Labor mobilization has become another form of attracting citizens to socially productive work. Its implementation was regulated by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942 “On the mobilization of the able-bodied urban population for wartime to work in production and construction”, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 “On the procedure mobilization of cities for agricultural work of the able-bodied population and rural areas” and other acts.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 13, 1942, it was recognized as necessary to mobilize the able-bodied urban population for the wartime period to work in production and construction. Men aged 16 to 55 were subject to mobilization, and women aged 16 to 45, who did not work in state institutions and enterprises. From mobilization, male and female persons aged 16 to 18 were exempted, who were subject to conscription to factory training schools, vocational and railway schools, according to the contingents established by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as women who had infants or children under the age of 8 years, in the absence of other family members providing care for them; students of higher and secondary educational institutions.

The workers and employees of the military industry, workers and employees of the railway transport, working near the front, were declared mobilized. Citizens were sent to agricultural work. During the four years of the war, urban residents worked 1 billion workdays in agriculture. This allows us to say that the practical significance of labor mobilization was enormous. Minors and disabled people of the III group were involved in labor. As one of the features of wartime, one can note the use of the labor of military personnel in industrial enterprises, in transport, and even in agriculture. Transfers of employees to work at other enterprises and in other localities were also widely practiced. During the war years, an additional system for the training and retraining of personnel was carried out. The age of male youth called up to FZO schools was lowered, they were allowed to accept girls aged 16-18.

The term of study in FZO schools was reduced to 3-4 months. Bakhov A.S. Book. 3. Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p. Labor law in wartime is characterized by a number of new provisions: wages in workdays of workers and employees seconded to collective farms in the order of labor mobilization; variety of types of bonuses, guarantee and compensation payments for various reasons (evacuation, assignment to agricultural work, provision of retraining, etc.). In wartime, the institution of labor discipline also develops, the responsibility of workers for violating order in production and the severity of penalties increases. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 26, 1941 "On the responsibility of workers and employees of enterprises of the military industry for unauthorized departure from enterprises" decided:

• 1. All male and female workers and employees of military industry enterprises (aviation, tank, armaments, ammunition, military shipbuilding, military chemistry), including evacuated enterprises, as well as enterprises of other industries serving the military industry on the principle of cooperation, count for a while war mobilized and assigned for permanent work to those enterprises in which they work.
• 2. Unauthorized departure of workers and employees from the enterprises of these industries, including those evacuated, shall be considered as desertion and persons guilty of unauthorized departure (desertion) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of 5 to 8 years.
• 3. Establish that cases of persons guilty of unauthorized departure (desertion) from the enterprises of these industries are considered by a military tribunal. Strengthening labor discipline and improving the organization of labor is also taking place in the collective farms. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 13, 1942 increases the minimum workdays for able-bodied collective farmers and collective farmers.

In addition to establishing a general annual minimum, periods of agricultural work are also established. If the collective farmers did not work out the mandatory minimum of workdays during the year, then they dropped out of the collective farm, were deprived of the rights of collective farmers and household plots. Collective farmers who did not work out the mandatory minimum of workdays for periods of agricultural work without good reason were subject to criminal liability and were subjected to corrective labor work on the collective farm for a period of up to 6 months with a deduction of up to 25% of workdays from payment in favor of the collective farm.

However, such harsh measures were applied quite rarely, since most of the collective farmers worked selflessly for the good of the Fatherland. Despite all the severity of wartime, the party and the government nevertheless showed great concern for improving the wages of collective farmers and increasing their material interest in its results. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated May 9, 1942, collective farms were recommended, starting from 1942, to introduce additional payment in kind or money for MTS tractor drivers, foremen of tractor teams and some other categories of machine operators.

An additional form of encouraging the work of collective farmers was also provided for in the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, establishing bonuses for collective farmers for overfulfilling production products, etc. During the Great Patriotic War, the primary task of Soviet finance was the constant financing of military spending, as well as the technical equipment of the army. During the war, a significant reduction in the cost of industrial production was achieved - by 5 billion rubles. or 17.2%. Tamarchenko M.L. Soviet finance during the Great Patriotic War. Moscow: Finance, 1967, p. 69.

Prices for the defense industry fell especially sharply. This provided an even greater reduction in prices for ammunition, equipment and weapons. The production of consumer goods expanded. All this together allowed the state budget revenues from socialist enterprises to increase. The structure of budget expenditures during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945) was characterized by the following data: Finances of the USSR, 1956, No. 5, p. 24

The country's regular budget revenues were sharply reduced due to the fall in civilian production and the enemy's occupation of part of the country's territory. In connection with this, extraordinary financial measures were taken, which provided additional revenues to the budget in the amount of about 40 billion rubles. Prior to this, funds came from taxes on turnover, deductions from profits, income tax from cooperation and collective farms, and regular tax payments from the population (agricultural and income).

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 3, 1941 introduced a temporary surcharge to agricultural and income taxes from the population. Its collection was discontinued due to the introduction of a special military tax from January 1, 1942. Bakhov A.S. Book. 3. Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p. Vedomosti Verkhov. Council of the USSR, 1942, No. 2

The authorities expanded the circle of taxpayers and raised taxes for industrial enterprises. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 10, 1942 determined the list of local taxes and fees, fixed rates and terms for tax collection, as well as the rights of local Soviets in the field of granting benefits. Vedomosti Verkhov. Council of the USSR, 1942, No. 13

As for financing during the war years, it can be noted that state loans were a major source of financing. It is also worth noting the dedication and patriotism of Soviet citizens. The population willingly participated in financing the needs of the front. Soviet citizens donated about 1.6 billion rubles, a lot of jewelry, agricultural products, government bonds to the defense fund and to the Red Army fund. An important form of accumulating funds and improving the supply of food to the population was the organization of commercial trade at higher prices while maintaining a rationed supply of food as the main form of providing workers at that time. Bakhov A.S. Book. 3. Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p.

The advantages of the socialist economy in the field of finance were clearly manifested in the fact that, even under conditions of extremely difficult wartime, the main and decisive source of budget revenues continued to be the accumulations of the socialist economy, and above all the turnover tax and deductions from profits. The cessation in 1944 of the issue of money to cover the budget deficit strengthened money circulation. Solid finances during the war years were one of the important prerequisites for the victory of the Soviet Union over the Nazi invaders. Bakhov A.S. Book. 3. Soviet state and law on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War (1936-1945) / A.S. Bakhov - M.: Nauka, 1985 - 358 p.

By the end of 1941, more than 800,000 Soviet Germans had been resettled in Siberia and Kazakhstan from the European part of the USSR. All of them eked out a miserable existence and were on the verge of life and death. Despair could push them to any step. According to the central leadership of the NKVD, based on reports from the field, the situation with the German settlers reached such a degree of acuteness and tension, became so explosive that it was impossible to save the situation with ordinary preventive arrests, radical measures were necessary. Such a measure was the conscription of the entire able-bodied German population into the so-called "Labor Army". The mobilization of the Soviet Germans on the "labor front" solved two problems at once. Social tension was eliminated in the places of accumulation of deported Germans and the contingent of the forced labor system was replenished.

The very term "Labour Army" was borrowed from the labor armies that really existed during the Civil War ("revolutionary armies of labor"). It is not found in any official document of the war years, official correspondence, reports of state and economic bodies. Those who were mobilized and called by the military commissariats to perform forced labor service as part of work detachments and columns with a strict centralized army structure began to call themselves Labor Army men, who lived in the barracks at the NKVD camps or at enterprises and construction sites of other people's commissariats in fenced and guarded "zones with military internal regulations. Calling themselves Labor Army members, these people, thereby, wanted to somehow improve their social status, which was lowered by the official authorities to the level of prisoners.

The “Trudarmia” was recruited primarily from representatives of the “guilty” peoples, that is, Soviet citizens ethnically related to the population of the countries at war with the USSR: Germans, Finns, Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians, although some other peoples were also represented in it. However, if the Germans ended up in Trudarmia already from the end of 1941 - the beginning of 1942, then work detachments and columns of citizens of other nationalities noted above began to form only at the end of 1942.

Several stages can be distinguished in the history of the existence of the "Labor Army" (1941-1946). The first stage - from September 1941 to January 1942. The process of creating labor army formations was initiated by the closed resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 31, 1941 “On the Germans living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR”. On its basis, labor mobilization of German men aged 16 to 60 takes place in Ukraine. It has already been noted that due to the rapid advance of the German troops, this decision was largely not implemented, however, it was still possible to form 13 construction battalions, with a total number of 18,600 people. At the same time, in September, the recall of German servicemen from the Red Army begins, from which construction battalions are also formed. All these construction battalions are sent to 4 NKVD facilities: Ivdellag, Solikambumstroy, Kimpersailag and Bogoslovstroy. Since the end of September, the first of the formed battalions have already started work.

Soon, by decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the construction battalions were disbanded, and the military personnel were removed from the quartermaster supply and received the status of construction workers. Of these, work columns of 1 thousand people each are created. Several columns were united into working detachments. This position of the Germans was short-lived. Already in November, they were again transferred to the barracks and subject to military regulations.

As of January 1, 1942, 20,800 mobilized Germans were working on construction sites and in the camps of the NKVD. Several thousand more Germans worked in work columns and detachments attached to other people's commissariats. Thus, from the very beginning, according to departmental affiliation, the Labor Army work columns and detachments were divided into two types. Formations of one type were created and placed at the camps and construction sites of the GULAG of the NKVD, obeyed the camp authorities, were guarded and provided according to the standards established for prisoners. Formations of a different type were formed under civilian people's commissariats and departments, obeyed their leadership, but were controlled by local bodies of the NKVD. The administrative regime for the maintenance of these formations was somewhat less strict than the columns and detachments that functioned within the NKVD itself.

The second stage of the functioning of the "Labor Army" - from January to October 1942. At this stage, there is a mass conscription of German men aged 17 to 50 into work detachments and columns.

• On the procedure for the use of German migrants of military age from 17 to 50 years. Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1123 ss of January 10, 1942

The beginning of the second stage was laid by the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 1123 ss of January 10, 1942 "On the procedure for using German settlers of military age from 17 to 50 years." The mobilization was subject to deported German men from the European part of the USSR, fit for physical labor in the amount of 120 thousand people "for the entire duration of the war." The mobilization was entrusted to the people's commissariats of defense, internal affairs and communications until January 30, 1942. The decree prescribed the following distribution of the mobilized Germans:

45 thousand people for logging at the disposal of the NKVD of the USSR;

35 thousand people for the construction of Bakalsky and Bogoslovsky plants in the Urals;

40 thousand people for the construction of railways: Stalinsk - Abakan, Magnitogorsk - Sarah, Stalinsk - Barnaul, Akmolinsk - Kartaly, Akmolinsk - Pavlodar, Sosva - Alapaevsk, Orsk - Kandagach at the disposal of the People's Commissar of Railways.

The need for mobilization was explained by the needs of the front and was motivated by the interests of "the rational labor use of the German settlers." For non-appearance on mobilization to be sent to work columns, criminal liability was provided for with the application of capital punishment to “the most malicious”.

On January 12, 1942, in development of the USSR GKO resolution No. 1123, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria signed order No. 0083 "On the organization of detachments from mobilized Germans at the NKVD camps." In the order, 80 thousand mobilized, who were to be at the disposal of the people's commissariat, were distributed among 8 objects: Ivdellag - 12 thousand; Sevurallag - 12 thousand; Usollag - 5 thousand; Vyatlag - 7 thousand; Ust-Vymlag - 4 thousand; Kraslag - 5 thousand; Bakallag - 30 thousand; Bogoslovlag - 5 thousand. The last two camps were formed specifically for the mobilized Germans.

All mobilized were required to appear at the assembly points of the People's Commissariat of Defense in good winter clothes, with a supply of linen, bedding, a mug, a spoon and a 10-day supply of food. Of course, many of these demands were difficult to fulfill, since as a result of the resettlement, the Germans lost their property, many of them were essentially unemployed, and all of them, as noted earlier, eked out a miserable existence.

The Department of Military Communications of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Railways were obliged to ensure the transportation of those mobilized during the remaining days of January 1942 with delivery to the places of work no later than February 10. These deadlines turned out to be unrealistic, just as 120 thousand people could not be mobilized.

How the mobilization of German settlers took place and why the requirement of the State Defense Committee of the USSR was not fully met can be judged by the example of the Novosibirsk Region. The report of the local administration of the NKVD indicated that, along with the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Novosibirsk Region was to mobilize 15,300 deported Germans out of 18,102 registered for dispatch into work columns. 16,748 people were summoned to the military registration and enlistment offices by personal summons to undergo a medical examination, of which 16,120 people turned up, 10,986 people were mobilized and sent, that is, the outfit turned out to be unfulfilled by 4,314 people. It was not possible to mobilize people who managed to get exemption from mobilization because of their "indispensability" in agriculture, coal and timber industries. In addition, 2389 people who were sick and did not have warm clothes arrived at the recruiting stations. Persons with higher education were also exempted from conscription. 628 people did not appear on the agenda.

The mobilization of the Germans in the Novosibirsk region took place over 8 days from January 21 to January 28, 1942. The mobilized were not announced that they would be sent to Trudarmia, as a result of which various rumors circulated about the causes and goals of mobilization. During the draft, 12 people were prosecuted for evasion, 11 people for "anti-Soviet agitation".

The first Labor Army workers of Bakalstroy clearing snow for construction. March 1942.

In other territories and regions, the mobilization of the Germans took place under similar conditions. As a result, instead of 120 thousand, only about 93 thousand people were recruited into Trudarmia, of which 25 thousand people were transferred to the People's Commissar of Communications, the rest were received by the NKVD.

