Defining the tasks of the further offensive in the Stalingrad direction, the German high command in the directive of July 23, 1942 ordered Army Group "B" to defeat the Soviet troops covering Stalingrad with a swift blow, take the city, then strike along the Volga to the south and capture the Astrakhan region in order to completely paralyze the Volga way. They planned to take Stalingrad on July 25th.
Breaking through to Stalingrad, the German command planned to inflict an enveloping blow on the flanks of the Soviet troops defending the approaches to the Don, break through their positions and reach the area of the city of Kalach, in order to then capture the city on the Volga with a swift blow on the move. To this end, the command of the German 6th Army, without waiting for the full concentration of troops, allocated two strike groups: the northern one, in the Perelazovsky area, as part of the 14th Tank and 8th Army Corps (later also the 17th Corps), and southern, in the Oblivskaya area, as part of the 51st Army and 24th Tank Corps. “Both of these groups,” noted Hans Dörr, “had their task to advance along the banks of the Don inside its large bend to Kalach and in this area to unite to force the Don and attack Stalingrad. Thus, the German command still hoped to encircle the enemy troops in the big bend of the Don ”(Derr G. Campaign to Stalingrad.).
Breakthrough of the northern flank of the Soviet defense
At dawn on July 23, the northern group of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive with superior forces in the direction of Verkhne-Buzinovka, Manoilin, Kamensky. The Germans attacked the right-flank divisions of the 62nd Army - the 33rd Guards, 192nd and 184th Rifle Divisions. In the breakthrough sector, the Germans created a great advantage in manpower, artillery and tanks. The advancing German troops were actively supported by aviation, which delivered massive strikes against the battle formations of the Soviet troops.
The situation was difficult. “The army continues the stubborn defense of the prepared line. The forward detachments, under the onslaught of superior forces, retreat beyond the front edge of the defensive zone, ”the army headquarters reported in a combat report on July 23 at 19:00. 30 min. On this day, especially stubborn battles were fought in the combat formations of the 33rd Guards Rifle Division, which held the defense southwest of Manoylip. On the right flank of the division, the 84th Guards Rifle Regiment fought under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.P. Barladyan. The enemy attacked the positions of the regiment with the forces of the 113th Infantry and 16th Panzer Divisions of the 14th Panzer Corps. The attacks of infantry and tanks were actively supported by aviation. The enemy broke through the defenses of the regiment, but the guards continued to fight. It was here that four armor-piercers performed their legendary feat - Pyotr Boloto, Pyotr Samoilov, Konstantin Belikov, Ivan Aleinikov. Left alone on a high-rise south of Kletskaya, armor-piercers, armed with two anti-tank rifles, repelled the attacks of German tanks. Fifteen tanks were destroyed by them, and the rest withdrew. However, the Germans rushed forward. On July 23, the enemy broke through the defenses of the 192nd Infantry Division in the Kletskaya, Evstratovsky sector and reached the settlement of Platonov. In the defense zone of the 33rd Guards Rifle Division, the enemy advanced 15 km, wedged into the Soviet defenses and captured the area of the May 1 state farm.
On the night of July 24, the enemy was pulling up forces, preparing to continue the offensive. In the morning the Germans went to Verkhne-Buzinovka, where the headquarters of the 192nd and 184th rifle divisions were located. German tanks with troops rushed in, firing on the move and cutting off escape routes. A hasty evacuation of the wounded and communications began. The headquarters of the divisions entered the battle, fighting off the pressing enemy. The commander of the 192nd division, Colonel Afanasy Stepanovich Zakharchenko, died. On the same morning, the Nazis went to the Oskinsky farm, where a medical battalion was located at the Mayak height. Male doctors and cadets entered the battle with the enemy, while the wounded were evacuated under fire. “But not all cars made their way through the German barrier. The Nazis - tankers and submachine gunners - burned and killed the wounded and medical workers ... ".
German flamethrower on the outskirts of Stalingrad
Thus, the situation was extremely difficult. The Germans, during two days of fighting, surrounded the 192nd, 184th rifle divisions, the 84th and 88th guards regiments of the 33rd guards rifle division, the 40th tank brigade, the 644th tank battalion in the Evstratovsky, Mayorovsky, Kalmykov area and three artillery regiments and captured Verkhne-Buzinovka, Osinovka, Sukhanovsky. Parts of the German 3rd and 60th motorized divisions broke into the areas of Skvorin and Golubinsky, reaching the river. Don and bypassing the right-flank formations of the 62nd Army. At the same time, the 16th Panzer and 113th Infantry Divisions broke through to the river. Liska near Kachalinskaya. This led to the fact that the front of the 62nd Army was broken through. Parts of the right flank were surrounded. They were combined into a task force led by Colonel K. A. Zhuravlev and fought heavy defensive battles. The left flank of the 62nd Army was deeply engulfed from the north by German troops. The German command sought to completely surround the 62nd Army and destroy it. The command of the 62nd Army, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, to hold the crossing over the Don in the Kalach region, on July 25 brought the forces of the 196th Infantry Division with the 649th Tank Battalion into battle.
The advance of the southern German group
The situation on the front of the 64th Army was also dangerous. The army came into contact with the enemy, not yet fully completed the concentration. The rear of the army, in large part, still followed in echelons from Tula to Stalingrad, the supply of ammunition and food was not established. Troops of the 64th Army deployed to the left of the 62nd Army in the zone from Surovikino to Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya. At the turn of Surovkkino-Pristenovsky, the defense was occupied by the 229th and 214th rifle divisions of Colonel F.F. Sazhin and Major General N.I. Biryukov, to the south - the 154th Marine Brigade and other formations. By July 24, the forward detachments of the army reached the river. Tsimle, where the next day they were attacked by approaching units of the 51st army corps of the enemy and began to retreat to the main line of defense. Our troops were entrenched at the turn of the river. Chir.
“In the twentieth of July, the enemy troops, crowding forward detachments, approached the front line of our defense,” recalled the divisional commander N. I. Biryukov. “For almost three days, the enemy tried to crack it with the help of bombing, artillery and tank strikes. Not a single fascist tank managed to break through into the depths of our defenses. All enemy tanks that went to the front line failed to return. The soldiers of the division withstood the fierce bombing and artillery shelling. The good quality of combat and political training affected here. To the north, on the right flank of the army, the defense was held by the 229th Rifle Division, which came into contact with the enemy when its artillery was still on the march. At first, the division fought small battles that did not threaten its positions, but soon the situation changed radically.
On July 25, the offensive of the southern grouping of the 6th German Army began, striking from the Oblivskaya, Verkhne-Aksenovskaya area on Kalach against the 64th Army. The enemy, using the forces of the 51st Army and 24th Tank Corps, sought to break through to the crossings across the river. Chir. The Germans attacked the 229th Rifle Division with superior forces, inflicting the main blow on the defensive formations of the 64th Army here, and the very next day German tanks broke through the defenses of the division and rushed to the river. Chir, going back to back with the 62nd and 64th armies. Colonel M.P. Smolyanov, head of the political department of the 64th Army, recalling the events of that day, notes that it was “the most difficult moment of our first operation on the right bank of the Don, when the whole mass of aviation and tanks piled up.”
Thus, the German troops also broke through the defenses of the 64th Army, which had not yet completed its concentration. With heavy fighting, part of the army retreated to the left bank of the Don. The commander of the 229th division, Colonel F.F. Sazhin and other commanders, were able, despite the ferocious onslaught of the enemy, to maintain the combat effectiveness of the division. Soldiers of the 214th division and the 154th naval brigade also distinguished themselves in fierce battles with the enemy. However, the situation was extremely difficult. The Germans were advancing, our troops were retreating beyond the Don, enemy aircraft bombed crowds of people at the crossing. The chief of artillery of the army, Major General of Artillery Ya. I. Broud, the head of the operations department, Lieutenant Colonel T. M. Sidorin, the head of the army engineering service, Colonel Burilov, and a number of other officers of the army headquarters, died here as a heroic death while restoring order at the crossing. By the evening of July 26, the railway bridge across the Don at Nizhne-Chirskaya was destroyed by German aircraft.
The deputy commander of the 64th Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov, who acted as commander, decided to withdraw the 214th Infantry Division and the 154th Naval Brigade to the left bank of the Don. “To prepare the crossing,” said Lieutenant General N. I. Biryukov, “parts of the division near Nizhne-Chirskaya started a battle with the enemy. But the communications officer delivered by plane a new order from the army command that the division should cross south, in the area of the rest house, since the crossing near Nizhne-Chirskaya was blown up. There was no ready crossing in the area of the rest house, and the division, having secured a bridgehead for itself, began to cross the Don using improvised means. For four days the crossing went on with the hard work of all the personnel, in the fight against the pressing enemy and the water element, which broke our rafts and ferries, under artillery and mortar fire and bombing by enemy aircraft. All the difficulties were steadfastly overcome by the soldiers of the division at the crossing. Only with 122-mm howitzers and motor vehicles the situation was hopeless - there was nothing to transport them across the river. It is difficult to say how it would have ended if a member of the Military Council of the Army Comrade. K. K. Abramov did not send us a motor semi-pontoon. On it, howitzers and vehicles were transported to the left bank of the Don in one night ”(“ The Battle for the Volga ”, Volgograd. 1962.). The crossing was covered, waging a fierce battle on the right bank, by one regiment of the 214th Infantry Division.
Thus, the Germans broke through the defenses of the 64th Army. The right-flank formations of this army with stubborn battles withdrew in an organized manner to the northeast, gaining a foothold along the railway from Surovikino to Rychkovo and further along the left bank of the Don. The Germans reached the Don in the Nizhne-Chirskaya area.
Soviet counterattack
As a result of the offensive of two German shock groups, the defenses of the 62nd and 64th Soviet armies were broken through. The Germans reached the Don north of Kalach - in the Kamensky area, and south of Kalach - near Nizhne-Chirskaya, creating a threat of bypassing Stalingrad from the west and southwest. There was a real threat of encirclement of the troops of the 62nd and 64th armies fighting in the big bend of the Don. The Germans planned to force the Don on the move and launch an offensive against Stalingrad.
