What is the role of the figure of Pavel Grachev in the modern history of Russia?
Vladimir Kara-Murza
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Pavel Sergeevich Grachev, General of the Army, former Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, died on Sunday at the age of 65. The cause of death of the ex-Minister of Defense was acute meningoencephalitis. Pavel Grachev was 64 years old. The future Minister of Defense was born into the family of a locksmith and a milkmaid in the village of Rvy, Tula Region, served in the Airborne Forces, then studied at the Frunze Military Academy. In 1981 he was sent to Afghanistan, where he served intermittently for more than 5 years. After returning from Afghanistan in 1998, he worked at the Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In 1990 he was appointed deputy commander of the Airborne Forces. Pavel Grachev served as Minister of Defense from 1992 to 1996 and during all this time he was criticized by almost all political forces. In the period from December 94 to January 95, the head of the military department personally directed the course of hostilities in Chechnya. Grachev promised to restore order in Chechnya in two days with one airborne regiment. On June 17, 1996, he was dismissed from the post of Minister of Defense. From December 18, 97 to April 98, military adviser to the general director of Rosvooruzhenie.
About the role of the figure of Pavel Grachev in the modern history of Russia, in our program we talk with Viktor Baranets, a columnist for Komsomolskaya Pravda, a former press secretary of the Ministry of Defense, and Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine. When did you meet Pavel Sergeevich, and what human qualities did he differ in?

Victor Baranets: My first acquaintance was in Afghanistan at the height of the war - it was 1986. Then Pavel Sergeevich commanded the 103rd airborne division, there were heavy battles. I then came on a business trip, and, of course, at first I was alarmed by such a respectful and loving attitude of soldiers and officers towards their commander. Then stories began that Pavel did not sit in a warm dugout, when sometimes he had to take auls, mountains, that he had been injured. In a personal acquaintance, Grachev showed me his tongue: “You see, a piece of my tongue was plucked off by a fragment.” Then I witnessed a curious detail. At the Kabul airfield, the cargo plane was completely packed with clothes, gifts were sent to Moscow generals, colonels, as always, and the officers sent their clothes. Then, I remember, it was very fashionable, the dream of a Panasonic officer to get hold of, jeans, jackets and other things were transported by officers. They brought a dozen wounded officers, and the impudent commander of the ship came out, apparently, he provided the Moscow elite and said: I have nowhere to be wounded, you see - everything is packed. Then Grachev jumped up and threw these boxes almost to Amin's palace, scattered everything, said: "These guys of mine should immediately be sent to the hospital in Kabul." This is how my acquaintance was. But I was lucky, in those days Pavel Sergeevich was awarded the rank of major general, he invited me to this party. And I remember with what officer's fury, sincerity, this officer's revel sang the song "Our combat commander, we will all follow you." I had the feeling that there was no falsehood. Indeed, he became a major general, and even the soldiers lovingly called him Pasha behind his back. This was a man who was respected, this was a man who did not hide behind the backs of the soldiers, as the famous song says. It was really a commander, a Soviet commander of a very good landing temper.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: How do you assess the reform of the armed forces, which began under Pavel Sergeevich as Minister of Defense?

Igor Korotchenko: First of all, it should be noted that Grachev ended up in the post of Russian Defense Minister by chance, by the will of fate. Shortly before the August events of 1991, he received Boris Yeltsin, they steamed together and drank several glasses of vodka, in fact, a close acquaintance of the Russian leader and one of the then promising Soviet airborne generals took place. And actually, Grachev's behavior during the August coup and then close acquaintance with Yeltsin, in fact, played the role of a springboard, thanks to which Grachev, with the outlook and mentality of the commander of an airborne division, suddenly found himself in the chair of the head of the Russian Ministry of Defense. He became the first Minister of Defense of the new Russia, of course, the burden of all those problems fell on his shoulders, which I still remember very well and which accompanied not only the process of the collapse of the Soviet armed forces, the Soviet army and navy, but also the legal formation Russian army.
First of all, I think that Grachev's great merit is that he managed to maintain centralized control over nuclear weapons, which were located not only on the territory of the Russian Federation, but also on the territory of several former Soviet Union republics. Let me remind you that at the beginning of 1992, many post-Soviet leaders of these republics desired nuclear status for their newly proclaimed states. And I think that Grachev's great merit is that in the end, after long and difficult negotiations, everything was taken out to the territory of Russia. At the same time, not a single nuclear warhead fell into unauthorized hands, which was extremely important in those conditions.
Grachev did a lot to prevent the collapse of the armed forces. We remember that there were various candidates for the post of Minister of Defense of Russia, I remember that even Galina Starovoitova, a number of other prominent democrats and liberals from Boris Yeltsin's entourage were predicted for this position. I think that if one of them had taken the post of the first civil minister then in the new Russia, then, probably, the armed forces would have completely lost control and controllability and they would have suffered an even sadder fate than the one that was prepared for them.
But of course, as Grachev’s negative moments as Minister of Defense, I would note the first thing that he let the army be drawn into the tragic events of October 93, when, succumbing to Yeltsin’s pressure, he dragged the army into internal political showdowns that led to a tank assault and attack units of the Airborne Forces of the building of the Supreme Council of Russia, and the unpreparedness of the army for military operations in Chechnya. Probably, here reproaches against Grachev are minimal, because starting from the late 1920s and early 1930s, in fact, our army had no more experience in suppressing an internal armed rebellion. The last such actions were to combat Basmachi. And of course, I also wanted to name as a drawback the fact that Grachev agreed with very short, I would say, very cruel deadlines for the withdrawal of our groups from the countries of Eastern Europe, primarily from the Western Group of Forces, from Germany and from other countries of the former Warsaw Pact . As a result, the divisions were transported to an open field, where there was nothing for their deployment, accommodation, housing. And today, these once glorified units and units practically no longer exist.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: Do you agree that Pavel Sergeevich dragged the army into the events of 1993?

Viktor Baranets: Let me start by making a small statement as an officer who also took the oath. I try not to accept these talks about what Pavel Sergeevich dragged into. Pavel Grachev is subordinate to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Russia, decrees, whose orders had to be carried out. Grachev, as the Minister of Defense, as a subordinate of Yeltsin, had little choice: either as an officer to fulfill the order, without discussing it, in my opinion, no one canceled the oath, decrees and charters, or submit a resignation letter. Grachev chose the second, that's his destiny. And the biggest tragedy of Pavel Sergeevich, in my opinion, is that he became a loyal soldier of the Yeltsin regime. He took on this black cross and carried it as he carried it. It suffices here to recall that conversation, the ferocious conversation between Yeltsin and Grachev, when he ordered firing on the White House. And there were many witnesses that night when Pavel Sergeevich did not express enthusiasm for this instruction. There are many witnesses that night what happened. Already leaving the office, frustrated, pale, gnashing his teeth, Yeltsin saw that Grachev hesitated, but Grachev at the last moment turned to Yeltsin, said: “Boris Nikolaevich”, or rather, he turned: “Comrade Supreme Commander, I ask you to still send me written order. And then Yeltsin, gnashing his teeth, said: "All right, I'll send it to you." This is a small detail, but she says that Grachev still had responsibility, conscience, and understanding of the dirty tragedy that Yeltsin dragged him into.
Now about the Chechen war. Now, of course, many, very many, especially the parents of the dead soldiers, curse and curse Grachev that he dragged the army into a civil war, in fact a war on the territory of his own state. But here the question arises: what, Grachev himself pulled troops there, he himself decided to fight Dudayev, whom he met twice on the eve of the war and persuaded him not to fight. Dudayev had already agreed, because it only remained to sit down for negotiations, which Yeltsin did not want. He did not want to sit with some shepherd, as he said, at the gilded tables of the Kremlin. And here again came the black fatal moment of truth for Grachev, he had to fulfill or not to fulfill. He is like a soldier, like an officer, like a general, he decided to act like an officer, to do whatever it takes. Yes, the army was not prepared, but I do not understand Grachev's reproaches that too many soldiers died. I do not know wars where there would be no casualties of soldiers and officers. On the other hand, the army is really ready for that operation, and let's say in our own words - a civil war against its own population, because Chechnya was and remains a Russian republic, it was Russia, even Napoleon would not have been prepared for such a war.
Remember, after all, it was 1994, that we really only pulled troops out of Europe, fled, we did not know where to place them, we still only removed weapons from the echelons, we had few units that were ready to fight with our own people . Now, of course, from the height of the present time, to say that he didn’t act like that, he didn’t fight like that. Yes, of course, Pavel Sergeevich made mistakes. Who didn't have them? I believe that Grachev is in our memory, in the history of Russia, by the way, he was the 40th Minister of Defense and, you know, in the list of a long list of ministers there was no such Minister of Defense who would conduct his first military operation in the center of the capital of the state against their own parliament. Grachev, of course, can be blamed endlessly, but there are many soldiers who, for the sake of objectivity, are ready not only to put black crosses on the memory of Grachev, but also to thank him.
Under Grachev, the army was in a difficult situation, when they did not give out salaries for 5-6 months, when officer wives cooked quinoa soup. Nevertheless, Grachev tried to support the army. Let me tell you an episode. As of February 23, we were no longer receiving salaries from the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, only brown bread and sprats in tomato sauce were given out. And Grachev was ashamed in front of the officers, he took, ordered to get from the storerooms all the commander's watches that were in his ministerial storeroom, and he distributed to us officers on February 23, said with a bitter smile: everything I can. We donated these hours to one major, sent him to the Arbat, where they sold like hot cakes at the Kazan station for foreign citizens. And we thanked Grachev that he did not forget even on our holy holiday, he gave this way to celebrate our sacred holiday, the Day of the Soviet Army, then, however, the army was already called Russian.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: We are listening to a question from Marina, a Muscovite.

