Who bombed Yugoslavia in 1999. Scientific confirmation of the fact that vaccines spread the flu

WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA 1991-1995, 1998-1999 – interethnic war in Yugoslavia and NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The reason for the war was the destruction of Yugoslav statehood (by mid-1992, the federal authorities had lost control of the situation), caused by the conflict between the federal republics and various ethnic groups, as well as attempts by the political "top" to revise the existing borders between the republics.
To understand the history of the conflict, you should first read about the collapse of Yugoslavia itself:

Brief overview of the wars in Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999:

War in Croatia (1991-1995).
In February 1991, the Sabor of Croatia adopted a decision on "disarmament" with the SFRY, and the Serbian National Council of the Serbian Krajina (an autonomous Serbian region within Croatia) - a resolution on "disarmament" with Croatia and remaining within the SFRY. Mutual escalation of passions, persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church caused the first wave of refugees - 40 thousand Serbs were forced to leave their homes. In July, a general mobilization was announced in Croatia, and by the end of the year, the number of Croatian armed formations reached 110 thousand people. Ethnic cleansing began in Western Slavonia. Serbs were completely expelled from 10 cities and 183 villages, and partially from 87 villages.

On the part of the Serbs, the formation of a system of territorial defense and the armed forces of Krajina began, a significant part of which were volunteers from Serbia. Units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) entered the territory of Croatia and by August 1991 drove out volunteer Croatian units from the territory of all Serbian regions. But after the signing of a truce in Geneva, the JNA stopped helping the Krajina Serbs, and a new offensive by the Croats forced them to retreat. From spring 1991 to spring 1995. Krajina was partially taken under the protection of the Blue Helmets, but the demand of the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of Croatian troops from the zones controlled by peacekeepers was not fulfilled. The Croats continued to take active military actions with the use of tanks, artillery, rocket launchers. As a result of the war in 1991-1994. 30 thousand people died, up to 500 thousand people became refugees, direct losses amounted to more than 30 billion dollars. In May-August 1995, the Croatian army carried out a well-prepared operation to return Krajina to Croatia. Several tens of thousands of people died during the hostilities. 250 thousand Serbs were forced to leave the republic. In total for 1991-1995. more than 350 thousand Serbs left Croatia.

War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995).
On October 14, 1991, in the absence of Serb deputies, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed the independence of the republic. On January 9, 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People proclaimed the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the SFRY. In April 1992, a "Muslim putsch" took place - the seizure of police buildings and the most important objects. Muslim armed formations were opposed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard and volunteer detachments. The Yugoslav army withdrew its units, and then was blocked by the Muslims in the barracks. For 44 days of the war, 1320 people died, the number of refugees amounted to 350 thousand people.

The United States and a number of other states have accused Serbia of fomenting the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the OSCE ultimatum, the Yugoslav troops were withdrawn from the territory of the republic. But the situation in the republic has not stabilized. A war broke out between Croats and Muslims with the participation of the Croatian army. The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into independent ethnic groups.

On March 18, 1994, with the mediation of the United States, a Muslim-Croat federation and a well-armed joint army were created, which launched offensive operations with the support of NATO air forces, bombing Serbian positions (with the authorization of the UN Secretary General). The contradictions between the Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav leadership, as well as the blockade of heavy weapons by the "blue helmets" of the Serbs, put them in a difficult situation. In August-September 1995, NATO air strikes, which destroyed Serbian military installations, communications centers and air defense systems, prepared a new offensive for the Muslim-Croatian army. On October 12, the Serbs were forced to sign a ceasefire agreement.

By Resolution 1031 of December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council instructed NATO to form a peacekeeping force to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the first ever NATO-led ground operation outside its area of ​​responsibility. The role of the UN was reduced to the approval of this operation. The composition of the peacekeeping multinational force included 57,300 people, 475 tanks, 1,654 armored vehicles, 1,367 guns, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, 200 combat helicopters, 139 combat aircraft, 35 ships (with 52 carrier-based aircraft) and other weapons. It is believed that by the beginning of 2000 the goals of the peacekeeping operation were basically achieved - a ceasefire had come. But the full agreement of the conflicting parties did not take place. The problem of refugees remained unresolved.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed more than 200,000 lives, of which more than 180,000 were civilians. Germany alone spent 320,000 refugees (mostly Muslims) on maintenance from 1991 to 1998. about 16 billion marks.

War in Kosovo and Metohija (1998-1999).
Since the second half of the 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to operate in Kosovo. In 1991-1998 There were 543 clashes between Albanian militants and Serbian police, 75% of which took place in five months of last year. To stop the wave of violence, Belgrade sent police units numbering 15 thousand people and about the same number of military personnel, 140 tanks and 150 armored vehicles to Kosovo and Metohija. In July-August 1998, the Serbian army managed to destroy the main strongholds of the KLA, which controlled up to 40% of the region's territory. This predetermined the intervention of the NATO member states, who demanded the cessation of the actions of the Serbian forces under the threat of the bombing of Belgrade. Serbian troops were withdrawn from the province and KLA militants re-occupied a significant part of Kosovo and Metohija. The forcible expulsion of the Serbs from the region began.

Operation Allied Force

In March 1999, in violation of the UN Charter, NATO launched a "humanitarian intervention" against Yugoslavia. In the Allied Force operation, 460 combat aircraft were used at the first stage, by the end of the operation the figure had increased by more than 2.5 times. The strength of the NATO ground grouping was increased to 10 thousand people with heavy armored vehicles and tactical missiles in service. Within a month from the beginning of the operation, the NATO naval grouping was increased to 50 ships equipped with sea-based cruise missiles and 100 carrier-based aircraft, and then increased several times more (for carrier-based aviation - 4 times). In total, 927 aircraft and 55 ships (4 aircraft carriers) participated in the NATO operation. NATO troops were served by a powerful group of space assets.

By the beginning of the NATO aggression, the Yugoslav ground forces numbered 90 thousand people and about 16 thousand people of the police and security forces. The Yugoslav army had up to 200 combat aircraft, about 150 air defense systems with limited combat capabilities.

NATO used 1,200-1,500 high-precision sea and air-based cruise missiles to attack 900 targets in the Yugoslav economy. During the first stage of the operation, these funds destroyed the oil industry of Yugoslavia, 50% of the ammunition industry, 40% of the tank and automobile industries, 40% of oil storage facilities, 100% of strategic bridges across the Danube. From 600 to 800 sorties per day were carried out. In total, 38,000 sorties were made during the operation, about 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles were used, more than 20,000 bombs and guided missiles were dropped. 37,000 uranium projectiles were also used, as a result of which 23 tons of depleted uranium-238 were sprayed over Yugoslavia.

An important component of the aggression was the information war, including a powerful impact on the information systems of Yugoslavia in order to destroy information sources and undermine the combat command and control system and information isolation not only of the troops, but also of the population. The destruction of television and radio centers cleared the information space for the broadcasting of the Voice of America station.

According to NATO, the bloc lost 5 aircraft, 16 unmanned aerial vehicles and 2 helicopters in the operation. According to the Yugoslav side, 61 NATO aircraft, 238 cruise missiles, 30 unmanned vehicles and 7 helicopters were shot down (independent sources give the numbers 11, 30, 3 and 3 respectively).

The Yugoslav side in the first days of the war lost a significant part of its aviation and air defense systems (70% of mobile air defense systems). The forces and means of air defense were preserved due to the fact that Yugoslavia refused to conduct an air defensive operation.
As a result of NATO bombing, more than 2,000 civilians were killed, more than 7,000 people were injured, 82 bridges, 422 tasks of educational institutions, 48 ​​medical facilities, the most important life support facilities and infrastructure were destroyed and damaged, more than 750 thousand residents of Yugoslavia became refugees, left without the necessary living conditions 2.5 million people. The total material damage from NATO aggression amounted to over $100 billion.

On June 10, 1999, the NATO Secretary General suspended operations against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership agreed to withdraw military and police forces from Kosovo and Metohija. On June 11, the NATO Rapid Response Force entered the territory of the region. By April 2000, 41,000 KFOR troops were stationed in Kosovo and Metohija. But this did not stop inter-ethnic violence. In the year after the end of NATO aggression, more than 1,000 people were killed in the region, more than 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins and 150,000 representatives of other ethnic groups were expelled, about 100 churches and monasteries were burned or damaged.

