Chapter 3

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Abstract

The military-analytical study is devoted to the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk - the operations of the Red Army in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions, which received the names "Kutuzov" and "Commander Rumyantsev". It is their course and results that make it possible to appreciate the true significance of the Battle of Kursk in the history of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. The author has made an attempt to show and analyze in more detail, as far as possible, the formation of offensive plans in both indicated directions and their features, as well as the course of operations, operational-tactical methods and methods of conducting hostilities of the opponents, and the operational and strategic results achieved by the parties. Conclusions and conclusions are based on a multifactorial comparative analysis of scientific research and archival historical information, including an assessment of losses on both sides. Special attention is paid to the personalities of the participants in the events. The work is intended for a wide range of readers interested in military history.

Petr Bukeikhanov

Introduction

Petr Bukeikhanov

Battle of Kursk Offensive. Operation Kutuzov. Operation "Commander Rumyantsev". July-August 1943

Introduction

According to the Soviet and Russian historical tradition, based on the theoretical principles of Soviet military science, the Battle of Kursk includes not only Operation Citadel, which serves as the main object of study for American and Western European historiography, but also offensive operations of the Red Army in Orlovsky and Belgorod-Kharkov directions. The troops of five fronts with a total strength of about 2.5 million people were involved in these operations, and the battles unfolded in a strip with a length of more than 900 km from Zhizdra in the north to Chuguev in the south. Nevertheless, in most military-historical studies, these offensive operations are described as if "in a glimpse", remaining in the shadow of the Citadel operation, although in reality it is their course and results that make it possible to assess the true significance of both the Citadel operation and the entire Battle of Kursk. generally.

Accordingly, the purpose of this work was to fill the existing gap in terms of a comprehensive study and multifactorial military-analytical study of the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operations of the Red Army in July-August 1943. To do this, an attempt was made to solve the following tasks: 1) to detail the events and course of hostilities; 2) consider alternative options for operational and operational-tactical decisions of both opposing sides; 3) assess the loss of forces and means of opponents; 4) show the senior command staff of the German and Soviet troops responsible for planning and conducting operations; 5) to determine the effectiveness of the defensive and offensive actions of the Soviet and German troops in these operations.

In such a volume, these operations were not considered either in the study of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, prepared by its Military Historical Directorate in 1946-1947 and most fully reflecting the course of the battles for Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov, or in subsequent works of domestic and foreign authors.

The subject of the study in the work is a system of interrelated and interdependent defensive and offensive actions of operational-strategic, operational and operational-tactical formations, operational-tactical formations and units of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov directions within the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operations of the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943, as well as the related operational and organizational management activities of the German and Soviet command. The chronological boundaries of the study include the period from July 12, 1943 (the beginning of the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the Oryol bridgehead of the enemy Army Group Center) to August 23, 1943 - the end of the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which ended with the capture of Kharkov. In some cases, time limits are extended in order to holistically consider the development of operations from the formation of the concept and the operational situation to the start of hostilities to the impact of the results achieved on the further position of the opponents. The established chronological framework of the study makes it possible to identify the characteristic features inherent in each of the operations, which requires a comparison of the entire course of hostilities in each of the directions. The geographic boundaries of the study include a significant part of the territory of the Central Black Earth region of Russia (Oryol, Kursk and Belgorod regions) and the northeastern regions of Ukraine (Sumy and Kharkov regions).

The relevance of the study is due to the fact that the numerous military-scientific and historical works and publications on the topic of the Battle of Kursk that preceded it were distinguished by a factual approach to reflecting the events that followed immediately after the unsuccessful offensive for the German troops according to the Operation Citadel plan. At the same time, in many studies, even factual reviews of the offensive operations of the Red Army in the Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov directions were superficial. They lacked an analysis of the dynamics of the operational situation, the composition of the opposing groupings, the forces and means involved in the battle, the operational decisions made, and the course of hostilities was not described in detail. To date, there is no relatively accurate comparative analysis of the losses of forces and means of both sides in these operations, since the opinions available on this subject are characterized by subjective value judgments.

All this indicates the need for an independent special study.

