The summer military campaign of 1919 and the end of the allied intervention The rules of the front-line Civil War in the Arkhangelsk province were dictated by northern nature. Frosty and snowy winters and spring-autumn thaws limited the period of active military operations to short

Formation of the anti-Hitler coalition

The rapprochement between England and the United States began in the period "Battles for England" when Churchill convincingly pleaded with Roosevelt to strengthen them with destroyers

March 11, 1941 The US Congress passed Lend-Lease Law which marked the rejection "politics of isolationism" .

lend-lease- a system for the transfer of US weapons, ammunition, strategic raw materials, food, and other allied countries in the anti-Hitler coalition on loan or on lease.

The first transaction was the transfer 50 obsolete American destroyers in exchange for the lease of British territories on the Atlantic coast of North America. In the future, all US assistance to allies will be carried out for gold or in exchange for the lease of territories.

After the German attack on the USSR, Lend-Lease began to spread to our country, due to which the country received assistance not only with weapons, but also with food, shoes, things, etc.

It would be wrong to belittle the importance of this assistance for our country, even though its volume compared to domestic production was only 4 % . But to attach decisive importance to it for the course of the war on the eastern front, as some Western historiographers do, is completely wrong.

Final clearance of the anti-Hitler coalition received after the US entered the war, and the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, during which the Soviet army regained its prestige lost during the Soviet-Finnish war.

January 1, 1942 26 states signed in Washington United Nations Declaration in which they pledged to use all their military and economic resources against the countries of the fascist bloc, and not to conclude a separate peace or truce with the enemy.

The Soviet side immediately began to insist at the opening of the "second front" in Europe, which would ease her position, but an attempt to land troops in Northern France in August 1942 failed, forcing the Allies to begin more thorough preparations for this operation.

Until then, the main theaters of war for our allies remained Africa, Asia And Pacific Ocean .

Meanwhile, major events 1942 deployed on the Soviet-German front, where, after failures con. 1941 - early. 1942 Hitler was preparing a new large-scale offensive.

a) Hitler's plans and Stalin's miscalculations

Planning offensive actions for summer 1942 , Although Hitler still had superiority in people and weapons, he no longer had the opportunity to conduct a simultaneous offensive in all strategic directions, as it was in 1941

Therefore, the main forces were concentrated in the army group "South" who were supposed to capture the industrial Donetsk basin , bread Kuban , oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and master Stalingrad to cut off the oil-bearing for Moscow trade route along the Volga (plan "Blau" ).

Hitler spoke:

"If I don't get oil from Maikop and Grozny, then I'll have to end this war."

The capture of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, according to the Germans, was to finally change the course of the entire war, and not just the situation on the eastern front.

Ribbentrop said:

“When Russia's oil sources are exhausted, Russia will be brought to its knees. Then the English... bow down to save what's left of the tormented empire.
America is a big bluff…”

The capture of the Caucasus was also supposed to push Russia's historical rival in the region to enter the war - Turkey .

After the fulfillment of these tasks, which put the USSR in a critical situation, a new attack on Moscow and Leningrad was planned.

Meanwhile Stalin was sure that the Germans would repeat the attack on Moscow, and ordered the main forces to be concentrated in the Moscow direction.
Neither the reports of our intelligence about the planned German strike in the South-Eastern direction, nor the opinion of the members of the Stavka could convince him.

Zhukov wrote:

“JV Stalin assumed that the Nazis, without taking Moscow, would not abandon their main grouping to seize the Caucasus and the south of the country.
He said that such a move would lead the German forces to an excessive stretching of the front, which the high command would not do.

b) Order No. 227

In May 1942 German and allied Italian, Hungarian and Romanian troops began offensive on the Crimean front .

4th of July , after 250 day defense , the Soviet troops were forced to leave Sevastopol .

Further capture Rostov-on-Don led to the loss Donbass and opened the way to the Caucasus and Stalingrad .

Hitler had to decide which direction should become the main one and where to direct his main forces. But he turned out to be too self-confident and undertook to solve both problems at the same time.

Chief of the General Staff Halder bitterly wrote about this trait of Hitler's character:

"The underestimation of the capabilities of the enemy, which has always been observed, gradually takes on grotesque forms and becomes dangerous."

The attack on Stalingrad was so successful that July 13 Hitler removed from this direction 4th Panzer Army and transferred it to the aid of the 1st Panzer Army in the Caucasus.
This was a mistake. The pressure on Stalingrad eased and Moscow managed to establish an organized defense there.

Realizing this, through 2 weeks Hitler returns the 4th Panzer Army to Stalingrad, but it was unable to radically change the situation, and the weakened Caucasian grouping failed to capture the oil-bearing regions of Grozny.

Hitler did not want to understand that the German army no longer had the strength to conduct two major operations at the same time, and he took out all his anger on the generals, replacing them at the most inopportune moment.
The commander of the troops in the Caucasian direction, Field Marshal, was removed Sheet and Chief of the General Staff Halder , sent to the Dachau concentration camp, where he was until the liberation by the Americans.

The German offensive led to an excessive stretching of the southern front.
Of particular concern to the German headquarters was Don flank , covered by the Hungarians, Italians and Romanians, who militarily have proven themselves not from the best side. In the event of the collapse of this flank, the German Stalingrad group would not only be surrounded, but also cut off from the Caucasian group.

But Hitler did not want to listen to the arguments of his generals, who proposed to withdraw troops from Stalingrad. He brought more and more new divisions into battle, demanding to capture the city and cut the Volga transport artery vital for the USSR.

Meanwhile, the situation of the Soviet units was critical.
The loss of rich industrial and agricultural areas had a heavy impact on the supply of the army, the power of the German tank wedges tore apart our defenses, creating huge gaps.

The front was held only by the desperate resistance of ordinary soldiers, who had to meet German tanks with Molotov cocktails. Especially in these battles, the soldiers of the Marine Corps, nicknamed by the Germans, proved themselves "black death" .

Stalin needed to justify his own miscalculations, which led after the winter offensive to a new retreat, which he did July 28, 1942 in Order No. 227 , which went down in history under the name "Not one step back!" .

In it, Stalin characterized the catastrophic nature of the current situation, but he declared the main reasons for this to be the indiscipline, cowardice and alarmism of soldiers and officers:

“The population of our country, with love and respect for the Red Army, begins to become disillusioned with it, lose faith in the Red Army, and many of them curse the Red Army because it gives our people under the yoke of German oppressors, and itself flows away to the east ".

The order ordered to shoot anyone who voluntarily retreated or left their positions. In the rear of the Soviet units were placed punitive guard detachments who, without warning, opened fire on anyone they suspected of fleeing their positions.

This inhuman order did not stop the retreat, but many participants in the war believe that it largely made it possible to delay the advance of the enemy and prepare the defense of Stalingrad.

c) "Battle of Stalingrad"

August 23, 1942 , from the crossing of the Don by German tank units, began battle for Stalingrad . Massive raids on the city began, turning it into ruins.

After the Germans reached the Volga from the north and south of Stalingrad, the city itself becomes the main goal. In continuous battles for each quarter and the house passed the whole September and October .

Changed hands many times Mamayev Kurgan , the fighters of the tractor plant repeatedly took up arms and cleared the factory territory of the Germans, after which they returned to the machines.

Heroic page in the annals of the battle of Stalingrad entered "Pavlov's House" , which during 59 days defended by a group of guards led by a sergeant Pavlov .

On the map of Paulus, this house was marked as a fortress.
During the storming of this house alone, the Germans lost as many soldiers as they lost during the capture of some major European cities, but they could not take it.

One of the direct participants in the Stalingrad battles, an officer of the Wehrmacht G.Weltz wrote in his notes:

“In the central sector, battles go on for days on end with the aim of breaking into the city from the west. But stubbornly, incredibly stubbornly, the resistance of the Stalingraders.
The battle is not even for the streets, not for the quarters. Every basement, every step is upheld. All day there is a battle for a single stairwell. Hand grenades fly from room to room. Now we seem to have captured this floor, it is firmly in our hands, but no, the enemy received reinforcements on the burning roofs, and close combat broke out again. Yes, Stalingrad is devouring German soldiers! Every meter is worth lives. More and more battalions are thrown into battle, and the very next day only a platoon remains of them.
Slowly, very slowly, the divisions move forward through the ruins and piles of rubble.