In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit was held, which legalized any operations of the alliance outside the territories of its member countries "wherever it is required." The summit documents did not mention the need to authorize the UN Security Council to use force.

During the NATO war against Serbia on April 12, 1999, during the bombing of the railway bridge in the Grdelica area (Grdelica), a NATO F-15E aircraft destroyed the Serbian passenger train Belgrade - Skopje.
This incident received prominent coverage in the NATO information war against Serbia.
The media of the NATO countries repeatedly showed a falsified (deliberately accelerated) video recording of the destruction of the train at the moment of passing over the bridge.
It was alleged that the pilot accidentally caught the train on the bridge. The plane and train were moving too fast and the pilot was unable to make a meaningful decision, the result is a tragic accident.

Details about the operation of the United States and its allies "Allied Force"

The peculiarity of the military conflict in Yugoslavia was that it included two "mini-wars": NATO aggression against the FRY and internal armed confrontation on ethnic grounds between Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Moreover, the reason for the NATO armed intervention was a sharp aggravation in 1998 of the hitherto sluggish current conflict. Moreover, one cannot ignore the objective fact of the constant, methodical escalation of tension in the cradle of Serbian culture - Kosovo - at first hidden, and then, starting from the late 1980s, almost undisguised support for the separatist aspirations of the Albanian population by the West.
Accusing Belgrade of disrupting negotiations on the future of the rebellious region and of not agreeing to accept the humiliating ultimatum of the West, which boiled down to the demand for the actual occupation of Kosovo, on March 29, 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana orders the Supreme Commander of the united armed forces of the bloc in Europe, American General Wesley Clark, to start a military campaign in the form of an air operation against Yugoslavia, which received the name "Allied Force", which was based on the so-called "Plan 10601", which provided for several phases of military operations. It is noteworthy that the fundamental concept of this operation was developed in the summer of the previous year, 1998, and in October of the same year it was refined and specified.

BYPASSED AND ADDED

Despite the careful study of all direct and related issues related to the operation, the Western allies faced the fact of the crime they were committing. The definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1974 (resolution 3314) unequivocally states: “Will be qualified as an act of aggression: the bombing by the armed forces of states of the territory of another state. No considerations of any nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, can justify aggression.” But the North Atlantic Alliance did not even try to obtain UN sanction, since Russia and China would have blocked the draft Security Council resolution anyway if it had been put to a vote.

However, the NATO leadership still managed to beat in its favor the struggle of interpretations of international law that was unfolding within the walls of the UN, when the Security Council at the very beginning of the aggression expressed its de facto agreement with the operation, rejecting (three votes for, 12 against) the proposal submitted by Russia a draft resolution calling for the renunciation of the use of force against Yugoslavia. Thus, all grounds for a formal condemnation of the instigators of the military campaign allegedly disappeared.

Moreover, looking ahead, we note that already after the end of the aggression at an open meeting of the Security Council, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Carla del Ponte, made a statement that in the actions of NATO countries against Yugoslavia in the period from March 1999 there is no corpus delicti and that the accusations against the political and military leadership of the bloc are untenable. The chief prosecutor also said that the decision not to open an investigation into the accusations against the bloc was final and was made after a thorough study by the tribunal experts of the materials submitted by the government of the FRY, the State Duma Commission of the Russian Federation, a group of experts in the field of international law and a number of public organizations.

But, according to Alejandro Teitelbom, representative of the Association of American Lawyers at the UN European Headquarters in Geneva, Carla del Ponte “actually admitted that it is very difficult for her to take steps that run counter to the interests of the North Atlantic Alliance,” since the content of the Hague Tribunal costs millions of dollars. , and most of this money is provided by the United States, so in the event of such actions on her part, she may simply lose her job.
Nevertheless, feeling the precariousness of the arguments of the initiators of this military campaign, some NATO member countries, primarily Greece, began to resist the pressure of the military-political leadership of the alliance, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of carrying out a military action in general, since, in accordance with the NATO Charter, this requires the consent of all members of the block. However, in the end, Washington managed to "squeeze" its allies.

SCRIPT WASHINGTON

The multinational grouping of the joint NATO navies in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas by the beginning of hostilities consisted of 35 warships, including American, British, French and Italian aircraft carriers, as well as ships carrying cruise missiles. 14 states took direct part in the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia - the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, Norway and Hungary. The main burden fell on the shoulders of the US Air Force and Navy pilots, who accounted for over 60% of sorties in the first month and a half of the campaign, although American aircraft accounted for only 42% of the NATO combat aviation grouping in the region. The aviation of Great Britain, France and Italy was also relatively actively involved. The participation of nine other NATO countries in air strikes was minimal and pursued rather a political goal - to demonstrate the unity and cohesion of the allies.

In essence, it was precisely according to Washington's scenario and, as the subsequent analysis of military operations confirmed, in accordance with instructions that came directly from the Pentagon, that the content and duration of the phases of the entire campaign were repeatedly adjusted. This, of course, could not but cause discontent on the part of some of the most influential European allies of the United States. Thus, for example, representatives of France in the North Atlantic Alliance, which made essentially the second largest contribution to the air campaign, openly accused Washington of "sometimes operating outside NATO." And this despite the fact that France, which did not fully delegate its powers to NATO (since it formally remained outside the military structure of the bloc), previously stipulated for itself the privilege of special information about all the nuances of conducting an air campaign.

After the end of hostilities, the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe, the American General Clark, frankly admitted that he did not take into account the opinion of "those who, due to nervousness, sought to change the objects of strikes." Under the veil of imaginary "unity" of the positions of the member states of the alliance, in reality, there were severe contradictions in the scheme of operational actions in the Balkans. At the same time, Germany and Greece were the main opponents of the escalation. During the conflict, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping even made a statement that the German government was "not going to discuss this matter at all." For its part, the Greek leadership, itself for many years faced with Albanian, including criminal, expansion and hardly agreed to “punish” Belgrade for “oppressing the Albanian minority”, began to artificially create obstacles to the expansion of hostilities. In particular, Athens did not allow its Turkish "ally" to use Greek airspace as part of the campaign against Yugoslavia.

The arrogance of the Americans, who took control of the entire campaign into their own hands, sometimes aroused bewilderment, bordering on open discontent, even among Washington's devoted "friends". So, for example, Ankara was, to put it mildly, "surprised" that, without agreement with it, the NATO military leadership announced the allocation of three air bases located in Turkey to the alliance's disposal. Even the facts of the refusal of the command of the Canadian contingent - Washington's most devoted Anglo-Saxon ally - to bomb "doubtful" targets in Yugoslavia, indicated by the leadership of the bloc, from the point of view of Ottawa, became public.

The states newly admitted to NATO - the Czech Republic and Poland (not to mention Hungary, which took a direct part in hostilities) - in contrast to their "senior" European counterparts in the alliance, on the contrary, demonstrated full support for the "flexible" position of Brussels and Washington and declared on the readiness to provide its military infrastructure for the solution of any tasks of NATO as part of the aggression against Yugoslavia.
Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Macedonia showed even greater zeal in the hope of Washington's loyalty in resolving the issue of the upcoming admission to NATO, proactively declaring that their airspace (some completely, some partially) was at the disposal of the bloc's OVVS. In general, as follows from the comments of experts, many of the frictions within the alliance were based on Washington's lack of awareness of European allies about specific plans within each phase of the campaign.

TESTS AND INTERNSHIPS

Pragmatic Washington, as in most other wars of the new time, especially disregarding the position of the allies, tried to "squeeze" the maximum out of the military conflict, "killing two birds with one stone": the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime, which became an overnight obstacle to the implementation of the plans of the White House in the Balkans and experimenting with new means of armed struggle, forms and methods of military operations.

The Americans capitalized on the opportunity by testing the latest air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, cluster bombs with homing submunitions, and other weapons. In real combat conditions, modernized and new reconnaissance, control, communications, navigation, electronic warfare systems, all types of support were tested; the issues of interaction between the types of the Armed Forces, as well as aviation and special forces (which, perhaps, was the most significant in the light of the latest installations of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld personally at that time; the concept of "integrity") were worked out.