The methodological basis of the study is the principles of objectivity and historicism, which provide for a politically impartial and, as far as possible, methodically accurate analysis of the collected information in the context of a specific historical situation, using all sources and literature available to the researcher. In the process of research, systemic, retrospective, problem-chronological, comparative-historical and mathematical methods of study were used. Data sources for the study include both published materials and archival documents, some of which are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in the fact that it objectively and fully reflects the course and operational-strategic characteristics of the battles of the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts with the military groupings of the German army groups "Center" and "South" during the offensive phase of the Kursk battles. The author made an attempt to study the features of the formation of the offensive plans of the Soviet command, the plans and intentions of the German side to organize the defense of the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, build a defense system of German troops on the bridgeheads, the balance of forces and means of opponents, the scheme for organizing the offensive of strike groups of Soviet operational associations, actions command and troops of both sides during the battles, as well as material and human losses.

Based on the available information, the study shows the characteristic features of the operational planning of the Soviet and German commands in the summer campaign of 1943; the causes, results and consequences of operational failures of each of the parties are disclosed; the relationship between the development of the situation on different sectors of the front is traced; both positive and negative aspects of the combat work of the Soviet and German troops and their command during this period are analyzed; the totality of objective and subjective factors that influenced the achievement of the assigned tasks and the effectiveness of the combat work of the enemy troops was characterized.

When formulating conclusions based on the results of the study of each of the battles, the author shows the impact of the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operations on the results of the Battle of Kursk as a whole and a further change in the operational-strategic position of the opponents on the Soviet-German front.

Part one. Operation Kutuzov

Chapter 1

1.1. The concept and plan of the operation "Kutuzov" (Oryol offensive operation), the forces and means of the Soviet side and measures to prepare for the offensive

The offensive of the troops of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, which ended with the capture of Orel, the retreat of the Oryol group of Germans and the liquidation of the Oryol strategic bridgehead, took place from July 12 to August 18, 1943. The fighting unfolded over a vast territory bounded from the north by the Zhizdra, Belev, Plavsk line, from the south by Maloarkhangelsk, Sevsk, from the east by Plavsk, Novosil, Maloarkhangelsk, and from the west by the border of the Bolva and Desna rivers.

The Oryol bridgehead of the Germans was a huge arc, bulging to the east. The border that bordered this bridgehead from the northeast, east and southeast was the front line that ran south of Kirov to Duminichi and further to Novosil, Zmievka, Tagino, Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky. In the general defense system of the German army in the East, this bridgehead remained one of the most fortified, since it was of great operational importance. It could serve as a starting point both for an attack on Moscow and for an attack on Kursk from the north. At the same time, the German command considered it as a "bastion" of defense on the Eastern Front. The liquidation of the Orlovsky bridgehead of the Germans eliminated the threat of an enemy attack on Moscow and the Kursk ledge from the north and created favorable conditions for the Red Army to advance on Bryansk.

At a time when the German army on the Eastern Front was preparing to attack Kursk, the Soviet command planned to carry out a similar operation, therefore, while strengthening the defense of the Kursk salient, it simultaneously concentrated troops for an attack on Oryol in order to encircle and defeat a large enemy grouping and eliminate the occupied by this grouping Orlovsky strategic foothold. The plan for this offensive operation, which received the code name "Kutuzov", was developed by the Headquarters and approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief back in May, and then discussed and corrected several times. The plan was based on the idea of ​​delivering concentric strikes by the forces of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts in the general direction of Oryol with the aim of encircling the Oryol grouping of the enemy, cutting it into pieces and destroying it.

According to the plan of the operation, the ZapF struck to the south with the forces of the 11th Guards. And with the support of the 1st VA, in order, together with the troops of the BrF, to surround and destroy the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy, and then, advancing with part of the forces in a southerly direction on Khotynets, with the main forces to cover the Oryol grouping of the enemy from the west and, interacting with the troops of the BrF, defeat it. To ensure the offensive of the 11th Guards. And from the west, an auxiliary strike was to be delivered by the 50th A ZapF.