In this situation, the Soviet command decided to urgently organize counterattacks on the shock groups of the 6th German army with the forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies, which were in the process of formation. On July 23, Colonel-General A.M. Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff, arrived at the Stalingrad Front as a representative of the Headquarters. He proposed to strike at the enemy with the forces of the emerging two tank armies. As early as July 22, the Stavka had transformed the directorates of the 38th and 28th armies into the directorates of the 1st and 4th tank armies. Summoned on the same day to the commander of the Stalingrad Front, the commander of the 38th Army, Major General of Artillery K.S. formation of the 1st Panzer Army. On the morning of the next day, General K.S. Moskalenko was already at the new command post, and after them the headquarters, headed by Colonel S.P. Ivanov, arrived. The formation of the 1st Panzer Army took place in the area of Kachalin, Rychkovsky, Kalach. Initially, it included the 13th and 28th tank corps, the 131st rifle division, two air defense artillery regiments and one anti-tank one. The army was given the 158th heavy tank brigade. The 4th Panzer Army was led by Major General V. D. Kryuchenkon, Brigadier Commissar F. P. Luchko (member of the Military Council), Colonel E. S. Polozov (Chief of Staff). The army included the 22nd tank corps, the 18th rifle division, the 133rd tank brigade, the 5th anti-tank artillery brigade, a rocket artillery regiment and two air defense regiments.
The situation developed in such a way that the Soviet mobile formations had to attack without completing the formation. Thus, formations and units of the 1st Panzer Army were scattered over a large area or had not yet arrived. The 13th Panzer Corps was already involved in the fighting on the right flank of the 62nd Army, 60 km northwest of Kalach; The 131st Rifle Division was defending on the eastern bank of the Don, from Golubinskaya to Kalach, the 158th Tank Brigade was still on the march. Parts of the reinforcement have not yet arrived. The army had only about 40% of the means of communication, there was not enough transport, the reconnaissance battalion did not arrive, etc. The 4th Panzer Army was in even worse condition, so its offensive began later. Both tank armies did not have the mobility of full-fledged mechanized formations, combined arms formations could not keep up with the tankers, which sharply reduced the maneuverability and combat effectiveness of the armies. The 1st Tank Army had about 160 tanks, the 4th Army - about 80. Tank formations did not have full-fledged artillery and aviation support. The formation of tank armies began only on July 22, they were not fully equipped with personnel and equipment. In addition, the command and staffs of the armies did not have the necessary experience in leading tank formations, since they were formed from the directorates of the combined arms armies.
However, there was no other choice but to throw into battle the tank armies that were still being formed. As A.M. Vasilevsky: “We were all determined to defend the city on the Volga. A study of the situation at the front showed that the only way to eliminate the threat of encirclement of the 62nd Army and the capture by the enemy of crossings across the Don in the Kalach region and to the north of it was to immediately launch counterattacks against the enemy with the available forces of the 1st and 4th tank armies, The 4th Panzer was able to do this only two days later, but there was no way to wait for it, otherwise we would have lost the crossings and the fascist troops would have gone to the rear of the 62nd and 64th armies. Therefore, I had to go for an immediate strike by the 1st Panzer Army, and then the 4th ”(A. M. Vasilevsky. A matter of a lifetime.).
By dawn on July 25, German troops had almost reached the crossing at Kalach. “The enemy had to overcome the last two or three kilometers. But he did not succeed, since it was at that moment that the 1st Panzer Army launched a counterattack on the advancing enemy. A head-on battle began with tanks and motorized infantry ”(K. S. Moskalenko. In the South-West direction.). The situation was aggravated by the fact that German aviation dominated the air, which on that day alone made more than 1,000 sorties against the battle formations of Moskalenko's army. However, despite all the difficulties, the Soviet tankers were able to somewhat rectify the situation. The troops of the 28th Tank Corps under the command of Colonel G.S. Rodin, acting on the right flank of the 62nd Army, pushed the Germans back 6-8 km from Kalach in stubborn battles. The 13th Panzer Corps, advancing to the north, reached the approaches to Manoilin and broke through to the encircled 192nd and 184th Rifle Divisions. The 196th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army, interacting with the troops of the 1st Tank Army, also moved forward.
On July 27, Kryuchenko's 4th Panzer Army struck the enemy from the Trekhostrovskaya area in a westerly direction. The blow of Kryuchenko's army finally broke the encirclement around two divisions and other units of the 62nd Army. By July 31, the commander of the encircled group, Colonel K. A. Zhuravlev, brought about five thousand people to the location of the 4th Panzer Army. Stubborn fighting in this direction continued until the beginning of August. The Germans continued to attack with the forces of the 14th Panzer and 8th Army Corps, supporting their actions with massive air strikes.
Thus, the Soviet troops managed to stop the enemy's movement to the south and along the right bank of the Don, frustrating the enemy's plan to encircle and destroy the troops of the 62nd and partially 64th armies. The encircled troops of the right flank of the 62nd Army in the Verkhne-Buzinovka area were released. Further movement of German troops was suspended. However, despite the mass heroism of the Soviet troops, it was not possible to defeat the German group that had broken through in the Werne-Buzinovka area and completely restore the position of the 62nd Army. The 1st and 4th tank armies simply did not have such an opportunity, since they were not full-fledged mobile formations.
The hopes of the German command for a lightning-fast capture of Stalingrad were destroyed. Prior to the collision with the tank formations of the Soviet 1st and 4th tank armies, Paulus, other senior officers of the 6th German army believed that the movement to Stalingrad would be non-stop and the city would be taken as easily as all other settlements on the way from Kharkov to Don. The Germans again overestimated their capabilities and did not expect such strong resistance. The German command began to take measures to regroup troops in order to organize a new offensive in the Stalingrad direction.
Soviet infantry in battle
The Soviet command took urgent measures to strengthen the southwestern approaches to the Don, which were the most vulnerable. A breakthrough of the enemy's southern grouping could lead to the latter's reaching the rear of the Stalingrad Front. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by August 1, troops of the 57th Army under the command of Major General F.I. Tolbukhin were deployed here, from the Red Don to Raigorod. On July 31, the 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front from the North Caucasian Front. Subsequently, troops from the reserve continued to arrive for the defense of Stalingrad. As a result, the front's defense zone increased to 700 km. It was difficult to manage the troops on such a front, therefore, on August 5, the Headquarters divided the Northern Fleet into two fronts: Stalingrad - under the command of V.N. Gordov, and South-Eastern - under the command of A.I. Eremenko. The 63rd, 21st, 4th tank (without tanks) and 62nd armies remained in the Northern Fleet. The 16th Air Army was formed to support the front from the air. The South-Eastern Front included the 64th, 57th, 51st, 1st Guards and 8th Air Armies advancing towards Stalingrad. The headquarters ordered the command of the two fronts to take the most decisive measures to hold the Stalingrad area.
A deep breakthrough of German troops in the Stalingrad and Caucasus directions sharply worsened the situation at the front. The Wehrmacht broke through the defenses of the Red Army in a wide strip and quickly advanced towards Stalingrad and Rostov. Soviet troops fought heavy defensive battles and retreated under heavy enemy blows, leaving behind rich and populous industrial and agricultural regions. In such a situation, the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin No. 227 appeared on July 28, 1942. In it, the Soviet leader with severe frankness described the gravity of the current situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The troops were ordered to increase resistance and stop the enemy - "Not a step back!"
The order said: “The enemy is throwing more and more new forces to the front and, regardless of heavy losses for him, climbs forward, breaks into the depths of the Soviet Union, captures new areas, devastates and devastates our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. . ... Some stupid people at the front console themselves with talk that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have an abundance of bread. By this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the fronts. But such talk is completely false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies. Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has captured and is striving to capture, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, and railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, there are much fewer people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million poods of grain a year and more than 10 million tons of metal a year. We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in manpower reserves or in grain supplies. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory left by us will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense, our Motherland in every possible way. ... From this it follows that it is time to end the retreat. No step back! This should be our main call now.”
To be continued…
Appendix.
Order of the NPO of the USSR dated July 28, 1942 No. 227. On measures to strengthen discipline and order in the Red Army and the prohibition of unauthorized withdrawal from combat positions.
The enemy is throwing more and more forces to the front and, regardless of the heavy losses for him, climbs forward, breaks into the depths of the Soviet Union, seizes new areas, devastates and devastates our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. The fighting is going on in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German invaders are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to seize the Kuban, the North Caucasus with their oil and grain wealth at any cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, half of Voronezh. Part of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without an order from Moscow, covering their banners with disgrace.
The population of our country, which treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it, loses faith in the Red Army, and many of them curse the Red Army for handing our people over to the yoke of German oppressors, while she herself flows away to the east.
Some foolish people at the front comfort themselves by talking about the fact that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have an abundance of grain.
By this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the fronts. But such talk is completely false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies.
Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our means are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has captured and is striving to capture, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, and railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, there are much fewer people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million poods of grain a year and more than 10 million tons of metal a year. We no longer have superiority over the Germans either in manpower reserves or in grain supplies. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory left by us will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defense, our Motherland in every possible way.
Therefore, it is necessary to root out the talk that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is great and rich, there is a lot of population, there will always be an abundance of bread. Such conversations are false and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop the retreat, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and factories, without railways.
It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.
No step back! This should now be our main call.
We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every patch of Soviet land and defend it to the last opportunity.
Our Motherland is going through hard times. We must stop and then push back and defeat the enemy, no matter what it costs us. The Germans are not as strong as it seems to the alarmists. They are straining their last strength. To withstand their blow now, in the next few months, is to ensure victory for us.
Can we withstand the blow, and then push the enemy back to the west? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working perfectly, and our front is getting more and more aircraft, tanks, artillery, and mortars.
What do we lack?
There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, tank units, air squadrons. This is now our main shortcoming. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our Motherland.
Commanders, commissars, political workers, whose units and formations arbitrarily leave their combat positions, cannot be tolerated any longer. It is impossible to endure any longer when commanders, commissars, and political workers allow a few alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, to draw other fighters into retreat and open the front to the enemy.
Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.
From now on, the iron law of discipline for every commander, Red Army soldier, political worker should be the requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command.
The commanders of a company, battalion, regiment, division, the corresponding commissars and political workers, retreating from a combat position without an order from above, are traitors to the Motherland. It is necessary to deal with such commanders and political workers as with traitors to the motherland.
This is the call of our Motherland.
Fulfilling this call means defending our land, saving the Motherland, exterminating and defeating the hated enemy.