At the insistence of the Americans, carrier aircraft were used as part of reconnaissance and strike combat systems and were only "carriers of ammunition." They took off from air bases in the United States, NATO countries in Europe and aircraft carriers in the seas surrounding the Balkans, delivered to the launch lines beyond the reach of the Yugoslav air defense systems cruise missiles aimed at specific critical points of objects in advance, launched them and left for new ammunition. In addition, other methods and forms of using aviation were used.

Later, taking advantage of the forced delay in the operation, again at the initiative of the Americans, the NATO command began to practice the so-called "combat training" of reservist pilots. After 10-15 independent sorties, which was considered sufficient to gain combat experience, they were replaced by other "trainees". Moreover, the bloc's military leadership was not in the least concerned by the fact that this period accounted for the largest number of almost daily, according to the NATO members themselves, blunders of the alliance's aviation when striking ground targets.

The fact was that the leadership of the OVVS block, in order to minimize the losses of the flight crew, gave the order to "bomb", not falling below 4.5-5 thousand meters, as a result of which compliance with international standards of warfare became simply impossible. The large-scale disposal of surpluses of obsolete bomb weapons that took place in the final phase of the operation by striking a wide range of mainly economic targets in Yugoslavia did not contribute to the observance of the norms of international law.
In total, which is not denied in principle by NATO representatives, in the course of hostilities, NATO aircraft destroyed about 500 important objects, of which at least half were purely civilian. At the same time, the losses of the civilian population of Yugoslavia were calculated, according to various sources, from 1.2 to 2 and even more than 5 thousand people.

It is noteworthy that in comparison with the gigantic economic damage (according to Yugoslav estimates - approximately 100 billion dollars), the damage to the military potential of Yugoslavia was not so significant. For example, there were few air battles (which was explained by the desire of the Serbs to maintain their air force in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the alliance's aviation), and the losses of the FRY in aviation were minimal - 6 aircraft in air battles and 22 at airfields. In addition, Belgrade reported that his army had lost only 13 tanks.

However, NATO reports also contained much larger, but by no means impressive numbers: 93 “successful strikes” on tanks, 153 on armored personnel carriers, 339 on military vehicles, 389 on gun and mortar positions. However, these data were criticized by analysts from the intelligence and military leadership of the alliance itself. And in an unpublished report by the US Air Force, it was generally reported that the confirmed number of destroyed Yugoslav mobile targets was 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers and 20 pieces of artillery.
By the way, in turn, the Serbs, summing up the results of the 78-day resistance, insisted on the following NATO losses: 61 aircraft, seven helicopters, 30 UAVs and 238 cruise missiles. The Allies naturally denied these figures. Although, according to independent experts, they are very close to the true ones.

BOMB, NOT FIGHT

Without questioning the sometimes truly “experimental” nature of military actions by the allies led by the Americans, one cannot but agree with those independent experts who state serious mistakes made by NATO, which consisted, in general, in underestimating the level of operational-strategic and tactical thinking of commanders and officers of the Yugoslav armed forces, who deeply analyzed the manner in which the Americans acted in local conflicts, primarily in the 1990-1991 war in the Persian Gulf. After all, it is no coincidence that the command of the alliance was forced to revise the general plan for conducting the operation, first getting involved in a protracted and extremely costly military conflict, and then bringing up the question of the advisability of conducting the ground phase of the operation, which was not originally planned.

Indeed, during the preparatory period for the aggression, there were no large-scale regroupings of NATO ground forces in the states adjacent to Yugoslavia. For example, ground forces with a total strength of only 26 thousand people were concentrated in Albania and Macedonia, while, according to Western analysts, in order to conduct an effective operation against the sufficiently trained armed forces of Yugoslavia, it was necessary to create a ground grouping with a total strength of at least 200 thousand people .

NATO's revision of the general concept of the operation in May and the idea of ​​urgent preparations for the ground phase of hostilities once again provoked sharp criticism from the influential European members of the alliance. For example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder vehemently rejected the proposal to send Allied ground troops to Kosovo as leading to a dead end. France also rejected this idea, but under the pretext that at that time it did not have a sufficient number of "free" formations of ground forces.
Yes, and American legislators have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of this undertaking. According to the US Congressional Budget Office, in addition to the already existing monthly cost of $1 billion for the operation, if the ground phase is carried out, at least another $200 million will have to be added to the maintenance of one Army division alone.

But, perhaps, most of all the allies, primarily the Americans, were worried about possible losses in the event of ground battles with Yugoslav units and formations. According to American experts, the damage in military operations in Kosovo alone could be from 400 to 1,500 servicemen, who would not be able to be hidden from the public. As, for example, carefully hidden data on the losses, according to estimates, of several dozen NATO pilots and special forces who “advised” Yugoslav Albanians and participated in the rescue of downed NATO pilots. As a result, the US Congress voted against consideration of a resolution allowing the US President, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to use ground forces in the military operation against Yugoslavia.

One way or another, it did not come to ground military operations between the Allies and the Yugoslav troops. However, from the very beginning of the aggression, the NATO command in every possible way stimulated the activity of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which consisted of Kosovo Albanians and representatives of the Albanian diasporas of the United States and a number of European countries. But the formations of the KLA, equipped and trained by NATO, in battles with Serbian border guards and regular units of the Armed Forces, showed themselves far from the best. According to a number of media reports, the largest operation of Albanian militants against Serbian troops in Kosovo, in which up to 4 thousand people took part, carried out in parallel with the NATO air campaign, ended in the complete defeat of the KLA units and the retreat of their remnants to the territory of Albania.

Under these conditions, the NATO leadership was left with the only way to resolve the problem it had created: to hit Yugoslavia with all the might of its potential. Which it did, sharply increasing in the last ten days of May the grouping of its Air Force to 1120 aircraft (including 625 combat aircraft) and adding two more aircraft carriers to the four aircraft carriers on combat duty in the seas adjacent to Yugoslavia, as well as five carriers of cruise missiles and a number of others. ships. Naturally, this was accompanied by an unprecedented intensity of raids on military and civilian targets on Yugoslav territory.

Relying on its colossal air power and putting Belgrade before a choice - the loss of Kosovo or the total destruction of the economy, an economic and humanitarian catastrophe - NATO forced the leadership of Yugoslavia to surrender and solved the Kosovo problem at that time in its own interests. Undoubtedly, the Serbs would not be able to resist the NATO group in open battles if the aggression continued, but they were quite able to conduct a successful guerrilla war on their territory for some time with the full support of the population, as was the case during the Second World War. But what happened happened!

CONCLUSIONS MADE

This military campaign once again demonstrated how much their European partners in the NATO bloc depend on the United States. It was the Americans who were the main striking force of the aggressor - 55% of combat aircraft (by the end of the war), over 95% of cruise missiles, 80% of bombs and missiles dropped, all strategic bombers, 60% of reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs, 24 reconnaissance satellites out of 25 and the vast majority precision weapons belonged to the United States.
The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Italian Admiral Guido Venturoni, was even forced to admit: “Only using the funds provided by the overseas partner, the European NATO countries can conduct independent operations, while the creation of a European component in the field of defense and security remains a noble idea.”

It is impossible not to pay tribute to the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance, which not only stated the fact that the European allies of the United States lagged behind their "big brother" in all aspects of the development of military potential, but also, following the results of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, took a number of drastic measures leading to correcting the negative from the point of view of view of Brussels (and Washington in the first place) position. First of all, it was decided to speed up the protracted process of reforming the Armed Forces of the European countries - members of the bloc, within which, among other things, the lion's share of the costs provided for in the national budgets for the purchase of weapons and military equipment, to be directed to the acquisition of high-precision weapons (in the United States, of course), to reform the logistics system and much more.

But, according to NATO strategists, the most important task facing the US allies in Europe continues to be the creation of such formations of expeditionary forces that could participate on an equal footing with the Americans in creating the model of world order that Washington needs.

