership underestimated the opponents, forces and means of Russia, France and England, which concealed the prerequisites for the future defeat of the German Empire.

It should be noted that a number of researchers believe that when implementing the original Schlieffen plan, the German army had a chance of success. And the 1914 plan led to a dispersal of forces, which deprived the German army of any chance of success in the 1914 campaign of the year. Other historians believe that Moltke's "mistakes" were not the reasons for the failure of the German blitzkrieg. There were many objective reasons for the failure, including the technical unpreparedness of the armies of that time for such a rapid movement, the inability to calculate all the factors, including the rapid and successful offensive of the Russian troops in East Prussia. The smooth German plan was only on paper, it did not take into account many factors.

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Subtitles

Purpose of the Schlieffen Plan

Since the time of Otto von Bismarck, winning a war on two fronts: with France and Russia was considered not only impossible, but also recognized as military suicide for Prussia, as the Empire - the unifier of the German states.

However, from 1879 the Prussian General Staff began to develop a plan that would allow the Dual Alliance to successfully fight on two fronts. The first draft of the plan was ready by 1905.

The main purpose of the Schlieffen Plan was to - using the difference in time required for full mobilization between France and Russia, which was estimated at about 2 months - to apply the principle of simultaneous war with only one enemy, defeating and forcing the surrender first - France and then Russia.

In a modified variant, the plan was to achieve victory over France during the first month of the First World War. However, a number of joint countermeasures of the Entente countries, including the French counterattack in the Battle of the Marne, which was not provided for by the plan, the “running to the sea”, as well as the offensive of the Russian army in East Prussia, disrupted the implementation of the Schlieffen plan, as a result of which the parties switched to a positional war that dragged on for some years.

Estimates of the Schlieffen plan are still the subject of controversy among civil and military historians.

Plan

For a long time, the German troops failed to take Paris (in 1870, the siege of Paris lasted about 6 months, in contrast to the planned 39 days), but nevertheless, after long battles, they passed through the western part of the city. The essence of the plan was not to capture the cities and trade centers of the country, but to force the French army to surrender and capture as many soldiers as possible, that is, to repeat the course of the Franco-Prussian war.

But some of the details that subsequently led to the collapse of the von Schlieffen plan were invisible to the German command: both Schlieffen and the executor of the plan, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were tempted by the opportunity to impose on the French army from two sides. Once again, the inspiration was history, namely the crushing defeat of the army of Ancient Rome in the battle of Cannae in 216 BC. e., and it was this battle that Schlieffen studied very meticulously. In essence, his plan was a rather large reimagining of Hannibal's plan.

It was expected that the mobilization of the Russian army would be very slow due to the poor organization and poor development of the Russian railway network. After an early victory over France, Germany intended to concentrate its forces on the Eastern Front. The plan was to leave 9% of the army in France and send the remaining 91% against the Russian Empire. Kaiser Wilhelm II put it this way:

Plan changes, 1906

After Schlieffen retired in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger became Chief of the General Staff of the Second Reich. Some of his views did not coincide with the original version of the Schlieffen plan, which seemed to him excessively risky. The plan was developed in 1905, and due to miscalculations by Schlieffen, part of the army did not want to act on this plan. For this reason, Moltke the Younger undertook to rework the plan. He decided to regroup his troops, transferring a significant part of the army from France towards the Russian borders and strengthening the left flank of the German army in the western strategic direction. Also different from the original plan was Moltke's decision not to send troops through the Netherlands. It is this decision of his that is the most discussed among chroniclers. Turner described this change thusly:

This was a significant change to the Schlieffen Plan, which probably doomed the German campaign on the Western Front to failure before that campaign even began.

Original text (English)

"A modification substantial in the Schlieffen Plan and one which probably doomed the German campaign in the west before it was ever launched".

Turner justified this by saying that Germany already did not have the strength to quickly capture France, and because of this, Germany immediately got involved in a war on two fronts.

At the very beginning of the war, following the directives of Plan-XVII, France began mobilization, and later the transfer of its army to the border with Germany, in order to regain control over the province of Alsace-Lorraine. These actions just fit into Schlieffen's idea of ​​a double encirclement of the French army. But due to Moltke's decision to transfer troops to Russia in order to prevent the capture of East Prussia, the plan was thwarted.

Start of the plan and subsequent failures

• Italy's refusal to enter the war: The entry into the war of Italy, Germany's partner in the Tripartite Alliance, was a necessary condition for the success of the plan. Firstly, the Italian army, advanced to the border with France, was supposed to divert a significant part of the French troops. Secondly, the Italian fleet, combined with the Austrian, would pose a serious threat to the communications of the Entente in the Mediterranean. This would force the British to keep a large naval force there, which would eventually lead to the loss of their superiority at sea. In reality, both the German and Austrian fleets were practically locked in their bases.
• Belgian resistance: Despite the fact that the Belgian army was only a tenth of the German army, Belgian soldiers held the country's defenses for about a month. The Germans used Big Bertha to destroy the Belgian strongholds in Liege, Namur and Antwerp, but the Belgians did not give up, creating a constant threat of losing the German army. Also, the German attack on neutral Belgium caused many neutral countries to reconsider their views on Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm.

