Italo-Ethiopian war 1935 1936 summary. Fascist Italy attacked Ethiopia

275,000 died in action
300,000 starved to death 5
181,000 executed and destroyed in concentration camps

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Second Italo-Ethiopian War (Second Italo-Abyssinian War, Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936)- the war between the Italian Kingdom and Ethiopia, the result of which was the annexation of Ethiopia and the proclamation in its place, with the annexation of the colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia, the colony of Italian East Africa. This war showed the failure of the League of Nations, of which both Italy and Ethiopia were members, in settling international conflicts. In this war, banned chemical weapons were widely used by Italian troops: mustard gas and phosgene.

On January 7, 1935, the Franco-Italian Agreement was signed, according to which, in exchange for supporting France's positions in Europe, Italy received several islands in the Red Sea and the right to use the French section of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway to supply Italian troops. Following the signing of the agreement, Italy began moving troops to its African colonies using the railroad.

On May 26, 1935, the Italians provoked an incident on the Ethiopian border, but it was settled.

The armed forces of the parties at the beginning of the war

Ethiopia

The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was aware of the approaching war with Italy and made efforts to strengthen the army. In mid-1935, he made attempts to procure weapons, however Western countries refused to sell weapons to Ethiopia.

In July-August 1935, the Ethiopian Patriots Association was created, uniting 14 thousand activists.

In September 1935, when it became clear that war with Italy was inevitable, Ethiopia turned to the League of Nations with a request (in accordance with Article 15 of the organization's Charter) to take immediate measures to prevent the outbreak of war. As a result, the League of Nations decided to create a "committee of five powers", which was instructed to consider the possibility of resolving the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia through diplomatic means. Since the measures taken could not avert the threat, in September 1935 Emperor Haile Selassie declared a general mobilization. He managed to mobilize about 500 thousand people.

By the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian army included parts of the imperial guard (10 thousand people in units trained on the model of the regular army), provincial troops (formed according to the territorial principle) and the militia (formed according to the tribal principle).

Despite the solid number of troops, the country lacked modern weapons. Many warriors were armed with spears and bows, most of the firearms were obsolete rifles produced before 1900. According to Italian estimates, by the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian troops numbered from 350 to 760 thousand people, but only a quarter of the soldiers had received at least minimal military training . In total, the army accounted for about 400 thousand rifles of various manufacturers and years of production, about 200 obsolete artillery guns, about 50 light and heavy anti-aircraft guns, 5 light tanks. The Ethiopian Air Force consisted of 12 obsolete biplanes, of which only 3 were operational. [ ] .

Italy

Parts of the Italian army, native units of the colonial troops took part in the war (" Regio Corpo di Truppe Coloniali"") and the fascist militia ("black shirts").

In general, 400 thousand troops were concentrated for the war against Ethiopia, including: 9 divisions of the Italian army (seven infantry, one motorized and one Alpine) and 6 divisions of the fascist militia (1st "March 23", 2nd " October 28", 3rd "April 21", 4th "January 3", 5th "February 1" and 6th "Tevere").

The main part of the Italian army before the invasion of Ethiopia was deployed in Eritrea, where in 1935 5 divisions of the regular army and 5 divisions of blackshirts arrived; at the same time, one division of the regular army and several battalions of blackshirts arrived in Italian Somalia. This force alone (excluding the army already stationed in East Africa, native units and units that arrived during the war) consisted of 7,000 officers and 200,000 privates and was equipped with 6,000 machine guns, 700 guns, 150 tankettes and 150 airplanes. The general command of the Italian forces in East Africa until November 1935 was carried out by General Emilio de Bono, starting from November 1935 - Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio. The northern front (in Eritrea) consisted of five corps, the 1st was commanded by Rugero Santini, the 2nd by Pietro Maravina, the 3rd by Adalbetro Bergamo (then Ettore Bastico), the Eritrean corps by Alessandro Pircio Biroli. The forces of the Southern Front (in Somalia) were for the most part brought together in a column commanded by General Rodolfo Graziani.

The course of hostilities

At 10:00 a.m., Haile Selassie I issued the order for a general mobilization. He personally took over the leadership of military operations: an example of his leadership is the order of October 19:

Tents should be set up inside caves, under the cover of trees or in the forest, if the place allows it, and they should be separated by platoons. Tents should be placed at a distance of 30 cubits from one another

Noticing an airplane in the distance, you must immediately leave a large, well-visible road or open field, and move on, adhering to narrow valleys and trenches, along winding roads, trying to stay closer to the forest or tree plantations.

For targeted bombing, the aircraft needs to descend to a height of about 100 meters, as soon as this happens, you should give a friendly volley from reliable, long guns, and immediately disperse. A plane hit by 3 or 4 bullets will crash to the ground. Only those to whom such an order has been given, and whose weapons have been specifically determined to be appropriate for the task, are to fire; shooting indiscriminately will only waste ammunition, and reveal the location of the squad to the enemy.

Due to the fact that, as the aircraft gains altitude, it fixes the position of people, it is safer for the squad to remain dispersed as long as the aircraft is in sufficient proximity. In view of the fact that it is common for an enemy in a war to target decorated shields, galloons, cloaks embroidered with silver and gold, silk shirts, etc. Therefore, for those who wear outerwear or do not have it, it would be preferable to use dull shirts flowers with narrow sleeves. When, with God's help, we will return<в страну>you will be allowed to adorn yourself again with gold and silver. But now is the time to fight. We give you this advice in the hope of saving you from the danger of indiscretion. We also inform you that we are ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with our subjects and shed our blood in the name of a free Ethiopia ...

However, these instructions were of little help to the Ethiopian warriors in their actions against the modern army. Most of the Ethiopian commanders were passive, some feudal lords generally refused to obey orders from the imperial headquarters, many out of arrogance did not want to adhere to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Nobility in the Ethiopian army from the very beginning was in the first place, to the detriment of talent. Three commanders of the fronts were appointed tribal leaders - the Kasa, Syyum and Getachou races.

The disunity of their armies on the Northern and Southern fronts negatively affected the combat positions of the Ethiopians. Due to the lack of an extensive road network and a sufficient amount of transport, this prevented the timely transfer of reinforcements. Unlike the Italians, the Ethiopians actually did not have a central group of troops opposing the invading enemy units in the Ausa area. The Ethiopians counted on the armed detachments of the Sultan of Ausa and on the inaccessibility of the desert region of Danakil; they did not foresee that the Sultan would go over to the side of the enemy and that the Italian units, moving on camels, would be provided with food and water by transport planes from Aseb. However, the fate of the war was decided on the Northern Front.

The stronghold of the Ethiopian troops soon became the city of Desse, where, on November 28, 1935, the headquarters of the emperor moved from Addis Ababa. In October - November 1935, the Italians captured the cities of the Tigre province. Ethiopian counteroffensive attempts were not always unsuccessful.

In December, Ras Imru - Haile Selassie's cousin - launched a successful attack on Aksum; On December 15, a 3,000-strong army crossed the river. Tekeze is about 50 km southwest of Adua. Immediately after the crossing, the Ethiopians attacked the Eritrean colonial battalion located here, into the rear of which another Ethiopian part imperceptibly penetrated, crossing the river below the crossing of the main forces of Ras Imru. In the battle, the Ethiopians destroyed 9 Italian officers, 22 Italian soldiers and 370 native Askari soldiers, captured 50 machine guns and rifles.

Haile Selassie demanded decisive action from the Kasa and Syyum races, who were operating on the central axis of the Northern Front. A unit under the command of Hailu Kabbede, consisting of soldiers of the Kasy and Syyum races, during a bloody 4-day battle, liberated the city of Abbi-Addi, which occupied an important strategic position in Tembepe, a forested-mountainous region west of Mekele. Here the Ethiopian soldiers took quite strong positions. During this battle, the Ethiopian soldiers managed to capture and disable several Italian tanks.

Failures infuriated Mussolini, for whom this war was his first full-fledged military campaign. The Duce tried to personally direct the military operations from Italy. Old Marshal De Bono often did not pay attention to instructions from Rome, although he did not openly object to Mussolini, but acted according to the situation, trying to adapt to Ethiopian conditions. Meanwhile, the war revealed a lot of shortcomings in the Italian army. She was poorly equipped and poorly supplied, looting, trade in medals and the "black market" flourished in military units. The rivalry between the army units and the fascist militia, which enjoyed many privileges, had an unfavorable effect on the mood among the troops.

Displacing Marshal De Bono, Mussolini in December 1935 ordered the new commander, Marshal Badoglio, to use chemical weapons, violating the Geneva Convention of 1925. Italian aviation systematically made raids deep into Ethiopian territory, bombing peaceful targets.

Haile Selassie subsequently wrote:

We attacked the enemy's machine-gun nests, his artillery, captured tanks with our bare hands, we endured aerial bombardments, but we could not do anything against poison gases that imperceptibly fell on our faces and hands.

In January 1936, the armies of the Kasa and Syyum races again went over to the offensive, broke through the Italian front and almost reached the Adua-Mekele road. But on January 20-21, the Italians, having received reinforcements in manpower and equipment, delivered a massive blow to the Ethiopian units, again using poison gases. Kasa and Syyum retreated and thereby forced the Ymru race to retreat; as a result of the counteroffensive, the invaders managed to wedge between the positions of the Kasa and Mulugeta races. Ethiopian troops on the Northern Front were divided into three isolated groups. Due to the lack of operational communication between them, the Italians had the opportunity of a phased attack on each of these groups, which was carried out by the Italian command.

At first, the Italians, who had superiority in manpower and equipment on each sector of the front, defeated the army of the Mulugeta race, located in the Amba-Aradom mountain range, while retreating, the Ethiopians were attacked by Oromo-Azebo units that rebelled against the emperor. The remnants of the Mulugeta army were killed by bombs while retreating to Lake Ashenge (north of Desse). Since Kasa and Siyum remained in the dark, the Italians in February 1936 went around their positions from the west: both Ethiopian commanders were shocked - they believed that the Italians would not be able to pass through the mountains, even if they won the battle. The races retreated to Simien; in March 1936, in a decisive battle in the Shire, on the right bank of the Tekeze, Ymru, the most talented of the races, was defeated (he had 30-40 thousand against 90 thousand Italians). Having crossed the Tekeze with losses, Ymru retreated to Ashenga. The last combat-ready units were concentrated here, and scattered detachments of the armies of the Mulugeta, Kasa and Syyum races defeated by the Italians flocked here.

At the headquarters of the emperor, they decided to give battle at Mai-Chou, north of Lake Asheng. The Ethiopian troops, numbering 31 thousand people, were opposed by the 125 thousandth Italian army with 210 artillery pieces attached to it, 276 tanks and hundreds of aircraft. The battle that determined the fate of Ethiopia began on March 31, 1936. At the very beginning, the Ethiopians were successful; they markedly pressed the enemy. But the next day, as a result of massive attacks by enemy artillery and aircraft, the Ethiopian troops retreated to their original positions.

On April 2, the Italians launched a counteroffensive. The imperial guard was almost completely destroyed by air attacks and powerful artillery fire. Haile Selassie's personal car and his radio station fell into the hands of the Italians. After the battle of Mai Chou, the Ethiopian army on the Northern Front practically ceased to exist. Only separate groups fought, using the tactics of guerrilla warfare. A few days later, Haile Selassie appealed to the world community for help:

“Do the peoples of the whole world not understand that by fighting to the bitter end, I not only fulfill my sacred duty to my people, but also stand guard over the last citadel of collective security? Are they so blind that they do not see that I am responsible to everything mankind?.. If they do not come, then I will say prophetically and without a sense of bitterness: the West will perish ... "

On April 1, 1936, the Italian units pursuing the Ymru race took Gonder.

On the Southern Front, the Italians under the command of Graziani inflicted a series of defeats on the armies of Ras Desta Demtyu and Dejazmatch Nesib Zamanel. Many close associates advised to fight near the capital, and then launch a guerrilla war, but Haile Selassie accepted England's offer of asylum. He appointed his cousin, Ras Ymru, as commander-in-chief and head of government, and on May 2 he left for Djibouti.

On May 5, Italian motorized units entered Addis Ababa.

By this time, most of the country was not yet controlled by the Italians; in the future, the active actions of the partisans, combined with the peculiarities of the relief, made it impossible for the Italian occupying army to completely control Ethiopia.

Actions of the Italian aviation

In total, from October 3, 1935 to May 5, 1936, 400 Italian aircraft were involved in the war against Ethiopia, the flight time of which amounted to 35 thousand hours. The planes delivered 1,100 tons of food and 500 tons of other cargo to the Italian troops, carried out 872 bombing, 178 machine-gun and 454 combined attacks (in which they used up 1,500 tons of bombs and 3 million rounds of ammunition), performed 2,149 short-range and 830 long-range reconnaissance sorties (the total duration of aerial photography in during which amounted to 300 hours).

International reaction

Volunteers from British India, Egypt and the Union of South Africa, as well as several US citizens of Negro origin, arrived to help Ethiopia.

In addition, anti-fascist Italians fought against the Italian expeditionary force, helping in the preparation, organization and conduct of the guerrilla war in Ethiopia. Among them are the publishers of the bulletin "Voice from Abyssinia" (Italian. La voce degli abissini) Domenico Rolla, Livorne Ilio Barontini and Trieste Anton Ukmar, nicknamed the "three apostles": "Peter", "Paul" and "John".

On August 31, 1935, the United States announced its intention not to sell weapons to both warring parties and refused to sell two ambulance aircraft to Ethiopia, however, at a meeting of the League of Nations, they voted against a proposal to establish a ban for Italy to use the Suez Canal to supply troops in Ethiopia. Britain also hesitated to close the Suez Canal to Italian ships.

Simultaneously, the French colonial authorities in Djibouti refused to move to the border with Ethiopia, and then detained a shipment of weapons ordered by the government of Ethiopia.

The Soviet Union resolutely came out in defense of the state sovereignty of Ethiopia, although it did not have diplomatic relations with it.

Economic sanctions against Italy came into force on November 18, 1935, 51 states joined the economic sanctions against Italy.

A number of countries refused to impose restrictions on trade and economic relations with Italy:

The USSR proposed to establish an embargo on the supply of oil and petroleum products to Italy, which was supported by 9 countries of the world (Argentina, Holland, India, Iran, New Zealand, Romania, Siam, Finland and Czechoslovakia), but in the end this proposal was rejected.

As Italy's aluminum production exceeded requirements, the League of Nations ban on aluminum sales to Italy proved to be meaningless. The ban on the sale of scrap iron and iron ore to Italy did not prove to be in any way effective, since this ban did not apply to pig iron and steel ingots. As a result, the embargo proved to be ineffective.

In December 1935, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Samuel Hora and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval proposed the Hora-Laval plan to Italy and Ethiopia, according to which Ethiopia was to cede the provinces of Ogaden and Tigre and the Danakil region to Italy, accept Italian advisers and provide Italy with exclusive economic benefits; in exchange for this, Italy had to cede access to the sea near the city of Assab to Ethiopia. On December 9, 1935, the text of the agreement was approved by the British government and presented to the League of Nations on December 13. On December 16, 1935, the Emperor of Ethiopia protested that the proposed plan was developed without the participation of Ethiopia and did not take into account the interests of Ethiopia as an independent state.

On July 4, 1936, the League of Nations decided to refuse further application of sanctions against Italy. On July 15, 1936, economic sanctions against Italy were lifted. December 11, 1937 Italy withdrew from the League of Nations. The war showed the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations as an instrument for settling international conflicts.

The first country to end diplomatic relations with Ethiopia was Latvia [ ] . On July 25, 1936, Germany terminated diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, and on November 18, 1936, the Japanese Empire. In 1937, only six states of the world (including the USSR, the USA and China) condemned the occupation of Ethiopia. In 1938, the sovereignty of Italy over the Ethiopian territory was recognized by Great Britain and France. The governments of the Spanish Republic and the USSR did not agree to the seizure of Ethiopia.

The results of the war

According to official data from Italy, during the war in Abyssinia 1935-1936. 2313 Italian soldiers, 1593 native troops and 453 Italian civilian workers died, Italy's direct military spending amounted to 12.111 billion lire, and the total cost of the war (taking into account the cost of building roads and railways, buildings and other necessary structures) - 40 billion lire.

The war provided the German secret services with a significant amount of information about the activities of the English navy. The war also contributed to some rapprochement between the naval forces of Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean - by April 1936, an exchange of information was established between them on the approximate location of the ships.

Subsequent events

A guerrilla war unfolded in the occupied territory of Ethiopia.

Ras Nasibu continued the war in northeastern Harare and Fikre Mariam in the area along the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway.

On July 28, 1936, Ethiopian guerrilla groups surrounded and attempted to storm the capital.

In the western part of the country, in 1936, the Black Lions partisan group arose, the basis of which was the military personnel of the Ethiopian army.

The troops of Ras Imru continued to operate in the provinces of Gojjam, Vollega and Ilubabar until the end of December 1936, when they were defeated. In the operation to destroy the troops of the Imru race, the Italians involved a large group of troops and 253 aircraft.

On February 19, 1937, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian partisans made an attempt on R. Graziani (several people were injured by fragments of a home-made bomb), in response to which the Italians began massacres and repressions - about 30 thousand people were killed over the next three days alone .

Until April 1937, individual units and detachments from the military personnel of the Ethiopian army continued to fight in the occupied territory of Ethiopia.

In the spring of 1937, an uprising began in the province of Wollo and Tigre.

In August 1937, an uprising broke out in the province of Gojjam.

In 1938, as a result of the unification of several partisan detachments, the “Committee of Unity and Cooperation” arose, which was headed by Auraris and Ras Abebe Aregai

Guerrilla warfare in occupied Ethiopia continued until 1941. The Italians were forced to hold large forces in the territory of "Italian East Africa".

On December 2, 1940, the commander of the British troops in the Middle East, A. Wavell, gave the order to begin preparations for an attack on the territory of Ethiopia. In January 1941, British troops launched an offensive (from Kenya through Italian Somalia, from southern Yemen through British Somalia and from Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) and on January 19, 1941 entered Ethiopian territory. On January 31, 1941, British Lieutenant General William Platt defeated the Italian General Frushi, on March 17, a detachment of the British entered Jijiga, and then the British launched an attack on Harar, the country's second largest city. During this offensive, British forces passed through the Marda Pass without a fight and occupied Harar on 25 March 1941.

On March 31, 1941, British troops broke through the fortified Karen Gorge. Later, with the support of the Ethiopian detachments, they continued the offensive. In April 1941, the native units formed by the Italians in Ethiopia began to defect to the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie.

On April 4, fighting began in the capital area, and on April 6, 1941, Ethiopian troops occupied Addis Ababa. After the loss of Addis Ababa, Italian troops began to retreat north to the Aladji mountain range.

On May 5, 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie returned to the capital. By the end of 1941, Italian forces were expelled from Ethiopia (however, British troops remained in the country until 1954).

In total, during the period of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936-1941), 760 thousand inhabitants of the country died (including 75.5 thousand participants in the partisan movement), the total economic damage (according to official data from the government of Ethiopia, named at the Paris Peace Conference of 1947 ) amounted to 779 million US dollars.