During 1991-2001 about 300 thousand bombs were dropped throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia and more than 1 thousand rockets were fired. In the struggle of individual republics for their independence, NATO played a big role, which solved its own and American problems by bombing a country in the center of Europe in the Stone Age. The war in Yugoslavia, the years and events of which claimed the lives of tens of thousands of inhabitants, should serve as a lesson for society, since even in our modern life it is necessary not only to appreciate, but also to maintain such a fragile world peace with all our might...

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The politics of the modern West is thoroughly saturated with double standards. They recall the tolerance and inadmissibility of encroachments on the territorial integrity of states only in cases where this affects their tactical and strategic interests.

At the same time, they themselves repeatedly crossed the line of unacceptable actions in relation to entire countries and peoples. The world community must never forget the events that took place between March and June 1999 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It was then that the North Atlantic Alliance carried out the military operation "Allied Force", which claimed the lives and destroyed the fate of many thousands of civilians. Not only military installations, but also civilian infrastructure were hit by NATO air strikes. According to official information alone, the number of civilians killed by the United States and the European Union amounted to more than 1.7 thousand people. They included at least 400 children. Another 10 thousand people were seriously injured, and about 1 thousand people simply went missing. The enormity of this military operation is aggravated by the fact that a large number of lives were claimed by NATO bombings after they were completed. In the tolerant European Union, they try not to particularly remember what ammunition was used in the implementation of the anti-human operation "Allied Force". They included depleted radioactive uranium in their composition. This had the most detrimental effect on the health of many of those people who were lucky enough to survive under NATO bombing. However, after the end of hostilities and until today, the main perpetrators have not been punished for bombing of Yugoslavia.

The reason for the start of the NATO bombing

Western politicians justified this operation with the term "humanitarian intervention". However, such "explanations" are a cynical substitution of the true reasons for their actions in the eyes of the world community. The war in Yugoslavia was unleashed even without a permit from the United Nations. It will never be considered legal and is a real example of military aggression by NATO countries against a sovereign state. The formal reason for the start of the bombing of Yugoslavia was the wave of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. As you know, the territory of the former socialist Yugoslavia repeated the fate of the Soviet Union and by that time already represented separate allied states. Western countries have largely contributed to the outbreak of new ethnic conflicts and civil wars on the Balkan Peninsula. The Kosovo Albanians were chosen as "heroes" by Washington. This region territorially and politically belonged to the then existing Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, back in 1996, the movement of Albanian separatists, secretly supported by American intelligence services, intensified here. In February 1998, the so-called "Kosovo Liberation Army" declared a "fight for independence". The war in Yugoslavia began with armed acts of violence not only against the state police, but also against Serbian civilians. There were real victims. Official Belgrade was forced to respond to this with an internal forceful operation aimed at eliminating bandit formations from among the Kosovars. During this operation, one of the leaders of the separatists, A. Yashari, was destroyed. However, 82 Albanian residents of a village in central Kosovo where internal fighting was taking place were affected. Western leaders immediately took advantage of this opportunity and began to put pressure on Belgrade. A temporary truce between the parties within the country did not bring results. After another clash between the forces of Belgrade and Albanian separatists, scenes of Albanians allegedly executed by the forces of the FRY were falsified, and a NATO operation began.

The true causes of NATO aggression in Yugoslavia

Some researchers drew attention to some coincidence between the beginning of NATO aggression against the FRY and domestic political events in the United States. We remind readers that at that moment there was a scandal related to the intimate relationship of the American President Clinton with Monica Lewinsky. American leaders have always been able to use foreign policy to solve personal problems. However, in this case, the goals of the West were much more ambitious. NATO's barbaric bombings in Federal Yugoslavia became a tool to achieve the following goals:

  • change of leadership in the lands of Serbia and Montenegro, followed by a reorientation of the most pro-Russian part of the former Yugoslavia towards the West;
  • the state division of Serbia and Montenegro along with the transformation of Kosovo into a separate state;
  • liquidation of the army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
  • free stationing and anchoring of NATO forces in the Balkans and, in particular, in Serbia and Kosovo;
  • testing the military power of the North Atlantic Alliance in real combat conditions. Destruction of old weapons and testing of new types of weapons;
  • demonstrating to the whole world the significant role of NATO in supposedly resolving ethnic conflicts.

It is noteworthy that the United Nations monitored the general situation on the territory of the FRY. However, no sanctions were issued by the UN in response to the open intervention of NATO countries in Yugoslavia. Why? Why war in Yugoslavia remained unpunished? The UN resolution, which condemned the actions of the North Atlantic Alliance, gained only 3 votes in the Security Council. Only the Russian Federation, China and Namibia dared to openly condemn the actions of Washington and NATO. There has been some criticism of NATO in the West. A number of independent media tried to draw the attention of the world community to the fact that the aggressive actions of the North Atlantic Alliance without the appropriate sanction of the UN Security Council are a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and all the canons of international law. However, by and large, the West has not yet made an official objective assessment of this criminal military operation.

Consequences of the barbaric bombardments of Yugoslavia

The most terrible "result" of NATO aggression in the FRY is the death of at least 1.7 thousand civilians, as well as thousands of wounded and missing. If we talk about the economic damage, then the losses are more than significant. As a result of the war in Yugoslavia, all the most important objects of the civilian infrastructure operating at that time were destroyed or seriously damaged. Under the lethal shells of the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance, national oil refineries, bridges, power supply units and the largest enterprises fell. More than 500 thousand people were left without work and means of subsistence. A huge number of citizens lost their homes. According to the estimates of the future Serbian authorities, the war in Yugoslavia brought an economic loss equivalent to 20 billion US dollars.

Such a barbaric action could not pass without a trace from the point of view of ecology. Targeted bombing of refineries contributed to the entry of sending substances into the atmosphere. We are talking about hydrochloric acid, toxic alkalis and chlorine compounds. The spilled oil entered the waters of the Danube. This led to the poisoning of not only the territories of modern Serbia, but also countries that were downstream of the largest European river. The use of munitions containing depleted uranium has triggered outbreaks of cancer and hereditary diseases. The NATO operation destroyed thousands of people, and hundreds of thousands are feeling the consequences of this terrible tragedy in our time.

The war crime committed by the United States and the European Union must not be forgotten by mankind. After such operations, statements by NATO leaders that the military bloc ensures "peace in Europe" sound doubly cynical. Only thanks to the sensible policy of the Russian Federation, at present there is a certain parity of forces that does not allow the West to repeat this in any of the countries they do not like. They still continue to arrange "democratic revolutions" and pit fraternal peoples against each other. However, this will not continue forever. The world is on the brink of radical change. And I want to believe that he will no longer allow death and destruction from the bombing of "humanitarian rescuers" from the NATO bloc.

(Operation Allied Force) - the air force operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bloc against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from March 24 to June 10, 1999. The American campaign under the operation was codenamed "Noble Anvil" (Noble Anvil). In some sources it appears under the name "Merciful Angel".

The reason for the international intervention was the inter-ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs who historically lived in Kosovo. On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council approved Resolution No. 1199, which demanded that the authorities of the FRY and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians ensure a ceasefire in Kosovo and begin negotiations without delay.

The situation escalated especially strongly after the incident in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, when there was a major armed clash between representatives of the Yugoslav security forces and militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Negotiations held in February-March 1999 in Rambouillet and Paris (France). The parties failed to reach an agreement, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic refused to sign military annexes to the agreement on the settlement of the crisis.

On March 24, 1999, without the sanction of the UN Security Council, the NATO alliance on the territory of the FRY. The decision to launch the operation was made by Javier Solana, then NATO Secretary General.

The official reason for the start of hostilities was the presence of Serbian troops in the territory of the province of Kosovo and Metohija. Serbian authorities have also been accused of ethnic cleansing.

In the first month of Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft made an average of about 350 sorties daily. At the NATO summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, the leaders of the alliance decided to intensify the air campaign.

In total, during the operation, NATO forces, according to various sources, made from 37.5 to 38.4 thousand sorties, during which more than 900 targets were attacked on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, more than 21 thousand tons of explosives were dropped.

Prohibited types of munitions with radioactive impurities, mainly depleted uranium (U 238), were used in the airstrikes.