• Mobilization of the Russian army: The mobilization of Russia was faster, and the invasion of Russian troops in East Prussia completely discouraged the German command. These events forced the command to transfer even more troops to the eastern front. This backfired: after winning the Battle of Tannenberg in early September

Contrary to German expectations, Great Britain was not ready to enter into peace negotiations even after the defeat of France in June 1940. Since the German air raids did not bring the expected result, and the attack on the island state looked too risky, the German strategic concept had to be changed. Preference was given to the final goal of the war - the destruction of the Soviet Union and the achievement of colonial rule over all of Eastern Europe, in order to thus achieve victory over Great Britain.

After various preliminary studies, on 12/18/1940, Hitler ordered the preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union ("Plan Barbarossa"). Only a small part of the German military and diplomats warned Hitler against this war, while the majority agreed with his goals and hoped for a quick victory. The optimistic authors of the plan intended to achieve the intended goal, the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, within eight weeks by a "blitzkrieg", the more cautious ones - within sixteen weeks. The military formations intended to attack the Soviet Union numbered 3.3 million soldiers, which roughly corresponded to their numbers in the war against France. True, they were better equipped and more experienced militarily. These included the Allied troops (Romania, Finland) numbering about 600,000 people. After talking to Hitler about a week before the attack, Goebbels expressed the general anticipation of victory: "We are facing an unparalleled victorious campaign."

When preparing the "war of world views" against the Soviet Union, something more was meant than military-technical planning. At the meeting of the commanders on March 30, 1941, Hitler left no doubt that it was a "struggle for annihilation." “The fight will be very different from the fight in the West. Cruelty in the East is soft for the future.” Accordingly, the military directives (General Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group) stated that the war against Russia was to be waged "with unheard-of cruelty." Already in March 1941, the Wehrmacht High Command announced its agreement that the Reichsfuehrer SS would "independently and under personal responsibility" carry out the "special tasks of the Fuhrer" in the area of ​​military operations of the ground forces. For actions against "enemy civilians," the decree on the conduct of military proceedings of May 13, 1941, said, "there will be no mandatory prosecution, even if the act is a war crime or misdemeanor." "Order on commissars" dated 6.6.1941, the destruction of political workers of the Soviet Army was authorized. In the plans for economic activity and food supply in the occupied regions, starvation was provided for many millions of people: “In this case, undoubtedly, tens of millions of people will starve” (session of state secretaries of May 2, 1941). “Several tens of millions of people in this territory will become superfluous and die or will be forced to move to Siberia.” ("Economic Headquarters Ost" dated 23.5.1941).

The Soviet leadership had, at the latest in May 1941, reliable information about the German attack. But the Red Army was not ready for war: neither its personnel, nor in organizational terms. Apparently, the Soviet leadership was unable to make a clear decision: although the troops were pulled up to the borders, they were not in a position to launch a counterattack and did not have a realistic defensive concept.

Text 25
Entries from the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder dated 30.3.1941 regarding the goals of the war against the Soviet Union and its conduct.

War of two worldviews. An annihilating sentence to Bolshevism as an anti-social bunch of criminals. Communism is a terrible danger to the future. We must abandon the idea of ​​a soldier's camaraderie. The communist was not and never will be a comrade. It's about fighting for destruction. If we do not accept this, then, although we will defeat the enemy, in 30 years we will again be confronted by the communist enemy. We are not waging war to conserve the enemy. Future picture of the state: Northern Russia belongs to Finland. Protectorates - the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus. The struggle against Russia: the destruction of the Bolshevik commissars and the Bolshevik intelligentsia. [...]

The struggle must be waged in order to destroy the poison of decay. This is not a question of military courts. The leaders of the troops must know what is at stake. They must lead the fight. Troops must defend themselves with the same means with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU officers are criminals, and they must be dealt with accordingly.

Therefore, the troops should not get out of the power of the leaders. The leader must take his orders in accordance with the mood in the troops. The fight will be very different from the fight in the West. In the East cruelty is soft for the future. Leaders must demand self-sacrifice from themselves, overcome their doubts.

Text 26
Directives of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of 13. 3. 1941 regarding the management of the occupied areas and cooperation with the SS.

2) [...]