In view of the fact that the plan determined by the decree of the GKO of the USSR No. 1123 ss was underfulfilled by more than 27 thousand people, and the needs of the military economy in labor were growing, the leadership of the USSR decided to mobilize those Soviet German men who were not deported. On February 19, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued Decree No. 1281 ss "On the mobilization of German men of military age from 17 to 50 years old, permanently residing in regions, territories, autonomous and union republics."

• On the mobilization of German men of military age from 17 to 50 years old, permanently residing in regions, territories, autonomous and union republics. Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1281 ss of February 14, 1942

Unlike the first, the second mass mobilization of the Germans was prepared by the NKVD more carefully, taking into account the mistakes and miscalculations made in January 1942, and had a number of features. Its term was no longer 20 days, as during the first mobilization, but stretched for almost several months. The preparatory work of the district military registration and enlistment offices was carried out until March 10. During this time, the mobilized were notified, passed a medical examination and enrollment in the work columns. From March 10 to March 5, the formation of working detachments and columns took place, they went to their destinations. Reports on the progress of the operation were received by the center every 5 days.

This time, the mobilized were informed that they were being called up for work columns and would be sent to work, and not to the active army, which was not the case during the first mobilization. The Germans were warned that if they did not appear at the recruiting and assembly points, they would be arrested and imprisoned in forced labor camps. As in the first mobilization, the mobilized were supposed to arrive in good winter clothes with a supply of linen, bedding, a mug, a spoon and a supply of food for 10 days. Since the conscripts were not subjected to deportation, their provision with clothing and food was somewhat better than that of the mobilized of the first mass conscription.

In the course of the second mass mobilization, the issue of releasing any specialists from it was raised very harshly. It was decided only personally, if necessary, by the head of the local department of the NKVD together with the military commissar. At the same time, each region, territory, republic sent lists of those exempted from mobilization to the central apparatus of the NKVD, indicating the reasons for the release.

At the assembly points and along the way, the NKVD carried out operational work, which was aimed at suppressing any attempts at "counter-revolutionary" speeches, at the immediate prosecution of all those who evaded the appearance at the assembly points. All intelligence materials available in the bodies on the mobilized Germans were sent through the chiefs of echelons to the operational departments of the camps at their destination. The heads of the local departments of the NKVD were personally responsible for the mobilized, right up to their transfer to the GULAG facilities.

The geographical aspect of the second mass mobilization of the Germans deserves attention. In addition to the territories and regions affected by the first mobilization, the second mobilization also captured the Penza, Tambov, Ryazan, Chkalovsky, Kuibyshev, Yaroslavl regions, Mordovian, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurt, Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. The mobilized Germans from these regions and republics were sent to build the Sviyazhsk-Ulyanovsk railway. The construction of the road was carried out by order of the State Defense Committee and was entrusted to the NKVD. In Kazan, a management was organized for the construction of a new railway and a camp, called the Volga Correctional Labor Camp of the NKVD (Volzhlag). During March - April 1942, 20 thousand mobilized Germans and 15 thousand prisoners were supposed to be sent to the camp.

The Germans living in the Tajik, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Kazakh SSR, Bashkir ASSR, Chelyabinsk region were mobilized for the construction of the South Ural railway. They were sent to Chelyabinsk station. Germans from the Komi ASSR, Kirov, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Ivanovo regions were supposed to work in the timber transport facilities of Sevzheldorlag and therefore were delivered to the Kotlas station. Mobilized from the Sverdlovsk and Molotov regions ended up at Tagilstroy, Solikamskstroy, and Vyatlag. The Kraslag received Germans from the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Irkutsk and Chita regions. Germans from the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories came to Umaltstroy, to the Urgal station of the Far Eastern Railway. In total, about 40.9 thousand people were mobilized during the second mass conscription of Germans into the Labor Army.

The bulk of the mobilized Germans (according to the decrees of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 1123 ss and 1281 ss) were sent to construction sites and to NKVD camps. Only the 25,000 people already noted by us from the first mobilization were at the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Railways and worked on the construction of railways. However, in October 1942 they were transferred to the NKVD.

In June 1942, according to additional mobilization, about 4.5 thousand more mobilized Germans were sent to the work column of the Volga camp of the NKVD for the construction of the Sviyazhsk-Ulyanovsk railway.

The third stage of the functioning of the "Labor Army" - from October 1942 to December 1943. It is characterized by the largest mobilization of Soviet Germans, carried out on the basis of the decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 2383 ss of October 7, 1942 "On the additional mobilization of Germans for the national economy of the USSR ". Compared with the two previous mass mobilizations, the third had its own significant features.

• On the additional mobilization of the Germans for the national economy of the USSR. Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR 2383 dated October 7, 1942

First of all, the range of conscription ages expanded: men aged 15 to 55 were called up. In addition, German women aged 16 to 45 were also mobilized, except for pregnant women and those who had children under the age of three. Children of three years and older were to be transferred to the upbringing of the rest of the family, and in their absence, to the closest relatives or collective farms. It was the responsibility of the local councils to take measures to arrange for the placement of mobilized children left without parents.

Labor army men, mostly teenagers and elderly people, were sent to the enterprises of the Chelyabinskugol, Karagandaugol, Bogoslovskugol, Chkalovskugol trusts of the People's Commissariat of the coal industry. In total, it was planned to send 20.5 thousand people to the mines. Women made up the main contingent of those mobilized for the People's Commissariat of the oil industry - 45.6 thousand people. 5,000 men were also mobilized there. All of them ended up at the enterprises of Glavneftestroy, Glavneftegaz, at oil engineering plants, at such large oil plants as Kuibyshev, Molotov, Bashkir. The Labor Army members of the third mass conscription were sent to the enterprises of some other people's commissariats and departments. In total, according to this mobilization, 123.5 thousand people were sent to Trudarmia, including 70.8 thousand men and 52.7 thousand women.

The mobilization took about a month. During the mobilization, the military registration and enlistment offices faced a "deficit of the working contingent", since the entire capable part of the German population was practically exhausted. That is why among those who were subsequently called were found people who had serious illnesses, disabled people of groups 2 and 3, pregnant women, teenagers 14 years old and people over 55 years old.

And yet, the mobilization of the Soviet Germans continued into 1943. By decrees of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 3095 of April 26, No. 3857 of August 2 and No. 3860 of August 19, 1943, more than 30 thousand Germans were called up to the Trudarmia: men and women. They were sent to the facilities of the NKVD GULAG, to civilian departments for the extraction of coal, oil, gold, rare metals, to the timber and pulp and paper industries, to repair roads, etc.

As before, most of the Germans were at the facilities of the NKVD. Only seven of them by the beginning of 1944 employed more than 50% of all mobilized (Bakalstroy - over 20 thousand, Bogoslovlag - about 9 thousand, Usollag - 8.8 thousand, Vorkutalag - 6.8 thousand, Solikambumstroy - 6 ,2 thousand, Ivdellag - 5.6 thousand, Vosturallag - 5.2 thousand. In 22 camps, the labor of 21.5 thousand German women was used (as of January 1, 1944). Work columns at camps such as Ukhtoizhemlag consisted almost entirely of mobilized German women (3.7 thousand), Unzhlag (3.3 thousand), Usollag (2.8 thousand), Dzhidastroy (1.5 thousand), Ponyshlag (0.3 thousand).

Outside the NKVD, 84% of the Germans mobilized in civilian departments were concentrated in four people's commissariats: the people's commissariat of the coal industry (56.4 thousand), the people's commissariat of the oil industry (29 thousand); People's Commissariat of Ammunition (8 thousand); People's Commissariat of Construction (over 7 thousand). Small groups of Germans worked in the People's Commissariat of Food Industry (106), Building Materials (271), Procurement (35), etc. In total - in 22 People's Commissariats (at the beginning of 1944).

By the middle of 1944, the number of regions, territories and republics in which work columns of mobilized Soviet Germans were deployed had almost doubled compared to August 1943 - from 14 to 27. The columns were scattered over a vast territory from Moscow and Tula regions in the west to the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories in the east, from the Arkhangelsk Region in the north to the Tajik SSR in the south.

As of January 1, 1944, most of the German labor army workers were used at the enterprises of Kemerovo (15.7 thousand), Molotov (14.8 thousand), Chelyabinsk (13.9 thousand), Kuibyshev (11.2 thousand). ), Sverdlovsk (11 thousand), Tula (9.6 thousand), Moscow (7.1 thousand), Chkalov (4.7 thousand) regions, Bashkir ASSR (5.5 thousand).

• Deployment of work detachments and columns of Soviet Germans

The fourth - the last - stage of the functioning of the "Labor Army" lasted from January 1944 until its liquidation (mainly in 1946). At this final stage, there were no longer any significant calls for Germans, and the replenishment of work detachments and columns went mainly at the expense of the Germans - Soviet citizens "discovered" in the territories of the USSR liberated from the occupation, and repatriated from the countries of Eastern Europe and Germany.

According to rough estimates, for the period from 1941 to 1945, more than 316 thousand Soviet Germans were mobilized into work columns, not counting the repatriated, whose mobilization, basically, took place after the end of the war.

Of all the people's commissariats that used the labor of mobilized Germans, the NKVD firmly held the lead in terms of the number of labor army members throughout the war years. This is confirmed by Table 8.4.1

Table 8.4.1

The number of German labor soldiers at the facilities of the NKVD

and other people's commissariats in 1942 - 1945.

The data cited indicate that more than half of the Germans mobilized during the war years in Trudarmia (49 thousand more than in all other people's commissariats) got into the NKVD work columns. Nevertheless, as shown in the table, almost all the time the number of labor soldiers in the NKVD was somewhat less than in all the people's commissariats combined. This is mainly due to the high mortality of labor army soldiers at NKVD facilities in 1942.

As of April 1945, the entire labor contingent of the NKVD was 1063.8 thousand people, including 669.8 thousand prisoners, 297.4 thousand civilians and 96.6 thousand German labor soldiers. That is, the Germans at the end of the war accounted for only 9% of the total labor potential of the NKVD. The proportion of mobilized Soviet Germans in relation to the entire labor contingent in other people's commissariats was also small. In the coal mining industry, it was 6.6%, in the oil industry - 10.7% (almost all women), in the People's Commissariat of Ammunition - 1.7%, in the People's Commissariat for Construction - 1.5%, in the People's Commissariat of the Forest Industry - 0.6%, in others departments even less.

From the above data it is clearly seen that in the total labor potential of the country, Soviet Germans mobilized in labor army formations with a camp regime made up a very small part and therefore could not have any decisive influence on the performance of production tasks by the relevant people's commissariats and departments. Therefore, we can talk about the absence of an acute economic need to use the forced labor of Soviet Germans precisely in the form of prisoner labor. However, the camp form of organizing forced labor of citizens of the USSR of German nationality made it possible to keep them under strict control, use them in the most difficult physical work, and spend a minimum of money on their maintenance.

The Labor Army soldiers who ended up at the NKVD facilities were housed separately from the prisoners in specially created camp centers for them. Of these, working detachments were formed according to the production principle, numbering 1.5 - 2 thousand people. The detachments were subdivided into columns of 300 - 500 people, the columns - into brigades of 35 - 100 people each. In the people's commissariats of the coal, oil industry, etc., workers (mine) detachments, district columns, shift departments and brigades were formed according to the production principle.

	in the Labor Army. Rice. M. Distergefta

The organizational structure of the detachments at the NKVD camps in general terms copied the structure of the camp divisions. The detachments were headed by NKVD workers - “Chekists - campers”, foremen, foremen were appointed civilian specialists. However, as an exception, a German Labor Army soldier could also become a brigadier if he was an appropriate specialist and was not on the “black lists” of the authorities as unreliable. A political instructor was appointed to each detachment to carry out political and educational work.

At the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Coal Mining, the heads of the mines were placed at the head of the detachment. In production, the mobilized Germans were obliged to unquestioningly comply with all orders of the chief engineer, head of the section, foreman. As heads of columns, mountain foremen and foremen, the use of Germans from among the "most trained and proven" was allowed. To ensure the regime of work and the maintenance of work columns, the established daily routine, discipline at work and at home, a deputy head of the mine was appointed to each mine - the head of a detachment of NKVD workers. The head of the mine - the head of the detachment and his deputy were obliged to organize continuous monitoring of the behavior of the mobilized Germans, to prevent and suppress "at the root of any manifestation of mass resistance to the established regime, sabotage, sabotage and other anti-Soviet speeches, to identify and expose pro-fascist elements, refuseniks, loafers and disorganizers of production. A similar system of management of labor army members was used in other civilian people's commissariats.

The orders and instructions of the NKVD, the people's commissariats of the coal and oil industries, and other people's commissariats established strict military order in the working detachments and columns. Strict requirements were also imposed on the implementation of production standards and orders. They had to be carried out strictly on time and with "100%" quality.

• Documents on the procedure for the maintenance, labor use and protection of mobilized Germans

The instructions demanded that the Labor Army soldiers be settled in the barracks-barracks in columns. Moreover, all the columns were located in one place - the "zone" enclosed by a fence or barbed wire. Around the perimeter of the "zone" it was ordered to set up posts of paramilitary guards, checkpoints of guard dogs and patrols around the clock. The guard shooters were tasked with stopping escape attempts, carrying out a “local search” and detaining deserters, and preventing Germans from communicating with local residents and prisoners. In addition to the protection of quartering places (“zones”), the movement routes and places of work of the mobilized were also protected. Germans. For Labor Army members who violated the security regime, the use of weapons was allowed.