After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline was shaken in the German troops, the Germans took some severe measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 penal companies from fighters who were guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, put them in dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. They formed, further, about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline through cowardice or instability, deprived them of orders, placed them in even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. Finally, they formed special barrier detachments, placed them behind the unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot the alarmists on the spot in case of an attempt to leave their positions without permission and in case of an attempt to surrender. As is known, these measures had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And so it turns out that the German troops have good discipline, although they do not have the lofty goal of defending their homeland, but there is only one predatory goal - to conquer a foreign country, and our troops, having the lofty goal of defending their outraged Motherland, do not have such discipline and endure because of this defeat.
Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, as our ancestors learned from their enemies in the past and then won a victory over them?
I think it should.
The Supreme High Command of the Red Army orders:
1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:
a) to unconditionally liquidate retreating moods among the troops and to suppress with an iron fist the propaganda that we can and must supposedly retreat further to the east, that there will be no harm supposedly from such a retreat;
b) unconditionally remove from their posts and send them to Headquarters to bring to court military commanders of the armies who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, without an order from the front command;
c) to form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sections of the front, in order to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.
2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:
a) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of corps and divisions who allowed unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front to be brought before a military court;
b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in case of panic and disorderly withdrawal of parts of the division, to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;
c) to form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.
3. Commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:
a) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions who allowed unauthorized withdrawal of units without the order of the corps or division commander, take away orders and medals from them and send them to the military councils of the front for submission to a military court;
b) provide all possible assistance and support to the barrage detachments of the army in strengthening order and discipline in the units.
Read the order in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, headquarters.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
I. Stalin.
Total > 1 million Human.
| The Great Patriotic War |
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| Invasion of the USSR Karelia arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikiye Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right-Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomierz Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians the Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
Battle of Stalingrad- a battle between the troops of the USSR, on the one hand, and the troops of Nazi Germany, Romania, Italy and Hungary during the Great Patriotic War. The battle was one of the most important events of World War II. The battle included an attempt by the Wehrmacht to capture the left bank of the Volga near Stalingrad (modern Volgograd) and the city itself, a confrontation in the city, and a counteroffensive by the Red Army (Operation Uranus), which resulted in the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht and other German allied forces inside and around the city were surrounded and partly destroyed, partly captured. According to rough estimates, the total losses of both sides in this battle exceed two million people. The Axis powers lost large numbers of men and weapons and subsequently failed to fully recover from the defeat. I. V. Stalin wrote:
For the Soviet Union, which also suffered heavy losses during the battle, the victory in Stalingrad marked the beginning of the liberation of the country and the victorious march through Europe, which led to the final defeat of Nazi Germany in.
Previous events
The capture of Stalingrad was very important to Hitler for several reasons. It was the main industrial city on the banks of the Volga (a vital transportation route between the Caspian Sea and northern Russia). The capture of Stalingrad would provide security on the left flank of the German armies advancing into the Caucasus. Finally, the very fact that the city bore the name of Stalin, Hitler's main enemy, made the capture of the city a winning ideological and propaganda move. Stalin may also have had ideological and propaganda interests in defending the city that bore his name.
The summer offensive was codenamed Fall Blau. variant blue). It was attended by the XVII armies of the Wehrmacht and the 1st tank with the 4th tank armies.
Operation Blau began with the offensive of Army Group South against the troops of the Bryansk Front to the north and the troops of the South-West to the south of Voronezh. It is worth noting that despite the two-month break in the active hostilities of the troops of the Bryansk Front, the result was no less disastrous than for the troops of the South-Western Front, battered by the May battles. On the very first day of the operation, both Soviet fronts were broken through for tens of kilometers and the Germans rushed to the Don. Soviet troops could oppose the German only weak resistance in the vast desert steppes, and then they began to flock to the east in complete disorder. Ended in complete failure and attempts to re-form the defense, when the German units entered the Soviet defensive positions from the flank. Several divisions of the Red Army in mid-July fell into a cauldron in the south of the Voronezh region near the village of Millerovo
The offensive of the German troops
The Sixth Army's initial offensive was so successful that Hitler intervened again, ordering the Fourth Panzer Army to join Army Group South (A). As a result, a huge "traffic jam" was formed, when the 4th and 6th armies needed several roads in the zone of operations. Both armies were firmly stuck, and the delay turned out to be quite long and slowed down the German advance by one week. With the slow advance, Hitler changed his mind and reassigned the target of the 4th Panzer Army back to the Stalingrad direction.
In July, when the German intentions became quite clear to the Soviet command, they developed plans for the defense of Stalingrad. Additional Soviet troops were deployed on the eastern bank of the Volga. The 62nd Army was created under the command of Vasily Chuikov, whose task was to defend Stalingrad at any cost.
Battle in the city
There is a version that Stalin did not give permission for the evacuation of the inhabitants of the city. However, no documentary evidence of this has yet been found. In addition, the evacuation, albeit at a slow pace, but still took place. By August 23, 1942, about 100 thousand of the 400 thousand inhabitants of Stalingrad were evacuated. On August 24, the Stalingrad City Defense Committee adopted a belated decision to evacuate women, children and the wounded to the left bank of the Volga. All citizens, including women and children, worked on the construction of trenches and other fortifications.
A massive German bombardment on August 23 destroyed the city, killing thousands of civilians and turning Stalingrad into a vast area covered in burning ruins. Eighty percent of the housing in the city was destroyed.
The burden of the initial struggle for the city fell on the 1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment: a unit staffed mainly by young female volunteers with no experience in destroying ground targets. Despite this, and without the proper support available from other Soviet units, the anti-aircraft gunners remained in place and fired on the advancing enemy tanks of the 16th Panzer Division until all 37 air defense batteries were destroyed or captured. By the end of August, Army Group South (B) had finally reached the Volga north of Stalingrad. Another German advance to the river south of the city also followed.
At the initial stage, the Soviet defense relied to a large extent on the "People's Militia of Workers", recruited from workers not involved in military production. Tanks continued to be built and manned by voluntary crews, consisting of factory workers, including women. The equipment was immediately sent from the conveyors of factories to the front line, often even without painting and without sighting equipment installed.
Street fighting in Stalingrad.
The Headquarters considered Eremenko's plan, but considered it unfeasible (the operation was too deep, etc.)
As a result, the Headquarters proposed the following version of the encirclement and defeat of the German troops near Stalingrad. On October 7, the directive of the General Staff (No. 170644) was issued on the conduct of an offensive operation on two fronts to encircle the 6th Army. The Don Front was asked to strike the main blow in the direction of Kotluban, break through the front and go to the Gumrak area. At the same time, the Stalingrad Front was advancing from the Gornaya Polyana region to Elshanka, and after breaking through the front, the units advanced to the Gumrak region, where they connected with the DF units. In this operation, the front command was allowed to use fresh units. Don Front - 7th Rifle Division, Stalingrad Front - 7th St. K., 4 Apt. K. The operation was scheduled for October 20th.
Thus, it was planned to encircle and destroy only the German troops fighting directly in Stalingrad (14th Panzer Corps, 51st and 4th Infantry Corps, about 12 divisions in total).
The command of the Don Front was dissatisfied with this directive. On October 9, Rokossovsky presented his plan for an offensive operation. He referred to the impossibility of breaking through the front in the Kotluban region. According to his calculations, 4 divisions were required for a breakthrough, 3 divisions for the development of a breakthrough, and 3 more divisions for cover from German attacks; thus, 7 fresh divisions were clearly not enough. Rokossovsky proposed to strike the main blow in the Kuzmichi area (height 139.7), that is, everything according to the same old scheme: surround the units of the 14th Panzer Corps, connect with the 62nd Army, and only after that move to Gumrak to join units of the 64th th army. The headquarters of the Don Front planned 4 days for this: -24 October. The "Orlovsky ledge" of the Germans haunted Rokossovsky since August 23, so he decided to "insure" and first deal with this "corn", and then complete the complete encirclement.
The Stavka did not accept Rokossovsky's proposal and recommended that he prepare an operation according to the Stavka's plan; however, he was allowed to conduct a private operation against the Oryol group of Germans on October 10, without attracting fresh forces.
In total, more than 2,500 officers and 24 generals of the 6th Army were taken prisoner during Operation Ring. In total, over 91 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were taken prisoner. Trophies of the Soviet troops from January 10 to February 2, 1943, according to a report from the headquarters of the Don Front, were 5762 guns, 1312 mortars, 12701 machine guns, 156,987 rifles, 10,722 machine guns, 744 aircraft, 1,666 tanks, 261 armored vehicles, 80,438 vehicles, 10,679 motorcycles, 240 tractors, 571 tractors, 3 armored trains and other military property.
Battle results
The victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad is the largest military and political event during the Second World War. The great battle, which ended in the encirclement, defeat and capture of a select enemy group, made a huge contribution to achieving a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire Second World War.
In the Battle of Stalingrad, new features of the military art of the Armed Forces of the USSR manifested themselves with all their might. Soviet operational art was enriched by the experience of encircling and destroying the enemy.
As a result of the battle, the Red Army firmly seized the strategic initiative and now dictated its will to the enemy.
The outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad caused bewilderment and confusion in the Axis. A crisis of pro-fascist regimes began in Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. The influence of Germany on its allies sharply weakened, and the differences between them became noticeably aggravated.
Defectors and prisoners
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According to some other sources, from 91 to 110 thousand German prisoners were taken prisoner near Stalingrad. Subsequently, 140 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were buried on the battlefield by our troops (not counting the tens of thousands of German soldiers who died in the "boiler" for 73 days). According to the testimony of the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, almost 20 thousand "accomplices" captured in Stalingrad - former Soviet prisoners who served in auxiliary positions in the 6th Army - also died in captivity. They were shot or died in the camps.
The reference book “World War II”, published in Germany in 1995, indicates that 201,000 soldiers and officers were captured near Stalingrad, of which only 6,000 returned to their homeland after the war. According to the estimates of the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, published in a special issue of the historical journal Damalz dedicated to the Battle of Stalingrad, about 250,000 people were encircled near Stalingrad. Approximately 25,000 of them managed to be evacuated from the Stalingrad pocket and more than 100,000 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers died in January 1943 during the completion of the Soviet operation "Ring". 130,000 people were taken prisoner, including 110,000 Germans, and the rest were the so-called “voluntary helpers” of the Wehrmacht (“Hiwi” is an abbreviation for the German word Hillwillge (Hiwi), literal translation; “voluntary helper”). Of these, about 5,000 survived and returned home to Germany. The 6th Army had about 52,000 Khivs, for whom the headquarters of this army developed the main directions for the training of "voluntary assistants", in which the latter were considered as "reliable comrades-in-arms in the fight against Bolshevism." Among these "volunteers" were Russian support personnel and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion manned by Ukrainians. In addition, in the 6th Army ... there were about 1000 people of the Todt organization, consisting mainly of Western European workers, Croatian and Romanian associations, numbering from 1000 to 5000 soldiers, as well as several Italians.