B) in the area of ​​operations of the ground forces, the Reichsfuehrer SS receives special tasks from the Fuhrer for the preparation of the political administration, which follow from the struggle of two opposing political systems, leading to a victorious end. Within the framework of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS acts independently and under his own responsibility. As for the rest, the administrative power transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the services authorized by him does not require intervention. The Reichsfuehrer SS makes sure that the performance of his tasks does not interfere with the conduct of military operations. In more detail, this is regulated directly by the High Command of the troops and the Reichsführer SS. [...]

Chief of the Supreme
command of the Wehrmacht
Keitel

31 Hitler in the Reich Chancellery with representatives of the generals after he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal for the victory over France, September 1940. From left to right: Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group A von Rundtstaedt, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group V von Bock, Reich Marshal Goering , Hitler, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group C Ritter von Leeb, Commander of the 12th Army, General List, Commander of the 4th Army, von Kluge, Commander of the 1st Army, General Witzleben, Commander of the 6th Army, General von Reichenau.

32 Meeting of the General Staff (1940). Participants of the meeting at the table with a map (from left to right): Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, Hitler, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder.

Text 27
Information about the meeting of state secretaries on May 2, 1941 on the economic goals of the war against the Soviet Union.

The place of the meeting is unknown, there is no list of participants. It is known for sure that those present were: Reichsmarschall Goering, head of the "Economy Management Headquarters Ost"; General Thomas, head of the military-economic and military-industrial department of the Wehrmacht; Lieutenant General Schubert, Chief of the "Economic Headquarters Ost"; secretaries of state Kerner (department of the four-year plan), Bake (ministry of food), von Hanneken (ministry of economics), Alpers (ministry of forestry). Allegedly present were Rosenberg, the future Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and General Jodl of the Wehrmacht High Command.

Memo on the results of today's meeting with the secretaries of state about the "Plan Barbarossa."

1) The war should be continued only if the entire Wehrmacht in the third year of the war is supplied with food from Russia.

2) At the same time, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve if we take everything we need out of the country.

3) The most important thing is the preservation and transportation of oilseed crops, oilseed cake and only then grain. The available fats and meat are intended to supply the troops.

4) The functioning of the industry should be restored only in some areas, in particular: enterprises producing vehicles, enterprises for the production of general products (iron, etc.), textile enterprises, from enterprises for the production of weapons only of such a profile as in Germany is not enough. Opening repair shops for troops in large numbers.

5) To secure the hinterland away from the highways, special troops must be trained, the RAD (Reich Labor Service) or auxiliary army formations can be used. It is necessary to identify especially important areas that require protection.

33 Reichsmarschall Göring in conversation with Secretary of State Herbert Backe (undated).

Text 28
An excerpt from the directive of the Economic Headquarters Ost, Agriculture Group, dated May 23, 1941, regarding the separation of Russian industrial centers from grain zones.

It follows from this: the allocation of black earth regions should ensure for us, under any circumstances, the presence of more or less significant surpluses in these regions. As a result - the cessation of supply of the entire forest zone, including large industrial centers - Moscow and St. Petersburg. [...]

From all this it follows that the German administration in this area must direct all efforts to alleviate the consequences of the famine that is undoubtedly capable of arising and to accelerate the process of naturalization. It is necessary to strive for a more intensive economic development of these areas in the sense of expanding the sown areas for potatoes and other high-yielding crops important for consumption. But this will not eliminate hunger. Several tens of millions of people in this territory will become superfluous and die or will be forced to move to Siberia. Attempts to save this population from starvation by sending surpluses from the black earth zone there can only be carried out at the cost of worsening the supply of Europe. They can undermine Germany's ability to hold out in the war and weaken the blockade strength of Germany and Europe. There should be absolute clarity on this issue.

Text 29
Decree of Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht dated May 13, 1941 on military justice in the war with the Soviet Union.

In the text of the original, the words "Plan Barbarossa", the former designation during development, are crossed out.

Fuhrer and Supreme
commander in chief
Wehrmacht
fuehrer headquarters,
13 May 1941

Decree
on the conduct of military proceedings
and about the special actions of the troops. The military court proceedings of the Wehrmacht serve primarily to maintain discipline.

The wide extent of the zone of combat operations in the East, the form of warfare and the peculiarities of the enemy pose tasks for military courts that, during military operations, up to fixing in the occupied areas, can be solved with their small number of personnel only if legal proceedings are limited to the main task . [...]

Consideration of criminal cases of representatives of the Wehrmacht and civilian employees for their actions against the local population.

1. There will be no mandatory prosecution for acts against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and civilians, even if the act is a war crime or misdemeanor.

2. In considering such actions, it must be borne in mind that the defeat of 1918, the subsequent period of suffering for the German people and the struggle against National Socialism with countless bloody victims of the movement is largely due to Bolshevik influence, and not a single German has forgotten this.