Shortly after the start of military aggression, the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia voted in favor of joining the union of Russia and Belarus. Russian President Boris Yeltsin blocked this process, since such a decision could give rise to a number of international difficulties.

The bombing ceased on June 9, 1999, after representatives of the FRY army and NATO in the Macedonian city of Kumanovo signed a military-technical agreement on the withdrawal of troops and police of Federal Yugoslavia from the territory of Kosovo and on the deployment of international armed forces on the territory of the region.

The number of military and civilians who died during the operation has not yet been precisely established. According to Serbian authorities, about 2.5 thousand people died during the bombing, including 89 children. 12.5 thousand people were injured.

The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has confirmed 90 incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing.

According to the organization, between 489 and 528 civilians were killed during Operation Allied Force.

More than 60% of the lives of the civilian population were claimed by 12 military incidents, among them an air strike on a convoy of Albanian refugees from Gjakovica (April 14), during which 70 to 75 people were killed, more than 100 were injured; a raid on the cities of Surdulitsa (April 27) and Nis (May 7), an attack on a bus on a bridge near Pristina (May 1), an attack on the Albanian village of Korisha (May 14), during which, according to various sources, from 48 to 87 people died civilians.

According to official NATO data, during the campaign, the alliance lost two servicemen (the crew of an American An 64 helicopter that crashed during a training flight in Albania).

About 863 thousand people, primarily Serbs living in Kosovo, voluntarily left the region, another 590 thousand became internally displaced persons.

The final amount of damage that was inflicted on the industrial, transport and civilian facilities of the FRY was not named. According to various estimates, it was measured in the amount of 30 to 100 billion dollars. About 200 industrial enterprises, oil storage facilities, energy facilities, infrastructure facilities, including 82 railway and road bridges, were destroyed or seriously damaged. At least 100 monuments of history and architecture, which were under the protection of the state and under the protection of UNESCO, were damaged.

On June 10, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1244, according to which an international civilian security presence was established in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The document also mandated the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces of the FRY, the free return of refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to the territory of organizations providing humanitarian assistance, as well as the expansion of the degree of self-government for Kosovo.

On June 12, 1999, the first units of the international forces led by NATO - KFOR (Kosovo Force, KFOR) entered the region. Initially, the number of KFOR was about 50 thousand people. At the beginning of 2002, the contingent of peacekeepers was reduced to 39,000, by the end of 2003 to 17,500 servicemen.

As of the beginning of December 2013, the strength of the unit was about 4.9 thousand soldiers from more than 30 countries.

An independent commission to investigate the war crimes of NATO leaders against Yugoslavia, set up on August 6, 1999 at the initiative of Swedish Prime Minister Hans Göran Persson, concluded that NATO's military intervention was illegal, since the alliance had not received prior approval from the UN Security Council. However, the actions of the allies were justified by the fact that all diplomatic means of resolving the conflict had been exhausted.

The Commission criticized the use of cluster bombs by NATO aircraft, as well as the bombing of chemical industrial complexes and oil refineries on the territory of the FRY, which caused significant environmental damage.

In March 2002, the UN confirmed the radioactive contamination in Kosovo as a result of NATO bombing.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources

16 years ago, on March 24, 1999, the NATO war against Yugoslavia began. Operation Allied Force, which lasted 78 days, was justified as a humanitarian intervention, was carried out without a UN mandate, and munitions with depleted uranium were used.

To understand the history of the conflict, you should first learn about the collapse of Yugoslavia itself:

Brief overview of the wars in Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999:

War in Croatia (1991-1995).

In February 1991, the Sabor of Croatia adopted a decision on "disarmament" with the SFRY, and the Serbian National Council of the Serbian Krajina (an autonomous Serbian region within Croatia) - a resolution on "disarmament" with Croatia and remaining within the SFRY. Mutual escalation of passions, persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church caused the first wave of refugees - 40 thousand Serbs were forced to leave their homes. In July, a general mobilization was announced in Croatia, and by the end of the year, the number of Croatian armed formations reached 110 thousand people. Ethnic cleansing began in Western Slavonia. Serbs were completely expelled from 10 cities and 183 villages, and partially from 87 villages.

On the part of the Serbs, the formation of a system of territorial defense and the armed forces of Krajina began, a significant part of which were volunteers from Serbia. Units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) entered the territory of Croatia and by August 1991 drove out volunteer Croatian units from the territory of all Serbian regions. But after the signing of a truce in Geneva, the JNA stopped helping the Krajina Serbs, and a new offensive by the Croats forced them to retreat. From spring 1991 to spring 1995. Krajina was partially taken under the protection of the Blue Helmets, but the demand of the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of Croatian troops from the zones controlled by peacekeepers was not fulfilled. The Croats continued to take active military actions with the use of tanks, artillery, rocket launchers. As a result of the war in 1991-1994. 30 thousand people died, up to 500 thousand people became refugees, direct losses amounted to more than 30 billion dollars. In May-August 1995, the Croatian army carried out a well-prepared operation to return Krajina to Croatia. Several tens of thousands of people died during the hostilities. 250 thousand Serbs were forced to leave the republic. In total for 1991-1995. more than 350 thousand Serbs left Croatia.

War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1995).

On October 14, 1991, in the absence of Serb deputies, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed the independence of the republic. On January 9, 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian People proclaimed the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the SFRY. In April 1992, a "Muslim putsch" took place - the seizure of police buildings and the most important objects. Muslim armed formations were opposed by the Serbian Volunteer Guard and volunteer detachments. The Yugoslav army withdrew its units, and then was blocked by the Muslims in the barracks. For 44 days of the war, 1320 people died, the number of refugees amounted to 350 thousand people.

The United States and a number of other states have accused Serbia of fomenting the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the OSCE ultimatum, the Yugoslav troops were withdrawn from the territory of the republic. But the situation in the republic has not stabilized. A war broke out between Croats and Muslims with the participation of the Croatian army. The leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into independent ethnic groups.

On March 18, 1994, with the mediation of the United States, a Muslim-Croat federation and a well-armed joint army were created, which launched offensive operations with the support of NATO air forces, bombing Serbian positions (with the authorization of the UN Secretary General). The contradictions between the Serbian leaders and the Yugoslav leadership, as well as the blockade of heavy weapons by the "blue helmets" of the Serbs, put them in a difficult situation. In August-September 1995, NATO air strikes, which destroyed Serbian military installations, communications centers and air defense systems, prepared a new offensive for the Muslim-Croatian army. On October 12, the Serbs were forced to sign a ceasefire agreement.

By Resolution 1031 of December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council instructed NATO to form a peacekeeping force to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the first ever NATO-led ground operation outside its area of ​​responsibility. The role of the UN was reduced to the approval of this operation. The composition of the peacekeeping multinational force included 57,300 people, 475 tanks, 1,654 armored vehicles, 1,367 guns, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, 200 combat helicopters, 139 combat aircraft, 35 ships (with 52 carrier-based aircraft) and other weapons. It is believed that by the beginning of 2000 the goals of the peacekeeping operation were basically achieved - a ceasefire had come. But the full agreement of the conflicting parties did not take place. The problem of refugees remained unresolved.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed more than 200,000 lives, of which more than 180,000 were civilians. Germany alone spent 320,000 refugees (mostly Muslims) on maintenance from 1991 to 1998. about 16 billion marks.

War in Kosovo and Metohija (1998-1999).

Since the second half of the 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to operate in Kosovo. In 1991-1998 There were 543 clashes between Albanian militants and Serbian police, 75% of which took place in five months of last year. To stop the wave of violence, Belgrade sent police units numbering 15 thousand people and about the same number of military personnel, 140 tanks and 150 armored vehicles to Kosovo and Metohija. In July-August 1998, the Serbian army managed to destroy the main strongholds of the KLA, which controlled up to 40% of the region's territory. This predetermined the intervention of the NATO member states, who demanded the cessation of the actions of the Serbian forces under the threat of the bombing of Belgrade. Serbian troops were withdrawn from the province and KLA militants re-occupied a significant part of Kosovo and Metohija. The forcible expulsion of the Serbs from the region began.