If we compare the German and Russian data on the number of soldiers and officers captured in the Stalingrad region, then the following picture appears. Russian sources exclude from the number of prisoners of war all the so-called “voluntary assistants” of the Wehrmacht (more than 50,000 people), whom the Soviet competent authorities never classified as “prisoners of war”, but considered them as traitors to the Motherland, subject to trial under the laws of wartime. As for the mass death of prisoners of war from the "Stalingrad cauldron", most of them died during the first year of their captivity due to exhaustion, the effects of cold and numerous diseases received during the period of being surrounded. Some data can be cited on this score: only in the period from February 3 to June 10, 1943 in the camp of German prisoners of war in Beketovka (Stalingrad region), the consequences of the "Stalingrad cauldron" cost the lives of more than 27,000 people; and out of 1800 captured officers stationed in the premises of the former monastery in Yelabuga, by April 1943 only a quarter of the contingent survived
Great Patriotic and World War II. And it began with a successful Red Army offensive, code-named "Uranus".
Prerequisites
The Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad began in November 1942, but the preparation of the plan for this operation at the Headquarters of the High Command began in September. In autumn, the German march to the Volga bogged down. For both sides, Stalingrad was important both in a strategic and propaganda sense. This city was named after the head of the Soviet state. Once Stalin led the defense of Tsaritsyn from the Whites during the Civil War. Losing this city, from the point of view of Soviet ideology, was unthinkable. In addition, if the Germans had established control over the lower reaches of the Volga, they would have been able to stop the supply of food, fuel and other important resources.
For all the above reasons, the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was planned with particular care. The process was favored by the situation at the front. The parties for some time switched to positional warfare. Finally, on November 13, 1942, the counter-offensive plan, code-named "Uranus", was signed by Stalin and approved at Headquarters.
original plan
How did the Soviet leaders want to see the counteroffensive near Stalingrad? According to the plan, the Southwestern Front, under the leadership of Nikolai Vatutin, was to strike in the area of \u200b\u200bthe small town of Serafimovich, occupied by the Germans in the summer. This grouping was ordered to break through at least 120 kilometers. Another shock formation was the Stalingrad Front. Sarpinsky lakes were chosen as the place of his offensive. After passing 100 kilometers, the armies of the front were to meet with the Southwestern Front near Kalach-Soviet. Thus, the German divisions that were in Stalingrad would be surrounded.
It was planned that the counteroffensive near Stalingrad would be supported by auxiliary strikes of the Don Front in the area of Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya. At Headquarters, they tried to determine the most vulnerable parts of the enemy formations. In the end, the strategy of the operation began to consist in the fact that the blows of the Red Army were delivered to the rear and flank of the most combat-ready and dangerous formations. It was there that they were least protected. Thanks to good organization, Operation Uranus remained a secret for the Germans until the day it was launched. The unexpectedness and coordination of the actions of the Soviet units played into their hands.
Encirclement of the enemy
As planned, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19. It was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation. Before dawn, the weather changed dramatically, which made adjustments to the plans of the command. Thick fog did not allow aircraft to take off, as visibility was extremely low. Therefore, the main emphasis was on artillery preparation.
The first under attack was the 3rd Romanian army, whose defenses were broken through by Soviet troops. In the rear of this formation were the Germans. They tried to stop the Red Army, but failed. The defeat of the enemy was completed by the 1st under the leadership of Vasily Butkov and the 26th tank corps of Alexei Rodin. These parts, having completed the task, began to move towards Kalach.
The next day, the offensive of the divisions of the Stalingrad Front began. During the first day, these units advanced 9 kilometers, breaking through the enemy defenses on the southern approaches to the city. After two days of fighting, three German infantry divisions were defeated. The success of the Red Army shocked and disconcerted Hitler. The Wehrmacht decided that the blow could be smoothed out by a regrouping of forces. In the end, after considering several options for action, the Germans transferred two more tank divisions to Stalingrad, which had previously operated in the North Caucasus. Paulus, until the very day when the final encirclement took place, continued to send victorious reports to his homeland. He stubbornly repeated that he would not leave the Volga and would not allow the blockade of his 6th Army.
On November 21, the 4th and 26th tank corps of the Southwestern Front reached the Manoilin farm. Here they made an unexpected maneuver, turning sharply to the east. Now these parts were moving straight to the Don and Kalach. The 24th Wehrmacht tried to stop the advance of the Red Army, but all its attempts came to nothing. At this time, the command post of the 6th Army of Paulus urgently relocated to the village of Nizhnechirskaya, fearing to be caught by the attack of Soviet soldiers.
Operation "Uranus" once again demonstrated the heroism of the Red Army. For example, the advance detachment of the 26th Panzer Corps crossed the bridge over the Don near Kalach in tanks and vehicles. The Germans turned out to be too careless - they decided that a friendly unit equipped with captured Soviet equipment was moving towards them. Taking advantage of this connivance, the Red Army destroyed the relaxed guards and took up a circular defense, waiting for the arrival of the main forces. The detachment held its positions, despite numerous enemy counterattacks. Finally, the 19th tank brigade broke through to him. These two formations jointly ensured the crossing of the main Soviet forces, which were in a hurry to cross the Don in the Kalach region. For this feat, commanders Georgy Filippov and Nikolai Filippenko were deservedly awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
On November 23, the Soviet units took control of Kalach, where 1,500 soldiers of the enemy army were captured. This meant the actual encirclement of the Germans and their allies who remained in Stalingrad and the interfluve of the Volga and Don. Operation "Uranus" at its first stage was successful. Now 330 thousand people who served in the Wehrmacht had to break through the Soviet ring. Under the circumstances, the commander of the 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, asked Hitler for permission to break through to the southeast. The Fuhrer refused. Instead, the Wehrmacht forces, located near Stalingrad, but not surrounded, were united in a new army group "Don". This formation was supposed to help Paulus break through the encirclement and hold the city. The trapped Germans had no choice but to wait for the help of their compatriots from outside.
Unclear prospects
Although the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad led to the encirclement of a significant part of the German forces, this undoubted success did not mean at all that the operation was over. The Red Army continued to attack enemy positions. The Wehrmacht grouping was extremely large, so the Headquarters hoped to break through the defense and divide it into at least two parts. However, due to the fact that the front narrowed noticeably, the concentration of enemy forces became much higher. The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad slowed down.
Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht prepared a plan for Operation Wintergewitter (which translates as "Winter Thunderstorm"). Its goal was to ensure the elimination of the encirclement of the 6th Army under the leadership of the Blockade, the Don Army Group was supposed to break through. The planning and conduct of Operation Wintergewitter was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main striking force of the Germans this time was the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Hermann Goth.
"Wintergewitter"
At the turning points of the war, the scales tilt to one side or the other, and until the last moment it is not at all clear who will be the winner. So it was on the banks of the Volga at the end of 1942. The beginning of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad remained with the Red Army. However, on December 12, the Germans tried to take the initiative into their own hands. On this day, Manstein and Goth began to implement the Wintergewitter plan.
Due to the fact that the Germans delivered their main blow from the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Kotelnikovo, this operation was also called Kotelnikovskaya. The blow was unexpected. The Red Army understood that the Wehrmacht would try to break the blockade from the outside, but the attack from Kotelnikovo was one of the least considered options for the development of the situation. On the way of the Germans, seeking to come to the rescue of their comrades, the 302nd Rifle Division was the first. She was completely scattered and disorganized. So Gotu managed to create a gap in the positions occupied by the 51st Army.
On December 13, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht attacked the positions occupied by the 234th Tank Regiment, which was supported by the 235th Separate Tank Brigade and the 20th Anti-tank Artillery Brigade. These formations were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Diasamidze. Also nearby was the 4th mechanized corps of Vasily Volsky. Soviet groups were located near the village of Verkhne-Kumsky. The fighting of the Soviet troops and units of the Wehrmacht for control over it lasted six days.
The confrontation, which went on with varying success on both sides, almost ended on December 19. The German grouping was reinforced by fresh units that came from the rear. This event forced the Soviet commanders to retreat to the Myshkovo River. However, this five-day delay in the operation played into the hands of the Red Army. During the time that the soldiers fought for every street of Verkhne-Kumsky, the 2nd Guards Army was brought up to this area nearby.
critical moment
On December 20, the army of Goth and Paulus was separated by only 40 kilometers. However, the Germans, who were trying to break through the blockade, had already lost half of their personnel. The advance slowed down and eventually stopped. Goth's powers are over. Now, to break through the Soviet ring, the help of the encircled Germans was needed. The plan for Operation Wintergewitter, in theory, included the additional plan Donnerschlag. It consisted in the fact that the blocked 6th Army of Paulus had to go towards the comrades who were trying to break the blockade.
However, this idea was never realized. It was all about Hitler's order "not to leave the fortress of Stalingrad for anything." If Paulus broke through the ring and connected with Goth, then he would, of course, leave the city behind. The Fuhrer considered this turn of events a complete defeat and disgrace. His ban was an ultimatum. Surely, if Paulus had fought his way through the Soviet ranks, he would have been tried in his homeland as a traitor. He understood this well and did not take the initiative at the most crucial moment.
Manstein's retreat
Meanwhile, on the left flank of the attack of the Germans and their allies, the Soviet troops were able to give a powerful rebuff. The Italian and Romanian divisions that fought on this sector of the front retreated without permission. The flight took on an avalanche-like character. People left their positions without looking back. Now the road to Kamensk-Shakhtinsky on the banks of the Severny Donets River was open for the Red Army. However, the main task of the Soviet units was the occupied Rostov. In addition, the strategically important airfields in Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk, which were necessary for the Wehrmacht for the rapid transfer of food and other resources, became naked.
In this regard, on December 23, the commander of the operation, Manstein, gave the order to retreat in order to protect the communications infrastructure located in the rear. The maneuver of the enemy was used by the 2nd Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky. The German flanks were stretched and vulnerable. On December 24, Soviet troops again entered Verkhne-Kumsky. On the same day, the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive towards Kotelnikovo. Goth and Paulus were never able to connect and provide a corridor for the retreat of the encircled Germans. Operation Wintergewitter was suspended.