3. The judge decides whether in such cases a disciplinary sanction should be imposed, or whether a trial is necessary. The judge prescribes the prosecution of acts against local residents in a military court order only when it comes to non-compliance with military discipline or a threat to the security of the troops. This applies, for example, to serious offenses on the basis of sexual promiscuity, a predisposition to crime, or to signs that testify to the savagery of the troops. Strictly condemned are criminal acts that result in the wanton destruction of locations, as well as stores or other spoils of war, to the detriment of their troops.
[...]

By order of the Chief of the Supreme
command of the Wehrmacht signed Keitel

Text 30
Instruction of the State Secretary of the Ministry of Food Herbert Backe to the district leaders of agriculture dated June 1, 1941 on the behavior towards the Russians in the occupied territory.

La V. No. 52/41 Kdos
Secret!
12 requirements
to the behavior of the Germans in the East and the treatment of the Russians. [...]

Don't talk, act. You will never “talk” Russians and not convince them with speeches. He can speak better than you, since he is a born dialectician and has inherited "philosophizing." In conversations and debates, you will be the loser. You should act. The Russian is impressed only by the action, because he himself is effeminate and sentimental.

[...] The Russians only want to be a controlled mass. The arrival of the Germans will have such an effect on them, for in this way their own desire will be fulfilled: "Come and rule over us." Therefore, the Russian should not get the impression that you hesitate. You must be a man of action, a man of action who, without debate, without long useless conversations and without philosophizing, determines what needs to be done and gives clear orders. Then the Russian will obediently serve you. Do not approach with German standards and customs, forget everything German except Germany itself. [...]

Need, hunger, contentment with little has been the fate of the Russian people for centuries. His stomach is distended, so no false sympathy. Do not try to impose the German standard of living and change the Russian way of life.

Rely completely on yourself, so no complaints or requests for help from superiors. Help yourself, and God help you!

Text 31
Order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht dated 6/6/1941 regarding the treatment of political commissars of the Soviet Army.

The order (“Order on Commissars”) was signed by the head of the Wehrmacht high command, Field Marshal Keitel.

Annex to VKV / V Det. L 4 / Ku No. 44822 / 41, city of Chef.

Basic Directives for the Treatment of Political Commissars.

In the fight against Bolshevism it is impossible to build relations with the enemy on the principles of humanism and international law. It is precisely from political commissars of every rank, as carriers of resistance, that one should expect hatred, cruel and inhuman treatment of our prisoners.

Troops must be aware of the following:

1) In this war, mercy and respect for international legal norms in relation to these elements are inappropriate. They are a threat to our security and to the rapid pacification of the occupied areas.

2) The political commissars are the initiators of the barbaric Asian methods of struggle. Therefore, they must be fought without condescension, with all ruthlessness. Therefore, they, captured in battle or in resistance, must be dealt with by using weapons.

For the rest, you need to do the following: [...]

2) Political commissars, as members of the bodies of the enemy troops, have a special distinction - a red star with an embroidered hammer and sickle on their sleeves (for details, see the "Armed Forces of the USSR" of the department of foreign armies dated January 15, 1941 in Appendix 9e). They should be followed immediately, i.e. still on the battlefield to separate from other prisoners of war. This is necessary to deprive them of any possibility of influencing captured soldiers. These commissars are not considered soldiers; they are not covered by international legal protection in relation to prisoners of war. After separation from prisoners of war, they should be destroyed. [...]

34 Plan of the German Wehrmacht attack on the Soviet Union, June 1941.

Text 32
An excerpt from the diary of the Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels dated 16.6.1941 regarding the attack on the Soviet Union.

The Fuhrer believes that the action will last approximately 4 months, I believe less. Bolshevism will collapse like a house of cards. We are facing an unprecedented victorious campaign. We need to act. [...]

Cooperation with Russia was actually a stain on our honor. Now it will be washed away. What we have been fighting against all our lives will now be destroyed. I say this to the Fuhrer, and he agrees with me completely. I must say a good word about Rosenberg, whose life's work, thanks to this action, is again justified. The Führer says: Whether we are right or wrong, we must win. This is the only way. And it is correct, moral and necessary. And if we win, then who will ask us about the methods. There are so many things on our conscience that we must win, otherwise all our people and we, at the head of everything that is dear to us, will be destroyed. So, to business! [...]

35 Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), photo 1939 Born in Helmscherode (Harz). In military service since 1901. During the First World War - an artillery and general staff officer. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of Major General. In 1935, head of the Wehrmacht department in the Imperial War Ministry. In 1936 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. In 1937 he became a general of artillery. In 1938 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General, in 1940 - Field Marshal General. As Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht (since February 1938), he was responsible for developing Hitler's instructions for the conduct of the war (for example, the “Order on Commissars”) and for monitoring its implementation, as well as for monitoring military planning. On May 8, 1945, he signed the act of unconditional surrender. 1. 10. 1946 sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Executed 10/16/1946

36 Walther von Brauchitsch (1881-1948), photo 1941. Born in Berlin. In 1900 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant. During the First World War, he held various positions in the general staff of the Western Front. After the war, an officer of the Reichswehr headquarters. In 1931 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1933 - Lieutenant General, in 1936 - General of Artillery. In 1938 he received the rank of colonel general and was appointed commander in chief of the ground forces. In July 1940 he became Field Marshal General. After the defeat near Moscow in December 1941, he was removed from his post. At the end of the war he was in English captivity. On 10/18/1948 he died in an English military hospital in Hamburg-Barmbek.

