Aviation of the Red Army. Photos from the life of the red army air force

Baranov Mikhail Dmitrievich (10/21/1921 - 01/17/1943)

Hero of the Soviet Union, deputy squadron commander of the 183rd Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 289th Fighter Aviation Division of the 8th Air Army of the Southwestern Front, senior lieutenant.

Member of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941. Fought on the Southern Front. By October 1941, he personally destroyed 5 enemy aircraft. On November 5 and 6, he was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, and on November 8 he shot down He-111 and Me-109 in an air battle. In February 1942 he was appointed deputy squadron commander.

By June 1942, Senior Lieutenant Mikhail Baranov made 176 sorties, personally shot down 20 enemy aircraft and destroyed 6 during ground attack on airfields.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 578) was awarded to Mikhail Baranov on August 12, 1942.

On August 6, 1942, Mikhail Baranov flew out on alert as part of a group of Yak-1 fighters to intercept enemy Ju-87 bombers marching towards the city of Kotelnikovo under the cover of Messerschmitt Bf.109F fighters. The forces were unequal, but the Soviet pilots entered the battle. Baranov shot down two Messerschmitts and one Yu-87, but during the battle he ran out of ammunition. After that, Baranov shot down another Me-109, hitting it with a wing on the tail. Then he met with another German fighter on a collision course, rammed him, but his plane was badly damaged and crashed. Baranov landed by parachute and soon returned to his regiment.

During the landing, he injured his leg and spine. The medical board suspended him from flying, but he continued to fly. Soon he was appointed navigator of the regiment, and then transferred to the 9th Guards Odessa Fighter Aviation Regiment. Due to untreated wounds, he often fell ill. In one of the flights in mid-November 1942, a cramp cramped his leg. He was sent to a rest home. There he got worse and was admitted to the hospital.

He returned to the regiment on January 15, 1943 with a medical report: "Subject to outpatient treatment in part, temporarily not allowed to fly." On January 17, he obtained permission to take to the air. On the first flight, one of the instruments failed. Then Baranov took off on another plane. During the performance of aerobatics, the plane suddenly rolled over, rolled over on its back and in this position fell to the ground and exploded. The pilot died.

He was buried in the city of Kotelnikovo, Volgograd region. After the war, he was reburied in Volgograd on Mamaev Kurgan. In less than a year of fighting, he made 285 sorties, in 85 air battles he personally shot down 31 enemy aircraft and 28 as part of a group, destroyed 6 aircraft at airfields.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner.

chart 1.

Chart 1

Notes:

QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RKKA AIR FORCE ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

Grigory GERASIMOV

More than half a century separates us from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, but disputes still do not stop why the Red Army Air Force suffered a severe defeat in 1941?

Soviet historiography saw one of the main reasons in the presence of an insignificant amount of modern equipment in the Air Force fleet. At the same time, most studies say nothing about the significant quantitative superiority of the Red Army Air Force over the enemy in June 1941, and in fact, on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, the Red Army aviation had 15,986 combat aircraft, while the entire German aviation fleet consisted of 10,000 aircraft. There were 4,000 combat aircraft directly in the troops operating against the USSR.

Why, then, did it happen that aviation, to which the military-political leadership of the country paid so much attention, at a decisive moment turned out to be unable to solve the tasks of protecting the air borders of the Motherland? The answer to this question can be given by analyzing the development of the Air Force in the 20s - early 40s.

The experience of the war has shown that for this it is necessary to study the quantitative and qualitative indicators characterizing aviation in the period under study.

Archival and published documents contain data on the aircraft fleet in the interwar period. The use of the method of expert assessments makes it possible to give a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of aviation for individual years of the interwar period.

Expert assessments include the determination of the conformity of the models of military equipment in service with the requirements of modern combat, i.e. the extent to which these types of aircraft could effectively conduct combat operations, resist air defense systems, and perform combat missions in accordance with their intended purpose. Then they were superimposed on the number of aircraft in service in the second half of the 1920s-1941. The calculation results are presented in graphical form on chart 1.

By 1941, the basis of the bomber aviation of the Red Army Air Force was still made up of obsolete SB-2 and TB-3

The chart clearly shows a number of trends:

First, the constant and steady quantitative growth of aviation technology. There were 515 combat aircraft in the Air Force units in 1925, 3649 in 1933, 6349 in 1938, and 15986 in June 1941;

Secondly, until 1940 the number of modern aircraft in the fleet of the Red Army was growing, and only in 1941 their number decreased, and significantly - from 4324 to 2577. By the beginning of the war, the number of aircraft that fully met the requirements of modern combat operations had decreased to the level of 1937 ;

Thirdly, the number of obsolete aircraft in the combat units of the Air Force was constantly growing. This growth becomes especially rapid in the prewar years: 1938 - 3737, 1939 - 8368, June 1941 - 13409;

Fourth, since the late 1920s the share of modern aircraft was steadily falling: 1928 - 95%, 1932 - 85%, 1937 - 53%, 1940 - 34%, June 1941 - 16%.

The reasons for these trends lay in the field of doctrinal views and the military-technical policy of the Soviet state and the production and technical capabilities of the country's economy.

Aviation was the branch of the armed forces, and then the branch of the armed forces, to which the country's top military-political leadership paid constant and unflagging attention. This was due, first of all, to the significant role that the air force was to play in a future war.

The first Soviet people's commissars for military and naval affairs invariably emphasized the great importance of aviation for future victories. L.D. Trotsky, in an article dedicated to the sixth anniversary of the Red Army, wrote: "If the most difficult task of the first three years was the creation of a revolutionary cavalry, now aviation issues occupy a central place in military development ...". M.V. Frunze also believed that "any state that does not have a powerful, well-organized and trained air fleet will inevitably be doomed to defeat."

At the same time, it is important to note that the top military-political leadership did not accept the theory of the Italian General Douai, according to which aviation was assigned a decisive role in achieving victory in modern warfare, and a course was taken for the harmonious development of all branches of service and types of armed forces.

A milestone decision that drew a line under the disputes about the role of aviation in the structure of the Armed Forces and the prospects for its further development was the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the state of defense of the USSR" dated July 15, 1929, which set the task of bringing the quality of aviation "to the level of advanced bourgeois countries". Guided by this decision, the Council of Labor and Defense, two days later, ordered the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR to clarify the five-year plan for military development, based on the requirement to be stronger than the enemy in three types of weapons, namely, in the air fleet, artillery and tanks.

On June 13, 1930, at a joint meeting of the STO and RVS of the USSR, an updated plan for the construction of the Red Army for the first five-year period was approved. It envisaged, in particular, the transformation of the Air Force into a powerful branch of the armed forces, solving independent operational tasks and ensuring close interaction with other branches of the military, the accelerated construction of heavy bombers, the rearmament of fighter aircraft, the creation of high-quality aircraft and engines, and the conquest of the stratosphere.

Thus, by the beginning of the 1930s, the contours of the future Air Force were clearly defined.

Further changes in views on the future of the air force were largely associated with the name of M.N. Tukhachevsky. In 1930, being the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, he submitted a report on the reorganization of the Armed Forces to the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs K.E. Voroshilov. As Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Biryuzov noted in the preface to selected works of Tukhachevsky, his proposals "not only were not appreciated and supported by Voroshilov and Stalin, but were also met with hostility. In Stalin's conclusion, to which Voroshilov fully joined, it was stated that the adoption this program would lead to the liquidation of socialist construction. What caused the anger of the top party and military leaders?

M.N. Tukhachevsky were to create a powerful, technically equipped army. In the early 30s. it was planned to have: 260 rifle and cavalry divisions, 50 ARGC divisions and 225 PRGC battalions, 40 thousand aircraft, 50 thousand tanks in service. A decade later, having created a powerful industrial base, straining all the forces of the people, spending most of the budget on preparing for war, the USSR managed to create only half of the military-technical potential that M.N. Tukhachevsky proposed. JV Stalin had every reason to call this program the system of "red militarism".

At the same time, a significant increase in the country's military-technical potential during the first five-year plan gave rise to Stalin's hopes for creating a powerful, technically equipped army. Tukhachevsky's plans now seemed not so unrealizable, and their author was again returned to the military Olympus. Now as Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy and Chief of Armaments of the Red Army.