The BrF dealt the main blow on its left wing with the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 63rd armies. Having carried out an offensive in divergent directions, they were supposed to cut the Orel-Kursk railway and highway, surround and destroy the enemy defending east of Orel, liberate the city, and then advance to the west. On the right wing of the front, the 61st A was supposed to interact with the 11th Guards. And to encircle and destroy the Bolkhov group of Germans, to seize Bolkhov, to further advance on Oryol from the north, and with part of the forces, together with the 3rd Army, to isolate and defeat the Mtsensk group of the enemy. The offensive of the front troops was supported by the 15th VA.

The Central Fleet was to, with the armies of the right wing, with the support of the 16th VA, eliminate the penetration of the enemy in the zone of his defense, then, striking in the general direction of Kromy and further to the northwest, cover the Oryol group of Germans from the south and southwest and assist the troops of Bryansk and Western fronts in its destruction. The armies of the left wing of the front were given the task of pinning down the enemy by partial operations in order to prevent his maneuver by forces and means, while their units and formations could be used to develop an offensive in the main direction.

At the same time, it should be noted that the original plan was somewhat different: the Headquarters and the General Staff planned that the 11th Guards. And he will strike the main blow not at Bolkhov, but at Khotynets, towards the strike of the Central Fleet, while all the forces of the BrF will be directed to the capture of Orel. This could lead to a dissection and deep coverage of the main forces of the 2nd German TA on the Orlovsky bridgehead, making it possible to avoid protracted battles to overcome its defenses.

Commander of the 11th Guards. And the (former 16th) Marshal of the Soviet Union (since 1955) Ivan Bagramyan testifies that the operation "Kutuzov" was developed in the following sequence: the command of the fronts, having received from the General Staff a preliminary plan for the offensive and general instructions for its organization, outlined specific front-line plans , involving in this the commanders of those armies who were to participate in the operation. In the future, the plans were considered by the General Staff and approved by the Supreme Commander. The commanders of the Western and Bryansk fronts, Generals Vasily Sokolovsky and Max Reiter, developed an agreed proposal for organizing an offensive, according to which the 11th Guards. And, which included 9 rifle divisions, 2 tank corps and other means of reinforcement, it was necessary to break through the enemy’s defenses south of Kozelsk and develop a blow strictly to the south - to Khotynets, in order to reach the flank and deep rear of the Oryol group of Germans. After breaking through the enemy defenses from behind the left flank of the 11th Guards. And three divisions of the neighboring 61st A BrF were supposed to move forward, with the task of "rolling up" the enemy's defenses, ensuring an offensive from the east. A particularly important role in the operation was assigned to the main forces of the Bryansk and Central fronts. The first was to inflict a powerful blow from the Novosil region on the top of the Oryol ledge and capture Orel. The troops of the Central Fleet were to advance from the Ponyri region to the northwest, towards the 11th Guards. And, in order to close the encirclement around the Oryol grouping of the enemy in the Khotynets area. At the same time, according to Bagramyan and the chief of staff of the 11th Guards. And General Ivan Grishin (Ivan Tikhonovich Grishin), the spectacular plan to encircle the entire Oryol group did not take into account the balance of forces, the strength of the enemy defense, as well as the likely development of the operational situation in the Central Fleet zone. During the attack on Khotynets, scattering forces over a large area, the 11th Guards. And it would inevitably lose its offensive power and itself, in the end, could become the object of strong flank counterattacks. In addition, a real calculation and analysis of the current situation showed that there was no need to hope for close interaction with the strike force of the Central Fleet, since its troops would inevitably be engaged in intense defensive battles for a long time and would hardly be able to quickly overcome the 120 km separating them from Khotynets after that.