37 Franz Halder (1884-1972), photo 1939. Born in Würzburg. Service in the army (artillery) since 1902, in 1904 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant. During the First World War he served in the General Staff, then in the Reichswehr and the Ministry of the Reichswehr. In 1934 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1936 - Lieutenant General, in 1938 - General of Artillery. In September 1938 he became chief of the general staff of the ground forces. In 1940 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General. After conflicts with Hitler on tactical issues in September 1942, he was dismissed and transferred to the command reserve; in January 1945 he finally retired from military service. In 1938 he had contacts with the circles of the Resistance, but without active participation. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, the Gestapo kept him under house arrest at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8 for some time. He was released by the Americans from the Dachau concentration camp. Died 2. 4. 1972 in Aschau / Chiemgau.

38 Fedor von Bock (1880-1945), photo 1940 Born in Kustrin. In 1898 he became an officer. From 1912 to 1919 - an officer of the General Staff. In 1916 he was awarded the rank of major. He was awarded the Order "Pour-le-Merit" ("For Merit"). After the First World War he served in the War Department. In 1931 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. From 1935 to 1938, as an infantry general, he was commander-in-chief of the 3rd corps of troops in Dresden. In the spring of 1938 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 8th Army in Austria. During the attack on Poland - the commander-in-chief of the Nord group of troops, during the attack on France in 1940 - by the group of troops B. He was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. In the war against the Soviet Union, he was first commander-in-chief of the Center group of troops, from January 1942 until his replacement in July - of the Süd group of troops. Died 3.5.1945 during an air raid.

Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956), photo 1940 Born in Landsberg am Lech. In 1895 he joined the Bavarian army. During the First World War - an officer of the General Staff. In 1919 he became a member of the volunteer corps. After the war he served in the Ministry of the Reichswehr and in the Reichswehr. In 1929 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1930 - Lieutenant General, in 1934 - General of Artillery. In March 1938, he was dismissed with the rank of colonel general, again called to serve during the occupation of the Sudetenland. In 1939 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ts group of troops. In 1940 he became field marshal general. After the attack on the Soviet Union - Commander-in-Chief of the Nord group of troops. In January 1942 he was again dismissed. On May 2, 1945, he was in American captivity. On October 22, 1948, he was sentenced to three years in prison, taking into account the time spent in captivity. Died April 29, 1956 in Füssen.

40 Carl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), photo 1939 Born in Aschersleben. Since 1892 - in the army. During the First World War - an officer of the General Staff. In 1927 was awarded the rank of major general, in 1929 - lieutenant general, in 1932 - general of infantry, in 1938 - colonel general. In November 1938 he was dismissed, in the summer of 1939 he was again drafted into the army. During the invasion of Poland - the commander-in-chief of the Süd group of troops, in France - the A group of troops, in the Soviet Union - the Süd group of troops. In November 1941 he was fired. In March 1942 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces West. From the summer of 1944, he led the "court of honor" of the Wehrmacht. After the end of the war, he was in American and English captivity, on May 5, 1949 he was released for health reasons. Died 24.2.1953 in Hannover.

41 Erich Hoepner (1886-1944) - no date. Born in Frankfurt an der Oder. Since 1905 - in the army. During the First World War he was an officer. In 1933 he was appointed chief of the general staff in the 1st military district of Koenigsberg. In 1938 he was appointed commander of the 16th army (tank) corps. He took part in campaigns in Poland and France. In 1940 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General. He was the commander-in-chief of tank group 4 (from January 1942 - the 4th tank army) as part of the Nord group of forces, and from October 1941 as part of the Center group of forces. After an unauthorized order to retreat near Moscow in January 1942, he was fired from the Wehrmacht. He had connections with the military Resistance. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, he was arrested. On August 8, 1944, he was sentenced to death and hanged.

42 Walther von Reichenau (1884-1942), photo 1942. Born in Karlsruhe. Since 1903 - in the army. During the First World War - an officer of the General Staff. In 1933 he was appointed chief of the ministerial department (since February 1934 - Wehrmacht department) in the Reichswehr ministry. In 1934 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1935 - Lieutenant General, in 1936 - General of Artillery. Upon entering Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and during the attack on Poland in September of the same year, he was commander-in-chief of the 10th Army. In October 1939 he became a colonel general. Then he was commander of the 6th Army in Group of Forces B. In July 1940, he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. He entered the territory of the Soviet Union with the 6th Army as part of the Süd group of troops, in December 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Süd group of troops. He died suddenly on January 17, 1942 near Poltava.