Operation Allied Force


NATO aircraft bombed the city of Nisham. Yugoslavia, 1999 (Reuters)

In March 1999, in violation of the UN Charter, NATO launched a "humanitarian intervention" against Yugoslavia. In the Allied Force operation, 460 combat aircraft were used at the first stage, by the end of the operation the figure had increased by more than 2.5 times. The strength of the NATO ground grouping was increased to 10 thousand people with heavy armored vehicles and tactical missiles in service. Within a month from the beginning of the operation, the NATO naval grouping was increased to 50 ships equipped with sea-based cruise missiles and 100 carrier-based aircraft, and then increased several times more (for carrier-based aviation - 4 times). In total, 927 aircraft and 55 ships (4 aircraft carriers) participated in the NATO operation. NATO troops were served by a powerful group of space assets.

By the beginning of the NATO aggression, the Yugoslav ground forces numbered 90 thousand people and about 16 thousand people of the police and security forces. The Yugoslav army had up to 200 combat aircraft, about 150 air defense systems with limited combat capabilities.

NATO used 1,200-1,500 high-precision sea and air-based cruise missiles to attack 900 targets in the Yugoslav economy. During the first stage of the operation, these funds destroyed the oil industry of Yugoslavia, 50% of the ammunition industry, 40% of the tank and automobile industries, 40% of oil storage facilities, 100% of strategic bridges across the Danube. From 600 to 800 sorties per day were carried out. In total, 38,000 sorties were made during the operation, about 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles were used, more than 20,000 bombs and guided missiles were dropped. 37,000 uranium projectiles were also used, as a result of which 23 tons of depleted uranium-238 were sprayed over Yugoslavia.

An important component of the aggression was the information war, including a powerful impact on the information systems of Yugoslavia in order to destroy information sources and undermine the combat command and control system and information isolation not only of the troops, but also of the population. The destruction of television and radio centers cleared the information space for the broadcasting of the Voice of America station.

According to NATO, the bloc lost 5 aircraft, 16 unmanned aerial vehicles and 2 helicopters in the operation. According to the Yugoslav side, 61 NATO aircraft, 238 cruise missiles, 30 unmanned vehicles and 7 helicopters were shot down (independent sources give the numbers 11, 30, 3 and 3 respectively).

The Yugoslav side in the first days of the war lost a significant part of its aviation and air defense systems (70% of mobile air defense systems). The forces and means of air defense were preserved due to the fact that Yugoslavia refused to conduct an air defensive operation.

As a result of NATO bombing, more than 2,000 civilians were killed, more than 7,000 people were injured, 82 bridges, 422 tasks of educational institutions, 48 ​​medical facilities, the most important life support facilities and infrastructure were destroyed and damaged, more than 750 thousand residents of Yugoslavia became refugees, left without the necessary living conditions 2.5 million people. The total material damage from NATO aggression amounted to over $100 billion.


There is nowhere to return. A woman in the ruins of her house, destroyed by a NATO airstrike. Yugoslavia, 1999

On June 10, 1999, the NATO Secretary General suspended operations against Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership agreed to withdraw military and police forces from Kosovo and Metohija. On June 11, the NATO Rapid Response Force entered the territory of the region. By April 2000, 41,000 KFOR troops were stationed in Kosovo and Metohija. But this did not stop inter-ethnic violence. In the year after the end of NATO aggression, more than 1,000 people were killed in the region, more than 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins and 150,000 representatives of other ethnic groups were expelled, about 100 churches and monasteries were burned or damaged.

In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit was held, which legalized any operations of the alliance outside the territories of its member countries "wherever it is required." The summit documents did not mention the need to authorize the UN Security Council to use force.

During the NATO war against Serbia on April 12, 1999, during the bombing of the railway bridge in the Grdelica area (Grdelica), a NATO F-15E aircraft destroyed the Serbian passenger train Belgrade - Skopje.

This incident received prominent coverage in the NATO information war against Serbia.

The media of the NATO countries repeatedly showed a falsified (deliberately accelerated) video recording of the destruction of the train at the moment of passing over the bridge.

It was alleged that the pilot accidentally caught the train on the bridge. The plane and train were moving too fast and the pilot was unable to make a meaningful decision, the result is a tragic accident.

The peculiarity of the military conflict in Yugoslavia was that it included two "mini-wars": NATO aggression against the FRY and internal armed confrontation on ethnic grounds between Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Moreover, the reason for the NATO armed intervention was a sharp aggravation in 1998 of the hitherto sluggish current conflict. Moreover, one cannot ignore the objective fact of the constant, methodical escalation of tension in the cradle of Serbian culture - Kosovo - at first hidden, and then, starting from the late 1980s, almost undisguised support for the separatist aspirations of the Albanian population by the West.

Accusing Belgrade of disrupting negotiations on the future of the rebellious region and of not agreeing to accept the humiliating ultimatum of the West, which boiled down to the demand for the actual occupation of Kosovo, on March 29, 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana orders the Supreme Commander of the united armed forces of the bloc in Europe, American General Wesley Clark, to start a military campaign in the form of an air operation against Yugoslavia, which received the name "Allied Force", which was based on the so-called "Plan 10601", which provided for several phases of military operations. It is noteworthy that the fundamental concept of this operation was developed in the summer of the previous year, 1998, and in October of the same year it was refined and specified.

BYPASSED AND ADDED


Ruins of a blown up Orthodox church in Kosovo. Yugoslavia, 1999

Despite the careful study of all direct and related issues related to the operation, the Western allies faced the fact of the crime they were committing. The definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1974 (resolution 3314) unequivocally states: “Will be qualified as an act of aggression: the bombing by the armed forces of states of the territory of another state. No considerations of any nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, can justify aggression.” But the North Atlantic Alliance did not even try to obtain UN sanction, since Russia and China would have blocked the draft Security Council resolution anyway if it had been put to a vote.

However, the NATO leadership still managed to beat in its favor the struggle of interpretations of international law that was unfolding within the walls of the UN, when the Security Council at the very beginning of the aggression expressed its de facto agreement with the operation, rejecting (three votes for, 12 against) the proposal submitted by Russia a draft resolution calling for the renunciation of the use of force against Yugoslavia. Thus, all grounds for a formal condemnation of the instigators of the military campaign allegedly disappeared.

Moreover, looking ahead, we note that already after the end of the aggression at an open meeting of the Security Council, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Carla del Ponte, made a statement that in the actions of NATO countries against Yugoslavia in the period from March 1999 there is no corpus delicti and that the accusations against the political and military leadership of the bloc are untenable. The chief prosecutor also said that the decision not to open an investigation into the accusations against the bloc was final and was made after a thorough study by the tribunal experts of the materials submitted by the government of the FRY, the State Duma Commission of the Russian Federation, a group of experts in the field of international law and a number of public organizations.

But, according to Alejandro Teitelbom, representative of the Association of American Lawyers at the UN European Headquarters in Geneva, Carla del Ponte “actually admitted that it is very difficult for her to take steps that run counter to the interests of the North Atlantic Alliance,” since the content of the Hague Tribunal costs millions of dollars. , and most of this money is provided by the United States, so in the event of such actions on her part, she may simply lose her job.

Nevertheless, feeling the precariousness of the arguments of the initiators of this military campaign, some NATO member countries, primarily Greece, began to resist the pressure of the military-political leadership of the alliance, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of carrying out a military action in general, since, in accordance with the NATO Charter, this requires the consent of all members of the block. However, in the end, Washington managed to "squeeze" its allies.

SCRIPT WASHINGTON


Bombing of the city of Nis by NATO aircraft. A woman shows a photo of her relatives who died under NATO bombing. Nis, Yugoslavia. 1999

The multinational grouping of the joint NATO navies in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas by the beginning of hostilities consisted of 35 warships, including American, British, French and Italian aircraft carriers, as well as ships carrying cruise missiles. 14 states took direct part in the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia - the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, Norway and Hungary. The main burden fell on the shoulders of the US Air Force and Navy pilots, who accounted for over 60% of sorties in the first month and a half of the campaign, although American aircraft accounted for only 42% of the NATO combat aviation grouping in the region. The aviation of Great Britain, France and Italy was also relatively actively involved. The participation of nine other NATO countries in air strikes was minimal and pursued rather a political goal - to demonstrate the unity and cohesion of the allies.