Marshal Baghramyan notes that the initial plan of the operation, apparently, appeared under the influence of the Stalingrad offensive, in which the shock groups of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed the encirclement ring at a precisely designated point, passing more than 200 km towards each other. However, near Stalingrad, the blow was delivered on the weak flanks of the enemy, and the encirclement maneuver was carried out along his rear, where he could not transfer reserves: they were swallowed up by fighting on the streets of a huge city. In the Orel region, the situation was completely different. The enemy prepared a strong long-term defense here and concentrated a powerful grouping, which itself was preparing to attack. To some extent, this was reminiscent of the situation that developed near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, when the armies of the Southwestern Front were planning an attack on the German grouping, which was also preparing for the offensive, and as a result, the Soviet troops suffered a major defeat (at that time Bagramyan was the chief of staff SWF and South-West direction. P. B.). In this regard, Bagramyan and Grishin came to the conclusion that the plan of the operation should be amended, limiting itself to a more modest in scale, but real task: converging strikes by the 11th Guards. And from the area south of Kozelsk, as well as the 61st A BrF from the northeast, to surround and destroy the enemy Bolkhov grouping, covering the German 9th A. from the north. The defeat of the Bolkhov grouping was supposed to lead to the loss of operational stability of the entire Oryol grouping and created favorable conditions for the further advance of Soviet troops to the south, to the flank and rear of its main forces. For this, it was desirable to subordinate the command of the 11th Guards. And all the formations that were to advance from the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Zhizdra River (captured by the troops of the 16th A during the Zhizdra operation of the ZapF in February - March 1943. - P. B.) - twelve rifle divisions, and reinforce the 61st A with several divisions and one tank corps from the Stavka reserve. These considerations, General Bagramyan reported in detail to the commander of the ZapF, but they seemed to General Sokolovsky not convincing enough. The commander of the BrF, General Max Reuter, also spoke out against them, so the leadership of the General Staff did not find it possible to change anything in the plan. At a meeting at Headquarters at the end of April, Bagramyan again reported his proposals, Sokolovsky and Reuter again spoke out against his version of the operation, but Stalin unexpectedly supported Bagramyan (as Bagramyan notes, after that there were no hunters to continue the dispute, although it is interesting that General Reuter, who in August 1941, he only served as chief of logistics of the BRF, in June 1943 he was removed from command of this front and appointed commander of the Steppe Military District, in early July - deputy commander of the VorF, and from September - commander of the South Urals military district. - P. B.). Thus, it was decided that the task of the 11th Guards. And now it consisted in overcoming the enemy’s defenses in the Glinnaya-Zhukovo sector, turning the main forces to the southeast and advancing on Bolkhov, where the troops of the 61st A BRF would strive from the northeast. To solve this problem, the 11th Guards. And all the divisions were transferred, which were to break through the enemy defenses south of Kozelsk. Only after the defeat of the Bolkhov grouping of the enemy, the 11th A could move to Khotynets.

The position taken by Stalin when discussing the final version of the Kutuzov operation plan is explained primarily by the fact that the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts depended on the results of the Kursk defensive battle. The Soviet command expected that the Oryol operation would either prevent the enemy from successfully advancing against the Kursk salient, creating a crisis situation for him on the neighboring sector of the front, or ensure the complete defeat of his Oryol grouping, weakened during unsuccessful battles to overcome the defenses of the Central Front. Hence, until the last moment, there was ambiguity with the timing of the start of the operation, with the nature of the interaction of the fronts, with the methods of action of the Central Front, with the order of building up efforts from the depths. Until the beginning of the operation, neither the Western nor the Bryansk fronts had second echelons, since it was not known in advance whether the Stavka reserves concentrated in this direction could be ready for action, or whether they would have to be transferred in order to enter the battle near Kursk. Only after July 12, the ZapF received the 11th combined arms and 4th tank armies for reinforcement, and the BrF received the 3rd guards. TA, which again required a significant revision of the operation plan. However, two and a half months earlier, being in conditions of uncertainty, Stalin preferred to accept a more cautious version of the plan proposed by Bagramyan, which could be implemented without the involvement of the reserves of the Supreme High Command, but, if successful, still created the threat of defeating the main forces. German 2nd TA at the Orlovsky bridgehead.