In 2001, Ethiopia turned to Italy with a request to provide information about the depots of ammunition and chemical equipment that were brought into this country during the war of 1935-1936. and were used from December 1935 to 1941 (against the Ethiopian guerrillas). Italy refused to provide this information. According to expert estimates, in 1935-1941. about 80 thousand tons of chemical warfare agents were imported into Ethiopia

Notes

Alberto Sbacchi, "The Price of Empire: Towards an Enumeration of Italian Casualties in Ethiopia 1935–1940", in ed. Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopianist Notes, vol. II, no. 2, p. 37.
Sbacchi, "The Price of Empire," p. 36.
Sbacchi, "The Price of Empire," p. 43.
Sbacchi, "The Price of Empire," p. 38.
History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. In 6 vols. T. 1. / Editorial board: P. N. Pospelov et al. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1960. - S. 103.
History of diplomacy. In 3 vols. T. 3. Diplomacy during the preparation of the Second World War (1919-1939) / Ed. V. P. Potemkin. - M.: OGIZ, 1945. - S. 514-515.
History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes) / editorial board, ch. ed. A. A. Grechko. Volume 2. M., Military Publishing House, 1974. pp. 44-45
History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes) / editorial board, ch. ed. A. A. Grechko. Volume 2. M., Military Publishing House, 1974. p. 49
History of diplomacy (in 3 vols) / ed. acad. V. P. Potemkin. Volume 3. Diplomacy during the preparation of the Second World War (1919-1939). M., OGIZ, 1945. p.549
Dmitry Zhukov. Archive: soldiers Duce // Bratishka magazine, August 2008
R. Ernest Dupuis, Trevor N. Dupuis. World History of Wars (in 4 vols.). book 4 (1925-1997). SPb., M., "Polygon - AST", 1998. pp. 66-69
Italo-Ethiopian war 1935-1936
G. V. Tsypkin. Ethiopia in the anti-colonial wars. M., "Nauka", 1988. p.239
History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes) / editorial board, ch. ed. A. A. Grechko. Volume 2. M., Military Publishing, 1974. p.46
Russian history. World, world history - History second …
Italo-Abyssinian war 1935-36 // Great Soviet Encyclopedia. / editorial board, ch. ed. B. A. Vvedensky. 2nd ed. Volume 49. M., State Scientific Publishing House "Great Soviet Encyclopedia", 1957. pp. 134-136

Second Italo-Ethiopian War (Second Italo-Abyssinian War, Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936)) - a war between the Italian kingdom and Ethiopia, which resulted in the annexation of Ethiopia and the proclamation of it, along with the colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia, colonies of Italian East Africa. This war showed the failure of the League of Nations, of which both Italy and Ethiopia were members, in settling international conflicts.

In this war, banned chemical weapons were widely used by Italian troops: mustard gas and phosgene. It is considered a harbinger of the Second World War (along with the Spanish Civil War). The victory in the war made Mussolini one of the most prominent and significant figures in European politics and showed the strength of the “Italian weapon”, it also encouraged him to overestimate his strength and get involved in a war with Greece, ended badly.

Benito Mussolini in Rome meets with Ethiopian collaborators. 1937

Fascism that came to power in Italy had a clear ideology of national superiority, which, of course, contradicted the continued existence of an independent African state created by Menelik II in Ethiopia. Duce Benito Mussolini from the beginning of his reign proclaimed a course towards the creation of a great Italian empire in the style of the Roman Empire.

A crowd in Rome's Piazza Venezia during Mussolini's speech on military mobilization. 1935

His plans included establishing control over the Mediterranean basin and northern Africa. Mussolini promised the people to equalize Italy with the main colonial empires: Great Britain and France. Ethiopia was the most convenient object for the implementation of the plans of the Italian dictator. There were several reasons for this. By that time, Ethiopia remained practically the only completely independent country in Africa. The capture of Ethiopia would allow the unification of the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somalia. In addition, Ethiopia was weak militarily: many warriors from the native tribes were armed with spears and bows. A victory over Ethiopia would make it possible to wash away the shame of the defeat at Adua weighing on Italy.

Haile Selassie in full uniform on a white horse

Haile Selassie, who received absolute monarchical power in Ethiopia, unlike Menelik II, who created Ethiopia, did not have enough adequate feedback with his people (which he completely lost by the end of his reign). He could not even find reliable external allies, and, for example, Negus's attempts to establish allied relations with the fascist regime of Japan (the real spiritual ally of Italian fascism) can be called completely inadequate and insane. The inability of Haile Selassie to adequately assess the historical vector of Ethiopian interests in the camp of anti-fascist forces cost the people of Ethiopia dearly. But, realizing that war with Italy was inevitable, Negus in September 1935 announced a general mobilization. He managed to mobilize about 500 thousand people.

Parade of Abyssinian troops. 1935

Despite the solid number of troops, the country lacked modern weapons. Many warriors were armed with spears and bows, most of the firearms were obsolete rifles produced before 1900. According to Italian estimates, by the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian troops numbered from 350 to 760 thousand people, but only a quarter of the soldiers had received at least minimal military training . In total, the army accounted for about 400 thousand rifles of various manufacturers and years of production, about 200 pieces of obsolete artillery, about 50 light and heavy anti-aircraft guns.

The Ethiopians had several armored Ford trucks and a small number of World War I tanks. The Ethiopian Air Force consisted of 12 obsolete biplanes, of which only 3 were operational. The best units were Haile Selassie's personal guard - Kebur Zabanga. These troops are quite well trained and better equipped. But the soldiers of the Imperial Guard wore the uniform of the Belgian army in khaki, in contrast to the rest of the army, which wore white cotton uniforms. In the conditions of Ethiopia, this made them an excellent target for Italian soldiers.

Abyssinian warriors. 1935

Italian soldiers say goodbye to their families before leaving for Abyssinia.

This force alone (excluding the army already stationed in East Africa, native units and units that arrived during the war) consisted of 7,000 officers and 200,000 privates and was equipped with 6,000 machine guns, 700 guns, 150 tankettes and 150 airplanes. The overall command of the Italian forces in East Africa until November 1935 was carried out by General Emilio de Bono, starting from November 1935 - Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio.

The northern front (in Eritrea) consisted of five corps, the 1st was commanded by Rugero Santini, the 2nd by Pietro Maravina, the 3rd by Adalbetro Bergamo (then Ettore Bastico), the Eritrean corps by Alessandro Pircio Biroli. The forces of the Southern Front (in Somalia) were for the most part brought together in a column commanded by General Rodolfo Graziani.

Italian General de Bono (left, with a beard) in a conversation with the "traitor" Koeksa.

On October 3, 1935, at 5 am, without a declaration of war, the Italian army invaded Ethiopia from Eritrea and Somalia; At the same time, Italian aircraft began bombing the city of Adua.
The troops under the leadership of Marshal Emilio De Bono, stationed on the territory of Eritrea, crossed the border river Mareb and launched an offensive in the direction of Addi Grat - Adua - Aksum. At the same time, in the south, from the territory of Italian Somalia, the army under the command of General Rodolfo Graziani crossed the border and launched an offensive in the direction of Korrahe - Harer. At 10:00 a.m., Haile Selassie I ordered a general mobilization. He personally took over the leadership of military operations: an example of his leadership is the order of 19 October.

The population of Addis Ababa learns about the beginning of the war. 1935

Tents should be set up inside caves, under the cover of trees or in the forest, if the place allows it, and they should be separated by platoons. Tents should be placed at a distance of 30 cubits from one another
Having noticed an airplane in the distance, one should immediately leave a large, well-visible road or open field, and move on, adhering to narrow valleys and trenches, along winding roads, trying to stay closer to the forest or tree plantations.

For targeted bombing, the aircraft needs to descend to a height of about 100 meters, as soon as this happens, you should give a friendly volley from reliable, long guns, and immediately disperse. An aircraft hit by 3 or 4 bullets will crash to the ground. Only those to whom such an order has been given, and whose weapons have been specifically determined to be appropriate for the task, are to fire; shooting indiscriminately will only waste ammunition, and reveal the location of the unit to the enemy.

Armed Abyssinians in ambush 1935.

Due to the fact that, as the aircraft gains altitude, it fixes the position of people, it is safer for the squad to remain dispersed as long as the aircraft is in sufficient proximity. In view of the fact that in war it is common for the enemy to target decorated shields, galloons, cloaks embroidered with silver and gold, silk shirts, etc. Therefore, for those who wear outerwear or do not have it, it will be preferable to use dull shirts flowers with narrow sleeves.

When, with God's help, we return, you will be allowed to adorn yourself again with gold and silver. But now is the time to fight. We give you these tips in the hope of saving you from the danger of indiscretion. We also inform you that we are ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with our subjects and shed our blood in the name of a free Ethiopia ...

Abyssinian gunners. 1935

The Italian offensive in Ethiopia was carried out in three directions, according to which three fronts were formed in the Ethiopian theater of operations: Northern, Southern (South-Eastern) and Central. The main role in the capture of the country was assigned to the Northern Front, where the main forces of the expeditionary army were concentrated. The Southern Front was faced with the task of pinning down as many Ethiopian troops as possible and supporting the offensive of the Northern Front units with a strike on Harer, in order to then reach the connection with the "northern" units in the Addis Ababa region.

An even more limited goal was set for the group of troops of the Central Front (moving from Aseb through Ausa to Desse), which was charged with the duty of linking the armies of the Northern and Southern fronts and securing their internal flanks. The most important operational facility was Addis Ababa. By capturing it, the Italians expected to proclaim the complete success of their campaign to conquer Ethiopia.

Italian artillery in action. 1935

The disunity of their armies on the Northern and Southern fronts negatively affected the combat positions of the Ethiopians. Due to the lack of an extensive road network and a sufficient amount of transport, this prevented the timely transfer of reinforcements. Unlike the Italians, the Ethiopians actually did not have a central group of troops opposing the invading enemy units in the Ausa area. The Ethiopians counted on the armed detachments of the Sultan of Ausa and on the inaccessibility of the desert region of Danakil; they did not foresee that the Sultan would go over to the side of the enemy and that the Italian units, moving on camels, would be provided with food and water by transport planes from Assab. However, the fate of the war was decided on the Northern Front.

Abyssinian soldiers. 1935

The stronghold of the Ethiopian troops soon became the city of Desse, where, on November 28, 1935, the headquarters of the emperor moved from Addis Ababa.

The huts of the inhabitants of Desse after the bombing of Italian aircraft. 1936

In October - November 1935, the Italians captured the cities of the Tigre province. Ethiopian counteroffensive attempts were not always unsuccessful. In December, Ras Ymru - Haile Selassie's cousin - launched a successful attack on Aksum; On December 15, a 3,000-strong army crossed the river. Tekeze is about 50 km southwest of Adua. As soon as the Ethiopians were on the right bank, a fierce battle ensued with the enemy, in the rear of which another Ethiopian unit imperceptibly penetrated, crossing the river below the crossing of the main forces of the Ymru race.

Haile Selassie demanded decisive action from the Kasa and Syyum races, who were operating on the central axis of the Northern Front. A unit under the command of Hailu Kabbede, consisting of soldiers of the Kasa and Syyum races, during a bloody 4-day battle, liberated the city of Abiy-Addi, which occupied an important strategic position in Tembepe, a forested-mountainous region west of Mekele. Here the Ethiopian soldiers took quite strong positions.

