Who bombed Yugoslavia. Operation Allied Force

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The politics of the modern West is thoroughly saturated with double standards. They recall the tolerance and inadmissibility of encroachments on the territorial integrity of states only in cases where this affects their tactical and strategic interests.

At the same time, they themselves repeatedly crossed the line of unacceptable actions in relation to entire countries and peoples. The world community must never forget the events that took place between March and June 1999 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It was then that the North Atlantic Alliance carried out the military operation "Allied Force", which claimed the lives and destroyed the fate of many thousands of civilians. Not only military installations, but also civilian infrastructure were hit by NATO air strikes. According to official information alone, the number of civilians killed by the United States and the European Union amounted to more than 1.7 thousand people. They included at least 400 children. Another 10 thousand people were seriously injured, and about 1 thousand people simply went missing. The enormity of this military operation is aggravated by the fact that a large number of lives were claimed by NATO bombings after they were completed. In the tolerant European Union, they try not to particularly remember what ammunition was used in the implementation of the anti-human operation "Allied Force". They included depleted radioactive uranium in their composition. This had the most detrimental effect on the health of many of those people who were lucky enough to survive under NATO bombing. However, after the end of hostilities and until today, the main perpetrators have not been punished for bombing of Yugoslavia.

The reason for the start of the NATO bombing

Western politicians justified this operation with the term "humanitarian intervention". However, such "explanations" are a cynical substitution of the true reasons for their actions in the eyes of the world community. The war in Yugoslavia was unleashed even without a permit from the United Nations. It will never be considered legal and is a real example of military aggression by NATO countries against a sovereign state. The formal reason for the start of the bombing of Yugoslavia was the wave of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. As you know, the territory of the former socialist Yugoslavia repeated the fate of the Soviet Union and by that time already represented separate allied states. Western countries have largely contributed to the outbreak of new ethnic conflicts and civil wars on the Balkan Peninsula. The Kosovo Albanians were chosen as "heroes" by Washington. This region territorially and politically belonged to the then existing Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, back in 1996, the movement of Albanian separatists, secretly supported by American intelligence services, intensified here. In February 1998, the so-called "Kosovo Liberation Army" declared a "fight for independence". The war in Yugoslavia began with armed acts of violence not only against the state police, but also against Serbian civilians. There were real victims. Official Belgrade was forced to respond to this with an internal forceful operation aimed at eliminating bandit formations from among the Kosovars. During this operation, one of the leaders of the separatists, A. Yashari, was destroyed. However, 82 Albanian residents of a village in central Kosovo where internal fighting was taking place were affected. Western leaders immediately took advantage of this opportunity and began to put pressure on Belgrade. A temporary truce between the parties within the country did not bring results. After another clash between the forces of Belgrade and Albanian separatists, scenes of Albanians allegedly executed by the forces of the FRY were falsified, and a NATO operation began.

The true causes of NATO aggression in Yugoslavia

Some researchers drew attention to some coincidence between the beginning of NATO aggression against the FRY and domestic political events in the United States. We remind readers that at that moment there was a scandal related to the intimate relationship of the American President Clinton with Monica Lewinsky. American leaders have always been able to use foreign policy to solve personal problems. However, in this case, the goals of the West were much more ambitious. NATO's barbaric bombings in Federal Yugoslavia became a tool to achieve the following goals:

  • change of leadership in the lands of Serbia and Montenegro, followed by a reorientation of the most pro-Russian part of the former Yugoslavia towards the West;
  • the state division of Serbia and Montenegro along with the transformation of Kosovo into a separate state;
  • liquidation of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
  • free stationing and anchoring of NATO forces in the Balkans and, in particular, in Serbia and Kosovo;
  • testing the military power of the North Atlantic Alliance in real combat conditions. Destruction of old weapons and testing of new types of weapons;
  • demonstrating to the whole world the significant role of NATO in supposedly resolving ethnic conflicts.

It is noteworthy that the United Nations monitored the general situation on the territory of the FRY. However, no sanctions were issued by the UN in response to the open intervention of NATO countries in Yugoslavia. Why? Why war in Yugoslavia remained unpunished? The UN resolution, which condemned the actions of the North Atlantic Alliance, gained only 3 votes in the Security Council. Only the Russian Federation, China and Namibia dared to openly condemn the actions of Washington and NATO. There has been some criticism of NATO in the West. A number of independent media tried to draw the attention of the world community to the fact that the aggressive actions of the North Atlantic Alliance without the appropriate sanction of the UN Security Council are a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and all the canons of international law. However, by and large, the West has not yet made an official objective assessment of this criminal military operation.

Consequences of the barbaric bombardments of Yugoslavia

The most terrible "result" of NATO aggression in the FRY is the death of at least 1.7 thousand civilians, as well as thousands of wounded and missing. If we talk about the economic damage, then the losses are more than significant. As a result of the war in Yugoslavia, all the most important objects of the civilian infrastructure operating at that time were destroyed or seriously damaged. Under the lethal shells of the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance, national oil refineries, bridges, power supply units and the largest enterprises fell. More than 500 thousand people were left without work and means of subsistence. A huge number of citizens lost their homes. According to the estimates of the future Serbian authorities, the war in Yugoslavia brought an economic loss equivalent to 20 billion US dollars.

Such a barbaric action could not pass without a trace from the point of view of ecology. Targeted bombing of refineries contributed to the entry of sending substances into the atmosphere. We are talking about hydrochloric acid, toxic alkalis and chlorine compounds. The spilled oil entered the waters of the Danube. This led to the poisoning of not only the territories of modern Serbia, but also countries that were downstream of the largest European river. The use of munitions containing depleted uranium has triggered outbreaks of cancer and hereditary diseases. The NATO operation destroyed thousands of people, and hundreds of thousands are feeling the consequences of this terrible tragedy in our time.

The war crime committed by the United States and the European Union must not be forgotten by mankind. After such operations, statements by NATO leaders that the military bloc ensures "peace in Europe" sound doubly cynical. Only thanks to the sensible policy of the Russian Federation, at present there is a certain parity of forces that does not allow the West to repeat this in any of the countries they do not like. They still continue to arrange "democratic revolutions" and pit fraternal peoples against each other. However, this will not continue forever. The world is on the brink of radical change. And I want to believe that he will no longer allow death and destruction from the bombing of "humanitarian rescuers" from the NATO bloc.

Good World Evil (Myth)

UPD: Today is the date - 10 years have passed since the beginning of NATO aggression on the state of Serbia. Last summer, I wrote this post about Serbia in order to compare the behavior of NATO and Russian troops in similar watered. and military situations.
Read and compare for yourself - how it was and what it led to ...

Listening, watching and talking about the war in South Ossetia, one cannot help but recall a very similar case in the very recent past of our planet - Operation Allied Force, which began in March 1999.
This historical review is especially interesting in terms of how the USA and Co. behaved in a situation where one independent country tried to pacify one self-proclaimed republic - does this remind you of anything, gentlemen?
Read and compare the behavior of the US and Russia, then and today:

UPD 1.: I then realized that 90% of my IFs cannot handle such an amount of text that I have provided for them below.
Especially for them, very briefly, only the facts of this war, which are worth paying attention to, in the light of today's events:

As a result of NATO bombing, more than 2,000 civilians, over 7,000 wounded, destroyed and damaged 82 bridges, 422 tasks of educational institutions, 48 ​​medical facilities, critical life support facilities and infrastructure, more than 750 thousand inhabitants of Yugoslavia became refugees, 2.5 million people were left without the necessary living conditions. The total material damage from NATO aggression amounted to over 100 billion dollars.

After the "Peacekeeping" operation:
On June 10, 1999, the NATO Secretary General suspended operations against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership agreed to withdraw military and police forces from Kosovo and Metohija. On June 11, the NATO Rapid Response Force entered the territory of the region. By April 2000, 41,000 KFOR troops were stationed in Kosovo and Metohija. But this did not stop inter-ethnic violence. A year after the cessation of NATO aggression in the region more than 1000 people were killed expelled more than 200 thousand Serbs and Montenegrins and 150 thousand representatives of other ethnic groups of the population, burned or damaged 100 churches and monasteries.

The definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1974 (resolution 3314) unequivocally states: “Will be qualified as an act of aggression: the bombing by the armed forces of states of the territory of another state. No considerations of any nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, can justify aggression.” But the Alliance and didn't try to get UN sanction, since Russia and China would still have blocked the draft Security Council resolution if it had been put to a vote.

In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit was held, which legalized any operations of the alliance outside the territories of its member countries. "wherever it is required". The summit documents did not mention the need to authorize the UN Security Council to use force.


But, according to Alejandro Teitelbom, representative of the Association of American Lawyers at the UN European Headquarters in Geneva, Carla del Ponte “actually admitted that it is very difficult for her to take steps that run counter to the interests of the North Atlantic Alliance,” since the content of the Hague Tribunal costs millions of dollars. , and most of this money is provided by the United States, so in the event of such actions on her part, she may simply lose her job.

WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA 1991-1995, 1998-1999 - inter-ethnic war in Yugoslavia and NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The reason for the war was the destruction of Yugoslav statehood (by mid-1992, the federal authorities had lost control of the situation), caused by the conflict between the federal republics and various ethnic groups, as well as attempts by the political "top" to revise the existing borders between the republics.

To understand the history of the conflict, you should first read about the collapse of Yugoslavia itself:
Brief overview of the wars in Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999 :

War in Croatia (1991-1995).
In February 1991, the Sabor of Croatia adopted a resolution on “disengagement” from the SFRY, and the Serbian National Council of the Serbian Krajina (an autonomous Serbian region within Croatia) adopted a resolution on “disengagement” from Croatia and remaining within the SFRY. The mutual incitement of passions, the persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church caused the first wave of refugees - 40 thousand Serbs were forced to leave their homes. In July, a general mobilization was announced in Croatia, and by the end of the year, the number of Croatian armed formations reached 110 thousand people. Ethnic cleansing began in Western Slavonia. Serbs were completely expelled from 10 cities and 183 villages, and partially from 87 villages.

On the part of the Serbs, the formation of a system of territorial defense and the armed forces of Krajina began, a significant part of which were volunteers from Serbia. Units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) entered the territory of Croatia and by August 1991 drove out volunteer Croatian units from the territory of all Serbian regions. But after the signing of a truce in Geneva, the JNA stopped helping the Krajina Serbs, and a new offensive by the Croats forced them to retreat. From spring 1991 to spring 1995. Krajina was partially taken under the protection of the Blue Helmets, but the demand of the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of Croatian troops from the zones controlled by peacekeepers was not fulfilled. The Croats continued to take active military actions with the use of tanks, artillery, rocket launchers. As a result of the war in 1991-1994. 30 thousand people died, up to 500 thousand people became refugees, direct losses amounted to more than 30 billion dollars. In May-August 1995, the Croatian army carried out a well-prepared operation to return Krajina to Croatia. Several tens of thousands of people died during the hostilities. 250 thousand Serbs were forced to leave the republic. In total for 1991-1995. more than 350 thousand Serbs left Croatia.


War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995).
On October 14, 1991, in the absence of Serb deputies, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed the independence of the republic. On January 9, 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People proclaimed the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the SFRY. In April 1992, a "Muslim putsch" took place - the seizure of police buildings and the most important objects. Muslim armed formations were opposed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard and volunteer detachments. The Yugoslav army withdrew its units, and then was blocked by the Muslims in the barracks. For 44 days of the war, 1320 people died, the number of refugees amounted to 350 thousand people.

The United States and a number of other states have accused Serbia of fomenting the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the OSCE ultimatum, the Yugoslav troops were withdrawn from the territory of the republic. But the situation in the republic has not stabilized. A war broke out between Croats and Muslims with the participation of the Croatian army. The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into independent ethnic groups.

On March 18, 1994, with the mediation of the United States, a Muslim-Croat federation and a well-armed joint army were created, which launched offensive operations with the support of NATO air forces, bombing Serbian positions (with the authorization of the UN Secretary General). The contradictions between the Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav leadership, as well as the blockade of heavy weapons by the "blue helmets" of the Serbs, put them in a difficult situation. In August-September 1995, NATO air strikes, which destroyed Serbian military installations, communications centers and air defense systems, prepared a new offensive for the Muslim-Croatian army. On October 12, the Serbs were forced to sign a ceasefire agreement.

By Resolution 1031 of December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council instructed NATO to form a peacekeeping force to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the first ever NATO-led ground operation outside its area of ​​responsibility. The role of the UN was reduced to the approval of this operation. The composition of the peacekeeping multinational force included 57,300 people, 475 tanks, 1,654 armored vehicles, 1,367 guns, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, 200 combat helicopters, 139 combat aircraft, 35 ships (with 52 carrier-based aircraft) and other weapons. It is believed that by the beginning of 2000 the goals of the peacekeeping operation were basically achieved - a ceasefire had come. But the full agreement of the conflicting parties did not take place. The problem of refugees remained unresolved.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed more than 200,000 lives, of which more than 180,000 were civilians. Germany alone spent 320,000 refugees (mostly Muslims) on maintenance from 1991 to 1998. about 16 billion marks.


War in Kosovo and Metohija (1998-1999).
Since the second half of the 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to operate in Kosovo. In 1991-1998 There were 543 clashes between Albanian militants and Serbian police, 75% of which took place in five months of last year. To stop the wave of violence, Belgrade sent police units numbering 15 thousand people and about the same number of military personnel, 140 tanks and 150 armored vehicles to Kosovo and Metohija. In July-August 1998, the Serbian army managed to destroy the main strongholds of the KLA, which controlled up to 40% of the region's territory. This predetermined the intervention of NATO member states, who demanded the cessation of the actions of Serbian forces under the threat of bombing Belgrade. Serbian troops were withdrawn from the province and KLA militants re-occupied a significant part of Kosovo and Metohija. The forcible expulsion of the Serbs from the region began.