In essence, it was precisely according to Washington's scenario and, as the subsequent analysis of military operations confirmed, in accordance with instructions that came directly from the Pentagon, that the content and duration of the phases of the entire campaign were repeatedly adjusted. This, of course, could not but cause discontent on the part of some of the most influential European allies of the United States. Thus, for example, representatives of France in the North Atlantic Alliance, which made essentially the second largest contribution to the air campaign, openly accused Washington of "sometimes operating outside NATO." And this despite the fact that France, which did not fully delegate its powers to NATO (since it formally remained outside the military structure of the bloc), previously stipulated for itself the privilege of special information about all the nuances of conducting an air campaign.

After the end of hostilities, the Supreme Commander of NATO in Europe, the American General Clark, frankly admitted that he did not take into account the opinion of "those who, due to nervousness, sought to change the objects of strikes." Under the veil of imaginary "unity" of the positions of the member states of the alliance, in reality, there were severe contradictions in the scheme of operational actions in the Balkans. At the same time, Germany and Greece were the main opponents of the escalation. During the conflict, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping even made a statement that the German government was "not going to discuss this matter at all." For its part, the Greek leadership, itself for many years faced with Albanian, including criminal, expansion and hardly agreed to “punish” Belgrade for “oppressing the Albanian minority”, began to artificially create obstacles to the expansion of hostilities. In particular, Athens did not allow its Turkish "ally" to use Greek airspace as part of the campaign against Yugoslavia.

The arrogance of the Americans, who took control of the entire campaign into their own hands, sometimes aroused bewilderment, bordering on open discontent, even among Washington's devoted "friends". So, for example, Ankara was, to put it mildly, "surprised" that, without agreement with it, the NATO military leadership announced the allocation of three air bases located in Turkey to the alliance's disposal. Even the facts of the refusal of the command of the Canadian contingent - Washington's most devoted Anglo-Saxon ally - to bomb "doubtful" targets in Yugoslavia, indicated by the leadership of the bloc, from the point of view of Ottawa, became public.

The states newly admitted to NATO - the Czech Republic and Poland (not to mention Hungary, which took a direct part in hostilities) - in contrast to their "senior" European counterparts in the alliance, on the contrary, demonstrated full support for the "flexible" position of Brussels and Washington and declared on the readiness to provide its military infrastructure for the solution of any tasks of NATO as part of the aggression against Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Macedonia showed even greater zeal in the hope of Washington's loyalty in resolving the issue of the upcoming admission to NATO, proactively declaring that their airspace (some completely, some partially) was at the disposal of the bloc's OVVS. In general, as follows from the comments of experts, many of the frictions within the alliance were based on Washington's lack of awareness of European allies about specific plans within each phase of the campaign.

TESTS AND INTERNSHIPS


A Serbian family looks at a house destroyed by NATO bombings. Yugoslavia, 1999

Pragmatic Washington, as in most other wars of the new time, especially disregarding the position of the allies, tried to "squeeze" the maximum out of the military conflict, "killing two birds with one stone": the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime, which became an overnight obstacle to the implementation of the plans of the White House in the Balkans and experimenting with new means of armed struggle, forms and methods of military operations.

The Americans capitalized on the opportunity by testing the latest air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, cluster bombs with homing submunitions, and other weapons. In real combat conditions, modernized and new reconnaissance, control, communications, navigation, electronic warfare systems, all types of support were tested; the issues of interaction between the types of the Armed Forces, as well as aviation and special forces (which, perhaps, was the most significant in the light of the latest installations of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld personally at that time; the concept of "integrity") were worked out.

At the insistence of the Americans, carrier aircraft were used as part of reconnaissance and strike combat systems and were only "carriers of ammunition." They took off from air bases in the United States, NATO countries in Europe and aircraft carriers in the seas surrounding the Balkans, delivered to the launch lines beyond the reach of the Yugoslav air defense systems cruise missiles aimed at specific critical points of objects in advance, launched them and left for new ammunition. In addition, other methods and forms of using aviation were used.

Later, taking advantage of the forced delay in the operation, again at the initiative of the Americans, the NATO command began to practice the so-called "combat training" of reservist pilots. After 10-15 independent sorties, which was considered sufficient to gain combat experience, they were replaced by other "trainees". Moreover, the bloc's military leadership was not in the least concerned by the fact that this period accounted for the largest number of almost daily, according to the NATO members themselves, blunders of the alliance's aviation when striking ground targets.

The fact was that the leadership of the OVVS block, in order to minimize the losses of the flight crew, gave the order to "bomb", not falling below 4.5-5 thousand meters, as a result of which compliance with international standards of warfare became simply impossible. The large-scale disposal of surpluses of obsolete bomb weapons that took place in the final phase of the operation by striking a wide range of mainly economic targets in Yugoslavia did not contribute to the observance of the norms of international law.

In total, which is not denied in principle by NATO representatives, in the course of hostilities, NATO aircraft destroyed about 500 important objects, of which at least half were purely civilian. At the same time, the losses of the civilian population of Yugoslavia were calculated, according to various sources, from 1.2 to 2 and even more than 5 thousand people.

It is noteworthy that in comparison with the gigantic economic damage (according to Yugoslav estimates - approximately 100 billion dollars), the damage to the military potential of Yugoslavia was not so significant. For example, there were few air battles (which was explained by the desire of the Serbs to maintain their air force in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the alliance's aviation), and the losses of the FRY in aviation were minimal - 6 aircraft in air battles and 22 at airfields. In addition, Belgrade reported that his army had lost only 13 tanks.

However, NATO reports also contained much larger, but by no means impressive numbers: 93 “successful strikes” on tanks, 153 on armored personnel carriers, 339 on military vehicles, 389 on gun and mortar positions. However, these data were criticized by analysts from the intelligence and military leadership of the alliance itself. And in an unpublished report by the US Air Force, it was generally reported that the confirmed number of destroyed Yugoslav mobile targets was 14 tanks, 18 armored personnel carriers and 20 pieces of artillery.

By the way, in turn, the Serbs, summing up the results of the 78-day resistance, insisted on the following NATO losses: 61 aircraft, seven helicopters, 30 UAVs and 238 cruise missiles. The Allies naturally denied these figures. Although, according to independent experts, they are very close to the true ones.

BOMB, NOT FIGHT

Without questioning the sometimes truly “experimental” nature of military actions by the allies led by the Americans, one cannot but agree with those independent experts who state serious mistakes made by NATO, which consisted, in general, in underestimating the level of operational-strategic and tactical thinking of commanders and officers of the Yugoslav armed forces, who deeply analyzed the manner in which the Americans acted in local conflicts, primarily in the 1990-1991 war in the Persian Gulf. After all, it is no coincidence that the command of the alliance was forced to revise the general plan for conducting the operation, first getting involved in a protracted and extremely costly military conflict, and then bringing up the question of the advisability of conducting the ground phase of the operation, which was not originally planned.

Indeed, during the preparatory period for the aggression, there were no large-scale regroupings of NATO ground forces in the states adjacent to Yugoslavia. For example, ground forces with a total strength of only 26 thousand people were concentrated in Albania and Macedonia, while, according to Western analysts, in order to conduct an effective operation against the sufficiently trained armed forces of Yugoslavia, it was necessary to create a ground grouping with a total strength of at least 200 thousand people .

NATO's revision of the general concept of the operation in May and the idea of ​​urgent preparations for the ground phase of hostilities once again provoked sharp criticism from the influential European members of the alliance. For example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder vehemently rejected the proposal to send Allied ground troops to Kosovo as leading to a dead end. France also rejected this idea, but under the pretext that at that time it did not have a sufficient number of "free" formations of ground forces.

Yes, and American legislators have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of this undertaking. According to the US Congressional Budget Office, in addition to the already existing monthly cost of $1 billion for the operation, if the ground phase is carried out, at least another $200 million will have to be added to the maintenance of one Army division alone.