Paying salaries in the Abyssinian army. 1935

Italians in Abyssinia, 1935.

After deposing Marshal De Bono, Mussolini in December 1935 ordered the new commander, Marshal Badoglio, to use chemical weapons, violating the Geneva Convention of 1925.

Marshal Badoglio (left) after the deposition of General Bono (right, with beard) in Asmara. November 1935.

Italian aviation systematically carried out raids deep into Ethiopian territory, bombing peaceful targets.

The Italians are loading grenades and other ammunition onto the plane.

Haile Selassie later wrote: We attacked the enemy's machine-gun nests, his artillery, captured tanks with our bare hands, we endured aerial bombardments, but we could not do anything against poison gases that imperceptibly fell on our faces and hands.

Abyssinian soldiers in gas masks. 1935

On October 7, 1935, the League of Nations recognized Italy as an aggressor, and on November 18, the Council of the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions against Italy, which were joined by 51 states. However, the embargo did not apply to oil, coal and metal. England did not dare to close the Suez Canal to Italian ships, the United States announced its intention not to sell weapons to both warring parties. The Soviet Union resolutely came out in defense of the state sovereignty of Ethiopia, although it did not have diplomatic relations with it. On September 5, 1935, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov, at a meeting of the Council of the League, drew attention to the fact that “there is an undoubted threat of war, a threat of aggression, which not only is not denied, but, on the contrary, is confirmed by the representative of Italy himself. Can we get past this threat? ".

On behalf of the Soviet government, he suggested that the Council "not stop at any effort and means to prevent an armed conflict between two members of the League." A few days later, at a meeting of the General Assembly of the League of Nations, the head of the Soviet delegation again called on the states responsible for maintaining peace to take all measures to pacify the aggressor. However, this high international organization did nothing to protect Ethiopia. The inaction of the League of Nations freed the hands of Rome, which was completing the final preparations for war. These half-hearted measures have in fact left Ethiopia to the mercy of the aggressor.

British Secretary of State for Foreign Relations Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval in December 1935 proposed to Italy and Ethiopia the Hoare-Laval plan, according to which Ethiopia was to cede to Italy the provinces of Ogaden and Tigris and the Danakil region, accept Italian advisers and provide Italy with exceptional economic benefits; in exchange for this, Italy had to cede to Ethiopia access to the sea near the city of Assab. Since this plan was clearly disadvantageous for Ethiopia, she rejected the proposal. In October 1935, Italy's actions were condemned by the Congress of Italian emigrants in Brussels. The war showed the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations as an instrument for resolving international conflicts.

French Prime Minister Laval (left) goes on September 5, 1935 to the meeting of the League of Nations, where the issue of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict will be considered.

Abyssinian artillerymen. 1935.

Italian tanks in action. 1935

Watchman on the alert. 1935

Soldiers behind the parapet with rifles at the ready. 1935

Porters in the camp of war correspondents. 1935

Italian cavalry crossing the river. 1935

Attack of the Italian tanks on the primitive fortifications around Adigrat.

The soldier seeks cover behind a cactus. 1935

Italian troops are preparing anti-aircraft guns for battle. 1935

Front line near Adigrat in Abyssinia. Abyssinians with a machine gun in the grass. 1935

Front line near Adigrat in Abyssinia. Abyssinian snipers in the grass with a rifle at the ready.

The advance of the tanks. Tanks have a great disadvantage when passing high basalt blocks that are scattered across the landscape.

Camp of war correspondents, 1935.

Abyssinian warriors in a corn field.

Captain Ayele from the province of Ogaden with a rifle under cover of a rock.

Cavalry attack 1935.

Italian troops on the march. 1935

In January 1936, the armies of the Kasa and Syyum races again went over to the offensive, broke through the Italian front and almost reached the Adua-Mekele road. When the attempt of the Abyssinians to break through the center of the Italians failed, Badoglio decided to go on the offensive at Mekele himself, especially since he knew from intercepted radio messages that Muluget did not have enough ammunition, which he was waiting for along with reinforcements.

General Mulugeta. 1936

Amba-Aradam - a huge rocky mountain, 8 km long and 3 km wide, 3,000 m high, a commanding height, a natural bastion protecting the passage along the "imperial path". Mulugeta decided to turn the mountain into a fortress. First of all, many trails were brought to it from the rear for the transport of food, ammunition and other types of combat and non-combat equipment. Caravans moved along them, but for fear of air attacks - only at night. Cattle were driven from all the surrounding villages to feed the troops. Caves were dug in the mountain - shelters from air raids and artillery shelling.

Amba-Aradam to the north has very steep slopes. The flanks of the mountain had more gentle slopes. The Italians decided, demonstrating a blow from the front, to cover this hill from both sides. Their forces consisted of the 3rd Corps (2 divisions), the 1st Army Corps - 3 divisions (divisions "Sabauda", "Pusteria", "January 3"); in reserve is the Assieta division, several Eritrean battalions and an air force (up to 200 aircraft). The 3rd Army Corps was to bypass Amba-Aradam from the west, and the 1st Army Corps from the east. Both were aimed at Antalo in the rear of Amba Aradam. The number of Italians - about 70,000 people, Abyssinians - with firearms up to 50,000 people.

Tanks in battle. 1935

On February 10, the 3rd and 1st Army Corps took up their starting position along the Gabat stream. And in February, the 3rd Army Corps remained in position, and one division of the 1st Army Corps went to Shelikot, the other (Sabauda) took a strong position on the left flank. On February 12, the division "January 3" from Shelikot moved to Afgol, and "Sabauda" - to Anseb, which it reached easily.

The blackshirt division "January 3" until 15 o'clock could not cope with the task, and only the regular Alpine division "Val Pusteria", put forward by Badoglio to help the hapless division, at 16 ciao. 30 min. captured Afgol. The 3rd Army Corps, with strong air and artillery support, captured the heights on the western wing of Amba Aradam. At night, the Abyssinians withdrew, leaving a few cannons and machine guns behind. 11-12th operational pause. The Italians are building roads and moving artillery.

Italian engineers build a road in Abyssinia. 1936

On February 13, the 1st and 3rd army corps strengthened their new positions, and the Abyssinians successfully attacked their left flank, captured Makale for a short time, but could not hold out there. All day on February 13 and on the night of the 14th it was pouring rain, washing away the paths, which delayed the concentration of the Italians, and most importantly, deprived them of powerful air support. On the morning of February 15, artillery preparation began at 7 o'clock. The Abyssinians retreated to the top of the mountain, which was Muluget's gross mistake and allowed the Italian infantry to strongly compress the encirclement. The mountain, on which the weather was clear, was fired from valleys shrouded in fog, artillery (up to 200 guns and howitzers) from three sides and aircraft from above (on February 13 and 14, aviation operations were severely limited by rain).

Attack of the armed Abyssinians.

At 5 pm on February 15, the Abyssinians, due to the interception of the route to Amba-Alagi by the Italians and fearing complete encirclement, having already lost up to 4,000 people, begin to withdraw. Aviation on February 16 and 17 turns the retreat into a stampede. The Mulugeta army is divided into two parts: one first retreats, and then flees to Fenaroa (14,000 people), the other to Amba Alaga (8,000 people).

Italian troops in Amba-Alagi. 1936

For five days the relentless air pursuit of the Mulugeta army continued. Here, for the first time, the Italians managed to achieve decisive success, moreover, exclusively thanks to aviation, for Mulugeta initially retreated to order. It is unlikely that the successes of aviation would have been so great if it had limited itself to machine-gun fire and bombardment. In this persecution from the air, undoubtedly, the merciless use of poisonous substances (OV) by the Italians played a decisive role. The intensity of the bombardment is evidenced by several well-known figures for the total weight of bombs dropped on troops fleeing and pursued by aircraft: 73 tons of bombs and explosive agents in one day on February 16, that is, in one “working day” lasting 10-11 hours maximum. On February 16 and 17, 300 hours were flown, 120 tons of bombs were dropped.

An Italian sentry in the area north of Mekele, where a guerrilla war broke out. 1935

On April 2, the Italians launched a counteroffensive. Attacks from the air and powerful artillery fire almost completely destroyed the imperial guard. Haile Selassie's personal car and his radio station fell into the hands of the Italians. After the battle of Mai Chou, the Ethiopian army on the Northern Front practically ceased to exist. Only separate groups fought, using the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

Red Cross in action 1935-1936

A few days later, Haile Selassie appealed to the world community for help:
“Do the peoples of the whole world really not understand that, by fighting to the bitter end, I am not only fulfilling my sacred duty to my people, but also standing guard over the last citadel of collective security? Are they really so blind that they do not see that I am responsible to all mankind?.. If they do not come, then I will say prophetically and without a sense of bitterness: the West will perish ... "

Dinner in the presence of the French Ambassador A. Bodard in honor of the Dutch ambulance service in Ethiopia. December 30, 1935.

On April 20, 1936, the Italian army under the command of Badoglio occupied the city of Desse, where the marshal's headquarters was established. It was decided to attack the Ethiopian capital, to which the Italians had 320 km. The outcome of the offensive was predetermined. The scattered remnants of the Ethiopian army could not offer worthy resistance to the Italians. The holy city of Aksum in Abyssinia was captured and sacked by the Italians.

Due to the almost complete lack of resistance, Badoglio conceived a spectacular "mechanized column" march for propaganda purposes. In 1936, "mechanized" meant that the infantry was transported by cars and trucks. "Motorized infantry" is a more appropriate term. Thanks to the organizational skills of Quartermaster General Fidenzio Dal'Or, Badoglio's "mechanized column" assembled at Dessa between 21 and 25 April.

Dal'Ora organized a rather powerful column for the African roads of that time. In addition to 12,500 soldiers, the column included 1,785 cars and trucks of all brands (Fiat, Lancia, Alfa Romeo, Ford, Chevrolet, Bedfords and Studebaker), a squadron of light tanks (L3), eleven batteries of artillery and aircraft. Also, 193 horses were included in the column so that Badoglio and other commanders could enter Addis Ababa victoriously.