Operation Allied Force

In March 1999, in violation of the UN Charter, NATO launched a "humanitarian intervention" against Yugoslavia. In Operation Allied Force, 460 combat aircraft were used at the first stage; by the end of the operation, the figure had increased by more than 2.5 times. The strength of the NATO ground grouping was increased to 10 thousand people with heavy armored vehicles and tactical missiles in service. Within a month from the beginning of the operation, the NATO naval grouping was increased to 50 ships equipped with sea-based cruise missiles and 100 carrier-based aircraft, and then increased several times more (for carrier-based aviation - 4 times). In total, 927 aircraft and 55 ships (4 aircraft carriers) participated in the NATO operation. NATO troops were served by a powerful group of space assets.

By the beginning of the NATO aggression, the Yugoslav ground forces numbered 90 thousand people and about 16 thousand people of the police and security forces. The Yugoslav army had up to 200 combat aircraft, about 150 air defense systems with limited combat capabilities.

NATO used 1,200-1,500 high-precision sea and air-based cruise missiles to attack 900 targets in the Yugoslav economy. During the first stage of the operation, these funds destroyed the oil industry of Yugoslavia, 50% of the ammunition industry, 40% of the tank and automobile industries, 40% of oil storage facilities, 100% of strategic bridges across the Danube. From 600 to 800 sorties per day were carried out. In total, 38,000 sorties were made during the operation, about 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles were used, more than 20,000 bombs and guided missiles were dropped. 37,000 uranium projectiles were also used, as a result of which 23 tons of depleted uranium-238 were sprayed over Yugoslavia.

Burning Belgrade April 23, 1999

An important component of the aggression was the information war, including a powerful impact on the information systems of Yugoslavia in order to destroy information sources and undermine the combat command and control system and information isolation not only of the troops, but also of the population. The destruction of television and radio centers cleared the information space for the broadcasting of the Voice of America station.

According to NATO, the bloc lost 5 aircraft, 16 unmanned aerial vehicles and 2 helicopters in the operation. According to the Yugoslav side, 61 NATO aircraft, 238 cruise missiles, 30 unmanned vehicles and 7 helicopters were shot down (independent sources give the numbers 11, 30, 3 and 3 respectively).

The Yugoslav side in the first days of the war lost a significant part of its aviation and air defense systems (70% of mobile air defense systems). The forces and means of air defense were preserved due to the fact that Yugoslavia refused to conduct an air defensive operation.

As a result of NATO bombing, more than 2,000 civilians were killed, more than 7,000 people were injured, 82 bridges, 422 tasks of educational institutions, 48 ​​medical facilities, the most important life support facilities and infrastructure were destroyed and damaged, more than 750 thousand residents of Yugoslavia became refugees, left without the necessary living conditions 2.5 million people. The total material damage from NATO aggression amounted to over $100 billion.

On June 10, 1999, the NATO Secretary General suspended operations against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership agreed to withdraw military and police forces from Kosovo and Metohija. On June 11, the NATO Rapid Response Force entered the territory of the region. By April 2000, 41,000 KFOR troops were stationed in Kosovo and Metohija. But this did not stop inter-ethnic violence. In the year after the end of NATO aggression, more than 1,000 people were killed in the region, more than 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins and 150,000 representatives of other ethnic groups were expelled, about 100 churches and monasteries were burned or damaged.

In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit was held, which legalized any operations of the alliance outside the territories of its member countries "wherever it is required." The summit documents did not mention the need to authorize the UN Security Council to use force.


During the NATO war against Serbia on April 12, 1999, during the bombing of the railway bridge in the Grdelica area (Grdelica), a NATO F-15E aircraft destroyed the Serbian passenger train Belgrade - Skopje.

F-15E camera shot of the train before it was destroyed.

This incident received prominent coverage in the NATO information war against Serbia.

The media of the NATO countries have repeatedly shown a falsified (deliberately accelerated) video recording of the destruction of the train at the moment of passing over the bridge.

It was alleged that the pilot accidentally caught the train on the bridge. The plane and train were moving too fast and the pilot was unable to make a meaningful decision, the result is a tragic accident.

Later, the falsification had to be officially recognized.

Details about the operation of the United States and its allies "Allied Force"

The Yugoslav city of Novi Sad after one of the NATO bombings.

The peculiarity of the military conflict in Yugoslavia was that it included two "mini-wars": NATO aggression against the FRY and internal armed confrontation on ethnic grounds between Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Moreover, the reason for the NATO armed intervention was a sharp aggravation in 1998 of the hitherto sluggish current conflict. Moreover, one cannot ignore the objective fact of the constant, methodical escalation of tension in the cradle of Serbian culture - Kosovo - at first hidden, and then, starting from the late 1980s, almost undisguised support for the separatist aspirations of the Albanian population by the West.
Accusing Belgrade of disrupting negotiations on the future of the rebellious region and of not agreeing to accept the humiliating ultimatum of the West, which boiled down to the demand for the actual occupation of Kosovo, on March 29, 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana orders the Supreme Commander of the united armed forces of the bloc in Europe, American General Wesley Clark, to start a military campaign in the form of an air operation against Yugoslavia, called the "Allied Force", which was based on the so-called "Plan 10601", which provided for several phases of military operations. It is noteworthy that the fundamental concept of this operation was developed in the summer of the previous year, 1998, and in October of the same year it was refined and specified.

Learn more about Operation Allied Force by the US and its allies

BYPASSED AND ADDED

Despite the careful study of all direct and related issues related to the operation, the Western allies faced the fact of the crime they were committing. The definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1974 (resolution 3314) unequivocally states: “Will be qualified as an act of aggression: the bombing by the armed forces of states of the territory of another state. No considerations of any nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, can justify aggression.” But the North Atlantic Alliance did not even try to obtain UN sanction, since Russia and China would still block the draft Security Council resolution if it were put to a vote.

However, the NATO leadership still managed to beat in its favor the struggle of interpretations of international law that was unfolding within the walls of the UN, when the Security Council at the very beginning of the aggression expressed its de facto agreement with the operation, rejecting (three votes for, 12 against) the proposal submitted by Russia a draft resolution calling for the renunciation of the use of force against Yugoslavia. Thus, all grounds for a formal condemnation of the instigators of the military campaign allegedly disappeared.

Moreover, looking ahead, we note that already after the end of the aggression at an open meeting of the Security Council, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Carla del Ponte, made a statement that in the actions of NATO countries against Yugoslavia in the period from March 1999 there is no corpus delicti and that the accusations against the political and military leadership of the bloc are untenable. The chief prosecutor also said that the decision not to open an investigation into the accusations against the bloc was final and was made after a thorough study by the tribunal experts of the materials submitted by the government of the FRY, the State Duma Commission of the Russian Federation, a group of experts in the field of international law and a number of public organizations.

But, according to Alejandro Teitelbom, representative of the Association of American Lawyers at the UN European Headquarters in Geneva, Carla del Ponte “actually admitted that it is very difficult for her to take steps that run counter to the interests of the North Atlantic Alliance,” since the content of the Hague Tribunal costs millions of dollars. , and most of this money is provided by the United States, so in the event of such actions on her part, she may simply lose her job.

Nevertheless, feeling the precariousness of the arguments of the initiators of this military campaign, some NATO member countries, primarily Greece, began to resist the pressure of the military-political leadership of the alliance, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of carrying out a military action in general, since, in accordance with the NATO Charter, this requires the consent of all members of the block. However, in the end, Washington managed to "squeeze" its allies.

SCRIPT WASHINGTON

The multinational grouping of the joint NATO navies in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas by the beginning of hostilities consisted of 35 warships, including American, British, French and Italian aircraft carriers, as well as ships carrying cruise missiles. 14 states took direct part in the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia - the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, Norway and Hungary. The main burden fell on the shoulders of the US Air Force and Navy pilots, who accounted for over 60% of sorties in the first month and a half of the campaign, although American aircraft accounted for only 42% of the NATO combat aviation grouping in the region. The aviation of Great Britain, France and Italy was also relatively actively involved. The participation of nine other NATO countries in air strikes was minimal and pursued rather a political goal - to demonstrate the unity and cohesion of the allies.

In essence, it was precisely according to Washington's scenario and, as the subsequent analysis of military operations confirmed, in accordance with instructions that came directly from the Pentagon, that the content and duration of the phases of the entire campaign were repeatedly adjusted. This, of course, could not but cause discontent on the part of some of the most influential European allies of the United States. Thus, for example, representatives of France in the North Atlantic Alliance, which made essentially the second largest contribution to the air campaign, openly accused Washington of "sometimes operating outside NATO." And this despite the fact that France, which did not fully delegate its powers to NATO (since it formally remained outside the military structure of the bloc), previously stipulated for itself the privilege of special information about all the nuances of conducting an air campaign.

After the end of hostilities, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of NATO in Europe, the American General Clark, frankly admitted that he did not take into account the opinion of "those who, due to nervousness, sought to change the objects of strikes." Under the veil of imaginary "unity" of the positions of the member states of the alliance, in reality, there were severe contradictions in the scheme of operational actions in the Balkans. At the same time, Germany and Greece were the main opponents of the escalation. During the conflict, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping even made a statement that the German government was "not going to discuss this matter at all." For its part, the Greek leadership, itself for many years faced with Albanian, including criminal, expansion and hardly agreed to “punish” Belgrade for “oppressing the Albanian minority”, began to artificially create obstacles to the expansion of hostilities. In particular, Athens did not allow its Turkish "ally" to use Greek airspace as part of the campaign against Yugoslavia.

The arrogance of the Americans, who took control of the entire campaign into their own hands, sometimes aroused bewilderment, bordering on open discontent, even among Washington's devoted "friends". So, for example, Ankara was, to put it mildly, "surprised" that, without agreement with it, the NATO military leadership announced the allocation of three air bases located in Turkey to the alliance's disposal. Even the facts of the refusal of the command of the Canadian contingent - Washington's most devoted Anglo-Saxon ally - to bomb "doubtful" targets in Yugoslavia, indicated by the leadership of the bloc, from the point of view of Ottawa, became public.

The states newly admitted to NATO - the Czech Republic and Poland (not to mention Hungary, which took a direct part in hostilities) - in contrast to their "senior" European counterparts in the alliance, on the contrary, demonstrated full support for the "flexible" position of Brussels and Washington and declared on the readiness to provide its military infrastructure for the solution of any tasks of NATO as part of the aggression against Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Macedonia showed even greater zeal in the hope of Washington's loyalty in resolving the issue of the upcoming admission to NATO, proactively declaring that their airspace (some completely, some partially) was at the disposal of the bloc's OVVS. In general, as follows from the comments of experts, many of the frictions within the alliance were based on Washington's lack of awareness of European allies about specific plans within each phase of the campaign.

TESTS AND INTERNSHIPS

Pragmatic Washington, as in most other wars of the new time, especially disregarding the position of the allies, tried to "squeeze" the maximum out of the military conflict, "killing two birds with one stone": the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime, which became an overnight obstacle to the implementation of the plans of the White House in the Balkans and experimenting with new means of armed struggle, forms and methods of military operations.

The Americans made the most of the opportunity by testing the latest air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, cluster bombs with homing submunitions, and other weapons. In real combat conditions, modernized and new reconnaissance, control, communications, navigation, electronic warfare systems, all types of support were tested; the issues of interaction between the types of the Armed Forces, as well as aviation and special forces (which, perhaps, was the most significant in the light of the latest installations of the Minister of Defense Donald Rumsfeld personally at that time; the concept of "integrity") were worked out.

At the insistence of the Americans, carrier aircraft were used as part of reconnaissance and strike combat systems and were only "carriers of ammunition." They took off from air bases in the United States, NATO countries in Europe and aircraft carriers in the seas surrounding the Balkans, delivered to the launch lines beyond the reach of the Yugoslav air defense systems cruise missiles aimed at specific critical points of objects in advance, launched them and left for new ammunition. In addition, other methods and forms of aviation were used.

Later, taking advantage of the forced delay in the operation, again at the initiative of the Americans, the NATO command began to practice the so-called "combat training" of reservist pilots. After 10-15 independent sorties, which was considered sufficient to gain combat experience, they were replaced by other "trainees". Moreover, the bloc's military leadership was not in the least concerned by the fact that this period accounted for the largest number of almost daily, according to the NATO members themselves, blunders of the alliance's aviation when striking ground targets.

The fact was that the leadership of the OVVS block, in order to minimize the losses of the flight crew, gave the order to "bomb", not falling below 4.5-5 thousand meters, as a result of which compliance with international standards of warfare became simply impossible. The large-scale disposal of surpluses of obsolete bomb weapons that took place in the final phase of the operation by striking a wide range of mainly economic targets in Yugoslavia did not contribute to the observance of the norms of international law.

In total, which is not denied in principle by NATO representatives, in the course of hostilities, NATO aircraft destroyed about 500 important objects, of which at least half were purely civilian. At the same time, the losses of the civilian population of Yugoslavia were estimated, according to various sources, from 1.2 to 2 and even more than 5 thousand people.

It is noteworthy that in comparison with the gigantic economic damage (according to Yugoslav estimates - approximately 100 billion dollars), the damage to the military potential of Yugoslavia was not so significant. For example, there were few air battles (which was explained by the desire of the Serbs to maintain their air force in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the alliance's aviation), and the losses of the FRY in aviation were minimal - 6 aircraft in air battles and 22 at airfields. In addition, Belgrade reported that his army had lost only 13 tanks.

However, NATO reports also contained much larger, but by no means impressive numbers: 93 “successful strikes” on tanks, 153 on armored personnel carriers, 339 on military vehicles, 389 on gun and mortar positions. However, these data were criticized by analysts from the intelligence and military leadership of the alliance itself. And in an unpublished report by the US Air Force, it was generally reported that the confirmed number of Yugoslav mobile targets destroyed was 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers and 20 pieces of artillery.

By the way, in turn, the Serbs, summing up the results of the 78-day resistance, insisted on the following NATO losses: 61 aircraft, seven helicopters, 30 UAVs and 238 cruise missiles. The Allies naturally denied these figures. Although, according to independent experts, they are very close to the true ones.

BOMB, NOT FIGHT

Without questioning the sometimes truly “experimental” nature of military actions by the allies led by the Americans, one cannot but agree with those independent experts who state serious mistakes made by NATO, which consisted, in general, in underestimating the level of operational-strategic and tactical thinking of commanders and officers of the Yugoslav armed forces, who deeply analyzed the manner in which the Americans acted in local conflicts, primarily in the 1990-1991 war in the Persian Gulf. After all, it is no coincidence that the command of the alliance was forced to revise the general plan for conducting the operation, first getting involved in a protracted and extremely costly military conflict, and then bringing up the question of the advisability of conducting the ground phase of the operation, which was not originally planned.

Indeed, during the preparatory period for the aggression, there were no large-scale regroupings of NATO ground forces in the states adjacent to Yugoslavia. For example, ground forces with a total strength of only 26 thousand people were concentrated in Albania and Macedonia, while, according to Western analysts, in order to conduct an effective operation against the sufficiently trained armed forces of Yugoslavia, it was necessary to create a ground grouping with a total strength of at least 200 thousand people .

NATO's revision of the general concept of conducting the operation in May and the idea of ​​urgent preparations for the ground phase of hostilities once again provoked sharp criticism from the influential European members of the alliance. For example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder vehemently rejected the proposal to send Allied ground troops to Kosovo as leading to a dead end. France also rejected this idea, but under the pretext that at that time it did not have a sufficient number of "free" formations of ground forces.

Yes, and American legislators have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of this undertaking. According to the US Congressional Budget Office, in addition to the already existing monthly cost of $1 billion for the operation, if the ground phase is carried out, at least another $200 million will have to be added to the maintenance of one Army division alone.

But, perhaps, most of all the allies, primarily the Americans, were worried about possible losses in the event of ground battles with Yugoslav units and formations. According to American experts, the damage in military operations in Kosovo alone could be from 400 to 1,500 servicemen, who would no longer be able to be hidden from the public. As, for example, carefully concealed data on the losses, according to estimates, of several dozen NATO pilots and special forces who “advised” Yugoslav Albanians and participated in the rescue of downed NATO pilots. As a result, the US Congress voted against consideration of a resolution allowing the US President, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to use ground forces in the military operation against Yugoslavia.

One way or another, it did not come to ground military operations between the Allies and the Yugoslav troops. However, from the very beginning of the aggression, the NATO command in every possible way stimulated the activity of the "Kosovo Liberation Army", which consisted of Kosovo Albanians and representatives of the Albanian diasporas of the United States and a number of European countries. But the formations of the KLA, equipped and trained by NATO, in battles with Serbian border guards and regular units of the Armed Forces, showed themselves far from the best. According to a number of media reports, the largest operation of Albanian militants against Serbian troops in Kosovo, in which up to 4 thousand people took part, carried out in parallel with the NATO air campaign, ended in the complete defeat of the KLA units and the retreat of their remnants to the territory of Albania.

Under these conditions, the NATO leadership was left with the only way to resolve the problem it had created: to hit Yugoslavia with all the might of its potential. Which it did, sharply increasing in the last ten days of May the grouping of its Air Force to 1120 aircraft (including 625 combat aircraft) and adding two more aircraft carriers to the four aircraft carriers on combat duty in the seas adjacent to Yugoslavia, as well as five carriers of cruise missiles and a number of others. ships. Naturally, this was accompanied by an unprecedented intensity of raids on military and civilian targets on Yugoslav territory.

Relying on its colossal air power and putting Belgrade before a choice - the loss of Kosovo or the total destruction of the economy, an economic and humanitarian catastrophe - NATO forced the leadership of Yugoslavia to surrender and solved the Kosovo problem at that time in its own interests. Undoubtedly, the Serbs would not be able to resist the NATO group in open battles if the aggression continued, but they were quite able to conduct a successful guerrilla war on their territory for some time with the full support of the population, as was the case during the Second World War. But what happened happened!

CONCLUSIONS MADE

This military campaign once again demonstrated how much their European partners in the NATO bloc depend on the United States. It was the Americans who were the main striking force of the aggressor - 55% of combat aircraft (by the end of the war), over 95% of cruise missiles, 80% of bombs and missiles dropped, all strategic bombers, 60% of reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs, 24 reconnaissance satellites out of 25 and the vast majority precision weapons belonged to the United States.

The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Italian Admiral Guido Venturoni, was even forced to admit: “Only using the funds provided by the overseas partner, the European NATO countries can conduct independent operations, while the creation of a European component in the field of defense and security remains a noble idea.”

It is impossible not to pay tribute to the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance, which not only stated the fact that the European allies of the United States lagged behind their "big brother" in all aspects of the development of military potential, but also, following the results of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, took a number of drastic measures leading to correcting the negative from the point of view of view of Brussels (and Washington in the first place) position. First of all, it was decided to speed up the protracted process of reforming the Armed Forces of the European countries - members of the bloc, within which, among other things, the lion's share of the costs provided for in the national budgets for the purchase of weapons and military equipment, to be directed to the acquisition of high-precision weapons (in the United States, of course), to reform the logistics system and much more.

But, according to NATO strategists, the most important task facing the US allies in Europe continues to be the creation of such formations of expeditionary forces that could participate on an equal footing with the Americans in creating the model of world order that Washington needs.

Background to the collapse of Yugoslavia
The fact that the Balkans have been called the powder keg of Europe for the last two centuries was far from an exaggeration. It is difficult to count how many big and small wars started here or were provoked by the events unfolding here. But, without plunging into history, let's return to a period that is directly related to today.

Almost immediately after the end of World War II, a black cat ran between the two communist leaders of the time, Stalin and Tito. Relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia cooled sharply and actually moved to confrontation. Both countries did not get tired of criticizing each other and actually considered each other military opponents.

WHY YUGOSLAVIA?

This anti-Stalinism of Tito was more than in the hands of the United States and the West.

Even after Khrushchev, who came to power, actually apologized to Tito and the ice between the USSR and Yugoslavia was melted, mutual suspicion and distance remained for many more years.

Tito criticized the USSR for excesses, for the suppression of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. For imperial manners. The Soviet leaders in response called him a revisionist, a traitor to the communist idea and a servant of the West.

At the height of the Cold War, this confrontation was given a new impetus.

A project of "alternative socialism" was formed in the political elite of the West.

According to him, Yugoslavia was to become a "showcase" of another socialism. Socialism with a human face of a cheerful Yugoslav.

It is difficult to say how much this coincided with the ideas of Tito himself, but the fact remains. At the end of the 1960s, the attitude of the West towards Yugoslavia began to change rapidly. One delegation after another rushes into the country, Tito is beginning to be received where before one word “communist” caused vomiting. The floodgates of the Western economy are beginning to open for Yugoslavia.

Tito was even allowed to play his own political toys. Let us recall the "Non-Aligned Movement" created by Tito. An international organization that unites states on the principles of non-participation in military blocs (which at the time of the founding of the organization meant, first of all, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Aligned Movement was officially created by 25 states at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. The creation of the Movement was preceded by The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the trilateral consultations of Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru in 1956.

Initially, the “sharpening” of this movement was anti-Soviet. It was positioned as a kind of "alternative way". Instead of the gloomy, post-Stalinist "Russian socialism", with its "Iron Curtain" (which, according to the truth, was, according to the logic of this term, omitted by the West in order to separate from the flammable barbarian East), a "soft" one was positioned, ready for diffusion and interaction with the West, Tito's socialism and the opportunity to live quite comfortably and quietly "without joining" the USSR and in exchange for this receiving preferences from the West.

For Yugoslavia itself, this interaction with the West was expressed primarily in the borders open to Yugoslavia, through which a powerful stream of "guest workers" of all stripes poured into the West. This flow was so powerful that in the mid-80s the Yugoslavs became popular heroes of German, French and Italian films about the life of "guest workers". Even German pornographers managed to master the image of a Yugoslav plumber who came to fix the toilet Frau X ...

This policy of open borders quickly paid off. Working in Europe not only allowed hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs to raise their standard of living, but also to feel like “Europeans”. In fact, in all Western countries, in the USA and Canada, large Yugoslav communities have formed.

For Yugoslavia, a unique favorable treatment was established. Tito easily received loans and technology. After his death in 1980, this regime was preserved, and by the end of the eighties Yugoslavia had become one of the most powerful countries in southern Europe. The economic and military potential of Yugoslavia surpassed all countries in the region, with the exception of Italy. Yugoslavia has become one of the largest arms sellers.

But "the Moor has already done his job."

MAVR MUST GO

Already after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (April 1, 1991), no one in the West needed an "extra" powerful country, and even with its own political ambitions. Just as the "non-aligned movement" was no longer needed. In the conditions of the complete dominance of NATO and the beginning of the era of preparation for the "Journey to the East", the countries "liberated" from the influence of the USSR had to be built and directed along the right path - under the boot of NATO!

"Non-alignment" in these circumstances was simply harmful. Therefore, in fact, after 1991, the influence of this organization begins to decline rapidly, and it itself shrinks to a peripheral political organization, which brings together the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Latin America and such “outcast countries” (in the terminology of the West) as Venezuela, Belarus, Cuba.

Under these conditions, in the political kitchen of NATO, the historic decision was made to “dismantle” Yugoslavia. Moreover, this dismantling was supposed not only to remove an unnecessary piece from the political chessboard, but also in fact defiantly crack the cornerstone of the entire world political order - the Yalta Agreements of 1944 and, more importantly, the Helsinki Treaty of 1957 on the immutability of the post-war order in Europe.

The ease with which the West carried out the operation over Yugoslavia can be explained by several reasons.

First of all, by the extent to which local elites - Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians - were incorporated into Western political structures by that moment. Over a decade and a half of “open borders”, parallel (bypassing Belgrade) ties with the political elites of Germany, France, England and the United States were built.

The second factor that catalyzed the collapse of Yugoslavia was the political intervention, in fact, the aggression of the Vatican. Here it must be remembered that

Tito was the first communist leader to officially visit the Vatican. And it happened in 1971. Relations with the Vatican were fully restored and the role of the Vatican in the events that followed was enormous. Catholic Croats and Slovenes have always been heavily influenced by the Vatican, making up almost 32% of the population of the former Yugoslavia. Vatican Radio broadcast in Serbian. The Vatican appointed bishops and priests, being in fact the propaganda and ideological center of the schism. It was the Vatican that became the second state after Iceland to recognize the independence of Croatia and one of the first to recognize Slovenia.

The third factor was the economic "nationalization" of Yugoslavia. The various republics of Yugoslavia had completely different levels of economic development, while being inhabited by national communities. At the time of secession from Yugoslavia, Croats made up the majority (more than 78% of the population of Croatia), while having 36% of the GDP of the SFRY in 1991, Slovenes made up 85% of the population of Slovenia, while having 21.3% of the GDP of the SFRY in 1991. In fact, Slovenia and Croatia were the most developed regions of Yugoslavia, in the development of which a large part of the republican budget was invested for decades. Here was the highest standard of living and the least dependence on the "center".

At the same time, in Yugoslavia, Serbs accounted for 36%, Croats 20%, Slovenes 8%, Bosnians 8%, Albanians 8%, Macedonians 6%, Montenegrins 3%. Hungarians 2%.

All this made it possible in a matter of months to launch the mechanism for the collapse of Yugoslavia, and by the beginning of 1992, the once prosperous republic turned into a civil war zone ...

In this war, to the complete shock of the Serbs, the West took an initially anti-Serb position.

The explanation for this is given above, so I will only formulate the conclusion:

Germany, the US, and France initially relied on the Catholic, anti-Yugoslav communities in Croatia and Slovenia as the driving force behind the collapse of Yugoslavia.

One can discuss for a long time the reasons for the exit from the SFRY of each of the communities and argue about the circumstances, but one thing is indisputable. The readiness, or rather perfidy, with which the Western elites used their influence in the SFRY to achieve their own plans and the cold determination of the Vatican not only to intervene in this process as a peacemaker, as required by confessional duty, but to actually carry out the spiritual nourishment of expansion in the spirit of the medieval "crusades" trips."

In a patriotic milieu, it is fashionable to compare the fate of Yugoslavia with the fate of the USSR and today's Russia. If this is done without emotional passages, then it must be admitted that the collapse of the USSR followed a different scenario. If Yugoslavia was divided "from the bottom up", then the USSR was divided "from the top down". In the USSR, the West and the United States initially relied on the top political leadership of the USSR, and above all the RSFSR, which was taken under control, when the Soviet orthodox political wing was eliminated with the help of the GKChP operation and a precedent was created to seize power from the unpopular Gorbachev in favor of Yeltsin, who had been promoted by that moment. And it was Yeltsin who subsequently launched the mechanism for the dissolution of the USSR. But the "Yugoslav version" turned out to be more than relevant for a number of republics of the former USSR, where civil wars began - Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan.

From this stage, the issue of “inclusion” of regional elites in Western political elites and institutions and the depth of penetration of these institutions and all kinds of non-governmental organizations into Russia is relevant for us. Controlling the advance of these Trojan horses into Russia is a vital task.

The second stage of the Serbian drama began in 1999 after the lost war for Kosovo. But the reasons for the second division of Yugoslavia are far from the ethnic problem of the Kosovo Albanians, but in a completely different area.

Sixteen years ago, almost immediately after the collapse of the "big" Yugoslavia, perhaps the main problem of Serbian society was its spiritual and political split. If among the Croats and Muslims there was complete unity about their political future, then among the Serbs there was none.

The urban and coastal populations have traditionally been pro-Western. For almost thirty years of Tito's Yugoslavia's orientation towards the West, a whole generation of Serbs has grown up, professing a cosmopolitan, Westernizing ideology. There are especially many such "Westerners" in Belgrade and other large cities. Many of them managed to work for several years in the West - in Germany, Italy, France, and the money earned there became the basis of their well-being. From the first day they experienced the aggravation of relations between Yugoslavia and NATO as a tragic mistake made by their own leadership. It was this part of the population of Serbia that opposed any assistance to the Serbs - Bosnians and Krajins, for an alliance with NATO.

The backbone of the national Great Serbian movement was the rural population of Serbia, as well as the army, police and workers, a significant part of which was concentrated in the Yugoslav military-industrial complex (before the collapse of the SFRY, the Yugoslav defense industry was one of the most powerful in southern Europe). In addition, a huge part of the Greater Serbian movement was made up of the population of the Serbian Krajina, as well as the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina - almost 30% of all Serbs of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, the former communists of Yugoslavia, who advocated the preservation of a single republic and the political independence of the country, actually leaned on the national Great Serbian wing. And until 1996, this bloc held monopoly power in the country. The serious military successes of the Serbs in 1991-1992 ensured the high popularity of this bloc and Greater Serb sentiments in Yugoslav society.

At the same time, the top political leadership of Yugoslavia, frightened by the interference of the West on the side of the enemy, entered into separate negotiations with the United States, Germany and France, trying in some form to obtain absolution and prove their loyalty.

In fact, it was precisely these flirtations of Milosevic with the West that deprived the Serbs of the only chance to end the civil war in Yugoslavia with victory. The stop at the request of Belgrade of Serbian troops on the outskirts of Sarajevo in the fall of 1992 - the last serious center of resistance of the Muslims of Bosnia, after the fall of which the Bosnian Republic of Serbska actually became a de facto mono-ethnic political entity under the protectorate of Yugoslavia, having 65% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina became the point after which the defeat of the Serbs. Was lost time and pace.

Already in the spring of 1993, the situation began to change dramatically. NATO, which actually intervened in the ethnic conflict on the side of the Croats and Muslims, first organizes an economic blockade of Yugoslavia, and then openly supports the operations of the Croats and Muslims, which over the next two years nullified all the military successes of the Serbs.

Anyone who has studied the history of the breakup of Yugoslavia even a little has always been struck by the slurred, inconsistent and passive behavior of the Serbian political and military leadership. Being the largest community, having the most powerful army - the JNA and a huge economic potential, the Serbs, contrary to all logic, lost the war. And there is only one clear explanation for this. All these years, the Serbian leadership was under the powerful influence of the West, conducted separate negotiations with it, acted with an eye on it and missed one opportunity after another.

But why didn't the West turn its anger to mercy after the collapse of Yugoslavia? Why was Yugoslavia not forgiven and accepted back?

The reason, I think, is that the West, after the collapse of Yugoslavia, was not satisfied with the revanchist position of part of the Serbian elite, which retained its influence and power after 1993. "Great Serbian chauvinism" - this is how the Western media defined the mood of a part of the population of Yugoslavia, the West did not need it.

And then the "offended" Yugoslavia made a second mistake - it swayed towards Russia.

A number of signs suggest that this rapprochement was rather a demonstrative step by Milosevic, with which he wanted to scare the West. It is clear that in their right mind it was stupid for the Yugoslavs to count on Russian help and protection. In 1991-1996, the pro-American governments of Gaidar-Chernomyrdin with Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who even recruited advisers from the US State Department, were in power in Russia.

Since 1991, Russia has consistently and treacherously supported all the efforts of NATO and the United States to pacify Serbia, joining first the sanctions, and then the blockade.

Against this background, Milosevic's appeal to Russia looked, to put it mildly, illogical.

Of course, this could not but resonate in Yugoslavia itself, where traditionally the attitude towards Russians was benevolent, but from a political point of view it was meaningless.

Weak, dependent Russia, led by an eternally drunk president, could not help Yugoslavia in any way. In fact, apart from moral support, Serbia has received nothing from Russia over these ten years: no weapons, no economic assistance, no diplomatic support...

And only a few hundred Russian volunteers, who made their way to the Serbian fronts over the years, kept the image of “Russian brothers” among the Serbs all these years. Even the famous “throw to Pristina”, conceived as a powerful military operation to divide Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian parts, turned into a shameful sitting, waiting for NATO to deign to allow several hundred more of our soldiers to stand in the places indicated to them by the Americans and the British.

Maybe Milosevic wanted to force the West to become more accommodating with these steps, but it turned out the other way around. Thus, he finally signed the verdict for himself and Yugoslavia in that version of it.

And here it is necessary to clarify something. If one defines the sentiments in Yugoslavia, then it is most correct to call them "nationalist". There are no “democrats”, as such, in Serbia at all, in the sense of our Koval, Novodvorsky and others with their “universal values”, “liberalism” and “human rights”. All parties in today's Serbia are exclusively nationalist. Only the left and the ultra-right speak from the position of great-Serbian, pan-Slavic nationalism, while the “moderates” argue that it will be easier and more comfortable for “little Serbia” to integrate into “greater Europe”. This is "Eurocentric" nationalism. That's the whole difference.

The West could not afford to leave the first in power in the center of Europe, and even in such an unpredictable version of “revanchism”, and even with curtsies towards Russia. And then the light of God was extracted Albanian map.

... The topic of how the US and NATO intelligence agencies "warmed up" Kosovo is still waiting to be explored. And how many billions of dollars were spent on the creation of the UCHK - the army of Kosovars, we will find out sometime. However, it is already known today that a third of the Afghan heroin is strangely airborne (apparently with the help of genies) to Bosnia and Kosovo and from there spreads across Europe, that today it is the Albanians who have become the main drug fighters in Europe, as well as arms dealers ...

Actually, the task was extremely simple - to drag Yugoslavia into the war at any cost. At the same time, from a certain moment, even the reason has ceased to be important. NATO presented the Serbs with an ultimatum previously unheard of in international diplomacy - to release their own province from their own armed forces and transfer it to the control of foreign troops.

The calculation was simple - not a single self-respecting government would agree to this ultimatum. And the calculation was justified - Yugoslavia rejected the ultimatum.

And on March 24, 1999, NATO Secretary General Solana ordered the commander of NATO forces in Europe, American General Wesley Clark, to start a war against Yugoslavia. Massive bombardments of Kosovo and Yugoslavia began.

But the main war was not in Kosovo, but in Belgrade. More precisely in the Serbian society. The main thing was to “bomb out” this Great Serbian spirit from the Serbs. Turn them into small obedient and manageable dwarfs of southern Europe. That is why the main goal of NATO aviation very soon became not the military facilities of Yugoslavia, not the positions of the JNA, but the economic potential of Yugoslavia. Factories for the production of baby food, toys, refrigerators, kitchen appliances, power plants supplying cities and towns, power networks, water pumping stations, aeration stations, radio and television stations.

The Serbs were defiantly deprived of all the usual benefits of civilization, as if emphasizing that they were excluded from the family of "civilized peoples." NATO even defiantly did not bomb Montenegro even then emphasizing that it does not consider it as part of Yugoslavia. It was the first bomb-psychological war. A war in which bombs and missiles were supposed not to kill, but to destroy to the ground a foreign culture and civilization.

And in this war, the Serbs lost. Milosevic trembled and asked for peace, instantly nullifying and making senseless all the destruction and deprivation.

More than once or twice I later heard the words from the Serbs; "What was the point of fighting NATO and destroying the country like that, if we then surrendered anyway?"

I had nothing to answer. After all, I, as a military analyst, was completely incomprehensible to the passivity of the Serbian generals. Instead of depriving NATO of the initiative and transferring hostilities to land, attack the NATO troops who stood along the borders with Serbia on the territory of the former republics of the SFRY - Macedonia, Slovenia, destroy NATO bases in Bosnia, inflict maximum defeat and losses, to which NATO is so sensitive , the Serbs just sat out under the bombs in shelters, passively watching for two months as their country was being destroyed.

And again, the analysis of this strange paralysis of the Serbian military leadership suggests that even under the bombs, some kind of separate negotiations continued through all sorts of intermediaries on the conditions for cessation of hostilities and the start of negotiations. And one of these conditions was certainly the "passivity" of the Serbs and not transferring the war for national territory ...

The outcome of the war was a disaster for the "Great Serbian" bloc.

Just one example. Even if during the years of sanctions, the average salary in Serbia was 800-1000 dollars, after the war it barely reached 300. For a population oriented towards Europe, accustomed to moving freely, traveling to other countries, such a drop was a shock.
The Milosevic government was swept away.

And for ten years now, Yugoslavia has not been able to get out of this shock.

Over the years, she consistently and meekly went through all the stages of national humiliation. Search and extradition to the Hague Tribunal of its own president and his death in prison. Arrests and extradition to The Hague of their generals. Unilateral disarmament and complete withdrawal of troops from Kosovo. The silent reception of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kosovo, the destruction and desecration of Serbian historical and religious shrines by the Kosovars. The complete collapse of Yugoslavia - the separation of Montenegro.

And all these years, the Yugoslav leadership has been smoldering and smoldering hope that, finally, now, after another surrender, and the implementation of another Western ultimatum, they can be forgiven and accepted into the family of "civilized European peoples."

Most likely, tomorrow Yugoslavia will receive another slap in the face from Europe, who has not forgotten anything and arrogantly despise her. Serbia's heart will be finally torn out - a historical shrine and the cradle of the Serbian civilization of Kosovo. And it will be necessary to reconcile, rub the shameful redness on the face. To brush off the spit of the thug Hashim Thaci, who tomorrow will become the national hero of Albanian history, and again knock on the back (for lackeys) door of Europe. Maybe this time she will have mercy on the Serbs...

Eight years ago, finishing my requiem for Serbia, I wrote:

“... Very soon, the new patrons will demand from the Serbian authorities the extradition of Milosevic and Karadzic, Mladic and Dragan, and tens and hundreds of Serbs whom NATO would like to try and throw in prison for daring to defend their land with weapons in their hands. And it is unlikely that the new authorities of Yugoslavia will be able to refuse this request.

The fate of Serbia has already been determined by the new masters of the world. A small Balkan country, an exotic resort for Italian, German and other tourists. Slightly to the left of Bulgaria, if you look at the map. Cheap hotels, tons of attractions, pretty inexpensive prostitutes. Two dozen lines in the guide to the "new Europe" ... "

Who would know how sad it is sometimes to feel like a seer...

And here again the question arises of the lessons of Kosovo and the "similarity" of the fates of Yugoslavia and Russia.

It is the precedent of Kosovo that we should carefully study and study, because the “Kosovo option” is more than relevant for Russia.

A number of "Kosovo mines" have been laid in Russia today. Chechnya and Ingushetia can at any moment be chosen by the West to play the role of Russian Kosovo, with all the ensuing consequences.

In 1999-2000, Russia was allowed to "solve" the Chechen problem because at that moment the United States was preparing to tackle a much more important and global task - the redivision of the world by the 9/11 project. And such a "trifle" as a half-dead Russia, clinging to some kind of Chechnya, was of little concern to anyone. But that time has passed, and the new US administration is absolutely not going to let anything down on Russia. Both main candidates demand a radical review of relations with Russia and the curbing of its imperial ambitions.

And there is no doubt that Russia will be pressed in all possible directions.

And here I would like to take, in Russian, the words of the Serbian Bishop Nikolai, uttered by him back in 1956:
“A terrible tragedy could happen again for the Serbian people. Everyone says that when Tito falls, things will get easier. But no one has any idea what will happen to us after the fall of communism.

The Croats have a plan inspired by the Pope and supported by Italy. When the communist system falls (if Russia does not intervene), the supply of weapons to the Croats will immediately begin, and the Serbs will be left with their bare hands ...

On the borders of Yugoslavia, everything is already ready: both the Ustashe and weapons ... Croatia will be armed in 24 hours ... The Pope will again bless the murders of Serbs with the tacit consent of the Anglo-Saxons ...

What do the Serbian party members think? They think that salvation, as in 1918, lies in holding elections, in which the Serbian people, stark-eyed, bent under the weight of worries, will express their will! And nothing more!

All the plans of the Serbian democratic and semi-democratic, left and semi-left parties, including patriotic, nationalist, Chetnik, etc., boil down to this idea.

What fantasies and what madness!

The question is not to topple Tito, but what will happen after Tito. Who will arm the Serbian people, and who will protect them from the eternal and more than powerful enemy? And what kind of power will become over the Serbian people?
(c) Vlad Shurygin

Bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces (Eng. Operation Allied Force, Operation Allied Force) is a NATO military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from March 24 to June 10, 1999, during the Kosovo War.

The reason for the intervention of NATO troops was called a wave of ethnic cleansing in the region.

Subsequently, the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia confirmed the responsibility of the Yugoslav security services for crimes against humanity against the Albanian population of Kosovo, especially during the NATO operation.

NATO bombing of Yugoslavia began on March 24 and ended on June 10, 1999. Both military installations and civilian infrastructure were under attack. According to the authorities of the FRY, during the bombings, the total number of civilian deaths was over 1,700 people, including almost 400 children, about 10,000 were seriously injured. According to the UN, 821 people went missing, most of them Serbs. Operation Allied Force claimed the lives of people and after its completion, NATO used radioactive depleted uranium in ammunition. The bombings were stopped after the signing of the Military-technical agreement in Kumanovo between representatives of the Yugoslav army and NATO countries.

As a result of the operation, the Kosovo War was completed. Control over the region passed to the forces of NATO and the international administration, which then transferred most of the powers to the structures of ethnic Albanians. Ethnic cleansing and (according to the Prosecutor's Office for War Crimes of the Republic of Serbia) war crimes against the Serb and Gypsy population of Kosovo and Metohija took place.

This is the second large-scale NATO military operation (the first was Operation Deliberate Force, against the Bosnian Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995).

The operation was officially justified as a humanitarian intervention, however, due to the lack of a UN mandate, it is often characterized by critics as an illegal military aggression.

background

Armed acts of violence against the police and the civilian population by Albanian separatists began in Kosovo from the beginning of 1996, and on February 28, 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) proclaimed the beginning of an armed struggle for the independence of the region. In late February and early March 1998, in response to a series of attacks by KLA rebels on police officers in Kosovo, Yugoslav security forces attacked a number of villages near the village of Drenica in central Kosovo. During the operation, one of the leaders of the KLA, Adem Yashari, was killed, as well as 82 other local residents, including at least 24 women and children. This incident drew international attention to the conflict and became the reason for its internationalization.

Throughout 1998, NATO countries stepped up pressure on Belgrade to force it to cease hostilities in Kosovo and Metohija. On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199, calling on the parties to a ceasefire. On September 24, NATO began planning an air campaign against Yugoslavia to force Belgrade into peace. On October 13, the NATO Council gave the order to launch the operation within 96 hours. The Yugoslav authorities yielded, and on October 15, under the auspices of NATO, a truce was signed in Kosovo, which involved the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army units to their places of permanent deployment. The truce went into effect on 25 October. The NATO monitoring of the truce was carried out as part of Operation Eagle Eye. According to the Serbian side, during this operation, reconnaissance was carried out on the state and positions of the Yugoslav army.

However, the truce turned out to be ineffective, violence against the peaceful Serbian and Albanian population continued. In January 1999, the Yugoslav army and police resumed operations against the separatists.

The immediate reason for NATO intervention in the conflict was the incident in Racak, when 45 Albanians were killed during an attack on a village held by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Representatives of Western countries claimed that the Albanians were executed, representatives of the FRY - that they died in battle. On January 30, NATO threatened with air strikes on the territory of the FRY if its leadership continues to refuse negotiations with the Kosovo leaders.

Researchers widely note the coincidence of the beginning of the war with some domestic political events in the United States, in particular, the personal problems of President Clinton. In parallel with the preparations for the attack on Yugoslavia, Clinton was involved in the scandal with Monica Lewinsky. It is possible that the huge attention to this scandal served as a maneuver to distract the media from thorough coverage of the events of the NATO intervention. Even before the start of the war, it was argued that aggression was part of the strategy of the English. Wag the Dog, named after the then-popular movie The Tail Wags the Dog (released in 1997, before the NATO attack), according to the script of which the President of the United States (in the image of which it was easy to guess Clinton, although in the book on which it was filmed President looks more like George W. Bush) mimics a military rescue operation in Albania to divert attention from his sexual escapades ("tail wagging the dog" is an English idiom for small causes that lead to big consequences). While there is no evidence for this explanation for the attack on Yugoslavia, Glen Antizzo speaks of a "significant" amount of circumstantial evidence and mentions three other examples in which Clinton may have used American foreign policy and military power to solve personal problems:

in response to the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton orders a retaliatory attack on August 20, 1998, the same day Lewinsky is due to testify before a grand jury;

Operation Desert Fox is conducted by the President 16-20 December 1998, concurrent with impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives;

the Rambouillet negotiations (see below) begin on February 6, 1999, at the same time as the impeachment hearings in the US Senate.

In February, under the auspices of the Contact Group (NATO countries and Russia), negotiations were held between the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovo Albanians in the Rambouillet castle near Paris. The negotiations ended in vain. On March 18, the United States and Great Britain submitted a draft settlement for consideration, which provided for the complete political autonomy of the province, the entry of NATO troops into its territory and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army and Interior Ministry forces from there. In addition, a clause was included in the draft agreement on the approval of the final status of Kosovo after three years by the "will of the people", which was unacceptable for the Yugoslav delegation. Also, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces was regarded by the Serbs as the surrender of the region to the Albanians. The project was accepted by the Albanian side, but rejected by the Yugoslav and Russia. On March 23, the Yugoslav delegation agreed to accept the political part of the proposal, but refused to allow NATO troops to occupy Kosovo and Metohija. On the evening of the same day, NATO decided to launch a military operation to force Yugoslavia to accept the entire project.

The UN closely monitored the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, but no sanctions were issued in response to the intervention. The UN resolution, condemning NATO's actions as aggression, collected only three votes "for" (Russia, Namibia and China) in the UN Security Council. On the other hand, critics of the intervention believe that NATO's military actions against a sovereign country - Yugoslavia - without the sanction of the UN Security Council were a violation of the UN Charter and international law.

By the beginning of the NATO operation, the number of victims of the Kosovo war was estimated at 1,000 killed (until September 1998), and the number of refugees at 400,000 people, more than half of whom returned to their homes after October 1998. Human Rights Watch estimated the number of civilian refugees in the region at 230,000. The death toll in the Kosovo war between March and June 1999 is estimated at 10,000, most of them Kosovo Albanians killed by Yugoslav forces.

Operation goals

The well-known Russian Balkan historian E. Yu. Guskova names the following NATO goals in the war:

change of leadership in Serbia and Montenegro, reorientation to the West

the division of Serbia and Montenegro, the transformation of Kosovo into an independent state

liquidation of the armed forces of Yugoslavia

free deployment of NATO forces on the territory of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro

rallying NATO, testing its military power, testing new weapons and destroying old ones

demonstrating to Europe the importance of NATO, creating a precedent for the use of military force without the consent of the UN Security Council.

Side forces

NATO countries

Operation planning

Planning for an air military operation against Yugoslavia began in June 1998. Two main campaign options have been developed. The first plan consisted of a large-scale attack on the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was divided into three zones - Kosovo and Metohija and part of Central Serbia south of the 44th parallel, the territory south of the 44th parallel without Kosovo and Metohija, and the territory of Serbia north of the 44th parallel . The second plan envisaged attacks by limited forces on the territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija with a gradual expansion of the zone of the operation to the whole of Yugoslavia. The second option was taken as the basis for Operation Allied Force. The main goal of the plan was to force Slobodan Milosevic to surrender. According to the Yugoslav General Smilyanich, the main goal of the NATO plan was to destroy and demoralize the Yugoslav army and reduce its capabilities to a level that would not pose a threat to US interests.

The final plan of the operation consisted of three stages. At the first stage, 91 military facilities on the territory of Kosovo were subjected to rocket attacks and bombardment for two to three days, after which, according to the drafters of the plan, the Yugoslav leadership had to capitulate. If this did not happen, the list of targets of the second stage expanded to predominantly military facilities located south of the 44th parallel. At the third stage, bombing of targets north of the 44th parallel, including in Belgrade, was envisaged. In general, 430 aircraft were allocated for participation in the operation, of which 344 were combat, and about 450 cruise missiles.

NATO strategists had very detailed data on the state of the Yugoslav army and its weapons. In previous years, Yugoslavia, within the framework of the treaty on the control of the number of weapons in the region, regularly informed the OSCE, sending complete data on the size of the army, the deployment of all military installations. The FRY also received foreign military observers. In planning the operation, NATO Allies conducted Operation Eagle Eye, collecting data using UAVs and satellite imagery.

The overall command of all forces was carried out by the American General Clark, who headed the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

General organization of aviation forces

According to the attack model, all air forces were divided into several groups:

Striking forces consisting of fighters, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft, bombers and aircraft for strikes against air defense systems. On the day the operation began, there were 282 aircraft, later their number increased to 639 (an increase of 122%).

Forces for reconnaissance and electronic actions. At the beginning of the war, there were 66 aircraft (14% of the total), then their number increased to 84.

Forces of direct command. During the fighting, they increased from 20 (4.3% of the total) to 29 aircraft.

Forces of logistical support. On March 24, 62 aircraft were involved (13% of the total), at the end of the war there were already 252 aircraft.

The forces planned to be involved in the attack were deployed at 59 bases in 12 NATO countries. They were most numerous in Italy, where 279 aircraft were based before the start of the operation (59% of the total according to the plan). 225 of them were drums (61% of the total). Only at the Aviano air base there were 111 aircraft for various purposes. This number for 70 days of the war grew to 229 aircraft. After building up forces during the operation, 559 aircraft (53% of the total) were based at Italian airfields.

Carrier-based aviation was based on the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and the helicopter carrier USS Nassau, as well as the French aircraft carrier Foch, located along with escort ships in the Ionian and Adriatic seas. On the day of the attack, carrier-based aviation numbered about 100 aircraft. Since then, this number has risen slightly. NATO ships also carried about 250 cruise missiles.

By country, the number of aircraft involved was as follows at the beginning of April 1999: 250 aircraft from the USA, 40 from France, 16 each from Germany and the Netherlands, 10 from Belgium, 9 from Great Britain, 8 from Norway, 6 from Canada, 4 each from Turkey, Spain and Denmark, 3 - Portugal. In addition, 42 Italian aircraft were involved, and later the number of American aircraft increased to 480, British to 28, French to 81.

Engagement of ground forces

The plan of the operation excluded the use of ground forces. The tactical reason for this decision was the difficulty of logistical support for ground troops in adverse terrain. In addition, the conduct of ground combat meant the inevitability of military losses, which would make the operation unpopular in the US Congress and among other members of NATO, and ultimately could lead to a split among the members of the alliance.

Nevertheless, a significant number of NATO troops were located in the countries neighboring Yugoslavia. As part of Operation Allied Harbor, the purpose of which was to help the increasing flow of refugees from Kosovo, about 8,000 soldiers and officers arrived in Macedonia in April 1999. In Albania, with the same goals, there was a military contingent of 7,500, in addition to which, by the end of April, a group of 5,000 American soldiers and officers arrived, equipped with 30 tanks, 28 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 27 artillery pieces of various calibers, as well as 26 combat and 26 transport helicopters. In addition, there was a NATO stabilization contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, numbering 32,000 soldiers and officers, which was soon increased to 50,000.

In addition, already in the course of hostilities, a plan for operation "B-minus" was developed, which provided for the launch of a full-scale ground invasion in September 1999 in the event that the air campaign and the efforts of the Finnish-Russian group of mediators ended in failure. The basis of the grouping would be a mixed American contingent of heterogeneous units under the control of the headquarters of the 1st armored division.

The ground forces in Albania and Macedonia, creating a potential threat of invasion, had a serious chilling effect on the actions of the Yugoslav leadership, and after the end of the bombing, they were introduced into the territory of Kosovo and Metohija as the basis of the NATO peacekeeping contingent (KFOR).

Support from the countries of the region

Albania has made its territory and airspace available to NATO forces. In addition, AOK rebel training camps were located on its territory, and its army units participated in battles with Yugoslav forces in the border areas.

Bulgaria grants territory and airspace to NATO forces

Hungary gave NATO territory and airspace, but refused to send its soldiers to Kosovo and Metohija.

The ground forces of the NATO countries, equipped with armored vehicles, artillery and helicopters, are located on the territory of Macedonia.

Romania provided NATO forces with territory and airspace.

Withdrawal of support for NATO action

Austria refused NATO to provide its airspace for the bombing, as the operation was not authorized by the UN Security Council.

Switzerland imposed sanctions against NATO countries, limiting the supply of weapons to them.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Military establishment

By March 1999, the army of Yugoslavia (Serb. Voјska Yugoslavia) consisted of about 140,000 soldiers and officers. Of these, about 22,000 people were in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija as part of the 52nd Pristina Corps of the 3rd Army of the Ground Forces. The 15th, 211th and 252nd armored brigades, the 58th and 243rd mechanized brigade, the 37th, 78th, 125th and 549th motorized brigades, the 7th, 175th 1st and 354th infantry brigades. The forces of two brigades of central subordination were also involved in the region: the 63rd paratrooper and the 72nd special purpose. In addition to them, about 18,000 employees of the Yugoslav Ministry of Internal Affairs and a number of militias from local Serbs and Montenegrins participated in the battles with the Albanian separatists.

The army was armed with 1275 tanks, 825 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and 1400 artillery systems.

The radio engineering units, united in the 126th air surveillance, warning and guidance brigade, had 12 ground-based radars: 4 AN / TPS-70, as well as S-605/654 and P-18.

The FRY was preparing for the defense, relying on the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serb. Yugoslav Army). They consisted of the Ground Forces (Serb. Kopnen Voska), Air Force and Air Defense (Serb. RV and Air Defense) and the Navy (Serb. Ratna Mornaritsa). Despite the fact that the NATO countries planned to use mainly aviation in the upcoming hostilities, it was the Air Force and Air Defense of the FRY that were supposed to repel the attacks. This type of Yugoslav troops consisted of two units - the Aviation Corps and the Air Defense Corps. In addition, air defense forces were possessed by corps and brigades of the ground forces. The Yugoslav army inherited almost all weapons from the SFRY army. Aviation was obsolete, and due to economic sanctions and an arms embargo, there were not enough spare parts and fuel. Many aircraft have completely run out of resources. The Kub and S-125 air defense systems of the 1970s were in a similar condition. The MANPADS in service with the ground forces were relatively modern, but they could only hit enemy aircraft at altitudes up to 4000 meters.

Defense planning

The General Staff of the FRY, together with the command of the Air Force and Air Defense, developed a defense plan consisting of four points:

air defense operation. It was planned to be carried out with the involvement of 8 air inspection and warning units (2 platoons, 6 companies), 16 medium-range missile units (4 S-125 Neva and 12 Kub divisions), 15 Strela-2M short-range batteries and "Strela-1M", 23 air defense artillery batteries, 2 squadrons of MiG-21 fighters (30 aircraft) and 5 MiG-29. The air defense forces of the Third Army (5 Strela-2M and Strela-1M missile batteries and 8 air defense artillery batteries) also had to support the operation. The operation was to be led by the command of the Air Defense Corps from the 31st operational center of the air defense sector "Jarchujak" near Kralevo.

Defense of the regions of Belgrade, Novi Sad and the Podgorica-Boka region. For Belgrade and Novi Sad, 6 air inspection and warning units (2 companies, 4 platoons), 12 medium-range missile divisions (8 S-125 Neva and 4 Kub), 15 short-range batteries (Strela- 2M and Strela-1M), 7 air defense artillery batteries, a fighter squadron (15 MiG-21 and 4 MiG-29), as well as the air defense forces of the First Army of the Ground Forces. Command Center - 20th Operational Center of the Stari Banovtsi Air Defense Sector. To cover the Podgorica-Boka area, 3 air inspection and warning units (1 company and 2 platoons), 4 Kub batteries, Strela-2M batteries and 7 artillery batteries, as well as air defense forces of the Second Army of the Ground Forces and the Naval Fleet. The command center is the 58th operational center of the air defense sector at the Podgorica airfield.

Helicopter combat. However, due to the lack of such, after a few days, the units that carried out this operation were transferred to other areas.

Air support for the forces of the Third Army of the Ground Forces. It was supposed to be carried out by the Aviation Corps in cooperation with the headquarters of the Third Army.

Operation progress (March-June)

The formal reason for the start of hostilities (casus belli) was Serbia's failure to comply with NATO's demand to "withdraw Serbian troops from the Serbian Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija." During March, April, May, June 1999, NATO troops carried out military operations on the territory of Serbia. The main part of the military operation consisted in the use of aviation to bombard strategic military and civilian targets on the territory of Serbia. Air strikes were carried out on military strategic facilities in major cities of Yugoslavia, including the capital, Belgrade, as well as numerous civilian facilities, including residential ones. 14 countries took part in the operation, which had 1,200 aircraft at their disposal. The naval group consisted of 3 aircraft carriers, 6 attack submarines, 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 13 frigates, 4 large landing ships. The total human composition of the NATO forces involved in the operation exceeded 60 thousand people.

During the operation, over 78 days, NATO aircraft made 35,219 sorties, more than 23,000 bombs and missiles were dropped and fired. Including 218 sea-launched cruise missiles against 66 targets and 60 air-launched cruise missiles by the Americans, 20 by Britain from a submarine.

According to official NATO data, 90% of the airborne munitions fired were guided bombs and missiles, while 15% of the fired guided airmunitions failed due to technical reasons.

Operation name

The NATO operation, which began on March 24, 1999, was codenamed Allied Force. Some Russian sources claim that it was called "Decisive Force". In reality, such a name (Determined Force) was borne by a hypothetical (unrealized) operation that the NATO bloc was ready to carry out in the period from October 13, 1998 to March 23, 1999.

The participation of the US Armed Forces in the NATO operation was codenamed "Noble Anvil" (Noble Anvil). In Serbia (probably due to a reservation by Chinese President Jiang Zemin), the name "Merciful Angel" has become widespread.

The remains of the F-117, shot down by the Yugoslav air defense

Periodization of hostilities

According to Russian researchers from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, the NATO bombings were divided into three stages:

from 24 to 27 March. This stage was a classic operation to suppress air defense and establish air supremacy

from March 27 to April 24 - attacks on Yugoslav troops in Kosovo and Metohija and bombing of objects throughout Yugoslavia

from 24 April to 10 June. During this period, NATO forces stepped up large-scale bombing of Yugoslavia, as they did not expect the Yugoslav leadership to refuse a quick surrender.

March

March 24, 1999 - NATO Secretary General Javier Solana ordered the commander of NATO forces in Europe, US General Wesley Clark, to launch a military operation against Yugoslavia. In the evening of the same day, Belgrade, Pristina, Uzhice, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Pancevo, Podgorica and others were subjected to air strikes. Russian President Boris Yeltsin delivered an address to the world, in which he asked Clinton not to take this tragic, dramatic step. This is a war in Europe, and maybe more. Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was on his way to visit the United States, turned the plane over the Atlantic and urgently returned to Russia.

March 25 - NATO air strikes again. 18 Tomahawk missiles were fired from the American cruiser Gonzalez in the Adriatic Sea. Military-strategic facilities in Nis, a large industrial center, were subjected to pinpoint bombardment. On the first night of the war, five Yugoslav MiG-29 fighters flew to intercept NATO aircraft, two of which were shot down by American F-15s, and another, apparently, was shot down by “friendly fire” from Yugoslav air defenses.

March 26 - the fuel depot in Lipovice was destroyed, which caused a big fire in the Lipovac forest.

March 27 - Serbian air defense unit (Zoltan Dani, S-125) destroyed an American F-117 ("stealth aircraft"). Colonel Milivoje Novakovic reported that since the beginning of the war, 250-300 cruise missiles have been fired at 90 military and other facilities in Serbia and Montenegro. After the nighttime bombing of Belgrade, the smell of chemicals spread throughout the city. On this day, NATO used cluster bombs in the bombing of Belgrade.

March 28 - At night, Bill Clinton, after a meeting with the leaders of Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy, confirmed permission to intensify military strikes against Yugoslavia. NATO aircraft delivered pinpoint strikes on military-strategic facilities in the suburbs of Belgrade. In the south of Serbia, targets in the city of Cacak were also targeted.

April

April 3 - A NATO air strike on Belgrade destroys the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

April 5 - Bombing of Aleksinac. At least five people died, at least thirty were injured, and a number of buildings were destroyed in the city, including a charitable medical center. In addition, a number of districts of Belgrade, as well as its airport, were bombed. The monastery of Rakovica was also affected. Several businesses in Nis were bombed. In the village of Luciani at 2:30 a.m., a chemical plant was attacked. For the first time since the beginning of the operation, Raska was bombed, a relay tower on Mount Kopaonik and a bridge over the Ibar River were destroyed. In Pristina, at 23:15, another blow was struck at the Slatina airfield. Also during April 5, Novi Sad was exposed to air attacks. Gnilyane, Kosovska Mitrovica and Sombor. In Sombor, 10 kilometers from the city, a fuel terminal was destroyed.

April 6 - The bombing of Novi Sad continued, hitting an oil refinery, a school building and a kindergarten in the city itself, as well as a TV repeater on Fruska Gora. At 00:30, another blow was delivered to the Pristina airfield. Also on 6 April, Kraljevo, Pancevo, Kragujevac (a TV repeater on Crni Vrh mountain) and Uzhice were bombed.

April 7 - by decision of the government of the FRY and the government of the Federal Republic of Serbia, the forces of the Pristina Corps and the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs unilaterally ceased hostilities against Albanian terrorist groups. However, the Albanians continued to attack, and NATO aircraft operated on industrial and residential facilities in Cacak (chemical factory), Pristina (post office building and several residential buildings were destroyed), Panceva, Podgorica (airport), Sremska Mitrovica, Novi Sad, Sombor (fuel terminal), Niš (enterprises), Belgrade.

April 8 - NATO forces attacked Kraljevo, Sombor, Chupriya, Uzhice and Lucani (chemical factory). As a result of the strike on the ski resort of Zlatibor, three civilians were killed.

April 9 - Air strikes were carried out on Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kragujevac (Zastava plant and residential areas, 120 wounded), Smederev (oil storage), Valev, Panchev, Prizren, Korisa, Glogovac, Istok, Kosovska Mitrovica and Leposavić.

April 10 - The Crvena Zastava (Red Flag) automobile plant in Kragujevac was attacked. There was a bombardment of Pristina and the railway station in Kosovo Polka.

April 11 - Numerous air strikes on Pec, Djakovica, Istok and the Slatina airfield near Pristina.

April 12 - a NATO aircraft F-15E destroyed passenger train number 393, which was traveling from Nis through Vranje, Skopje to Athens and passing along the Grdelichka Klisura bridge (the pilot had an order to destroy the bridge). As a result, 9 bodies and fragments of four more were found, many are considered missing. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana justifies pilot error.

In Krushevets, air strikes on the 14 Oktobar metalworking plant and the city's thermal power plant. In Kraguevets, the automobile plant "Zastava" was damaged. In Pancevo, Novi Sad and Sombor, attacks on Naftagas warehouses and oil refineries. In Pristina, numerous strikes on the Slatina airfield.

April 14 - Yeltsin appoints Chernomyrdin as his special representative for Yugoslavia. NATO strikes at a convoy of Albanian refugees in Kosovo. 75 people died. Italian planes join direct bombardments (up to that time they performed only an auxiliary function).

April 19 - Among the night targets were: Obrenovac, the Prva Iskra factory in Baric, Novi Sad, Paracin, the bridge in Backka Palanka, Subotica and Kraljevo.

In the afternoon, air strikes continued on the territory of Kosovska Mitrovica, Pech, Podueva and the Slatina airfield.

April 20 - NATO aircraft targeted: a tobacco factory in Nis, the Krushik factory in Valjevo, a bridge near Donja Bistrica, the Yugoslavia satellite station near Ivanitsa was destroyed. Several explosions sounded near Kralevo, Pristina, Kurshumlia.

The information service of the Yugoslav Army Corps in Kragujevac reported that the air defense of the Yugoslav Army shot down two enemy planes, which most likely fell on the territory of Chumich-Rudnik-Topol.

April 21 - NATO aircraft hit the Ushche business center in New Belgrade at night. The building housed the television companies "BK", "Pink", "Koshava", SPS and two dozen offices of various companies.

In Novi Sad, two rockets were fired at the Zhezhelevo bridge over the Danube. During the night, near Djakovica, 10 people were killed and 16 injured by eight NATO missiles that hit a settlement of Serbian refugees from Croatia. Two people were injured in Valjevo at the Krušik factory.

April 22 - At about 4 am, NATO strikes at the personal residence of Milosevic and the headquarters of the Socialist Party of Serbia in Belgrade. There were no casualties. The building has been razed to the ground.

During the day, the bridge in Novi Sad was attacked, and the following night, the Pristina airfield Slatina.

April 23 - air strike on the Belgrade television center. 16 people were killed, 16 more were injured of varying severity.

In the newly shelled Kursumlie, the number of civilian deaths reached 17 people.

April 27 - in an air attack on Surdulica, the city suffered great material damage. 16 people died.

April 28 - The barracks of the Army of Yugoslavia were hit in Belgrade by NATO. Material damage was caused to the children's hospital and the maternity ward of the hospital "Dragisa Misovich", located in the immediate vicinity.

April 30 - NATO strikes the building of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army and the Ministry of Defense of Yugoslavia. Three were killed and about 40 wounded.

1 May - NATO aircraft bombed a Nish Express bus on a bridge near Pristina, killing 23 people. After the doctors arrived at the scene of the tragedy, a second blow was struck, as a result of which several doctors were injured.

May 2 - NATO strikes at the Nikola Tesla energy center in Obrenovac. Most cities in Yugoslavia were left without electricity for some time.

May 14 - Attack on the village of Korisha (near Prizren), inhabited by Albanians. According to Ilya Kramnik, a military observer for the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, 87 residents were killed and another 160 were injured. According to the Yugoslav White Paper, 48 people died and at least 60 were injured.

May 30 - On the Day of the Holy Trinity and a large weekly fair, at about one in the afternoon, four NATO military aircraft dropped bombs on the bridge in the city of Varvarin in two passes. As a result of the bombing, 10 civilians were killed, 47 were seriously injured.

June

June 1 - Novi Pazar is fired with twenty rockets. One of them ended up in a residential building. 13 people were killed (including a 2-year-old child), 23 were injured. During the bombing of Panchev, Colonel-General Lyubish Velichkovich died.

During the night, Belgrade and most of Vojvodina were left without electricity as a result of NATO bombs hit the trafo stations (transformer substation, in Serbian). Also affected were Smederevo (oil storage), Pancevo, Novi Sad, Mladenovac, Kikinda, Vranje (television repeater), Pristina (oil storage), villages on the Albanian-Serbian border near Prizren.

June 2 - attacks mainly hit television repeaters throughout Serbia (Kraljevo, Vranje, Yagodina, Kragujevac, Novi Sad, Pirot). Not far from Uzhice, the Ponikwe airfield was damaged, and oil depots were damaged twenty kilometers from Sombor. Also, NATO aircraft repeatedly bombed Kursumliya, Pristina, Prizren, Pec, Belgrade, Parachin.

NATO bombs damaged the road and railway bridges across the Jasenice River in the Velika Plana region, the Pharmakos factory in Prizren, TV repeaters near Pirot, Srbobran and Kopaonik.