On the other hand, Bagramyan's proposal was consistent with the experience gained by the Soviet command in 1942 as a result of offensive operations near Leningrad, Kharkov, in the Rzhev and Vyazma regions, when strike groups aimed at a deep breakthrough of enemy defenses were cut off by German flank counterattacks. In addition, when developing Operation Kutuzov, Stalin was also dominated by the experience of the recent offensive near Stalingrad, where a deep breakthrough of the enemy defenses turned out to be successful due to the fact that the strikes were delivered in areas occupied by much less combat-ready troops of Germany's allies. At the same time, the liquidation of the Stalingrad group, which was based on the German troops themselves, required a lot of effort and time and lasted from the end of November 1942 to February 2–3, 1943, and in the course of hostilities there was a threat of releasing the encircled enemy, just as before near Demyansk, where the Germans eventually managed to free their troops. Apparently, it was precisely in connection with this that, instead of deep strikes under the base of the Oryol ledge, Stalin preferred to solve the problem of destroying the enemy's Oryol grouping in stages, carrying out several front-line operations with the aim of dividing it and encircling it in parts. Such a plan was justified on the condition that the rapid pace of the offensive be maintained so that the enemy did not have time to withdraw his troops from the blows, otherwise the operation would only lead to his gradual displacement from positions. At the same time, the strikes of several groupings along a long front, directed against the most heavily fortified centers of resistance of the Germans, hardly made it possible to ensure such a high rate of advance.

According to the final plan of the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, four strike groups were created to carry out Operation Kutuzov: one on the left wing of the ZapF - in the Glinnaya - Ozhigovo area (troops of the 11th Guards A); two in the BrF zone - in the area of ​​​​Karagashinka - Gorodishche - Tshlykovo on the left wing of the 61st A, as well as north and southwest of Novosil at the junction of the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 63rd armies; one on the right wing of the Central Front, which made it possible to launch an offensive in a 400 km long strip.

Troops of the 11th Guards. And under the command of General Ivan Bagramyan, they received the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses in the Glinnaya-Ozhigovo sector and, striking at Krapivna, reach the line: the Resseta River - Krapivna - Sorokino. In the future, they were to develop an offensive to the southeast in the general direction of Bolkhov, with the aim of destroying the Bolkhov group of Germans in cooperation with the troops of the 61st A BrF, advancing on Bolkhov from the northeast. At the same time, part of the forces of the troops of the 11th Guards. And they were supposed to move south to Uzkoye, in order to ensure the right flank of the BrF troops advancing on Orel, as well as to block communications linking the enemy’s Oryol grouping with Bryansk.

The left-flank units of the 50th A ZapF, commanded by General Ivan Boldin (Chief of Staff General Nikita Brilev), were tasked with attacking in the direction of Zikeevo to secure the right flank of the shock group of troops of the 11th Guards. BUT.

The troops of the BRF broke through the enemy defenses in two directions: on the right wing of the front with the forces of the 61st A, and on the left wing with the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 63rd armies, so that later, by introducing strong mobile groups into battle in the breakthrough sectors, concentric strikes with north and south to Orel to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping defending east of Orel.

The troops of the 61st A BF under the command of General Pavel Belov (Chief of Staff Colonel Mikhail Nikolaevich Salnikov), advancing from the line of Palchikovo, Middle Rostock in the south-western direction, were supposed to interact with units of the 11th Guards. And to defeat the Bolkhov grouping of the Germans and eliminate the Bolkhov knot of resistance, and then develop an offensive against Oryol from the north.

The task of the troops of the 3rd A BF under the command of General Alexander Gorbatov (Chief of Staff General Makar Ivashechkin), according to the plan, was to, after breaking through the enemy defenses in the Izmailovo-Vyazhi section, advance on Staraya Otrada (Otrada), later on, by attacking the main forces from the north -east along the western bank of the Oka River to capture Orel. This task was carried out by the troops of the 3rd A in close cooperation with the troops of the 63rd A under the command of General Vladimir Kolpakchi (Kalpakchi, chief of staff Colonel Nikolai Vladimirovich Eremin), who had the task of breaking through the German defenses in the Vyazhi-Orlovka sector and inflicting the main blow on Stanovaya Well, developing it further in a northwestern direction with the aim of covering Orel from the southeast and capturing the city in cooperation with the troops of General Gorbatov.

After capturing the city of Orel, the troops of the BRF were to immediately and vigorously develop an offensive to the west.