End of Operation Uranus
On January 8, 1943, when the position of the encircled Germans finally became hopeless, the command of the Red Army issued an ultimatum to the enemy. Paulus had to capitulate. However, he refused to do so, following the order of Hitler, for whom a failure at Stalingrad would have been a terrible blow. When the Headquarters learned that Paulus was insisting on his own, the offensive of the Red Army resumed with even greater force.
On January 10, the Don Front proceeded to the final liquidation of the enemy. According to various estimates, at that time about 250 thousand Germans were trapped. The Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad had already been going on for two months, and now a final push was needed to complete it. On January 26, the encircled Wehrmacht grouping was divided into two parts. The southern half turned out to be in the center of Stalingrad, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Barricades plant and the tractor plant - the northern half. On January 31, Paulus and his subordinates surrendered. On February 2, the resistance of the last German detachment was broken. On this day, the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad ended. The date, moreover, became the final one for the entire battle on the banks of the Volga.
Results
What were the reasons for the success of the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad? By the end of 1942, the Wehrmacht had run out of fresh manpower. There was simply no one to throw into battles in the east. The rest of the energy was exhausted. Stalingrad became the extreme point of the German offensive. In the former Tsaritsyn it choked.
The key to the whole battle was precisely the beginning of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad. The Red Army, through several fronts, was able to first encircle and then eliminate the enemy. 32 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. In total, the Germans and their Axis allies lost about 800 thousand people. The Soviet figures were also colossal. The Red Army lost 485 thousand people, of which 155 thousand were killed.
For two and a half months of encirclement, the Germans did not make a single attempt to break out of the encirclement from the inside. They expected help from the "mainland", but the removal of the blockade by Army Group "Don" from the outside failed. Nevertheless, in the given time, the Nazis set up an air evacuation system, with the help of which about 50 thousand soldiers got out of the encirclement (mostly they were wounded). Those who remained inside the ring either died or were captured.
The plan for the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was successfully carried out. The Red Army turned the tide of the war. After this success, a gradual process of liberation of the territory of the Soviet Union from Nazi occupation began. In general, the Battle of Stalingrad, for which the counteroffensive of the Soviet armed forces was the final chord, turned out to be one of the largest and bloodiest battles in the history of mankind. The battles on the burnt, bombed and devastated ruins were further complicated by the winter weather. Many defenders of the motherland died from the cold climate and the diseases caused by it. Nevertheless, the city (and behind it the entire Soviet Union) was saved. The name of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad - "Uranus" - is forever inscribed in military history.
Reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht
Much later, after the end of World War II, Manstein published his memoirs, in which, among other things, he described in detail his attitude to the Battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet counter-offensive under it. He blamed Hitler for the death of the encircled 6th Army. The Fuhrer did not want to surrender Stalingrad and thus cast a shadow on his reputation. Because of this, the Germans were first in the boiler, and then completely surrounded.
The armed forces of the Third Reich had other complications. Transport aviation was clearly not enough to provide the encircled divisions with the necessary ammunition, fuel and food. The air corridor was never used to the end. In addition, Manstein mentioned that Paulus refused to break through the Soviet ring towards Goth precisely because of the lack of fuel and the fear of suffering a final defeat, while also disobeying the order of the Fuhrer.
The offensive of the German army in the summer of 1942 and the battle for Stalingrad
Brief overview and selected episodes
The first orders for the summer offensive of 1942 came to the 6th Army through the southern army grouping in April 1942.
They concerned the measures that had to be taken in May to correct the situation south of Kharkov, which had arisen as a result of the Russian winter offensive.
Subject to the fulfillment of these preliminary measures, the orders developed further first performance from the area between the Sea of Azov and Kursk to the breakthrough of the Russian front for the decisive battle.
The idea was this: to break the Russian forces located along the Rostov front - west of Oskol - west and northwest of Voronezh, in order to thereby create the prerequisites for further decisive operations in the East.
All preparatory activities were entrusted to the southern army group. Later (by setting a deadline), this grouping was to be divided into two army groups "A" and "B".
Preliminary discussion of the summer offensive with Hitler in Poltava
1. VI - 42nd year at the headquarters of the southern army group in Poltava, Hitler held a meeting where the main plan of the summer offensive was discussed. To this end, on the same day before lunch, Hitler arrived by plane from East Prussia to Poltava and flew back in the afternoon. He was accompanied by the head of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, the head of the operations department of the OKH, Major General Heusinger, and the Quartermaster General of the OKH, Lieutenant General Wagner, as well as one or two of Hitler's adjutants.
The meeting was attended by: the commander-in-chief of the southern army grouping (later "B"), Field Marshal von Bock, the head of the headquarters of this grouping, General of Infantry von Sondenstern, from the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the subsequently formed army group "A": who later became the beginning. the headquarters of this group, Lieutenant General von Greifenberg, commander of the 1st Panzer Army, Colonel General von Kleist, commander of the 17th Army, Colonel General von Ruof; from the area of operations of the subsequently formed army group "B": the commander of the 2nd Army, Colonel General von Weichs, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel General Goth, the commander of the 6th Army, General of the Panzer Forces Paulus; from aviation: the commander of the 4th aviation army, Colonel General von Richthofen and the commander of the IV Air Corps, General Aviation Pflugbeil, as well as the commander of the III Tank Corps, General of Cavalry von Mackensen.
The operational directives - the main subject of the meeting - provided in general, in accordance with the above-mentioned intention, the following actions in stages:
1) The offensive of the 1st Panzer Army with a limited target from the area southeast of Kharkov, with the task of reaching Oskol on the line: the mouth - Kupyansk. Purpose: to relieve the southern flank of the offensive in accordance with paragraph 2.
2) Reach the Don from N. Kalitva to Voronezh. Purpose: covering the northern flank of the future main offensive, see point 3.
For this: the offensive of the 6th Army from the Volchansk region and north of the Novy Oskol direction, the 4th Panzer Army and the 2nd Army from the Kursk region, the Stary Oskol direction, in order to destroy the Russian forces standing west of the Don after breaking through the Russian front, covering them from two sides.
3) The main offensive of the 1st Panzer Army and to be transferred from the area west of Voronezh south to the area south of Rossosh of the 4th Panzer Army to break through the front between the Donets and the Don in the direction of Millerovo. Then, sending separate units to the east to cover, direct the main masses to the south (the mouth of the Donets), in order, in cooperation with the 17th Army and the 8th Italian Army, to surround the Russian forces standing between Rostov, northwest of Starobelsk and Millerovo.
4) Further decision-making, depending on the course of the upcoming battles.
The meeting lasted 2-3 hours. It took place in such a way that, in addition to those who accompanied Hitler, representatives of army groups and aviation sat for a long time at the table with cards, while army commanders were involved only to discuss the actions of their army groups. The rest stood aside at this time or talked in the waiting room. Field Marshal von Bock spoke of the conduct of the individual phases of the summer offensive in the prescribed manner (cf. points 1-3). Together with Colonel-Generals von Weichs, Goth, von Kleist and General von Mackensen, I was present at the map table during the discussion of the above points 1 and 2.
Field Marshal von Bock concluded his statement regarding the 6th Army with approximately the following words: “... it means that the 6th Army, upon reaching the Don, first has a purely defensive task. But in her preparations, she must also prepare herself for a possible wide advance to the east. I myself, like other army commanders, did not speak out.
Then discussion began on the third phase of the summer offensive (see point 3). Bock was again the speaker, since he was charged with all the preparatory measures for the future army group "A". For this purpose, Colonel Generals Goth, von Kleist, Ruof were asked to the table with cards to Hitler. During this part of the meeting, I stood off to the side in the same room or in an adjacent room, talking with von Weichs about the interaction of the 2nd and 6th armies. From this part of the meeting, therefore, I heard only excerpts.
Of all the statements that Hitler made at the meeting, I remember some in the following sense:
“Russian forces were exhausted in the battles in winter and spring. Under these circumstances, it is necessary and possible to bring the war in the East to a decisive outcome this year. My main idea is to occupy the Caucasus region, possibly defeating the Russian forces more thoroughly ... If I do not get the oil of Maykop and Grozny, I must stop the war ... To protect the flank of the forces advancing to the Caucasus, we must move as far east as possible in the bend of the Don ... Stronger forces allies of the Romanians, Italians, Hungarians will begin to act after the start of the offensive. Future reinforcements, depending on the position ... ".
After these general remarks, Hitler closed the meeting, indicating that it was time for him to return. He had a quick breakfast at the officer's casino of the army group and then headed for the Poltava airfield at about 3 pm to fly to East Prussia.
Operations
The beginning of the offensive under point 1: the end of June 1942. The beginning of the offensive under point 2: the beginning of July 1942.
Since the Russian command did not accept a decisive battle, but systematically retreated, the 6th Army from mid-July was turned in the direction of the large bend of the Don, with its left flank along the river. Task: covering the flank and rear of the offensive in accordance with the above paragraph 3, as well as the further advance of these units through the lower reaches of the Don to the south and southeast.
While the 6th Army in the second half of July fought on the line Surovikino, Kletskaya for the Don heights, an order was received from the army group to continue the offensive to the Volga at Stalingrad. The task of covering the troops at the Don began to be carried out by the 2nd Army, and over time, by the Allied Forces.
The battles for the heights northwest of Kalach dragged on until mid-August. Between August 20 and 23, VIII and I Army Corps and XIV Panzer Corps conquered the Don crossing at Kalach and north of it. The XIV Panzer Corps succeeded, it is true, in reaching the Volga north of Stalingrad, but the I Corps met stubborn resistance in the forefield of Stalingrad, while the VIII Army Corps defended the flank east of the Don.
Expectations to take Stalingrad with a sudden blow suffered a final collapse. The selfless resistance of the Russians in the battles for the heights west of the Don delayed the advance of the 6th Army so much that during this time it was possible to systematically organize the defense of Stalingrad.
Planned attack on Stalingrad
The headquarters of the 6th Army since the beginning of September in Golubinka on the Don.
From about August 28, the I Army Corps from the west and the XIV Panzer Corps from the north advanced step by step towards the city with battles. Since Hitler and the OKW - as was clear from numerous inquiries - became impatient with the slow progress of the fighting, I, along with the commander of Group B, Colonel-General von Weichs, were ordered to attend a meeting at Hitler's main headquarters in Vinnitsa.