The most complete and consistent requirements of the instructions for the placement and protection of work columns from German citizens of the USSR were carried out in the NKVD system. The leadership of the camps and construction sites consisted of employees of the camp administration and had extensive experience in implementing the camp regime for keeping prisoners. Somewhat better in terms of maintenance were the work columns at the enterprises of other people's commissariats. There, sometimes violations of instructions were allowed, expressed in the fact that "zones" were not created and the Labor Army could live more freely (sometimes even in apartments with the local population). An interesting order of the People's Commissar of the coal industry dated April 29, 1943. It notes violations of the detention regime at a number of Kuzbass mines. “So, at the mine named after Voroshilov and named after Kalinin, the barracks in which the Germans are settled are not fenced, armed guards are not organized in the zones, at the Babaevskaya mine of the Kuibyshevugol trust, more than 40 people are settled in private apartments.” As noted further in the order, in the overwhelming majority of mines the Germans went, accompanied by employees of the special detachment administration, only to work, returning back without escort and protection. Reception and transfer of labor army members against receipt were not carried out. The order demanded that trust managers and mine managers by May 5, 1943, fence all hostels and barracks that housed mobilized Germans and establish armed guards, stop issuing leave, and relocate all those living in private apartments to "zones".

And yet, despite the demands of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of the coal industry, even by the end of 1943, not all mines complied with the instructions to create "zones" and their armed guards. A similar situation took place in some other civilian people's commissariats.

To prevent possible escapes of the Labor Army, the authorities tightened the regime of detention, searches were widely practiced. The camp commanders were ordered to conduct a thorough inspection of all camp premises where mobilized Germans were kept at least twice a month. At the same time, personal belongings were examined and checked, during which items prohibited for use were confiscated. It was forbidden to store cold and firearms, all types of alcoholic beverages, narcotic substances, playing cards, identity documents, military topographic maps, terrain plans, maps of districts and regions, photographic and radio equipment, binoculars, compasses. Those guilty of possession of prohibited items were held accountable. From October 1942, the frequency of checks and personal searches of the Germans was increased to once a month. But now, when prohibited things were found in a barracks, tent or barracks, in addition to the guilty, orderlies and commanders of the units in whose premises these things were found were brought to justice.

For violation of internal regulations, industrial discipline, failure to comply with instructions or instructions from the administration and engineering and technical workers, failure to comply with production standards and tasks due to the fault of the worker, violation of safety rules, damage to inventory, tools and property, disciplinary sanctions were imposed on the labor army. For minor offenses, a personal reprimand, a warning, a reprimand before the ranks and in an order were announced, a fine was applied, assignment to harder work up to 1 month, arrest. In the NKVD camps, arrest was divided into simple (up to 20 days) and strict (up to 10 days). A strict arrest differed from a simple one in that the arrested person was kept in solitary confinement without going to work, hot food was given out every other day, and taken out for a walk once a day for 30 minutes under the guard of an armed shooter.

The most “malicious” violators were sent to penal mines and penal columns for up to three months or were brought to justice. The order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs No. 0083 of January 12, 1942 warned the mobilized Germans that they were subject to criminal liability for violation of discipline, refusal to work and desertion "with the use of capital punishment in relation to the most malicious."

At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944. the regime of keeping the Germans mobilized into work columns was somewhat softened. Published new orders of people's commissariats: coal industry; pulp and paper industry; the instructions of the people's commissariats of ferrous metallurgy and construction allowed the armed guards to be removed from the "zones" and replaced with guard posts at checkpoints and mobile posts inland. The arrows of the VOKhR from the civilian staff were replaced by those mobilized from among the Komsomol members and members of the CPSU (b). Conclusion to work began to be carried out without protection under the command of the head of the column or foreman.

According to the new guiding documents of the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944. the heads of the columns received the right to grant the Labor Army soldiers leave from the “zone” in their free time on leave notes with a mandatory return by 22.00. On the territory of the "zone" it was allowed to organize covered stalls for the sale of dairy and vegetable products by the local civilian population, who entered the territory of the camp with passes issued by those on duty in the "zone". Workers were allowed to move freely within the territory, receive and send all types of correspondence, receive food and clothing parcels, use books, newspapers and magazines, play checkers, chess, dominoes and billiards, engage in physical education and sports, and amateur arts.

After the end of the war, the gradual liquidation of all “zones” began and the transfer of the Labor Army to the position of special settlers with their fixing at the enterprises where they worked, as workers for free hire. The Germans were still forbidden to independently leave enterprises and leave their place of residence without the permission of the NKVD.

By order of the People's Commissar of the coal industry No. 305 from July 23, 1945, all labor army workers were allowed to call their families. The exception was those who worked in the mines of the Moscow, Tula and Leningrad regions. At the facilities of the NKVD, the "zones" and the paramilitary guards of the mobilized Germans were liquidated by the directive of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs No. 8 from January 8, 1946. In the same month, the "zones" for the mobilized Germans were liquidated in other people's commissariats. The Germans were allowed to live in apartments and dormitories, to transfer their families to the place of work for permanent residence.

During the entire period of the war, forced labor of mobilized Germans was used by enterprises and construction sites of 24 people's commissariats. As already noted, the largest number of work columns from the Germans (25) functioned at the camps and construction sites of the NKVD. On January 1, 1945, over 95 thousand mobilized Germans worked in them. The distribution of this number of Labor Army members by main departments is presented in Table 8.4.2.

Table 8.4.2

Distribution of Labor Army members according to the main departments of the NKVD

The data presented show that the bulk of the mobilized Germans were used in the construction of industrial facilities and in logging, where they accounted for, respectively, a fifth and a seventh of the total number of labor contingent in these industries.

During the war years, having a huge army of cheap labor, the NKVD built many industrial facilities. Work columns from the Germans worked on the construction of the Bakalsky metallurgical and coke-chemical plants and on the creation of the ore base of these enterprises. The terms of the first five electric furnaces of this plant were record-breaking short. Their start-up was scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1942, and two blast furnaces were put into operation in the second quarter of 1943. The tasks were completed on time, which was a considerable merit of the Labor Army Germans who worked there.

The Labor Army took part in the construction of the Novotagilsky metallurgical and coke-chemical plants, plant No. 166 in Omsk, the Altai bromine plant, the Bogoslovsky aluminum plant, the Molotov shipbuilding plant, etc. on the Usva River, many other objects of the national economy.

The Soviet Germans called up for work columns were mostly peasants and therefore had almost no working specialties and qualifications. As of January 1, 1944, out of 111.9 thousand mobilized Germans who worked in camps and construction sites, only 33.1 thousand were qualified specialists (29%). But even these specialists were not always used for their intended purpose. 28% of them were in general work, including engineers - 9.2%, technicians - 21.8%, medical workers - 14.2%, electricians, radio and communications specialists - 11.6%, agricultural machine operators (tractor operators , combine operators, drivers) - 68.7%. And this is despite an acute shortage of such specialists in the camps and construction sites, in the whole national economy of the country!

The country's leadership divided the labor contingent at its disposal into 4 groups: group "A" - the most able-bodied and physically healthy people used in the main production and construction work; group "B" - service personnel; group "B" - released from work outpatients and inpatients, teams of the weak, pregnant women and the disabled; group "G" - newly arrived and departing, under investigation and in penal units without being sent to work, refusers of work, as well as people who did not have clothes and shoes. The ratio of Labor Army members for the considered groups on average for 1943 is given in Table 8.4.3.

Table 8.4.3

The ratio of labor army workers who worked in the NKVD system

for groups "A", "B", "C" and "D" on average for 1943

From the data in the table it can be seen that the labor of the bulk of the mobilized Germans was used in production (77.1%) and only a small part (5.8%) was in the service personnel. A significant number of Labor Army members (15%) did not go to work due to illness. This was primarily due to poor nutrition and harsh working conditions.

A small number of absences from work due to bad weather did not mean at all that the weather favored the work of the mobilized. Most of the NKVD camps were located in areas with harsh climatic conditions in the North, in Siberia and the Urals, but the camp authorities, as a rule, neglected this fact in pursuit of the fulfillment of planned targets, fearing the failure to launch the facilities under construction.

At the camps of the NKVD there were work columns not only from mobilized Germans, but also from representatives of the Central Asian peoples. For them, unlike the Germans, the working day was shortened in bad weather. Thus, the duration of the working day at temperatures below -20o in calm weather and below -15o in windy weather was reduced to 4 hours 30 minutes, at temperatures below -15o in calm weather and below -10o in windy weather - up to 6 hours 30 minutes. For the Germans, in all weather conditions, the duration of the working day was at least 8 hours.

Unfavorable weather conditions, hard work, poor nutrition, lack of clothing, especially in winter, lack of places for heating, long working hours, often over 12 hours, or even 2-3 shifts in a row - all this led to a deterioration in the physical condition of the Labor Army and significant labor losses. . The dynamics of labor losses at the NKVD facilities can be traced by the change in the percentage composition of group "B" (sick, weak, disabled) to the entire contingent of labor army:

1.7. 1942 - 11,5 % 1.7. 1943 - 15,0 % 1.6. 1944 - 10,6 %

1.1. 1943 - 25,9 % 1.1. 1944 - 11,6 %

The given data once again show that the most difficult period in the existence of work columns was the winter of 1942-1943, during which the percentage of labor losses was the highest. First of all, we are talking about the sick and the weak. During the same period, the strictest regime of detention, interruptions in food and the provision of uniforms, warm clothes and shoes, the disorder of life and life of the Labor Army fall. Since the summer of 1943, there has been a tendency to improve the physical condition of people, the indicator for group "B" has been steadily declining.

One of the significant reasons for the non-fulfillment of production standards by many Labor Army members was the lack of skills in most of them to work in production. So, at the Aktobe combine of the NKVD, the bulk of the Labor Army consisted of former collective farmers from the southern regions of Ukraine, who did not even have a clue about working in the mining industry. As a result, in the fourth quarter of 1942, the average percentage of the fulfillment of production standards decreased from month to month, and only from January 1943 did labor productivity increase. This was facilitated not only by the acquisition of certain production skills, but also by improved nutrition. In addition, courses were organized at the camp for the training of qualified personnel on the job, at which about 140 people were trained monthly in the specialties required by the plant: excavators, drivers, plumbers, stove workers, etc.

A similar situation took place in the logging camps. In the Vyatka camp of the NKVD, the mobilized Germans were used in logging, logging and logging operations. Lacking work skills, they could not meet production standards as experienced workers. The situation was complicated by the intensive supply of wagons for timber shipment to defense enterprises. Brigades of Labor Army members were at work for 20 or more hours a day. As a result, group "B" in Vyatlag, which in March 1942 accounted for 23% of the total list of labor army members, by December of the same year reached 40.3%.

And yet, despite the difficult working conditions, the standards of output and labor productivity of the mobilized Germans were at a fairly high level and exceeded the same indicators for prisoners who worked under the same conditions. So, at the Chelyabmetallurgstroy of the NKVD, 5.6% of prisoners and 3.7% of Labor Army soldiers did not fulfill the norm. Fulfilled the norm by 200% - 17% of the prisoners and 24.5% of the Labor Army. At 300%, none of the prisoners did not fulfill the norm, and 0.3% of the labor army workers with such indicators worked.

On the whole, in the majority of work detachments and columns, output norms were not only met, but even exceeded. For example, in the second quarter of 1943, the development of norms by the Labor Army was: at the construction of the theological aluminum plant - 125.7%; in Solikamsklag - 115%; in Umaltlage - 132%. For the third quarter of the same year, the labor army workers of Vosturallag fulfilled the norms of logging by 120%, and removal of timber by 118%. The work columns of the Inta camp of the NKVD for the same quarter fulfilled the norm by 135%.

A certain difference, from those discussed above, was the nature and working conditions at the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the coal industry. As already noted, this was the second, after the NKVD, people's commissariat, where the use of forced labor by Soviet Germans was widespread. The instruction on the labor use of mobilized Germans at the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Coal Industry established the length of the working day and the number of days off on a common basis with civilians, required compulsory technical training for workers, mountain foremen, foremen and foremen from among the mobilized at least four hours a week. The production rates, due to the lack of skills in working in mines, decreased to 60% in the first month, to 80% in the second month, and from the third month they amounted to 100% of the norms established for civilian employees.

In June 1943, the People's Commissar of the coal industry issued an order in which he demanded that all mobilized Germans no later than August 1 be concentrated to work in specially designated mines and construction sites, taking into account "their group placement near production." Allocated mines and construction sites were to be fully staffed by the Labor Army, headed by civilian leaders and engineering and technical personnel. It was allowed to use civilian workers in these mines on the main units for professions that were missing among the Germans.

The first "special sections" of the mobilized Germans were created at the mines of the trusts "Leningugol" and "Molotovugol". They successfully coped with planned tasks. So, at the Molotovugol trust at the Kapitalnaya mine, special stage No. 9 completed the February 1944 plan by 130%, at mine No. 10, special stage No. 8 - by 112%. But there were few such places. Even by April 1944, the concentration of Germans in individual mines was not completed.

A significant part of the Labor Army members admitted to underground work did not undergo special training (“technical minimum”). The lack of knowledge in the specialty and safety precautions led to accidents, frequent injuries, and, consequently, to disability. In the trust "Kaganovichugol" only in March 1944, a loss of 765 man-days was recorded due to injuries received at work. At the mine. Stalin plant "Kuzbassugol" for the first quarter of 1944 there were 27 accidents, of which 3 were fatal, 7 - with severe injuries that led to disability and 17 - with injuries of moderate severity.

On February 16, 1944, an explosion occurred at the Vozhdaevka mine of the Kuibyshevugol trust, as a result of which 80 people died, including 13 Germans, and one Labor Army member went missing. According to the management of the mine, the causes of the accident were non-compliance with safety rules by some workers, cluttered passageways, untimely shutdown of furnaces, failure to analyze the causes of previous incidents, staff turnover, and violations of labor discipline.