But the Soviet units also suffered huge losses.
According to average statistics, a person died every 20 seconds in Stalingrad, and the average life expectancy of a soldier was less than a day.

In November, ice bound the Volga, cutting off the defenders of the city from the right bank, and leaving them without ammunition and food. Of the 7 districts, the Germans captured 6 - only Kirovsky district remained ours.

The population remaining at the behest of Stalin (Stalin said that the army does not protect empty cities) found itself in a terrible situation.

Hiding in basements, wells, etc., being on the front line, they existed without any food, under constant fire.
Even in the "Pavlov's house", in addition to the soldiers, there were also civilians, and during the fighting even one girl was born.

When they talk about the torments of the besieged Leningraders, for some reason they forget that they received at least some grams of bread and lived in their homes, while the Stalingraders did not even have this for 6 months.

In November Hitler was already celebrating victory and in his speech he told the Germans:

“I wanted to reach the Volga at one specific point, at one specific city. By chance, this city bears the name of Stalin himself.
But I aspired there not for this reason. The city could be called quite differently. I went there because it is a very important point.
Through it, 30 million tons of cargo were transported, of which almost 9 million tons were oil. Wheat flocked there from Ukraine and Kuban to be sent to the north. Manganese ore was delivered there. There was a giant transshipment center. That's what I wanted to take, and - you know, we don't need much - we took it! Only a few very insignificant points remained unoccupied.

d) operation "Uranus"

And in this situation, the city survived, and the Stavka developed a counteroffensive plan "Uranus" .

Purpose of the plan: forces of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts to hit the flanks of the German Army Group "South" and, breaking through them, connect, surrounding the Stalingrad German grouping.

Operation started November 19 and already November 23 about 330 thousand the Germans were in a bag - the final stage of their destruction began.

Paulus did not dare to launch a breakthrough operation without Hitler's permission, while it was still possible.

Hitler demanded to resist to the last, promising help.
But all attempts by the Germans to organize the supply of their encircled troops by air were thwarted by our aviation and tankers of General Badanova who raided the rear of the enemy and destroyed a large airfield and over 300 German aircraft .

German attempts to break through to help the encircled were thwarted by Soviet attacks on the flank of the advancing German units.

January 8, 1943 the Soviet command, in order to avoid unnecessary casualties, offered Paulus to surrender, but he refused.

January 10 Soviet units unleashed a flurry of artillery and aviation fire on the encircled Germans.

To strengthen Paulus' determination to continue resistance, Hitler awarded him rank of field marshal , but the surrounded parts no longer believed in the genius of Hitler and did not want to die for him.

February 2 the encircled units capitulated: surrendered 24 generals led by Paulus himself and about 113 thousand soldiers and officers .

e) the results and significance of the victory at Stalingrad

The effect of the destruction of German troops near Stalingrad was stunning - the Germans lost about 25 % his army in the east.

This victory of the USSR undermined the morale of the German soldiers (3-day mourning was declared in Germany), raised the prestige of the Soviet army and instilled hope for the conquered peoples.

In addition, there was a threat of encirclement of German troops in the Caucasus, which forced them to begin a retreat.

German historian Tippelskirch In his history of World War II, he admitted:

“Although within the framework of the war as a whole, the events in North Africa are given a more prominent place than the Battle of Stalingrad, but the disaster at Stalingrad shocked the German army and the German people more, because it turned out to be more sensitive for them.
Something incomprehensible happened there ... - the death of an army surrounded by the enemy.

In an effort to build on the success of Stalingrad, the Red Army went on the offensive on all fronts.

During the winter of 1942-43. managed to finally remove the threat to Moscow, break the ring around Leningrad, linking the besieged city with the mainland, and liberate Kursk.

By the spring of 1943 active hostilities ceased.
By this time, the Soviet units had occupied convenient bridgeheads and built up enough forces for new offensive operations.

CODE AND SYMBOLS
strategic plans of the belligerents during the Second World War, military campaigns and major operations, military-political events and strategic defensive lines

1. The plan of the general strategic offensive of the Armed Forces of Japan in the Pacific Ocean and in Southeast Asia in 1945 - 1942.
2. The Japanese plan to repel the offensive of the US Armed Forces, expected in the summer of 1944, against the Japanese defense line in the Pacific Ocean, passing through the islands of Sumatra, Java, Timor, the western part of New Guinea, Palau and the Mariana Islands.

"A - A"

The Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line is the exit line of German troops according to the German war plan against the USSR.

"AIDA"
(AIDA)

The plan of the offensive operation of the German-Italian troops in the summer of 1942 in North Africa with the aim of capturing Africa (cancelled).

"EISENHAMMER"
(EISENHAMMER)

The plan of operations of the German Air Force on the Soviet-German front in 1941 - 1942. with the aim of delivering strikes against strategic targets in the central regions of the USSR.

"ICEBERG"
(ISEBERG)

Amphibious operation of the US Armed Forces on about. Okinawa, held in the spring of 1945

"AYSSHTOSS"
(EISSTOSS)

The operation of the German Air Force, carried out in April 1942 with the aim of destroying the Soviet fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt.

"AKSE"
(AKSE)

The operation of the German troops in the autumn of 1943 with the aim of occupying the territory of Italy and disarming the Italian troops.

"ALARICH"

The transfer of German troops from France to Italy in August 1943 in case of surrender of Italy and its withdrawal from the war and the operation "AKSE".

"ALPENWEILCHEN"
(ALPENVEILCHEN)

Plan for the invasion of German troops in Albania in 1940 (cancelled)

"ANTON"
(ANTON)

The operation of the German troops, carried out in the autumn of 1942, with the aim of occupying the southern part of France and the island of Corsica, seizing the French fleet, disarming the remnants of the French army and organizing the defense of the Mediterranean coast in case of invasion by the Anglo-American forces.

"ARGONAUT"
(ARGONAUT)

Conference of the heads of governments of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in Yalta in January-February 1945

"ARCADIA"
(ARCADIA)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States and Great Britain in Washington in December 1941

"ATLANTIC SHAFT"
(ATLANTIKWALL)

The defensive line of the German troops, created in 1942 - 1944. along the Atlantic coast of Western Europe to prevent the invasion of the Anglo-American forces on the continent.

"ATTICA"
(ATTIKA)

The offensive operation of the German troops in August-September 1942 in the North Caucasus.

"ATTILA"
(ATTILA)

The original name of the plan is "ANTON".

"AUFMARSH 25"
(AUFMARSCH)

The invasion of German troops into Yugoslavia in April 1941 (the name "Operation 25" is also found in the literature)

BAGRATION"

Belarusian offensive operation of the Soviet troops in June-July 1944

"BARBAROSSA"
(BARBAROSSA FALL)

The strategic plan of the German aggression against the USSR, launched on June 22, 1941

"BLOW"
(BLAU)

The plan of the summer-autumn campaign of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in 1942 (replaced on June 30, 1942 by the plan "BRAUNSCHWEIG")

"BLAUFUKS"
(BLAUFUCHS)

Plan for the formation and transfer of German troops from Germany and Norway to Finland in May-June 1941 to conduct combat operations in the Soviet Arctic.

"BLACK LIST"
(BLACK LIST)

The American plan for the occupation of Japan in 1945 in the event of its surrender.

"BODGARD"
(BODYGUARD)

A series of measures taken by the Anglo-American command to hide from the enemy the time and area of ​​the invasion of France by their troops in June 1944.

"BOLERO"
(BOLERO)

The transfer of American troops from the US to the UK in 1942 - 1944. for the subsequent invasion of France.

"BRAUNSCHWEIG"
(BRAUNSCHWEIG)

See "BLOW".

"WALDRAUSCH"
(WALDRAUSCH)

Operation of German troops against the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in 1944

"VALKYRIE"
(WALKIRIA)

Plan to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the fascist regime in Germany in 1944

" VACTAMREIN"
(WACHT AM RHEIN)

Ardennes offensive operation of the German troops in the winter of 1944/45.

"WEZERUBUNG"

German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940

"VESUVIUS"
(VESUVIUS)

The landing operation of the Anglo-American troops on about. Corsica.

"WEIS"
(WEISS FALL)

German invasion of Poland in September 1939

"WEREWOLF"
(WEHRWOLF)

1. Hitler's headquarters on the Soviet-German front in the Vinnitsa region in 1942-1943.
2. Subversive and terrorist detachments created by the German command in 1944-1945. for operations in the Soviet rear.

"WINTERGEWITTER"
(WINTERGEWITTER)

The operation of the German troops in December 1942 with the aim of deblocking the group surrounded by Stalingrad.

"WOLFSHANCE"
(WOLFSCHANZE)

Hitler's main headquarters during the war near the city of Rastenburg (East Prussia) in 1941 - 1944.

"EAST SHAFT"
(OSTWALL)

The strategic defensive line of the German troops on the Soviet-German front, created by the autumn of 1943 on the line of the Narva, Pskov, Vitebsk, Orsha, Sozh rivers, the middle course of the Dnieper, the Molochnaya river (in September 1943 it was divided into lines " PANTHER" and "WOTAN").

"WOTAN"
(wotan)

The defensive line of the German troops, created in the fall of 1943 on the southern front in the zone of action of army groups "South" and "A".

"VOLCANO"
(VULCAN)

Tunisian offensive operation of the Anglo-American troops in the spring of 1943

"G"

The operation of the Japanese Armed Forces in 1942 with the aim of capturing the island of Guam in the Pacific Ocean.

"GElb"
(GELB)

Offensive operation of German troops in Western Europe in May 1940

"GERTRUDE"
(GERtrUD)

The plan for the invasion of German troops into Turkey in the event of its entry into the war against Germany (cancelled).

"BLUE LINE"
(Blauline)

The defensive line of German troops on the Soviet-German front between the Black and Azov Seas, created in 1943.

"GRANITE"
(GRANITE)

The general plan of operations of the US Armed Forces in the Pacific for 1944.

"GRUN"

The plan of the operation of the German troops to capture Czechoslovakia and liquidate the Czechoslovak state in 1938 (cancelled due to the capitulation of the Czechoslovak government under the Munich Agreement).

"D" - "DEEL PLAN"
(DYLE-PLAN)

Strategic plan for the war of France against Germany, developed in 1939.

"DANZIG"
(DANZIG)

Conditional signal to the German troops to start an offensive operation in Western Europe in May 1940.

"DOWNFALL"
(DOWNFALL)

The general plan for the invasion of American troops in Japan in 1945-1946.

"DAEMON"
(DEMON)

Evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Greece in April 1941

"DIADEM"
(DIADEM)

The offensive operation of the Anglo-American troops in Italy in 1943

"DON"

North Caucasian offensive operation of the Soviet troops in January-February 1943

"DYNAMO"
(DYNAMO)

Evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk in May 1940

"DITECHMENT"
(DETACHMENT)

Landing operation of the American Armed Forces on the island of Iwo Jima in February 1945

"DONNERSCHLAG"
(DONNERSCHLAG)

The plan of the operation of the 6th German Army in November-December 1942 with the aim of breaking out of the encirclement near Stalingrad.

"DORTMUND"
(DORTMUND)

Conditional signal to the German troops to start the war against the USSR in 1941.

"DRAGOON"
(DRAGOON)

Landing operation of the American-French troops in the South of France in August 1944

"WEST SHAFT"
(WESTWALL)

A system of permanent fortifications along the western borders of Germany from the Netherlands to Switzerland (another name is the "SIEGFRID LINE").

"STAR"

Offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the Kursk-Kharkov direction in February 1943

"ZEELEWE"

Plan for the invasion of the German troops in the UK in 1940 (cancelled).

"Z"
(Z)

Plan for the construction of the German navy in preparation for the Second World War.

"SIGFRID LINE"
(SIEGFRIED-STELLUNG)

See "WEST SHAFT".

"ZILBERFUKS"
(SILBERFUCHS)

Plan of joint operations of German and Finnish troops in the Soviet Arctic and Karelia for 1941

"SONNENVENDE"
(SONNENWENDE)

The plan of the counteroffensive of German troops in February 1945 from Pomerania to the South to the flank of the Soviet grouping (not implemented).

"SUMPFBLUTE"
(SUMPFBLUTE)

Operation of German troops against Ukrainian partisans in July 1942

"ISABEL"
(ISABELLA)

The plan for the invasion of German troops into Spain and Portugal in the event of a threat of landing Anglo-American troops in the Pyrenees (cancelled).

"SPARK"

The offensive operation of the Soviet troops in January 1943 with the aim of breaking the blockade of Leningrad.

"CALVERIN"
(CULVERIN)

Landing operation of British troops on the island of Sumatra and Malaya in 1944 - 1945.

"KAN-TOKU-EN"

The strategic plan for the war of Japan against the USSR (developed in July 1941).

"CATAPULT"
(CATAPULT)

The operation of the British fleet in July 1940 to prevent the capture of the French fleet by Germany and its neutralization.

"KATRIN"
(CATHERINE)

The plan of operations of the Armed Forces of Great Britain and France against the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea in 1939-1940. (canceled)

"QUADRANT"
(QUADRANT)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States and Great Britain in Quebec in August 1943

"KING"
(KING)

Philippine landing operation of the US Armed Forces in October 1944 - July 1945.

"COBRA"
(COBRA)

The offensive operation of American troops in Northern France in July 1944.

"RING"

The operation of the Soviet troops to eliminate the encircled group of Germans in Stalingrad in January-February 1943

"KONSTANTIN"
(KONSTANTINE)

The plan of the operation of the German troops for the occupation of Italy in 1943 (renamed to the "AKSE" plan)

"CONCERT"

The operation of Soviet partisans in September-October 1943 in order to disable enemy communications.

"KORMORAN"
(KORMORAN)

The operation of the Germans against the Belarusian partisans in May-June 1944

"COTTBUS"
(KOTTBUS)

Operation of German troops against Belarusian partisans in 1943

"KREMLIN"
(KREML)

Measures taken by the Germans to misinform the Soviet command about the direction of the main attack in the spring-summer campaign of 1942.

"CROSSWORD"
(CROSSWORD)

Negotiations between representatives of the United States and Great Britain with the leadership of Germany, secretly from the Soviet Union, were held in Switzerland in March 1945.

"KUGEBLitz"
(KUGELBLITZ)

Operation of German and Italian troops against Yugoslav partisans in 1943

"KUTUZOV"

Oryol offensive operation of the Soviet troops in July-August 1943

"CAPITAL"
(CAPITAL)

Offensive operation of British troops in Burma in 1944-1945.

"KETSU"

Strategic Plan for the Defense of the Japanese Armed Forces in the Western Pacific for 1945

"LIGHTFOOT"
(LIGHTFOOT)

The offensive operation of the British troops near El Alamein in October-November 1942

"M"

Plan for the reorganization and rearmament of the British Air Force in preparation for war.

"MAGINO LINE"
(MAGINOT LIGNE)

The system of French long-term fortifications on the eastern borders of France, created by the beginning of World War II.

"SMALL SATURN"

Offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Middle Don in December 1942

"MAMEL"
(MAMEL)

Operation of German troops against Polish partisans in 1943

"MANNERHEIM LINE"

The system of long-term fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, created by the Finns in 1927 - 1939.

"MANHATTAN DISTRICT"
(MANHATTEN DISTRICT)

Plan for the creation of an atomic bomb in the United States.

"MARGARET I"
(MARGARET I)

The operation of the German troops to occupy Hungary in March 1944

"MARGARET II"
(MARGARET II)

The plan of the German operation for the occupation of Romania in 1944 (cancelled)

"MARET"
(MARETH)

The defensive line created by the French troops before the war on the border of Libya and Tunisia and used by the German-Italian forces for defense in 1943.

"MARITA"
(MARITA)

The operation of the German troops to capture Greece in 1941

"MARKET GARDEN"
(MARKET GARDEN)

The operation of the Anglo-American troops in the Netherlands in September 1944 ("MARKET" - the stage of the operation with the landing of airborne assault forces, "GARDEN" - the actions of ground troops)

"MARS 1"
(MARS 1)

Plan for the concentration and deployment of Romanian troops for combat operations as part of German troops on the Soviet-German front in 1942.

"MARS 2"
(MARS 2)

The same for the Italian troops.

"MARS 3"
(MARS 3)

The same for the Hungarian troops.

"MATTERHORN"
(MATTERHORN)

US Air Force operations for the purpose of delivering air strikes on Japan from airfields located in the eastern regions of China in 1944-1945.

"MAIGEVITTER"
(MAIGEWITTER)

The operation of the German troops against the Belarusian and Polish partisans, carried out in May 1943.

"MERCURY"
(MERKUR)

Crete airborne operation of the German troops in May 1941

"MAILFIST"
(MAILFIST)

The operation of the British Armed Forces to capture Singapore in 1945

"NEPTUNE"
(NEPTUNE)

The amphibious landing operation of the Anglo-American troops in Normandy in June 1944 (a stage of the general operation to invade the continent "OVERLORD").

"NORDLICHT"
(NODLICHT)

The plan of the offensive operation of the German troops with the aim of capturing Leningrad in the fall of 1942 (not implemented)

"OVERLORD"
(OVERLORD)

Anglo-American invasion of Normandy (Northern France) across the English Channel in June 1944

"OCTAGON"
(OKTAGON)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States and Great Britain in Quebec in September 1944

"OLYMPIC"
(OLYMPIC)

Plan for the US military invasion of Japan in 1945.

"OLDENBURG"
(OLDENBURG)

The economic section of the plan "BARBAROSSA" (measures of the German command and the occupation administration to plunder and use the occupied Soviet territory in the interests of Nazi Germany).

"OST", "GENERAL PLAN "OST"
(OST, GENERAL PLAN "OST")

The plan of colonization by Germany of the states of Eastern Europe.

"OSTGOTENBEWEGUNG"
(OSTGOTTENBEVEGUNG)

Transfer by Germany of its strategic reserves from the West to the Soviet-German front in 1944-1945.

"OCU"

The strategic plan for the war of Japan against the Soviet Union (A variant of the plan for 1941 was the basis for the KAN-TOKU-EN plan drawn up after the German attack on the USSR).

"PANTHER"
(Panther)

The defensive line of the German troops in the fall of 1943 in the zone of the Army Groups "North" and "Center".

"PLANDER"
(PLANDER)

Allied Ruhr offensive in the spring of 1945 (part of the operation carried out by the Anglo-Canadian forces)

"POINTBLANK"
(POINTBLANK)

The operation of the US Air Force and Great Britain against industrial facilities in Germany in 1943 - 1945.

"POLYARFUKS"
(POLARFUCHS)

Offensive operation of German troops in the Soviet Arctic in 1941

"POMERANIAN SHAFT"
(POMMERNWALL)

The strategic defensive line of the German troops in Pomerania on the Neuschtettin, Deutsch-Krone, Lukatz-Krois, Zantoch lines to deter the offensive of the Soviet troops in 1944 - 1945.

"REINUBUNG"

The operation of the raider group of the German fleet (the battleship Bismarck and the cruiser Prinz Eugen) in the Atlantic in May 1941

"REGENSHAUER"
(REGENSCHAUER)

Operation of German troops against Belarusian partisans in April-May 1944

"RAILWAR"

The operation of Soviet partisans in August-September 1943 to disable the enemy's railway communications.

"RÖSSELSHPRUNG"

The operation of the German Air Force and Navy, carried out in July 1942 in the Barents Sea to destroy the allied convoy "PQ-17".

"MOUTH"
(ROT)

The offensive operation of the German troops in France in June 1940

"RUMYANTSEV"

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation of the Soviet troops in August 1943

"RUBETSAL"
(RUBEZAHL)

Operation of German troops against the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in 1943

"SATURN"

Offensive operation of the Soviet troops on the Middle Don in January-February 1943

"SE"

Strategic plan of Japanese defense in 1944-1945. in the western part of the Pacific Ocean along the line of the Philippines, about. Formosa and Japan.

"SEXTANT"
(SEXTANT)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States and Great Britain in Cairo in November 1943

"SYMBOL"
(SYMBOL)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, Great Britain and France in Casablanca in January 1943

"JUMP"

Donbass offensive operation of the Soviet troops in January-February 1943

"STRANGE WAR"
(PHONY WAR)

The name of the period of the Second World War accepted in the literature (from September 3, 1939 to May 10, 1940), when, despite the declared state of war, there were no active operations by the troops of France, Great Britain and Germany on the Western Front.

"SUVOROV"

Smolensk offensive operation of the Soviet troops in August-October 1943

"SUPERCHARGE"
(SUPERCHARGE)

The offensive of the British troops in North Africa in December 1942, following the retreating German-Italian troops without a fight.

"TYPHOON"
(TAIFUN)

Offensive operation of German troops on the Soviet-German front in October-November 1941 with the aim of capturing Moscow and the Moscow industrial region.

"TANNENBAUM"
(TANNENBAUM)

Plan for the invasion of German troops in Switzerland in 1940 (cancelled)

"THESEUS"
(TESEUS)

The offensive operation of the German-Italian troops in North Africa in June-July 1942

"TERMINAL"
(TERMINAL)

Potsdam Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in July 1945

"TOLSTOY"
(TOLSTOY)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR and Great Britain in Moscow in October 1944 (conventional name in English documents)

"TORCH"
(TORCH)

Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November 1942

"TRIDENT"
(trIDENT)

Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States and Great Britain in Washington in May 1943

"URANUS"

Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad in November 1942

"FELIX"
(FELIX)

The plan of the operation of the German troops to capture Gibraltar in 1940 (cancelled)

"FORAGER"
(FERAGER)

The operation of the US Armed Forces in the summer of 1944 to defeat the Japanese group in the Marianas and capture the islands of Saipan, Tinnan and Guam.

"FISCREYER"
(FISCHREIHER)

The offensive operation of German troops on the Soviet-German front in July-August 1942 in the direction of Stalingrad.

"FRANTIK"
(FRANTIC)

Joint "shuttle" operation of the Air Forces of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in the summer of 1944 from airfields in Ukraine and Italy.

"FRIEDERICUS"
(FRIDERICUS)

The offensive operation of the German troops near Kharkov in May-June 1942

"FRYLINGSERVACHEN"

The counteroffensive of the German troops in the area of ​​the lake. Balaton in March 1945

"HAGEN"
(HAGEN)

Rear defensive line of German troops in the Bryansk direction in 1943

"HEY"

The strategic plan for the war of Japan against China, developed in the 30s.

"TSIGOYNERBARON"
(ZIGEUNERBARON)

Operation of German troops against Bryansk partisans in May 1942

"CITADEL"
(ZITADELLE)

Offensive operation of German troops near Kursk in July 1943

"CHAMPION"
(CHAMPION)

The general plan of military operations of the British troops in Burma for 1944-1945.

"SHINGL"
(SHINGLE)

Landing operation of American troops in the Anzio region (Italy) in January 1944

"SHO"

The plan of the counteroffensive of the Japanese fleet in the Western Pacific in 1943

"STERFANG"

The offensive operation of the German troops in June-July 1942 with the aim of capturing Sevastopol.

"AVELANCE"
(AVALANCHE)

Anglo-American invasion of South Italy in September 1943

"EUREKA"
(EUREKA)

Tehran Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in November 1943

"EDELWEISS"
(EDELWEISS)

The offensive operation of the German troops in the summer and autumn of 1942 with the aim of capturing the Caucasus and the oil fields of Grozny and Baku.

MAIN BATTLE Winter campaign of 1942-1943 Battle of Stalingrad (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943) Summer-autumn campaign of 1943 Battle of Kursk (July 5 - August 23, 1943) the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper.

Battle of Stalingrad By the middle of summer 1942, the battles of the Great Patriotic War had reached the Volga. In the plan for a large-scale offensive in the south of the USSR (Caucasus, Crimea), the German command also includes Stalingrad. Germany's goal was to take over an industrial city, the enterprises in which produced military products that were needed; gaining access to the Volga, from where it was possible to get to the Caspian Sea, to the Caucasus, where the oil needed for the front was extracted. Hitler wanted to carry out this plan in just a week with the help of the 6th Paulus Field Army. It included 13 divisions, where there were about 270,000 people. , 3 thousand guns and about five hundred tanks. From the side of the USSR, the forces of Germany were opposed by the Stalingrad Front. It was created by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on July 12, 1942 (commander - Marshal Timoshenko, from July 23 - Lieutenant General Gordov). The difficulty also lay in the fact that our side experienced a shortage of ammunition.

The beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad can be considered on July 17, when near the rivers Chir and Tsimla, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front met with detachments of the 6th German army. Throughout the second half of the summer, fierce battles were going on near Stalingrad. Further, the chronicle of events developed as follows. On August 23, 1942, German tanks approached Stalingrad. From that day on, fascist aviation began to systematically bomb the city. On the ground, battles did not stop either. It was simply impossible to live in the city - you had to fight to win. 75 thousand people volunteered for the front. But in the city itself, people worked day and night. By mid-September, the German army broke through to the city center, the battles went right on the streets. The Nazis stepped up their attack more and more. Almost 500 tanks took part in the assault on Stalingrad, German aircraft dropped about 1 million bombs on the city. The courage of the Stalingraders was unparalleled. Many European countries were conquered by the Germans. Sometimes they needed only 2 3 weeks to capture the whole country. In Stalingrad, the situation was different. It took the Nazis weeks to capture one house, one street.

In the battles passed the beginning of autumn, mid-November. By November, almost the entire city, despite resistance, was captured by the Germans. Only a small strip of land on the banks of the Volga was still held by our troops. But it was still too early to announce the capture of Stalingrad, as Hitler did. The Germans did not know that the Soviet command already had a plan for the defeat of the German troops, which began to be developed even in the midst of the fighting, on September 12th. The development of the offensive operation "Uranus" was carried out by Marshal G.K. Zhukov. Within 2 months, in conditions of increased secrecy, a strike force was created near Stalingrad. The Nazis were aware of the weakness of their flanks, but did not assume that the Soviet command would be able to gather the required number of troops.

Further, the history of the Battle of Stalingrad was as follows: on November 19, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General N.F. Vatutin and the Don Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive. They managed to surround the enemy, despite the resistance. Also during the offensive, five enemy divisions were captured and defeated. During the week from November 23, the efforts of the Soviet troops were directed to strengthening the blockade around the enemy. In order to remove this blockade, the German command formed the Don Army Group (commander - Field Marshal Manstein), however, it was also defeated. The destruction of the encircled grouping of the enemy army was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky). Since the German command rejected the ultimatum to end resistance, the Soviet troops proceeded to destroy the enemy, which was the last of the main stages of the Battle of Stalingrad. February 1943, the last enemy grouping was liquidated, which is considered the end date of the battle. 2

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad: Losses in the Battle of Stalingrad on each side amounted to about 2 million people. The significance of the Battle of Stalingrad can hardly be overestimated. The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad had a great influence on the further course of World War II. She stepped up the fight against the Nazis in all European countries. As a result of this victory, the German side ceased to dominate. The outcome of this battle caused confusion in the Axis (Hitler's coalition). There was a crisis of pro-fascist regimes in European countries.

The Kursk Salient In the spring of 1943, a relative calm settled on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased the production of military equipment at the expense of the resources of all of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. A lot of work was done to strengthen the Soviet army. Design bureaus improved and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Aviation technology was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing - after the Stalingrad

Stalin and Stavka initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwestern direction. However, marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky managed to predict the place and time of the future offensive of the Wehrmacht. The Germans, who had lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having brought together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the ledge of the front line, which was formed in the Kursk region. With the victory in this operation, Hitler planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor. Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number. The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2,000 tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.

Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy's attack with his offensive, but, having organized a defense in depth, to meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3,600 tanks and 2,400 aircraft were concentrated. Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank attack of the entire war on the formations of the Red Army. Methodically breaking into the defense, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of the fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.

The battle near Prokhorovka was the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation that went down in history as the Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows. The Nazi command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in their favor. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943, codenamed "Citadel". Having information about the preparation of the German fascist troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk salient and bleed the enemy strike groups during a defensive battle. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.

On July 12, 1943, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a Soviet counterattack (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army). Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo-Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and the Kempf Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, to the positions of the 6th and 7th Guards armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized division. On July 6, two counterattacks were delivered against the advancing Germans from the side of the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (Northern) - Kalinin area by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

To assist Katukov's 1st Panzer Army, which was fighting heavy battles in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 11 p.m. on July 7, Front Commander Nikolai Vatutin signed Directive No. 0014/op on readiness for the transition to active operations from 10:30 a.m. on the 8th. However, the counterattack inflicted by the forces of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the brigades of the 1st TA, did not bring tangible results. Having not achieved decisive success - by this moment the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyansky direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the tip of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psyol River .

The change in the direction of the strike was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the outnumbered Soviet tank reserves. In the event that the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the approach of the Soviet tank reserves, it was supposed to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive in order to use the favorable terrain for themselves, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantages by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

By July 11, the Germans took up their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", equipped better than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not attack in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" providing its flanks fought active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" covering the left flank "expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psyol River, having managed to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of their attack through the defile).

By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had concentrated on positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defenses at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The area of ​​concentration of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovka direction.

On the other hand, the choice of the specified area for the concentration of two guard armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the most powerful enemy grouping (2 m SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defending this direction of the 1st division of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack, the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Against the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte SS division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o'clock, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades. At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers got some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which the tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to accurately hit the most vulnerable places of heavily armored German vehicles. To the south of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction. At about 1 pm, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the Totenkopf Division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed. By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy to the west. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

The battle for the Dnieper of the Soviet troops in Ukraine in August - December 1943 was carried out with the aim of liberating the Left-bank Ukraine, Northern Tavria, Donbass and Kyiv, as well as creating strong footholds on the right bank of the Dnieper. After the defeat at Kursk, the German command developed the Wotan defense plan. It provided for the creation of a well-fortified Eastern Wall from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which ran along the Narva-Pskov-Gomel line and further along the Dnieper.

This line was, according to the plan of the German leadership, to stop the advance of Soviet troops to the west. The main core of the defenders of the Dnieper part of the "Eastern Wall" in Ukraine were units of the Army Group "South" (Field Marshal E. Manstein). The troops of the Central (General K. K. Rokossovsky), Voronezh (General N. F. Vatutin), Steppe (General I. S. Konev), South Western (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and Southern (General F. I. Tolbukhin) fronts. The balance of forces at the beginning of the battle for the Dnieper is given in the table. Soviet troops German troops Personnel, thousand 2633 1240 Guns and mortars 51200 12600 Tanks 2400 2100 Aircraft 2850 2000

The battle for the Dnieper consisted of two stages. At the first stage (in August - September), the Red Army units liberated the Donbass, Left-bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move and captured a number of bridgeheads on its right bank. The battle for the Dnieper began on August 26 with the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30), in which the troops of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts participated. It took place simultaneously with the Donbass operation. The troops of the Central Front were the first to go on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the troops of the 60th Army (General I. D. Chernyakhovsky), who managed to break through the German defenses in a secondary sector, south of Sevsk. The front commander, General Rokossovsky, promptly reacted to this success and, having regrouped his forces, threw the main shock units of the front into the gap. This decision turned out to be a major strategic win. Already on August 31, the troops of the Central Front managed to expand the Breakthrough to a width of up to 100 km and a depth of up to 60 km, forcing the Germans to begin withdrawing troops to the Desna and Dnieper. Meanwhile, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts joined the offensive.

In early September, the offensive of the Red Army unfolded throughout the Left Bank Ukraine, which completely deprived the German command of the ability to maneuver reserves. Under these conditions, it began the withdrawal of its troops across the Dnieper. In pursuit of the retreating, the advanced units of the Red Army reached the Dnieper on the 750-kilometer section from Loev to Zaporizhia and immediately began forcing this water barrier. By the end of September, on this strip, Soviet troops captured 20 bridgeheads on the right bank. The calculations of the German leadership for a long-term defense of the Left Bank were frustrated. In October - December, the second stage of the battle began, when a fierce struggle was fought to expand and hold bridgeheads. At the same time, reserves were being brought up, bridges were being built, and forces were being built up for a new strike. During this period, the troops operating in Ukraine became part of the four Ukrainian fronts formed on October 20. At this stage, the Red Army carried out two strategic operations: Nizhnedneprovsk and Kiev.

The Lower Dnieper operation (September 26 - December 20) was carried out by the troops of the Steppe (2nd Ukrainian), Southwestern (3rd Ukrainian) and Southern (4th Ukrainian) fronts. During the operation, they liberated Northern Tavria, blockaded the Crimean peninsula and captured the largest bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye (450 km long and up to 100 km deep). However, their attempts to break through from this bridgehead into the Krivoy Rog iron ore basin were stopped by mid-December by the fierce resistance of the German units, which received reinforcements from the West and other regions of Ukraine. The Nizhnedneprovsk operation was notable for the large losses of the Red Army, which amounted to 754 thousand people. (about half of all losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Ukraine from August to December 1943).

The Kyiv operation (October 12 - December 23) of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front was also difficult. It began with battles north and south of Kyiv for the Lyutezhsky and Bukrinsky bridgeheads. Initially, the Soviet command planned to attack Kyiv from the south, from the Bukrin area. However, the rugged terrain prevented the advance of the troops, especially the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P.S. Rybalko. Then this army was secretly transferred to the Lyutezh bridgehead, from where it was decided to deliver the main blow. On November 3, 1943, Soviet troops launched an offensive north of Kyiv, which was liberated on November 6. The Germans failed to gain a foothold on the Dnieper line. Their front was broken through, and Soviet mobile formations liberated Zhytomyr on November 13. Despite the German counterattack in the area, Manstein failed to recapture Kyiv (see Kyiv operation).

By the end of 1943, the battle for the Dnieper was over. By that time, the Eastern Wall in the Ukraine had been broken through almost along its entire length. Soviet troops captured two large strategic bridgeheads (from Kyiv to Pripyat and from Cherkasy to Zaporozhye) and dozens of operational tactical bridgeheads. The hopes of the Wehrmacht command to give their troops the opportunity to rest and regroup forces at the “winter line” under the protection of a large water barrier turned out to be unrealizable. The battle for the Dnieper became a rare example in the history of wars of such a large-scale and rapid forcing of such a wide water barrier against the fierce resistance of large enemy forces. According to the German General von Butlar, during this offensive "the Russian army demonstrated its high fighting qualities and showed that it had not only significant human resources, but also excellent military equipment" . The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to the breakthrough of the Eastern Wall is evidenced by the fact that 2438 soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper (20% of the total number of those awarded this title for the war). The losses of Soviet troops during the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine with Kiev, Donbass, Northern Tavria, as well as the struggle in the bridgeheads, exceeded 1.5 million people. (including irrevocable - 373 thousand people), about 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns (without the Kiev defensive operation), about 1.2 thousand aircraft (without the Kiev defensive operation).

Hitler's inner circle, including the leading figures of the main headquarters of the armed forces, could not fail to draw certain lessons from the failure of the "blitzkrieg" that occurred on the Eastern Front. The collapse of Operation Typhoon in the battle near Moscow cost the Nazis especially heavy losses in people, weapons and military equipment. It was noted above that fascist Germany managed to make up for these losses, but the combat effectiveness of its army decreased. The certificate of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW dated June 6, 1942 stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces as a whole is lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the impossibility of fully ensuring their replenishment with people and materiel” ( "Top secret! Only for command!”: The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. S. 367.). At the same time, the number and combat effectiveness of many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces increased.

With all their arrogance, the Nazi rulers and strategists were forced to take all this into account. Therefore, continuing to maintain confidence in the superiority of the forces of the German army and striving to achieve victory over the USSR, they no longer dared to conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

What goals did the Nazis set for themselves for 1942, more precisely, for the spring and summer of this year, when it was planned to launch a new offensive? Despite the apparent clarity of the issue, it requires detailed consideration. Let us turn first of all to the testimonies of those who were close to the preparation of a new offensive, knew about it or even took a direct part in it.

Undoubtedly interesting in this regard are the statements of Colonel-General Walter Warlimont, the former deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command (OKW). He reports in some detail about some of the facts of the planning of the campaign, the implementation of which led the Nazis to the catastrophe on the Volga. In his book “In the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. 1939-1945" Warlimont ( Warlimont W. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.), in particular, he writes: “Even during the period of the greatest strain of forces in the struggle to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops, the confidence in the headquarters of the German armed forces did not weaken for a minute that in the East it would be possible to seize the initiative again, at least no later than the end of winter” ( Ibid. S. 238.). On January 3, 1942, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, announced his firm decision, “as soon as the weather is favorable for this, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. This direction is the most important. It is necessary to go to the oil fields, as well as to Iran and Iraq ... Of course, he, in addition, will do everything to destroy Moscow and Leningrad "( Ibid.).

Elsewhere, Warlimont notes that in January - March 1942, the plan for the summer campaign was in general terms ready. On March 20, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The Fuhrer again has a completely clear plan for the spring and summer. His goal is the Caucasus, Leningrad and Moscow ... An offensive with devastating blows in certain areas ”( Ibid. S. 241.).

It is noteworthy that the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad appear in Warlimont's statements in both cases. But there is no evidence that in the process of discussing the concept of the campaign, it was originally planned to resume the offensive simultaneously in all three strategic directions, and only later - when calculating the available possibilities - did the specific contours of the plan begin to change their outlines significantly. It is quite obvious that the Nazis could no longer prepare the second edition of the Barbarossa plan. Despite this, Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 the Russian army would be completely destroyed ( Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. S. 229.). It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But there was something else here as well. Adventurist in its essence, Hitler's policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations in 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front became more and more difficult for the Nazi generals. Warlimont writes the following about this: “Halder ... for a long time studied the question of whether we should finally go on the defensive in the East, since a second offensive is beyond our strength. But it is absolutely impossible to talk about this with Hitler. And what can all this lead to? If we give the Russians a breather and the American threat intensifies, then we will give the initiative to the enemy and we will never be able to regain it. Thus, we have no choice but to once again attempt an offensive despite all doubts ”( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239.).

So, there was no longer confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began hostilities on the European continent. The Nazis had no doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were looming for some people completely differently than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the question arose before the German high command in what form to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to be decided what should be done on a front of 3,000 kilometers long in order to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive" ( Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. S. 126.).

The offensive operations of the summer campaign of 1942, according to the testimony of General Halder, were foreseen as early as the winter of 1941/42. and disrupt their communications along the Volga" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 35.). The OKW directive of December 8, 1941, spoke of creating the prerequisites for conducting an "offensive operation against the Caucasus" ( There.). In that memorable winter for the Germans, Hitler forbade the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper and demanded at all costs to hold positions near Leningrad, in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyazma, Orel, Kursk and in the Donbass.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Nazi generals. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed to carry out an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front in order to capture Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the resumption of the offensive, but, as before, he continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out by the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl (OKW), ordered the main efforts of the German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to seize the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, it was planned to postpone the operation to capture Leningrad until the moment when the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, hoping to defeat the Soviet troops here in successive operations piecemeal. Thus, although when planning the campaign of 1942 Hitler's strategists for the first time began to show hesitation, nevertheless, as before, the top military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a single point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited. General Halder reported in detail the plan for the deployment of troops for the summer offensive, based on the instructions given to him by the Fuhrer.

Warlimont paints a picture of the meeting this way: “Nobody raised any objections. But, despite this, the displeasure of the chief of the general staff of the land army (Halder. - A.S.) was almost palpably felt, who even earlier had repeatedly spoken out both against the strange layer-by-layer introduction of forces at the beginning of the offensive, and against delivering the main blows during the offensive in divergent directions, and especially against the excessive scale of operations along the front and in depth "( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242.).

Colonel General Jodl of the Design Bureau, who was not indifferent to the development of Hitler's operational plans, a few weeks after the aforementioned meeting, declared to Lieutenant Colonel Scherf, a general staff officer devoted to him, whom Hitler appointed authorized to write military history, that Operation Siegfried ( Hitler, after the winter defeat of 1941/42, began to beware of assigning big names to plans for military operations and on April 5 crossed out the original code name "Siegfried". On June 30, the new code name "Blau" ("Blue") was changed to "Braunschweig" out of fear that the former name could become known to the Soviet side.) due to the lack of forces of Army Group Center and Army Group North will be at great risk if the Russians launch a decisive attack on Smolensk. However, Jodl, like Hitler, seemed doubtful whether the Soviet side had the strength and courage to do so; they believed that with the start of the German offensive in the southern sector of the front, the Russians would automatically begin the transfer of troops to the south ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242-243.).

Jodl instructed his deputy and senior officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces to draw up in the form of a directive of the OKW the plans for the command of the ground forces, proposed on March 28 and approved by Hitler. The headquarters decided to limit the content of the directive to only the formulation of "tasks", without linking the main command of the ground forces with any details. However, Hitler, during the report of the "draft" on April 4 by General Jodl, announced that he himself would rework the directive. The next day, his "historiographer" wrote: "The Fuhrer substantially revised the draft directive No. 41 and supplemented it with important points formulated by himself ... First of all, he re-formulated that part of the draft, which refers to the main operation." The result of these efforts was a document dated April 5, which contained "multiple repetitions and long lengths, confusion of operational directives with well-known principles of troop leadership, vague formulations of the most significant issues and a detailed explanation of minor details" ( Ibid. S. 243-244.).

It is easy to see that the former Nazi generals are in every possible way fenced off from Hitler, whose associates and like-minded people they have been for so long. This is done in a different historical setting and at least two decades after the events they describe. In his book, Warlimont also follows this trend, as can be seen from the citations. Wehrmacht generals did not put forward any fundamentally new proposals as opposed to Hitler's plans. The atmosphere of servility to the "Fuhrer", which reigned supreme among the German generals, eliminated any possibility of this. The hidden discontent of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, did not change anything. His alleged independence of judgment is clearly exaggerated in post-war West German literature. In hindsight, after the end of the war, Halder began to assert that at that time they were offered to throw the main forces of the German troops to capture Stalingrad in order to avoid simultaneous attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The attack on the Caucasus, in his opinion, should have been of secondary importance for securing the southern flank of the Stalingrad group. It is easy to see that, if this was the case, then such a proposal did not contain anything radically different from Hitler's plan. No wonder in his diary, referring to the meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht on March 28, 1942, Halder writes down such a significant phrase: "The outcome of the war is decided in the East" ( Halder F. Military diary. M.. 1970. Vol. 3, book. 2. S. 220.).

All this shows quite clearly that the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was planned by the German generals, who stood for the continuation of the aggressive and adventurous war against the USSR. Hitler only detailed and refined this plan, made the final decision regarding the choice of the direction of offensive operations. The majority of Hitler's generals showed a complete inability to understand the criminal nature of the war unleashed by the Nazis after the defeat of Germany in the Second World War. Thus, Warlimont in his memoirs puts forward his own plan for the continuation of the war in relation to the situation of 1942.

“Without speculation,” he writes, “it will obviously be appropriate here to speak of the prospects that a generous reconciliation with France could still bring. These prospects must have been of particular importance, considering that Germany was now dealing with two major maritime powers. If a devastating blow had been delivered to the enemy's sea lanes and fleet from bases located on the territory of the French state, using a large number of submarines and all air formations suitable for this, then it would have been possible - in accordance with some then and today's estimates - according to at the very least, to delay the landing of the Western allies on the European continent and in North Africa, and thereby create serious obstacles for the enemy in achieving air superiority over the continent. At the same time, the Red Army in the East, which was largely dependent on allied imports by sea, would obviously have been deprived of the opportunity to conduct major operations for a long time as a result of shifting the main efforts to the sea and air war in the Atlantic, especially if to involve the Japanese in the joint conduct of the war, at least at sea" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239-240.). This plan, conceived many years after the war, does not deserve serious consideration. Suffice it to say that the combat power of the Red Army - contrary to Warlimont's assumptions - was not determined at all by the supplies of the Western Allies. In addition, the transfer of funds to the creation of a more powerful submarine fleet of fascist Germany was bound to lead to a decrease in the equipment of the Wehrmacht's ground forces. The landing of Anglo-American troops on the European continent, as is known, was already delayed until the summer of 1944. As for the actions of the allies in Africa, they were of a local nature. Finally, "generous reconciliation" with France depended not only on the desire of the Nazis. All this suggests that Hitler and the German General Staff - contrary to Warlimont's opinion - more correctly than he defined the main theater of the war. But they did not understand the inevitability of the catastrophe that awaited them.

The idea of ​​the Wehrmacht command for 1942 is most fully set forth in Directive No. 41 (see Appendix 14), which was of particular importance: stubborn attempts to implement it determined the actions of the enemy on the Soviet-German front until late autumn and the beginning of winter 1942.

Directive No. 41 largely reveals the essence of the policy of the Third Reich in the second year of the war against the Soviet Union. It is quite obvious that in preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front, the enemy by no means abandoned the military-political goals formulated a year and a half earlier in the Barbarossa plan - to defeat Soviet Russia. In general form, this task remains in Directive No. 41. “The goal is,” it says there, “to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers” ( See: App. 14. S. 567-571.). Hitler spoke about the same on April 3, 1942, in a conversation with Antonescu. “This summer,” he declared, “I decided to continue the pursuit as deeply as possible for the final destruction of the Russians. American and British assistance will be ineffective, as new Russian defeats will lead to a loss of contact with the outside world. They have lost the best soldiers and equipment, and now they are only improvising" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 34.).

It should be noted that some authors in the FRG are trying to retrospectively narrow the tasks of the Nazi plan for the summer campaign of 1942. Thus, the former Hitlerite General Mellenthin writes: “In the summer offensive of 1942, our armies in the south had as their task the defeat of the troops of Marshal Timoshenko and the liquidation of the enemy in the bend of the Don River between Rostov and Voronezh, in order to create a springboard for the subsequent offensive on Stalingrad and the oil regions of the Caucasus. The offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus was planned to begin much later, perhaps not earlier than 1943. Mellenthin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. M., 1957. S. 142.).

The absurdity of such statements is refuted by the Nazi generals themselves. K. Zeitzler, who after F. Halder became chief of the general staff of the ground forces, testifies: “Planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended, first of all, to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The implementation of these intentions, of course, would be of great importance if the German army could cross the Volga in the Stalingrad region and thus cut the main Russian communication line running from north to south, and if the Caucasian oil went to meet the military needs of Germany, then the situation in the East would be radically changed, and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would be greatly increased. Such was Hitler's train of thought. Having achieved these goals, he wanted to send highly mobile formations to India through the Caucasus or in another way ”( Fatal decisions. M., 1958. S. 153.).

An objective assessment of the plans of the German High Command for the summer of 1942 is incompatible with the unreasonable narrowing of their actual scope and goals. In the document under consideration, as is clear from its text, in addition to the main operation on the southern wing of the front, the Wehrmacht troops were also tasked with “taking Leningrad in the north” and carrying out the operations necessary “to level the front line in its central and northern sections” . Ignoring this part of Directive No. 41 on the part of certain representatives of bourgeois historiography, especially West German, can only be explained by a conscious desire to belittle the scale of the victory of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people in the battle on the Volga. At the same time, one must also see significant differences between Directive No. 41 and the Barbarossa plan.

The ultimate military-political goals of Nazi Germany's aggressive war against the Soviet Union, in connection with the changed situation on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42, seemed unattainable even to the most rabid Nazis within the framework of the next campaign. This led to the well-known inconsistency of the document under consideration and the vagueness of setting in it the main goal of the strategic offensive of 1942. In a general form (without indicating the terms), it sets out the intention to crush the Red Army, and at the same time it also contains an indication that the defensive positions created along the right bank of the Don to ensure the north-eastern flank of the strike force of German troops, should be equipped "taking into account their possible use in winter conditions." The capture of the region of the Lower Volga and the Caucasus, for all its great strategic importance, could not yet lead to the defeat of the USSR. The most powerful grouping of the Red Army was located in the central industrial region. In this regard, we should recall the testimony of Field Marshal Keitel. He said that the German high command, after the capture of Stalingrad by the Nazi army and the isolation of Moscow from the south, intended to carry out a turn with large forces to the north. “I find it difficult to give any time frame for this operation,” added Keitel ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 41.).

Thus, the main goal of the enemy offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. However, unlike the Barbarossa plan, the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the strategy of "blitzkrieg". That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, to defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, to seize the southern regions of the USSR rich in strategic raw materials. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and only after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, the successful conduct of the main operation to conquer the Caucasus “in the first place”. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of fascist Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the commanders of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that if he did not receive oil from Maykop and Grozny, he would have to end this war ( See the testimony of Paulus to the International Military Tribunal on February 11, 1946 // Nuremberg trial, M., 1954. T. 1. S. 378; see also: Voen.-ist. magazine 1960. No. 2. S. 81-82.). At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the loss of oil by the USSR would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than is commonly believed after its final catastrophic failure" ( Liddell Hart BG Strategy of indirect actions. pp. 347-348.).

The choice of the south for the offensive was also determined by a number of other considerations, including those of a specifically military nature.

The enemy troops on the central sector of the front penetrated deeply into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, the Nazi troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern grouping of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less forces here than in the western direction. However, the open terrain - the steppe expanses of the Don, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the enemy to use armored formations and aviation. Of certain importance was the fact that in the south it was easier for the Nazis to concentrate the troops of their allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.

The capture of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to those mentioned above, other important goals: according to the plans of the enemy, this brought the Nazi troops closer to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its rulers about armed aggression against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of ties with the outside world through Iran; the capture of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to death. Finally, the Nazis hoped, in the event of a successful implementation of the planned offensive, to open their way to the Middle East.

In preparation for carrying out the planned operations, the Nazi leadership carried out a number of preparatory measures. In search of the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten either. Warlimont writes that a few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the 1942 summer campaign was made, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, General Keitel, visited, on Hitler's instructions, the capitals of Germany's European allies, who were to contribute "every available force" to the operation. As a result, the Nazis managed to get a promise from the rulers of Italy and Hungary to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu placed at the disposal of the German command another 26 divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East ( Lebedev N. I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M., 1976. S. 347.). “Hitler, who in this case refused personal correspondence with the heads of state and government, subsequently limited himself to only demanding that the contingents of the Allied troops be part of the armies under their own command. In addition, already in the directive of April 5, when determining the zones for the offensive of the allied forces, it was stipulated, albeit in veiled terms, that the Hungarians and Romanians, who were allies of Germany, but were at enmity with each other, should be separated from each other by a considerable distance, introducing in between are Italian compounds. All these troops were assigned defensive missions, for which they had to be reinforced with German reserves, and above all with anti-tank weapons" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 244.).

Among the activities of the Nazi command aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the plan for the fictitious operation "Kremlin" occupied not the last place. Its purpose is to misinform the Soviet command regarding German plans for the 1942 summer campaign.

Operation "Kremlin" was developed at the direction of the OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of the army group "Center". In the “Order on the offensive against Moscow”, signed on May 29 by the commander of Field Marshal Kluge and the chief of staff, General Wehler, the troops of the Army Group Center were tasked with: “To defeat the enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, Moscow, surrounding the city, and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of operational use of this area "( Dashichev V.P. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. S. 312.). To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks for the 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and the 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations ("Kremlin" and "Blau") coincided in time.

The enemy did everything, including radio disinformation, so that the plan of Operation "Kremlin" became known to the command of the Red Army. To some extent, this trick succeeded the enemy.

By the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff were faced with the need to develop a new strategic plan - for the next stage of the war. The impossibility of continuing the broad offensive of the Red Army, which remained unfinished, became obvious. A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then deputy, and then chief of the General Staff ( In May 1942, A. M. Vasilevsky was admitted to the duties of Chief of the General Staff, and on June 26 he was approved in this position.), wrote in his memoirs that the winter offensive in April 1942 died out due to the lack of the necessary forces and means to continue it. The troops of the fronts were ordered to go on the defensive.

From the way events unfolded at the front, it was clear that the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him and was preparing for active operations. The Soviet leadership had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the enemy would try to seize the strategic initiative again. The absence of a second front allowed the Nazis to transfer troops from the European countries they occupied to the Eastern Front. All this had to be taken into account when analyzing the situation.

In what direction will the new major offensive of the enemy begin? “Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces,” recalled Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to determine as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all perfectly understood that the further development of the entire Second World War, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942 ”( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. M.. 1975. S. 203.).

Military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.” ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 5. S. 112.).

On March 23, the state security agencies reported the same to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil" ( There.).

However, intelligence data was not fully taken into account. The Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest grouping of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 70 divisions, continued to be located on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital. Therefore, it seemed most likely that the enemy would strike the main blow in the Moscow direction. “This opinion, as I am well aware, was shared by the command of most fronts” ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 206.), - testifies A. M. Vasilevsky.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that in the summer of 1942 the enemy would be able to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions - the western and the south of the country. But Stalin also feared most of all for the Moscow direction ( Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 2nd ed. add. M., 1974. Book. 2. S. 64.). Later it turned out that this conclusion was not confirmed by the development of events.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be an active strategic defense of the Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary materiel, followed by a transition to a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov in the middle of March in the presence of A. M. Vasilevsky. After that, work on the summer campaign plan continued.

The General Staff correctly considered that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not, at the same time, conduct offensive operations on a large scale. Stalin, who was poorly versed in matters of military art, did not agree with this opinion. G.K. Zhukov supported B.M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that at the beginning of summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping, which held a vast bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated ( There. S. 65.).

At the end of March, the Headquarters again discussed the issue of a strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan submitted by the command of the South-Western Direction for a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff,” writes A. M. Vasilevsky, “but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to provide for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas: on some - in order to improve the operational situation, on others - to preemption of the enemy in the deployment of offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to carry out private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lugovsko-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.

How can one regard the fact that such an authoritative military leader as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country's highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on a question on the correct solution of which so much depended? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many, unaware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the past war, can rightly blame its leadership for failing to prove to the Supreme Commander the negative consequences of the decision to defend and come on at the same time. Under conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, the conduct of private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of energy. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed with their own eyes that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, the refusal to conduct offensive operations, such as Kharkov, for example, would save the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would allow we will go over to active offensive operations much earlier and recapture the initiative in our own hands.

The miscalculations made by the Headquarters and the General Staff when planning hostilities for the summer of 1942 were taken into account in the future, especially in the summer of 1943, when a decision was made on the nature of hostilities on the Kursk Bulge "( Vasilevsky A. M. Memories of the historical battle // Stalingrad epic. M., 1968. S. 75.).

Historians of the past war have not yet exhausted their study of the problem of planning the summer campaign of 1942; it needs further in-depth research. At the same time, one should also take into account the general situation that the failures of the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942 were not inevitable ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 207.).

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the rear of the country, which ensured its struggle, had forces and means, if not in everything sufficient, then in the main, to prevent a new deep penetration of the Nazi troops into the vital regions of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people gained confidence in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative effect on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the factor of surprise, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors exerted a growing influence in all spheres of the struggle. The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war has acquired an ever more prominent role. Its first year was a serious test for the entire command and political staff, most of which acquired both hardening and the skill that comes only with practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved, the abilities and talents of those who led the combat operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral might of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which, under difficult conditions, thwarted the plan of a "blitzkrieg" war of fascist Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm for their actions in the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army did not have enough trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most expedient use of available forces and means acquired special significance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue the aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of ​​the strength and professional qualities of the Wehrmacht troops, of the features of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against fascist Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of armed struggle depended on the adoption of correct strategic decisions. Expecting that the enemy would strike the main blow in the central direction, the Headquarters concentrated strategic reserves in the areas of Kalinin, Tula, Tambov, Bori-soglebsk, Vologda, Gorky, Stalingrad, Saratov, believing that, depending on the development of events at the front, they could be used both southwest and west History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. T. 5. S. 143.). However, the actual development of events did not fully justify these calculations.

Thus, the Headquarters planned for the spring and summer of 1942, along with the transition to the defense, offensive operations in the Leningrad region, near Demyansk, in the Oryol direction, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass and Crimea. The successful conduct of these operations could lead to the release of Leningrad, the defeat of the Demyansk, Kharkov and other groupings of enemy troops. This was due to the desire to bring as close as possible the timing of the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil. However, at that time there were not yet sufficient prerequisites for this, and the decision taken by the Headquarters was erroneous.

The ability to solve the practical problems of military strategy, taking into account all the factors that determined accurate and correct foresight, was developed at the Supreme Command Headquarters gradually, as experience in warfare was accumulated.