A homeless child who joined the Italian army. 1936

On April 24, Badoglio called on 4,000 Eritreans to guard the marching column as a precautionary measure, but this measure proved unnecessary.

Badoglio's mechanized forces were to march along the Imperial Highway from Desse to Addis Ababa. Badoglio noted that the road was of poor quality. Badoglio expected resistance at the Termaber Pass, and the mechanized column made a halt that stretched out for two days, but all was quiet. During the halt, a section of the road was repaired.

Repaired section of the road. 1936

In Selva Sina, the Italians found themselves in one of the most beautiful and fertile regions of the province of Shoa. Soldiers from trucks with rifles between their knees looked at the landscape as if spellbound. Many Italian soldiers looked forward to the end of the war so that they could take farm implements instead of rifles and reap the benefits of the victory of this rich land they had acquired.

Emperor Haile Selassie visited the French embassy in Addis Ababa. After a meeting with the French Minister Paul Bodard, when further defense of the capital was impossible, he explained that it was better to leave the Empress Menen Asfaw and two sons, the nineteen-year-old Crown Prince Asfa-Wassan and the thirteen-year-old Prince Makonnen, in the country. They eventually retired to a Coptic monastery in Palestine, but asked the French minister to temporarily take them refuge in French Somalia.

Haile Selassie returned to his palace and a crowd gathered on the steps of the palace. To the crowd he said: “Ethiopia will fight to the last soldier and the last inch! Let every man who can take up arms and have enough food for five days go north to fight the invaders!” The crowds roared in response to their emperor's words, "We'll go!"

Aerial view of Addis Ababa during the Italian-Abyssinian War.

Haile Selassie retired to his palace for a final conference with his leaders. It was clear to him that the government of the Ethiopian empire had to leave Addis Ababa. One possibility was for the government to move to the mountains in the southwestern part of the country, and the emperor was waiting for a response. Initially, no one told him anything. But when the chiefs spoke, they explained that the army under the command of Ras Nasibu Emmanuel in the Ogaden had not lost its fighting capacity. This army opposed the grouping of General Rodolfo Graziani advancing on Harar. They added that the tribes in the west were discouraged, but everything possible must be done to save the country.

After a painful meeting with his chiefs, Haile Selassie visited Sir Sidney Barton at the British Embassy. He said everything to the point. The UK has been generous with words and made many promises. However, Britain provided Ethiopia with only a few guns, for which the Ethiopians paid in cash. Haile Selassie emphasized that he risked his life not only for Ethiopia, but also for the League of Nations. He asked Britain to come to the rescue at this hour. But, having received again nothing promising words, Haile Selassie left disappointed.

Prior to his departure, Haile Selassie decreed that the government of Ethiopia be moved to Ghor, he ordered the Mayor of Addis Ababa to maintain order in the city until the Italian arrival, and he appointed Ras Imru Haile Selassie as Prince Regent during his absence.

Prince Makonnen, Governor of Addis Ababa.

The Negus of Abyssinia, Haile Selassie, leaves his garden guarded by lions. Addis Ababa, 1936

The capital garrison of the Ethiopian army began to loot, discipline fell.

Addis Ababa, after the departure of Negus and government troops, was subjected to looting and arson by an army of marauders for several days. 1936

Soldiers went to rob shops, shouted curses at foreigners and fired their rifles into the air.

Many European buildings were looted and burned by rebellious soldiers and looters after the Negus fled. 1936

The new palace, the pride of Haile Selassie, was open to plunder.

The plundered throne room of the royal palace. Addis Ababa.

Most of the foreigners took refuge with the British.

The fortifications of the British embassy in Addis Ababa, where dozens of Europeans sought protection from Abyssinian rebel troops. 1936

Chaos and lawlessness reigned in the capital. The riots in Addis Ababa grew stronger by the hour. The Treasury was attacked. Several loyal servants tried to salvage the remains of the emperor's gold with a machine gun, but the robbers cut off their hands.

Destruction in Addis Ababa after the departure of the Negus. 1936

Chaos, anarchy, destruction and casualties on the streets of Addis Ababa. The looting of the capital by soldiers and marauders. 1936

On the evening of May 4, Eritrean detachments reached the outskirts of Addis Ababa. They reached the city ahead of Badoglio's mechanized column, and managed to accomplish this feat on their feet.

Italian officers at the head of a detachment of soldiers from Eritrea enter Addis Ababa. 1935

Meanwhile, Badoglio's motorized column was gaining momentum. Italian planes flew over the city, and the Eritreans retreated into the background. By that time the main body of the column reached the capital on May 5 at 16:00 and the Italians were overjoyed.

Addis Ababa, conquered by the Italians. 1936.

When the Italians entered the city, heavy rain began. The first step was to restore order. White flags were hung everywhere. Badoglio made his triumphant entry into the city. Many of the city's residents fled south or sought refuge in foreign embassies they had previously attacked.

The entry of Badoglio's troops into Addis Ababa. 1936

A detachment of Ethiopian customs guards stood guard when Badoglio's car drove past them.

Soldier of the Abyssinian army at the post.

Further, the Italian guard of honor, which accompanied the vanguard of the column, saluted Badoglio, who rode past the soldiers on horseback. As Badoglio's encirclement halted in front of the Italian legation, the tricolor of the Kingdom of Italy was hoisted at 17:45. This was followed by three cheers for King Victor Emmanuel of Italy and Benito Mussolini. After the applause, Badoglio addressed the high command of the Italian Air Force: “We did it! We won!".

The fall of Addis Ababa had long been expected in Italy, but when the news reached Rome on the evening of May 5, the city plunged into the celebration of the long-awaited victory. Crowds in Rome's Piazza Venezia celebrate the fall of Addis Ababa and the annexation of Abyssinia. 1936

It is noteworthy that the march was completed in ten days of movement through difficult terrain and in bad weather. This was an achievement that demonstrated the offensive potential of motorized forces. However, meeting no Ethiopian resistance, the march turned out to be nothing more than an exercise. In the words of an anonymous journalist at the time, "This is nothing more than a sporting event in military history."

War correspondents during the Italo-Abyssinian War. 1936

Within a week of Marshal Badoglio's entry into Addis Ababa, Dr. Hans Johan Kirchholts visited Ethiopia. Badoglio was at that time viceroy and governor general of Italian East Africa, and the former Italian embassy building became his headquarters. Kirchholts was one of the first to recognize the conquest of Ethiopia as a fait accompli.

Commander of the Southern Abyssinian Army Ras Nasibu upon arrival in Marseille, France. 1936

Arrival of the hospital ship "Urania" with four hundred sick and wounded on board from Abyssinia to the port of Naples. 1936.

Meanwhile, one of Marshal Badoglio's staff officers, Captain Adolfo Alessandri, visited every foreign mission in Addis Ababa. Alessandri politely explained to each ambassador that they would enjoy "all diplomatic privileges until the moment of departure." This was the first official notification from Italy that Ethiopia had ceased to exist even at the level of a puppet state. Henceforth, Ethiopia became a colony of Italy. Giuseppe Bottai was appointed the first governor of Addis Ababa, and the former palace of Haile Selassie became his residence.

Haile Selassie arrived by train in Djibouti after fleeing Addis Ababa. Here he transferred from the British cruiser Enterprise and reached Haifa. 1936

Haile Selassie's arrival in Haifa, 1936

Haile Selassie's treasury was delivered to Haifa, from where it ended up in the Barclay Bank in Jerusalem. Haifa. 1936

Haile Selassie leaves his hotel in Jerusalem for London. 1936

The emperor of Abyssinia, expelled from his country, arrived in London after a trip to Jerusalem. 1936

Haile Selassie with his family in London. 1936

Haile Selassie in conversation with Lord Robert Cecil. London, England, 1936

Princess Jilma, Prince Harar, Dr. Martin, Negus and the Crown Prince. London, England, 1936.

May 7, 1936 Italy annexed Ethiopia; On May 9, the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III was declared Emperor of Ethiopia. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somalia were merged into Italian East Africa. On June 30, at an emergency session of the League of Nations dedicated to the annexation of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie called for the return of Ethiopia's independence. He warned: "What is happening with us today will happen with you tomorrow" and criticized the international community for inaction.

Haile Selassie arrived in Geneva for a meeting of the League of Nations. 1936

At a meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Negus of Abyssinia Haile Selassie (left in black jacket) and members of his family. 1936.

On July 15, economic sanctions against Italy were lifted. However, most countries of the world did not recognize the accession of Ethiopia to Italian possessions, as Germany did on July 25, 1936, and in 1938 also England and France. The Soviet Union categorically did not recognize the occupation of Ethiopia. The first country to recognize the occupation of Ethiopia by Italy was Latvia.

In 1937 Italy withdrew from the League of Nations.

Ethiopian guerrillas continued to fight until 1941, when British troops, advancing from Kenya through Italian Somalia, from southern Yemen through British Somalia and from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, defeated the Italian troops and liberated Ethiopia.

Abyssinian soldiers pose next to captured Italian tanks.

On May 5, 1941, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie returned to his capital. But this certainly contributed to the further deepening of the rupture of the Ethiopian monarchy with its people, as well as to the strengthening of the positions of the "pro-British" party of the Ethiopian feudal lords.

We offer you a selection of ironic postcards by the Italian artist Enrico De Seta dedicated to the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936).

Italy's first attempt to conquer Ethiopia was made in 1894-1896. and went down in history as the First Italo-Ethiopian War. It ended badly for Italy. Italian troops left the country, the Ethiopian emperor Menelik forced the Italians to recognize the full sovereignty of Ethiopia. For the first time in modern history, a European power paid an indemnity to an African country. For a long time, representatives of official Italy were called "tributaries of Menelik" in derision.

The second Italo-Ethiopian war took place in 1934-1936. Benito Mussolini, from the beginning of his reign, proclaimed a course towards the creation of a great Italian empire similar to the Roman Empire. His plans included establishing control over the Mediterranean basin and northern Africa. Mussolini promised the people to equalize Italy with the main colonial empires: Great Britain and France.