In general, as was constantly noted in the documents of the heads of mines, combines, trusts, despite the shortcomings in the organization of labor and poor skills in working at the mine, the vast majority of the Labor Army worked conscientiously, achieving high results. So, according to the Anzherougol trust, the fulfillment of the norms by the Labor Army was characterized by the following average indicators: miners - 134%; bulk breakers - 144%; installers - 182%; lumber carriers - 208%.

At the enterprises of the People's Commissariat for Coal Mining, the labor of German teenagers, mobilized in the autumn of 1942 as a result of the third mass conscription of Germans, was widely used in the mines. For example, at the mine Severnaya trust "Kemerovougol" in the work column, numbering 107 people, 31 teenagers aged 16 and younger worked, including 15-year-olds - 12, 14-year-olds - 1. They worked in all sections of the mine on an equal basis with adults and no one tried to make their work easier.

At most mines of the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry, the requirement of instructions to provide labor army workers with at least three days off per month was not observed. The management of the enterprises demanded that every labor mobilized worker take the so-called "New Year's oath to Comrade Stalin", in which the Labor Army members undertook to increase coal production at the expense of days off.

In the People's Commissariat of the Oil Industry, work columns of mobilized Germans were used mainly in the construction of roads, oil pipelines, quarries, logging, logging, road clearing, etc. they were not allowed to work in the main and especially in the defense workshops. A similar nature of the labor use of the Germans took place in other people's commissariats where they worked.

The living conditions of the Labor Army, although they differed from each other at various sites where the mobilized Germans worked, were generally extremely difficult.

Housing conditions were characterized by tightness, the use of poorly adapted or completely unsuitable premises for housing. Work columns at the camps of the NKVD were located, as a rule, in the former camp sites, and often from scratch in hastily dug dugout barracks. Inside the barracks for sleeping, two-, and sometimes three-tiered wooden bunks were equipped, which could not provide normal rest due to the large crowding of people living in the same room. For one person, as a rule, there was a little more than 1 square. meters of usable area.

In civilian people's commissariats, there were cases of labor army members living in private apartments. However, during 1943, all the mobilized Germans were moved to barracks built according to the type of barracks described above in the NKVD work columns.

Beginning in 1944, there was a general trend towards some improvement in the living conditions of the Labor Army, mainly due to the labor of the workers themselves. Baths, laundries, canteens, housing facilities were built, but there were no serious changes for the better. The facts of the blatantly dismissive attitude of the administration of camps, construction sites, and enterprises to elementary human needs continued to take place. So, in June 1944, 295 families (768 men, women, children) of German special settlers were delivered from the Narym district to the plant No. 179 and plant No. 65 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. All the able-bodied were mobilized into work columns. The management of the plant was not prepared for the meeting of the new party of Labor Army members. Due to the lack of housing and the lack of fuel, 2-3 people slept on one trestle bed.

The housing difficulties of the mobilized were exacerbated by the lack of bedding, poor supply of warm clothes, uniforms and overalls. So, in the Volga camp of the NKVD, only 70% of the labor army had blankets, pillowcases and sheets. In the Inta Correctional Labor Camp, there were only 10 sheets for 142 Labor Army soldiers. Mattresses were usually stuffed with straw, but this was often not done either. At a number of enterprises of the Kuzbassugol and Kemerovougol trusts, due to the lack of straw, the mobilized slept directly on bare plank beds.

The problem of providing the Labor Army with clothing and bedding was not resolved until the end of the war. For example, in the spring of 1945, at the Polunochnoye manganese mine in the Sverdlovsk region, out of 2534 Labor Army soldiers, only 797 people were fully dressed, 990 people did not have any clothes, 537 people did not have shoes, 84 people had neither clothes nor shoes at all .

The situation with the food supply for the personnel of the work columns and detachments was no less dramatic. The supply of the mobilized Germans was carried out almost in the last turn, which caused difficulties with food in the work columns.

A particularly acute shortage of food was noted in the winter of 1942-1943. On October 25, 1942, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Kruglov instructed the heads of forced labor camps to prohibit the issuance of more than 800 g of bread per person per day to mobilized Germans, regardless of the percentage of completion of the production task. This was done "in order to save food and bread." Provision rates for other products were also reduced: fish - up to 50 g, meat - up to 20 g, fat - up to 10 g, vegetables and potatoes - up to 400 g per day. But even low food standards were almost never fully brought to the attention of workers for various reasons: from the lack of food to the abuse of officials who organized meals.

Depending on the fulfillment of the planned task, food norms were divided into three types ("boiler"). Norm No. 1 - reduced - was intended for those who did not fulfill production tasks. Norm No. 2 was received by those who completed these tasks by 100 - 150%. According to norm No. 3 - increased - those who overfulfilled production tasks by more than 150% ate. The number of products according to the norms differed significantly from each other. Thus, norm No. 1 was lower than norm No. 3 for potatoes and vegetables by 2 times, for meat and fish by more than 2 times, for cereals and pasta by 3 times. In fact, eating according to the first norm, a person was on the verge of exhaustion and could only maintain his strength so as not to die of starvation.

Eating food was carried out by the Labor Army in rooms that were mostly not suitable for canteens. The low capacity of these premises, a significant shortage of utensils aggravated the situation. For example, at the Severnaya and Yuzhnaya mines of the Kemerovougol plant, the Labor Army had to queue for three hours to get their meager portion of food, and all because there were only 8 tables and 12 bowls in the canteen of the Severnaya mine, in canteen mine South only 8 bowls.

Difficulties in catering forced the leadership of the people's commissariats to resort to extraordinary measures. On April 7, 1943, the same Kruglov issued a directive, which noted the fact of a massive deterioration in the physical condition of the "special contingent" of camps and construction sites of the NKVD. It was proposed to take emergency measures to "recovery". As one of these measures, it was ordered "to organize the collection of sorrel, nettle, and other wild plants that can be immediately used as substitutes for vegetables." The collection of grass was prescribed to engage in the weakened and disabled.

Of course, all these measures taken could not fundamentally solve the food problems of Trudarmiya.

Difficult working conditions, poor nutrition, clothing supply and lack of basic living conditions put thousands of mobilized Germans on the brink of survival. The lack of complete statistical data makes it difficult to accurately determine the number of labor soldiers who died from hunger, cold, disease and inhuman working conditions during the entire existence of work columns during the war years. But even fragmentary information allows us to conclude that the mortality rate is quite high.

Table 8.4.4

The number of Labor Army members who died in 1942-1944

As can be seen from table 8.4.4, it was especially high in the working detachments and columns at the camps and construction sites of the NKVD. In 1942, out of 115,000 Labor Army members, 11,874 or 10.6% died there. Subsequently, in this people's commissariat, a decrease in the death rate of mobilized Germans was observed, and by 1945 it amounted to 2.5%. In all other people's commissariats that used the labor of the Germans, the absolute number of deaths was less than in the NKVD, but there the death rate increased from year to year.

In individual work columns at NKVD facilities, the mortality rate in 1942 significantly exceeded the average for the people's commissariat. 4 camps of the NKVD especially “distinguished themselves”: Sevzheldorlag - 20.8%; Solikamlag - 19%; Tavdinlag - 17.9%; Bogoslovlag - 17.2%. The lowest mortality was in Volzhlag - 1.1%, Kraslag - 1.2%, Vosturallag and Umaltlag - 1.6% each.

The main causes of high mortality were malnutrition, difficult living conditions, overexertion at work, lack of medicines and qualified medical care. On average, one doctor and two paramedical workers accounted for a thousand mobilized Germans, not counting prisoners and civilian workers. In the memorandum of the head of the Vyatlag NKVD, the increased mortality of the Labor Army was noted: from 5 cases in March 1942 to 229 in August of the same year, the main types of diseases that led to death were named. These were mainly diseases associated with hard physical labor with malnutrition - pelagra, severe malnutrition, heart disease and tuberculosis.

By the end of the war, the gradual demobilization of large German women from work columns began. According to the report of the head of the special resettlement department of the NKVD, Colonel Kuznetsov, there were 53,000 German women in the work columns. Of these, 6436 had children left in the places of their mobilization. 4304 women had one child under the age of 12, 2 - 1739, 3 - 357, 4 - 36 German women.

At some enterprises, the management was forced to create their own boarding schools for German children. For example, such a boarding school existed at the plant number 65 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. It housed 114 children aged 3 to 5 years. Winter clothes and shoes were completely absent for children and therefore they were deprived of the opportunity to walk in the fresh air. Many children, completely barefoot and naked, spent whole days in bed under blankets. Almost all had signs of rickets. There was no isolation room for sick children in the boarding school, and those who fell ill with infectious diseases - measles, mumps, scarlet fever, scabies - were kept together with healthy ones. In the dining room of the boarding school there were only three mugs and the children drank tea from plates in which they ate the first and second courses.

The position of the Labor Army also largely depended on the attitude of the management of the facilities where they worked towards them. It was uneven. Somewhere benevolent, somewhere indifferent, and somewhere hostile and cruel, up to physical insult.

14-year-old Rosa Shteklein, who worked at plant No. 65 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, dressed only in a shabby, torn dress and a torn padded jacket, with bare knees, without linen in frost and cold, went to the plant back and forth every day for 5 km. She systematically overfulfilled the norms, however, in 4 months she received only 90 rubles for work. The head of the shop answered her request to help with coupons for additional bread with a rude shout: "Go to your Hitler for bread." At the same plant, there were cases of bread abuse in the shops, when the masters illegally kept bread cards in order to force people to come to work, and then they issued not cards, but coupons for additional bread, the rate for which was much lower than for cards .

The order on the state coal plant "Kuzbassugol" dated February 5, 1944 noted that some mine managers and site heads allow "hooligan rude attitude towards the Germans, up to inflicting all kinds of insults and even beatings."

At the Kemerovougol plant, the head of the Butovka mine Kharitonov, holding a general meeting of mine workers on January 23, 1944, which was attended by mobilized Germans, in his speech indiscriminately scolded all German workers, stating that they "are enemies of the Russian people" and that their you need to force them to work even without them having overalls: “We will force them to work naked.”

Despite the above facts, nevertheless, many leaders, civilian workers, the majority of the local population not only treated the mobilized Germans kindly, but often even helped them by sharing bread and other products. Many factory directors and construction managers willingly took on working specialists from the work columns.

According to many former Labor Army members, the attitude of the local population towards the Germans was kept under the close attention of the NKVD. Everyone who at least once put in a good word for them or helped in some way was summoned to the party committees and NKVD bodies, where they were told that they were not patriots of their Motherland, as they were associated with enemies of the people. Especially strong pressure was exerted on men and women of any nationality if they married a German or a German woman. For such people, the movement up the career ladder was closed. And yet, there were many mixed marriages in which one of the spouses was German during the war years.

In the Tagillag of the NKVD in 1942-1945, an old chapel surrounded by barbed wire was adapted as a punishment cell. The Labor Army gave her the name Tamara - after the name of the Russian girl, on a date with whom the young Labor Army member went on a date, for which he was given the "honor" to be the first to master this punishment cell.

Many former German Labor Army members kindly remember Major General Tsarevsky, who was appointed head of the NKVD Tagilstroy in early 1943. At the same time, both his high demands and humane attitude towards people are noted. It was he who saved the mobilized Germans from starvation and exhaustion after the unbearably difficult winter of 1942-1943.

At the same time, the chief of the Chelyabmetallurgstroy labor army, Major General Komarovsky, inspired horror. By his evil will, the executions of the Labor Army for the slightest offenses became commonplace in the camp.

The Labor Army members themselves assessed their position differently. The older generation perceived Trudarmia as another link in a long chain of various repressive anti-German campaigns carried out under Soviet rule. Younger people, brought up on socialist ideology, were most offended by the fact that they, Soviet citizens, communists and Komsomol members, were deprived of the opportunity to defend their homeland with weapons in their hands, undeservedly identified with the Germans in Germany and accused of complicity with the aggressor. These people with all their actions, behavior, active work tried to convince the authorities of their loyalty, hoping that the mistake would be corrected, justice would be restored.

At the initiative of the party and Komsomol activists, funds were raised to help the Red Army. At the construction of the Bogoslovsky aluminum plant, for each holiday, from their meager daily allowance, the labor army gave 200 g of bread, so that later they could bake cookies from high-quality flour and send them to the front as a gift to the fighters. In the same place, the German workers collected over two million rubles for the armament of the Red Army. This initiative did not go unnoticed by the top leadership of the country. The telegram sent to the Labor Army members of Bogoslovstroy and signed by Stalin himself said: “I ask you to pass on to the workers, engineering and technical workers and employees of German nationality working at BAZstroy, who collected 353,783 rubles for the construction of tanks and 1,820,000 rubles for the construction of a squadron of my aircraft. fraternal greetings and thanks to the Red Army. The telegram was evidence of the involuntary recognition by the leadership of the country, including I. Stalin, of the high patriotic spirit of a significant part of the workers of German nationality who worked in work detachments and columns. This spirit persisted despite the humiliation and insults to human and civic dignity inflicted by the official authorities.

Many Germans throughout the years of Trudarmia were leaders in production, participated in the Stakhanov movement. So, for example, only in the Kemerovougol trust, according to the results of socialist competition among the Labor Army in March 1944, there were 60 Stakhanovites and 167 shock workers. There have been repeated cases of conferring the title of "Best in Profession" to the Labor Army. In particular, the Anzhero-Sudzhensk city party, Soviet, trade union and economic bodies in March 1944 awarded the title of the best timber supplier of the Anzherougol trust to the German Schleicher, who fulfilled the norm by 163%.