Meeting at the headquarters in Vinnitsa on September 12, 1942
Early in the morning of September 12, I flew from Golubinka to Starobelsk, where I transferred to the plane of the commander of the army group. At about 12 noon, we were at the airfield in Vinnitsa and at about 12.30 we arrived by car at Hitler's headquarters, located in a forest grove about 3 km north of the city. Immediately upon the arrival of Colonel-General von Weichs and I, we were shown to the conference room in the house of Keitel and Jodl. The daily report on the situation on the fronts was being heard there. Present: Hitler, Keitel, Jodl and several of Hitler's adjutants, as well as the chief of the headquarters of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, the chief of the operations department of the OKH, Major General Heusinger, and the Quartermaster General of the OKH, Lieutenant General Wagner.
First, Colonel General von Weichs reported on the general situation on the front of the army group "B", pointing out in particular the insufficiently provided extended front (or flank) near the Don.
Following him, I outlined the situation at Stalingrad and reported in detail on each division separately; due to the protracted offensive, the combat capability of some of them has greatly decreased.
Hitler listened to both reports without any significant remarks and then asked me: “When will you hold the city and the banks of the Volga within the city in your hands? It is very important to me that this happens soon.”
My answer:“In view of the just reported condition of our troops, exhausted by battles, as well as Russian resistance, I cannot name a final date. On the contrary, I must ask for reinforcements with three combat-ready divisions.
Hitler agreed that this issue should be studied. At the same time, Colonel-General Halder interjected that they had neither fresh forces at their disposal nor the possibility of transferring them there in a timely manner. That there was only one way out: to put at the disposal of the 6th Army a unit of the 4th Panzer Army, which was stationed south of Stalingrad. But that this is primarily the business of the army group "B".
Hitler closed the meeting with something like this: “The Russians are on the verge of exhaustion of their forces. The resistance at Stalingrad should be assessed only as a local matter. They are no longer capable of broad strategic responses that could be dangerous for us. In addition, the northern flank on the Don will receive significant reinforcements from the Allied forces. Under these circumstances, I see no serious danger to the northern front. For the rest, we must take care to take the city into our own hands as soon as possible, and not allow it to turn into an all-devouring focus for a long time.
The meeting in Vinnitsa was aimed at putting pressure on the 6th Army so that it would take Stalingrad as soon as possible. During the meeting, when Hitler spoke, Keitel often nodded his head helpfully. Jodl and the other participants in the meeting refrained from making any statements.
The result of the meeting in Vinnitsa was the placement of three divisions of the 4th Panzer Army at the disposal of the 6th Army, while at the same time extending the front of the 6th Army to the south so much that now all of Stalingrad, up to the southern ledges of the city, was in the area of operations of the 6th Army.
Visit of the 6th Army by the commander of the army group "B" Colonel-General von Weichs at the end of September 1942
In connection with the issues discussed in Vinnitsa on September 12, 1942, the 6th Army was visited at the end of September by the commander of the army group "B", Colonel-General von Weichs. Purpose of the visit: to check the conditions and, at the request of Hitler, to quickly occupy the areas of Stalingrad, which are still in the hands of the Russians.
Colonel-General von Weichs, together with an accompanying officer, landed at an airfield 3 km west of Golubinka at about 8 a.m. There he was met by me, the chief of staff of the 6th Army, Major General Schmidt and adjutant Colonel Adam, as well as the commandant of the airfield (major of aviation). There was a flight guard at the plane (1 non-commissioned officer, 5 soldiers). From here, Colonel-General von Weichs and I, with two officers, flew on two Storch planes to Gumrak to the command post of the 1st Army. corps.
From the command post, a further trip by all-terrain vehicle to the advanced observation post of the 6th Army at a height near the cement plant, about 3 km south of Gorodishche. From here, a view of the central and northern parts of Stalingrad opened.
General von Seydlitz was explaining the tactical situation at the stereo tube, that is, the location of his own and Russian forward lines and the distribution of our and Russian artillery fire during the attack on the tractor factory, which had already lasted for several days.
Following this, I personally spoke with Colonel-General von Weichs in the dugout. After a detailed description of the extremely difficult conditions of the struggle in the city, with the increasingly stubborn resistance of the Russians and our daily losses, which increasingly reduce the combat effectiveness of the troops, I concluded something like this: “Added to this is a weighty factor that winter is on the threshold. First of all, we must prudently think about providing uniforms, supplies and material of all kinds for building positions, so that the winter will not again take us by surprise in a catastrophic way, as last year. But the supply situation is so tense that we are now not getting even the usual daily ration, let alone extra. And it becomes all the more necessary that we take firm and permanent positions before the onset of winter and be able to allocate sufficiently strong reserves. But the situation on my deep flank is especially troubling to me. The front, several hundred kilometers long along the Don, is simply asking for a Russian offensive in order to cut off Stalingrad, and perhaps with a more distant goal. Therefore, now it is necessary to put at the disposal of the army everything that can strengthen it, so that we here, at Stalingrad, can quickly cope and then have reserves for every necessary case.
Colonel General von Weichs replied something like this: “All this is clear to me. This is what I point out to the people above almost every day. But now leave this concern to me. It is important for you to concentrate your attention on Stalingrad and take the whole city as soon as possible. How much I can help with this, I will help.
Continuation of the offensive on Stalingrad
Under constant, persistent pressure from the OKW, the attacks, devouring all forces, continued, and the combat effectiveness of the six divisions that fought in Stalingrad decreased to that of the regiments. In mid-September, they occupied the southern part of the city, in October - the northern part and reached the banks of the Volga. The middle part of the city with the banks of the Volga remained in the hands of the Russians. Also, individual house-to-house battles, which continued until mid-November, no longer brought significant results due to the stubborn resistance of the Russians and constant counterattacks. Along with this, from the end of August to the end of October, attacks on the northern front of the army between the Volga and the Don continued, which fettered the forces stationed there (XIV tank and VIII army corps) and were partially involved in battles.
Signs of an upcoming Russian offensive
But the most significant thing in this situation was that from about mid-October, judging by the results of observations on the ground and from the air, the Russians were preparing for an offensive as northeast of Stalingrad on the left flank of the army (II Arm. Corps) near Kletskaya and on the adjoining west of the 3rd Romanian army, and south of Stalingrad to the 4th tank army. It was obvious that preparations were being made to encircle the 6th Army.
The command of the 6th Army, in accordance with the opinion of the corps commanders, constantly sent reports and proposals to the headquarters of the army group "B":
a) about the above preparations of the Russians for the offensive;
b) about the expediency of ending the hopeless and devouring battles for the rest of Stalingrad; and in connection with this:
c) the impossibility of preparing reserves to repel the expected Russian offensive.
The command of the army group "B", which shared the opinion of the command of the 6th Army, however, could not do anything and forwarded the following orders and conclusions to the OKW:
a) that the OKW, in the light of the well-known general opinion about the state of the Russian forces, does not believe in the danger to the Don Front in the form of a Russian offensive;
b) that the 6th Army itself must provide itself with reserves; that for the rest, for the Allied Don Front, there are enough reserves standing there (including the 48th Panzer Corps with the 22nd Panzer Division and the 1st Romanian Panzer Division behind the front of the 3rd Romanian Army);
c) that in this situation it is necessary to complete the attack on the remainder of Stalingrad in order to eliminate this focus;
d) that aviation will operate on a large scale in the areas of strategic deployment of the Russians.
Combat troop strength
Under the prevailing situation, the reduction in the combat capability of the divisions assumed an increasingly serious character. This picture can be visualized by recalling one of the conversations about this between the army commander and IIa (the affairs of the command staff). Around the end of October or the beginning of November, Na reported the following to the commander at the army headquarters in Golubinka.
Colonel Adam: “In connection with the heavy fighting in Stalingrad, the combat strength of the infantry of the 6 divisions operating there was reduced by 30 percent. 5 sapper battalions, given to us in the second half of October and brought into battle as assault battalions, are almost completely defeated. According to a report from the OKH, one cannot yet count on replenishment from convalescents. How should combat units, with such a small number, withstand the winter?
Commander's response: "Prepare me, regardless of the current report, a review of the state of the army's personnel for a report to the OKH. I will write the corresponding cover letter myself. In addition, from now on, on every important issue of the conduct of the struggle, it will be more often than before that the unfavorable situation with the number of troops will be pointed out.
The 6th Army consisted of three tank regiments, the 14th, 16th and 24th tank divisions, with 200 tanks in total, which could be sent into battle at any moment. But the arrows and artillery of this tank division were busy in the battles. In mid-November, the army had only a small reserve of infantry at its disposal.
By this time, as a reserve of the army southeast of Kletskaya, behind the left flank (XI Army Corps), there was a mixed formation equal in size to a regiment, as well as a tank regiment and an anti-tank division of the 14th tank division (with division headquarters).
The beginning of a major Russian offensive
On November 19, 1942, a major Russian offensive began against the 3rd Romanian Army (to the left of the 6th), whose front was broken through on the same day; On November 20, the front of the 4th Panzer Army, which stood to the right of the 6th, was also broken through.
In contrast to the opinion of the OKW mentioned above, the scale of the Russian offensive corresponded to the assessment by the command of the 6th Army and the army group "B", which they had long talked about.
1) On the morning of November 19, an order was given to the XIV Panzer Corps with the 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions - since they were not busy at the front - to be on the western bank of the Don for a counterattack against the Russians advancing south from the Kletskaya area.
2) Transfer the section of the front of the XIV Panzer Corps to the jurisdiction of the I arm. corps.
3) Stop the attacks in the city area and withdraw the troops of the 1st and 8th arm. corps as reserves at the disposal of the army command.
4) To occupy the bridgehead on the western bank of the Don, west of Kalach, with the forces of all rear units (the officer training school, the sapper school).
5) Immediately evacuate the wounded behind Chir and rear services and units that are not needed.
6) Secret directive to the corps commanders: prepare the retreat of the corps to the western bank of the Don. Take the wounded and materiel with you. The idea is to create a new front on the Don and counterattack the enemy with as many forces as possible. Development of directives only in the operational departments of the headquarters of the corps. Avoid any kind of unrest in the troops. The time of execution will be ordered separately.