43 Hermann Hoth (1885-1971), photo 1941. Born in Neuruppin. Since 1904 - in the army. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1936 - lieutenant general, in 1938 - general of infantry. As commander of the 15th Army Corps (in 1940 expanded to the 3rd Panzer Group), he participated in the war against Poland and France, as well as in the attack on the Soviet Union. In October 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 17th Army, in June 1942 - of the 4th Tank Army. After the surrender of Kyiv in December 1942, he was removed from his post. In April 1945 he became commander in Erzgebirge. At the Nuremberg trials against the high command of the Wehrmacht, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison, in 1954 he was pardoned and released from prison. Died 25.1. 1971 in Goslar

44 Discussion of the situation and issuance of orders in one of the German units immediately before the attack on 22.6.1941.

45 Appendix No. 2 to the instructions for deployment and combat operations according to the "Plan Barbarossa" for Panzer Group 4 (General Hoepner) dated May 2, 1941, regarding the nature of the war. “The war against Russia is one of the most important stages in the struggle for the existence of the German people. This is the ancient battle of the Germans against the Slavs, the defense of European culture from the Muscovite-Asiatic invasion, the defense against Jewish Bolshevism. The purpose of this war is the defeat of today's Russia, so it must be waged with unprecedented cruelty. Each combat operation, both in planning and in its conduct, must be carried out with an unbending will for the merciless total extermination of the enemy. In particular, no mercy towards the representatives of the Russian-Bolshevik system.”

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There are certain grounds for believing that the Soviet leadership, primarily Stalin, seriously hoped to stay away from the outbreak of the world war. And the prerequisites for this should have been our military power, unprecedented in terms of the scale of that time. Of course, the power is potential, hypothetical, in fact useless, as time has shown.

CARDS GAMES

In September 1940, the People's Commissariat of Defense reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks the considerations for deploying troops near the western border in the light of the events that had taken place in Europe. It was assumed that the concentration of the main forces of the German army was most likely north of the mouth of the San River. Therefore, the main forces of our army must be deployed from the Baltic Sea to Polissya, in the Baltic and Western districts.

Stalin suggested that the main blow would be in the southwest, to capture the Ukraine, the Donets Basin, the Caucasus - the richest industrial, raw materials and agricultural regions. So it is written in the Soviet "History of World War II".

A new plan was developed, which appeared by the end of 1940. According to it, the main attack of the enemy was expected in the direction of Lvov-Kyiv. An auxiliary strike could have been delivered from East Prussia to Vilnius-Vitebsk.

The concentration of the main forces in the Lvov-Kiev direction pursued the goal of preventing the advance of large enemy tank masses into Ukraine. It was taken into account that in this direction the terrain was most convenient for the deployment of tank and motorized infantry units, of which we had much more German ones. It is important to note that the military still assumed the possibility of a flank attack on the central German grouping by part of the forces in the southern direction, but subject to the obligatory retention of the Kovel, Rovno, Lvov area.

In December 1940, a meeting of the senior command staff of our army was held, at which the problems of modern warfare were discussed. An interesting characterization was given by the then Chief of the General Staff Meretskov in his report on the draft Field Manual for the Soviet and German troops. He asserted that our division was much stronger than the German one and would certainly defeat it in a meeting engagement. On the defensive, our division will repulse the blow of two or three enemy divisions. In the offensive, one and a half of our divisions will overcome the defenses of the enemy division. According to the layout of the army general, it turned out that our division had nothing less than a double superiority over the German one. This is a typical assessment for those times.

The meeting was followed by two operational-strategic games on maps, the design of which reflected the Soviet military doctrine. On the instructions for the first game, the "Western" (commander Zhukov) carried out an attack on the "Eastern" (commander Pavlov) and by July 23-25 ​​advanced into the territory of Belarus and Lithuania 70-120 km from the border. But as a result of retaliatory actions, they were thrown back by August 1 to their original position.

On the instructions for the second game, the South-Eastern Front of the "Western" (commander Pavlov) and their allies began hostilities on August 1, 1941 against the Lvov-Ternopil grouping of the "Eastern" (commander Zhukov) and invaded the territory of Ukraine to a depth of 50-70 km , however, at the turn of Lvov-Kovel, they were met by a strong counterattack of the South-Eastern Front of the "Eastern" and by the end of August 8 they retreated to previously prepared lines.

In the games there was not even an attempt to consider the actions of the "Eastern" in the event of an attack by a real enemy. That is, it was assumed that the plan to cover the state border was carried out successfully in the first days. What seemed to the developers of the game for granted in terms of superiority in forces and means, especially in aviation and tanks. In the first game - tanks 2.5:1, aviation 1.7:1. In the second - for tanks 3:1, for aircraft 1.3:1.