If one, significant in number, part of the Labor Army tried to prove their loyalty and patriotism to the authorities by active work and high performance in production, hoping that as a result the authorities would change their negative attitude towards the Soviet Germans, then the other, also not small, - their resentment, protest against the injustice committed, the difficult humiliating conditions of work and life, they expressed actions opposite in nature: desertion, refusal to work, open resistance to violence, etc.

• Directive of the operational department of the GULAG of the NKVD to the heads of the operational-Chekist departments of the corrective labor camps of the NKVD. 08/06/1942.

The desertion of the Labor Army from the work columns had a fairly wide scope. According to the NKVD, in 1942, only 160 group escapes were made from the camps and construction sites of this department. In particular, in August 1942, a group of Germans in the amount of 4 people deserted from the Usolsky camp of the NKVD. Preparations for the escape were carried out for several months. "The organizer of the escape, Like, acquired fictitious documents, which he provided the members of the group with." In October 1942, 6 mobilized Germans deserted from the repair and mechanical plant of the Tagil camp of the NKVD in a car. Before escaping, deserters collected donations from their fellow workers for the escape, mostly money.

Most of the fugitives were caught and returned to the camps, passing their cases to the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, which, as a rule, entailed capital punishment. And yet, in 1942, 462 deserted Labor Army soldiers were never caught.

During the capture of deserting groups of Labor Army soldiers, there were isolated cases of them rendering armed resistance to the subdivisions of internal troops that detained them. So, during the detention of a group of Labor Army soldiers who had escaped from the Bogoslovlag, “they turned out to be armed with Finnish knives and homemade daggers and, resisting ... tried to kill pom. platoon commander of the operational division.

The fact that in a number of work columns the Germans were seriously preparing for escape and, if necessary, were ready to offer resistance, is evidenced by the things that were found with them during searches. Knives, daggers, points, axes, crowbars and similar items were confiscated en masse, and in one of the NKVD camps a Nagan pistol with seven rounds of ammunition was even found from a labor army soldier. They also found maps, a compass, binoculars, etc.

In 1943, the desertion of the Labor Army gained even greater proportions.

In contrast to the camps and construction sites of the NKVD, at the facilities of all other people's commissariats, the dependence of desertion on the working and living conditions of the Labor Army is very clearly visible. In 1943, almost every fourth Labor Army member deserted from the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. It has already been noted that at the plant No. 179 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, located in the Novosibirsk region, the working detachment was located in the former camp site of the Siblaga NKVD, the columns of the Labor Army were guarded during the journey to the plant and back. Nevertheless, in 1943, 931 people fled from there - more than half of the total number of Germans who worked at this plant. A similar situation took place at factories No. 65 and 556, where, according to the results of the inspection of the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, “completely unsatisfactory living conditions and poor organization of labor use” were noted at the three enterprises we noted. At the same time, at factories No. 62, 63, 68, 76, 260, with more or less tolerable living conditions for the Labor Army, there was no desertion.

The expansion of the scale of desertion was facilitated by the facts that took place when the heads of enterprises, collective farms, and MTS hired mobilized Germans who deserted from work detachments and columns without asking them for documents.

The authorities skillfully counteracted the "negative manifestations" on the part of the Labor Army, applying severe penalties, fabricating "counter-revolutionary" cases against them, forming and using a wide agent-information network in the Labor Army environment.

The following example eloquently testifies to the far-fetchedness and fabrication of cases. In the Bakalsky camp of the NKVD, the valiant Chekists liquidated "an insurgent organization that called itself" Combat Detachment ". Foreman Dizer, a former sea captain, a foreman of mechanical workshops Vaingush, a former instructor of the Union of Vineyards, Frank, a former agronomist, and others were arrested. “Members of the organization were preparing an armed escape from the camp in order to go over to the side of the German occupation forces. On the way to the front, the organization was preparing to blow up bridges on railway lines in order to slow down the supply of supplies for the Red Army.

The "rebel organization" was also opened in the Volzhlag of the NKVD. “In order to obtain weapons, the participants in this organization intended to establish contact with the German occupation forces. For this purpose, an escape from the camp of 2-3 members of the group was being prepared, who were supposed to make their way through the front line to the Nazis.

"Rebel" and "sabotage" groups from the Labor Army were "discovered" and "liquidated" also in Ivdellag, Tagillag, Vyatlag, at other NKVD facilities, as well as at a number of mines and enterprises of civilian people's commissariats. So, the Novosibirsk security officers, relying on a network of agents, concocted a bunch of cases: "Huns" - about a "pro-fascist rebel organization"; "Thermists" - about espionage in favor of Germany; "Fritz" - about "fascist agitation", as well as "Hans", "Altaians", "Guerrika", "Crows" and many others.

Former front-line soldiers who allowed themselves to tell people the truth about the real situation on the fronts in the initial period of the war were also held accountable. Kremer, a labor army soldier of the 2nd working detachment of the NKVD Chelyabmetallurgstroy, was given a show trial in the summer of 1942 for telling his comrades about the bloody battles and heavy losses during the retreat of our army in the summer of 1941, that the enemy was armed to the teeth, and Our soldiers didn't even have bullets. Kremer was accused of spreading false information about the course of the war, of sabotage, and sentenced to death.

In general, the number and nature of the "crimes" committed by the Labor Army can be judged by the example of the Germans brought to criminal responsibility in the NKVD camps. So, only in the fourth quarter of 1942, 121 Germans were prosecuted in Vyatlag, including 35 for "counter-revolutionary crimes", 13 for theft, "counter-revolutionary sabotage" (refusal to work, self-mutilation, deliberately bringing oneself to exhaustion) - 32, desertion - 8 labor army.

As you can see, the Labor Army members were very different and dissimilar people in their views and beliefs, in relation to the situation in which they found themselves. And this does not seem to be surprising. Indeed, in the working detachments and columns, people met and worked side by side who had in common nationality, language, a sense of resentment and bitterness for their humiliating position, but before the war they lived in different regions, belonged to different social, professional and demographic groups, professed different religions, or were atheists, had different attitudes towards the Soviet government, ambiguously assessed the regime in Germany. Trying to find their way out of the unbearably difficult situation in which they found themselves, as it seemed to everyone, the only correct way out and thus determining their fate, they all lived in the hope of good luck, that fate would turn out to be favorable to them, that the nightmare of war, a slave camp life will end sooner or later.

The political and legal recognition of Trudarmia as a form of participation of Soviet citizens in ensuring victory over the aggressor occurred only at the turn of 1980-1990, that is, more than four decades after the end of the war. Many Labor Army members did not live to see this time.

“Labour Army” - not everyone knows what this term means, because during the Great Patriotic War it was used unofficially.

During the Great Patriotic War, those who performed forced labor service began to call themselves "Labour Army". But not a single official document of the period 1941-1945. the concept of "labour army" does not occur. The labor policy of the Soviet wartime state was associated with the terms "labor service", "labor legislation".

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, a significant part of the able-bodied population of the industrial regions of the country was drafted into the Red Army. In the rear of the country were massively evacuated enterprises of defense importance from the central zone of Russia, where hostilities were taking place. For the remaining and newly arriving enterprises, workers were required, it was necessary to build new buildings, produce military products, the country needed wood and coal.

On June 30, 1941, under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for Accounting and Distribution of Labor was established. On the ground, special bureaus were created that organized the registration of the non-working population, mobilized and sent people recognized as able-bodied to the defense industry. After the adoption of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 23, 1941 "On granting the Council of People's Commissars of the republics and the territory (regional) executive committees the right to transfer workers and employees to another job," local authorities were able to maneuver their labor force regardless of departmental and geographical characteristics.

Already in the autumn of 1941, under the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, construction battalions and work columns began to form. They called the able-bodied population and the unfit for military service. Detachments were formed from the Labor Army, whose service was equated with military service.

The first stage - in September 1941. According to the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 31, 1941 “On the Germans living on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR”, labor mobilization of German men aged 16 to 60 takes place in Ukraine.

The second stage - from January to October 1942. It was initiated by the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 1123 ss of January 10, 1942 "On the procedure for using German settlers of military age from 17 to 50 years." Subject to mobilization were German men deported from the European part of the USSR, fit for physical labor in the amount of 120 thousand people for the entire duration of the war.

From October 1942 to December 1943, the largest German mobilization was organized. On the basis of the Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 2383 ss of October 7, 1942 “On the additional mobilization of Germans for the national economy of the USSR”, German men aged 15 to 55 years old, as well as German women aged 16 to 45 years old, were drafted into the labor army , except for pregnant women and those who had children under the age of three. Children older than this age were transferred to the education of the rest of the family, and in their absence - to the closest relatives or collective farms.

The historiography of the "labor army" of the Great Patriotic War spans a little over 10 years. At the end of the 80s of the twentieth century, a number of publications appeared that raised the issues of the deportation of Soviet Germans and other peoples, in a number of which the problem of the relationship between the fate of the deported peoples and the "labor army" was raised. The Soviet Germans, together with all the people, brought victory over the aggressors closer, but history about this remains silent, as well as about what constitutes a "trudarmiya". A lot has been written about the contribution of the Soviet Germans to the cause of the Victory, but the question of the participation of Soviet Germans in the "labor army" is poorly covered.

Memories of work in the labor army.

The Zyryanovsky archive stores a book of registration of special settlers settled on the territory of the Zyryanovsky district in 1941-1942. The Germans, expelled from the Volga region and the Krasnodar Territory, found themselves in our region against their will. The Neiman family was evicted from the village of Dzhiginka from the Varenikovsky district of the Krasnodar Territory. The head of the family, the father, was taken back in 1937, declaring him an "enemy of the people", he died somewhere in distant Siberia. Then all the men, according to the memoirs of Erna Vasilievna, were taken from the village. The better a person worked, could provide for himself and his family, the stronger was the accusation against him. In 1941, more troubles fell on the orphaned large family: the war began, and with it the eviction inland. They announced that they needed to meet within three days. I had to leave everything that was acquired, and go under duress to unknown lands. We fed the livestock for the last time, released it into the field and drove off. True, they gave a certificate for the cow and heifer handed over to the state, promising that where they stop, the settlers will be given livestock according to this certificate. They were transported in wagons not intended for the transport of people, in the so-called "veal" wagons to Ust-Kamenogorsk. Each family on the train had its own two bricks, on which they prepared some food for themselves when they stopped. They brought them to Zyryanovsk on barges to the Gusinaya pier.

Neiman Erna during the war

In the Zyryanovsky district, the family was assigned to the village of Podorlyonok. Here, indeed, according to the certificate, they gave a cow, but they did not even begin to talk about the heifer.

From the story of Erna Vasilievna Neiman: “When we arrived in the Zyryanovsky district, we were placed with a lonely man who really did not want such tenants, but he was forced to accept us. Some time later I was sent to study at the school of mechanization at the courses of tractor drivers in the village. Bolshenarim. I also participated in the spring sowing campaign in the village of Podorlyonok after graduation. And then my mother and I, as part of a group of girls and women, were sent to the Kuibyshev region for logging. Mom cried a lot: after all, her three young children were left to the mercy of fate, in the arms of their 16-year-old daughter Irma, who worked on a sheep farm. But no one made allowances for the fact that the children were small. A decree was issued to send the Germans to the labor front, and it was subject to execution.

School of mechanization in Bolshenarym, 1942

Many of us were still children then, girls of 15-18 years old. They settled us in a barrack, 40 people in one room. They got up in the morning, each prepared some kind of lean soup for themselves. The food was more than meager. Everyone went to work in the forest on foot, and I on a tractor. It was very hard work. Young girls had to cut very large pine trees. These pines were so thick that three girls, holding hands, could hug the tree. They had to be sawn with hand saws, chopped off branches, sawn into logs to the desired dimensions. There was a man who sharpened their saws. Another team of girls - skidders, they moved logs to the road with large sticks, poles, so that I could hook them with a tractor. I hitched them up and took them to another road, from which they could pick up cars for further transportation. Girls also worked on loading. Loaded onto timber trucks by hand. They pushed the logs with their hands, helping with poles. Rafts were tied from logs, onto which more logs were loaded and taken to Kuibyshev, to Stavropol. The work was very hard, men were supposed to work in such work, but we, young girls, worked. And they had no right to refuse, because our only fault was that we were Germans, we were called fascists. They gave us a ration, which contained vegetable oil, flour, salted fish, and sugar. We changed part of the products from the local population, which treated us with understanding, helped us, despite the fact that they themselves did not live well. I worked on a tractor, so it was a little easier for me than for the others: either you plow someone's garden, or you bring some firewood from the forest, for which they will give you potatoes, ghee or other products.

At logging sites

We suffered not only from hunger, but also from the cold. They practically did not give out any clothes, we had to sew them ourselves somehow from something suitable. They gave me a wipe on the tractor, and I sewed a skirt out of it. Bast shoes made of bast were given out on their feet. To make these bast shoes, they removed the bark from the linden and from this bast they wove them for us like shoes. In front, the leg is covered with these bast shoes, there is nothing behind, they wrapped the legs with rags. They gave out sleeves from jerseys, we put them on our legs to the knees, tied them up. So I caught a strong cold over the years, and then I could not give birth to children. And my legs got so cold that now I can’t even walk on my own. I was in the labor army for six years.

And in 1948 we were allowed to go home. And only those who had relatives were released. But my friend Polina, who also worked on a tractor, was not released. My mother, as having young children, was released two or three years earlier than me, after the end of the war. My sixteen-year-old sister stayed with three little brothers, taking care of them herself. She worked on a sheep farm. The local people felt sorry for her, knowing what position the young girl was in, they helped her. They allowed to take home some wool, the brothers spun from this wool, knitted socks for themselves and sold them for a bucket of potatoes or for other products.

Then we moved to Zyryanovsk, where I got married. My husband's first wife died, and I raised my son and adopted daughter. She worked on a tractor for a long time. An enrichment plant was built here, building materials were transported there on a tractor.

2015

Now Erna Vasilievna lives in a private house, dreaming of moving into an apartment, because living in a house with stove heating at 92 is not easy. But dreams remain dreams, you can’t get 40,000 tenge for retirement, you don’t have enough money to pay for the exchange. She is helped by her daughter, who herself has health problems, granddaughter, great-grandson. Her legs almost do not work, it is very difficult to move around the house. A girl from the welfare department comes to her, brings groceries. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Victory, she, as a home front worker, was awarded a medal, because she contributed to the fact that there was peace in our country.

It remains only to regret that this woman, in whose life politics interfered so rudely, first taking her father, and then throwing her away from her native places and sending her to the labor army as a punishment for nothing, never received it. She does not complain, does not reproach anyone for the circumstances, but simply continues to live, overcoming the next obstacles ...

Senior archivist Zyryanovsk branch
Saule Tleubergeneva

Bulgar Stepan Stepanovich

MOBILIZATION OF THE GAGAUZS TO THE "LABOR ARMY" DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The article considers for the first time the fate of the Gagauz mobilized into the "labor army" in 1944-1945. on the territory of the Moldavian SSR and the Odessa region of the Ukrainian SSR to work as "Labour Army" in the regions of the Soviet Union. For the first time, archival materials on the Gagauz villages of Moldova are introduced into scientific circulation, little-known pages of the history of the mobilization of the Gagauz in the "labor army" are revealed, and the problems of falsification of the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in the Republic of Moldova are considered.

Article address: www.gramota.net/materials/3/2017/5/8.html

Source

Historical, philosophical, political and legal sciences, cultural studies and art history. Questions of theory and practice

Tambov: Diploma, 2017. No. 5(79) C. 35-44. ISSN 1997-292X.

Journal address: www.gramota.net/editions/3.html

© Gramota Publishing House

Information about the possibility of publishing articles in the journal is available on the website of the publisher: www.gramota.net Questions related to the publication of scientific materials, the editors ask to be sent to: [email protected]

He returns to the image of Death in the film "Weary Death" (1921), in which the character who takes lives suffers himself from the fact that he is doomed to follow the Divine will. In "Metropolis" (1927), a female robot will appear, like the courtesan Julia, capable of depraved dances to make the crowd rage and destroy the city. The ghostly characters that mark the death of the hero appear repeatedly in the Dr. Mabuse trilogy (1922, 1933, 1960) and the film Spies (1927). The theme of the continuity of Evil, passed down through the decades, will become the leitmotif of films about Mabuse. However, the most important outcome of the first two years of Fritz Lang's film career is the transition from the notion of cinema as a spectacle that implements a socio-philosophical idea, but does not pretend to be a strict composition and lacks a logical connection between episodes, to the creation of large-scale narratives, clearly divided into "chapters" and realizing the unity of artistic thought and a powerful visual range.

List of sources

1. Zolnikov M. E. The early films of Fritz Lang in the context of film expressionism in the 1910s-1920s. (“Tired Death” and “Nibelungs”) // Historical, philosophical, political and legal sciences, cultural studies and art history. Questions of theory and practice. 2015. No. 10 (60): in 3 parts. Part 3. S. 63-66.

2. Lang F. I never knew how to relax [Electronic resource]. URL: http://wwwcineticle.com/slova/615-fri1z-lang-lost-interview.html (accessed 03/06/2017).

3. Lunacharsky A. V. About art: in 2 volumes. M.: Direct-Media, 2014. T. 1. Art in the West. 458 p.

4. Sadul Zh. General history of cinema: in 6 volumes / per. from fr. M .: Art, 1982. T. 4 (First semi-volume). Europe after the First World War. 528 p.

5. Slepukhin S. V. The motives of the "Dance of Death" by Thomas Mann // Foreign Literature. 2013. No. 8. S. 233-264.

6. Hilda Warren and death [Electronic resource]: reviews and reviews of viewers. URL: https://www.kinopoisk.ru/film/72910/ (date of access: 03/06/2017).

FORMATION OF THE DIRECTOR FRITZ LANG "S ARTISTIC WORLD IN CREATION OF THE SCRIPTS OF THE FILMS "HILDE WARREN AND THE DEATH" (1917) AND "THE PLAGUE OF FLORENCE" (1919)

Bulavkin Klim Valer"evich, Ph. D. in Philology Roman Sergei Nikolaevich, Ph. D. in Philology Moscow Regional Institution of Higher Education "University for Humanities and Technologies" in Orekhovo-Zuyevo

[email protected] en

The article deals with the artistic peculiarities of the films shot by other directors on the basis of Fritz Lang's early scripts. The authors ascertain the figurative and ideological similarity of these films to the classical works of Lang. The evolution of creative techniques, which the cinematographer uses in the first years of his work, is analyzed. Connection between the images of Death and Plague in the films based on Lang's scripts and the ideas of Death in the German culture is studied.

Key words and phrases: cinematography; history of feature and live-action films; expressionism; image of Death; Fritz Lang.

UDC 94 (470.56) "1941/1945" Historical sciences and archeology

The article deals for the first time with the fate of the Gagauz people mobilized into the "labour army" in 1944-1945. on the territory of the Moldavian SSR and the Odessa region of the Ukrainian SSR to work as "Labour Army members" in the regions of the Soviet Union. For the first time, archival materials on the Gagauz villages of Moldova are introduced into scientific circulation, little-known pages of the history of the mobilization of the Gagauz in the “labor army” are revealed, and the problems of falsification in the Republic of Moldova of the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 are considered.

Key words and phrases: Gagauz; labor army; THE USSR; Great Patriotic War 1941-1945; mobilization; Moldavian SSR; Odessa region.

Bulgar Stepan Stepanovich

Research Center of Gagauzia named after M. V. Marunevich, Comrat, Gagauzia, Republic of Moldova bulg200 [email protected]

MOBILIZATION OF THE GAGAUZS TO THE “LABOR ARMY” DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The topic of the contribution of the Gagauz people to the victory of the Soviet people over fascism in the Great Patriotic War was not considered in Soviet historiography, nor was the mobilization of the Gagauz people into the "labor army" of the USSR in 1941-1945. In the historiography of the Republic of Moldova, at present, the participation of the Gagauz in the "labor army" during the Great Patriotic War is hushed up, while the theme of "occupation

Bessarabia by the Red Army, and also puts forward the thesis “about the liberation” nature of the war of Germany and Romania against the USSR. All neighboring peoples are considered from the position of the concept of Romanianism as "hostile to the Romanian family", and national minorities - as a "fifth column".

In the newspaper “Literature shi Arta” of the Union of Writers of the Moldavian SSR in 1990, an article “Rights or Privileges” by Margarita Grigoriu was published, where she wrote about the Gagauz: “None of them fought at the front in the war. It is known that Bulgarians from other villages were also exempted from these ordeals. Therefore, today the Bulgarian and Gagauz villages are so numerous ... ". And in the newspaper "Fakel" of the Popular Front of Moldova for 1990, the author of the article "No Compromise" Stefan Cazacu wrote: "During the Second World War, the Bessarabians were mobilized into the ranks of the Red Army. Some of them - in the very first days of the war, the rest later. It must be emphasized that the Bulgarians and Gagauz were exempted from military service in the Red Army. . The well-known Moldavian historian of Bulgarian origin S. Z. Novakov subjected these insinuations to fair criticism; XX century in the republican press, the version that the Bessarabian Bulgarians did not participate in the Great Patriotic War is untenable, “since their mobilization for the labor front was no less important than conscription into the active Soviet army, especially since many died in the mines and from illness, cold. Mobilized to the labor front also contributed to the victory over fascism. Work at factories and mines in the Urals continued for them from November 1944 until the end of 1946 [Ibid.].

Ignoring the participation of the Gagauz in the Great Patriotic War leads to the fact that the topic of repression, deportation, famine is artificially exaggerated, and the conscientious work of the Gagauz and Bulgarians in the coal mines of Karaganda and Donbass, at the metallurgical plants of Chelyabinsk and at numerous construction sites of the USSR is hushed up. Thus, a great and significant phenomenon in the history of the war and in the post-war years is doomed to oblivion.

It should be noted that in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, when in the summer of 1941 hostilities took place on the border with Romania, on the territory of the Moldavian SSR and in the southern regions of the Odessa region of the Ukrainian SSR, when the concept of "labor army" had not yet come into use, hundreds The Gagauz were mobilized into the working battalions of the Red Army. In fact, the workers' battalions were the prototype of the future labor army.

The term "labor army" arose in the USSR during the Civil War and meant the real-life "revolutionary armies of labor". N. A. Morozov writes in his research that “Trudarmia is a paramilitary form of labor for certain categories of Soviet citizens in 1941-1945.” [Cit. Quoted from: Ibid., p. 161]. P. N. Knyshevsky, considering the activities of the State Defense Committee for the mobilization of labor resources, expands the list of military mobilized for alternative service (labor front) [Cit. by: Ibid.]. Despite the fact that the term "labour army" is rarely found in the documents of the republican and federal authorities in 1941-1945. [Ibid., p. 154], we find it in various documents of the local authorities of the Gagauz regions of the Moldavian SSR: for example, in the Protocol No. 5 of the meeting of the executive committee of the Comrat District Council of Workers' Deputies of December 16, 1944, where the issue “On the approval of lists for mobilization for labor” was considered on the agenda. front along the district. Reports pres. District Executive Committee Comrade Chebotar.” (Gagauzia, Republic of Moldova, hereinafter - RM); in Minutes No. 5 of the meeting of the Comrat Regional Executive Committee dated November 22, 1944 (Gagauzia, RM) [Ibid.]. In the household book for 1947-1950. of the Executive Committee of the Tatar-Kopchak s / council of the Taraclia region of the MSSR (Gagauzia, RM) in the column “absence mark” it is indicated: F. I. Chavdar (born 1919, Gagauz) “mob. in labor 10.10.44"; U. D. Braga (b. 1926, Gagauz) [Ibid., l. 79] mobilized "20.11.44 Trudarmia"; F. I. Filioglo (b. 1922, Gagauz) [Ibid., l. 91] “mob. in labor 20.11.44"; Z. F. Chavdar (b. 1926, Gagauz) and A. M. Chavdar (b. 1914, Gagauz) [Ibid., l. 837] mobilized “10.10.44 prom. work"; F. F. Nedeoglo (born 1916, Gagauz) and M. F. Yusyumbeli (born 1911, Gagauz) were mobilized “10.10.44 labor. front” [Ibid., d. 14, l. 799, 800] and others. The Protocol No. 5 of the meeting of the Comrat Executive Committee of the Bendery District of the MSSR dated March 22, 1946 says: “We decided: To approve the list of persons of the labor front presented for awarding medals “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 ."" .

Those who shied away from labor duties were considered as deserters from the front. The above-cited Minutes No. 5 of the meeting of the executive committee of the Comrat District Council of Workers' Deputies dated December 16, 1944 states that “Chairman. comrade Chadyryan and his deputy comrade Marin do not fight deserters, and from here there are 800 deserters in the village council.” [Ibid., d. 1, l. 5].

The "labor army" was recruited primarily from representatives of the so-called "unreliable" peoples, that is, Soviet citizens ethnically related to the population of the countries at war with the USSR: Germans, Finns, Romanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians. However, if the Germans found themselves in the "labor army" already from the end of 1941, then work detachments and columns of citizens of other nationalities noted above began to form only at the end of 1942, and the mobilization of the Gagauz into the "labor army" (according to other documents - in " The Red Army, on the "labor front", "industrial work") began in the fall of 1944 in the territories of mass residence of the Gagauz in the Moldavian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR. Apparently, based on a long tradition of resolving the issue of the ethnic identity of the Gagauz, the Soviet authorities ranked them as Bulgarians or a people related to the Bulgarians.

During the Great Patriotic War, "Labour Army" began to be called those who performed forced labor service. At the end of the 80s. In the 20th century, publications appeared that raised issues of the deportation of peoples, in which the problem of the relationship between the fate of the deported peoples and the "labor army" was raised. Speaking about the fate of the Soviet Germans, some authors noted that they were "mobilized into the so-called" labor army "" [Ibid.]. Others pointed out that the available publications reflected the contribution of the Soviet Germans to the cause of the Victory, but did not mention the participation of the Soviet Germans in the "labour army" [Ibid., p. 155]. The history of the formation and functioning of the “labor army” during the Great Patriotic War began to a large extent to be associated with the fate of the “labor mobilized Germans” [Ibid., p. 156], while in reality the mobilization into the “labor army” affected the fate of many peoples of the USSR, among which, in addition to the Germans, there were other peoples, including the Bulgarians [Ibid.] and the Gagauz. Representatives of the peoples of Central Asia, among whom were Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, were also mobilized into the "labor army" during the Great Patriotic War.

Military enlistment offices and internal affairs bodies were engaged in mobilization and formation of the "labor army", the personnel were assigned the status of those liable for military service. For the non-appearance of a mobilized person at a recruiting or assembly point, for unauthorized leaving work or desertion, criminal liability was established. The mobilized were supervised by the NKVD, thereby providing the national economy with free labor. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the NKVD had become the largest industrial and construction department; during the war, prisoners and labor mobilized worked at the construction sites and industrial facilities of the NKVD. During the war years, by special decrees of the Soviet Government, a contingent of special settlers, together with the local population, was mobilized for work in industry and for the most important construction projects.

De facto, a special group of people was formed, which was supposed to work until the end of the war as part of the "labor army". This group was heterogeneous in its social and national composition. It included both full-fledged citizens of the Soviet state, and those with limited rights. The Gagauz and Bulgarians of Moldova and the Odessa region of Ukraine were not limited in their rights, but, nevertheless, they were unofficially ranked as "unreliable peoples."

Since September 1944, the Gagauz and Bulgarians of Moldova began to be mobilized into the labor army, about which there is an entry in the Household Books of the executive committee of the Tatar-Kopchak village / council of the Taraclia region of the MSSR (Gagauzia, RM) for 1945-1946, for 1947-50 with an entry in the "absence mark" column. Here are examples of records: “20.09.44 of the Red Army”, “20.10.44 of the Red Army” [Ibid., l. 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72], “10.44 in the army” [Ibid., d. 7, l. 409, 410, 412, 419, 421, 422], “02.11.44 of the Red Army” [Ibid., d. 3, l. 1], "20.12.44 of the Red Army" [Ibid., l. 17, 39, 40, 47, 49], "1944 of the Red Army" [Ibid., d. 12, l. 680, d. 13, l. 709, 713, 776, 777], "1945 of the Red Army" [Ibid., d. 7, l. 448, 449, 462, 464, 486, 489], “01/05/45 arrested” [Ibid., d. 3, l. 6]. In the village of Tatar-Kopchak (today - the village of Kopchak, Gagauzia, RM) in the period of interest to us 1945-1946. and 1947-1949 35 household books have been preserved. For other villages

There are much fewer books in Gagauzia.

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Rice. 1. "Household book of the main production indicators of farms in rural councils" for 1947-1949. on 27 sheets. Komrat district, Novo-Komrat s/soviet

Rice. 2. Members of the "labor front" from the city of Vulcanesti: on the left - N. G. Kostev. 1945, Stalinsk (today - Novokuznetsk) Kemerovo region.

There are records about mobilization into the labor army in the column "absence mark" in household books and other villages with a Gagauz population (Gagauzia, RM). Let's give examples. So, in the Household Book

for 1945-1947 M.K. Bayraktar (born 1914, Gagauz, village of Dezginzha), mobilized in Trud. Arm.» and etc.; in Household Books for 1947-1949. N.P. Keosya (born in 1902, Gagauz, Comrat) was noted in the Novo-Komratsky s / council of the Comratsky district of the MSSR - “1944 Labor. army ", F. A. Kamilchu (born 1921, Gagauz, Comrat) -" 12/20/44 Labor. army” [Ibid., d. 24, l. 146] and others; in Household Books for 1947-1949. F. A. Kysa (born in 1901, Gagauz, Comrat) is listed as mobilized “20.09.44 Labor. Arm.» , G. A. Terzi (born 1904, Gagauz, Comrat) mobilized in “1944 Trud. army, Cheremkhovo, Irkutsk region.” [Ibid., d. 36, l. 18] and others; in the Household Book for 1945-1946. G.P. Sarandi (born 1901, Gagauz, Avdarma village) is listed on the Avdar-Minsk s / council - mobilized “10.12.44 Labour. Arm.» , V.P. Yazadzhi (born 1915, Gagauz, Avdarma village) mobilized “10.12.44 Labour. Arm.» [Ibid., l. 5] and others; in the Household Book for 1945-1946. according to the Kirsov village council of the Comrat district of the Moldavian SSR, S. S. Sapunzhi (born 1898, Gagauz, village of Kirsovo) is listed as mobilized “02.12.1944 Labor. Arm.» ; in the Household Book for 1944-1946. according to the Kongaz village / council of the Comrat district of the MSSR, I. Karaseni (born 1904, Gagauz, Kongaz village) is listed - “1944 of the Red Army”; in the “Household book” for 1945, according to the Chok-Maidan village council, I. I. Slav (born 1922, Gagauz, Chok-Maidan village) was noted as mobilized in “Labor. Arm.» .

Rice. 3. "Household book" for 1945-1946. according to the Tatar-Kopchak s / council. F. I. Filioglu (b. 1922, village of Tatar-Kopchak) mobilized in 1944 in the Red Army

In the "Household Books" according to the Beshalma village council of the Comrat district of the Moldavian SSR for 1947-1949. G. D. Bodur (born 1923, Gagauz, village of Beshalma) was noted as mobilized in “1944 Trud. army ", P. V. Karakly (born in 1922, Gagauz, village of Beshalma) mobilized in" 1944 Labour. army” [Ibid., d. 9, l. 94]. According to the "household books" of the above villages, a table was compiled indicating the number of those mobilized into the "labour army" (see Table).

Rice. 4. "Household book" for 1945-1947. according to the Dezginzhinsky s / council. M. K. Bayraktar (born 1914, village of Dezginzha) was mobilized into the “labor army”

Rice. 5. "Household book" for 1945-1946. according to the Kirsov s / council. V. S. Khorozov (b. 1897, village of Kirsovo) was mobilized in November 1944 into the “labor army”

Rice. 6. "Household book" for 1947-1949. according to the Novo-Komratsky village council of the Komratsky district of the MSSR. I. A. Domuscha (born in 1920, Comrat) was mobilized on December 1, 1944 in the “labor army”

Rice. 7. "Household book" for 1944-1946. according to the Kongaz s / council. K. A. Uzun (born in 1920, the village of Kongaz) was mobilized in 1944 in the Red Army

Rice. 8. "Household book" for 1947-1949. according to the Staro-Komratsky village council of the Comratsky district of the MSSR.

D. N. Kroitor (b. 1903, Comrat) was mobilized in 1944 into the “labor army”

Let us pay attention to discrepancies in the records of mobilization into the "labor army" in the cited books. So, W. D. Braga (born 1926, Gagauz) in the column “absence mark” in the Household Book for 1945-1946. mobilized in the "RKKA 20.11.44." , and he, U. D. Braga (born 1926, Gagauz), is listed in the Household Book for 1947-1949. as mobilized "20.11.44 Trudarmiya". And there are many such discrepancies, which allows us to say that the mobilization in the Red Army in 1944 was like mobilization in the "labor army". Such mobilizations continued after the end of the war because of the lack of manpower to restore the destroyed national economy, in particular to work in coal mines.

The mobilized, as well as those drafted into the army, were handed summons. So, on May 17, 1945, the Chishmekey village council (Gagauzia, RM) handed over 50 selected peasants summons for a month of work at the Chumai state farm (RM), on July 22 - 25 peasants from the same village. The chairman of the Chishmekey s / council "in January 1945 arrested and put in the basement 7 mobilized people because they expressed their unwillingness to go to work in the city of Sevastopol" . By the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the MSSR dated February 27, 1947, the district executive committee approved a plan for contracts with the Artemugol plant (Donetsk region), according to which 180 people should go to work from the villages of Chishmekoy and Vulkanesti, less from other villages, and only 1500 people.

Petr Petrovich Kurdoglo (b. 1923, village of Baurchi, Gagauzia, RM) says: “Me and other residents of the village. Baurchi was mobilized into the labor army. My fellow countryman Dobrozhan and I ended up in one of the working battalions and carried out construction and restoration work in the city of Odessa ... ".

Residents of Vulkanesht (Gagauzia, RM) were mainly sent to the Donbass for restoration work, to the city of Serov, Krasnoyarsk Territory, the city of Stalinsk (Novokuznetsk), Kemerovo Region, and others. Nikolai Georgievich Kostev (born 1920, Vulkanesti, RM) He said that in October 1944 more than a hundred people from Vulcanest were mobilized into the labor army of the USSR, they were put on a freight train in Chisinau and sent to Kazan. In early February, they arrived in the city of Stalinsk (Novokuznetsk) in the Kemerovo region, where they were sent to the bathhouse again, then settled in a hostel, and the next day they were assigned to work. N. G. Kostev got a job as an observer to a blast furnace [Cit. by: 13, p. 565-566].

Pantelei Ilyich Dimov (born 1926, Vulkanesti) in 1945 was mobilized to the labor front in the city of Stalinsk in the Urals and sent to work at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine. His wife recalled: “We lived in long barracks. The barrack had several entrances, each entrance had 4-5 rooms, each

room for 5-7, or even 9 people. The Raspopov family huddled in one room: father, mother and three adult daughters, as well as the owner's mother. The family willingly accepted the son-in-law. They lived happily and together. In 1950 they moved to Vulkanesti...” [Cit. Quoted from: Ibid., p. 568].

Rice. 9. Participants of the “labor front” from the village of Kurchi (from left to right): G. P. Kulaksyz (b. 1925), Kh. E. Kulaksyz (b. 1924), P. E. Kulaksyz (b. 1926) R.). 1945, Karaganda (and the inscription on the back of the photo)

From the village of Kazaklia, D. D. Uzun (b. 1928), S. S. Gara, S. Kikhayal, I. M. Pen, M. Kuyuzhuklu and others.

In Ukraine, the mass mobilization of men of military age into the "labor army" at the enterprises of the Donbass and the Urals, Kazakhstan, etc., in the industrial centers of Ukraine and Russia began in November 1944.

Members of the "labor army" Ivan Trufkin and Vasily Bolgar from the village. Kubey (today - the village of Chervonoarmeiskoye, Bolgradsky district of the Odessa region, Ukraine) was told that in 1945 they were called “to the labor front in the mines of the Urals. We were identified in the city of Karpinsk, Sverdlovsk region. There, at the second section of the mine, we were extracting coal for a post-war country where there was an acute shortage of labor. For downhole work, captured German and Romanian military uniforms without shoulder straps, captured by the Soviet Army during the war, were issued as overalls. Hard physical labor was compensated by relatively good nutrition. [Cit. Quoted from: Ibid., p. 194-195].

1154 people were mobilized from the village of Kubey to the labor army [Ibid., p. 194]. There were cases of desertion from work. Thus, I.M. Zaim (b. 1922, village of Kubey) left his place of work and came home from Donbass, where he was arrested and convicted [Ibid., p. 193-194]. N. S. Ivanov was sentenced to ten years for escaping from the Donbass [Ibid., p. 194].

Kh. V. Bolgar (born 1932, Kubey) says: “According to the agenda of the Bolgrad military registration and enlistment office, I was mobilized into the labor army and sent in 1951 to the city of Lugansk at the 3-BIS mine. He worked as a miner, loaded coal onto a conveyor, lying on his side. [Cit. Quoted from: Ibid., p. 193-194].

About mobilization into the labor army in December 1944 in the village of Kurchi (today - the village of Vinogradovka, Bolgradsky district of the Odessa region, Ukraine), its participant P.F. dressed in winter clothes, everyone had bags of groceries for the road. After the announcement of the names, the column headed for the city of Bolgrad. On December 24, 1944, at the Tabaki station (railway station of the Bolgrad station), the mobilized were put into freight cars and sent to Kazakhstan, to the city of Karaganda. The mobilized were on the road for more than forty days, food ran out, some fell ill with relapsing fever. In the city of Karaganda, the mobilized were distributed among mines and construction sites. The salary of apprentice miners was 600 rubles, miners - 2000 rubles. Adults worked as apprentices on a par with miners, and received much less wages.

Former chairman of the collective farm with. Kurchi Alexander Alekseevich Banev wrote about this period: “Immediately after the liberation, the period of restoration of the national economy of the country began. Our village Kurchi, like all other villages, contributed to the solution of this important state task: more than 800 people left for mobilization in November-December 1944 in Karaganda. [Cit. by: 12, p. 178-179].

According to the Moldavian historian P. M. Shornikov, in total from November 1944 to May 1945 in Moldavia 35,890 people were called up in the order of labor mobilization; half of them, 17,370 people, were sent to work outside the republic. A footnote was used in the work of the historian, from which it is not clear what source he relies on, therefore the number given by P. M. Shornikov raises doubts, especially since he wrote about labor mobilization, and not about mobilization into the labor army.

It should be noted that the question of labor mobilization is broader than the question of the labor army. Labor duties were different. Since 1944, in the Soviet Union, due to a shortage of labor force, mobilization by organized recruitment was used in a number of regions of the country. Moldavian historian Ruslan Shevchenko writes about this in his article “The Migration Policy of the Soviet Regime in the MSSR (1940-1947)”: “In the list of materials used by us, a very special place belongs to the fund 3100 of the National

Archive of the Republic of Moldova ... This is the Main Directorate of Labor Reserves (1940-1941), the Moldavian Republican Office for Organized Recruitment of Workers (hereinafter - KONR) (1947-1954), the Main Directorate for Resettlement and Organized Recruitment of Workers (hereinafter - GU PONR, 1954 -1967), State Committee for Labor Resources (Goskomtrud, 1967-1977) ". On August 9, 1940, “The Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to send 20,000 workers to Moldova, instead of which 7,000 peasants from the MSSR were mobilized to the enterprises of the Ministry of the Coal Industry of the USSR. During August 1940, 36,356 citizens of the republic were forcibly mobilized from Moldova to the eastern regions of the USSR. People were recruited for work, but not through the draft board, but on a voluntary basis. The Labor Army members were mobilized only through the military registration and enlistment offices (by handing in a summons), not on a voluntary basis, but as conscripts who were sent to the front. Accordingly, criminal punishment was also provided for evading mobilization. The labor army recruitment policy continued until 1946, and voluntary recruitment continued later. The law recognizing Labor Army members as participants in the Great Patriotic War did not apply to people recruited for various jobs. Consequently, it is necessary to recognize as incorrect the information available in the literature, which can be taken as accurate data on people mobilized into the labor army. In order to at least approximately determine the number of Labor Army members, it is necessary to turn to household books as the most accurate sources.

In August-September 1944, the population of Moldova (including the Gagauz) was mobilized by the field military registration and enlistment office of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, in particular, in the city of Comrat (Gagauzia, RM) on August 25-31, 1944 by the advanced units of the Soviet Army (field mail number 26737) in the Comrat district of the Moldavian USSR, 2,392 people were called up. But soon the mobilization of the Gagauz in the Red Army was suspended, and those who had already been called up began to be returned back. And in December 1944, a new mobilization of the Gagauz and Bulgarians began, but already in the "labor army". So, when working with the "Household books of the main production indicators of farms in rural councils" for 1945-1946, 1947-1949. in the villages of Gagauzia (RM) Avdarma, Beshalma, Dezginzha, Kongaz, Kopchak, Chok-Maidan, the city of Comrat, the author of the article identified 1,224 mobilized, focusing on the column “absence mark” (see Table).

The number of those mobilized into the labor army (based on the entries in the column “absence mark” in the “Household books of the main production indicators of the farms of the rural councils of the Moldavian SSR” for the period 1944, 1945-1946, 1947-1949 in the villages of Avdarma, Beshalma, Dezginzha, Kirsovo, Kongaz, Tatar-Kopchak, Chok-Maidan and Comrat)

The total number of those mobilized to the front, to the Red Army, 1940-1941 To the Red Army, 10.44, 12.44, 1945, 1946. In the Red Army, 1944 - early. 1945 In "labor. army”, 1944. On “labour. front”, 1944 Mobilization. 10.44, 12.44 at the "prom. works" in books for 1947-1949. Arrested Camp Rum. army, 1942-1944

Tatar-Kopchak village, village council, Taraclia region, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

672 12 72 537 5 7 3 28 4 4

Chok-Maidan village, village council, Romanovsky district, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

40 - - 32 7 1 - - - -

Avdarma village, village council, Romanovsky district, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

184 4 6 - 171 - - 2 1 -

Dezginzha village, village council, Comrat district, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

2 - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 1 -

Congaz village, village council, Comrat region, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

20 8 - 4 - - - 7 - 1

Beshalma village, Comrat region, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

91 - 1 - 51 - 13 26 - -

Gagauz-Bulgarian village of Kirsovo, Comrat region, MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

103 8 - - 88 4 - 2 - 1

City of Comrat (Novo-Komratsky and Staro-Komratsky village councils), MSSR (Gagauzia, RM)

112 3 5 - 99 - - 5 - -

Total: 1224 35 85 573 422 12 16 70 5 6

Sources: .

According to the memoirs of the "Labor Army" and criminal cases against the "Labor Army" who deserted from their place of work, it is possible to determine the regions of the USSR where the mobilized Labor Army were sent. So, from the village of Baurchi, Chadyr-Lungsky district (Gagauzia, RM): V.P. Kyosia (born 1924), in the fall of 1944, mobilized in Novorossiysk to study at the FZO (factory training), for escaping was sentenced to 2 years in labor camp; S.P. Kyosya (born 1926), mobilized in the autumn of 1944 in Novorossiysk to study at the FZO, was sentenced to 2 years in labor camp for escaping; I. I. Kurdoglo (born 1928), mobilized in the city of Kerch, was sentenced to 2 years in prison for escaping in 1947 (released ahead of schedule); I. V. Kurdoglo (born 1913), mobilized in the “labor army” in August-September 1944, convicted of escaping, returned home in 1945; N.V. Kurdoglo (born 1927), mobilized to Donetsk, sentenced to 2 years in labor camp for escaping; P.P. Kurdoglo (born 1923), in September-October 1944, mobilized in Odessa to restore the seaport, was sentenced to 7 years in a labor camp in the Republic of Komi ASSR, Inta for escaping; N. S. Kurdoglo, who was mobilized in Odessa in September-October 1944, was sentenced for escaping to 7 years in a labor camp in the Republic of Komi ASSR, Inta, died in a camp in 1946; N. D. Slav (born 1903), mobilized into the "labour army" in 1945, sentenced to 8 years in labor camp for escaping from the location of the labor battalion, released ahead of schedule; I. N. Slav (born in 1908) in 1945 was sentenced to 8 years in a correctional labor camp for escaping, dosr. released; V. A. Filchev (b. 1927) mobilized to Donetsk, sentenced to 2 years in labor camp for escaping; I. V. Chernioglo (born 1906) was mobilized in the autumn of 1944 in the city of Odessa, for escaping in 1945 he was sentenced to 5 years in a correctional labor camp, Ufa, died in a camp in 1947. From the city of Vulkanesti (Gagauzia, RM): N. G. Kostev (b. 1920) was mobilized in October. 1944 in the city of Stalinsk (Novokuznetsk), Kemerovo Region, blast furnace supervisor (in 1950 he did not return from his home leave, was convicted, received a 4-month prison sentence); A. I. Filippov (born 1920) was mobilized in Donetsk to a metallurgical plant (for escaping home - 5 years in labor camp, six months later - amnesty); P. F. Pavlioglo (born 1901) was mobilized into the military industry at the Magnitogorsk Combine (a criminal case, convicted under Article 7 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR and Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Court dated 15 / ^.42). From the village of Avdarma, Komrat region (Gagauzia, RM), V.F. Yazadzhi (born 1921), in 1944, mobilized into the "labor army" in the city of Tuapse, a cargo port, was convicted for escaping on March 29, 1946 by Decree dated 12/26/41 for 5 years of engineering and technical work.

The researcher N. P. Paletskikh defined the categories of persons included in the labor army, “special contingent: prisoners, special settlers, labor army, prisoners of war, repatriates”. G. A. Goncharov supplements this list with a category that included the Bulgarians and Gagauz, mobilized into the "labor army" in 1944-1945. They, being legally free citizens, formed a separate social group that lived and worked under the same conditions as the representatives of the repressed peoples and deported citizens of the USSR. The labor army did not have sufficient food, the necessary clothing allowance, medical care and suitable living conditions, difficult working and living conditions were reflected in their physical condition. The norms of support and the level of wages of the labor army were lower than those of the "civilian workers". And yet, despite all the difficulties and difficulties of working in the rear during the Great Patriotic War and after it, the Gagauz people made a feasible contribution to the victory over fascism at the front and in the rear.

Members of the labor army at the present time, according to the legislation of Ukraine - the Law of Ukraine "On the status of war veterans, guarantees of their social protection" dated January 30, 2013 (Article 9 "Persons who belong to the participants in the war"), according to which "... 2) persons who, during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and the 1945 war with imperialist Japan, worked in the rear, at enterprises, institutions, organizations, collective farms, state farms, individual agricultural enterprises, at the construction of defensive lines, procuring fuel, products , drove cattle, studied during this period in trade, railway schools, schools and schools of factory training and other institutions of vocational education, at vocational training courses or while studying at schools, higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, worked on the farm and restoration of economic and cultural facilities. Participants in the war also include persons who during the Great Patriotic War worked in the territories that, after 1944, became part of the former Soviet Union ... "are recognized in their rights as participants in the Great Patriotic War and enjoy a number of benefits.

The Republic of Moldova adopted the Law “On Veterans” dated May 8, 2003 No. 190-XV (Article 7 “Veterans of War”), which states that “... 2) persons equated to participants in the war: c) persons, awarded orders or medals for selfless work during the Second World War, who worked in the rear from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945 for at least six months, excluding the period of work in the temporarily occupied territories of the former USSR ... "from among the participants in the labor armies currently have war veteran status and enjoy a number of benefits.

The position of the Gagauz, mobilized into the "labor army", was difficult not only physically, but also morally and psychologically, since the Gagauz were always with Russia, fought for the liberation of Bessarabia from the Romanian-German invaders. But the Soviet government did not take into account the patriotic sentiments of the Gagauz and their loyalty to Russia, the Soviet Union. The majority of the male population of the Gagauz people was officially drafted into the Red Army, but in reality these people were prepared for forced labor, and the attitude towards the Gagauz was unfairly manifested as one of the "unreliable peoples". It should be noted that a certain number of Gagauz served in the combat units of the Red Army and fought against the Nazi and Romanian invaders, these people showed courage and heroism and were awarded high government awards.

Thus, an appeal to the history of the Gagauz during the Great Patriotic War and for a number of years after its end leads to the conclusion that the Gagauz participated not only in hostilities. In 1944-1946.

more than three tens of thousands of them were involved in work in the so-called labor army - a paramilitary organization that was supposed to restore the national economy destroyed during the war. Until about the end of the 1940s. Together with representatives of other so-called "small peoples", the Gagauz worked both on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and on the lands of Ukraine and Russia, mainly in industrial areas. At the same time, those who were mobilized (hence, participants in the war) were also sent to FZU (factory schools) to receive a working specialty.

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GAGAUZ PEOPLE MOBILIZATION TO THE "LABOUR ARMY" IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Bulgar Stepan Stepanovich

Gagauzia Scientific Research Center named after M. V. Marunevici in Komrat, Gagauzia, The Republic of Moldova

[email protected]

The article for the first time examines the destiny of Gagauz people mobilized to the "Labor Army" in 1944-1945 within the territory of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and Odessa region of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to work as the "Labor Army" members in the USSR regions. The author introduces archival materials on Gagauz villages of Moldavia into scientific use, reveals little-known history of Gagauz people mobilization to the "Labor Army", and studies the problems of falsifying the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in the Republic of Moldova.

Key words and phrases: Gagauz people; labor army; The USSR; The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945; mobilization; The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic; Odessa region.

UDC 94 (470.6) "1813" (082) Historical sciences and archeology

The article is devoted to the study of the consequences of the Gulistan Peace for the development of Russian-Iranian relations in the first quarter of the 19th century. This document is analyzed in comparison with the Tehran agreement, which strengthened the position of Great Britain in Persia. The unsuccessful attempts of the Persian government to play on Russian-British contradictions in order to build a sovereign position are shown. The peaceful policy of St. Petersburg and the role of London in pitting Russia and Persia in order to establish their own hegemony in the region are noted. The escalation of regional tension is shown, which was later resolved by the first Herat crisis.

Key words and phrases: Gulistan world; Tehran Treaty; Russian-Iranian war; Iran; Russian empire; United Kingdom; A. P. Ermolov.

Vasiliev Sergey Dmitrievich

Saint Petersburg State University [email protected] gee

Vasiliev Dmitry Valentinovich, candidate of historical sciences, associate professor

Russian Academy of Entrepreneurship, Moscow dvvasш [email protected] gee

PEACE OF GULISTAN AND RUSSIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1810s

The first serious aggravation of Anglo-Russian relations in the Middle East occurred in the second half of the 1830s. and is associated with the first Herat conflict. At this time, the Persian policy of the Russian Empire was regarded by London as part of the expansionist intentions towards the eastern region, creating a direct threat to the British colonial possessions in the East Indies. All the actions of the British were aimed at eliminating Russia as their main competitor from the Persian market. In turn, St. Petersburg sought to put pressure on England in order to achieve her concessions in the theaters of the Near and Middle East and get support in resolving the Turkish issue (the issue of the Black Sea straits). In this situation, it was the Herat campaign of Muhammad Shah that pushed Russia and Iran against Afghanistan and England, became the starting point for the escalation of tension in the region and launched the “great game” of the two European powers in the Middle East arena.

This was preceded by a difficult period in the first decades of the 19th century, when Iran was gradually and steadily drawn into the struggle between Russia and Great Britain for hegemony in the region. The beginning of this struggle falls on the first Russian-Iranian war, which ended with the Gulistan peace.

At the beginning of the 19th century, feudal production relations dominated in agrarian Iran, some changes in which began to appear by the end of the 30s and 40s. the same century. In agriculture, there was an expansion of private land ownership. Bourgeois relations began to penetrate into other sectors: trade expanded, a certain modernization of the army began, printing houses appeared, newspapers began to be published, translations of Western fiction and scientific works were published, the country gradually opened up to the ideas of European enlighteners. Industry was represented by the simplest (dispersed and centralized) manufactories, where self-employed artisans gradually became hired workers. Full-fledged capitalist manufactories began to emerge only by the middle of the century. Politically, Iran remained an unrestricted Qajar feudal monarchy.

Early 19th century in relations between Russia and Iran is associated with the first Russian-Iranian war of 1804-1813, which resulted in the Peace of Gulistan (October 12, 1813), recognizing the Karabakh, Gandzha, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Cuban, Baku and Talysh khanates , Dagestan, Georgia, Imereti, Guria, Mingrelia and Abkhazia as parts of the Russian Empire. Article IV of the agreement required

Officially, these people were considered free, but in reality their life was practically no different from the life of prisoners. They usually lived in barracks. There was a lack of warm clothes, linen, bedding, shoes, not to mention food.

Mortality among the labor army was very high. They mostly died from dystrophy, in other words, malnutrition, since the rations were very scarce.

So, out of 120,000 labor army workers who worked at the factories of the Southern Urals, by the end of the war, a little more than 34,000 people survived. The dead were secretly buried at night in common graves without documents. They did not even install signs, which subsequently greatly hampered the work of search teams.

Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the Volga German Willy Goebel, who was born in 1925 in the village of Keppental and mobilized in November 1942 to the Gremyachinskoye coal deposit: “Every morning one or two dead people were carried out of the barracks. I especially remember January 1943. The frost reached minus 53 degrees. All builders were allowed to stay at home for two days. Later, it got a little warmer to minus 49, and then some boss ordered everyone to be taken out of the hut to clean up the railway track near the mine. More than 300 came out

Human. Every third person who returned from snow removal had frostbite on his hands or feet. Employees of the medical unit did not have the right to release even severely frostbite from work. And they were unable to go to work, and they were immediately deprived of bread rations and hot meals. For weakened people, this was tantamount to death. As a result of someone's bungling, we lost forever more than forty comrades.