As a result of this war, on May 7, 1936, Italy annexed Ethiopia; On May 9, the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III was declared Emperor of Ethiopia. On June 1, 1936, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somalia were united as part of the colony of Italian East Africa.
Subsequently, a guerrilla war unfolded in the occupied territory of Ethiopia, and by the end of 1941, with the support of British troops, Italian troops were expelled from the country.

Postcards by Enrico De Seta

11. The politics of war

(Start)

Preparing for war

Mussolini's closest associates stubbornly denied the fact of the conscious creation of a cult of his personality. But sometimes he himself suddenly admitted this, saying in justification that the dictator needs supporters who fanatically believe in his infallibility. If the newspapers called him “our prophet Duce”, and his regime was called nothing less than “the embodiment of divine will”, if he was made into a miracle worker, whose name alone acted on patients in hospitals as an anesthetic before surgery, then all this was done not without him silent approval.

In 1933, Mussolini decided to publish his works in the so-called "final" edition. Everything written and said by him, except for the period when he was a socialist and editor of the newspaper Avanti!, was to be included there. At least sixty articles of the nineteenth year were also omitted; there were sections whose vulgar tone or anti-clericalism did not suit his new image. Much of the real Mussolini was to remain a mystery. The "final" edition was published under a pseudonym.

By this time, Mussolini had again taken over seven of the fourteen positions in the Cabinet of Ministers and often did not hide his irritation with even the limited power that went to other ministers. He warned them never to argue with him, "because contradiction only increases my doubts and distracts me from the path that I know is right, since my animal instincts are always correct." Sometimes he admitted that he is easily influenced by other people and that is why he prefers to make all important decisions without consulting anyone. Even the lowest ranks were ordered not to give any executive orders, without even pretending that they come from the Duce himself. Therefore, ministers and officials less and less often expressed a desire to make any decisions even on the most insignificant issues.

Subsequently, some fascists admitted that this process of idolization of Mussolini was one of the mistakes of the regime, that the attempt to create "oriental despotism" naturally had to lead to general inaction. But Mussolini himself thought just the opposite. He believed that he had already done as much for Italy as Napoleon had done for France, and from time to time pointed out in what respects he even surpassed him. This superiority over Napoleon became a common theme among Fascist propagandists who claimed that the Duce was more original and had greater vision, better knowledge of the people, more courage, and less personal vanity.

Flatterers fueled his vanity, suggesting that he was the same born commander as Napoleon, and capable of personally leading any military campaign. They knew that these were just the words that Mussolini would like best. While to a wider international audience he continued to stubbornly assert that all his energy was directed towards preserving the peace, in his soul Mussolini cherished a dream, which became literally an obsession, of how he would lead his country to a victorious war. He repeated earlier assertions that 1935 would be the year of readiness for war. Fascism should seize the chance to seize another colony as proof that Italy under Mussolini has become a great power.

The first and necessary step was to strengthen the power of the leader over the economy. Talking to foreigners in the early thirties, Mussolini remarked that he was against tariff barriers and for the least possible state intervention in economic life. But soon he spoke quite differently. Since the logic of fascism increasingly inclined him towards supervision and patronage, he explained that he was reluctant to do this and only because other countries forced him to act in this way in order to protect himself. However, in reality, he was forced to change his policy and resort to helping sick sectors of the economy by the global economic crisis of 1929, coupled with aggressive trends in international politics. It began with state interference in the affairs of important industries, which were temporarily in a difficult position; then the success of this operation showed Mussolini that intervention could be used on a larger scale to create more centralized control over the entire economy. By 1933 he was used to repeating that the capitalist organization of production was no longer acceptable. The State, Mussolini now said, must intervene in every branch of the economy, which led one senator to accuse him of becoming almost a communist, since three-quarters of Italian industry would soon be controlled, if not wholly owned by the state.

In 1934, Mussolini felt the need to proclaim the existence of corporations. He convinced himself that England and other countries would follow suit, introducing their own corporate systems. The Duce hoped that these corporations would soon control the entire Italian economy. However, he miscalculated. The costly and burdensome corporate bureaucracy "has become a powerful body working for its own perpetuation, with its functions completely obscure, except that, by demanding huge money, it constantly puts spokes in the wheels of the industry."

Of course, Mussolini could not publicly admit that corporations were a mistake. He simply supplemented them with respective agencies, whose functions, often overlapping, created administrative confusion. Soon the buzzword was no longer corporatism, but autarchy, or self-reliance. In this Duce saw the need to prepare Italy for hostilities, when it will be difficult to import goods from abroad. In February 1935, he set the goal of eliminating the country's dependence on external supplies. Mussolini said that ten years of the "battle for bread" made Italy capable of self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, so that now she has enough food to feed even twice the number of the nation. Few of the listeners knew that this was a complete lie. Mussolini regretted that ten years ago he did not realize the need for self-sufficiency in industrial products. He failed to appreciate in its entirety that arms production would invariably increase rather than decrease Italy's dependence on imports. Autarky became a magic spell for the dictator, which by itself could solve the basic problems of the war economy.

Mussolini hoped that the war would contribute to the solution of Italian economic problems. The conquest of Ethiopia would link the two existing colonies, Eritrea and Somalia, and he dreamed of sending millions of Italian settlers to a united East Africa. Mussolini was in no mood to listen to realists, who knew that colonial enterprises usually cost more than they were worth; he preferred the advice of others who believed that Italian settlers would turn Ethiopia into a rich economic zone in a few years. There was constant talk at length about the huge deposits of gold, diamonds, copper, iron, coal and oil, although Mussolini's most attractive prospect was the mobilization of one or two million Ethiopians into the army, who, as soon as industry was properly established in the new colony, would become the dominant power throughout the African continent.

At the end of the summer of 1934, significant shipments of military equipment were sent to Eritrea. In October, France received a request to allow Italy free "economic penetration" into the area. In early December, one of the many skirmishes took place in Vol-Val. An Italian garrison was established eighty miles from the border, in a territory that even on Italian maps was marked as part of Ethiopia. Mussolini took this as a convenient occasion for subsequent military preparations. He refused to bring the Vol Vol incident to international discussion, but - as in the case of Corfu in 1923 - he demanded monetary compensation and punishment for those responsible for "aggressive actions" against the Italians.

At the end of December, the Duce issued a secret order to prepare for the "total" conquest of Ethiopia. Now there was a need to hurry - not only because German rearmament would soon force him to keep most of the army at home, but also because Ethiopia was becoming a Europeanized country. It was necessary to strike before she acquired enough modern weapons and conducted appropriate military training. He was not going to formally declare war, it was necessary to take the world by surprise by announcing that these actions were taken in self-defense. In this way he could have avoided accusations of aggression at the meeting of the League of Nations. Mussolini believed that first it was necessary to process France, and then the British could be given a bribe by providing them with one of the regions of Ethiopia.

In January 1935, a formal treaty was signed with France. The main intention of the French was to create a common front against Nazi Germany. It was rumored that French Prime Minister Pierre Laval secretly gave Mussolini verbal assurances that France would be lenient with Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. Laval subsequently always denied this, arguing that he was only told about the economic penetration of Italy. Mussolini then also said that he did not say anything to Laval about the possibility of war. But on the other hand, he certainly hinted to the French side that economic penetration implied some degree of political control, and both sides contented themselves with this without specifying the details.

Throughout February and March, Mussolini continued to convince other countries that he had no aggressive intentions. By this point, foreign diplomats were beginning to show some suspicion. But no one could believe that Mussolini so underestimated the threat from Germany that he was going to unleash a big war in Africa. In Italy itself, the Duce ordered to keep military preparations in absolute secrecy. Arrangements were made for the distribution of gas masks and the return to their homeland of ten million Italians, supposedly living abroad.

Of course, Mussolini knew that the British would not like the war he had planned against Ethiopia, but he relied on the fact that they were too worried about Hitler's activation and would prefer to turn a blind eye to his affairs. On January 29, Mussolini sent a message to London that he would like to agree on spheres of influence in East Africa, but did not show any haste. Ambassador Grandi told the British representatives that this was a matter of medium importance, again accompanying his words with the promise that Italy had absolutely no aggressive intentions. Perhaps Mussolini just wanted another ambiguous arrangement, like the one made with France. This would make it possible later to tell the government in London that they had no reason to be surprised at the outbreak of war. In response, the British approved of their commitment to avoid starting a war. They told Mussolini unequivocally and more than once that he would make an irreparable mistake if he resorted to violence. Unfortunately, Grandi was more concerned about not upsetting the Duce. The truth was distorted in favor of flattery: the ambassador kept saying that the British assured him of their full support.

In order to decide to go to war, Mussolini did not need to consult with anyone but the king, and certainly not with his ministers and the Grand Council. He despised his civilian colleagues too much and admitted that he was afraid of their objections to what instinct and the "highest judge" had already suggested to him. Counseling, he explained, is a haven for people without willpower. Mussolini told the chief of the Italian police that war would begin in a few months, but did not say against whom. And only in February 1935 did he speak more clearly when he deciphered to his ministers that the main military operation was being prepared. He said that the armed forces are already ready, the main food stocks have been created, and even the problem of coal and oil delivery has been solved.

The Duce was going to take over the main leadership of the campaign. The commander of the active army, De Bono, was instructed not to enter into any direct contact with the headquarters of the armed forces. By March, aircraft were repaired, designed to carry 300,000 people, which were to include an equal number of fascist policemen and regular troops. But De Bono found that the militia had no military training at all and was almost useless. When pressured on him, Mussolini said that he was ready to send many more people: fascist prestige demanded a quick and decisive victory in the war, no matter what it cost.

In the end, half a million soldiers and civilian workers were sent to East Africa - a huge army, the largest ever used in colonial wars. It was necessary to transport several million tons of cargo over two thousand miles, which, according to one senior officer, was ten times the amount actually needed. But Mussolini insisted that sending only one army corps would be too big a mistake, especially considering that "we will need troops later to conquer Egypt and the Sudan." De Bono was horrified when he discovered that his requests were multiplied many times over in such a random and unsystematic way. Since the capacity of the port in Massawa was only designed to unload 3000 tons per day, some ships had to wait for unloading for several weeks and even months.

Hitler waited until these preparations had gone far enough before shocking the world with an official announcement that the Germans would rearm in defiance of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. Mussolini, who secretly helped them, suddenly realized that he had acted in the highest degree reckless, concentrating almost his entire army in Africa. This concern was reflected in an article in his own monthly magazine. There was an accusation against Germany and Japan of trying to establish dominance in the world, as well as a statement that the Germans were afraid of Mussolini, knowing that he was strong enough to prevent their expansion into Central Europe. He was so shameless that he warned the British government about Hitler's sending weapons to Africa and his possible intention to raise "the Negro race against all Europeans." The English politicians may not be "able to understand the German mentality", but they could at least take good advice from him and build up a strong air force as quickly as possible.

To respond to a potential Nazi challenge, Mussolini held talks with the French and British prime ministers in April. Stresa was chosen as the meeting place, so that the Duce did not have to leave Italy. As a host, he could preside and set the agenda. The Foreign Office offered to take this opportunity to raise the issue of Ethiopia, but since the Duce knew that England was hostile to his African claims, he did not want to risk it.

Mussolini's main interest was to conclude an agreement on the opening of the so-called "Stresa Front" against Germany - having no protection on the northern border, he could not risk starting a war in Africa. Therefore, Mussolini asked the British delegates not to discuss the Ethiopian question, except perhaps unofficially, outside the walls of the conference room. They agreed, although some of their officials - as well as his - felt that this was a major mistake. Subsequently, the silence of the British allowed Mussolini to declare that since no official protest was recorded at Stresa, the British, like the French, should leave him free to follow his own path.

Mussolini already knew that England was resolutely opposed to the war he had started. The dissatisfaction of the British was clearly expressed behind the scenes of the conference in Stresa. Ethiopia, they pointed out, was a member of the League of Nations, and any encroachment on its territorial integrity would entail the intervention of the outside world. Undoubtedly, they hoped that the Italians were only trying to intimidate Ethiopia and force her to make concessions. Mussolini did not dissuade them.

The resulting uncertainty was deliberately provoked by Mussolini. He knew that otherwise he would have to pay attention to a second, this time, public warning against starting a war, issued by the British the day after the end of the Stresa conference. As Mussolini's military preparations became more pronounced, private instructions again came from London to warn him that as soon as Ethiopia wished to accept international arbitration, Italian intrigues against a much weaker country would alienate potential allies from her, and the resulting hostility would destroy the system of collective security, in which Italy, like other countries, badly needs.

But Mussolini was not a man to be moved by such arguments. He made it clear that, if his plans were upset, he would leave the League of Nations forever. In any case, he added, the hostility of world public opinion meant nothing to him. Mussolini had already spent huge sums preparing his colonial war and "intended to give Italy the opportunity to recoup its investment." In Grandi's view, this new prospect of challenging the League of Nations gave Mussolini even more pleasure than the addition of Ethiopia.

At the end of May 1935, Mussolini continued to adhere to the anti-German position and ranted that, if necessary, he would "crush" Hitler. Italy signed a secret military agreement with France on the joint defense of the independence of Austria, and consultations were held with the French general staff on the strategy of the war against Germany. But in reality, Mussolini intended to move in the exact opposite direction. Even before the conclusion of the military pact with France, he informed Germany that he was ready for a fundamental reorientation of the political course from the "Stresa Front" to a confrontation with Western democracies.

For several years, Mussolini's people eavesdropped on the negotiations between the British and French embassies in Rome. The Duce had to have confirmation from this source that there was a firm determination in London and Paris to prevent a war against Italy at almost any cost. When the British proposed an agreement on Ethiopia in June, Mussolini did not take it seriously: the rearmament of England had barely begun, and he knew that London had decided to give priority to the Japanese threat in the Far East.

As the weeks passed, and nothing but verbal protests were heard from the other members of the League of Nations, Mussolini realized that his plan was moving along safely and was becoming quite feasible. Publicly, he listed ninety-one examples of Ethiopian "aggression" and stated that he was only exercising the right of self-defense. But in private, the Duce said: even if he could take over this entire vast empire through peaceful negotiations, he would prefer war - victory in the war would be revenge for the defeat of Italy in Ethiopia in 1896. Mussolini wanted "war for the sake of war, because fascism needs the glory of defeating the gel." The paradox was that just at this time, someone again began to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

For a while, Mussolini toyed with the idea of personally going to East Africa to lead the offensive. In his unpublished speeches, he declared that he wanted to force the whole world to submit to his will and, if the Ethiopians showed the slightest resistance, he would betray their land "by fire and sword."

By August, Mussolini was also talking about war with England if she got in his way. This greatly alarmed his generals and admirals. They tried to convince the Duce that there was no way to start such a war, but he brazenly claimed that he could attack and sink the entire English fleet in Alexandria in a few hours. Perhaps he did not know what the Italian General Staff did know - only about half a dozen aircraft in Italy had sufficient range for this, and besides, they did not have enough armor-piercing bombs to destroy enemy ships.

Britain's policy towards Italy in September, as Mussolini learned through his interception channels, continued to be a policy of condoning the aggressor. With limited opportunities and numerous obligations, especially in the Far East, England was unlikely to be able to defend the independence of Ethiopia. But since articles began to appear in the Italian press about possible attacks on Suez, Gibraltar and Malta, London considered it wise to strengthen the fleet in the Mediterranean. Mussolini privately told the British that he would have done the same in their place, but publicly declared that this was an unacceptable threat, and cleverly took advantage of this fact in his homeland to raise patriotic feelings.

The commanders of the troops were amazed at the self-confidence of the Duce, because they knew that his fable about the weakness of the British fleet was just a figment of his imagination. The fact that Italy received over three-quarters of its imports by sea, and even had to send drinking water by sea to its armed forces in East Africa, made it extremely vulnerable. The admirals reported that if England entered the war, they could not even defend the Italian coastline from bombardment. But Mussolini correctly judged that the British would never oppose Italy as long as they were sure that the main danger to them was Germany or Japan. When the Duce was right, the leaders of the armed forces, like all of Italy, were filled with admiration.

In those last weeks before the outbreak of the war, there was something startlingly daring about Mussolini's entire appearance. He had almost no friends in the League of Nations, the Vatican thought he was a little crazy, and the Pope, despite the general sympathy for the upcoming "Catholic crusade", plotted to introduce public censorship directed against "a civilized nation who intended to take over another country" . According to the US ambassador, Mussolini was not insane, but "a treacherous, inflexible, stubborn, ruthless, and wicked" man; the English ambassador considered him "extremely devoid of remorse", but creating "a permanent impression of a man who turned out to be a victim, and not the master of his fate."

War in East Africa

Mussolini's strategic plans were based on the assumption that the Ethiopians were poorly armed. They may have had several hundred machine guns, perhaps ten unarmed aircraft (although Mussolini pretended to the public that his opponents were very well armed with the most modern weapons). With an undeniable superiority in air power, Mussolini intended to use them to carry out a carefully prepared strategy to terrorize the civilian population until it surrendered to the mercy of the victor. It was planned, if necessary, to destroy the main Ethiopian cities by bombardment. He also relied on the power of bribery, which he subsequently did in other countries that he was about to attack.

On October 2, the ringing of bells and the howl of sirens gathered the people of Italy in the squares of the cities, where through loudspeakers the Duce announced the beginning of the war. This entire procedure had been carefully rehearsed by Starace in the preceding months. Twenty-six million people took part in this so-called greatest event in the history of mankind.

Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936 (video)

At the same time that a flotilla of aircraft set off to bomb the city of Adua, Mussolini sent a message to the League of Nations that Italy was the victim of a barbaric and unprovoked aggression. On these planes were his two eldest sons and son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano. The youngest son Bruno was taken away from school. In less than seventeen years, after little training, he also received a pilot's license.

The Italians met the beginning of the war, oddly enough, without much enthusiasm. This was forced to admit to himself and Mussolini. His claims that this was a defensive war against a barbarian aggressor clearly lacked credibility. Few responded to the call to enlist in the army as volunteers. What finally raised a stir among the people was, as he expected, the unanimous condemnation of Italy by the fifty members of the League of Nations. This was exactly what the Duce needed to convince the Italians that their country was in danger, that all true patriots should rally for a common cause.

Under the terms of the treaty establishing the League of Nations, any state that was a member of it and attacked another state was considered to have committed an act of aggression against all other members who were supposed to break off trade relations with it. Mussolini agreed that he had violated the treaty, but claimed that trying to put Italy on the same level as uncivilized Ethiopia was an act of humiliation of her national dignity. The general denunciation in Geneva cut him off from Western democracies but provided unexpected support in his own homeland.

The economic blockade under the terms of the League of Nations treaty was not only mandatory, it was definitely political in nature for countries that saw collective security as their only defense system. However, in reality, the sanctions against Italy were more than useless. In the absence of a precedent for application, it took too long to create a mechanism for their real implementation at the same time by so many different countries. In particular, there was no agreement on the closure of the Suez Canal for military traffic or the ban on oil supplies, which would be tantamount to the start of hostilities against Italy.

So much was said about fascist military preparations and it was so important to capture as much territory as possible before international reaction made itself felt that Mussolini, rejecting the advice of his army commanders, ordered that he ignore the enemy remaining behind lines and move forward into the central regions of Ethiopia. De Bono complained about the incompetence of the Duce as an organizer and strategist, others believed that De Bono was truly incompetent, who decided to wage a long war and did not count on the lightning victory that the political situation demanded. The choice of the commander was an obvious mistake and, judging by the first hours of the offensive operation, Mussolini immediately began to look for a replacement for him.

Meanwhile, what had happened aroused in London and Paris a terrible alarm about the fate of the Stresa Front, formed by three anti-German states. Grandi, who was in London, remained almost completely unaware of the political decisions of Rome, so that he sometimes had to ask the British government what was going on. Privately, he kept trying to convince the British that Mussolini's belligerent public statements were intended for the ears of Italians abroad and should not be taken seriously.

Without informing the ambassador, Mussolini sent his emissaries to London, whose appearance caused even more confusion. One of them brought proposals to resolve the conflict. But when a messenger arrived from Ethiopia in Rome to discuss the terms, Mussolini refused to accept him on the pretext that it might be a sent assassin. Instead, the Duce made a strange agreement with a charming rogue named Jakir Bey, who undertook to either kidnap Haile Selassie and bring him to Italy, or collude with him to conduct a dummy battle, which the Italians would supposedly win, after which the Ethiopians would agree to compromise world. For two months the fascist government continued to play this unheard-of game, but in the end decided to buy off Jakir Bey by generously paying him for his silence. Some documents relating to this fact were removed from the archive.

In December, the French and British presented further proposals for a compromise, according to which Italy would be given most of what she claimed. Mussolini was already ready to accept this "Hore-Laval" plan as a basis for discussion, but the outburst of popular indignation in England against such a betrayal of Ethiopia forced Samuel Hoare to resign his position as foreign secretary. This, in turn, gave Mussolini the opportunity to refuse the offer, while declaring at the same time that the refusal was forced upon him.

December was a difficult month for the Duce. His colleagues thought he was adrift with no clear political purpose and wondered how he could survive the almost unanimous condemnation of the Western world. Several Italian ministers and hierarchs were sent to fight in Ethiopia to show that they remained at heart devoted Squadrists, and to let everyone see that Mussolini could easily run the state without their help. Balbo noted that their leader imposed war on them without any prior discussion or consultation, and that he "rarely has seen a spectacle of this magnitude, with such lack of skill, or with such frivolous naivete. Political, diplomatic, financial, even military preparations were completely inadequate.” Mussolini “lived in isolation, within four walls, not seeing or hearing anything from the real world...surrounded only by sycophants who told him only what he wanted to hear. If a person is told a hundred times a day that he is a genius, then in the end he himself will believe in his infallibility.

The victory was supposed to serve as Mussolini's excuse, he expected it from Marshal Badoglio, who replaced De Bono. Badoglio was ordered to use any terrorist methods, including the destruction of villages and the use of poisonous substances on a large scale. Although Mussolini himself signed the international convention on the prohibition of the use of poison gases, he continued to consider them a conventional weapon of war as long as the fact of their use was kept secret. The Duce was ready, if necessary, to use even bacteriological weapons to spread infectious diseases. Since Jakir Bey and other intermediaries failed to conquer Ethiopia by ruse, it was decided to use every possible military means. There was no point in spending ten years producing hundreds of tons of poison gas without using it to intimidate and demoralize the enemy.

The very fact of the use of the gas perhaps deserves less attention than the great efforts that were made to cover it up. Mussolini needed to make the world believe that a civilized country like Italy was involved in a war by a wild country, so all reports from the front were carefully checked. He also did not want people to think that the Italians won only by resorting to illegal methods of struggle. The Duce knew that if such facts surfaced, it would deal a severe blow to fascist prestige. Mustard gas was Mussolini's secret weapon, and he wanted to keep this secret so that he could use it in the future.

In early 1936, Badoglio's huge army began to move deep into Ethiopia from the north, Graziani was advancing from Somalia in the south. Mussolini realized that a compromise peace was no longer needed. The danger arose when the British finally decided to propose a ban on oil supplies. In response, Mussolini threatened that he would withdraw from the League of Nations and possibly attack Sudan. However, he did not forget to encourage the peacekeepers, continuing to conduct separate negotiations with them in Rome, Geneva and Djibouti, in order to create the impression that it was still possible to negotiate with him.

Meanwhile, Grandi tried to regain Mussolini's confidence. He reported from London unlikely information that King Edward allegedly wanted the Italians to know that he was secretly on their side and, in great secrecy, told the Italian ambassador that he considered the attempt of the British government to support the League of Nations "criminal and ridiculous." Grandi's efforts were aimed at causing panic in London because of the threat of war: articles should have been placed in English newspapers saying that Italy had an army of eight million and the most powerful air force in Europe and that any resistance to it was not only doomed to failure, but could lead to the establishment of the hegemony of Nazi Germany in Europe.

In early May, Badoglio occupied Addis Ababa. Apparently, the war came to a triumphant end. The fact that most of Ethiopia remained unconquered and that the struggle continued for the next three years, they tried to hide from the Italian public. Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed emperor instead of "Signor Tafari". Mussolini declared that the captured Ethiopians would now be executed as "rebels". His generals were given official permission to continue to use poison gas and pursue a "systematic policy of terror," as well as special instructions to eliminate the few intellectuals who could direct the resistance movement. A rule was introduced for every even accidentally killed Italian to execute ten Ethiopians.

By creating the Italian empire, Mussolini finally achieved the goal that he set for himself many years ago. The Italian people gladly received the news that the Ethiopians unanimously and in a friendly way welcome the conquerors, thanking them for bringing them civilization, justice and technical achievements. The European countries vigorously assured that Italy had satisfied all its sovereign demands and would no longer lay claim to any territory. Fascism will now become conservative, inclined to oppose violence and, with regard to the revolution, will go over to "the other side of the barricades." Mussolini convinced the British that the rumors about the recruitment of a huge army of Ethiopians had no basis.

None of these statements were true, but the Duce hoped they would be believed.

The Duce admitted to his close associates that waging such a war as he waged may be immoral, but the only morality in politics is success. The "greatest colonial war in history" was planned and won personally by Mussolini - everyone should have understood this. He did his best to ensure that the merits of his commanders De Bonet, Badoglio and Graziani did not overshadow the glory that rightfully belonged to him alone. The victory in Ethiopia has been described as a "masterpiece" that amazed the world. It was said that European military experts considered Ethiopia a country that knows no defeats. Among the foreigners, hacks were hired, who could then be generously quoted in Italy.

It is difficult to determine what this war cost. The Ethiopians estimate, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, that they lost half a million people. The Italian side claimed that about 5,000 soldiers died on its side, mostly from among the colored ones. Mussolini, commenting on these figures, cynically stated that he would like more Italians to die in order to make this war look more serious. Almost the entire annual national income was spent on the war. The amount of war material expended would have been enough to equip seventy-five divisions. In financial terms, this was equal to the entire military budget of the country for the next three years. However, Mussolini thought he could make people believe that the army had come out of the war stronger than ever. Just as exaggerating, he spoke of the new colony as a "promised land", with the help of which it is possible to solve all Italian economic problems. In reality, however, it has become a huge waste of already limited national resources.

Sculpture Mussolini-Sphinx, built by soldiers after the victory over Ethiopia

Dictatorial propaganda sought to perpetuate many such delusions. Still, it was not difficult for outside observers to notice that as a result of the military efforts undertaken, Italy became much weaker than before. The program for the long-term supply of troops in the Red Sea basin proved to be very costly and extremely vulnerable, especially now that Mussolini's systematic provocations and threats have at last prompted Britain to rearm more quickly. Economic sanctions, although ineffective, still brought losses. By pushing away the Western democracies, Mussolini was pushing himself ever closer to an alliance with Germany and thus began to lose one of Italy's most important advantages - the ability to pit powerful European powers against each other. The room for maneuver in foreign policy has narrowed sharply. Now Mussolini has become a truly prominent figure - in the United States, the Nazis began to be treated as a gang of gangsters who are unscrupulous in their means, and some people again suggested that if the Duce was not completely crazy, he was still able to pounce "like a mad dog" on anyone anything else.

The negative results of Mussolini's victory in Africa came to light much later. In a short time, he managed to challenge fifteen countries - members of the League of Nations. Instantly becoming a central figure in world politics, Mussolini forced the British to accept that he had defied and won. In Italy itself, he convinced many doubters of his genius and reached the high point of his popularity.

Speaking about the fact that all his ambitions are satisfied, Mussolini increasingly came to the conclusion that if he could win the greatest colonial war in the history of mankind, he would be able to accomplish something more. “Every stop is a loss,” he once said to an old acquaintance, without even allowing the thought of how dangerous such a slogan is. Mussolini was about to establish a powerful steel industry in Ethiopia, capable of producing the necessary weapons for the millionth army of soldiers he planned to recruit there, and wanted to be thought that he was studying the Amharic language, as befitted the ruler of the empire. Already in March 1936, he began to talk about the inevitability of the next war and the need to direct the entire national economy towards this main goal. Most of the industry had to stop making products for private consumers and concentrate exclusively on the production of weapons. Some of the Duce's ministers finally realized that his self-confidence, which arose as a result of a too easy victory over a poorly armed and disorganized Ethiopian army, was a cruel joke of fate that lured him to the path of final defeat.

The months following the Ethiopian war were marked by a new upsurge in the "Duchism" movement, and Mussolini was not a strong enough personality to withstand the storm of praise heaped upon him. Peasants in the fields fell on their knees before him, women lifted up babies so that he could give them his blessing, and cabinet ministers sometimes stood at attention in his presence for hours. The time came when Starace set a general rule for those who wanted to interview the Duce: they had to run to his desk, and then back in the same way, only stopping for a moment at the door to give him a salute.

Any reasonable person should have understood that this goes beyond all limits and carries a certain danger. But Mussolini himself did not understand this. A flock of well-paid journalists every day repeated that the Duce was almost a deity, at least the vicegerent of God on earth, who came to make history, the helmsman and leader of the race, which is destined to dominate at all times.

Mussolini's mother also became a kind of cult. In memory of her, schoolchildren sang the song "Happy Mother" in recitative. The birthplace of the Duce and the burial place of his parents turned into a shrine, in front of which visitors had to kneel in gratitude. In the new edition of the biography written by Pini, it was quite officially said that Mussolini was considered all over the world to be a superman and the greatest genius of our time. Those who held this opinion included Gandhi, Douglas Fairbanks, Kipling, De Valera, Stravinsky, Lehar, Piero Morgan, Franklin Roosevelt, and "an infinite number of others."

Portal for the student. Self-training

Italo-Ethiopian war 1935 1936 summary. Fascist Italy attacked Ethiopia

The armed forces of the parties at the beginning of the war

Ethiopia

Italy

The course of hostilities

Actions of the Italian aviation

International reaction

The results of the war

Subsequent events

see also

Notes

Postcards by Enrico De Seta

Preparing for war

War in East Africa

Portal for the student. Self-training

The armed forces of the parties at the beginning of the war

Ethiopia

Italy

The course of hostilities

Actions of the Italian aviation

International reaction

The results of the war

Subsequent events

see also

Notes

Postcards by Enrico De Seta

Preparing for war

War in East Africa

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