The external situation that arose these days in the area of operations of the army was characterized by the following:
a) front the army was not attacked;
b) withdrawal of troops from the front and the regrouping of forces according to the order developed systematically;
in) rear parts armies (numbering approximately 80,000 people) were located on both sides of the Don in the west within the line west of Nizhne-Chirskaya, Surovikino, south of Kletskaya. Parts of these rear troops were engaged in the defense of their quarters, but were unable to offer prolonged resistance due to the small size of the fighting force. The main mass, temporarily echeloned, retreated according to the order to the southern coast of the Chir and settled down on both sides of Surovikino for defense;
G) headquarters army, together with the 1st echelon (headquarters task force) on November 19 was in Dove on the Don. The echelon of the chief quartermaster is in the village, 2 km south of Kalach.
In connection with further events and the obvious fact that the countermeasures taken were insufficient to stop the Russian offensive, as well as the advance of the Russians in the direction of Kalach, on November 20 in the afternoon, the operational group of the headquarters of the 6th Army and the echelon of the chief quartermaster had to be transferred to Nizhne-Chirskaya, provided for in as a winter camping headquarters. Therefore, lines of communication with the front and rear were already prepared there. The rest of the headquarters followed there on 21 November.
As early as November 19, by telephone, I personally received the following order from the OKW from the commander-in-chief of the army group “B”, g / p von Weichs: “The 6th Army, by all means, remain in its current positions and hold Stalingrad. Countermeasures have been taken." I again expressed to von Weichs the opinion, which he shared and which was mentioned in the highest authorities, that it was necessary, without losing a single day, to pull the army to the Don.
Discussion of the situation with the commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, General of the Panzer Troops Khyube in Golubinka on November 20
On November 20, the headquarters of the XIV Panzer Corps arrived in Golubinka, under whose command the existing reserves of the army, partly already in battle, were transferred.
In addition to me, the discussion was also attended by: General of the Panzer Troops Khübe with his chief of staff, Colonel Tunert, and Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, Major General Schmidt.
General Schmidt reported on the situation at the front and said something like this:
“The result of the individual reports just reported is that the Russians are obviously going to surround the 6th Army with two-sided coverage from the northwest and southeast in the general direction of the Kalach region. On the front of the army, not yet attacked and prepared for defense, little can happen. Therefore, here we must draw out the latter. It is clear that both major Russian breakthroughs in the areas of the 3rd Romanian and 4th Panzer armies can finally be stopped only with the help of the reserves of the high command. So we have to fight to buy time."
General Paulus:
“Therefore, the task of the XIV Panzer Corps: immediately contacting the XI Army Corps and in close cooperation with it, take the heights on both sides of Sukhanov.”
General Hyube:
General Paulus:
“The allocation of these units from the front and their transfer have already been ordered. But we cannot wait in this position. I will see to it that XI Army Corps supports you with artillery and infantry. Once again, no time to waste.
As a result of everything, time was won, which subsequently made it possible to transport the XI arm. corps across the Don again to the east.
On November 20, the Russian offensive on the left flank of the army west of the Don was temporarily stopped with the help of reserves. On this day, information was received about strong Russian attacks in the area of the 4th Panzer Army and rumors about the forces of Russian tank units that had broken through there.
In the telephone conversations that took place in this connection between the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group "B" and myself, the unity of views in assessing the situation was again revealed. Von Weichs pointed out that (by order of the OKW) in the arm. countermeasures are being taken by the grouping (I did not speak about them in more detail), but they have not yet had their effect. In general, his directive was as follows: "The 6th Army must hold its present positions."
November 21, in the morning, the wire connection with the army group "B" was interrupted. Before noon, in addition to urgent reports, the following important reports were also received, explaining the seriousness of the situation:
1) From XI arm. corps (General of Infantry Shtreker) about the situation west of the Don: “The situation on the left flank (of the corps), already pushed back, is very doubtful. The Russians are coming in more and more from the west to cover us from two sides. The last reserves of the corps have been set in motion. Panzer divisions adjoining from the south could hardly hold out for long against the superior Russian forces. What the situation is further to the west is unknown. There is no more communication with the command of the neighbors on the left (Romanians). The Russians are constantly moving more and more troops across the Don.”
2) On the situation in the area of the 4th Panzer Army:
a) From I arm. corps(Artillery General von Seydlitz): “According to unverified information, the Russian tanks that had broken through to the right of the neighbor had already crossed the Stalingrad-Kotelnikovo road. There is an assumption that the Russians also broke through to the south on a wide front in the region of the 4th Panzer Army.
b) From the Chief Quartermaster of the 6th Army:“Parts of the rear troops of the 4th Panzer Army have been retreating to the western bank of the Don since last night. The rest of the units occupied the rear guard line with the northern flank about 30 km southeast of Kalach.
in) Radiogram from the 4th Panzer Army:“The situation on the front of the army is unclear. The Russians, apparently with the tank units that have broken through, are moving southwest towards Kotelnikovo, as well as northwest. The army headquarters, in view of the approaching Russian tanks, is transferred to the Tsibenko area.
Thus, the situation manifested itself from the most unfavorable side.
Under this impression, I flew on November 21 at about 13.00 on two planes from Golubinka to Nizhne-Chirskaya, together with the beginning. headquarters by Major General Schmidt and two officers for assignments, after the last parts of the task force of the army headquarters were sent there in the first half of the day.
When boarding the plane, from the northwest came the noise of a battle that took place about 4-5 km away.
Already from the plane and during landing in Nizhne-Chirskaya, I saw a lively jerky movement of the columns and especially the evacuation of the wounded.
Upon arrival at the cantonment site, along with other reports confirming the situation described above, I received another one that even radio contact could not be established with the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army.
Following this, I had a telephone conversation with the commander-in-chief of the army group "B", Colonel-General von Weichs, in which I stated something like the following:
"The fears expressed yesterday regarding the encirclement that threatened the 6th Army were confirmed by the further development of events." Then I briefly conveyed the content of the reports received at the headquarters of the 6th Army and continued: “Therefore, I ask you to pull the 6th Army to the southern part of the large bend of the Don and to the Chir. In this way, forces can be released at the same time in order to restore contact with neighbors and again form a solid front. How and to what extent this will be done depends on the evolution of the situation. It is necessary to hurry with making a decision, since I arm. the corps needs three days to deploy the movement. The retreat of the army, as it can already be seen now, is possible only with battles, since both fronts must fight their way.
Weichs replied: “I am of the same opinion and will express it at headquarters. But until a decision is made, the 6th Army must hold its previous positions.
At about 20.00, by telephone and telegraph, the following, approximately, order was received from the army group "B":
“By order of the Fuhrer (transmitted through the OKH, Chief of Staff, General Zeitzler) of the 6th Army, under all circumstances, hold Stalingrad and the front on the Volga. If, in the event of a rupture of the flanks, it will be necessary to restore the front of the army, this should be done without leaving Stalingrad. Move the army command post to the area east of Kalach. IV Corps of the 4th Panzer Army (3 German, 1 Romanian divisions) is subordinate to the 6th Army. Countermeasures are generally accepted. Further orders will follow."
Hitler's superior decision was communicated by telephone to the corps commanders, with something like the following addition on my part:
“The considerations and preparatory measures for the retreat of the corps beyond the Don and Chir transmitted today by order should still be carried out so as not to waste time in this case. I will continue to work in this direction. What is rejected today may be understood tomorrow.”
This was followed by an additional order I arm. corps to prepare in the Gumrak region (about 400 meters from the command post) the vacant quarters for the headquarters of the 295th Infantry. divisions (dugouts) for the reduced operational group of the headquarters of the 6th Army.
Late in the evening of November 21, another telephone conversation took place with the commander-in-chief of the army group "B".
Confirming the receipt of the above order, I stated something like the following:
“Meanwhile, the situation has worsened even more. Russian tanks are already on the heights northwest of Kalach. I doubt whether the formation of a defensive ring is even possible, according to the order. The movement of units can begin on November 22. But first of all, I do not know with what forces the gap between the right and left flanks of the army should be filled. Will XI Arm. body, that's another question. With the IV army transferred to my jurisdiction. I don't have a communication corps yet. Nothing has been prepared for the construction of defensive positions on the new front line. In the steppe region between the Volga and the Don, there are no building materials, water, fuel, etc. I myself, together with the operational group of the army headquarters, will fly tomorrow to Gumrak, since the only land connection through Kalach is in doubt. I renew my request for the retreat of the army, which is now still possible, even with heavy fighting in the future. A written proposal with justification will be sent.
Colonel General Weichs replied: “I will continue to act in the spirit of your assessment of the situation, which I share. But first of all, you must carry out the order received.
On the morning of November 22, at about 0700, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Goth, with the chief of staff of this army, Colonel Fangor, and also with part of the headquarters, stopped on his way to Nizhne-Chirskaya. He appeared at my place with conspicuous feigned calmness and said something like the following: “The headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army, by order of the army group, is withdrawing to build a new front line in the rear and to meet the retreating units of the 4th Panzer Army. What remains after the transition of the IV Panzer Corps under the command of the 6th Army - I do not know. Details about the position of IV arm. The hulls are also unknown to me. I, with my headquarters, as well as the headquarters of the IV Corps, with difficulty got away from the Russian tanks. Last night they (tanks) were in the area south of Tsybenko. After I briefly explained the situation of the 6th Army, he said goodbye to me in a depressed mood with the following words: "We probably won't see each other again."
a) from XI arm. corps: “The Russians are all moving their forces across the Don in the region west of Kletskaya. The Russian attacks against the left flank of the corps are obviously only a cover for the flank of the main units, which are moving further and further to the west. In addition to tanks, strong infantry is also advancing to the southeast. The XIV Panzer Corps is currently defending itself in the Sukhanov region against Russian attacks.
b) from I arm. corps: "Communication with the headquarters of the IV arm. corps (general of sapper troops Yeneke) in the district north of Tsybenko was installed.
in) from the head of the Don bridgehead:"Russian tanks broke through from the northwest to Kalach."
I first reported the above messages in general, then I said:
“Thus, we are directly facing the encirclement of the 6th Army. Therefore, I repeat my proposal to break through to the west, if only for reasons of supply.
I cannot imagine how an army of more than 200 thousand people can be supplied from the air for a long time. Even in calm times, when there is no major battle, this would require 500-600 Yu-52s daily, not taking into account the opposition of Russian aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. I myself am flying out now with the chief of staff to the new army command post in Gumrak. The rest of the task force will follow there in the evening."
The answer of Colonel-General von Weichs:
“We are also aware of your precarious position. I continue to act in the spirit of the 6th Army. Good luck!"
Between 13.00 and 14.00 I arrived in Gumrak (from Nizhne-Chirskaya) by plane from the beginning. headquarters and two officers for assignments.