In both games, the offensive side was the “Eastern”. In the first game, the offensive of the "Eastern" was interrupted by a flank attack by the "Western". In the second game, the offensive of the "Eastern" was more successful.

On March 11, 1941, an "updated plan" for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union was drawn up, taking into account the results of the games. In this regard, the south was finally recognized as the main direction of the enemy's strike, for the capture of Ukraine. Accordingly, our troops had to concentrate precisely there in order to defeat the attackers and, at the very first stage of the war, cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive her of her most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war against the USSR. After successfully repulsing the first strike with powerful mechanized formations, conduct and develop a deep breakthrough and quickly decide the outcome of the war.

THE PREVENTIVE STRIKE IS ON PAPER

By this time, the German army had already prepared - it only remained to turn on the mechanism for the mass transfer of formations and units from the western regions of Germany to the border of the USSR. Moreover, the German command relied on the superiority of the railway network, believing that it did not matter much where the troops intended for concentration in the east would be located - in Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia or in West Germany. The farther the forces are from the forthcoming concentration area, the more sudden will be the beginning of this concentration, which Germany is able to carry out much faster than the enemy.

In fact, the ratio of the speed of mobilization and deployment of the army, which was at the beginning of the First World War, was preserved: Germany in 10 days, Russia in 40. The fact is that the railway network developed in the USSR in the 20-30s. extremely unsatisfactory, and in the newly captured areas they only managed to change the existing network to a wider gauge. It should be especially noted that at that time military power was understood somehow one-sidedly: tanks, guns, planes, people. But the fact that there were not enough roads, and it was extremely dangerous, did not hurt my head about this.

In May 1941, the notorious document appeared signed by the then deputy chief of the operational department of the General Staff. He insisted on the need to seize the initiative from the German command, to forestall its deployment. To do this, you need to attack the German army, which is under deployment. This is facilitated by the fact that Germany is bogged down in a war with England.

The second thing that favored, according to Vasilevsky, the offensive operation was that of the supposedly available 287 German divisions, only 120 were concentrated on our border (actually 123). And Germany could put up 180 divisions (including 19 tank and 15 motorized) and up to 240 - together with the allies.

The idea was to strike the main blow with the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow-Katowice and cut off Germany from the allies - Hungary and Romania. The left wing of the Western Front was to strike in the direction of Sedlec-Demblin. This blow could tie down the Warsaw grouping and assist in the defeat of the Lublin grouping by the Southwestern Front. Against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary, Romania should have been actively defending, but be ready to strike against Romania.

It all looked not only a project, but even stupidity from the point of view of the direction of the strikes, their goals. Indeed, it took Germany almost a year to develop and secure the Barbarossa plan. But Germany had an excellent military apparatus, which we practically did not have.

In a word, there was clearly not enough time to prepare a major offensive operation. Even less experience. And the sad example of the Finnish campaign makes it possible to doubt the possibility of successful offensive operations of our army in those conditions and in that condition. The assumptions now appearing that a preemptive strike would make it easier for us to defeat Germany are highly doubtful. As well as versions that entering the war in 1939 would be a great boon.

GERMANY PLANS

Already in October 1939, Hitler formulated the idea of ​​a western campaign - a decisive blow and a quick victory, a deep breakthrough of tank units through the Ardennes to the English Channel and the encirclement of the bulk of the enemy troops. The offensive should be carried out on the widest possible front so that the enemy cannot organize a solid defense. Dismember his front. Concentrate large forces in the depths of the location of their troops, aiming them against individual sections of the enemy front. It is then that it will be possible to fully realize the superiority of the German leadership. The main thing is the will to defeat the enemy.

This is very important to emphasize - the attacker himself chooses the direction, time, force of impact. The lot of the defender is to withstand the first blow, regroup, exhaust the enemy with competent defense and only then strike himself. This is a great art, which we did not have at all then.

In November 1939, at a meeting of the leadership of the Wehrmacht, Hitler stated that Russia did not pose a danger at the moment, and its armed forces had low combat capability. A little more than half a year passes - and the tone becomes even more categorical: the war against the USSR, as opposed to the war with France, will only look like a game of Easter cakes. The basis for this assertion was the notion that the Soviet officer corps was not able to carry out qualified leadership of the troops, which was confirmed by the experience of the Finnish campaign.

On May 9, 1941, the chief of staff of the 4th German Army, Blumentritt, at a meeting in the operational department of the headquarters of the ground forces, argued that the Soviet military command was inferior to the German one: it thinks formally, does not show self-confidence. The remaining senior military leaders should be even less afraid than the former, well-trained generals of the tsarist army. German troops are superior to the enemy in combat experience, training and weapons. The systems of command, organization and training of troops are the most correct. Stubborn battles are ahead for 8-14 days, and then success will not be long in coming. Glory and the halo of invincibility, going everywhere ahead of the Wehrmacht, will have a particularly paralyzing effect on the enemy.