June 11 (day) - June 12 (night) - the throw of Russian paratroopers to Pristina. Capture of the Slatina airfield.

Ground fighting in Kosovo during the bombing period

During March - June 1999, according to UNHCR, 848,100 Albanians left Kosovo, of which 444,600 people settled in Albania, and 244,500 people ended up in Macedonia. Thus, the KLA was able to recruit additional forces from among the Kosovo refugees in Albania. By the end of March 1999, the KLA managed to mobilize up to 20 thousand people from this contingent, arming them with Chinese-made small arms.

In early March 1999, Yugoslav forces launched an offensive and by early April of that year were able to capture most of the KLA's positions in Kosovo. However, the Yugoslav side failed to completely suppress the Albanian resistance: the KLA forces continued to wage a guerrilla war in some mountainous and forested regions of the region.

In addition, during the bombing period, skirmishes took place along the Albanian-Yugoslav border. In April 1999, the KLA took the Koshary border guard, but was stopped by Yugoslav units and foreign volunteers. Attempts to move deep into Kosovo, made in May of the same year with the support of NATO aircraft, were repulsed. In April 1999, Yugoslav forces entered the territory of Albania and occupied the village of Kamenitsa (near the town of Kukes).

Solemn passage of units of the Russian peacekeeping contingent KFOR in honor of the arrival of V.V. Putin at the Slatina airport in June 2001

Rush to Pristina by Russian paratroopers

On the night of June 12, 1999, paratroopers of the Russian peacekeeping forces, ahead of NATO troops, entered the territory of Yugoslavia. Marching from Bosnia and Herzegovina, they occupied the Slatina airfield near Pristina, and a few hours later units of other foreign armies also arrived there. Although the commander of NATO forces in Europe, American General Wesley Clark ordered British General Michael Jackson, who commanded the group in the Balkans, to seize the airfield before the Russians, the Briton replied that he was not going to start World War III.

Subsequently, the famous British singer James Blunt, who served in the NATO group in 1999, testified about the order of General Clark to recapture the airfield from the Russian paratroopers:

“About 200 Russians settled down at the airfield…. General Wesley Clark's direct order was to "suppress them". Clark used expressions that are unusual for us. For example - "destroy". There were political reasons for the capture of the airfield. But the practical consequence would be an attack on the Russians.”

In the course of an interview with the President of the Republic of Ingushetia, Yunus-bek Yevkurov (at the time of the events being covered, a GRU major), it became known that, starting from the end of May 1999, a group of 18 GRU fighters secretly entered the territory of the Slatina airport and actually controlled it until the landing battalion. All the circumstances of this operation are still classified.

results

Despite the difficult conditions in which the air forces of Yugoslavia had to operate and the enemy's total air superiority, during the NATO operation, the country's air forces continued to provide assistance to ground forces - for example, the 241st fighter-bomber squadron completed 15 aircraft from the airfields of Ladzhevtsi and Ponikve - sorties with air strikes on the bases and command posts of the KLA.

The bombing of chemical industry enterprises, water and electricity supply facilities almost led to an environmental disaster in Serbia.

Kosovo and Metohija under KFOR.

Most of the air strikes were directed at Pristina (374), Prizren (232), Belgrade (212), Uroševac (205), Djakovica (190), Kraljevo and Uzice (145 for each city), Novi Sad (114).

The American military base Camp Bondsteel was built on the territory of Kosovo. The number of the KFOR (NATO) contingent at the end of 2013 is 4,900 people.

British military historian John Keegan wrote: "The calendar now marks a new turning point: June 3, 1999, when the surrender of President Milosevic proved that the war could be won by air power alone."

Victims and losses

NATO

According to official NATO data, during the campaign, the alliance lost two servicemen dead (the crew of an American AH-64 helicopter that crashed during a training flight in Albania).

According to official information from the US Air Force, two American aircraft (F-16 and F-117) were shot down by Yugoslav air defense systems, both pilots were picked up by search and rescue services.

In addition, the US government officially acknowledged the loss of two Predator drones.

In 2003, American researcher Ralph Sanders reported that 22 NATO drones were lost during the conflict.

US Navy officer R. Dixon in his study mentions that in the period after March 1999, 24 NATO unmanned vehicles were lost here (including 4 Predators, 4 Hunters, 4 Pioneers, 6 German CL-289 , one French CL-289, two French "Crecerelle", two British "Phoenix").

According to Russian researchers, NATO has acknowledged the loss of 47 UAVs.

According to official Yugoslav data, announced in connection with the celebration of the Day of the Yugoslav Army on June 16, 1999, by the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Dragoljub Oydanich, during the war, NATO losses amounted to 61 aircraft and 7 helicopters.

In December 2000, the Russian newspaper NVO, citing unidentified Yugoslav sources, reported that NATO had lost 31 aircraft and 6 helicopters.

In early 2001, the head of the TsAGI ONTI military aircraft sector, V. Ilyin, cited both the old data of 1999 (61 aircraft and 7 helicopters) and the “verified and updated data” of the Yugoslav Ministry of Defense for 2000 (31 aircraft and 6 helicopters).

In March 2008, the Serbian Ministry of Defense reported updated data on NATO losses, according to which two aircraft, at least 9 UAVs and 45 NATO cruise missiles were destroyed during the operation, and another 38 air targets were damaged. In the open press, the information was published by the Serbian newspaper Politika in the article "Milošević nije dozvolio napade na NATO", dedicated to the 9th anniversary of the start of the NATO military operation against Yugoslavia.

Within two years after the end of the bombing, it became known about the death from cancer of 18 NATO soldiers who served in Yugoslavia.

The captured engine of the A-10 attack aircraft, torn off from the aircraft, was also shown (the footage was also broadcast on Russian television). This fact suggests that the attack aircraft was either able to crash-land outside the territory of the SFRY, or crashed abroad, although the latter is far from necessary for an attack aircraft. The available cases of destruction of the A-10 MANPADS caused incomparably less damage and were characterized as damage, but not losses.

A large amount was the cost of the operation itself. For example, the United States alone spent $1.7 billion on it.

Losses of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the FRY

According to Slobodan Milosevic, 462 Yugoslav military personnel and 114 policemen were killed during the conflict.

NATO estimates that more than 5,000 Yugoslav military personnel were killed.

According to the former commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, General Spasoe Smilyanich, 249 servicemen and 22 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs died directly from the actions of NATO aviation.

After the war, losses of 1,002 people were announced, including 324 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Most died in battles with Albanian militants.

According to the first estimates of the US Department of Defense, the Army of Yugoslavia lost 120 tanks, 220 other armored vehicles and 450 artillery pieces.

Estimates by the SHAPE European Command on September 11, 1999 were slightly less optimistic - 93 tanks destroyed, 153 various armored vehicles and 389 artillery pieces.

The American weekly Newsweek published a refutation with detailed clarifications after the US military's claims of success. As a result, it turned out that the losses of the army of Yugoslavia in NATO were in some cases overestimated dozens of times.

A special American commission (Allied Force Munitions Assessment Team), sent to Kosovo in 2000, found the following destroyed Yugoslav equipment there: 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers and 20 artillery pieces and mortars.

Yugoslav military aviation took a minimal part in repelling NATO raids, having completed only 11 sorties in 11 weeks of the war to intercept enemy aircraft, but suffered significant losses - according to Yugoslav and Russian researchers, the Yugoslav Air Force lost 6 aircraft in the air, about 70 more aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Two-thirds (11 out of 16 aircraft) of the most modern MiG-29 fighters and half of the old MiG-21 fighters (33 out of 60 aircraft) were lost; due to high losses after the war, one of the two fighter regiments that were part of the Yugoslav Air Force was disbanded.

Civilian casualties

The number of terrorist attacks - 4354 (the Yugoslav army has already left the region). Of these: 4121 for Serbs and Montenegrins, 96 for Albanians loyal to the Serbs, 137 for Gypsies, Turks, etc.

The number of missing people is 821, of which 757 are Serbs, 37 Albanians, 27 other nationalities.

The number of people killed is 910, of which 811 Serbs, 71 Albanians, 28 other nationalities.

802 people were injured. Accordingly, 751 Serbs, 20 Albanians, 31 others.

According to the authorities of the FRY, from March 24 to June 10, 1999, the total number of civilian deaths was over 1,700 people, including almost 400 children, and about 10,000 were seriously injured. About 1 million people were left without water, 500 thousand people were left without work, thousands - without a roof over their heads. According to the UN, 821 people went missing, most of them Serbs. Operation Allied Force claimed the lives of people and after its completion, NATO used radioactive depleted uranium in ammunition.

NATO used cluster bombs.

According to General Spasoye Smilyanich, about 500 civilians were killed and more than 900 were wounded during the war. 88 children were killed by NATO aviation. The identity of 22 of them was not established by the experts. Three unborn children died in the wombs of their mothers.

The human rights organization Human Rights Watch counted 90 incidents, in which a total of 489 to 528 civilians died. Excess deaths as a result of deteriorating living conditions cannot be estimated.

The main victims of the bombing were civilians. As Jiří Dienstbier, the UN Special Representative for Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, recently acknowledged, NATO's Balkan operation resulted in more civilian casualties than the Kosovo conflict itself, for which it was allegedly undertaken.

RIA Novosti Agency, 21.07.99

“Our country was bombed by NATO with the aim of its total destruction, in order, as they put it, to “return it to the stone age.” At the same time, only civilian objects fell into the scope. The NATO ground army was not ready for an open clash with the army of the FRY, which at that time was still a serious force. Instead, Serbia was bombed for twenty-four hours a day. And so 78 days.

Slobodan Samardzhia, editor, from an interview with InoSMI

On January 27, 2004, the District Court of The Hague began preliminary hearings on the claim of the victims of the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

According to Patrick Buchanan,

“The Founding Fathers would have been ashamed of the actions that Clinton and Albright allowed themselves against the Serbs. This state did not attack the United States, did not threaten us in any way, did not try to draw us into military rivalry. Nevertheless, we bombarded Serbian cities, making the Serbs remember the Nazi occupation, only because they refused to provide freedom of movement on their territory to the separatists from Kosovo.

Damage to the Yugoslav economy, social infrastructure and ecology

The total damage inflicted on Yugoslavia is estimated at $1 billion. Serbian sources estimate the damage at $29.6 billion, the largest share of which, $23.25 billion, was lost gross domestic product. An estimate was also published - about 30 billion.

The NATO bombings were aimed, among other things, at the destruction of important civilian infrastructure. They damaged many commercial facilities. By June 2, more than 50 bridges, two oil refineries, 57% of all oil storage facilities, 14 large industrial facilities, and 9 large power generation units were damaged. The Yugoslav side tried to minimize losses. For example, 9 civilian airliners of the Yugoslav company JAT were evacuated to Romanian Bucharest after the start of the bombing.

During the bombing, 89 factories and plants, 128 other industrial and service facilities, 120 energy facilities, 14 airfields, 48 ​​hospitals and hospitals, 118 radio and TV repeaters, 82 bridges, 61 road junctions and tunnels, 25 post and telegraph offices, 70 schools, 18 kindergartens, 9 buildings of university faculties and 4 dormitories, 35 churches, 29 monasteries. In total, 1,991 attacks were made on industrial facilities and social infrastructure. The bombings left about 500,000 people in Yugoslavia unemployed.

Bombardment of chemical facilities

The most tangible consequences were caused by NATO strikes on the industrial complex in Panchevo: a nitrogen plant, an oil refinery and a petrochemical complex. Poisonous chemicals and compounds entered the atmosphere, water and soil, posing a threat to human health and ecological systems throughout the Balkans. At the time of the bombing, the tanks of the petrochemical plant contained significant amounts of vinyl chloride monomers, chlorine, ethylene dichloride, 40% sodium hydroxide and 33% hydrochloric acid.

As a result of NATO actions, the air was poisoned by toxic fumes from burning oil plants, the Danube and other rivers were poisoned with oil from tanks blown up by bombs, Lake Skadar and other lakes and the Adriatic Sea were polluted.

NATO bombing attacks on chemical industries have become a precedent in history. In this regard, the Minister of Health of the Republic of Serbia, Leposava Milicevic, stated: “Even Adolf Hitler did not bomb our chemical plants! NATO is doing it calmly, destroying rivers, poisoning the air, killing people, the country. A brutal experiment is being carried out on our people using the latest weapons.”

Nuclear pollution

NATO military forces used depleted uranium ammunition against targets in Yugoslavia. According to the officials of Yugoslavia, the European Union and the UN, as well as a number of experts and human rights activists, during the hostilities there was a radioactive contamination of the area, which led to the death of people, an outbreak of cancer and hereditary diseases. According to experts, most of the water in Kosovo after the bombings is not suitable for drinking. In many areas of Serbia where the bombings were carried out, the number of people with cancer has increased.

Yugoslavia's request for admission to the union of Russia and Belarus

On April 12, 1999, the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, attacked by NATO troops, voted in favor of joining the republic to the union of Russia and Belarus.

The Russian parliament at an emergency meeting fully supported its Serbian counterparts, recommending that President Boris Yeltsin and the government begin preparations for this process immediately. Yeltsin blocked this process. Nor had any consequences the adoption by the Duma of the recommendation to immediately send military advisers and equipment to the territory of Yugoslavia (this step would have violated the UN embargo on the supply of arms to Yugoslavia).

(Operation Allied Force) - the air force operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bloc against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from March 24 to June 10, 1999. The American campaign under the operation was codenamed "Noble Anvil" (Noble Anvil). In some sources it appears under the name "Merciful Angel".