The troops of the Central Fleet with their right wing were supposed to strike at Orel from the south, along the Oka River, together with the troops of the ZapF, surround the enemy’s Oryol grouping along the Bolkhov-Khotynets-Kromy line, and, together with the troops of the BrF, cut it into pieces and destroy it. To do this, the troops of the 48th A under the command of General Prokofy Romanenko were to break through the enemy defenses with their left flank in the Pozdeevo area and advance in the general direction towards Zmievka. The troops of the 13th A, under the command of General Nikolai Pukhov, had the task of breaking through the enemy defenses at the Kamenka-Tatino line and advancing with the right wing on Nesterovo, and with the left wing, together with the troops of the 70th A, General Ivan Galanin, on Kromy.

Significant forces were involved in defeating the enemy: by July 10, 1943, the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts numbered 1,286 thousand people (of which over 927 thousand soldiers and officers were in combat units), 26,379 guns and mortars (including jet artillery, but excluding 50-mm mortars), 3314 tanks and self-propelled guns. By the same time, there were 3323 combat-ready combat aircraft for air support of the offensive operation of the ground forces as part of long-range aviation units and formations (300 aircraft), as well as the 1st (1322 aircraft), 15th (995 aircraft), 16th (706 aircraft) of the air armies of the three fronts mentioned above. Taking into account the length of the strip occupied by the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts (~ 530 km), the average operational density of the forces and means deployed by the Soviet side reached over 2.4 thousand military personnel, about 50 guns and mortars, over 6 tanks and self-propelled guns on kilometer.

Preparations for the offensive were begun in advance and carried out in strict secrecy. Much attention was paid to the study of the enemy's defense, the grouping of his forces and reserves. The units that were in direct contact with the enemy continuously conducted enhanced reconnaissance, clarifying the location of his minefields, the nature of engineering barriers, the fire system, and the grouping of artillery. Reconnaissance aviation penetrated the tactical and rear zone of the German troops, determining the depth and nature of their defense, and in May and June, reconnaissance aviation photographed the defensive positions of the enemy in the areas planned for a breakthrough. Aerial photography made it possible to reveal in sufficient detail the front line of the enemy defense, the system of trenches, and the location of artillery positions. All materials from aerial photography and military observation were summarized by the topographic departments of the front headquarters and displayed on maps that were sent to the army headquarters, and from there to the corps and divisional headquarters.

Theoretical classes were held with staff officers and formation commanders to master all the details of an offensive operation; in May and June, the entire senior command staff was involved in reconnaissance, during which the issues of interaction between the combat arms related to the upcoming operation were fully worked out. The armies held special staff exercises with the chiefs of staff of armies and divisions. The participants in these exercises worked out in detail the issues of command and control in battle, the formation of battle formations in the offensive, and the organization of interaction and communications. In addition, the headquarters lost on the ground the forcing of water lines by the troops, the breakthrough of the fortified zone and the interaction of the combat arms in the offensive. The exercises on the ground were usually preceded by exercises on a box of sand depicting the relief of the breakthrough site. War games, staff exercises and exercises with the troops made it possible to carefully work out the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks.

The troops were trained on training fields, also specially equipped according to the type of German defense, where, in tactical exercises, techniques were worked out to overcome obstacles located in the enemy's disposition; interaction of infantry with tanks and artillery in the link company - battalion - regiment; offensive behind the explosions of shells of their artillery. To consolidate the knowledge gained during training, regimental tactical exercises with live firing were organized. At these exercises, the main attention was paid to working out the theme: "Breaking through the fortified zone and developing success in depth".