If we recall that in July 1940, when Hitler's first orders were given to begin the practical preparation of an operation against the USSR, it was about a duration of about 5 months, then in a year the period was reduced to almost a week. Hitler immediately started talking about the main attack on Moscow, which made it possible to create extremely unfavorable conditions for the military operations of the most powerful Soviet grouping in Ukraine (a war with an "inverted front").

General considerations about the possibility of the development of events were set out in a memorandum prepared by September 15, 1940 by Colonel Lossberg, head of the ground forces group in the operations department of the German General Staff. In his opinion, in the war against Germany, the USSR had three options: a preventive strike against German troops beginning to concentrate near the border; taking over the blow of the German armed forces, turning around at the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas); retreat into the depths of their space in order to impose on the advancing armies the difficulties of extended communications and the difficulties of supply associated with them, and then, only in the further course of the campaign, delivering a counterattack.

The first option seemed unbelievable - at best, operations against Finland or against Romania. The second option is more likely, since it cannot be assumed that such a powerful military power will give up its richest, including recently conquered areas, without a fight. In addition, a particularly well-equipped network of Air Force ground installations has been deployed to the west of the Dnieper. With a retreat, this network will be lost.

For the German army, such a decision, in which the enemy will take up the battle with large forces at an early stage, is favorable, because after the defeat in the border battle, the Soviet command is unlikely to be able to ensure an organized withdrawal of the entire army.

If the Soviet troops make their plans in advance to first accept the blow of the German troops with small forces, and concentrate their main grouping in the deep rear, then the boundary of the latter’s location north of the Pripyat marshes could be a powerful water barrier formed by the Dvina (Daugava) and the Dnieper . Such an unfavorable decision Lossberg considered possible. But the assumption seemed incredible to him that south of the Pripyat marshes, the southern regions of Ukraine would be left without a fight.

Of the three options, the one that was the most unfavorable for us was recognized as the most probable. In fact, that is what happened. Moreover, the impossibility for Stalin to act differently was calculated - both political, and psychological, and even economic.

All subsequent German developments developed these ideas. In mid-December 1940, a preparatory strategic game for Operation Barbarossa took place at the headquarters of the Ground Forces Command. The idea of ​​the operation was outlined by Paulus. The first goal he called the mastery of Ukraine (including the Donbass), Moscow, Leningrad. This made it possible to capture almost the entire military and heavy industry. The second goal is to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga-Astrakhan line. As conceived by the developers, such an outcome deprived the USSR of any hope for a revival.

In assessing the possible behavior of the Soviet command, the calculation was clearly made on its desire to put up stubborn resistance on the border. Motives - it is difficult to decide to voluntarily give up areas that have recently been captured. And besides, try from the very beginning to weaken the German forces and ensure the possibility of deploying the army.

Therefore, the tasks of the German ground forces were formulated in this way - with the support of aviation, destroy the best personnel troops of the enemy, achieving a decisive battle, and thereby prevent the systematic and full use of the enormous human potential of the USSR. After the success of the first breakthrough, strive in parts to smash the enemy forces and prevent them from creating a united new front. If with the help of these decisions it is not possible to achieve the final victory of the war, then all the same the enemy will not be able to hold on, and even more so to achieve a turning point in the war.

On January 31, 1941, a directive appeared on the strategic deployment of the German ground forces, which finally enshrined the intention to destroy the Soviet troops by rapidly advancing the shock tank groups to prevent a withdrawal into the interior of the country. Moreover, our command was expected to conduct major offensive operations to eliminate the German breakthrough, as well as to ensure the withdrawal of troops behind the Dnieper-Dvina line.

On June 11, 1941, Hitler's directive # 32 saw the light, in which, after the defeat of the USSR, by the fall of 1941 (this is about 3 months, this is exactly the period expected back in March for the "final solution of the Russian problem"), a breakthrough to the Middle East was to follow (through Turkey or from Transcaucasia and through Egypt) in 1942. This plan was confirmed in Hitler's July directive, however, the collapse of the USSR was expected by the winter of 1941 with access to the Volga.

The Soviet leadership hoped that the German leadership would realize the danger of an attack on the USSR. Stalin, as a pragmatist, suggested the impossibility for Hitler to successfully campaign against the USSR. And he believed that there would simply be no war. And Hitler deftly took advantage of this natural desire of Stalin.

As for the ratio of the military potential of the USSR and Germany in 1939 and 1941, it has not changed, since the domestic policy in the USSR, the leadership style, the principles of military planning, and everything else have not changed. Therefore, serious defeats were inevitable.