Since 1933 M.N. Tukhachevsky puts K.E. Voroshilov, the question of increasing the size of the Air Force fleet. In one of his memos, he writes: "A general assessment of the possible development of the Air Force of our enemies indicates the need for our country to have 15,000 active aircraft - this reinforcement cannot be stretched out, but carried out in 1934 - 1935." He was supported by G.K. Ordzhonikidze, who guaranteed that the industry would do everything in its power. At the report, Voroshilov imposed a resolution: "America" I do not see. All the same abstract "projects" on 11/23/1933.

Not finding support from the people's commissar, M.N. Tukhachevsky tried to find assistance from the most authoritative military figures of the Red Army and found it in the person of I.P. Uborevich. In a joint note to the People's Commissariat of Defense, they, based on the experience of exercises and maneuvers that have shown the enormous combat capabilities of modern aviation, require an urgent build-up of the Air Force:

"Modern aviation can disrupt rail transport for a long time, destroy ammunition depots, disrupt the mobilization and concentration of troops. The side that will not be ready to defeat the enemy's air bases, to disorganize its rail transport by systematic air attacks, to disrupt its mobilization and concentration by numerous airborne assaults, to the destruction of its fuel and ammunition depots, ... she herself runs the risk of being defeated. Proceeding from this, Tukhachevsky and Uborevich believed that the main decisive link in the development of the Red Army in the coming years should be an increase in the number of aircraft up to 15 thousand active aircraft in 1934-1935.

Against what enemy did Tukhachevsky need 15 thousand combat aircraft? In the operational plans of the mid-30s. the most likely adversary was Poland, which in case of war could be supported by Germany. Both of these states, according to Tukhachevsky's calculations, could field 2,600 aircraft at that time. Definitely, in order to destroy them, fifteen thousand aircraft are too many. Maybe they were needed in order to ensure the guaranteed security of the country in the event of any large-scale war?

Yes, they gave such a guarantee. But what would have happened if the war had not started in the mid-1930s. or did it start later, when this entire aviation armada was morally obsolete? Then the army was in for a disaster. And this catastrophe happened in 1941. It was planned by the untimely deployment of the world's largest air force in the mid-1930s, when there was no real threat of war to the Soviet Union. All European countries had insignificant air forces. In 1934, potential aggressors, including Germany, Japan and Italy, had relatively small air fleets - 620, 2050, 931 combat aircraft, respectively. Other European states: France, England also did not contain large air forces, but had an industrial base for their deployment, they constantly carried out research and development in order to start mass production of modern aircraft in case of war.

Is it possible to lay all the blame for the untimely deployment of numerous Air Forces only on M.N. Tukhachevsky and I.P. who supported him. Uborevich, I.A. Khalepsky? No. They were only executors of the will of I.V. Stalin, who appointed them to high positions, since they were able to talentedly, sincerely and conscientiously pursue a policy of massive technical equipment of the Red Army. The fact that this was Stalin's principled policy is also evidenced by the fact that it did not undergo significant changes after the destruction in 1937-1938. the people who carried it out.

K.E. Voroshilov was against these people and against such an implementation of the military-technical policy. He was a supporter of more moderate and, apparently, realistic solutions, but Stalin did not reckon with him. Voroshilov himself, in order not to lose his post, preferred to remain silent, reconcile and work with people whose views he did not share.

How cost-effective was the military-technical policy of that time? Diagram 2 provides an answer to this question. It shows that the cost of purchasing aircraft was incomparably greater than the cost of combat training, the acquisition of prototype weapons and equipment for the Air Force, and even the cost of all R&D in the estimate of the Red Army. For example, if in 1930 84 million rubles were allocated for the purchase of aircraft, then only 252 thousand rubles were allocated for combat training of the Air Force, 2 million for orders for experimental weapons and equipment, and 11 million rubles for all R&D conducted by the Red Army . In 1935, these figures were respectively - 756, 5.7, 8.6 and 43 million rubles. In 1940, 7.7 billion rubles were spent on aircraft equipment, 16 million rubles on combat training of the Air Force, and 414 million rubles on R&D through the Red Army. In the same year, all spending on education in the USSR amounted to 2 billion rubles, on science - 0.3 billion rubles.

An analysis of expenditures on the purchase of equipment, combat training of the Air Force, R&D shows that huge funds were spent on the production and maintenance of a huge fleet of aircraft in combat readiness, most of which were already obsolete in the prewar period. At the same time, disproportionately little money was spent on the creation of new types of equipment and combat training.

The redistribution of finances in favor of the creation of promising aircraft and better training of pilots would have a greater effect than the maintenance of the world's largest armada of obsolete aircraft.

Another important set of circumstances that led to the fact that the Air Force approached the beginning of the war with the worst indicators of the quality of the aircraft fleet were technical reasons. They were determined by the state and possibilities of the economy, the level of developmental developments and the ability of the industry to master them.

Modern bombers - Pe-2 and Pe-8 by 1941 had just begun to enter combat units and in fact had not yet been mastered by personnel

Chart 1 clearly indicates that the Air Fleet of the Red Army possessed the most modern fleet of vehicles in the 20s. This is explained by the fact that the rate of improvement of combat aircraft after the end of the First World War was not as fast as during the war years or in the thirties. The basis of the fleet of most European countries was the aircraft of the First World War. The same aircraft were in service with the Red Air Fleet.

In the early 20s. even modern aircraft were in the most miserable technical condition. On November 7, 1921, M.V. Frunze wrote about the Air Fleet: “We don’t have one, because you can’t seriously consider the fleet of several hundred vehicles that are known among our pilots as“ coffins. Only the exceptional valor and courage of our aircrew make it possible to use them."

In the abstracts of the report to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR by the head of the USSR Air Force A.P. Rozengolts dated May 9, 1924, the main conditions for the development of the Air Fleet in the USSR were determined: the organization of aircraft and aircraft design industries within the country, the preparation of ground equipment and aviation personnel, the development of aviation sciences and design work.

For the first time, the issue of organizing the aviation industry was discussed by the country's top military leadership in September 1924, and in October of the same year a 3-year aircraft manufacturing program was developed. Unfortunately, the Main Directorate of the Military Industry (GUVP), which was supposed to carry out the implementation of the program, did not have the proper production base and capabilities for this, therefore, already at the beginning of next year, when discussing the results of the implementation of the production program, the Revolutionary Military Council stated its significant underfulfillment. 41 combat aircraft and 132 training aircraft were delivered instead of 254 and 144 respectively. 70 motors were delivered instead of 200. A resolution was adopted obliging the GUVP to deliver all aircraft and motors in accordance with the order.

Due to the weakness of the domestic aviation industry in the early twenties, the military leadership, represented by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, was forced to turn to the purchase of aircraft equipment abroad and the concession construction of aircraft. Foreign partners with whom negotiations were underway on the organization of the construction of aircraft and engines were the German firms "Junker", "Fokker", "WWII".

Cooperation with the Junkers firm, which undertook to create a modern all-metal aircraft at a plant in Moscow, received the greatest development. In reality, the company was able to make only 100 aircraft, which were inferior in quality to foreign counterparts. At the same time, the work of Junkers was of great importance for the development of the Soviet aircraft industry. In particular, in a note sent by K.E. Voroshilov and F.E. Dzerzhinsky to the Politburo of the Central Committee, it was noted: “We have extracted all the drawings and data, both about the aircraft under construction in Fili, and about the organization of production. We put this material in the basis for the organization of its own production of metal aircraft".

In 1927-1928. managed to establish a mass production of aircraft, but, as was emphasized in the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the quantitative expansion of production was not accompanied by a qualitative improvement in aircraft and engines. In this regard, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR believed that aviation should be fully provided with high-quality domestic products. At a meeting in 1928, the Revolutionary Military Council stated: "The level of technology, the degree of security and the state of aviation, except for fighter aviation, is considered satisfactory, and fighter aviation is threatening." The way out was found in the urgent purchase of 100 fighters abroad, followed by the organization of mass production under license of the most modern foreign fighter.

BB-22 Yakovlev - outdated before he was cured of "childhood diseases"

The struggle for the independence of the domestic aircraft industry from abroad continued until the beginning of the 30s, in connection with which, at the end of 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council determined a detailed list of measures necessary to ensure the production in the USSR of all units and parts for aircraft and aircraft engines.

Questions of production of engines, armament of aircraft remained open. In the Decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR "On the state of aviation armament" adopted in January 1929, it was recognized that the situation with the armament of the Air Force had made very little progress. This was especially true of machine guns and the production of aerial bombs.

An important milestone in the provision of aviation with military equipment and weapons was the adoption in January 1929 of the system of the air fleet of the Red Army and a five-year plan for pilot construction. The main attention was paid to the creation of a powerful bomber and fighter aircraft. The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks / "On the state of defense of the USSR" adopted on July 15, 1929 stated: "... the most important task for the coming years in the construction of red aviation is to bring its quality to the level of advanced bourgeois countries as soon as possible, and by all means should be planted, cultivated and develop their own, Soviet scientific and design forces, especially in engine building". The presence by this time of a relatively well-established aviation industry ensured the fulfillment of supply plans.

In 1933, in the report of the head of the Air Force of the Red Army, an assessment was made of the technical equipment of the air fleet: "Our air fleet, being the most powerful in the world, lags behind the air forces of the advanced capitalist countries in terms of the quality of its materiel, and is inferior even to Poland and Japan in terms of fighter aviation."

The 30s, especially their second half, were the "golden age" of military aviation, when development accelerated incredibly. Moral obsolescence of equipment occurred sometimes in 3-4 years, sometimes in a year! For example, the Su-2 and Yak-2 (Yak-4) were not considered modern aircraft in 1941, although their production was carried out for no more than a year or two. The I-153 "Chaika" fighter was really obsolete, which was put into series in 1939 and continued to be produced in small quantities in 1941.

The Soviet Union was really late with the development of combat aircraft, which are considered to be "modern" at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The Germans had a serial Bf 109 in 1936, the British had the Hurricane and Spitfire in 1937. Our main fighters (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3) were put into production only in 1940 ., since the hopes for earlier machines (I-180) did not materialize. In reality, mass production of modern aircraft was launched only in 1941. A significant role in this was also played by the saturation of the Air Force with obsolete, but still quite technically sound aircraft, which prevented the rearmament and repression of design personnel.

An analysis of the state of aviation technology shows that the most important reason that hindered the creation of modern aviation in the USSR was the lack of high-quality domestic engines that corresponded to world standards. This was especially evident in the late 1930s and early 1940s. On the eve of the war we had:

- in-line V-shaped M-105 with a power of 1100 hp (reproduction of the French "Hispano-Suiey" with forcing), due to the need for refinement, it entered the supply only in the second half of 1940, and actually became brought up no earlier than mid-1941. By this time, the Germans considered the standard Dfl09F fighter with an engine DB 601N with a power of about 1350 hp, which gave the enemy a noticeable advantage, since with approximately the same mass of fighters, the power load on the Germans became less.

- in-line V-shaped AM-35A designed by Mikulin, with a power of 1350 hp, the only motor of a completely domestic design. It was distinguished by a very large mass - 850 kg, while English and German engines of similar power weighed no more than 700 kg. This, along with weak armament and excessive altitude, was the reason for the relatively small success of the MiG-3.

- double-row star-shaped M-88B (reproduction of the French "Mistral-Major" with forcing and a two-speed supercharger) with a capacity of 1100 hp. In reality, this engine was put into production in 1941, and therefore at the first stage it was distinguished by low reliability, which was especially bad for long-range bomber aviation, since failures over enemy territory threatened with an emergency landing and loss of equipment and crew. According to its data, it belonged to an outdated generation of motors. Modern "stars" in the early 40s. reached the power level of 1500-1700 hp

- single-row star-shaped engines M-62 and M-63 (reproduction of the American "Wrights") with a power of 1000-1100 hp, obsolete, although they had good specific characteristics, but were not applicable to modern fighters (they were equipped with I-16 and I-153), during the war years they were used on transport vehicles, for example, on Li-2.

- the only truly advanced engine that was in service in 1941 was the Shvetsovsky M-82 with a power of 1700 hp, created based on the "motives" of French engines. It was mass-produced, but in 1941 it was not installed on any production aircraft, except for a small batch of Su-2. Due to the fact that the M-82 was a new design, it had a lot of shortcomings, including significant ones. . It was possible to finish the engine only by 1943 with the creation of the M-82FN modification.

Thus, an important reason for the backwardness of Soviet military aviation, which manifested itself in the late 30s, was the delay in the development of a new generation of engines. It was laid down by the very logic of the development of a new generation of engines, associated at that time mainly with the reproduction of imported American and French engines, which at the time of purchase were no longer quite modern, and taking into account the time for mastering, fine-tuning, etc., they caused a qualitative lag from other countries, especially from the Germans and the British.

If you look even deeper, then the backlog of the USSR was, as it were, echeloned along several levels: aircraft (1st level); motors (2nd level); technologies (3rd level); machine tool building (4th level); education and culture of production (5th level), etc.

The military-political leadership of the country clearly saw the need to invest in problems of the 1st level, and this led to the creation of many aviation design bureaus. Level 2 problems were largely recognized. Much has been done to develop education. Less attention was paid to cultivating a culture of production – apparently much longer periods are needed to develop it. Technologies at that time were almost completely borrowed, which was due to the weakness of fundamental science, the lack of scientists. The machine tool industry developed at a rapid pace, but the machines were primitive, there was a lack of precise, high-performance equipment, which led to the fact that entire aircraft factories, for example, Kazan No. 124, had to be equipped with American equipment.

As historical experience shows, real, long-term, and not instantaneous, from the last forces, success is ensured by levels of 3, 4, 5 orders. Conditions for their development in the 30s. did not exist in the USSR.

Creation in 1943-1944. fighters that seriously competed with the German ones, and, in particular, the Yak-3 and La-7, became possible due to successes in the field of aerodynamics, the maximum reduction in the mass of our machines, including due to weapons and fuel reserves, as well as squeezing out of our motors, the latest "juices". Thanks to this, our M-105PF2 and ASh-82FN engines approached the German ones in terms of specific characteristics, but were still inferior to them in absolute terms. The DB 605 on the Bf 109G had a power of 1650 hp, while the M-105PF2 on the Yak-3 had only 1280, but the Soviet aircraft was 500-600 kg lighter. The BMW 801J engine, which was installed on the FW 190A-9, was about 150 hp. more powerful than our ASh-82FN, but the La-7 was again somewhat lighter than the German aircraft,

The analysis of the technical condition of the Red Army Air Force testifies to the presence of a number of objective and subjective reasons that led to a decrease in the share of modern combat aircraft in the country's air fleet in the prewar period.

Modern aircraft on the eve of the war were "raw" machines, and this is confirmed by an analysis of the technical condition of the Air Force fleet in the 30s - early. 40s

Chart 2 shows the following trends:

– General increase in the share of serviceable aviation equipment;

– Increasing the share of serviceable obsolete aircraft;

- Decrease, immediately before the war, in the share of serviceable modern military equipment.

Strange and incomprehensible, at first glance, is the decline in the proportion of serviceable modern aircraft. This happened only once in the history of domestic aviation in the interwar period, and it is clear that this event is not accidental. These aircraft were created in a hurry, their fine-tuning was carried out directly in the troops, therefore among them the proportion of faulty aircraft exceeds that of obsolete military equipment. Of course, one must also take into account the fact that the obsolete equipment was produced only 1-3 years ago and was only morally obsolete, but still its technical condition was better than that of new aircraft that had just left the factory.

Dry figures characterizing the technical state of the army's combat effectiveness are filled with living content only when they are compared with similar indicators of a specific enemy with whom real combat actions will have to be carried out. Unfortunately, there are no complete data on the qualitative state of German aviation. But you can make an approximate comparative analysis based on the available figures.

Soviet aviation included 16% of modern types of combat aircraft, about the same number had the Iraqi Air Force during the operation "Desert Storm" by the multinational forces, and could not resist the enemy. Why did the Soviet Air Force continue to fight under approximately similar conditions and eventually won air supremacy?

First of all, thanks to the huge stock of aviation equipment and its economic potential. The group of German troops that attacked the USSR included 4,000 combat aircraft. They were opposed by 7469 aircraft in the Western theater of operations and 2311 as part of the AGK aviation, in which there were 2061 aircraft of modern types, which accounted for 51% of the total number of German aircraft, but if we take into account all modern machines of the Red Army Air Force, then this figure will grow to 64%, and this may already indicate, if not the equality of forces, then at least the comparable quantitative and qualitative potential of the air forces of both sides.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the success of combat operations in the air depended not only on the performance characteristics of the aircraft, but also on the level of preparedness of the pilots. Of course, it is one thing to try to fight on some I-5 against a Bf 109F-2, and quite another to fight a competent pilot on an I-16 type 24 of 1940 release against a Bf 109E, especially in a group. And the war gave examples of this kind. For example, twice Hero of the Soviet Union B.F. It was on the I-16 that Safonov made 224 sorties, in which he personally shot down 30 enemy aircraft and 3 in group battles. This suggests that success largely depended on the tactics of combat use, which we, in 1941, as a whole, were, of course, worse worked out than the Germans, especially for modern types of aircraft.

The degree of development of "donkeys" at the beginning of the war was much higher than the MiGs, not to mention the LaGGs and Yaks, which were considered to be in trial operation and did not pass state tests. It is likely that, from the point of view of combat effectiveness, the 2065 I-16s available in the Western theater posed a much greater threat to the Germans than the 845 "modern" MiGs.

The main reasons for the presence of a large number of aircraft of obsolete designs and an insignificant share of modern aircraft in the fleet of the Red Army Air Force at the beginning of the war were: inefficient, costly military-technical policy aimed at creating the largest Air Force in the world without taking into account the real military threat; creation and introduction into mass production of weapons models doomed to rapid obsolescence; and the delay on this basis with the creation of modern types of aviation in the prewar period.

3 Combat and strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War 11941 - 1945 - Sat. Art. No. 1.M., IVI. 1994; History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T.Z. M. Military Publishing. 1974. S.327-328

4 Calculated according to: RGVA f.4, on. 14, d.2678, l.204; d.2396; f.31811, op.2. d.602, l. fourteen; e.bb4 l.3; f.29, op.46, file 271 l.3; f.29, op.26, e, 1, l.65; d.42, l.84; Combat and strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War / 1941 -1945 - Sat. Art. No. l.M., 1994.

5 RGVA, f.4, op. 14, d.30, l.20.

6 Frunze M.V. Sobr. op. T.Z. M., 1929. P.158.

7 History of the Second World War 1939 -1945. T.I. M., 1973. P.258.

8 M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected works. M., 1964. S. 12.

9 RGVA, f.33987, op.3, l 155, l.57.

10 Biryuzov S. Preface II M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected works. T.I. M., 1964. S. 12.

11 RGVA, f.22987, op.3, d.400, l, 112.

13 M.N. Tukhachevsky. Selected works. T.1. M., 1964. S. 13.

15 RGVA, f.22987, op.Z, d.400, l. 178.

16 History of domestic artillery. T.Sh. Book 8. p.201

17 Compiled according to: RGVA, f.51, op.2, d.54, l.74; 448, l.5, 527, l.544.

18 RGVA, f.51, op.2, d.54, l.74; d.448, l.5, d.527, l.544; The national economy of the USSR for 70 years. M., 1987. P.632.

19 Frunze M.V. Selected works. M., 1957. T.2. P.25.

20 RGVA, f. 4, op 7., d. 6, l. 461.

21 According to the explanatory note to the pian, it is based “on the gradual development in accordance with the normal pace of development of human and material resources. The total amount of operating aircraft is increased by 33% from the figure of the previous year. For comparison: the annual increase in operating aircraft in the United States is 8%, England -10%, France -15%, Romania -18%. Nevertheless, the report of the chief of the UVVS of the Red Army stated that the three-year plan for the development of the Air Force for 1925-1928 adopted by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. is the minimum to ensure the air defense of the USSR. RGVA, f.4, op.1, d. 61, l.538; f.33987, op.Z, d.210, l. ten.

22 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d.7, l.230; d.8, l. ten; d.9, l. 132.

23 Issues of cooperation with the "Junker" company were discussed at the meetings of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR 5 times, and with "Fokker" - 4 times. The issue of concluding an agreement on the provision of technical assistance by BMW in the production of engines was also discussed. Not all members of the Revolutionary Military Council were supporters of such cooperation. RGVA, f.4, on. 18, d.7, l. 128,182,219,230,238; d.8, l. 15.16; d.9, l.232,224;d. And, l.268. See also: Mishanov S.A., Zakharov V.V. Military cooperation between the USSR and Germany. M., 1991. pp.54-56.

24 Op. Quoted from: Mishanov S.A., Zakharov V.V. Military cooperation between the USSR and Germany. 1921 - 1933 Analysis of Western historiography. M., 1991. P.56.

25 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d. 15, l.25.

26 RGVA, f.4, op.1, d.707, l.276.

27 RGVA, f.4, op.1, 0.707, l.276.

28 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d, 19, sheet 418.

29 RGVA, f.4, op.2, d.484, l.9.

30 RGVA, f.4, op. 18, d. 19, l.2.

31 of the CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. M., 1981. P.259.

32 RGVA, f.33987, op.3, d.485, l.58.

33 Combat and strength of the USSR Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War / 1941 -1945 Art. Sat. No. 1. M., 1994. S. 244-245.

34 Tulyak Heroes of the Soviet Union. Tula. 1967. S.335-336.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Yakovlev Design Bureau worked with extraordinary stress, which could be considered normal for such a difficult time. With great efforts, the most successful Soviet fighters were designed and introduced into production. Yaks were produced at 15 aircraft factories during the war. Every day, up to 38 Yak fighters left the assembly line. By the end of the war, the fleet of these beautiful fighters accounted for almost 2/3 of the entire Soviet fighter aviation. The words "Yak" and the fighter became synonymous in Russian, and Vladimir Vysotsky even wrote the song "Yak the Fighter".

During 1941-1945, more than 40,000 Yak fighters were produced: 35,086 combat fighters Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak-3 and dozens of their various modifications and variants, 4,955 training aircraft UT-2, also used as combat. The Yakovlev Design Bureau achieved its most important successes at a time when the Motherland needed it most of all. Among the few Soviet enterprises during the Great Patriotic War, it was awarded: on September 18, 1942, the Order of Lenin and on November 12, 1944, the Order of the Red Banner. Flying on the Yak fighter, Alexander Pokryshkin, Hero of the Soviet Union, received his first Gold Star three times. Of the 25 Soviet fighter pilots who became twice Heroes of the Soviet Union, most of the war or part of it fought on Yaks, while French pilots from the Normandie-Niemen squadron fought on Yaks.

Fighter Yak-1

The Yak-1 fighter was created under the guidance of designer A.S. Yakovlev and approved for testing in 1940. The fighter was a cantilever monoplane with a mixed design, which was quite well adapted for mass production conditions. Yak-1 was one of the lightest fighters of its time. The takeoff weight of the aircraft was 2,847 kg, with an empty weight of 2,347 kg. The design of the fighter was mixed: the fuselage frame was shaped, welded from steel chromansile pipes. The bow is sheathed with duralumin, the tail is linen. The wing of the aircraft is wooden, covered with canvas. The plumage frame is duralumin and also sheathed with canvas. With the VK-105P engine, the Yak-1 could reach speeds of up to 580 km / h and climbed 5,000 meters in 5.4 minutes. In terms of its combat and aerobatic qualities, it was one of the best front-line fighters.

The armament of the vehicle included 1 ShVAK cannon of 20 mm caliber, fire was fired through the hollow shaft of the propeller gearbox, as well as 2 ShKAS synchronous rapid-fire machine guns of rifle caliber. A feature of this fighter due to its low weight was ease of piloting and good stability. In the first half of World War II, this aircraft was one of the main Soviet fighters. It harmoniously combined weapons and excellent flight characteristics. Compared to the main German Bf-109E fighter, the Yak-1 had superiority in all types of maneuvers and in speed. But with the advent of the more advanced Bf-109F, its flight performance was no longer enough.

Realizing this, the Yakovlev design bureau was working to improve its combat potential. The aircraft has been modified several times. It changed the engine and armament. When replacing the engine with the M-105PF, the aircraft also received new weapons: instead of 2 7.62-mm ShKAS machine guns, a more powerful 12.7-mm UB machine gun was installed on it. Also, work was underway to improve the aerodynamics of the fighter, it had an improved view of the upper hemisphere from the cockpit and a radio appeared. All these measures made it possible to continuously maintain the excellent combat qualities of the fighter, which remained in service with the Air Force throughout the war. During this time, the factories produced 8,721 Yak-1 aircraft of all types.

The performance characteristics of the Yak-1:

Dimensions: wingspan - 10.0 m, length - 8.48 m,
Wing area - 17.15 square meters. m.
The takeoff weight of the aircraft is 2,850 kg.
Engine type - 1 PD M-105PA, power 1050 hp
Maximum speed - 569 km / h.
Practical flight range: 650 km.
Practical ceiling: 10,000 m.
Crew - 1 person.
Armament: 1 x 20 mm ShVAK cannon, 2 x 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns.

Fighter Yak-7

The Yak-7 was a Soviet single-engine fighter built shortly after the start of World War II. The aircraft was designed on the basis of the training Yak-7UTI, on which full-fledged weapons were mounted, an armored back, protected gas tanks, a system for filling gas tanks with neutral gas from a carbon dioxide cylinder were installed. At the same time, the photo-cinema machine gun was dismantled, equipment and control were removed from the instructor's rear cockpit. After that, it became possible to use it for the transfer of small cargoes, technical personnel during the relocation of parts, the delivery of pilots from emergency landing sites, the installation of an additional gas tank, etc.

The design of the Yak-7B repeated the design of the Yak-1 fighter and was mixed. At the same time, in comparison with the Yak-1, the single-seat Yak-7 was a more advanced fighter with the following advantages: the engine mount was made detachable, which made it possible to modify the aircraft for a different engine; the dimensions of the landing gear wheels now fully corresponded to the flight weight of the machine; due to the displacement of the centering of the fighter forward, the longitudinal stability has significantly increased; the changed ratio between the areas of the stabilizer and the elevator increased the deflection of the elevator and led to improved handling; an increase in the anti-bonnet angle by 1.5 ° to some extent reduced the risk of the car nosed over during heavy braking, and also reduced the length of the landing run.

On the Yak-7B, the ShKAS machine guns were replaced with UBS, and an RSI-4 receiving and transmitting station with a two-beam antenna and a mast was also installed. On variants of the fighter, which were intended for air defense, a landing headlight, an RPK-10 radio semi-compass, and an electric light signaling the retracted position of the landing gear were installed. The version of the aircraft with UBS machine guns met the needs of the front and could be used against both air and ground targets. The aircraft has been produced since 1942, a total of 6399 aircraft of all modifications, including training ones, were produced. The most massive Yak-7B model was produced from 1942 to 1944, a total of 5120 fighters were assembled.

The performance characteristics of the Yak-7B:

Dimensions: wingspan - 10.0 m, length - 8.5 m, height - 2.75 m.
Wing area - 17.15 square meters. m.
Take-off weight of the aircraft is 3,010 kg.
Engine type - 1 PD M-105PF, power 1180 hp
Maximum speed - 570 km / h.
Practical flight range: 645 km.
Practical ceiling: 9,900 m.
Crew - 1 person.

Fighter Yak-9

The Yak-9 fighter was created by the Yakovlev Design Bureau at the end of 1942 and became the most massive Soviet fighter during the Great Patriotic War. The experience of the first year of the war clearly showed that all Soviet fighters (to varying degrees) have one weak feature - insufficient power supply (the ratio of engine power to aircraft weight). That is why they were inferior to the new versions of the Messerschmitt Bf-109F and Bf-109G fighter in vertical maneuver and rate of climb. It was possible to increase the power-to-weight ratio of a fighter either by replacing the engine with a more powerful one, or by reducing the payload (due to weakening weapons, reducing the fuel supply, etc.), or by simplifying the design by replacing wooden elements with metal ones. In 1942, a real opportunity arose in the USSR to use light aluminum alloys in the design of at least some aircraft, and the Yak-9 became one of them.

When creating this aircraft, the Yak-7B fighter with the M-105PF engine was taken as the basis. When creating a new fighter, the wooden wing spars were replaced with metal ones. This event alone allowed me to lose 150 kg of weight. The armament of the fighter consisted of a cannon and a large-caliber synchronous machine gun. The aircraft received a slightly increased fuel supply and a better view from the cockpit. Production of the Yak-9 fighter began at the end of 1942. The machine had excellent maneuverability and excellent aerobatic qualities, was stable in control. Compared to the Yak-1 and Yak-7B, the new fighter had greater speed, rate of climb and better vertical maneuver. This fighter could successfully fight the best German machines.

The Yak-9 became a universal machine with a wide range of specializations. In 1943, the Yak-9T fighter, armed with a 37 mm cannon, was created, in 1944, the Yak-9K fighter, armed with a 45 mm cannon. These fighters were intended to fight bombers, as well as to attack ground targets. In 1943, the Yak-9D fighters, which had an increased fuel reserve, began to arrive at the front, and in 1944, the Yak-9DD version. The maximum flight range of the Yak-9D was 1400 km, for the Yak-9DD it was 1800 km, while for the serial Yak-9 it was 910 km.

After developing and bringing to series a new powerful VK-107A engine designed by V. Ya. Klimov, Yakovlev had a rare opportunity to seriously improve the flight performance of the Yak-9 fighter. At the very end of 1943, a new modification of the Yak-9U was created. This fighter had an excellent rate of climb and the highest speed, its performance was a record for the beginning of 1944. The Yak-9U fighter stood out for its excellent maneuverability both in the vertical and horizontal planes. In 1944, its serial production was started, and the aircraft went to the front. After the war, its release continued for several more years. The Yak-9U was one of the last piston fighters produced in the USSR. In total, during the war years, 16,769 Yak-9 fighters of all modifications were produced.

The performance characteristics of the Yak-9U:

Dimensions: wingspan - 9.74 m, length - 8.55 m, height - 3.0 m.
Wing area - 17.15 square meters. m.
The takeoff weight of the aircraft is 3,204 kg.
Engine type - 1 PD VK-107A, power 1500 hp
Maximum speed - 672 km / h.
Practical flight range: 675 km.
Service ceiling: 10,650 m.
Crew - 1 person.
Armament: 1 x 20 mm ShVAK cannon, 2 x 12.7 mm UBS machine guns.

Fighter Yak-3

The Yak-3 fighter was designed by the Yakovlev Design Bureau in 1943. During its design, the main emphasis was placed on a sharp increase in its flight data, which was supposed to provide the aircraft with a decisive superiority in air battles with German fighters. Since at that time the designers did not have a suitable engine, they focused on improving the weight and aerodynamic perfection of the fighter. The basis was to take the well-known Yak-1. At the same time, a noticeable reduction in aerodynamic drag was achieved by improving individual layout elements and reducing the size of the wing.

Compared to the Yak-1, the new fighter has become lighter by almost 200 kg. The engine builders also had their say, who carried out the second forcing of the M-105PF engine, raising its power by another 80 hp. The new engine was designated M-105PF-2 (since 1944 VK-105PF-2). Serial production of the Yak-3 began in 1944. Air battles demonstrated the superiority of the new fighter over enemy aircraft. The actions of the Soviet air units, which had this fighter in service, were distinguished by very high efficiency. French pilots from the Normandie-Neman regiment fought on the Yak-3. In terms of tactical use, the Yak-3 could not replace other fighters with more powerful weapons or range, but it complemented them perfectly. The Yak-3 embodied the idea of a light, maneuverable and fast fighter.

Among the shortcomings of the fighter, the pilots noted a small supply of fuel, which made free hunting on this machine inefficient. Therefore, the Yak-3 was usually used to call ground posts. Another drawback was the weak fastening of the upper wing skin, there were even cases of its separation at the exit of a fighter from a dive at the maximum allowable speed. Knowing about this feature, the pilots tried not to enter the unacceptable mode, so the cases with the breakdown of the skin stopped, and the maneuverable and light aircraft quickly gained popularity. The Yak-3 was one of the most advanced Soviet fighters of the war, its design was distinguished by rationality and simplicity. In total, 4,848 Yak-3 fighters were produced during the war years.

The performance characteristics of the Yak-3:

Dimensions: wingspan - 9.2 m, length - 8.5 m, height - 2.42 m.
Wing area - 14.85 square meters. m.
The takeoff weight of the aircraft is 2,692 kg.
Engine type - 1 PD VK-105PF-2, power 1240 hp
The maximum speed is 646 km / h.
Practical flight range: 648 km.
Practical ceiling: 10,400 m.
Crew - 1 person.
Armament: 1 x 20 mm ShVAK cannon, 2 x 12.7 mm UBS machine guns.

Information sources:
-http://www.otvoyna.ru/yaki.htm
-http://voenhronika.ru/publ/vtoraja_mirovaja_vojna_sssr_khronika/sovetskaja_aviacija_vtoroj_mirovoj_vojny_rossija_serij_2009_god/22-1-0-921
-http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fww2/yak7b.html
-http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fww2/yak1.html
-http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fww2/yak9u-107.html
-http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fww2/yak3.html

Photos with airplanes. I took the captions and legends for the photographs from there.

Aviation technicians of the Leningrad Front of the 1st mine-torpedo regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet preparing a bomber for the next flight. 1941

Aviation technicians of the Leningrad Front of the 1st mine-torpedo regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet preparing a bomber for the next flight. 1941

Location: Leningrad region

TsGAKFFD St. Petersburg, unit ridge Ar-145181

Muscovites on Sverdlov Square inspect a German plane shot down over the capital. 1941

RGAKFD, 0-312216

Muscovites on Sverdlov Square inspect a German plane shot down over the capital. 1941

RGAKFD, 0-312216

Air unit commander Korolev (left) congratulates Captain Savkin on the excellent performance of the combat mission. 1942

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Air unit commander Korolev (left) congratulates Captain Savkin on the excellent performance of the combat mission. 1942

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-177145

The soldiers are advancing on the copse occupied by the Germans. In the foreground - the wreckage of a downed German aircraft. 1943

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The soldiers are advancing on the copse occupied by the Germans. In the foreground - the wreckage of a downed German aircraft. 1943

Location: Leningrad Front

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Assembly of combat aircraft in the shop of one of the defense plants. 1942

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Assembly of combat aircraft in the shop of one of the defense plants. 1942

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-154837

Professor Predchetensky A.M. inspects combat vehicles collected at the expense of the workers of the Ivanovo region. October 7, 1944

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Professor Predchetensky A.M. inspects combat vehicles collected at the expense of the workers of the Ivanovo region. October 7, 1944

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256694

Appearance of the shop N-sky aviation plant. 1943

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Appearance of the shop N-sky aviation plant. 1943

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Interior view of the aircraft assembly shop at an aircraft factory. March 1943

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Interior view of the aircraft assembly shop at an aircraft factory. March 1943

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Suspension of test bombs to the aircraft at the aircraft building, Order of Lenin Plant No. 18 named after. Voroshilov. 1942

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Suspension of test bombs to the aircraft at the aircraft building, Order of Lenin Plant No. 18 named after. Voroshilov. 1942

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A participant in the All-Union Socialist Competition, a student of a vocational school, Komsomol member A. Fedchenkova, finishing the armored glass of the pilot's cockpit. 1942

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A participant in the All-Union Socialist Competition, a student of a vocational school, Komsomol member A. Fedchenkova, finishing the armored glass of the pilot's cockpit. 1942

RGAKFD, 0-72488

Aerologist-sounder of the Tbilisi airport Krasnikova E. at the instruments after a high-altitude flight. February 02, 1945

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Aerologist-sounder of Tbilisi airport Krasnikova E.U. instruments after high-altitude flight. February 02, 1945

RGAKFD, 0-274703

R.L. Carmen in a group at the plane on one of the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. 1941

RGAKFD, F. 2989, op. 1, unit ridge 860, l. one

One of the aircraft of the squadron, built at the expense of the staff of the State Academic Maly Theater of the USSR, at the airfield before being sent to the front. June 1944

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-163735-in

One of the aircraft of the squadron, built at the expense of the staff of the State Academic Maly Theater of the USSR, at the airfield before being sent to the front. June 1944

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-163735-in

Artists of the State Jazz Orchestra conducted by L. Utyosov inspect the fighter "Merry Fellows", purchased at the expense of the musical group. 1944

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Artists of the State Jazz Orchestra conducted by L. Utyosov inspect the fighter "Merry Fellows", purchased at the expense of the musical group. 1944

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Honored Artist of the RSFSR L.O. Utyosov speaks at a rally on the occasion of the transfer of aircraft built with funds from the State Jazz Orchestra to representatives of the Red Army command. 1944

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Honored Artist of the RSFSR L.O. Utyosov speaks at a rally on the occasion of the transfer of aircraft built with funds from the State Jazz Orchestra to representatives of the Red Army command. 1944

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Fighter squadron "Gorky worker", built at the expense of the workers of the Gorky region, at the airport. 1944

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Fighter squadron "Gorky worker", built at the expense of the workers of the Gorky region, at the airport. 1944

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Fighter Yak-9, built at the expense of the collective farmer F.P. Golovaty. 1944

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Fighter Yak-9, built at the expense of the collective farmer F.P. Golovaty. 1944

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F.P. Golovaty and Guard Major B.I. Eremin near the 2nd aircraft, purchased at the personal expense of F.P. Golovaty and handed over to the Soviet pilot. June 1944

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F.P. Golovaty and Guard Major B.I. Eremin near the 2nd aircraft, purchased at the personal expense of F.P. Golovaty and handed over to the Soviet pilot. June 1944

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Guard Major B.N. Eremin in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of F.P. Golovaty. January 1943

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Guard Major B.N. Eremin in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of F.P. Golovaty. January 1943

Location: Stalingrad Front

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Komsomol members of the Yaroslavl region at the airport hand over to Soviet pilots a squadron of aircraft built with funds raised by the youth of the region. 1942

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Komsomol members of the Yaroslavl region at the airport hand over to Soviet pilots a squadron of aircraft built with funds raised by the youth of the region. 1942

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Member of the agricultural artel "Krasny Luch" A.M. Sarskov and Hero of the Soviet Union, Major F.N. Orlov near the plane, built on the personal savings of A.M. Sarskov. July 10, 1944

RGAKFD, unit ridge 0-256904

Member of the agricultural artel "Krasny Luch" A.M. Sarskov and Hero of the Soviet Union, Major F.N. Orlov near the plane, built on the personal savings of A.M. Sarskov. July 10, 1944

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Guard Lieutenant I.S. Pashayev near the plane, built at the expense of the workers of Kyiv. September 13, 1944

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Guard Lieutenant I.S. Pashayev near the plane, built at the expense of the workers of Kyiv. September 13, 1944

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Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General of Aviation V.I. Shevchenko thanks the representative of the collective farmers of the Ivanovo region E.P. Limonov for the planes built at the expense of the working people of the region. October 10, 1944

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Attack aviation pilot G. Parshin thanks Evgenia Petrovna and Praskovya Vasilievna Barinov for the plane built with their personal savings. June 3, 1944

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Attack aviation pilot G. Parshin thanks Evgenia Petrovna and Praskovya Vasilievna Barinov for the plane built with their personal savings. June 3, 1944

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A squadron of aircraft "Chapaevtsy", built at the expense of the workers of the city of Chapaevsk, and transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front, at the airfield. September 12, 1944

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A squadron of aircraft "Chapaevtsy", built at the expense of the workers of the city of Chapaevsk, and transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front, at the airfield. September 12, 1944

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Aircraft squadron "Moscow", built at the expense of the workers of the Kiev region of Moscow, at the airport. October 16, 1944

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Aircraft squadron "Moscow", built at the expense of the workers of the Kiev region of Moscow, at the airport. October 16, 1944

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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the Komsomol members of Novosibirsk. 1942

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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the Komsomol members of Novosibirsk. 1942

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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the youth of the Khabarovsk Territory. 1942

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A squadron of fighters built with funds raised by the youth of the Khabarovsk Territory. 1942

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Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ryazanov, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and Colonel General S.K. Goryunov inspect aircraft built at the expense of the workers of the city of Znamensk. 1944

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Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain I.N. Kozhedub in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of the collective farmer V.V. Konev. June 1944

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Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain I.N. Kozhedub in the cockpit of an aircraft built at the expense of the collective farmer V.V. Konev. June 1944

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Collective farmer of the agricultural artel “Gudok” K.S. Shumkova is talking with Guard Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Sobolev, who received the Krasnoyarsk Komsomolets aircraft, built with her personal savings. 1943

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Loading ammunition on transport aircraft to be sent to the front. March 1943

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Loading ammunition on transport aircraft to be sent to the front. March 1943

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Loading ammunition at the airport. 1944

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Loading ammunition at the airport. 1944

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Fighter pilots N.F. Murashov, A.G. Shirmanov and technician N.P. Starostin for the release of the Combat Leaflet. July 1941

RGAKFD, 1-104649

Fighter pilots N.F. Murashov, A.G. Shirmanov and technician N.P. Starostin for the release of the Combat Leaflet. July 1941

RGAKFD, 1-104649

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Junior Sergeant A.V. Smirnov, senior sergeant G.M. Ter-Abramov and military commissar S.I. Yakovlev load leaflets on the plane. 1942

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Junior Sergeant A.V. Smirnov, senior sergeant G.M. Ter-Abramov and military commissar S.I. Yakovlev load leaflets on the plane. 1942

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Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet N.A. Ostryakov (left), Commissar of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet, Brigadier Commissar N.V. Kuzenko and the head of the flight inspection, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Naumov (right) at the airport near the plane. 1942

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Captain I.I. Saprykin (left) assigns a combat mission to a fighter unit at the Kherson Mayak airfield. 1942

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Captain I.I. Saprykin (left) assigns a combat mission to a fighter unit at the Kherson Mayak airfield. 1942

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Fighter pilot, captain Balashov V.I. tells combat friends about his experience in air combat. August 1942

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Fighter pilot, captain Balashov V.I. tells combat friends about his experience in air combat. August 1942

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Captain V.I. Balashov, commander of the squadron squadron, explains the course of combat flight to the navigator of the torpedo bomber Nikolai Samoilovich Umansky. 1943

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Captain I.E. Korzunov near the damaged aircraft. In the background, the main aircraft of the Soviet long-range aviation - DB3F (IL-4). 1941

Captain I.E. Korzunov near the damaged aircraft. In the background, the main aircraft of the Soviet long-range aviation - DB3F (IL-4). 1941

GARF, F.10140. Op.5. D.6. L.14

German fighter jet Messerschmidt making an emergency landing. 1942

German fighter jet Messerschmidt making an emergency landing. 1942

GARF, F.10140. Op.5. D 7. L.10

An American aircraft in service with one of the flying units of the Northern Navy. 1942

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An American aircraft in service with one of the flying units of the Northern Navy. 1942

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Naval aviation bombers at the airport. October 1942

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Naval aviation bombers at the airport. October 1942

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Suspension of a torpedo on a torpedo bomber at the airfield of a mine-torpedo regiment. 1943

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Suspension of a torpedo on a torpedo bomber at the airfield of a mine-torpedo regiment. 1943

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Return from a combat flight to the naval reconnaissance seaplane base. June 1943

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Return from a combat flight to the naval reconnaissance seaplane base. June 1943

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Hurricane fighters at the field airfield of one of the air units. 1942

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Hurricane fighters at the field airfield of one of the air units. 1942

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The commander of the torpedo bomber aircraft of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet, which sank four transports and one enemy patrol ship, Guards Captain Bolashev V.P. talking with crew members: navigator, guard captain Nikolai Samoilovich Umansky, gunner, sergeant V.A. Emelianenko and gunner-radio operator Biryukov M.M. - at the plane. 1943

RGAKFD, 0-156896

Soviet fighter pilot Maksimovich V.P. learns to drive an English Hurricane fighter

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Soviet fighter pilot Maksimovich V.P. learns to drive an English Hurricane fighter

under the leadership of the English pilot Votsevis Paul. 1941

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English fighter pilot Sergeant Howe, who fought on the Northern Front,

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English fighter pilot Sergeant Howe, who fought on the Northern Front,

awarded the Order of Lenin, at his plane. 1941

RGAKFD, unit ridge 4-24056

Captain Druzenkov P.I. introduces a group of pilots "Fighting France"

(Squadron "Normandie-Neman") with the route of the upcoming combat flight. 1942

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French pilots of the military unit of the Fighting France "Normandie" leave the airfield after completing a combat mission. 1943

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French pilots of the military unit of the Fighting France "Normandie" leave the airfield after completing a combat mission. 1943

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Major A.F. Matisov. talks with the pilots of the Fighting France "Normandy", operating as part of the air force of the Red Army. 1943

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Major A.F. Matisov. talks with the pilots of the Fighting France "Normandy", operating as part of the air force of the Red Army. 1943

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The group of aces "Normandie" of the Fighting France is developing a plan for the next flight. 1945

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The group of aces "Normandie" of the Fighting France is developing a plan for the next flight. 1945

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The crew of the American "flying fortress" bomber, upon returning from a combat mission, talks with Soviet pilots. 1944

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The crew of the American "flying fortress" bomber, upon returning from a combat mission, talks with Soviet pilots. 1944

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Senior Lieutenant N.I. Dobrovolsky (left) and captain A.G. Machnev - order-bearing pilots of the assault aviation unit, who distinguished themselves in battles in the Oryol direction at the field airfield near the aircraft. 1943

SAOO, unit ridge 9763

Location: Oryol-Kursk direction

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Soviet attack aircraft in the sky near Berlin. 1945

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Soviet attack aircraft in the sky near Berlin. 1945

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One of ten gliders captured by the Yugoslav partisans at one of the German airfields near Belgrade. 1944

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One of ten gliders captured by the Yugoslav partisans at one of the German airfields near Belgrade. 1944

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A rally at one of the airfields near Berlin before the departure of the Victory Banner to Moscow for the Victory Parade. 1945

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A rally at one of the airfields near Berlin before the departure of the Victory Banner to Moscow for the Victory Parade. 1945

Location: 1st Belorussian Front

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Warriors carry the Banner of Victory across the Central Moscow airfield on the day it arrives in Moscow from Berlin. June 20, 1945

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Warriors carry the Banner of Victory across the Central Moscow airfield on the day it arrives in Moscow from Berlin. June 20, 1945

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The crew of flight commander M. Khazov before departure at the airport. 1945

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The crew of flight commander M. Khazov before departure at the airport. 1945

Location: 2nd Far Eastern Front

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Female calculation of "hearers". 1945

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Female calculation of "hearers". 1945

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Military photojournalist V. Rudny with the crew of the aircraft "Catalina". Shooting year unknown

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Military photojournalist V. Rudny with the crew of the aircraft "Catalina". Shooting year unknown

RGAKFD, 0-329245

From March 1932, in accordance with the strategic and operational-tactical designation of the Red Army Air Force (Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army), they were divided into military, army and front-line aviation. In November 1940, the aviation of the High Command, or long-range bomber aviation (DBA), stood out separately.

The aviation of the High Command was intended to carry out independent air operations to deliver bombing strikes on targets deep behind enemy lines and consisted of aviation corps and individual divisions. Its designation was successively changed from AGK to ADD (long-range aviation) from March 1942, and then to the 18th Air Army from December 1944 until the end of the war.

The military aviation consisted of separate squadrons, one for each rifle, mechanized and cavalry corps. The squadrons were armed with light aircraft for reconnaissance, communications and artillery fire adjustment. Probably, at the beginning of the war, the squadrons were withdrawn from the corps, but from April 1943 they began to appear again, when an aviation communication link - 3 aircraft was included in the mechanized corps. From the end of January 1943, the communications aviation regiment (on Po-2 aircraft) was part of the tank army, sometimes, however, it was not a regiment, but an air squadron.

Army aviation consisted of separate mixed air formations (air divisions) that were part of combined arms armies, as a rule, one air formation per army.

In May 1942, with the formation of the air armies, which united the air forces of the fronts and the air forces of the armies, one mixed air regiment remained in the combined arms army. In November of the same year, it was replaced by a light aircraft regiment for aerial reconnaissance and communications. In the first half of 1943, the mixed aviation regiment was replaced by a communications squadron consisting of 12 Po-2 aircraft.

Frontal aviation was part of the military districts, consisted of units and formations of various branches of aviation, and acted in accordance with the plans of the district (front). Existed until November 1942.

Aircraft were also owned by educational institutions of the Air Force, Navy, Civil Air Fleet, flying clubs of Osoaviakhim, the NKVD and border troops.

In accordance with the tasks, flight tactical data and weapons, military aviation was divided into fighter, bomber, assault and reconnaissance. By the beginning of the war, bomber aviation was represented by short-range (front) and long-range bomber aviation.

Since October 1941, with the advent of night light bomber regiments, front-line bomber aviation began to be divided into day and night.

Link. The primary division of the Red Army Air Force. For all types of military aviation, the link included three aircraft, but in September-November 1942, in fighter aviation, they switched to a link of two pairs, i.e., four aircraft. By the end of 1943, a four-aircraft link was also introduced in attack aviation.

Squadron. The main tactical unit of domestic aviation until 1922. The number of aircraft in the detachment varied and depended on the type of aviation. From September 16, 1924, the fighter aviation detachment consisted of three units (9 aircraft), reconnaissance light bomber of two units (6 aircraft). The detachment of heavy bombers had 3 aircraft. In May 1925, aviation detachments of 6, 8 and 12 aircraft were introduced into the staff of rifle corps, intended for close reconnaissance and maintenance of artillery. With the transition to a regimental organization, aviation detachments remained in the military transport aviation and aviation of the Navy.

Squadron. From September 16, 1924, the squadron consisted of two or three detachments. Fighter squadron - of three detachments of three links each. In total, the squadron had 46 aircraft, of which 12 were spares.

The light bomber and reconnaissance squadrons included three squadrons of two units each and consisted of 31 aircraft, of which 12 were spares. The heavy bomber squadron consisted of two detachments of 3 aircraft. Only 6 planes.

In 1938, a decision was made to change the structure and number of squadron aircraft.

The bomber aviation squadron consisted of four units of 3 aircraft (12 aircraft). Assault squadron - from three combat units and one reserve (12 aircraft). The fighter squadron consisted of 15 aircraft and consisted of five units.

The experience of the war and heavy losses necessitated new changes. On August 10, 1941, by order of the air force squadron commander, 10 aircraft each were determined in assault, bomber and fighter aircraft (three links and the commander's aircraft). Ten days later, on August 20, a new order followed for units receiving new types of aircraft "like Il-2, Pe-2, Yak-1, etc." The squadron at the same time consisted of 9 aircraft, i.e., three full links.

In the middle of 1943, in fighter aviation, they returned to the composition of a squadron of 10 aircraft, two links and a pair (commander and his wingman).

At the end of 1943, the squadrons of fighter and attack aircraft switched to a three-section structure and consisted of 12 aircraft. The bomber squadron consisted of 10 aircraft, three flights and the aircraft of the squadron commander. The communications squadron consisted of four flights of 12 aircraft.

air regiment. In the USSR, aviation regiments were first formed in 1938. The status of the air regiment is a military unit.

The short-range bomber regiment consisted of five squadrons and two aircraft under the control of the regiment (62 combat aircraft), the long-range bomber regiment consisted of three to four squadrons and two aircraft under the control of the regiment (38-42 combat aircraft). The fighter regiment included four to five squadrons and two regiment control aircraft (63-77 combat aircraft). The assault aviation regiment consisted of five squadrons and was armed with 61 combat, 5 training and 1 communications aircraft.

In the battles in July-August 1941. there were problems in controlling a large number of aircraft in regiments and divisions, and the bulkiness of these units and formations made it difficult to disperse aircraft at airfields and made it easier for the enemy to destroy them on the ground. On August 10-12, a new organization of short-range bomber, attack and fighter air regiments was adopted.

The short-range bomber regiment now consisted of three mixed squadrons - two bomber squadrons, one fighter squadron and 2 bombers in the regiment's control, a total of 32 aircraft.

The assault aviation regiment also of mixed composition consisted of 33 aircraft (two squadrons of Il-2 aircraft, a flight of Su-2 aircraft, one squadron of fighters). The fighter regiment was to consist of three squadrons and two regimental command and control aircraft, for a total of 32 aircraft.

Due to heavy losses and difficulties in replenishing the aircraft fleet, especially with new types of aircraft, the organization was again revised. From August 20, 1941, aviation regiments, which were armed with new types of aircraft (Pe-2, Il-2, Yak-1, etc.), and later most of the other regiments, began to be formed homogeneous, consisting of two squadrons and two aircraft in the control of the regiment, a total of 20 aircraft.

By the spring of 1943, many aviation regiments consisted of three squadrons. The fighter aviation regiment consisted of three squadrons of 9 aircraft and 4-5 aircraft under the control of the regiment, a total of 31-32 aircraft.

In the middle of 1943, there were 34 aircraft in the fighter regiment, consisting of three squadrons of 10 fighters and 4 aircraft each in the regiment's control.

At the end of 1943, the bomber regiments consisted of three squadrons and two aircraft under the control of the regiment (32 combat aircraft). The assault aviation regiment consisted of three squadrons and four aircraft under the control of the regiment (40 combat aircraft), the fighter regiment consisted of three squadrons and 4 aircraft under the control of the regiment (40 combat aircraft). In addition, each air regiment had 1 communications aircraft and 1 dual-control aircraft (where there was a need for such an aircraft). In the aviation of the Navy, mixed air regiments met both in 1942 and 1943.

air brigade. The main tactical unit of the Red Army Air Force until 1938-1940. The first air brigades began to form in 1927 and consisted of three or four squadrons. There were bomber, assault, fighter air brigades. Abolished in 1938-1940. in connection with the transition to the regimental organization, they remained in the Navy and training units. The air brigades of the Navy consisted of two air regiments.

Air group. Temporary formation under a single command. On July 21, 1941, the creation of full-time reserve aviation groups (RAG) began, which were subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and were intended to solve independent tasks and to help the air forces of the fronts. The air group included from four to five air regiments (60-100 aircraft).

In the fall of 1941, temporary (non-regular) aviation reserve groups were created from front-line aviation units and newly formed air regiments. From March to May 1942, ten strike aviation groups (UAG) were created with a mixed composition of three to eight air regiments, including heavy bombers.

The air groups operated until the beginning of June 1942 and later as hydroaviation units of the Navy and transport aviation.

Air division. The first were formed in the second half of 1940, the Air Force command tried to take into account the "foreign" experience of the Second World War in Europe and "their own" war with Finland. The division became the main tactical formation of the Red Army Air Force. As a rule, an air division consisted of three or four regiments, in some five or six air regiments, and consisted of up to 350 aircraft. There were homogeneous (bomber, fighter) and mixed (fighter-assault and fighter-bomber) air divisions during the war, until about 1943 there were mixed divisions consisting of assault and bomber regiments. In July 1941, it was considered expedient to gradually move to the organization of a two-regiment structure, but at the same time there were air divisions of three, four and five air regiments.

In May-June 1942, assault air divisions were created, consisting of two to four assault air regiments (numbering up to 80 aircraft), and night short-range bomber air divisions. At the end of 1943, most air divisions switched to a three-regiment structure (from 100 to 120 aircraft).

Air Corps. The formation of aviation corps began in the USSR as early as 1933, when two or four brigades of long-range bomber aviation received DBA corps. In November 1940, two air divisions were part of the DBA corps. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, one long-range escort fighter aviation division was formed in each DBA corps. In June-August 1941, the DBA corps were disbanded, and on April 30, 1943 they were organized again. They included two air divisions. In August-September 1942, the formation of the air corps of the reserve of the Supreme High Command began. Homogeneous and mixed air corps of two or more divisional composition were created. There were from 120 to 270 aircraft in the corps. Mixed air corps included two fighter and one attack or bomber air divisions. In the future, the organization of mixed air corps was abandoned, and some of the existing ones were transferred to homogeneous ones. In 1941, the formation of air defense fighter aviation corps began, consisting of two or three fighter air divisions.

Army. In January 1936, on the basis of aviation brigades of heavy bombers stationed in the European part of the USSR, a special aviation army (AON-1) was created. March 15, 1937 AON-2 was formed in the Far East. Later, AON-3 was formed in the North Caucasian Military District. Initially, the staff structure and composition of the AON were not the same. It was not until April 1937 that a unified organization was established, which included two heavy bomber, one light bomber and one fighter air brigade.

They reported directly to the General Command. On November 5, 1940, shortly after the war by Finland, the GA was abolished as having not justified itself in a combat situation.

On May 5, 1942, by order of the NPO of the USSR, the 1st Air Army was created, which united the army and front-line aviation of the Western Front, the army included two fighter air divisions (four fighter air regiments each), two mixed air divisions (each had two fighter air regiments, two assault and one bomber air regiment), a training air regiment, a long-range reconnaissance air squadron, communications squadrons and a night short-range bomber air regiment.

During 1942, all other air forces of the active fronts were reorganized into air armies. (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th air armies). In December 1944, the ADD units were consolidated into the air army, which received the designation 18 VA.

On July 1, 1942, the formation of two fighter and one bomber aviation armies began. It was assumed that each would include three to five air divisions and number 200-300 aircraft. In practice, only the 1st Fighter Aviation Army was created and took part in the hostilities.

Serious shortcomings in the organizational structure of the aviation army and the practice of military operations have shown that it is inexpedient to have an air and aviation armies in the same front. The choice was made in favor of the air army as the highest form of operational association. Instead of aviation armies, reserve and strike aviation groups, it was decided to create aviation corps and separate aviation divisions of the RVGK (Reserve of the Supreme High Command).

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