We flew at an altitude of 800 meters. Already in the area east of Kalach one could observe the battle. The rest of the task force of the headquarters arrived at nightfall in two Yu-52 planes.
Command post of the headquarters of the 6th Army in Gumrak
From noon on 22.XI to 25.XI:
a) encirclement of the 6th army;
b) the proposals of the headquarters of the 6th army to break through the ring were rejected.
Location of the command post of the 6th Army
In general, there were about 7-8 dugouts, in which about 20 officers and 40 soldiers were located. One dugout for telephone communication. Motor vehicles and a field kitchen were dug into the ground, equipped with gangways and covered with a canopy. The radio station was located aside, a kilometer to the north-west, and occupied 2 dugouts. She maintained contact with the headquarters of the army group and with the OKH. With the headquarters of the corps in the environment there was a telephone connection.
My first measures upon my arrival at Gumrak were aimed at forming a solid ring front east of the Don, in accordance with the order of the OKW dated November 21, transmitted through the army grouping. To this end, the army headquarters issued the following orders:
a) XI arm. the corps retreated with fighting across the Don to occupy the line of the left flank of the VIII corps, first along the Don, then turning back to the area 10 km northeast of Kalach.
b) The headquarters of the XIV Panzer Corps to join the XI Army. corps to the district west of Bazargino, there join the IV army. hull.
On the basis of preliminary orders, the guard units stood on the named line from noon on November 22.
The total duration of these advances was calculated to be 5–6 days. Parts moved forward according to plan.
Regardless of the fulfillment of orders lowered from above, proposals for a breakthrough from the ring in a westerly direction were again repeated by radio and in writing (sent by plane). Also, the preparatory measures of the headquarters of the corps were carried out in such a way as not to delay the beginning of the breakthrough.
November 22, while I was in the dugout, early. headquarters, together with General Schmidt, made a new proposal (radiogram) for a breakthrough, von Seydlitz came. He took part in the conversation. His remarks culminated in the following (roughly) excited words: “It's crazy to be here! After all, we will die here! We must get out of the boiler as soon as possible.”
The new proposal of the headquarters of the 6th Army, summarizing and emphasizing all past proposals, read approximately as follows:
“Further resistance, as ordered, in the environment is impossible. Too little power. More than half of the front we do not have prepared positions. There are no materials for building defensive positions. First of all, there is no forest for dugouts. And all this before the beginning of the Russian winter ... The supply, while there was a land connection, was already insufficient. Air supply is even more inadequate.
Therefore, because of the winter conditions of the struggle, which people cannot endure, and because of the insufficient supply from the air, which depends on meteorological conditions in winter, it is impossible to stay further in the boiler. I once again and earnestly ask you to give immediate permission for a breakthrough.
The same proposal was sent on November 23 in writing, in detail, with an accurate calculation of everything necessary, through one officer by plane to the army group "B" and to the army group "Don" (Field Marshal von Manstein), to which the 6th Army became subordinate with November 24th. All corps commanders were aware of this proposal. They shared the opinion of the army headquarters.
During November 23, the 6th Army can be seen as encircled. Late in the evening of November 23, from the OKH, through the von Weichs army grouping, Hitler's decision as a response to my proposal to break out of the boiler ... In addition to the fact that the encirclement near Stalingrad was suddenly unexpectedly called a "fortress", in order contained the following items:
a) the exact establishment of the front line on the map 1:100,000 with the task of holding this "fortress" in all cases;
b) an indication of an offensive planned for early December with the aim of freeing the 6th Army from encirclement by forces of new units led by the 4th Panzer Army;
c) a promise to supply from the air to a sufficient extent.
On November 24, the commander of the 1st army. corps, General of Artillery von Seydlitz, in connection with the conversation on November 22, presented a memorandum. In it, in addition to a brief description tactical of the position and condition of the troops, mainly the seriousness of the situation with the supply of the army was stated. The memorandum reached its climax in the proposal to arbitrarily, contrary to orders from above, break out of the encirclement, "responsible only to the German people".
I agreed with the business characterization of the position. Taking into account the strategic consequences of arbitrary actions (Caucasian Front), I decided to submit this memorandum to the von Manstein army group as a new attempt, in the spirit of my previous proposals, to obtain permission for a breakthrough. This memorandum, with the above addition on my part, was sent by courier by plane to the army group "Don" (von Manstein) on November 25th.
Even before Seydlitz's memorandum reached the army grouping, on November 25, at dawn, I received a message that the radio stations were accepting an order from the OKH. In view of the exceptional tension, waiting for permission to break through, the request for which was repeated several times and persistently, I myself went to the radio station, located at a distance of 1 km, and was present at the decoding of the radio message.
The OKH order read something like this: “The eastern and northern sections of the front of the 6th Army, up to the railway south of the stop, south of Kotluban, should be transferred under the sole command of General of Artillery von Seydlitz, commander of the 1st Army. corps, which is for holding this front is directly responsible to the Fuhrer…»
The radiogram with this order, which I had to take as a lack of confidence in my person, I personally transmitted to General von Seydlitz at his nearby command post. When I asked how he now felt about the idea of a breakthrough against the order from above, he answered me that under these circumstances (i.e., with his direct responsibility to Hitler), he had no choice but to adhere to the order.
All subsequent time was occupied by regrouping forces, reorganizing the line of defense, organizing air supply in conditions of encirclement (evacuation and replenishment), as well as preparing for the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army to liberate the 6th Army.
After the regrouping of forces the following picture of the composition of the troops came to light: the total number of those on allowance at the time the Russian offensive began was 300,000 people in round numbers. In the encirclement at the end of November, 220,000 (rounded) consisted of allowances. Combat equipment of troops surrounded: about 3200 guns, including anti-tank guns and grenade launchers, 200 tanks.
80,000 people of the difference were rear services and units, as well as evacuated units of the army outside the encirclement.
air supply
For this, the Pitomnik airfield and two small alternate airfields near Gumrak were provided. The OKW plan for air resupply did not take into account the meteorological conditions of the winter, nor the change in situation that caused the constant movement of the air supply base further and further west. Hence the result that on many days nothing was received at all, while on others, instead of the daily minimum of 600 tons, at most 140 tons arrived, but more often only 80-100 tons.
With the loss of Gumrak (January 24, 1943), air supply ceased altogether, except for the fact that sometimes the essentials were dropped in a minimal amount.
The offensive of the 4th Panzer Army (commanded by Colonel-General Goth) from the district southwest of Kotelnikovo to liberate the 6th Army
The exchange of opinions, in writing and by radio, between the 6th Army and the army group "Don" (Field Marshal von Manstein) regarding the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army can be summarized in two meetings held at the command post of the army headquarters in Gumrak. To do this, the beginning flew into the environment. army headquarters. grouping "Don" Major General Schultz (27.XI.42) and early. Colonel Busse of the operational department of the headquarters of the grouping (30.XI.42).
Both meetings were held in the dugout early. headquarters of the 6th Army, Major General Schmidt and dealt with the same issues. Both Schultz and Busse set out the intentions of the high command as follows:
“The 6th Army must hold Stalingrad at all costs. The 4th Tank Army (8-9 divisions) was given the task of setting out from the areas southwest of Kotelnikovo and south of Nizhne-Chirskaya to establish contact with the 6th Army and recapture the original front line of the 4th Tank Army. As first aid in supplying the 6th Army, the 4th Panzer Army will lead a large convoy in vehicles with a load of 3,000 tons.
My answer: “I remain on my point of view, known in arm. grouping that this plan does not represent a solution to the problem of Stalingrad:
1) The 4th Panzer Army is not strong enough to break through the ring around Stalingrad for sure if the 6th Army does not simultaneously break through to the south.
2) If Goth does not reach this goal, the position of the 6th army will worsen even more, since then the last reserves will be tied up. Thus, the last opportunity for a breakthrough of the 6th Army will disappear.
3) Also, if Goth, having set out alone, does not achieve his goal, all hope will be lost of radically improving the serious situation with the supply of the 6th Army. In this case, the possibility of further resistance, already due to some reasons for supply (not to mention human forces), is sharply limited.
4) In addition, the stabilization of the situation on the broken Don Front is not yet foreseen in any way, so that even with the success of Gotha's offensive, the 4th Panzer Army will also face the threat of being cut off.
Therefore, my proposal has in mind the only true solution: get out of the trap of Stalingrad. To do this, the 4th Panzer Army should advance to the northeast, the 6th Army to the southwest, to meet on the dominant hill 60 km southwest of Stalingrad. Both attacks must be coordinated in time.
Then the 6th Army will be really saved, and the command will receive reserves for the construction of a new front line.
General Schultz, like Colonel Busse, agreeing with me, they declared that Field Marshal von Manstein also shared the opinion of the 6th Army.
My answer to this: "In this case, I will give an order regarding the breakthrough of the 6th Army in order to break through towards Goth."
Both representatives of the Armenian gangs told me that there is no talk about it yet. That the Fuhrer's order to hold Stalingrad is now in force. That measures to prepare for a breakthrough can be carried out only after consent is received from above.
For direct negotiations between the headquarters of the 6th army and arm. grouping "Don" in early December, a direct wireless connection was established. It existed until the beginning of January.
4th Panzer Army set out on December 8 and reached the aforementioned, of great importance, a hill 60 km southwest of Stalingrad, but already at the beginning of the second half of December it was thrown back to Kotelnikovo. The 6th Army did not receive permission to meet her. Thus, any possibility of liberation from the cauldron collapsed.
The situation on the Don Front also worsened in December as a result of the Russian breakthrough along the front and in depth in the region of the 8th Italian Army.
Mission of the General of Panzer Troops Hube
In the 20th of December, in East Prussia, at Hitler's headquarters, on his orders, General of the Tank Forces Hube was summoned to report on Stalingrad. Around January 6, 1943, Hube returned by plane to Stalingrad. In my dugout near Gumrak, in the presence of the beginning. of the army headquarters of General Schmidt, he stated the following:
“Regarding Stalingrad, the Fuhrer is full of confidence. Now the 6th Army faces the historic task of holding Stalingrad to the last, even if by the end the front is within the city.
The 6th Army must pin down large Russian forces and buy time to enable the southern sector of the Eastern Front, formerly occupied by the Allies, to be rebuilt.
Until mid-February, significant fresh forces will be prepared for a powerful counterattack, as well as troops of the withdrawn army group "Caucasus". Then the current crisis will turn in the direction of victory.”
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