Listener: Hello. You know, we are also witnesses of all these times. I think the people I talk to think that Yeltsin was lucky with Chubais, lucky with Gaidar, but very unlucky with comrade Grachev. I can't imagine that Yeltsin came up with the idea of ​​rolling out the tank himself. And Grachev is in his character. And what did he say about Chechnya and who started the rubbish that we would take a regiment there? It was also Grachev. Well, what a life, such a life. As for watches, because we also lived at that time and we did not have commander's watches. We cleaned the streets, engineers and candidates, and we don't sit and cry. Of course, a man died, he was not a traitor, but Yeltsin was not lucky with him.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: In your opinion, is there any share of personal guilt of Pavel Sergeevich in the number of victims in Chechnya?

Igor Korotchenko: You know, it's hard to blame a person who is no longer there. But it can be said quite clearly that obviously, when planning the operation in the Chechen Republic, a number of miscalculations were made. First of all, this concerned the issues of intelligence, this concerned the issues of armament and equipment of the troops. In principle, the troops were largely unprepared for what awaited them there. Therefore, I believe that the unsuccessful New Year's assault on Grozny in the first Chechen campaign, a certain amount of Grachev's guilt here is quite obvious. In general, I can note that in terms of his personal qualities, Grachev was an honest person. Those accusations, we remember how the press furiously kicked him, not all, but part of the press, with which he did not have relations as Minister of Defense and which treated the Minister, accused him of a number of corruption crimes and misdemeanors. From the position of the past tense, it should be noted that Grachev turned out to be an honest man, nothing stuck to his hands, and this does him honor as a general, as a leader.
At the same time, it should be noted that, while serving as Minister of Defense, he took approximately the same position in relation to the instructions that Yeltsin gave him, approximately the same as Marshal Yazov took in relation to Gorbachev. He saluted, not trying to counteract, as Marshal Akhrameev did in his time, hasty and ill-considered decisions. It is quite obvious that there was no need for a sharp withdrawal of the Russian army groups that ended up under Russian jurisdiction from the territory of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Germany, in principle, was generally ready for the fact that the Russian groupings of the Western Group of Forces would be there for almost ten years, while they were ready to pay the necessary money to create the actual social infrastructure for the withdrawn troops on Russian territory. However, the pressure of Kozyrev and other Western-oriented people on Yeltsin led to the fact that Grachev, in the future, receiving Yeltsin's instructions for an accelerated withdrawal of troops, nevertheless acted to the detriment of the armed forces. I repeat once again where the groupings are, because in Germany we had several tank armies that inspired NATO with horror, because in terms of their combat equipment, in terms of combat coherence, they were the most powerful strike groups of troops, today they don’t exist, they disappeared into the Russian black soil, where they were brought out by Yeltsin and Grachev. Therefore, I think that in the activities of Pavel Sergeevich Grachev there were both positive and negative aspects. Although, in general, I must note that there were much more positive things in his work than negative ones. And most importantly, assessing him from the standpoint of past years, the most important conclusion is that Grachev was an honest man, nothing stuck to his hands. Although, of course, we understand the scale of those corruption crimes that were going on in our country in the 90s, and the fact that Grachev turned out to be clean does honor to his memory.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: What was the relationship between Pavel Sergeevich and Alexander Ivanovich Lebed?

Viktor Baranets: Before answering your question, about the opinion of our respected radio listener, who said that Yeltsin was unlucky with Grachev. My answer will be that Yeltsin was terribly lucky with Grachev, if only because in October 1993 Yeltsin would have hung on a lamppost or on a road booth, like Najibulla, if Grachev had not withdrawn the tanks and shot down the parliament - such is the salty truth of life. Yeltsin was lucky with Grachev only because this damned civil war from Chechnya did not crawl to Moscow, a respected radio listener, where the guts of our children, grandchildren, fathers could hang out on telegraph wires. Here we are very lucky. Yes, the minister of defense was not sinless, yes, and the army was poorly prepared, it was only two years old, the commanders were not yet fired upon, there was no experience in killing their own fellow citizens in Chechnya, but it happened that way.
Now, of course, it's easy to say. Now about Swan. The relationship between Lebed and Grachev was very different. We must not forget that they served together, that they studied at the same school, for a long time they lived in parallel in the airborne troops, the commanders of divisions were almost neighboring. At first, their life developed normally and the service too. But the situation changed dramatically when Grachev became the Minister of Defense, and Lebed was often used as a kind of fire extinguisher, which was thrown into Transnistria, you know, and Lebed was dissatisfied with many, many things. Lebed was more attached to the opposition wing of the Russian officers, the national patriots, one might say. And in general, by 1996, Lebed had become the figure that even to a certain extent began to dictate to the Kremlin who to appoint, who to remove from the post of Minister of Defense. You remember, Yeltsin, whose rating in 1996 was slipping to the crisis zero mark, he offered Lebed the post of secretary of the Security Council with only one condition, which Alexander Ivanovich set for him. He said: if you remove Grachev, appoint Rodionov, I will agree. And thus, it can be said that the former colleague also had a hand in pushing Yeltsin to throw "the best minister of all times and peoples" from this military-political ship of Russia.
Well, we have two outstanding figures in the history of the modern Russian army, yes, outstanding, I say this without any reproach. These were personalities, these were people who will be remembered by the army for their extraordinary deeds and their dislike for the regime, as Lebed frankly demonstrated, and devotion to the regime, as Pavel Sergeevich Grachev demonstrated. But you understand, here you can’t argue in some kind of lyrical-dramatic plan, argue while sitting on some kind of drunken mound. I repeat once again: the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Grachev was a forced figure, he was a subordinate of the President. I repeat once again, he had little choice: either click the heels of his patent leather shoes and follow the orders that Yeltsin gave, or put a report on the president's desk and tell him: Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I do not want to participate in your dirty game. The whole tragedy of Grachev is that he supported Yeltsin, made this choice, which forced him to follow orders and which were deeply disgusting to Grachev. I speak as a person who was closely acquainted with Pavel Sergeevich Grachev.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: In your opinion, did Pavel Grachev's reputation suffer from suspicion of involvement in the murder of Dmitry Kholodov?

Igor Korotchenko: It was a whole campaign that was launched against the Minister of Defense, it acquired the character of fierce persecution. Of course, Grachev did not give any orders to kill Kholodov. Another thing is that the Ministry of Defense was looking for the possibility of informational neutralization of the flow of negativity that poured out both on the military department and personally on the Minister of Defense. Of course, Grachev was very worried about unfair reproaches and direct insults. But, nevertheless, of course, this dealt a blow to the reputation of the military department, and personally to Grachev. Because people, far from understanding the real processes that took place in the military department, were inclined to believe hasty journalistic statements and pseudo-investigations regarding corruption in the Western Group of Forces, Grachev's connection with the facts of this corruption, and so on. Although I will emphasize once again that during the withdrawal of troops from East Germany, every effort was really made to ensure that all this took place in the legal field and was not accompanied by the excesses that were in other areas of Russian reality and politics.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: We are listening to a question from Muscovite Oleg.

Listener: Good evening. I wanted to say a few words about Grachev. The fact that he threw tanks into Grozny into Chechnya, how could a normal person do this? Is it really not clear that they will all be burned there? Here you are, please, his competence. Pasha - "Mercedes" what was his name for? The fact that he withdrew nuclear weapons from the republics is not his merit, it is the merit of both Russian and Western politicians, who set conditions, it was beneficial for them, of course. And here Grachev?

Vladimir Kara-Murza: Was it Pavel Sergeevich's idea - the November tank attack on Grozny?

Viktor Baranets: You know, for a long time, like Igor Korotchenko, he served in the Ministry of Defense, and for almost 33 years in the army I was always annoyed by the ridiculous beautiful phrase that the commander is responsible for everything and the defense minister is also allegedly responsible for everything. Yes, of course, Grachev was informed about the plan of the operation in Grozny, but the direct executors were those people who brought tanks into the necks of the streets of Grozny, where there were very dense ambushes, where one brigade was completely laid down by Maikop. Yes, it was a tragedy, it was one of Grachev's worst failures in his ministerial career. But nevertheless, to be objective, you still need part of the blame, although it may sound defiant and cynical, still part of the blame for that tragedy is shifted onto the shoulders of those commanders who, figuratively speaking, were sitting on armor and who They planned the operation directly in the situation that had developed at that time. I do not at all remove the blame, and, you know, it is easy now to blame Grachev for the fact that we had an absurd and tragic assault on Grozny. Now, in general, all the shortcomings that were there for 4 years, when Grachev was Minister of Defense, can be dumped all together: poor wages, weapons, the fact that we were in the mud, in the sands, in Siberia, you can blame everything. But we must not forget at what time Grachev commanded the armed forces, we must not forget to what extent the army was ready, in fact it was dismantled, Grachev tried to put it together from the remnants of the Soviet army. We had a significant loss of combat readiness at that time. We have a huge number of officers who did not have combat experience. In general, Grachev accepted the army the way he accepted it.
And I would not want us today not to notice at least those positive features that the army noticed under Grachev. Yes, Pavel Sergeevich Grachev got into this very ugly story with the Mercedes. But you need to know why he got into it. Because the people who left Germany, who enriched themselves there with terrible force and who were followed by the military prosecutor's office, they simply, these fellow generals impudently smeared Grachev, bought him a Mercedes and dragged him into this criminal case. He cursed this damned Mercedes a thousand times, which they allegedly tried to give him, and then allegedly forged documents, which is legal. Yes, Grachev was not a child, but dizziness from success, Yeltsin's violent love, she often untied the hands of the president's favorite, which was Pavel Sergeevich. And here, of course, we must also remember the dachas, and who shouted: Pavel Sergeevich, your generals got fat and built dachas. Didn't Pavel Sergeevich admit that when he was Minister of Defense, he gathered a whole bunch of generals close to him and even the head of the office, he wanted to confer the rank of army general. Of course, we understood why. Grachev was a vulnerable minister of defense, it was not for nothing that Lebed said sarcastically about him that he jumped into the chair of the minister of defense, like a March cat on a fence. All this we know. With all these pluses and minuses, Grachev will go down in history. But, of course, no one will take his place in the history of the Russian army.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: We are listening to a question from Muscovite Nikolai Illarionovich.

Listener: You said such words that do not deserve the negativity of the Minister of Defense, it does not suit the Minister of Defense of such a state. You know how he started in Chechnya - drunk. 31 it's his birthday, his present, he gave himself a present, he yelled at the whole country that I was making myself a present, I would capture Chechnya in two days. On it lies the blood of children whose mothers did not wait.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: Do you think that these words addressed to Yushenkov and Kovalev that they were traitors to the motherland, were further history refuted?

Igor Korotchenko: To be precise, Grachev called them "bastards" for the traitorous position they took towards their own soldiers and their own army. I think this is a historical estimate. And in this regard, in my opinion, Grachev acted absolutely right then. As for the mistakes, yes, Grachev is guilty of those mistakes that were made during the first Chechen campaign - this is quite obvious. Because the Minister of Defense is responsible, among other things, for such responsible decisions, the decision to storm Grozny on New Year's Eve - this was, of course, a political decision of the Minister of Defense. Meanwhile, you can not hang all the dogs on Grachev. We know that he was a categorical opponent of solving the Chechen problem by military means, at least within the tight deadlines set for him by the Kremlin. And Grachev was an opponent of such hasty decisions that were not prepared in military-technical terms. Therefore, a share, perhaps even a large share of the responsibility for what happened at the beginning of the first Chechen war, should be placed on President Yeltsin and his closest political entourage, who actually twisted Grachev's arms and forced him to act so hastily and therefore so ineffectively in the very stratum of this war. war in Chechnya.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: We are listening to the Muscovite Ilya Efimovich.

Listener: Good evening. I wanted to ask Viktor Nikolaevich Barants, he said that Mr. Grachev was a forced person, he had a dilemma: either follow the order or submit a resignation report. But there was a precedent, if I am not mistaken, General Vorobyov refused to obey the order and resigned. You, as I understand it, personally knew Mr. Grachev well, what prevented him from resigning at that moment - love for the benefits, understanding of pseudo-military duty, why did he at that moment, when he did not internally agree to send troops to Chechnya , not resigned?

Viktor Baranets: I answer right off the bat: because soldier Grachev remained Grachev, and did not smear snot, reflecting on the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that Chechen armed terrorists should be rebuffed. Now it is easy to think about what choice Grachev could have had. Grachev, I repeat, is a soldier of the regime, a soldier of the president. I want to say even more that Grachev was the president's bodyguard. And he did not want to be a traitor to the aspirations and hopes that Yeltsin had placed in him. I want to take this opportunity to remember Yushenkov here, you remember that Grachev rashly called Yushenkov a bastard, I remember how Yushenkov filed a lawsuit. We have lawyers in the management of affairs, there was a big commotion, it was necessary to somehow save Pavel Sergeevich in this situation. The best connoisseurs of the Russian language were called in and day and night they puzzled over what to do with Yushenkov, because it's a shame if the Minister of Defense is fined 10 million rubles. I remember that joyful moment when a connoisseur of the Russian language called from the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Language and said: “Pavel Sergeevich, don’t worry, because in many stylistic parameters the “bastard” is the son of a snake, and there is nothing wrong with that.” As they say, what kind of commemoration without anecdotes, without tales, but nevertheless, I also remember this episode.
I would like to add one more fundamentally important thing. You know, today we can dump all the dead soldiers and officers who died in Chechnya into a heap and bring this mournful mass to Grachev's grave. But I'm afraid that this will be a reflection of everyday life, this is a reflection of people, yes, indeed, many of whom have lost children, nephews, husbands. But it is necessary to evaluate the figure from the height of those specific historical conditions that had developed by December 1994. I agree that Grachev was not happy to send troops into Chechnya. And if we want to operate with facts, then we need to look into the minutes of the Security Council, where Grachev's arms were actually twisted. He did not give explicit consent. Moreover, now is the time to tell the truth that for Grachev's indecision to send troops to Chechnya, he was removed from his post, he was not given a Kremlin connection for several days - this also needs to be known. And then only Pavel Sergeevich, in order to improve his reputation before the president, who almost called him a traitor, then he said this phrase, which he probably regretted until yesterday, this bravura phrase, this boastful phrase, unrealistic phrase. He rashly blurted out that Grozny could be taken by one airborne assault regiment. But such is life. We must evaluate the figure of Grachev strictly in terms of the military-political situation that was in Russia during the period of his rule.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: In your opinion, was Grachev's resignation from the post of Defense Minister dictated by political considerations in parallel with the resignation of Korzhakov and Barsukov?

Igor Korotchenko: I believe these are unrelated resignations. Because the resignation of Korzhakov and Barsukov was the result of the activities of Anatoly Chubais and his ability to influence Boris Yeltsin through Tatyana Dyachenko. As for Grachev's resignation, as Viktor Nikolayevich Baranets has already noted, this was the result of a compromise deal with Alexander Lebed, who came in third in the first round of the presidential election. And one of the conditions that he would call on his supporters to vote for Yeltsin was the condition of Pavel Grachev's departure from the post of Minister of Defense. At the same time, I remember very well, since I was then in fairly close and close relations with Alexander Lebed, that actually one of the motives for such a quick and hasty resignation was the report that Lebed made to President Yeltsin that Grachev was preparing some kind of conspiracy. Although in reality it was nothing more than a discussion in a narrow circle at the table of the current situation and the search for a way out of this situation. There was a leak, it was reported to Lebed, and Lebed presented it to Yeltsin as some kind of conspiracy that needed to be resolutely suppressed. And we remember that together with Grachev, the building of the Ministry of Defense on Arbatskaya Square was left by his closest associates and advisers. Therefore, fate decreed the way it decreed.
Of course, Grachev actually got nowhere, because being a very active person by nature and having tasted the delights of a ministerial post, and even such a post of defense minister, of course, he was simply out of work. To be honest, I was very hurt when a year or two ago, attending one of the anniversaries of a respected military leader, where Pavel Grachev was, speaking, Grachev uttered the following phrase: we, veterans of the armed forces. I remember I was very uncomfortable. I looked at Grachev, of course, he had aged, but all the same he was a young, healthy, strong man, and I thought: what kind of veteran are you, aren't you an old person at all? And yesterday, this tragic news made me remember this feast, Pavel Sergeevich, and still think that he was a man of a tragic and rather complicated fate. An enchanting rise and then years of oblivion, uselessness - this is how his human and military fate developed.

Vladimir Kara-Murza: In your opinion, did this biography, which ended in years of oblivion, shortened the days of Pavel Sergeevich Grachev?

Viktor Baranets: As far as I know, I met not only with Grachev, but also with people who lived next to him, whom I met, of course, for Grachev it was a very big blow. And during one interview, Grachev told me the words that he had to say either to himself or to Russia in May 92, when his stellar takeoff happened: “I am very sorry that I agreed to become the Minister of Defense.” By the way, in the memoirs of Yeltsin, and in the memoirs of Korzhakov, and in the memoirs of many Kremlin clerks, there is the same detail that Yeltsin more than once offered to become the Minister of Defense of Russia when he was sitting in the White House. You know that at one time the military committee was headed by Kobets, moreover, you probably should know that at one time Yeltsin himself was our defense minister. This is the rise, the forceful rise of Grachev, I believe that Grachev is the product of this voluntarist-adventurist crazy policy of Yeltsin himself. Grachev is, of course, a vestige of this Yeltsin policy, this arbitrariness, a man who sometimes felt no boundaries in his personnel policy. Here he liked Grachev: I am the president, you will be with me, Pasha, my bodyguard, you will be my watchman. And he broke the fate of a good officer. The army remembers the two Grachevs, of course, the army remembers Grachev and the cadet, and the division commander, and remembers the Afghan Grachev, and remembers, of course, Minister of Defense Grachev, whose fate was so tragically inscribed with black pages by the man who patronized him as Minister of Defense - This, of course, is Yeltsin.
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The personality of Pavel Sergeevich Grachev is known to most people interested in politics. He held a high position in the most difficult time for the country, devoted most of his life to military activities. In order to learn about the biography of Pavel Sergeevich Grachev, as well as to get better acquainted with the successes in the career of a military man, you just need to familiarize yourself with the material of the article.

Youth

Pavel Sergeevich Grachev was born on the first day of the new year 1948. The place of his birth is a small village near Tula. The family of Pavel Sergeevich was the simplest: his father, Sergei Grachev, worked as a mechanic at a factory, and his mother was a milkmaid in his native village.

Education

In 1964, Pavel Sergeevich Grachev graduated from school with success, and the following year he entered the Airborne Forces School, which is located in Ryazan. Upon graduation, in 1969, Grachev was awarded a gold medal in several specialties. In 1978, already an experienced military man, Pavel Sergeevich attended a course of lectures at the military academy, which bears the name of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. He also graduated with honors. After graduation, Grachev was sent to Afghanistan.

The beginning of a military career

Since 1969, for several years, Grachev commanded a reconnaissance platoon of the Airborne Division, located in the city of Kaunas, which is located in Lithuania. For the next four years, Pavel Sergeevich commanded a company of cadets at the Ryazan Airborne Forces School, and until 1978 Grachev was in the position of commander of a training battalion.

Military activities after the fighting in Afghanistan

Grachev returned to the USSR in 1983 after participating in the Afghan armed conflict, where he held the position of deputy commander, and later he himself began to command a guards regiment. Pavel Sergeevich was sent to Kaunas, where he served as chief of staff. Good service was appreciated: in 1984, Grachev received the rank of colonel ahead of schedule, and in November 1986 he was given a new rank - major general.

Awards and titles

In May 1988 Grachev Pavel Sergeevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Grachev received this honorary award for the fact that the combat mission under his strict guidance was completed with minimal human losses, in particular, Pavel Sergeevich showed himself well in the most difficult military operation "Magistral".

Participation in the August coup and further promotion

August 20, 1991 Grachev received an order to send troops to Moscow to protect the most important objects. He fulfilled this order by sending the Tula 106th Airborne Division to a combat mission. On August 23, Pavel Sergeevich was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. At the beginning of November of this year, in connection with the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers, he began to perform duties related to defense issues. Grachev believed that it was necessary to create a common defense system for the CIS countries.

April 1992 was marked by another high appointment of a serviceman, this time he became the Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia. His duties included control over military units under the jurisdiction of the Russian troops. In May 1992, Pavel Sergeevich was appointed army general. The first army general in the history of the Russian Federation.

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

The promotion went by leaps and bounds. On May 18, 1992, Pavel Sergeevich took over as Minister of Defense. Most of the higher ranks in the ministry Grachev distributed to his colleagues in Afghanistan. He opposed liberties in the army, considered unity of command the only possible option for doing business in the armed forces. He banned the All-Russian Officers' Meeting and the trade union of military personnel, which caused indignation of the military.

In June 1992, Grachev's decision to transfer half of all weapons belonging to the Soviet army to the Chechen politician Dudayev caused a great resonance. Pavel Sergeevich called this forced measures, since the weapons actually already belonged to the militants, and there was no way to take them out. This situation had a very negative impact on the military clash that happened two years later, when Russian soldiers were fired from the transferred weapons.

Pavel Sergeevich Grachev supported Russian President Boris Yeltsin, which caused a sharply negative attitude from the opposition. On October 3, riots took place in Moscow, during which Grachev, despite his statements that the army should only perform the functions of protecting the Motherland and not interfere in the internal affairs of the State, brought troops into the city, who stormed the parliament building.

Pavel Sergeevich repeatedly admitted that he was opposed to the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya, but Yeltsin and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Chernomyrdin did not share his opinion. The management of military operations in Grozny did not end very well, and Grachev returned to Moscow. Since then, he has been subjected to even greater criticism not only from opposition groups, but also from former associates.

The activities of Pavel Sergeevich after the end of his military career

In December 1997, Grachev added another position to his track record, becoming an adviser to the general director at the large Rosvooruzhenie company. In 2000, Pavel Sergeevich was elected president of the Airborne Forces - Combat Brotherhood Foundation. Since 2007, he worked as an adviser to the general director at the radio plant named after A. S. Popov. In the same year, he was transferred to the reserve.

Investigations and allegations

Secretary of the Security Council A. Lebed said that the embezzlement committed by Grachev became the cause of the armed conflict in Chechnya. The media actively supported this position of Lebed and accused Pavel Sergeyevich of repeatedly illegally purchasing expensive cars. Grachev himself did not refute this information in any way, but he was not involved in the investigation either.

In October 1994, the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov was committed, in which Grachev was suspected. In addition to Pavel Sergeevich, some officers were accused in the case. All the defendants were acquitted, and the crime was never solved. The investigator of the investigative department of Shchelkovo about Pavel Sergeevich Grachev recalled that during interrogations the former defense minister was very confident, which confused even experienced policemen. The investigator did not understand the nature of such confidence: either Grachev really had nothing to hide, or he knew that serious evidence would never be found against him.

last years of life

On the night of September 11-12, Grachev entered the cardiology department of the intensive care unit of the hospital. Vishnevsky, which is located in the city of Krasnogorsk near Moscow. Pavel Sergeevich died on September 23, 2012. The media called the cause of death of Grachev Pavel Sergeevich a severe hypertensive crisis, and according to one version, it could be poisoning. The official report of the Russian Ministry of Defense said that the real cause of Grachev's death was acute inflammation of the brain. He left behind a wife and two adult children.

1. The number of wounds and shell shocks Pavel Sergeevich Grachev received during his service is amazing: he was shell-shocked eight times and received about ten wounds.
2. Despite the fact that the official date of birth of Pavel Sergeevich is January 1, 1948, he stated that he was born on December 27, 1947.
3. During his military service, Pavel Sergeevich made an amazing number of parachute jumps - 647 times he jumped from an airplane.
4. Pavel Sergeevich Grachev became the youngest army general in the history of Russia. This title was awarded to him at the age of 44.
5. In 1993, Grachev participated in the finalization of the new constitution of Russia.
6. Pavel Sergeevich believed that the army should be formed according to a mixed principle and a contract basis should be introduced.
7. It is interesting that there is a full namesake of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, a member of the board of directors of the Polyus Gold company - Grachev Pavel Sergeevich, the biographies of these famous men are often confused due to the same names. Such confusion has repeatedly created awkward situations. So, in an article about the director of Polyus Gold, Grachev Pavel Sergeevich, a photograph of his namesake, a military man, was posted.

Pavel Sergeevich Grachev
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev speaking at the State Duma in 1994
2nd Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (in the period from May 18, 1992 - June 17, 1996)
2nd Chairman of the State Committee of Russia for Defense Issues
(in the period August 23, 1991 - June 23, 1992)
13th Commander of the Airborne Forces of the USSR
(in the period December 30, 1990 - August 31, 1991)
Party: CPSU (until 1991)
Education: Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School
Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR
Profession: engineer for the operation of wheeled and tracked vehicles
Occupation: soldier
Birth: 1 January 1948
Rvy village, Leninsky district, Tula region, RSFSR, USSR
Death: 23 September 2012

Pavel Sergeevich Grachev(January 1, 1948, Tula region - September 23, 2012, Moscow region, Russia) - Russian statesman and military leader, military leader, Hero of the Soviet Union (1988), former Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (1992-1996), the first Russian army general (May 1992).

Youth and early career of Pavel Grachev

Was born Pavel Grachev(January 1, 1948 (according to Grachev himself - December 26, 1947) in the village of Rvy, Leninsky district of the Tula region in the family of a locksmith and a milkmaid. In 1964 he graduated from school. Since 1965 in the Soviet Army, he entered the Ryazan Higher Airborne command school, which he graduated with honors in the specialties "platoon commander of the airborne troops" and "referent-translator from the German language" (1969), graduated as a lieutenant.
After graduating from college in 1969-1971, he served as commander of a reconnaissance platoon of a separate reconnaissance company of the 7th Guards Airborne Division in Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR. In 1971-1975 he was a platoon commander (until 1972), a company commander of cadets of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School. From 1975 to 1978 he was the commander of the training paratrooper battalion of the 44th training airborne division.
Since 1978 Pavel Grachev was a student of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, from which he graduated in 1981 with honors and after which he was sent to Afghanistan.

Since 1981 Pavel Grachev took part in military operations in Afghanistan: until 1982 - deputy commander, in 1982-1983 - commander of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment (as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan). In 1983, as chief of staff - deputy commander of the 7th Guards Airborne Division, he was seconded to the territory of the USSR (Kaunas, Lithuanian SSR).
In 1984, he was promoted ahead of schedule to a colonel. Upon returning to the DRA in 1985-1988, he was commander of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops. In total, he spent five years and three months in the country. May 5, 1988 "for the performance of combat missions with minimal casualties." Major General Pavel Grachev He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (Medal "Gold Star" No. 11573). After returning, he served in the airborne troops in various command positions.

In 1988-1990. Pavel Grachev Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. After graduation, he was appointed first deputy commander of the Airborne Forces. Since December 30, 1990 - Commander of the Airborne Forces of the USSR (the position of Colonel General, Grachev at that time - Major General).

Pavel Grachev

Participation in the GKChP
August 19, 1991 Grachev fulfilled the order of the Committee of the State Emergency Committee on the introduction of troops into Moscow, ensured the arrival of the 106th Guards Airborne Division (Tula), which took under protection the strategically important objects of the capital. At the first stage, the GKChP acted in accordance with the instructions of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal D.T. Yazov: he trained paratroopers, together with the KGB special forces and the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to storm the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR.

Switching to Yeltsin's side

In the second half of August 20, Pavel Grachev Together with Air Marshal E. I. Shaposhnikov, Generals V. A. Achalov and B. V. Gromov, he expressed his negative opinion to the leaders of the State Emergency Committee about the plan for the forcible seizure of the Russian parliament. Then he established contacts with the Russian leadership. By his order, tanks and personnel at the disposal of General A. Lebed were sent to the White House to protect it.
Subsequently Pavel Grachev received a promotion, on August 23, 1991, by decree of the President of the USSR, he was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Chairman of the State Committee of the RSFSR on Defense Issues, and on October 29, 1991, by Decree of the President of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin, he was appointed Chairman of the State Committee of the RSFSR on Defense Issues.
By decision of the President of the USSR Pavel Grachev promoted to colonel general and appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (August - December 1991). From January to March 1992 - 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS; was a supporter of the idea of ​​​​creating a system of unified armed forces of the CIS. Pavel Grachev himself, answering the question of the correspondent of the newspaper "Trud" Viktor Khlystun about the reasons for his appointment to the post of the first Minister of Defense of Russia after the collapse of the USSR, recalled:

- The first minister was not I, but Yeltsin. True, in jest.
- How come?
- It all started in August 1991. Then I spoke out against the GKChP, in fact, I did not allow the capture of Boris Nikolayevich in the White House. At least that's what many thought. That is probably why Yeltsin decided to thank me. I refused several times... I am a paratrooper, I fought in Afghanistan for five years. I have 647 skydives. Commander of the Airborne Troops. Many paratroopers dream of such a career. The new appointment did not appeal to me.

And what about Yeltsin?
- I thought, then he says: maybe you are right that you are not in a hurry. With that, he let me go, but the next day he called and immediately suggested: let's go to Gorbachev, there is an idea. We go into the office. No knock. Boris Nikolayevich immediately: Mikhail Sergeevich, this is the Grachev who saved you. I appointed him chairman of the Russian Defense Committee. How will you thank him? Gorbachev replied: I am ready, I remember everything. Yeltsin immediately said: put him in the first deputy minister of defense of the USSR Shaposhnikov and give him the rank of colonel general. Gorbachev immediately gave the order to write a decree.

Chairman of the Defense Committee - what kind of position?

She was nominal. The Union was disintegrating before our eyes, and independent Russia did not yet exist. The Ministry of Defense of the USSR was headed by Shaposhnikov, he actually had the nuclear button. This continued until May 1992. Then Yeltsin called me again. By that time, the former republics of the USSR had armies and ministries. The President announced to me: I have decided to create the Ministry of Defense of Russia instead of a committee. Shaposhnikov will be in the USSR, and you will be in Russia. I appoint you minister. I say - early, Boris Nikolaevich, put Shaposhnikov, he has experience, and I - his first deputy. That was sort of decided, but the next day, May 10, B.N. calls and says with some irony, or something: well, Pavel Sergeevich, if you don’t agree, if you don’t want to help the president, then I myself will defense minister. And you are my deputy. So the first Minister of Defense of Russia was Yeltsin... A week later, a phone call: how is the situation in our troops? Tired voice. He often conveyed the mood with his voice, played. I answer everything is fine. And then Yeltsin seemed to complain: you know, I'm so tired of being a minister! Therefore, I signed a decree on your appointment.
- Interview "Pavel Grachev:" I was appointed responsible for the war "", the newspaper "Trud" No. 048 of 03/15/2001

Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev

Since April 3, 1992 - First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, responsible for interaction with the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS on the management of military formations under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

Since May 7, 1992 Pavel Grachev- Acting Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation; on the same day, he, the first in Russia after the collapse of the USSR, was awarded the rank of army general. He became the first military leader in the modern history of Russia to be awarded this title. Since May 18, 1992 - Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Most of the senior leadership of the Ministry was formed from among the generals whom he personally knew from joint service in Afghanistan. He opposed the accelerated withdrawal of parts of Russian troops stationed outside the former USSR, in the Baltic states, Transcaucasia and some regions of Central Asia, justifying this by the fact that Russia does not yet have the resources necessary to solve the social problems of military personnel and their families. He sought to prevent the weakening of unity of command in the army, its politicization: they banned the All-Russian Officers' Assembly, the Independent Trade Union of Military Personnel and other politicized army organizations.
Until June 23, 1992 Pavel Grachev continued to hold the position of First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces - Chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Defense Issues.

At first time Pavel Grachev was almost never criticized either by the President of Russia or by the communist opposition. He stated that "the army ... should not interfere in the resolution of domestic political problems, no matter how acute they are."
However Pavel Grachev after his statements during the constitutional crisis in the country in the fall of 1992 about the support of the President by the army, the attitude of the opposition towards Grachev changed to sharply critical. In March 1993, Grachev, like other power ministers, made it clear that he took the side of the President. During the riots that began in Moscow on October 3, after some delay, he called troops into the city, which the next day, after tank shelling, stormed the parliament building.

In May 1993, he was introduced to the working commission to finalize the draft of the new Constitution of Russia.

November 20, 1993 Pavel Grachev Appointed a member of the Russian Security Council by presidential decree.
November 30, 1994 Pavel Grachev By decree of the President of Russia, he was included in the Group for Leading Actions for the Disarmament of Bandit Formations in Chechnya. In December 1994 - January 1995, from headquarters in Mozdok, he personally led the military operations of the Russian army in the Chechen Republic. After the failure of several offensive operations in Grozny, he returned to Moscow. Since that time, in periodicals of the entire political spectrum, he has been sharply criticized for actually refusing to reform the army, for its failure to restore order in Chechnya, and "for a policy pursued in the selfish interests of the highest generals."
He advocated a phased reduction of the Armed Forces for the period until 1996, believed that the army should be formed according to a mixed principle, with a subsequent transition to a contract basis. Pavel Grachev sent to the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief by presidential decree of June 17, 1996 as a result of an election agreement between B. Yeltsin and A. Lebed.

Subsequent activities of Pavel Grachev

After leaving office, Pavel Grachev for a long time (until the autumn of 1997) was at the disposal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
On December 18, 1997, in accordance with a special decree of the President of Russia, he assumed the duties of an adviser to the general director of the Rosvooruzhenie company. On April 27, 1998, he was appointed chief military adviser to the general director of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Rosvooruzhenie" - "Rosoboronexport", officially taking up his duties.

In April 2000, he was elected president of the Regional Public Fund for Assistance and Assistance to the Airborne Forces "Airborne Forces - Combat Brotherhood".

On April 25, 2007, the media, citing Colonel-General Vladislav Achalov, chairman of the Union of Russian Paratroopers, reported that Grachev was dismissed from the group of advisers to the general director of Rosoboronexport "due to organizational events." On the same day, the press service of the department clarified that, firstly, this happened on February 26, and secondly, due to the fact that from January 1, in accordance with the Federal Law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Russia on issues of secondment and transfer of military personnel, as well as the suspension of military service ”, the institution of secondment of military personnel to Rosoboronexport was abolished, after which several of them, including General of the Army Pavel Grachev, at the personal request were presented for secondment for further military service at the disposal Minister of Defense of Russia.

Since 2007 - chief adviser - head of the group of advisers to the general director of the Omsk production association "Radiozavod im. A. S. Popova. In the same year he was transferred to the reserve.
Scandals and their investigations

According to opponents, Grachev was involved in the case of corruption in the Western Group of Forces in 1993-1994. Against him in the Russian media, accusations were repeatedly made for the illegal acquisition of imported Mercedes cars, which were registered with the help of the command of the Western Group of Forces. None of these accusations was disputed by Pavel Sergeevich in court, but he was also not held accountable.

Question: Do you remember when Pavel Grachev bought two Mercedes-500s in Germany when he was Defense Minister? Then, with the light hand of the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper, Grachev was nicknamed Pasha-Mercedes. And the nickname stuck to him so much that many still remember. Grachev, through Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, who commanded the troops that were being withdrawn from Germany, did not understand how he purchased those ill-fated cars. True, not for themselves, but for official needs.
- Colonel Igor Konashenkov

Pavel Grachev owned the famous phrase, said before the start of the operation of the federal troops in Chechnya, that it was possible to restore order in the republic in seventy-two hours with the help of one "fifty kopecks" - the 350th regiment of the 103rd Airborne Forces. This phrase was uttered after the failure of an attempt to capture Grozny by the Chechen opposition with the support of Russian tankers in November 1994.

Later, he commented on a quote about one regiment of the Airborne Forces as follows:

Pavel Sergeevich, what about your infamous promise to take Grozny in two hours with the forces of one parachute regiment? “And I still don’t give up on it. Just listen fully to that statement of mine. Otherwise, they snatched out only one phrase from the context of a big speech - and let's exaggerate. It was about the fact that if you fight according to all the rules of military science: with the unlimited use of aviation, artillery, missile troops, then the remnants of the surviving bandit formations could really be destroyed in a short time by one parachute regiment. And I really could do it, but then my hands were tied.

January 1995 Grachev at a press conference after the “New Year's assault” on Grozny, he said: “These eighteen-year-old boys died for Russia, and died with a smile. They need to erect monuments, and they are being denigrated. This one... This peacekeeper-deputy... Kovalyov. Yes, he has nowhere to put brands, nowhere to put brands. This is an enemy of Russia, this is a traitor to Russia. And they meet him there, everywhere. This Yushenkov, this bastard! It's different, you can't say it, it's the army that gave him an education, gave him a title. Unfortunately, in accordance with the decree, he is still a colonel in the Russian army. And he, this bastard, protects those scoundrels who want to ruin the country.”

Personality assessments of Pavel Grachev

Gennady Troshev, Colonel General, Hero of Russia in his memoirs “My War. The Chechen diary of a trench general" gave his own, versatile assessment of Grachev, giving place to both the negative aspects of his activities and the positive ones:

Grachev is an experienced warrior, he passed all command positions, he smashed the "spirits" in Afghanistan, unlike most of us who had not yet gained combat experience, and we expected some non-standard solutions from him, original approaches, after all, useful, "educational" criticism.

But, alas, he hid his Afghan experience as if in the storeroom of the museum, we did not observe any kind of internal burning, fighting passion in Grachev ... Put the old preference player next to the table where the game is being played - he will be exhausted from the desire to join the fight for the buyback . And here - some kind of indifference, even detachment.
… I am afraid that this confession of mine will disappoint many, but I continue to assert that it is largely thanks to Grachev that the army did not crumble to dust in the early 90s, like many things did in that period. The military know and remember that it was Pavel Sergeevich who came up with a lot of "tricks" to increase the monetary allowance for officers: either a bonus for "tension", then pension "cheat", then payment for "secrecy", etc. the merit is that he did not allow the army to be destroyed under the guise of military reform, as required by the young reformers. If he had yielded then in the main, Russia would not have an army today, just as it does not, by and large, have an economy. - Gennady Troshev. "My war. Chechen diary of a trench general, memoirs, book

Hero of Russia, General of the Army Pyotr Deinekin: “With Pavel Grachev, we were engaged in the withdrawal of troops from the former republics of the USSR, and the construction of the Russian army, and reforms, and the first Chechen war. A lot of unfair words were printed and said about him in the so-called "independent" press and electronic media, but, in my opinion, he was the most powerful of those ministers of defense under whose leadership I happened to serve. He was remembered as a decent man and a brave paratrooper who made most of his parachute jumps while testing new equipment. I sincerely respect him…” (“Donetsk communication resource”, 05/19/2008).

Army General Rodionov, Igor Nikolaevich: “Grachev in my 40th army was a good commander of the airborne division. He never rose above this level. He became a minister only because he defected to Yeltsin's side in time.

Illness and death

On the night of September 12, 2012, Grachev was hospitalized in a serious condition in the 50th cardiological intensive care unit of the Central Military Clinical Hospital. Vishnevsky in Krasnogorsk near Moscow. According to news agencies and the press, Grachev suffered a severe hypertensive crisis with cerebral manifestations, but poisoning was not ruled out.
He died on September 23, 2012 at the military clinical hospital named after Vishnevsky.

Personal Information
From his youth he was fond of sports (he loved football, volleyball and tennis), in 1968 he became the master of sports of the USSR in cross-country skiing.
Was married, widow - Grachev Lyubov Alekseevna. Had two sons. Senior, Sergey b.1970, officer of the Armed Forces of Russia, graduated from the same airborne school as his father; junior, Valery, b.1975 - studied at the Security Academy of the Russian Federation.

Awards and titles

Hero of the Soviet Union (May 1988)
Two orders of Lenin
Order of the Red Banner
Order of the Red Star
Order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" III degree
Order "For Personal Courage" (October 1993, "for courage and bravery shown during the suppression of an armed coup attempt on October 3-4, 1993")
Order of the Badge of Honor
Order of the Red Banner (Afghanistan)
Honorary Citizen of Yerevan (1999)

Military service of Pavel Grachev

Pavel Grachev, the first minister of defense of post-Soviet Russia, who died last Saturday, was buried in Moscow.

The farewell ceremony was held at the Cultural Center of the Armed Forces from 11 am to 1 pm.

Condolences on Grachev's death were expressed by President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov emphasized that Grachev led the armed forces at the most difficult time and actually created the army of sovereign Russia.

The 64-year-old army general was admitted to the intensive care unit of the Vishnevsky military hospital in Krasnogorsk near Moscow on September 12 with a diagnosis of a stroke, which was subsequently not confirmed.

mysterious death

As one of the versions, it was about mushroom poisoning.

An autopsy found that the commander died of a rare disease - acute meningoencephalitis (inflammation of the brain and its membranes caused by a bacterial or viral infection).

How Grachev got infected is not known.

The former head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces, Pavel Popovskikh, rejects the possibility of an assassination attempt.

"He did not pose any kind of threat to anyone, for sure, he was generally a silent person and knew how to keep his own and state secrets, believe me, I know this for sure," Popovskikh said.

“We saw each other for the last time on August 2. He didn’t look very healthy, I must say, a little so sickly, thinner. But he kept himself cheerful, was, as always, an energetic, active and businesslike person. Although, the general opinion is not only mine that he had some kind of illness. A little bit just complexion and some thinness said that he was not all right with his health. But we did not ask, and he did not say anything, "he added.

The career of Pavel Grachev turned out to be the same as the era itself - chaotic, inconsistent, somewhat successful, somewhat stupid, somewhat heroic Konstantin Bogdanov, military observer

Pavel Sergeevich Grachev was born on January 1, 1948 in the village of Rvy, Tula Region. He graduated from the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, the Frunze Military Academy and the General Staff Academy. He commanded an airborne regiment and a division in Afghanistan. He received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union "for the performance of combat missions with minimal human losses."

"He will be remembered not as a military man, but as an official in an officer's uniform," Pavel Svyatenkov, a political scientist at the National Strategy Institute, said after Grachev's death.

"He was a real, not a parquet general. A real soldier," former head of the State Property Committee Alfred Koch tweeted.

The head of the Union of Russian Paratroopers, Lieutenant General Valery Vostrotin, agrees with Koch's assessment.

"He was a platoon commander for me - I entered the Ryazan Military School, and my first platoon commander was Lieutenant Grachev: tall, slender, master of sports in skiing. He was fair, in hussar, I would say, an officer, he is for We, the cadets, were an idol even then. Then I met him nine years later in Afghanistan. He was my commander there. Although I was already experienced, and he had just come after the academy, he again won us over instantly with his honesty, decency and professionalism "He took us, being not very experienced yet, and we were already experienced battalion commanders, to combat operations. And the main task was: not to kill anyone. In the first place was, "recalls the veteran.

Army and politics

In early 1991, a successful "Afghan" general was appointed commander of the Airborne Forces.

Selected elite troops have always been considered in the USSR and Russia as the Life Guards. Their significance objectively increases during periods of instability. Unaccustomed to this, Grachev immediately became a political figure and found himself at the epicenter of turbulent events.

According to the investigation on the "GKChP case", on August 6, 1991, KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, two days after Gorbachev's departure for Foros, invited Grachev and KGB generals Alexei Yegorov and Vyacheslav Zhizhin to his place and instructed them to prepare a strategic forecast and a list of measures to ensure state of emergency.

On August 8, the generals declared the inexpediency of introducing a state of emergency before the signing of the Union Treaty. "After August 20 it will be too late," Kryuchkov answered.

Undoubtedly understanding what was about to happen, Grachev did not warn either Gorbachev or Yeltsin, and at half past five in the morning of August 19, according to the order, raised the alert and sent the 106th Tula Airborne Division to Moscow.

However, when Boris Yeltsin called him from his dacha in Arkhangelsk, he hung up the phone and confidently declared to his comrades-in-arms: "Grachev is ours." It is noteworthy that Grachev, along with the heads of the Union republics, was among the people with whom Yeltsin considered it necessary to speak immediately.

Grachev is an experienced warrior, he passed all command positions, he smashed the "spirits" in Afghanistan. Largely thanks to Grachev, the army did not crumble to dust in the early 90s. The military know and remember that it was Pavel Sergeevich who came up with a lot of "tricks" to increase the monetary allowance for officers: either a surcharge for "tension", then pension "cheat", then an additional payment for secrecy, etc. Gennady Troshev,
retired Colonel General, Hero of Russia

Around 11:00 p.m. on August 20, when the assault on the White House was being prepared, Yeltsin's adviser Yuri Skokov met with Grachev on the street near the headquarters of the Airborne Forces. According to Skokov, Grachev asked to tell the leadership of Russia that "he is Russian and will never allow the army to shed the blood of his people."

After the failure of the putsch, Grachev was appointed first deputy of the new USSR Minister of Defense Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. He also became the first military commander to receive the rank of army general in the new Russia.

Once again, Grachev faced a dramatic choice on October 3, 1993. After supporters of the Supreme Soviet seized the building of the Moscow mayor's office and tried to storm the television center in Ostankino, and Alexander Rutskoi proclaimed from the balcony of the White House: "Tomorrow - to the Kremlin!", Boris Yeltsin demanded to bring tanks into Moscow.

Grachev at the meeting asked for a written order.

General Viktor Karpukhin, who commanded the Alpha group during the 1991 coup, later said that the words that the army and Alpha "refused to shoot at the people" sound nice, but the military would have carried out the order if they had received it in a clear, unambiguous form . However, the members of the GKChP chimed in, actually posing the question in this way: it would be nice if you took the White House, but keep in mind that we have nothing to do with it.

Yeltsin did not suffer from a lack of decisiveness and did not hide behind other people's backs. Want a written order - please!

The tanks fired 12 shots at the White House, 10 of which were unloaded blanks. Only two shells were live, and they caused a fire in the building.

According to numerous insiders, most of the Russian security forces in 1993 did not have much love for the president and his reforms. But Yeltsin was still in their eyes a responsible and predictable person, and the seizure of power by young radicals who settled in the White House could lead to anything, up to civil war or armed conflict with the West.

Even bad order was preferable in the eyes of the generals to chaos comparable to the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century.

The general attitude was expressed by the commander of the Kantemirovskaya division, Boris Polyakov, who said in those days: "For me, Rutskoi is False Dmitry."

“Whatever is said about Grachev, but he absolutely did not want the politicization of the army and fought with all his might. When Grachev made a choice and switched to full support of Yeltsin in confrontation with the Supreme Soviet, he did it for the simplest reason: he sincerely believed that it will be better for the army, and I saw in Yeltsin at least some, but a stabilizer of the situation," Konstantin Bogdanov, a military observer for the RIA Novosti agency, points out.

Criticism and Kholodov's case

Having taken the post of Minister of Defense in May 1992, Grachev faced many problems that until recently and in a dream could not have been dreamed of by the Russian military.

Grachev was a good airborne division commander in my 40th army [in Afghanistan]. He never rose above this level. He became a minister only because Igor Rodionov defected to Yeltsin's side in time,
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1996-1997

"A man who clumsily and honestly fought for the preservation of the" indestructible and legendary ", but clearly had neither the resources, nor the mandate, nor a coherent strategic plan for this," Konstantin Bogdanov assesses him.

According to the expert, Grachev understood the inevitability of the withdrawal of the Russian army from Eastern Europe, but opposed the withdrawal of troops from the CIS countries with all his might.

Pavel Popovskikh credits Grachev with fighting against the privatization of the military-industrial complex.

"During the years when he was Minister of Defense, Pavel Sergeevich Grachev managed to prevent the privatization of the military-industrial complex, which Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar wanted. He succeeded thanks to his special relationship with Boris Yeltsin," Popovskikh said.

Some observers believed that Grachev, who had risen from divisional to ministerial level in a little over a year, lacked experience. Others point out that in the current situation, little depended on him.

“Everything fell out of hand and went to hell, the country was written off as scrap in bulk, and with such logging, it’s better not to get in the way of echelons with chips,” says Konstantin Bogdanov.

The Minister soon became a favorite target for the media, not only the left and nationalist, but also the liberal ones.

"He stayed with Yeltsin, and that's why we had the 90s, and the new Constitution, and the market economy, and the free press, which just scolded him and poured dirt on him," Alfred Koch wonders.

When, at the direction of Grachev, two Mercedes-500s were purchased for the ministry at the expense of proceeds from the sale of the property of the former Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the nickname Pasha-Mercedes was firmly entrenched in the press.

“The fact that in 1994 became almost the central item on the agenda of the federal press and caused an extremely painful reaction from state authorities, now, 18 years later, causes us only bewilderment. Just think, two Mercedes, but for the office, and not for yourself Today, even Navalny would not be interested in such a case," Konstantin Bogdanov noted.

Another scandal erupted after Grachev allegedly ordered the head of the economic department of the Ministry of Defense to allocate a garage to his son.

“Young, inexperienced,” one of the observers commented at the time. “In the past, it was not the minister, but the minister’s wife, who would talk to the head of the HOZU on such an issue. , the supply manager is a toady, and I am busy with state affairs.

With Pavel Grachev, we were engaged in the withdrawal of troops from the former republics of the USSR, and the construction of the Russian army, and reforms, and the first Chechen war. A lot of unfair words were said about him in the press and electronic media, but, in my opinion, he was the most powerful of those ministers of defense under whose leadership I happened to serve. He was remembered as a decent man and a brave paratrooper who made most of his parachute jumps while testing new equipment. I sincerely respect him Peter Deinekin,
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force in 1992-1998, General of the Army

Pavel Popovskikh offers his version of events.

According to him, thanks to his closeness to Yeltsin, Grachev had the opportunity to resolve many issues contrary to the position of the cabinet's financial bloc. "Because of such actions, he became objectionable to the government, and persecution began against him," says Popovskikh.

When Boris Yeltsin established the rank of Marshal of the Russian Federation on February 11, 1993, the media unanimously concluded that this was being done "under Grachev."

Two journalists from "Moskovsky Komsomolets" came to the workshop of the Ministry of Defense, where the uniforms and insignia of the highest commanding staff were made, and, in order to get sensational material, played a scene. One pretended to be drunk, while the employees escorted him out together, the other seized the moment and photographed ready-made marshal's epaulettes with huge stars and double-headed eagles on the desktop of the gold embroidery.

Due to numerous media scandals and military failures in Chechnya, Grachev never received the highest rank.

Perhaps the main opponent of Grachev, who accused him of abuse, primarily in the course of selling the property of a group of Soviet troops in Germany, was Dmitry Kholodov, a Moskovsky Komsomolets correspondent.

Colleagues of the journalist later admitted that Kholodov waged a kind of personal war with Grachev.

On October 17, 1994, a man who did not identify himself called Kholodov and indicated the number of the cell in the station's storage room, where there was a briefcase with some sensational material. When Kholodov brought it to the editorial office and tried to open it, there was an explosion.

After retiring, Grachev led a private life, left no memoirs, and rarely appeared in public. Until April 2007, he worked as an adviser to the general director of the Rosvooruzhenie company, then as an adviser to the director of the Popov Omsk Radio Plant.

A retired senior official always fell into complete insignificance. And Grachev, after his resignation, instantly disappeared, as if he had never existed. It is necessary to change the principles of forming our elite so that expulsion from a ministerial post does not equal expulsion from politics Pavel Svyatenkov, political scientist

Former chief military adviser to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport, former Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army. Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", "For Personal Courage", as well as the Afghan Order of the Red Banner. He was accused in the case of the murder of journalist Dmitry Kholodov. He died in Moscow on September 23, 2012.
Pavel Sergeevich Grachev was born on January 1, 1948 in the village of Rvy, Tula Region. He graduated with honors from the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (1969) and the Frunze Military Academy (1981). In 1981-1983, as well as in 1985-1988, Grachev took part in the fighting in Afghanistan. In 1986 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union "for the performance of combat missions with minimal casualties." In 1990, after graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff, Grachev became deputy commander, and from December 30, 1990 - commander of the USSR Airborne Forces.
In January 1991, Grachev, on the orders of the Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Yazov, brought two regiments of the Pskov Airborne Division into Lithuania (according to a number of media reports, under the pretext of assisting the military registration and enlistment offices of the republic in forced recruitment into the army).
On August 19, 1991, Grachev, following the order of the State Emergency Committee, ensured the arrival of the 106th Tula Airborne Division in Moscow and its taking under the protection of strategically important objects. According to media reports, at the beginning of the putsch, Grachev acted in accordance with Yazov's instructions and trained paratroopers, together with KGB special forces and Interior Ministry troops, to storm the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. On August 20, Grachev, along with other high-ranking military officers, informed the Russian leadership about the intentions of the State Emergency Committee. A version was also voiced in the media, according to which Grachev warned Boris Yeltsin about the impending coup on the morning of August 19.
On August 23, 1991, Grachev was appointed chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense and Security with a promotion from major general to colonel general and became the first deputy minister of defense of the USSR. After the formation of the CIS, Grachev became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS (CIS Joint Armed Forces), Chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Defense Issues.
In April 1992, Grachev was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia, in May he first became Acting Minister and then Minister of Defense in the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin. In the same month, Grachev was awarded the rank of army general. Grachev, according to a number of media reports, himself admitted to having no experience, so he surrounded himself with experienced and authoritative deputies, mostly "Afghan" generals.
Grachev's role in the operation to withdraw Russian troops from Germany was ambiguously assessed by the media. Noting the complexity and scale of the military operation (it became the largest of those committed in peacetime), the press also indicated that corruption and embezzlement flourished under the guise of preparing and conducting the withdrawal of troops. However, none of the highest military officials who served in Germany were convicted, although several trials took place.
In May 1993, Grachev joined the working commission to finalize the presidential draft of the Russian constitution. In September 1993, after presidential decree number 1400 on the dissolution of the Supreme Council, he declared that the army should be subordinate only to Russian President Yeltsin. On October 3, Grachev summoned troops to Moscow, who the next day, after tank shelling, stormed the parliament building. In October 1993, Grachev was awarded the Order "For Personal Courage", as stated in the decree - "for courage and bravery shown during the suppression of an armed coup attempt on October 3-4, 1993." On October 20, 1993, Grachev was appointed a member of the Russian Security Council.
In 1993-1994, several extremely negative articles about Grachev appeared in the press. Their author, Moskovsky Komsomolets journalist Dmitry Kholodov, accused the minister of involvement in a corruption scandal in the Western Group of Forces. October 17, 1994 Kholodov was killed. A criminal case was opened on the fact of the murder. According to investigators, to please Grachev, the crime was organized by retired Airborne Colonel Pavel Popovskikh, and his deputies were accomplices in the murder. Subsequently, all the suspects in this case were acquitted by the Moscow District Military Court. Grachev was also involved in the case as a suspect, which he learned about only when the decision to terminate the criminal case against him was read out. He denied his guilt, pointing out that if he spoke about the need to "deal with" the journalist, he did not mean his murder.
According to a number of media reports, in November 1994, a number of regular officers of the Russian army, with the knowledge of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, took part in hostilities on the side of forces in opposition to Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. Several Russian officers were captured. The Minister of Defense, denying his knowledge of the participation of his subordinates in the hostilities on the territory of Chechnya, called the captured officers deserters and mercenaries and said that Grozny could be taken in two hours by the forces of one airborne regiment.
On November 30, 1994, Grachev was included in the leadership group for the disarmament of gangs in Chechnya, in December 1994 - January 1995, he personally led the military operations of the Russian army in the Chechen Republic from headquarters in Mozdok. After the failure of several offensive operations in Grozny, he returned to Moscow. Since that time, he has been subjected to continuous criticism both for the desire for a forceful solution to the Chechen conflict, and for the losses and failures of Russian troops in Chechnya.
On June 18, 1996, Grachev was dismissed (according to a number of media reports, at the request of Alexander Lebed, appointed Assistant to the President for National Security and Secretary of the Security Council). In December 1997, Grachev became chief military adviser to the general director of the Rosvooruzhenie company (later Rosoboronexport). In April 2000, he was elected president of the Regional Public Fund for Assistance and Assistance to the Airborne Forces "VDV - Combat Brotherhood". In March 2002, Grachev headed the commission of the General Staff for a comprehensive inspection of the 106th airborne division stationed in Tula.
On April 25, 2007, the media reported that Grachev was dismissed from his post as chief military adviser to the director general of FSUE Rosoboronexport. Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, the chairman of the Union of Russian Paratroopers, with reference to whom the media disseminated this information, said that Grachev was removed from the post of adviser "in connection with organizational events." On the same day, the press service of Rosoboronexport clarified that Grachev was relieved of his post as adviser to the director of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise and seconded to the Russian Ministry of Defense to resolve the issue of further military service as early as February 26, 2007. The press service explained this personnel decision by the abolition of the institution of secondment of military personnel to Rosoboronexport on January 1, 2007. Information about Grachev's resignation appeared in the media a day after the death of the first Russian president, Yeltsin, who appointed the ex-minister of defense to the post of adviser to the state-owned company by a special decree.
In June 2007, Grachev was transferred to the reserve and appointed chief adviser - head of the group of advisers to the general director of the production association A. S. Popov Radio Plant in Omsk.
On September 12, 2012, Grachev was taken to the intensive care unit of the Vishnevsky military hospital in Moscow, and on September 23 he died. The next day it became known that the cause of death was acute meningoencephalitis.
Grachev had a number of state awards. In addition to the Star of the Hero and the Order "For Personal Courage", Grachev was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR", and the Afghan Order of the Red Banner. He was a master of sports in skiing; Headed the board of trustees of the CSKA football club.
Grachev was married, he left two sons - Sergey and Valery. Sergei graduated from the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School.