The reason for the international intervention was the inter-ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs who historically lived in Kosovo. On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council approved Resolution No. 1199, which demanded that the authorities of the FRY and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians ensure a ceasefire in Kosovo and begin negotiations without delay.

The situation escalated especially strongly after the incident in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, when there was a major armed clash between representatives of the Yugoslav security forces and militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Negotiations held in February-March 1999 in Rambouillet and Paris (France). The parties failed to reach an agreement, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic refused to sign military annexes to the agreement on the settlement of the crisis.

On March 24, 1999, without the sanction of the UN Security Council, the NATO alliance on the territory of the FRY. The decision to launch the operation was made by Javier Solana, then NATO Secretary General.

The official reason for the start of hostilities was the presence of Serbian troops in the territory of the province of Kosovo and Metohija. Serbian authorities have also been accused of ethnic cleansing.

In the first month of Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft made an average of about 350 sorties daily. At the NATO summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, the leaders of the alliance decided to intensify the air campaign.

In total, during the operation, NATO forces, according to various sources, made from 37.5 to 38.4 thousand sorties, during which more than 900 targets were attacked on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, more than 21 thousand tons of explosives were dropped.

Prohibited types of munitions with radioactive impurities, mainly depleted uranium (U 238), were used in the airstrikes.

Shortly after the start of military aggression, the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia voted in favor of joining the union of Russia and Belarus. Russian President Boris Yeltsin blocked this process, since such a decision could give rise to a number of international difficulties.

The bombing ceased on June 9, 1999, after representatives of the FRY army and NATO in the Macedonian city of Kumanovo signed a military-technical agreement on the withdrawal of troops and police of Federal Yugoslavia from the territory of Kosovo and on the deployment of international armed forces on the territory of the region.

The number of military and civilians who died during the operation has not yet been precisely established. According to Serbian authorities, about 2.5 thousand people died during the bombing, including 89 children. 12.5 thousand people were injured.

The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has confirmed 90 incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing.

According to the organization, between 489 and 528 civilians were killed during Operation Allied Force.

More than 60% of the lives of the civilian population were claimed by 12 military incidents, among them an air strike on a convoy of Albanian refugees from Gjakovica (April 14), during which 70 to 75 people were killed, more than 100 were injured; a raid on the cities of Surdulitsa (April 27) and Nis (May 7), an attack on a bus on a bridge near Pristina (May 1), an attack on the Albanian village of Korisha (May 14), during which, according to various sources, from 48 to 87 people died civilians.

According to official NATO data, during the campaign, the alliance lost two servicemen (the crew of an American An 64 helicopter that crashed during a training flight in Albania).

About 863 thousand people, primarily Serbs living in Kosovo, voluntarily left the region, another 590 thousand became internally displaced persons.

The final amount of damage that was inflicted on the industrial, transport and civilian facilities of the FRY was not named. According to various estimates, it was measured in the amount of 30 to 100 billion dollars. About 200 industrial enterprises, oil storage facilities, energy facilities, infrastructure facilities, including 82 railway and road bridges, were destroyed or seriously damaged. At least 100 monuments of history and architecture, which were under the protection of the state and under the protection of UNESCO, were damaged.

On June 10, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1244, according to which an international civilian security presence was established in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The document also mandated the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces of the FRY, the free return of refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to the territory of organizations providing humanitarian assistance, as well as the expansion of the degree of self-government for Kosovo.

On June 12, 1999, the first units of the international forces led by NATO - KFOR (Kosovo Force, KFOR) entered the region. Initially, the number of KFOR was about 50 thousand people. At the beginning of 2002, the contingent of peacekeepers was reduced to 39,000, by the end of 2003 to 17,500 servicemen.

As of the beginning of December 2013, the strength of the unit was about 4.9 thousand soldiers from more than 30 countries.

An independent commission to investigate the war crimes of NATO leaders against Yugoslavia, set up on August 6, 1999 at the initiative of Swedish Prime Minister Hans Göran Persson, concluded that NATO's military intervention was illegal, since the alliance had not received prior approval from the UN Security Council. However, the actions of the allies were justified by the fact that all diplomatic means of resolving the conflict had been exhausted.

The commission criticized the use of cluster bombs by NATO aircraft, as well as the bombing of chemical industrial complexes and oil refineries on the territory of the FRY, which caused significant environmental damage.

In March 2002, the UN confirmed the radioactive contamination in Kosovo as a result of NATO bombing.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

On March 24, 1999, NATO troops, without the permission of the UN Security Council, began to bomb Yugoslavia, until June 11, when Russian paratroopers entered Kosovo. According to official figures, thousands of civilians were killed. During this war, Kosovo passed to NATO forces, which in turn gave it to the Kosovo Albanians under control.

During the civil war, four of the six union republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) seceded from Greater Yugoslavia at the end of the 20th century. At the same time, UN peacekeeping forces under the leadership of the United States were introduced into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then the autonomous province of Kosovo. Meanwhile, the country turned into Lesser Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). After holding a referendum on independence in Montenegro, the last remnants of the former federation went down in history, Serbia and Montenegro also became independent states.

The reasons underlying the Balkan crisis lie not only in politics, it is a whole tangle of political, economic, national factors, reinforced and exacerbated by powerful pressure from outside, from the United States and a number of European countries interested in the territorial redistribution.

A tasty morsel for the West was the copper industry of Yugoslavia. Perhaps that is why NATO aircraft did not bomb the enterprises of this complex. In addition, Kosovo has Europe's largest unexploited hard coal reserves. Another important reason could be the destruction of the Yugoslav military-industrial complex, which sold cheap weapons to Africa, North Korea and the Persian Gulf countries. Another reason is the elimination of the Yugoslav tobacco industry as a serious competitor to US factories in Eastern Europe.

In the spring of 1998, a new socialist president was elected in Albania. Fatos Nano, who replaced Sali Berishu, a supporter of the idea of ​​"Great Albania". In this regard, the prospect of resolving the Kosovo problem has become more realistic. However, bloody clashes between the so-called "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA) and government forces continued until autumn, and only in early September Milosevic spoke in favor of the possibility of granting self-government to the province (by this time, the armed formations of the KLA had been pushed back to the Albanian border). Another crisis erupted in connection with the disclosure of the murder of 45 Albanians in the village of Racak, attributed to the Serbs. The threat of NATO air strikes hung over Belgrade. By the autumn of 1998, the number of refugees from Kosovo exceeded 200 thousand people.

The pretext for war against Yugoslavia turned out to be far-fetched. Finnish scientists who studied the incident stated in an official report that there was no massacre in the village of Racak in Southern Serbia on January 15, 1999!

At this time, anti-Serb propaganda reached its climax. It was said, for example, that the Serbs came up with a sophisticated method of reprisal against the Albanians: they opened gas in the basement of residential buildings, put a candle in the attic, and then they had enough time to leave the houses before the explosion. However, quite soon this type of assassination disappeared from official NATO documents. Apparently, they realized that the gas is heavier than air and could not have reached the attic.

Further, the controlled media began to spin another myth, that the Serbs allegedly set up a real concentration camp for thousands of Albanians at the stadium in Pristina. German Minister of Defense Rudolf Sharping with horror in his eyes, he told me that real fascist methods were being used there, that teachers were being shot in front of children. Surveys of people living nearby showed that the stadium was empty, except for the fact that it was sometimes used as an airfield. But NATO bombed him anyway, just in case, "forgetting" about the prisoners.

In 1992 an American journalist Peter Brock processed 1,500 articles from newspapers and magazines published by various news agencies in the West, and came to the conclusion that the ratio of publications against the Serbs and in their favor is 40:1.

"It was confirmed that they intended to use force. This was confirmed Al Gore(former Vice President of the United States - approx. Vesti.Ru) during a conversation with me. The conversation took place from the aircraft. I was two and a half hours from US territory, invited the aircraft commander and told him to turn around. Then I called the President Boris Yeltsin and said he made the decision. He asked if there was enough fuel to fly to Moscow," says Evgeny Primakov, then prime minister of the Russian Federation.

Why didn't the US wait for Security Council approval? Russia and China, which have veto power in the Security Council, spoke out against NATO attacks. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright knew that the council would not authorize air strikes.

If we look at the last four resolutions of the UN Security Council regarding the Kosovo problem, the point remains unchanged in them, which postulates the commitment of all UN member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In this context, it doesn't even matter that NATO's actions violate its own regulations and treaty relations with other countries. There is a fact of violation of the foundations of international law, that is, the world will no longer have a global body capable of resolving international conflicts. The UN will cease to perform its functions. Which was later proven.

"I had a very tough conversation with Milosevic. And he made concessions. He said that he guaranteed the return of Albanian refugees to Kosovo, that he wanted to start negotiations with the Albanian leaders. But the only thing he refused to do was withdraw the special forces. He said that then the genocide against the Serbs will begin,” continues Yevgeny Primakov.

"When you talk with the official representative of Germany, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, it turns out that they are categorically against this violence. But the right of consensus, the right of one state to disrupt this operation, was not used," explains Leonid Ivashov, in 1996-2001 - Head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

It is impossible to ignore the so-called agreements signed in Rambouillet (France). The history of this signing is one of the strangest. As is known, the contact group on Kosovo worked together with the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians and representatives of Federal Yugoslavia to work out these decisions. Russia was also involved in the discussion of the agreements. Initially, it was only about a political memorandum, which declared ways to give Kosovo certain freedoms in relation to autonomy, but within the framework of Yugoslavia. When many of the points of this small document were settled, multi-page appendices appeared concerning military and police issues.

It was in them that the entry of peacekeeping forces into Kosovo was fixed. Russia was categorically against linking political and military documents in a single package. The Delegation of Yugoslavia was also outraged by this approach to negotiations. There was a feeling that steps were taken to put forward obviously unacceptable conditions to Yugoslavia and to disrupt the signing. And so it happened. The Yugoslav delegation left Rambouillet, after which the Kosovar Albanian delegation defiantly signed the entire package.

On March 24, 1999, NATO aircraft began bombing the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. First missile strikes against the command of the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana were inflicted around 20.00 local time (22.00 Moscow time) on the radar installations of the army of Yugoslavia, located on the Montenegrin coast of the Adriatic Sea. At the same time, a military airfield a few kilometers from Belgrade and large industrial facilities in the city of Pancevo, located less than twenty kilometers from the capital of the republic, were subjected to rocket attacks. Martial law was declared in most major cities in Serbia and Montenegro for the first time since World War II.

The military operation against Yugoslavia, which lasted 78 days, involved 19 NATO countries in one form or another. The North Atlantic Alliance decided to start aggression after failed negotiations with the leadership of the FRY on the problem of Kosovo and Metohija in the French city of Rambouillet and Paris in February and March 1999. The bombing ceased on June 9, 1999, after representatives of the FRY army and NATO in the Macedonian city of Kumanovo signed a military-technical agreement on the withdrawal of troops and police of Federal Yugoslavia from the territory of Kosovo and on the deployment of international armed forces on the territory of the region. A day later, the UN Security Council adopted a corresponding resolution on this issue under the number 1244.

The damage that was inflicted on the industrial, transport and civilian facilities of the FRY as a result of almost three months of bombing, according to various estimates, is measured in the amount of 60 to 100 billion dollars. The number of dead military and civilians has not yet been precisely established. It ranges from 1200 to 2500 people.

"Only 800 children were killed. They bombed not only bridges, industrial enterprises, but also railway stations, hospitals, kindergartens, temples built in the Middle Ages," he claims Borislav Milosevi h, in 1998 - 2001 Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the Russian Federation.

"From March 23 to March 24, I was in Serbia, the roar of planes was heard over my head. But even at that moment I thought that they would fly to the border and turn back. Normal human logic did not give me the opportunity to realize the full scale of the lawlessness and evil that had occurred," - remembers Alexander Kravchenko, in 1999 he headed the domestic Union of Volunteers of the Republic of Srpska.

On the bombs of the British planes, the inscriptions were visible: "Happy Easter", "We hope you like it", "Do you still want to be a Serb?"

During this aggression, 35,000 sorties were made, in which about 1,000 aircraft and helicopters were involved, 79,000 tons of explosives were dropped (including 156 containers with 37,440 cluster bombs prohibited by international law).

"As a rule, journalists who had already been in various hot spots worked there. We did not know what would happen next. It seemed to us that the whole of Yugoslavia would turn into ruins. We went to film bridges, orphanages ... Despite the information that" leaked "The Americans, their" point "weapons made serious mistakes. Let's remember the Chinese embassy in which people died," says Andrey Baturin, in 1999, special correspondent for TSN in Yugoslavia.

In February 2008, the Serbian province of Kosovo, with the support of the United States, declared independence, and most Western countries recognize this independence. Under the same far-fetched reasons that accompanied decades of interference in the life of Yugoslavia.

“I would like to think that under the current conditions, the northern part of Kosovo with the Serbian population will be annexed to Serbia. Maybe things will come to this someday,” Yevgeny Primakov believes. same, but stabilization of the situation will be difficult. There will be floating stability."

With the same "success" today they are planting "democracy" in Iraq and Afghanistan. The scenarios for the development of events in Ukraine and Georgia are extremely similar to the Yugoslav scenario. Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic died in The Hague prison, according to doctors - from a heart attack.

On the other hand, the United States and the European Union can say that their aggression against the Serbs was justified and NATO bombings will have a chance to go down in history with a "plus" sign, because there was a "struggle for peace."

Nobel Peace Prize to be awarded to Special Envoy for the Kosovo Conflict Marty Ahtisaari with the wording "for those efforts in resolving international conflicts that he has made for three decades."