But, perhaps, most of all the allies, primarily the Americans, were worried about possible losses in the event of ground battles with Yugoslav units and formations. According to American experts, the damage in military operations in Kosovo alone could be from 400 to 1,500 servicemen, who would not be able to be hidden from the public. As, for example, carefully hidden data on the losses, according to estimates, of several dozen NATO pilots and special forces who “advised” Yugoslav Albanians and participated in the rescue of downed NATO pilots. As a result, the US Congress voted against consideration of a resolution allowing the US President, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to use ground forces in the military operation against Yugoslavia.

One way or another, it did not come to ground military operations between the Allies and the Yugoslav troops. However, from the very beginning of the aggression, the NATO command in every possible way stimulated the activity of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which consisted of Kosovo Albanians and representatives of the Albanian diasporas of the United States and a number of European countries. But the formations of the KLA, equipped and trained by NATO, in battles with Serbian border guards and regular units of the Armed Forces, showed themselves far from the best. According to a number of media reports, the largest operation of Albanian militants against Serbian troops in Kosovo, in which up to 4 thousand people took part, carried out in parallel with the NATO air campaign, ended in the complete defeat of the KLA units and the retreat of their remnants to the territory of Albania.

Under these conditions, the NATO leadership was left with the only way to resolve the problem it had created: to hit Yugoslavia with all the might of its potential. Which it did, sharply increasing in the last ten days of May the grouping of its Air Force to 1120 aircraft (including 625 combat aircraft) and adding two more aircraft carriers to the four aircraft carriers on combat duty in the seas adjacent to Yugoslavia, as well as five carriers of cruise missiles and a number of others. ships. Naturally, this was accompanied by an unprecedented intensity of raids on military and civilian targets on Yugoslav territory.

Relying on its colossal air power and putting Belgrade before a choice - the loss of Kosovo or the total destruction of the economy, an economic and humanitarian catastrophe - NATO forced the leadership of Yugoslavia to surrender and solved the Kosovo problem at that time in its own interests. Undoubtedly, the Serbs would not be able to resist the NATO group in open battles if the aggression continued, but they were quite able to conduct a successful guerrilla war on their territory for some time with the full support of the population, as was the case during the Second World War. But what happened happened!

CONCLUSIONS MADE

This military campaign once again demonstrated how much their European partners in the NATO bloc depend on the United States. It was the Americans who were the main striking force of the aggressor - 55% of combat aircraft (by the end of the war), over 95% of cruise missiles, 80% of bombs and missiles dropped, all strategic bombers, 60% of reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs, 24 reconnaissance satellites out of 25 and the vast majority precision weapons belonged to the United States.

The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Italian Admiral Guido Venturoni, was even forced to admit: “Only using the funds provided by the overseas partner, the European NATO countries can conduct independent operations, while the creation of a European component in the field of defense and security remains a noble idea.”

It is impossible not to pay tribute to the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance, which not only stated the fact that the European allies of the United States lagged behind their "big brother" in all aspects of the development of military potential, but also, following the results of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, took a number of drastic measures leading to correcting the negative from the point of view of view of Brussels (and Washington in the first place) position. First of all, it was decided to speed up the protracted process of reforming the Armed Forces of the European countries - members of the bloc, within which, among other things, the lion's share of the costs provided for in the national budgets for the purchase of weapons and military equipment, to be directed to the acquisition of high-precision weapons (in the United States, of course), to reform the logistics system and much more.

But, according to NATO strategists, the most important task facing the US allies in Europe continues to be the creation of such formations of expeditionary forces that could participate on an equal footing with the Americans in creating the model of world order that Washington needs.

(Operation Allied Force) - the air force operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bloc against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from March 24 to June 10, 1999. The American campaign under the operation was codenamed "Noble Anvil" (Noble Anvil). In some sources it appears under the name "Merciful Angel".

The reason for the international intervention was the inter-ethnic conflict between Albanians and Serbs who historically lived in Kosovo. On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council approved Resolution No. 1199, which demanded that the authorities of the FRY and the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians ensure a ceasefire in Kosovo and begin negotiations without delay.

The situation escalated especially strongly after the incident in the village of Racak on January 15, 1999, when there was a major armed clash between representatives of the Yugoslav security forces and militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Negotiations held in February-March 1999 in Rambouillet and Paris (France). The parties failed to reach an agreement, FRY President Slobodan Milosevic refused to sign military annexes to the agreement on the settlement of the crisis.

On March 24, 1999, without the sanction of the UN Security Council, the NATO alliance on the territory of the FRY. The decision to launch the operation was made by Javier Solana, then NATO Secretary General.

The official reason for the start of hostilities was the presence of Serbian troops in the territory of the province of Kosovo and Metohija. Serbian authorities have also been accused of ethnic cleansing.

In the first month of Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft made an average of about 350 sorties daily. At the NATO summit in Washington on April 23, 1999, the leaders of the alliance decided to intensify the air campaign.

In total, during the operation, NATO forces, according to various sources, made from 37.5 to 38.4 thousand sorties, during which more than 900 targets were attacked on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, more than 21 thousand tons of explosives were dropped.

Prohibited types of munitions with radioactive impurities, mainly depleted uranium (U 238), were used in the airstrikes.

Shortly after the start of military aggression, the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia voted in favor of joining the union of Russia and Belarus. Russian President Boris Yeltsin blocked this process, since such a decision could give rise to a number of international difficulties.

The bombing ceased on June 9, 1999, after representatives of the FRY army and NATO in the Macedonian city of Kumanovo signed a military-technical agreement on the withdrawal of troops and police of Federal Yugoslavia from the territory of Kosovo and on the deployment of international armed forces on the territory of the region.

The number of military and civilians who died during the operation has not yet been precisely established. According to Serbian authorities, about 2.5 thousand people died during the bombing, including 89 children. 12.5 thousand people were injured.

The human rights organization Human Rights Watch has confirmed 90 incidents in which civilians were killed as a result of NATO bombing.

According to the organization, between 489 and 528 civilians were killed during Operation Allied Force.

More than 60% of the lives of the civilian population were claimed by 12 military incidents, among them an air strike on a convoy of Albanian refugees from Gjakovica (April 14), during which 70 to 75 people were killed, more than 100 were injured; a raid on the cities of Surdulitsa (April 27) and Nis (May 7), an attack on a bus on a bridge near Pristina (May 1), an attack on the Albanian village of Korisha (May 14), during which, according to various sources, from 48 to 87 people died civilians.

According to official NATO data, during the campaign, the alliance lost two servicemen (the crew of an American An 64 helicopter that crashed during a training flight in Albania).

About 863 thousand people, primarily Serbs living in Kosovo, voluntarily left the region, another 590 thousand became internally displaced persons.

The final amount of damage that was inflicted on the industrial, transport and civilian facilities of the FRY was not named. According to various estimates, it was measured in the amount of 30 to 100 billion dollars. About 200 industrial enterprises, oil storage facilities, energy facilities, infrastructure facilities, including 82 railway and road bridges, were destroyed or seriously damaged. At least 100 monuments of history and architecture, which were under the protection of the state and under the protection of UNESCO, were damaged.

On June 10, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1244, according to which an international civilian security presence was established in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The document also mandated the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces of the FRY, the free return of refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to the territory of organizations providing humanitarian assistance, as well as the expansion of the degree of self-government for Kosovo.

On June 12, 1999, the first units of the international forces led by NATO - KFOR (Kosovo Force, KFOR) entered the region. Initially, the number of KFOR was about 50 thousand people. At the beginning of 2002, the contingent of peacekeepers was reduced to 39,000, by the end of 2003 to 17,500 servicemen.

As of the beginning of December 2013, the strength of the unit was about 4.9 thousand soldiers from more than 30 countries.

An independent commission to investigate the war crimes of NATO leaders against Yugoslavia, set up on August 6, 1999 at the initiative of Swedish Prime Minister Hans Göran Persson, concluded that NATO's military intervention was illegal, since the alliance had not received prior approval from the UN Security Council. However, the actions of the allies were justified by the fact that all diplomatic means of resolving the conflict had been exhausted.

The Commission criticized the use of cluster bombs by NATO aircraft, as well as the bombing of chemical industrial complexes and oil refineries on the territory of the FRY, which caused significant environmental damage.

In March 2002, the UN confirmed the radioactive contamination in Kosovo as a result of NATO bombing.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources