Mongols and Tamerlane. Ottoman Turkey, its history and peoples

Zayakin B. N.

"Mongols and Tamerlane".

Like other barbarian states created by conquest, the Mongol state proved to be short-lived. After the death of Genghis Khan, it was divided into four khanates: Eastern - China, Manchuria, part of India and Mongolia; Jagatai - the upper reaches of the Irtysh and Ob and all of Central Asia; Golden Horde - the northern part of Turkestan, southern Russia to the Lower Danube; Persian Khanate - Persia, Afghanistan and others.
Civil strife weakened the Mongolian state. Taking advantage of this, China in 1367 was the first to overthrow the Mongol yoke.
The Golden Horde was also weakened by civil strife, which contributed to the liberation of the Russian people from the Mongol-Tatar yoke. On the Kulikovo field in 1380, the first major blow was dealt to the Tatars, which marked the beginning of the liberation of the Russian people.
The Mongolian state was more and more fragmented and disintegrated. The process of disintegration proceeded very quickly, which was a consequence of the development of feudal relations, which developed in Asia in the same way as in Europe, but in a shorter time.
Genghis Khan, as a reward for faithful service, gave to his companion the possession of any ulus-tribe or association of tribes. Having crushed the city of Kerent, according to ancient sources, Genghis Khan distributed it to his associates: one of them received a hundred houses, the other of the people who were in charge of the vessels - artisans, and so on.
Then Genghis Khan began to distribute uluses-destinies to his sons and relatives, who became the rulers of the uluses. Each of them had certain duties, the most important of which was military service.
The new ruler of the ulus was obliged to appear at the first request with a certain number of soldiers. The size of the ulus was determined by the number of wagons and the number of soldiers that he could field. Each new vassal took a kind of oath of allegiance to the khan.
In order to more tightly bind the commanding staff to himself: temnikov, thousand, centurions, Genghis Khan gave a hundred, a thousand, darkness of one of the uluses, which was owned by one of his sons, the prince of the blood, to the fief hereditary possession.
Such temniks, thousandths and centurions began to be called noyans - gentlemen. The noyans were vassals of the princes. The result was a feudal ladder: the khan-prince of the blood was the owner of the ulus, followed by the temnik, the thousand, the centurion. For the right to govern, each of the noyans received a label-letter.
The Mongol khan and the princes of the blood completely disposed of the noyan's personality and could deprive him of possession, but the noyan himself had no right to leave the service or change his overlord. It was already a feudal relationship.
Ultimately, all free Mongols became the property of the noyan or prince of the blood. Noyan owned not only people, but also received a certain territory for nomadism and hunting.
The Noyans, however, were not full owners of the herds of cattle, which were at the disposal of their people. The Mongol nomad had his own personal property - livestock and nomadic economy.
With regard to nomadic life, the Mongol had to fulfill the orders of his noyan, as well as carry out certain duties, provide the noyan with small cattle for slaughter, send him dairy mares for a certain period, and so on.
The free Mongol nomad cattle breeder turned out to be enslaved. At the same time, vassal relations developed. This is how feudalism arose among the Mongols.
The measures of Genghis Khan and his successors discussed above were subjectively aimed at strengthening the khan's power. Objectively, as in Europe, completely opposite results were obtained.
Each noyan strove to become independent, to get rid of vassalage. As a result of this struggle, the noyans began to turn into independent, independent khans, and the Mongolian state of nomadic pastoralists disintegrated.
The feudal khans waged continuous wars among themselves, greatly weakening the Mongols. Some khans managed to overcome this internecine strife, and they temporarily restored the power of the Mongol state, but on a much smaller scale. One of these khans was the Mongol commander Tamerlane.
Tamerlane was born in the city of Kesh, southwest of Bukhara. His father had a small ulus. Since childhood, Tamerlane had great physical strength.
He was engaged in military exercises and from the age of 12 began to go on campaigns with his father. Tamerlane went through the harsh school of war and was an experienced warrior, as well as a zealous Mohammedan, which played some role in his struggle with the Uzbeks.
In 1359, a descendant of Genghis Khan, Khan Togluk, relying on middle feudal lords, captured Central Asia. Part of the prominent nobles from the descendants of Genghis Khan took refuge in Afghanistan, the other part voluntarily submitted to Togluk.
Among them was Tamerlane. With the help of gifts and bribes, Tamerlane saved his lands and the lands of his allies from robbery. He won the sympathy of Togluk and was given command over the tumen.
When Tamerlane began to fight the Uzbeks, Togluk ordered him to be killed. This order fell into the hands of Tamerlane himself, who, with 60 soldiers, fled across the Amu River to the Badakhshan Mountains, where several dozen more people joined him.
A detachment of about one thousand people was sent against Tamerlane. As a result of a stubborn battle, 50 people remained from this detachment, who retreated without completing their task.
Tamerlane began to vigorously prepare for a war with the Uzbeks. Among the Turkmens, he incited hatred for the Uzbeks. In 1369, a popular uprising broke out in Samarkand.
Tamerlane brutally cracked down on the rebels, captured Samarkand and started a war with the Uzbeks, who were led by the son of Togluk. The army of Uzbeks, according to exaggerated reports of sources, had up to 100 thousand people, of which up to 80 thousand were in the fortresses.
The detachment of Tamerlane consisted of only about 2 thousand soldiers. Togluk dispersed the forces of the Uzbeks. Tamerlane took advantage of this and inflicted a number of defeats on them.
By 1370, the remnants of the Uzbek field troops retreated across the Syr River. Tamerlane, on behalf of his son Togluk, sent orders to the commanders of the fortresses to leave the fortresses and retreat across the Syr River. With the help of this trick, almost all the fortresses of the Uzbeks were cleared.
Tamerlane pretended to be the liberator of the Uzbeks. In fact, he was their enslaver. In 1370, a kurultai was convened, at which the rich and noble Mongols elected a descendant of Genghis Khan, Kobul Shah Aglan, as khan.
Soon Tamerlane removed this khan and declared himself the khan-ruler, and made Samarkand his capital. A number of weak neighboring states were then conquered.
In these wars, the army, manned by the Mongols, grew, tempered and strengthened. In military construction, Tamerlane was guided by the combat experience of the Mongols and the rules of Genghis Khan.
Of the 313 people who advanced during the struggle for dominance in Turkestan, Tamerlane singled out 100 people to command dozens, 100 hundreds and 100 thousand.
The remaining 13 received senior positions. Tamerlane paid great attention to the selection of chiefs. “The chief,” he said, “whose power is weaker than a whip and a stick, is unworthy of the title.” Foremen were chosen by ten, centurions, thousandth and higher standing chiefs were appointed.
In the Mongol army, a certain salary was now paid. A warrior received from 2 to 4 horse prices, the size of the salary was determined by the correctness of his service, the foreman's salary was his ten, so he was interested in his soldiers receiving the highest rate, the centurion's salary of six foremen, and so on.
One of the disciplinary sanctions was the deduction of one tenth of the salary. Encouragement measures were widely practiced: praise, salary increase, gifts, ranks, titles - brave, hero and others, banners for units.
Simple equestrian warriors had to be armed with a bow, 18-20 arrows, 10 arrowheads, an ax, a saw, an awl, a needle, a lasso, a bag-tursuk - a bag for water and a horse.
A wagon relied on 19 warriors. It was a light cavalry. Selected warriors had helmets, armor, swords, bows and two horses each. Kibitka relied on five people. It was a heavy cavalry.
The Mongol army had light infantry, which traveled on horseback during campaigns, and dismounted to fight in order to increase the accuracy of fire.
The infantryman had a sword, bow and up to 30 arrows. Light infantry was used for operations on rough terrain and during sieges. In addition, Tamerlane organized a special infantry for operations in the mountains, the mountain infantry.
The Mongols used all modern technology, which complicated the organization of troops and required clarity in management. The Mongol army also included pontoon specialists, Greek fire throwers, and siege engine technicians.
The army had a harmonious organization and a certain order of formation. Each warrior had to know his place in the top ten, ten in a hundred, and so on. The military units were able to move in the ranks and differed in the color of equipment, clothes and banners.
Some units differed in the colors of the horses. Genghis Khan's law on inspections before a campaign under Tamerlane was carried out with all rigor. When located in the camps, the troops carried out security service. The guard unit was advanced in front of the camp for 3-5 kilometers, posts were sent from it, and sentries from the posts.
A large and even field was chosen for the battle, while attention was paid to the fact that there was water and pasture nearby, so that the sun would not shine in the eyes.
The battle order was dispersed along the front and especially in depth. Due to the weakening of the center, the flanks were strengthened, which were a means of encircling the enemy. For a decisive blow, Tamerlane created strong reserves.
Light troops started the battle by throwing arrows and darts, and then attacks began, carried out in succession by lines of battle order.
When the enemy was weakened, a strong and fresh reserve was brought into action. “The ninth attack,” said Tamerlane, “gives victory.” An energetic pursuit ended the defeat of the enemy.
In the Mongolian army at the end of the XIV century, the organization, strategy and tactics of the cavalry mass found their most complete completion. This period did not yet know the use of firearms.
The army had some of the features of a regular army: a clear organization, formation and complex battle formations, good equipment for its time, rather monotonous weapons and equipment.
The difference between military units in the color of equipment and banners, or in the colors of horses was not only external, but was important for organizing and managing the battle.
Tamerlane also left a theoretical legacy - the rules of politics and warfare, which he passed on to his children in the form of a will.
In the XIV century, the Mongols again made a number of large conquest campaigns, but already mainly within Asia. In 1371, the Mongols under the command of Tamerlane defeated the Uzbeks.
In 1376, Tamerlane assisted one of the descendants of Genghis Khan, Tokhtamysh, who became the Kipchak Khan. In 1378, the Mongols again fought with Khorezm and subjugated it.
Then Afghanistan was conquered, the conquest of Persia and the Caucasus began. The Mongols advanced to the Derbent-Tbilisi-Erzerum line. The capital of Georgia, Tbilisi, was destroyed, and the Georgian king was taken prisoner.
The Mongols managed to take the Georgian fortress of Vardzia with great difficulty. Access to the fortress was possible only through the dungeon through a narrow entrance that led to the cave.
From this cave, it was possible to penetrate into the fortress only through the stairs going up through the round hatches. Through hatches and loopholes, the defenders of the fortress hit the enemy who had made his way into the cave with arrows, stones, pitch and spears.
The underground fortress of Vardzia was connected by underground passages with the fortresses of Tmovgi, Nakalakevi, Vanis, Kvabi. The Mongols managed to take the fortress with the help of wooden platforms, which they lowered on ropes from the neighboring mountains. Engineering preparation for the attack of the fortress is of considerable interest.
The Mongols under the command of Tamerlane dealt cruelly and ferociously with the defenders of the fortified cities. The inhabitants of one of the cities stubbornly defended themselves.
After the assault, Tamerlane ordered 4,000 people to be buried alive. When taking another city, he, according to legend, ordered his soldiers to deliver him 70 thousand heads of inhabitants and build a tower out of them.
The Mongols enslaved the peoples of the countries they conquered. They waged aggressive, predatory wars. From the conquered countries, Tamerlane brought to his capital Samarkand the best craftsmen - up to 150 thousand people.
He took care of the decoration of his capital, and by his order many city and country palaces were built. The palaces were decorated with paintings depicting the campaigns of the Mongols.
When Tamerlane fought in Persia, Tokhtamysh, who became the Khan of the Golden Horde, attacked his possessions. Tamerlane returned to Samarkand and began to carefully prepare for the war with Tokhtamysh. It was necessary to go through the steppes of 2500 kilometers.
In 1389, the army under the command of Tamerlane made a campaign in the region of Lake Balkhash, and in 1391 set out on a campaign against Tokhtamysh. The army of Tokhtamysh was defeated in the battle near Samara.
From 1392 to 1398, the Mongols made campaigns in Persia and the Caucasus. In 1395, they again defeated the horde of Tokhtamysh and by this objectively contributed to the liberation of the Russian principalities from the Tatar yoke.
In 1398-1399 the Mongols invaded India. The battle took place on the Ganges River. The Mongol cavalry fought with 48 Hindu ships that sailed along the river and were attacked by the Mongols by swimming.
From 1399, the Mongols began to prepare for the big war they were going to wage in the West. First of all, they intended to conquer Turkey.
Turkey at that time was torn apart by civil strife and uprisings of peasants, and the wars with the feudal lords of Western Europe greatly weakened it. Tamerlane decided to take advantage of this.
Under the authority of the Turkish sultan by this time was all of Asia Minor and the Balkans. The main mass of the Turkish army consisted of various tribes and peoples of this large state: Turks, mercenary Tatars, Serbs and many others. It was a large army, but its fighting efficiency has fallen sharply in recent years.
Tamerlane first began a friendly correspondence with Bayazet, and at that time he seized Georgia, Syria and Mesopotamia, securing his rear and flanks.
In 1402, Tamerlane, according to sources, had up to 800 thousand people under his banners. This figure is undoubtedly greatly exaggerated.
The first stage of the campaign was the invasion of the Mongol army into the territory of Turkey. In May 1402, the Mongols set out on a campaign. They captured Kemak Castle, moved towards Sivas and soon occupied it.
In Sivas, Tamerlane's ambassadors arrived for negotiations, in the presence of which he held a review of his troops, showing their brilliant weapons and organization. This review made a great impression on the ambassadors, and through them on the Turkish army of various tribes.
From Sizas, Tamerlane sent reconnaissance in the direction of Tokat in order to detect the enemy and take the crossings across the Kizil-Irmak River. The reconnaissance completed its task, discovering a concentrated Turkish army north of Ankara.
The second stage of the campaign is the maneuver of the Mongol army in order to create an advantageous situation for a decisive battle. In order to cut off the Turkish army from Egypt, Syria and Baghdad and lure it out of the mountainous and wooded area, the Mongols moved to Caesarea, and from there to Ankara.
From Kirsheir, Tamerlane sent a new reconnaissance detachment of 1,000 horses to clarify the location and nature of the actions of the Turkish army.
Then the Mongols laid siege to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, as a result of which the Turkish army was forced to go to the plain. Then the Mongols lifted the siege of Ankara and, after making a short march, camped and fortified themselves.
Tamerlane learned that the Turkish army had not received a salary for a long time and that there were many dissatisfied people in its ranks, especially Tatars. He sent scouts to the Tatars, offering to pay his due salary for the service of Bayazet, provided that they go over to his side.
The third stage of the campaign was the defeat of the Turkish army in the battle of Ankara. According to Eastern sources, the Mongol army numbered from 250 to 350 thousand soldiers and 32 war elephants, the Turkish army had 120-200 thousand people.
The data is certainly exaggerated, but these figures still show that the Mongols had an almost double superiority in forces. Bayazet built the battle formation of his troops with the rear to the mountains with retreat routes on the right flank.
The center of the battle formation was strong, and the flanks were weak. The Mongols, on the contrary, had strong flanks. In addition, they had a fairly strong reserve, consisting of 30 tumens of selected troops.
The battle was started by the light cavalry of the Mongols, and then the vanguard of their right wing unsuccessfully attacked the Serbs. After that, the entire right wing of the Mongols was put into battle, which engulfed the Serbs from the left flank and rear, but the Serbs continued to stubbornly resist.
The vanguard of the left wing of the Mongols was initially successful, as 18,000 Tatar mercenaries went over to the side of Tamerlane. The right flank of the Turkish army, commanded by Suleiman son of Bayazet, began to retreat.
At this moment, Tamerlane brought into battle part of the second line, trying to cut off the Serbs from the main forces of the Turks, but the Serbs managed to break through and connect with the Janissaries.
Tamerlane brought into battle a reserve, which began to surround the main forces of the Turks. The Serbs began to retreat to the west. The Mongols easily completed the encirclement of the Janissaries, killed them, and captured Bayazet.
To pursue the remnants of the Turkish troops commanded by Suleiman, Tamerlane allocated 30 thousand people, of which 4 thousand rode to Broussa on the fifth day. With a small detachment, Suleiman barely had time to board the ship and sail away from the coast.
Having defeated the army of Bayazet, the Mongols moved to Smyrna, after a two-week siege they took it and plundered it. Then the Mongols turned to Georgia, defeated it again and returned to Samarkand.
Here, the 70-year-old Mongol conqueror began to prepare for war with China, but in the midst of these preparations in 1405 he died. In the war with the Turks, the Mongols created an enveloping base that reliably provided their rear and isolated the Turkish army.
Tamerlane organized reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain, correctly assessed the situation, set a goal, drew up a plan of action, seized the initiative and interrupted enemy communications.
Taking advantage of discontent in the ranks of the Turkish army, he forced him to fight in extremely unfavorable conditions. The conquering Mongols waged wars with large masses of light cavalry.
They created a centralized armed organization with high military discipline, with a hierarchy of commanding officers who wielded disciplinary power and enjoyed great prestige.
The strength of the Mongol army, as well as the troops of other states similar in nature, consisted in their tribal and tribal ties, which gave them a great advantage over the enemy, whose internal contradictions divided and divided people - religious and tribal contradictions in Central Asia, feudal civil strife in Europe.
The political and military feudal fragmentation was opposed by the political and military centralization of the Mongolian state. The political and military weakness of the opponents, first of all, were the reasons for the major military successes of the Mongols.
Although the people resisted the conquering Mongols, the corrupt nobility usually colluded with them in order to preserve themselves and their wealth.
In this situation, deceit and treachery proved effective. So it was in Samarkand, where the masses staunchly defended their city. When in 1365 the inhabitants of Samarkand defeated the Mongols, Tamerlane, under the pretext of negotiations, lured their leader Abu-Vekir-Kelevi to him and killed him.
The Mongols, like the Arabs, widely used the achievements of science and technology, especially China. They borrowed from the Chinese not only their technology, in particular gunpowder, but also military science.
Finally, the great advantage of the Mongols in comparison with the enemy was the high mobility of their cavalry and the ability to maneuver it.
The policy of the Mongols-conquerors was aimed, first of all, at aggravating internal contradictions among their opponents, at dividing the people and the government, at disintegrating their troops and suppressing the enemy’s will to resist, at disorganizing his defense even before it was organized.
The Mongols used every means to disorganize their opponents. First of all, they organized espionage, flooding the country with their agents and involving in this network the corrupt nobility of this country. Spies provided exhaustive information about the economic, political and military state of the state. By their subversive actions, they tried to provoke internecine struggle in the country.
One of the important moments of espionage was the desire to sow distrust of the people and troops in the government. Spies spread rumors about the betrayal of individual officials and military leaders, and sometimes about the venality of the entire government as a whole and its inability to protect the people.
During campaigns in the state of the Suns, the Mongols spread rumors about the betrayal of the government of this state and at the same time bribed one prominent official, as a result of which the rumor turned out to be a fact.
They bribed the major military leaders of the enemy, who, on their instructions, disrupted the measures for the defense of the country. The Mongols widely spread defeatist sentiments and rumors about their invincibility among the enemy troops, sowed panic and talked about the futility of resistance.
As a rule, the Mongols practiced the method of intimidation, presented the enemy with an ultimatum, which recalled all the troubles experienced by other peoples who resisted.
The demands were usually small: destroy the defenses, pay tribute annually, give a few people to serve with the Mongols and let the Mongol army through the country.
When refusing to fulfill these requirements, the ambassadors declared: “Let it be, what will be, and what will be, we don’t know, only God knows.” But if the demands were accepted, then the Mongols did not comply with the agreement. In this case, they faced a completely unarmed country.
The aggravation of contradictions between the allies was a common policy of the Mongols-conquerors. The Kipchaks, about 40 thousand, not accepting the battle with the Mongols, retreated from the southern Russian steppes to Hungary.
The Mongols skillfully threw a letter to the Kipchaks, addressed to the Hungarian king and written in characters that only the Turks could understand. This caused enmity between the Turks and the Hungarians, which weakened the strength of the resistance of both.
Finally, as one of the measures, one should note the political camouflage of the attack, or the so-called peaceful offensive.
A striking example is the offensive of the Mongols under the command of Bayan against the state of the Suns, which had a large territory and a large population. Bayan decided to act in such a way as not to have the Chinese against him and to divide the people and the government.
The Mongols advanced into the territory of the Sun state very slowly under the guise of changing nomadic summer camps. By order of Bayan, inscriptions were hung out: “It is forbidden to take a life from a person,” which emphasized the peaceful nature of the nomadic Mongols.
Moreover, specially detached detachments provided extensive assistance to the local population: they distributed agricultural implements, seeds, food, and money.
When an epidemic broke out in one area, Bayan sent his doctors there. Mongol spies spread rumors about the Mongols keeping the peace and about the Sung government's desire to drag the Chinese into the war.
If it was necessary to conduct hostilities, then Bayan called the rulers of the Suns the culprits, buried their dead commanders with honor and prayed at their graves in front of everyone. Nine years later, China was at the mercy of the Mongols.
The strategy of the Mongols was a continuation of their insidious policy and was aimed at achieving political goals. First of all, the espionage data was supplemented and refined by deep strategic intelligence: the raid of the reconnaissance detachment in Khorezm, the raid of the Subedei detachment in Eastern Europe, and so on.
This reconnaissance revealed the most convenient approaches, a favorable time for an attack, tested the strength of the enemy’s resistance in battle, and had a moral effect on him. One of the main tasks of strategic intelligence was the exploration of pastures for horse masses.
On the basis of political and strategic intelligence data, a campaign plan was developed, which was discussed at the kurultai, where the objects of attack, the main strategic directions and military leaders were approved.
The Mongols paid great attention to the strategic camouflage of the attack. Often their troops moved in the form of peaceful nomadic caravans, their weapons were hidden in bales.
Sometimes weapons were in secret warehouses created along the path of movement of the Mongol detachments. It was difficult to determine the direction of the blow from the movement of these detachments. Captured Mongolian spies, even under torture, reported false information and thus further misinformed another victim of aggression.
Surprise was an important means of the Mongols' strategy. It was carried out by choosing the time of the attack and the direction of movement. The invasion of the territory of the Russian principalities took place in winter, when the Russian princes, for example, could not expect the movement of large cavalry masses in frost, in deep snow and in the absence of pasture.
The direction of movement of the detachments of the Mongolian army also unexpectedly changed. A small detachment under the command of Tolui passed through Tibet and invaded the country of the Kins - Central China from the south, from where the Mongols could not be expected.
Sending Tolui, Subedei said to him: “These are people who have grown up in cities, they are pampered; wear them down properly, and then it will be easy to deal with them.”
Tolui attracted the attention of the kin to the actions of his small detachment, who threw their main forces against him. He lured them into the mountains, exhausted them, and with a counterattack threw them back into the plains.
At this time, Subedei with the main forces of the Mongols invaded from the north. The defense of the country was completely disorganized. To achieve strategic surprise, the Mongols often resorted to treachery.
Thus, the detachment of Subedei tried to take the city of Nanjing by open assault. Within six days, the Chinese repelled all enemy attacks. Then the Mongols erected a rampart around the city and blockaded Nanjing, which soon ran out of food supplies and an epidemic broke out.
Subedei said that for a good ransom he would lift the blockade. The Chinese gave such a ransom, and the Mongols left. The inhabitants of the city considered themselves saved, but suddenly the Mongols appeared again.
The suddenness of their appearance paralyzed the resistance of the Chinese. The Subede detachment easily captured the city. Large cavalry masses quickly overcame vast spaces and appeared where they were not expected. By maneuver, they made up for the missing numbers, creating a false idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhis army among the opponents.
The most important content of the Mongols' strategy was the following: the disorganization of the enemy's defense by internal subversion and terror, evasion of the fight against large organized enemy forces, bypassing them and a deep blow to the country's vital centers, the destruction of the government and the high command of the enemy troops.
Strategic forms had their own characteristics and were diverse. The main ones were: infiltration, that is, movement past fortified points, strategic coverage, strategic wedge, conquest by regions, the Volga region, North-Eastern Russia, South-Western Russia, Central Europe, each of them has its own regions, the Ryazan principality, Vladimir and so on, reaching the flank of the enemy grouping or its defensive system as a whole, counteroffensive as a result of a deliberate retreat, strategic pursuit of the enemy until it is completely destroyed.
The strategic actions of the Mongols are characterized by the desire to evade pitched battles. The tactics of the Mongolian troops also had their own characteristics: well-organized military reconnaissance, tactical dismemberment of their troops, their skillful maneuvering and good control in battle.
The Mongols spent their entire lives in military service. They were excellent horse archers. In battle, they used throwing machines, smoke screens.
During the day, the Mongols used whistling arrows as signals in battle, and colored lanterns at night. Silent, stubborn and incredibly mobile, they all acted as if on one command.
The Mongols paid great attention to the selection of command personnel. The main requirement in the selection of a commander was the personal qualities of a warrior, his combat abilities, and not origin, nobility or length of service.
When Subedei was 25 years old, he already commanded a tumen and, according to legend, during his life he successfully fought 82 wars and won 65 battles. Genghis Khan said that he “made those who were knowledgeable and well done into army beks; those who were nimble and dexterous he made herdsmen; those who did not know, gave them a small whip, and sent them to shepherds.
“There is no commander braver than Yesutai,” said Genghis Khan. “No military commander has the same qualities as him. He does not get tired from long hikes. Never feels hungry or thirsty. But he thinks that his warriors also have the same qualities.
Therefore, he is not suitable for great military leaders. He must know the existence of hunger and thirst and understand the suffering of his subordinates, he must preserve the strength of people and animals.
The boss had to take care of his subordinates and be demanding. He had no right to needlessly risk the lives of his people. Batu reproached Subedei for being late in the battles near Buda to build a bridge: “You were the fault of the fact that I lost Bogadur and 23 warriors.”
The strictest discipline ensured the exact execution of the order. Before the campaign, a review was made, at which the weapons and equipment of each warrior were checked, up to a tursuk with water and a needle.
On a campaign, the rider of the rearguard was threatened with death if he was too lazy to pick up an object lost by the rider of the advanced units. For failure to help a comrade in battle, the perpetrator was also sentenced to death.
Military intelligence provided detailed information to the Mongolian command, on the basis of which the nature of the hostilities was determined.
If the knights of Western Europe were predominantly hand-to-hand combat, then among the Mongols, the most developed was the fight with throwing weapons. The Mongols were excellent archers. They could hit a flying bird with an arrow.
The battle order of the Mongols was divided along the front and in depth up to nine lines. The forces were distributed in such a way that the flanks were stronger than the center, this made it possible to surround the enemy. The components of the battle order maneuvered well. The battle was fed by reserves from the depths.
If the Mongols met stubborn resistance, they avoided further combat and left in another direction or returned for a new attack.
So it was on the Middle Volga, in campaigns against Novgorod and Western Europe. The properties of the Mongols' cavalry and the high mobility of the troops as a whole ensured a quick separation from the enemy and a painless retreat.
The Mongols were usually strong in battle with a weak opponent, they avoided a strong opponent. Therefore, the wars of the Mongols are often characterized as wars without battles, and battles without losses.
One of the reasons for the Mongols avoiding frontal battles was the small stature and relative weakness of their horses, which is very disadvantageous in hand-to-hand combat. When the Mongols encountered stubborn resistance, they destroyed the enemy with the help of throwing machines.

Ertugrul was the son of Suleiman Shah. And his mother is Khaima Khatan. When his father died (drowned in the Euphrates), Ertogrul assumed power over the Kayi tribes subordinate to him. The Seljuk sultan Kai-Kubad I granted him an inheritance near Ankara.

During the reign of Ertogrul, the gradual strengthening of kaya begins.

After the death of Ertogrul, power passed to his son, Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, and the first monarch of the Ottoman state.

Ertogrul Gazi (1188-1281) - one of the founders of the Ottoman Empire. The monument is located in Ashgabat.

According to Turkish historical tradition, part of the Kay tribe migrated to Anatolia from Central Asia, where the leaders of the Kay were in the service of the rulers of Khorezm for some time. Initially, the Kay Turks chose the lands in the Karajadag region to the west of present-day Ankara as a nomadic place. Then part of them moved to the regions of Ahlat, Erzurum and Erzinjan, reaching Amasya and Aleppo (Haleb). Some nomads of the Kayi tribe have found shelter on the fertile lands in the Chukurov region. It was from these places that a small unit of kaya (400-500 tents), led by Ertogrul, fleeing from the Mongols' raids, went to the possessions of the Seljuk Sultan Alaeddin Keykubad I. Ertogrul turned to him for patronage. The sultan granted Ertogrul uj (outlying area of ​​the sultanate) on the lands seized by the Seljuks from the Byzantines on the border with Bithynia. Ertogrul took upon himself the obligation to protect the border of the Seljuk state on the territory of the udj granted to him.

But history says that the kai were Turkified Mongols. Kai is the name of one of the twenty-four tribes of the Oghuz, from which the dynasty of the Ottoman sultans originates. Mahmud of Kashgar gives an ancient form - kayig, which refutes the identification proposed by Markvart with kays mentioned by Biruni and Aufi in the most extreme East. Markvart considers the kai to be Turkified Mongols, which explains, in his opinion, "the historical role played by the blood-stained and fratricidal clan of the Ottomans and the Ottoman people." It is possible that the Kai were Mongols; Mahmud of Kashgar mentions them, along with the Tatars and others, among the peoples who spoke their own special languages, although they also knew well the Turkic language; however, the Oguz tribe Kayig, or Kayi, undoubtedly has nothing to do with this people.

Information about the life of Ertogrul's son, Osman, who gave the name to the future state, is also largely legendary. Osman was born around 1258 in Sögut. This mountainous sparsely populated region was convenient for nomads: there were many good summer pastures, and there were enough comfortable winter nomads.

Osman declared his uj an independent state, and himself an independent ruler. It happened around 1299, when the Seljuk sultan Alaeddin Keykubad II fled from his capital, fleeing from rebellious subjects. True, having become practically independent from the Seljuk Sultanate, which nominally existed until 1307, when the last representative of the Seljuk dynasty of Rum was strangled by order of the Mongols, Osman recognized the supreme power of the Mongol Hulaguid dynasty and annually sent to their capital part of the tribute that he collected from his subjects.

The collapse of the Mongolian state. Like other barbarian states created by conquest, the Mongol state proved to be short-lived. After the death of Genghis Khan, it was divided into four khanates: Eastern (China, Manchuria, part of India and Mongolia); Jagatai (upper reaches of the Irtysh and Ob and all of Central Asia); Golden Horde (northern part of Turkestan, southern Russia to the Lower Danube); Persian Khanate (Persia, Afghanistan and others).

Civil strife weakened the Mongolian state. Taking advantage of this, China in 1367 was the first to overthrow the Mongol yoke.

The Golden Horde was also weakened by civil strife, which contributed to the liberation of the Russian people from the Mongol-Tatar yoke. On the Kulikovo field in 1380, the first major blow was dealt to the Tatars, which marked the beginning of the liberation of the Russian people.

The Mongolian state was more and more fragmented and disintegrated. The process of disintegration proceeded very quickly, which was a consequence of the development of feudal relations, which developed in Asia in the same way as in Europe, but in a shorter time.

Genghis Khan, as a reward for faithful service, gave his companion the possession of any ulus - a tribe or an association of tribes. Having crushed the city of Kerent, according to ancient sources, Genghis Khan distributed it to his associates: one of them received a hundred houses, the other - people who “managed the vessels” (artisans), etc.

Then Genghis Khan began to distribute uluses (destinies) to his sons and relatives, who became the rulers of the uluses. Each of them had certain duties, the most important of which was military service. The new ruler of the ulus was obliged to appear at the first request with a certain number of soldiers. The size of the ulus was determined by the number of wagons and the number of soldiers that he could field. Each new vassal took a kind of oath of allegiance to the khan.

In order to bind the commanding staff (temniks, thousandths, centurions) more tightly to himself, Genghis Khan gave to the fief hereditary possession of “hundred”, “thousand”, “darkness” of one of the uluses, which was owned by one of his sons - the prince of blood (tsarevich). Such temniks, thousandths and centurions began to be called "noyans" (noyan - master). The noyans were vassals of the princes. It turned out a feudal ladder: khan (prince of blood) - the owner of the ulus, followed by a temnik, a thousand, a centurion. Each of the noyans received a label (letter) for the right to govern.

The Mongol khan and the princes of the blood completely disposed of the noyan's personality and could deprive him of possession, but the noyan himself had no right to leave the service or change his overlord. It was already a feudal relationship.

Ultimately, all free Mongols became the property of the noyan or prince of the blood. Noyan owned not only people, but also received a certain territory for nomadism and hunting. The Noyans, however, were not full owners of the herds of cattle, which were at the disposal of their people. The Mongol nomad had his own personal property - livestock and nomadic economy. With regard to nomadic life, the Mongol had to fulfill the orders of his noyan, as well as carry out certain duties (provide small cattle for slaughter to the noyan, send dairy mares to him for a certain period, etc.). The free Mongol nomad cattle breeder turned out to be enslaved. At the same time, vassal relations developed. This is how feudalism arose among the Mongols.

The measures of Genghis Khan and his successors discussed above were subjectively aimed at strengthening the khan's power. Objectively, as in Europe, completely opposite results were obtained. Each noyan strove to become independent, to get rid of vassalage. “Why should we take a master over us? one of them asked. We can take care of our own heads. Let's kill this crown prince-tsarevich now. As a result of this struggle, the noyans began to turn into independent, independent khans, and the Mongolian state of nomadic pastoralists disintegrated.

The feudal khans waged continuous wars among themselves, greatly weakening the Mongols. Some khans managed to overcome this internecine strife, and they temporarily restored the power of the Mongol state, but on a much smaller scale. One of these khans was the Mongol commander Tamerlane (1333–1405).

Tamerlane was born in the city of Kesh, southwest of Bukhara. His father had a small ulus. Since childhood, Tamerlane had great physical strength. He was engaged in military exercises and from the age of 12 began to go on campaigns with his father. Tamerlane went through the harsh school of war and was an experienced warrior, as well as a zealous Mohammedan, which played some role in his struggle with the Uzbeks.

In 1359, a descendant of Genghis Khan - Khan Togluk, relying on the middle feudal lords, captured Central Asia. Part of the prominent nobles from the descendants of Genghis Khan took refuge in Afghanistan, the other part voluntarily submitted to Togluk. Among them was Tamerlane. With the help of gifts and bribes, Tamerlane saved his lands and the lands of his allies from robbery. He won the sympathy of Togluk and received command over the Tumyn.

When Tamerlane began to fight the Uzbeks, Togluk ordered him to be killed. This order fell into the hands of Tamerlane himself, who, with 60 soldiers, fled across the river. Amu, to the Badakhshan mountains, where several dozen more people joined him.

A detachment of about one thousand people was sent against Tamerlane. As a result of a stubborn battle, 50 people remained from this detachment, who retreated without completing their task.

Tamerlane began to vigorously prepare for a war with the Uzbeks. Among the Turkmens, he incited hatred for the Uzbeks. In 1369, a popular uprising broke out in Samarkand. Tamerlane brutally cracked down on the rebels, captured Samarkand and started a war with the Uzbeks, who were led by the son of Togluk. The army of Uzbeks, according to exaggerated reports of sources, had up to 100 thousand people, of which up to 80 thousand were in the fortresses. The detachment of Tamerlane consisted of only about 2 thousand soldiers. Togluk dispersed the forces of the Uzbeks. Tamerlane took advantage of this and inflicted a number of defeats on them. By 1370, the remnants of the Uzbek field troops retreated beyond the river. Cheese. Tamerlane, on behalf of his son Togluk, sent orders to the commanders of the fortresses to leave the fortresses and retreat beyond the river. Cheese. With the help of this trick, almost all the fortresses of the Uzbeks were cleared.

Tamerlane pretended to be the liberator of the Uzbeks. In fact, he was their enslaver. In 1370, a kurultai was convened, at which the rich and noble Mongols elected a descendant of Genghis Khan, Kobul Shah Aglan, as khan. Soon Tamerlane removed this khan and declared himself the khan-ruler, and made Samarkand his capital. A number of weak neighboring states were then conquered. In these wars, the army, manned by the Mongols, grew, tempered and strengthened. In military construction, Tamerlane was guided by the combat experience of the Mongols and the rules of Genghis Khan.

Of the 313 people who advanced during the struggle for dominance in Turkestan, Tamerlane singled out 100 people to command dozens, 100 - hundreds and 100 - thousands. The remaining 13 received senior positions. Tamerlane paid great attention to the selection of chiefs. “The chief,” he said, “whose power is weaker than a whip and a stick, is unworthy of the title.” Foremen were chosen by ten, centurions, thousandth and higher standing chiefs were appointed.

In the Mongol army, a certain salary was now paid. A warrior received from 2 to 4 horse prices (the size of the salary was determined by the serviceability of his service); foreman - the salary of his ten (therefore, he was interested in his soldiers receiving the highest rate); centurion - the salary of six foremen, etc. One of the disciplinary sanctions was the deduction of one tenth of the salary. Encouragement measures were widely practiced: praise, salary increase, gifts, ranks, titles (brave, hero and others), banners for units.

Simple equestrian warriors had to be armed with a bow, 18–20 arrows, 10 arrowheads, an ax, a saw, an awl, a needle, a lasso, a tursuk bag (water bag) and a horse. A wagon relied on 19 warriors. It was a light cavalry. Selected warriors had helmets, armor, swords, bows and two horses each. Kibitka relied on five people. It was a heavy cavalry.

The Mongol army had light infantry, which traveled on horseback during campaigns, and dismounted to fight in order to increase the accuracy of fire. The infantryman had a sword, bow and up to 30 arrows. Light infantry was used for operations on rough terrain and during sieges. In addition, Tamerlane organized special infantry for operations in the mountains (mountain infantry).

The Mongols used all modern technology, which complicated the organization of troops and required clarity in management. The Mongol army also included pontoon specialists, Greek fire throwers, and siege machine technicians.

The army had a harmonious organization and a certain order of formation. Each soldier had to know his place in the top ten, ten - in a hundred, etc. The military units were able to move in formation and differed in the color of equipment, clothes and banners.

Some units differed in the colors of the horses. The law of Genghis Khan on inspections before a campaign under Tamerlane was carried out with all rigor.

When located in the camps, the troops carried out security service. The guard unit was advanced in front of the camp for 3–5 km, posts were sent from it, and sentries were sent from the posts.

A large and even field was chosen for the battle, while attention was paid to the fact that there was water and pasture nearby, so that the sun would not shine in the eyes. The battle order was dispersed along the front and especially in depth. Due to the weakening of the center, the flanks were strengthened, which were a means of encircling the enemy. For a decisive blow, Tamerlane created strong reserves.

Light troops started the battle by throwing arrows and darts, and then attacks began, carried out in succession by lines of battle order. When the enemy was weakened, a strong and fresh reserve was brought into action. “The ninth attack,” said Tamerlane, “gives victory.” An energetic pursuit ended the defeat of the enemy. In the Mongolian army at the end of the XIV century. the organization, strategy and tactics of the cavalry masses found their most complete completion. This period did not yet know the use of firearms. The army had some of the features of a regular army: a clear organization, formation and complex battle formations, good equipment for its time, rather monotonous weapons and equipment. The difference between military units in the color of equipment and banners or in the colors of horses was not only of external significance, but was important for organizing and managing the battle.

Tamerlane also left a theoretical legacy - the rules of politics and warfare, which he passed on to his children in the form of a will.

Military art in the wars of the Mongols in the XIV century. In the XIV century. the Mongols again made a number of large conquest campaigns, but already mainly within Asia. In 1371, the Mongols under the command of Tamerlane defeated the Uzbeks. In 1376, Tamerlane assisted one of the descendants of Genghis Khan, Tokhtamysh, who became the Kipchak Khan.

In 1378 the Mongols again fought against Khorezm and subjugated it. Then Afghanistan was conquered and the conquest of Persia and the Caucasus began. The Mongols advanced to the Derbent-Tbilisi-Erzerum line; Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, was destroyed, and the Georgian king was taken prisoner.

The Mongols managed to take the Georgian fortress of Vardzia with great difficulty. Access to the fortress was possible only through the dungeon through a narrow entrance that led to the cave. From this cave, it was possible to penetrate into the fortress only through the stairs going up through the round hatches. Through hatches and loopholes, the defenders of the fortress hit the enemy who had made his way into the cave with arrows, stones, pitch and spears. The underground fortress of Vardzia was connected by underground passages with the fortresses of Tmovgi, Nakalakevi, Vanis, Kvabi.

The Mongols managed to take the fortress with the help of wooden platforms, which they lowered on ropes from the neighboring mountains. Engineering preparation for the attack of the fortress is of considerable interest.

The Mongols under the command of Tamerlane dealt cruelly and ferociously with the defenders of the fortified cities. The inhabitants of one of the cities stubbornly defended themselves. After the assault, Tamerlane ordered 4,000 people to be buried alive. When taking another city, he, according to legend, ordered his soldiers to deliver him 70 thousand heads of inhabitants and build a tower out of them.

The Mongols enslaved the peoples of the countries they conquered. They waged aggressive, predatory wars. From the conquered countries, Tamerlane brought the best craftsmen (up to 150 thousand people) to his capital Samarkand. He took care of the decoration of the capital, and by his order many city and country palaces were built. The palaces were decorated with paintings depicting the campaigns of the Mongols.

When Tamerlane fought in Persia, Tokhtamysh, who became the Khan of the Golden Horde, attacked his possessions. Tamerlane returned to Samarkand and began to carefully prepare for the war with Tokhtamysh. It was necessary to go through the steppes of 2500 km.

In 1389, the army under the command of Tamerlane made a campaign in the region of Lake Balkhash, and in 1391 set out on a campaign against Tokhtamysh. The army of Tokhtamysh was defeated in the battle near Samara.

From 1392 to 1398, the Mongols made campaigns in Persia and the Caucasus. In 1395, they again defeated the Horde of Tokhtamysh and by this objectively contributed to the liberation of the Russian principalities from the Tatar yoke.

In 1398-1399 The Mongols invaded India. The battle took place on the Ganges. The Mongol cavalry fought with 48 Hindu ships that sailed along the river and were attacked by the Mongols by swimming.

From 1399, the Mongols began to prepare for the big war they were going to wage in the West. First of all, they intended to conquer Turkey.

Turkey at that time was torn apart by civil strife and uprisings of peasants, and the wars with the feudal lords of Western Europe greatly weakened it. Tamerlane decided to take advantage of this.

Under the authority of the Turkish sultan by this time was all of Asia Minor and the Balkans. The main mass of the Turkish army consisted of various tribes and peoples of this large state (Turks, mercenary Tatars, Serbs and many others). It was a large army, but its fighting efficiency has fallen sharply in recent years.

Tamerlane first began a friendly correspondence with Bayazet, and at that time he seized Georgia, Syria and Mesopotamia, securing his rear and flanks. In 1402, Tamerlane, according to sources, had up to 800 thousand people under his banners. This figure is undoubtedly greatly exaggerated.

First leg of the trip- The invasion of the Mongol army into the territory of Turkey.

In May 1402, the Mongols set out on a campaign. They captured Kemak Castle, moved towards Sivas and soon occupied it. In Sivas, Tamerlane's ambassadors arrived for negotiations, in the presence of which he held a review of his troops, showing their brilliant weapons and organization. This review made a great impression on the ambassadors, and through them on the Turkish army of various tribes.

From Sizas, Tamerlane sent reconnaissance in the direction of Tokat in order to detect the enemy and take the crossings across the river. Kizil-Irmak. The reconnaissance completed its task, discovering a concentrated Turkish army north of Ankara.

Second leg of the trip- a maneuver of the Mongolian army in order to create an advantageous situation for a decisive battle.

In order to cut off the Turkish army from Egypt, Syria and Baghdad and lure it out of the mountainous and wooded area, the Mongols moved to Caesarea, and from there to Ankara.

From Kirsheir, Tamerlane sent a new reconnaissance detachment (1 thousand horses) to clarify the location and nature of the actions of the Turkish army. Then the Mongols laid siege to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, as a result of which the Turkish army was forced to go to the plain. Then the Mongols lifted the siege of Ankara and, after making a short march, camped and fortified themselves.

Tamerlane learned that the Turkish army had not received a salary for a long time and that there were many dissatisfied people in its ranks, especially Tatars. He sent scouts to the Tatars, offering to pay his due salary for the service of Bayazet, provided that they go over to his side.

Third leg of the trip- the defeat of the Turkish army in the battle of Ankara.

According to Eastern sources, the Mongol army numbered from 250 to 350 thousand soldiers and 32 war elephants, the Turkish army - 120-200 thousand people. The data is certainly exaggerated, but these figures still show that the Mongols had an almost double superiority in forces.

Bayazet built the battle formation of his troops with the rear to the mountains with retreat routes on the right flank. The center of the battle formation was strong, and the flanks were weak. The Mongols, on the contrary, had strong flanks. In addition, they had a fairly strong reserve, consisting of 30 selected troops.

The first stage of the battle- battle on the flanks of battle formations.

The battle was started by the light cavalry of the Mongols, and then the vanguard of their right wing unsuccessfully attacked the Serbs. After that, the entire right wing of the Mongols was put into battle, which engulfed the Serbs from the left flank and rear, but the Serbs continued to stubbornly resist. The vanguard of the left wing of the Mongols was initially successful, as 18,000 Tatar mercenaries went over to the side of Tamerlane. The right flank of the Turkish army, commanded by Suleiman, the son of Bayazet, began to retreat. At this moment, Tamerlane brought into battle part of the second line, trying to cut off the Serbs from the main forces of the Turks, but the Serbs managed to break through and connect with the Janissaries.

Second phase- the Mongols surrounded the main forces of the Turkish army.

Tamerlane brought into battle a reserve, which began to surround the main forces of the Turks. The Serbs began to retreat to the west. The Mongols easily completed the encirclement of the Janissaries, killed them, and captured Bayazet.

Third stage- persecution of the remnants of Turkish troops.

To pursue the remnants of the Turkish troops commanded by Suleiman, Tamerlane allocated 30 thousand people, of which 4 thousand rode to Broussa on the fifth day. With a small detachment, Suleiman barely had time to board the ship and sail away from the coast.

Having defeated the army of Bayazet, the Mongols moved to Smyrna, after a two-week siege they took it and plundered it. Then the Mongols turned to Georgia, defeated it again and returned to Samarkand. Here the 70-year-old Mongol conqueror began to prepare for war with China, but in the midst of these preparations in 1405 he died.

In the war with the Turks, the Mongols created an enveloping base that reliably provided their rear and isolated the Turkish army. Tamerlane organized reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain, correctly assessed the situation, set a goal, drew up a plan of action, seized the initiative and interrupted enemy communications. Taking advantage of discontent in the ranks of the Turkish army, he forced him to fight in extremely unfavorable conditions.

The conquering Mongols waged wars with large masses of light cavalry. They created a centralized armed organization with high military discipline, with a hierarchy of commanding officers who wielded disciplinary power and enjoyed great prestige.

The strength of the Mongol army, as well as the troops of other states similar in nature, consisted in their tribal and tribal ties, which gave them a great advantage over the enemy, in which internal contradictions divided and divided people (religious and tribal contradictions in Central Asia, feudal civil strife in Europe). The political and military feudal fragmentation was opposed by the political and military centralization of the Mongolian state. The political and military weakness of the opponents were primarily the reasons for the major military successes of the Mongols. Although the people resisted the conquering Mongols, the corrupt nobility usually colluded with them in order to preserve themselves and their wealth. In this situation, deceit and treachery proved effective. So it was in Samarkand, where the masses staunchly defended their city. When in 1365 the inhabitants of Samarkand defeated the Mongols, Tamerlane, under the pretext of negotiations, lured their leader Abu-Vekir-Kelevi to him and killed him.

The Mongols, like the Arabs, widely used the achievements of science and technology, especially China. They borrowed from the Chinese not only their technology, in particular gunpowder, but also military science.

Finally, the great advantage of the Mongols in comparison with the enemy was the high mobility of their cavalry and the ability to maneuver it.

The policy of the Mongols-conquerors was aimed primarily at aggravating internal contradictions among their opponents, at dividing the people and the government, at disintegrating their troops and suppressing the enemy’s will to resist, at disorganizing his defense even before it was organized.

The Mongols used every means to disorganize their opponents. First of all, they organized espionage, flooding the country with their agents and drawing into this network the corrupt nobility of this country. Spies provided exhaustive information about the economic, political and military state of the state. By their subversive actions, they tried to provoke internecine struggle in the country.

One of the important moments of espionage was the desire to sow distrust of the people and troops in the government. Spies spread rumors about the betrayal of individual officials and military leaders, and sometimes about the venality of the entire government as a whole and its inability to protect the people. During campaigns in the state of the Suns, the Mongols spread rumors about the betrayal of the government of this state and at the same time bribed one prominent official, as a result of which the rumor turned out to be a fact. They bribed the major military leaders of the enemy, who, on their instructions, disrupted the measures for the defense of the country.

The Mongols widely spread defeatist sentiments and rumors about their invincibility among the enemy troops, sowed panic and talked about the futility of resistance.

As a rule, the Mongols practiced the method of intimidation - they presented the enemy with an ultimatum, in which they recalled all the troubles experienced by other peoples who resisted. The demands were usually small: destroy the defenses, pay tribute annually, give a few people to serve with the Mongols and let the Mongol army through the country. When refusing to fulfill these requirements, the ambassadors declared: “Let it be, what will be, and what will be, we don’t know, only God knows.” But if the demands were accepted, then the Mongols did not comply with the agreement. In this case, they faced a completely unarmed country.

The aggravation of contradictions between the allies was a common policy of the Mongols-conquerors. The Kipchaks (about 40 thousand), not accepting the battle with the Mongols, retreated from the southern Russian steppes to Hungary. The Mongols skillfully threw a letter to the Kipchaks, addressed to the Hungarian king and written in characters that only the Turks could understand. This caused enmity between the Turks and the Hungarians, which weakened the strength of the resistance of both.

Finally, as one of the measures, one should note the political camouflage of the attack, or the so-called "peace offensive". A striking example is the offensive of the Mongols under the command of Bayan against the state of the Suns, which had a large territory and a large population. Bayan decided to act in such a way as not to have the Chinese against him and to divide the people and the government.

The Mongols advanced into the territory of the Sun state very slowly under the guise of changing nomadic summer camps. By order of Bayan, inscriptions were hung out: “It is forbidden to take a life from a person,” which emphasized the peaceful nature of the nomadic Mongols. Moreover, specially detached detachments provided extensive assistance to the local population: they distributed agricultural implements, seeds, food, and money. When an epidemic broke out in one area, Bayan sent his doctors there. Mongol spies spread rumors about the Mongols keeping the peace and about the Sung government's desire to drag the Chinese into the war. If it was necessary to conduct hostilities, then Bayan called the rulers of the Suns the culprits, buried their dead commanders with honor and prayed at their graves in front of everyone. Nine years later, China was at the mercy of the Mongols.

The strategy of the Mongols was a continuation of their insidious policy and was aimed at achieving political goals. First of all, the espionage data was supplemented and refined by deep strategic reconnaissance: the reconnaissance detachment's raid on Khorezm, the Subede detachment's raid on Eastern Europe, etc. This reconnaissance revealed the most convenient approaches, the favorable time for an attack, tested the strength of the enemy's resistance in battle, and morally influenced him. One of the main tasks of strategic intelligence was the exploration of pastures for horse masses.

On the basis of political and strategic intelligence data, a campaign plan was developed, which was discussed at the kurultai, where the objects of attack, the main strategic directions and military leaders were approved.

The Mongols paid great attention to the strategic camouflage of the attack. Often their troops moved in the form of peaceful nomadic caravans; their weapons were hidden in bales. Sometimes weapons were in secret warehouses created along the path of movement of the Mongol detachments. It was difficult to determine the direction of the blow from the movement of these detachments. Captured Mongolian spies, even under torture, reported false information and thus further misinformed another victim of aggression.

Surprise was an important means of the Mongols' strategy. It was carried out by choosing the time of the attack and the direction of movement. The invasion of the territory of the Russian principalities took place in winter, when the Russian princes, for example, could not expect the movement of large cavalry masses in frost, in deep snow and in the absence of pasture. The direction of movement of the detachments of the Mongolian army also unexpectedly changed.

A small detachment under the command of Tului passed through Tibet and invaded the country of the Kins (Central China) from the south, from where the Mongols could not be expected. Sending Tului, Subede told him: “These are people who grew up in cities, they are pampered; wear them down properly, and then it will be easy to deal with them. To the actions of his small detachment Tulu riveted the attention of the kin, who threw their main forces against him. He lured them into the mountains, exhausted them, and with a counterattack threw them back into the plains. At this time, Subede, with the main forces of the Mongols, invaded from the north. The defense of the country was completely disorganized.

To achieve strategic surprise, the Mongols often resorted to treachery. So, the Subede detachment tried to take the city of Nanjing by open assault. Within six days, the Chinese repelled all enemy attacks. Then the Mongols erected a rampart around the city and blockaded Nanjing, which soon ran out of food supplies and an epidemic broke out. Subede said that for a good ransom he would lift the blockade. The Chinese gave such a ransom, and the Mongols left. The inhabitants of the city considered themselves saved, but suddenly the Mongols appeared again. The suddenness of their appearance paralyzed the resistance of the Chinese. The Subede detachment easily captured the city.

Large cavalry masses quickly overcame vast spaces and appeared where they were not expected. By maneuver, they made up for the missing numbers, creating a false idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhis army among the opponents.

The most important content The strategy of the Mongols was as follows: disorganization of the enemy's defense by internal subversion and terror; evasion of the fight against large organized enemy forces, bypassing them and a deep blow to the vital centers of the country; destruction of the government and the high command of the enemy troops.

Strategic forms had their own characteristics and were diverse. The main ones were: infiltration, i.e., movement past fortified points; strategic coverage; strategic wedge; conquest by regions (Volga region, North-Eastern Russia, South-Western Russia, Central Europe; each of them has its own regions - the Ryazan principality, Vladimir, etc.); access to the flank of the enemy grouping or its defensive system as a whole; a counteroffensive resulting from a deliberate retreat; strategic pursuit of the enemy until its complete destruction.

The strategic actions of the Mongols are characterized by the desire to evade pitched battles.

The tactics of the Mongolian troops also had their own characteristics: well-organized military reconnaissance, tactical dismemberment of their troops, their skillful maneuvering and good control in battle.

The Mongols spent their entire lives in military service. They were excellent horse archers. In battle, they used throwing machines, smoke screens. During the day, the Mongols used whistling arrows as signals in battle, and colored lanterns at night. “Silent, stubborn and mobile to the point of improbability, they act as if on command,” wrote one of their contemporaries about them.

The Mongols paid great attention to the selection of command personnel. The main requirement in the selection of a commander was the personal qualities of a warrior, his combat abilities, and not origin, nobility or length of service. When Subede was 25 years old, he already commanded Tumyn and, according to legend, during his life he successfully fought 82 wars and won 65 battles. Genghis Khan said that he “made those who were knowledgeable and well done into army beks; those who were agile and dexterous ... made herdsmen; those who were ignorant, gave them a small whip, and sent them to be shepherds” (145).

“There is no commander braver than Yesutai,” said Genghis Khan. “No military commander has the same qualities as him. He does not get tired from long hikes. Never feels hungry or thirsty. But he thinks that his warriors also have the same qualities. Therefore, he is not suitable for great military leaders. He must know the existence of hunger and thirst and understand the suffering of his subordinates, he must preserve the strength of people and animals” (146). The boss had to take care of his subordinates and be demanding. He had no right to needlessly risk the lives of his people. Batu reproached Subede for being late in the battles near Buda to build a bridge: "You were the fault of the fact that I lost Bogadur and 23 warriors."

The strictest discipline ensured the exact execution of the order. Before the campaign, a review was made, at which the weapons and equipment of each warrior were checked, right down to the tursuk and the needle. On a campaign, the rider of the rearguard was threatened with death if he was too lazy to pick up an object lost by the rider of the advanced units. For failure to help a comrade in battle, the perpetrator was also sentenced to death.

Military intelligence provided detailed information to the Mongolian command, on the basis of which the nature of the hostilities was determined.

If the knights of Western Europe were predominantly hand-to-hand combat, then among the Mongols, the most developed was the fight with throwing weapons. The Mongols were excellent archers. They could hit a flying bird with an arrow.

The battle order of the Mongols was divided along the front and in depth up to nine lines. The forces were distributed in such a way that the flanks were stronger than the center, this made it possible to surround the enemy. The components of the battle order maneuvered well. The battle was fed by reserves from the depths.

If the Mongols met stubborn resistance, they avoided further combat and left in another direction or returned for a new attack. So it was on the Middle Volga, in campaigns against Novgorod and Western Europe. The properties of the Mongols' cavalry and the high mobility of the troops as a whole ensured a quick separation from the enemy and a painless retreat. The Mongols were usually strong in battle with a weak opponent, they avoided a strong opponent. Therefore, the wars of the Mongols are often characterized as wars without battles, and battles - without losses. One of the reasons for the Mongols avoiding frontal battles was the small stature and relative weakness of their horses, which is very disadvantageous in hand-to-hand combat. When the Mongols encountered stubborn resistance, they destroyed the enemy with the help of throwing machines.

Some Russian military historians overestimated the importance of the military art of the Mongols, believing that it had a decisive influence on the development of Russian military art. This opinion is not supported by the process of historical development of the armed organization of the Russian state and the methods of warfare and combat used by the Russian army in the 14th-16th centuries. The composition and organization of the Russian army was determined by the historical features of its development, as well as the social and political structure of Russia. The Russian army had its original structure and the same forms of organization.

The strategy and tactics of the Russian army, including its battle formations, had their own national features, determined by the process of the historical development of Russian military art.

The study of the structure of the armed organization of the Mongols, the features of their military policy and the methods of waging war and combat with mass light cavalry, of course, is of scientific interest. Without a section on the military art of the Mongols, the history of military art will not be complete.

The chronological framework of the first stage of the feudal or guild period of the war covers approximately eight centuries, during which a new progressive stage of human society arose, took shape and developed - the feudal mode of production. In these eight centuries, a new alignment of forces in Europe, Asia and North Africa was also determined. New peoples appeared, beginning to play a leading role in history. These were the tribes and peoples of Eastern and Western Europe. The link with the ancient peoples of southern Europe, Asia and northeastern Africa was the Byzantine Empire, which existed for about a thousand years. All this left its mark on the peculiarities of the development of the military art of the first stage of the feudal period of the war.

In the history of the development of military art, Russian military art occupied an important place. It was the military art of the ancient Slavic tribes and the ancient Russian state, which developed in the struggle against Byzantium, the Varangians, Khazars and Pechenegs; it was the military art of the armed organization of the Russian principalities, which developed in the fight against the Polovtsy, the Tatar-Mongols and the aggression of the German-Swedish feudal lords. The military art of the Arabs, Franks, Turks and Mongols also deserves attention, since these peoples created a massive light cavalry as the main branch of the army and laid the foundation for the formation of infantry detachments, which were the beginnings of a permanent army. Byzantium preserved the military heritage of the ancient world and replenished it with what it borrowed from its neighbors - the Slavs and Arabs.

In the feudal wars of Western Europe, there were no major strategic goals, and therefore there was no basis for the development of strategic forms. Byzantium fought on two fronts: with the Slavs and the Arabs. In this struggle, she relied on the powerful fortifications of her capital, on a strong fleet and on economic power, which allowed her to pay off any enemy.

The Slavic tribes fought with Byzantium, the Varangians and the nomadic peoples of the Black Sea and Caspian steppes, that is, they simultaneously solved three major strategic tasks. The Russian army under the command of Svyatoslav consistently solved these problems. A feature of the strategy of the armed forces of the Slavs was offensive operations and the capture of a strategic initiative. The Russian northwestern lands had to fight against the strong German-Swedish feudal lords, having the Tatar-Mongols in the rear. Alexander Nevsky skillfully combined the policy of agreement with the Tatar-Mongols, while at the same time ensuring the strategic security of the northwestern borders of Russia by victories over the Swedish and German feudal lords-knights. It was the solution of strategic tasks in the defensive wars of Russia.

The Tatar-Mongols pursued the goal of enslaving the peoples of Asia and Europe. They consistently concentrated the entire mass of light cavalry against states weakened by internal political intertribal and religious struggle, intensifying the process of their decomposition with their insidious policy. As a result, China, the peoples of Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Asia Minor were enslaved. The strategy of the Mongol army is characterized by evasion of the fight against a strong enemy and the desire to fight at the expense of the enslaved peoples.

To identify the features of the strategy of the Mongols-conquerors, it is necessary to take into account that their army did not need communication in our understanding of the word. If the Arabs had food bases in their oases, then the Mongol army was supplied by nomadic herds of cattle. The warriors themselves made their own arrows, spears and items of equipment. Women and children provided rest and food for the soldiers. There was an exact distribution of responsibilities for the installation and removal of wagons, and the strictest order was maintained in the wagon - each family member and each item had a strictly defined place. Women and children in a combat situation often portrayed the actions of the reserves, and also defended their property and rear.

The "communications" of the Mongol army did not go from the rear to the front, but from the area of ​​​​the attack of the Mongols to their deep rear, where the looted wealth and slaves were sent.

The tactics of the ancient Slavs are characterized by the art of maneuver. Infantry and cavalry interacted on the battlefield. During the period of feudal fragmentation, a new moment in tactics was the division of the battle order of the Russian rati along the front and in depth. At the same time, each component of the battle order had a tactical purpose: the “brow” made up the main forces, the right and left wings were the wings of the battle formation, the guard regiment started the battle. The wings were formed from the best troops, were stronger than the center, as a result of which, during the battle, the enemy's flanks were covered and surrounded. New in the tactics of encirclement combat was the pursuit of enemy remnants that had escaped from the encirclement. The pursuit ended with the defeat of the enemy.

A characteristic feature of the tactics of the Arab cavalry was the successive attacks of the enemy, which was based on the multi-line construction of the Arab battle order.

The main point in the tactics of the Mongol cavalry was to exhaust the enemy with archery.

The lack of discipline in the feudal militia ruled out the possibility of organizing interaction between the constituent parts of the army on the battlefield. The emergence of knightly organizations with their strict order discipline made it possible to build knights in a compact mass - a "wedge" that pierced the enemy's battle formation to the full depth. But the knightly battle order could not maneuver on the battlefield, since it was not dismembered and consisted of one type of troops - heavy cavalry. The Western European infantry, which by this time had lost its former fighting qualities, could not fight with the knightly cavalry. Only the Russian infantry inflicted defeats on the Byzantine cavalry, in cooperation with their own cavalry beat the cavalry of the Pechenegs, Polovtsy and the heavy knightly cavalry of the German and Swedish feudal lords.

During the period under review, a powerful fleet was created in the Byzantine Empire, equipped with new equipment - "Greek fire". The fleet of Byzantium successfully fought the fleet of the Arabs.

At the beginning of the 8th century Byzantium faced the threat of death, but survived the crisis and by the beginning of the 9th century. consolidated its position and again expanded its borders. Marx noted that at the beginning of the X century. "Byzantium was the largest maritime power in Europe." At the end of the 9th and at the beginning of the 10th century, Byzantium was under the blows of the Danube Bulgaria and the Russians. The process of the expansion of the empire and the formation of feudal relations greatly weakened the Byzantines. Byzantium moved from active struggle to passive defense. At the same time, the Byzantine government, setting its opponents against each other, sought to weaken them.

In Byzantium, the ancient military-theoretical heritage was preserved, which developed on the basis of the experience of wars with the Slavs and Arabs. From the Byzantine military theorists of the X century. Nikifor Fok should be noted. He is credited with a treatise called in the Russian translation “On Collisions with the Enemy” (the main theme of the treatise is war in a mountain theater). Interest in the war in the mountain theater of military operations among Byzantine military writers of the 10th century. was dictated by the struggle with the Slavs in the Balkans. The treatise "On Collisions with the Enemy" examines in detail all the tactical options for a campaign and battle in mountainous conditions. The treatise gave Byzantine commanders advice on how to act in a particular environment of a mountain theater. Nikifor Foka advised to be especially vigilant and careful when passing through mountain passes and forcing passes.

Another military-theoretical treatise of the same period, "The Strategy of the Emperor Nicephorus", has been preserved, which discusses the organization of a campaign and the conduct of battle with significant forces against the Arabs. According to the author, for a successful campaign it is necessary to have an army of at least 24 thousand soldiers, consisting of cavalry and infantry. As a tactical infantry unit, the author recommended using a detachment of 1 thousand people, which would include 400 heavily armed infantrymen, 300 archers, 300 javelin throwers and slingers. The battle formation of the infantry was envisaged in the form of a phalanx, built by detachments of 700 soldiers in seven ranks each detachment; 1st, 2nd, 6th and 7th ranks should be heavily armed infantrymen, 3rd, 4th and 5th - archers. Between infantry detachments, intervals of 15–20 m were left, in which slingers and javelin throwers were built.

The author of the treatise divided the cavalry into armored, that is, heavily armed, and horse archers. It was recommended that the battle order of the cavalry be built in three lines with the allocation of a reserve. The front of the first line of cavalry was shaped like a trapezoid, with its top turned towards the enemy.

In the general battle, according to the author, one can enter only when there is a numerical superiority and when the enemy has already suffered damage in separate skirmishes and lost heart. The forward detachments must engage in battle and lure the enemy into an ambush. Then, moving forward through the intervals of the infantry, the cavalry enters the battle. If the cavalry cannot stand the battle, it should retreat behind the line of infantry, which will take the blow of the enemy. The author of the treatise recommended covering the flanks of the enemy army and surrounding it. If the enemy began to retreat, then the pursuit should be carried out carefully so as not to fall into an ambush.

The work of Emperor Leo VI "Tactics" was widely known, in which many works on the military art of his predecessors were summarized. For the most part, Leo VI, without reference to the source, rewrote the work of Mauritius "Strategikon", which had a serious influence on all subsequent Byzantine military writers.

Leo VI tried to put in a new way only the question of hand-to-hand combat. He argued that "with the modern development of throwing weapons, hand-to-hand combat is no longer possible." In the course of the further development of military art, this position was not confirmed, although it was put forward every time an improved throwing weapon appeared.

The military-theoretical works of Byzantine military writers influenced the development of military-theoretical thought in Western Europe for many hundreds of years. Interest in the military culture of Byzantium was shown by the princes of Kyiv, and then by Russian military theorists until the beginning of the 18th century, when all the main military-theoretical works of the Byzantines were translated into Russian.

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The red-haired Khan of the Mongols entered into his first and decisive battle with the enemy and won. He could now proudly wear an ivory rod or horn in the form of a small mace, which rightfully belonged to the commander and leader.

And he passionately longed to have people loyal to him under his control. Undoubtedly, this passion was explained by the suffering in those difficult years, when Borchu took pity on him, and the arrows of the rustic Casar saved his life.

However, Temujin recognized as strength not political power, which he did not really think about, and not wealth, in which he obviously saw little use. Being a Mongol, he only wanted what he needed. His concept of strength was reduced to human strength. When he praised his bagaturov, he said that they broke hard stones into small pieces, turned over boulders and stopped the enemy's swift onslaught.

Above all, he valued loyalty. Betrayal was considered the unforgivable sin of a tribesman. A traitor could cause the destruction of the entire camp or lure the horde into an ambush. The devotion to the tribe and the khan was, so to speak, ultimate desideratum(highly desired). "What can be said of a man who makes a promise at dawn and breaks it at nightfall?"

The echo of his passionate desire to have loyal subjects resounded in his prayers. It was customary for the Mongol to climb to the top of the rock, which he considered his permanent residence tengri- the celestial spirits of the air of the upper plane, which sent down hurricanes and thunders and gave rise to all the awe-inspiring wonderful phenomena of the boundless sky. He offered prayers to the four corners of the world, throwing his belt over his shoulders.

“Eternal Heaven, be kind to me; send the spirits of the upper air to help me, and on earth send people to help me.

And people gathered under his banner of nine yak tails no longer in families and yurts, but in hundreds. The tribe of wanderers, who had become an enemy to their former khan, seriously discussed the merits of Temujin, the leader of the Mongols. “He allows hunters to keep all the booty during a big hunt, and after the battle, each warrior keeps his share of the captured trophies due to him. He gave a fur coat from his shoulder. He dismounted from his horse, on which he rode, and gave it to the needy.

Not a single collector rejoiced with such fervor at a rare acquisition as the Mongol Khan, welcoming these wanderers.

He gathered around him a court without treasurers and advisers, who were replaced by the spirits of war. Of course, it included Borchu and Kasar - his first comrades in arms, Argun - a musician who played the lute, Beyan and Mukhuli - cunning and battle-hardened military leaders, as well as Su - a skilled crossbowman.

Argun appears before us not so much as a bard, but as simply a cheerful and sociable person. One vivid episode is connected with him, when he borrowed a golden lute from the khan and lost it. The hot-tempered Mongol flew into a rage and sent two paladins to kill him. Instead, they seized the offender, forced him to drink two leather sacks of wine, and locked him up in a secluded place. The next day, at dawn, they pushed him aside and escorted him to the entrance to the khan’s yurt, exclaiming: “The light is already illuminating your horde(the center of the tribe, the khan's headquarters and the main yurt of the camp), oh khan! Open the door and show your mercy."

Taking advantage of the pause that had arisen, Argun sang:

When the thrush sings "ding dong"

The hawk grabs him with its claws before the last note -

Likewise, the wrath of my master falls upon me.

Alas, I like to drink, but I'm not a thief.

And although theft was punishable by death, Argun was forgiven, and the fate of the golden lute remains a mystery to this day.

These followers of the khan were known throughout the Gobi under the nickname "furious streams". Two of them - Jebe-noyan ("commander-arrow") and the valiant Subedei-bagatur - at that time still just boys, subsequently devastated the territory along the entire ninety-degree meridian.

Jebe Noyan first appears in a string of events as a young man from an enemy tribe, fleeing after a battle and surrounded by the Mongols, led by Temuchin. He lost his horse and asked the Mongols for another, offering to fight on their side for it. Temujin heeded his request, giving young Jeba a swift white-nosed horse. However, sitting on it, Jebe managed to break through between the Mongol warriors and ride away. Then he nevertheless returned and said that he wanted to serve the khan.

Subsequently, when Jebe-Noyan made his way through the Tien Shan, pursuing Kuchleuk with his Kara-Khitan tribe, he gathered a herd of a thousand white-nosed horses and sent it as a gift to the Khan. It was a sign that Jebe had not forgotten that old incident with the horse, when his life was saved.

Not as impetuous as young Jebe, but Subedei from the tribe of reindeer herders was more sharp-witted. uriakhi. There was something of Temujin's cruel determination in him. Before getting involved in a war with the Tatars, the khan asked his associates who would dare to lead the soldiers on the offensive. Subedey stepped forward and was praised for this by the khan, who suggested that he select one hundred of the best warriors as his bodyguards. Subedei replied that he did not need anyone to accompany him and he intended to move ahead of the horde alone. Temujin, after hesitating, allowed, and Subedei galloped to the Tatars' camp and declared that he had left the khan and would like to join them. He convinced the Tatars that there was no Mongol horde nearby, so that they were completely unprepared when the Mongols attacked and put them into a disorderly flight.

“I will protect you from your enemies in the same way that the felt of a yurt shelters you from the wind,” Subedei promised the young khan. “That is what I will do for you.

“When we capture beautiful women and capture magnificent stallions, we will give them to you,” his paladins promised him. - If we disobey you or harm you, leave us to perish in barren places.

“I was like in a dream when you came to me,” Temujin answered his brave men. “I used to sit in sorrow, and you inspired me.

They honored him as he deserved as the true Khan of the Yakka Mongols, and he assigned to each the position that he deserved, given the peculiarities of his character.

He said that Borchu would sit beside him on kurultai(assembly of leaders) and will be among those who are entrusted with carrying the bow and quiver of the khan. Someone had to be in charge of food, be responsible for livestock. Others were in charge of wagons and servants. Possessing great physical strength, but not brilliant in mind, Kasar, he made a swordsman.

Temujin carefully selected smart and brave warriors as military leaders, generals for his armed horde. He appreciated the ability to control his anger and wait for the right moment to strike. Truly, the essence of the Mongol character is his patience. Temujin entrusted the brave and selfless to look after the wagons and food supplies. He left the stupid ones to guard the cattle.

About one commander, he said: “There is no person more valiant than Yesudai, no one has such rare abilities. But since the longest campaigns do not tire him, since he does not feel either hunger or thirst, he assumes that his subordinates do not suffer from this either. That is why he is not suitable for a high command post. The commander must not forget that his subordinates may suffer from hunger and thirst, and must wisely use the strength of his people and animals.

To maintain his authority with this host of "fierce fighters", the young khan needed unshakable determination and a finely balanced sense of justice. The leaders who stood under his banner were as uncontrollable as, for example, the Vikings. The chronicles tell how Father Borte appeared with his supporters and seven adult sons to present them to the khan. An exchange of gifts took place, and the seven sons took their places among the Mongols, causing endless irritation, especially one of them, a shaman named Tebtengri. It was believed that he, as a shaman, was able to leave his physical body at will and visit the world of spirits. He was also endowed with the gift of divination.

And Tebtengri had an aggressive ambition. After spending several days in the yurts of several chiefs, he and some of his brothers attacked Kasar and beat him with fists and sticks.

Qasar complained to Khan Temuchin.

- You, brother, boasted, - he answered, - that you have no equal in strength and cunning, how did you let these guys beat you?

Angry, Kasar went to his half at the headquarters of the khan and no longer approached Temuchin. Then Tebtengri found the khan.

“My spirit heard what was said in the other world,” he said, “and this truth has been conveyed to me by Heaven itself. Temujin will rule over his subjects for a while, but then Kasar will be over them. If you do not put an end to Kasar, your reign will not last long.

The cunning of the shaman-sorcerer had an effect on the khan, who could not brush aside what he sincerely took for a prediction. That evening, he mounted his horse and went with several soldiers to seize Kasar. His mother Hoelun found out about this. She ordered the servants to prepare a wagon harnessed by a swift-footed camel, and hurried after the khan.

She arrived at Kasar's yurt and made her way past the khan's guards who surrounded her. Entering the main yurt, she found Temujin in front of Kasar kneeling without a hat and a sash. Kneeling down, she bared her breasts and said to Temuchin: “You are both fed from these breasts. You, Temujin, have many virtues, while Kasar has only his strength and skill as a well-aimed archer. When the rebels opposed you, he struck them with his arrows.

The young khan listened in silence, waiting for his mother's anger to dry up. He then walked out of the yurt, saying, “I felt uncomfortable when I did this. And now I'm ashamed."

Tebtengri continued to go from yurt to yurt and create trouble. Claiming that his actions are guided by revelations from above, he was like a thorn in the eye of the Mongol Khan. Tebtengri gathered a lot of supporters around him and, being ambitious, believed that he was able to undermine the prestige of the young khan. Fearing to come into conflict with Temuchin himself, he and his accomplices sought out Temugu the otchigin, the youngest of the Khan's brothers, and forced him to kneel before them.

Tradition forbade the Mongols to use weapons in resolving conflicts with each other, but after this act of the shaman, Temuchin called Temugu and told him:

– Today Tebtengri will come to my yurt. Treat him the way you want.

Temujin's position was not easy. Munlik, the leader of the Olkunuts and Borte's father, helped him in battle many times and gained respect. Tebtengri himself was a shaman, soothsayer and sorcerer. Temujin, as a khan, had to act as a judge in resolving conflicts and not be led by his desires.

He was alone in the yurt and was sitting by the fire when Munlik and his seven sons entered. He greeted them and they sat down at his right hand when Temugu entered. All weapons, of course, were left at the entrance to the yurt, and the younger brother grabbed Tebtengri by the shoulders.

“Yesterday I was forced to kneel in front of you, but today I will measure my strength with you.

They struggled for a while, while Munlik's other sons rose from their seats.

- Don't fight here! Temujin turned to the fighters. - Go outside.

Three strong fighters were waiting at the entrance to the yurt. They were just waiting for this moment, acting on the orders of Temugu or the Khan. They grabbed Tebtengri as soon as he appeared, broke his spine and threw him aside. He remained motionless at the wheel of the wagon.

- Tebtengri put me on my knees yesterday! Temugu exclaimed, addressing his brother Khan. - Now, when I want to measure strength with him, he lies and does not get up.

Munlik and his six sons rushed to the exit, looked out and saw the body of the shaman. Grief seized the leader, and he turned to Temuchin.

“Oh, kagan, I have served you faithfully until today.

The meaning of what was said left no room for doubt, and his sons prepared to pounce on Temujin. Temujin stood up. He was unarmed and could not get out of the yurt otherwise than through the entrance. Instead of calling for help, he said to the severely enraged fools:

- Get out of my way! I need to go out.

Puzzled by the unexpected command, they stepped aside, and he left the tent to the guard post of his warriors. Nevertheless, this case became one of the incidents in a series of endless conflicts around the red-haired khan. But he wanted to avoid, if possible, a bloody feud with the Munlik family.

At night, Temujin ordered two of his men to lift the body of the shaman and pull it out through the chimney at the very top of the yurt. When curiosity began to grow among the Horde about what had become of the sorcerer, Temuchin opened the entrance to the yurt, went out and explained to them:

- Tebtengri beat my brothers and unjustly slandered them; for that heaven did not love him and took both his life and his body together.

But when he was alone with Munlik again, he spoke to him quite seriously:

“You did not teach your sons obedience, even though they needed it. As for you, I promised to protect you from death in any case. And let's finish with this 4 .

Meanwhile, there was no end in sight to the intertribal wars in the Gobi, this "wolf strife" of large clans with chases and persecutions. And although the Mongols were still considered weaker than other tribes, there were still one hundred thousand yurts under the banner of the Khan. The protection for his subjects was his intelligence and cunning, and his cruel courage inspired his warriors. Responsibility not for several families, but for the whole nation fell on his shoulders. He himself could sleep peacefully at night; the number of his livestock grew steadily thanks to the received "Khan's tithe". He was in his thirties, in the prime of his life, and his sons were now galloping with him and already looking for future wives, just as he himself had once traveled through the plains side by side with Yesugei. He took away from his enemies what belonged to him by inheritance, and did not want to lose this wealth.

But something else was brewing in his head—an unfinished plan, a desire not fully expressed.

To unite the "smashing warriors" into an alliance of tribes to confront their sworn enemies, he thought. And he proceeded to implement his plan with all his truly great perseverance.

Ertugrul (1198 - 1281) - Turkic (representative of the Oghuz Kayi tribe) ruler, father of the founder of the Ottoman dynasty Osman I. Ruled since 1227 in the territory called the Ottoman beylik, with the center in the city of Sogyut.

The future great Ottoman Empire originated from a small Turkic tribal group, the main component of which was the nomads of the Oguz Kayi tribe. According to Turkish historical tradition, part of the Kayi tribe migrated to Anatolia from Merv (Turkmenistan), where the leaders of the Kayi were in the service of the rulers of Khorezm for some time. At first, they chose the lands in the Karajadag region to the west of present-day Ankara as a place of nomadism. Then part of them moved to the region of Khlat, Erzurum and Erzinjan, reaching Amasya and Aleppo. Some nomads of the Kayi tribe have found shelter on the fertile lands in the Chukurov region. It was from these places that a small unit of kaya (400-500 tents), led by their leader Ertugrul, fleeing the Mongols' raids, went to the possessions of the Seljuk sultan Ala ad-Din Kay-Kubat II.

Turkish legends say that one day, having driven to the top of the mountain, Ertugrul saw two fighting armies unknown to him on the plain. After consulting with his people, he decided to come to the aid of one of them, which seemed to him weaker and was losing. At the head of 444 horsemen (the number 4 was considered sacred by the Turks), he rushed at those who had already begun to gain the upper hand, and brought victory to their opponents. This success, as it turned out, was won over the horde of the Mongols, and Sultan Kay-Kubat II and his Seljuks (Oghuz-Kynyks) owed their victory to Ertugrul. As a reward, the sultan gave the newcomers the Tumanidzh and Ermeni mountains for their summer roaming, and the Sogyut plain for the winter. These lands were recently captured by the Seljuks from the Byzantines, and Kei-Kubat formed a border udzh out of them. The possession was small, but its ruler turned out to be an energetic person, and his soldiers willingly participated in raids on neighboring Byzantine lands. At the same time, Ertugrul gave an obligation to repel the attacks of Byzantium, seeking to return these lands that previously belonged to it.

As a result, through continuous conquests, Ertugrul managed to somewhat increase his udzh at the expense of the border regions of Byzantium. Now it is difficult to accurately determine the scale of these aggressive operations, as well as the initial size of Ertugrul himself.

Ertugrul ruled from 1230 on the territory called the Ottoman beylik, with the center in the city of Sogyut, which was conquered from Byzantium in 1231. In 1243, the Seljuks were defeated by the Mongols and the Seljuk empire gradually began to disintegrate.

During the reign of Ertugrul, the gradual strengthening of the kaya begins. Turkish legends say that the founder of the Ottomans lived for a long time: he died at the age of 90 in 1281.

After the death of Ertugrul, power passed to his son, Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, and the first monarch of the Ottoman state.

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