Each part was preparing to carry out exactly the task that was assigned to it according to the offensive plan. In rifle formations, the training of platoons, companies and battalions was carried out in accordance with the tasks assigned to them for the upcoming operation. In particular, individual subunits were preparing to break through the front line, for joint operations with tanks in the depths of enemy defenses, for operations at night, for blocking enemy strongholds, for operations in the forest, for crossing water barriers, for operations in special conditions (in wooded swampy areas), to perform special combat missions. The assault and obstacle groups, created to destroy the enemy's long-term structures, underwent intensive training. The main burden of breaking through the enemy defenses fell on these groups, so special attention was paid to their organization and combat training. Battalions and groups stood out in the regiments, which were preparing for assault operations. So, for example, by July 12 in the 11th Guards. And 404 assault groups of 8-10 people each were prepared. When working out issues of interaction between infantry and tanks at joint tactical exercises, much attention was paid to such units as a tank company - a rifle battalion, a tank platoon - a rifle company, a separate tank - a rifle platoon. During these exercises, the interaction of tanks with assault groups and obstacle groups was especially carefully worked out.

Operation "Commander Rumyantsev"

5.1. Between defense and offensive

(general situation before the start of the Soviet offensive)

Having deployed the pursuit of the retreating units of the 4th Panzer Army from July 17-18, the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts by July 23 basically reached the lines that the Soviet troops occupied at the beginning of the month. Heavy offensive battles were still going on along the entire front line north of Belgorod, but the current situation carried an obvious charge of optimism for the Red Army command. Despite all the misses and heavy losses suffered in the defensive battle, the main task of disrupting the German offensive was completed.

It is not surprising that on July 24, the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief came to light following the results of a defensive battle. The July offensive of the Wehrmacht in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge was declared "finally liquidated." This order was of great political significance, in fact declaring the failure of the plans on which the enemy had placed such high hopes. After two years of extremely unsuccessful summer campaigns ending in humiliating defeats, Stalin could note with particular satisfaction that thanks to mass heroism and courage, as well as a significant increase in the combat skills of the Red Army, it was possible to expose the legend that "The Germans in the summer in the offensive always gain success, and the Soviet troops are supposedly forced to retreat". The official Soviet historiography connects the end of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk with the issuance of the mentioned order.

Without in the least diminishing the courage and steadfastness of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts who took the first blow, at the same time it is impossible not to notice that the outcome of the defensive battle was largely determined by its relationship with the course of the offensive operation in the area of ​​the Oryol Bulge, as well as the July offensive of the South-Western and Southern Fronts. These operations, which followed each other with almost a week's break, clearly demonstrated to the leadership of the Wehrmacht the "real scale of the game." The German stake on conducting one, even very well planned and prepared operation in the framework of the summer campaign turned out to be untenable.

Like the Oryol offensive operation we examined in the previous part, the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts had very ambitious goals. In Soviet historiography, this offensive is divided into two operations: Izyum-Barvenkovskaya and Miusskaya. Their tasks are declared - in the best style of Soviet times - as auxiliary, with the main goal of pinning down a powerful group of German troops in the Donbass in order to prevent their transfer to the Kursk Bulge region. In reality, the Soviet command assumed an operation to encircle a significant part of the Donbass grouping, which consisted of the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies. The troops of the South-Western Front of General of the Army R. Ya. Malinovsky were to launch an offensive from the Izyum region, seize bridgeheads on the right bank of the Seversky Donets and later, by introducing units of the 1st Guards Mechanized and 23rd Tank Corps into the breakthrough, develop an offensive on Stalino. Colonel-General F.I. Tolbukhin, part of the forces of the Southern Front, was also sent here, who were also tasked with defeating the enemy’s Taganrog grouping. Thus, to the east of Stalino, the encirclement of significant forces of the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies was planned.

The offensive of the troops of R. Ya. Malinovsky and F. I. Tolbukhin, which began on July 17 from the border of the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers, put the command of Army Group South before the need to significantly strengthen the 1st Tank and 6th Armies. The German command, relying on army and radio intelligence data, largely managed to unravel the Soviet plans, revealing the composition and places of concentration of enemy strike groups. All this made it possible not only to put our troops on high alert in advance, but also to allocate reserves for the 6th Army, which, according to the command of Army Group South, was in serious danger. The army of General Adolf Hollidt (Hollidt Adolf) received reinforcements in the form of the 23rd Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions. These formations played an important role in repulsing the Soviet offensive and stabilizing the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Parts of the 17th Panzer Division, as well as the SS Viking divisions from the 24th Panzer Corps, were transferred to the zone of the 1st Panzer Army, which Manstein insisted on transferring to the Kempf group on July 13. At the same time, the command of the compound was transferred to the 6th Army.

The unfolding battle was almost more difficult than the battles in the Belgorod region. Despite the capture of the bridgehead in the Izyum region, the troops of General R. Ya. Malinovsky failed to develop the offensive. The offensive of the Southern Front was not only rich in losses, but as a result of the counterattack carried out by the Germans, in early August it led to the loss of a bridgehead on the Mius. However, this operational success went to the command of the Army Group "South" at the cost of heavy losses and strain, forcing the use of almost all available reserves in battles.

Assessing the situation that had developed by the twentieth, with restrained optimism and not wanting to miss the opportunity to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, Manstein and his staff decided to conduct two operations to eliminate the Soviet bridgeheads on the Mius and the Seversky Donets, formed during the fighting. According to the German generals, these bridgeheads were a source of constant potential danger of the Soviet offensive in the Donbass and southern Ukraine.

To carry out the operation against the troops of the Southern Front, the command of the Army Group "South" had no choice but to actually eliminate the shock grouping of the 4th Panzer Army, which finally predetermined the death of the "Citadel". Starting from July 18–19, the process of “pulling apart” the tank formations of the Gotha army and the group of General Kempf gradually began to gain momentum. During the period from 18 to 22 July they parted ways with many of their mobile formations. From July 26, units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps began to concentrate in the 6th Army zone as part of the Reich and Totenkopf divisions, as well as the 3rd Panzer Division. The corps lost one of its most combat-ready divisions, Adolf Hitler, which, leaving the materiel on the Eastern Front, departed for Germany in connection with the planned transfer to Italy.

On July 30, the strike force of the 6th Army went on the offensive in the area of ​​​​Marinovka and Uspenskaya against the 2nd Guards and 28th armies. Fierce fighting, which lasted four days, led to the elimination of the bridgehead on the Mius - the battered Soviet troops were forced to cross to the left bank of the river. However, the German units also suffered heavy losses in these battles. Nevertheless, emboldened by the success, Manstein suggested to Hitler that a similar offensive be launched against the larger bridgehead of the Southwestern Front, which hung over the 6th Army from the north, but the Fuhrer's permission for this operation was not received.

As we can see, the focus of attention of the command of Army Group "South" in the second half of July was firmly riveted to the 1st Panzer and 6th armies. An offensive by the Red Army north of Belgorod and in the vicinity of Kharkov in the near future seemed to him unlikely, despite the incoming intelligence data indicating the beginning of the concentration of large formations of tanks and infantry. The field marshal remembered well the damage that the Soviets managed to inflict during the July battles. In his memoirs, Manstein cites data according to which, by July 13 alone, they managed to destroy about 1,800 tanks, 267 guns, and about 1,080 more anti-tank guns. The fact that the enemy would recuperate within just two weeks seemed unrealistic to the German commander.

However, the events that followed soon convincingly demonstrated that the resources of the Soviet side were far from being exhausted, and its organizational abilities were clearly underestimated by the enemy. It was this underestimation that made the fatal mistake in determining the timing of the future Soviet offensive in the area of ​​Belgorod and Kharkov. Manstein noted that the hope for a respite in front of the front of the 4th Panzer Army and the group of General Kempf "turned out to be fatal for the development of the situation on the northern flank of the group, since the enemy launched an offensive earlier than we expected" .

Now it is worth turning to the consideration of events that were directly related to the planning and preparation by the Soviet command of the offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. Stalin, who expected that the advance of the troops of N.F. Vatutin and I.S. Konev would develop without an operational pause, was extremely dissatisfied with the delay that arose at the end of July. According to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, he and A.M. Vasilevsky with great difficulty managed to convince the Supreme Commander not to rush, throwing troops into useless attacks, but to give time to the front commanders for the comprehensive preparation of the offensive operation, which soon received the name "Commander Rumyantsev". First of all, it was necessary to replenish the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies with personnel and equipment, without which the achievement of decisive success seemed very problematic. After some hesitation, Stalin gave the go-ahead, allocating only 10 days to prepare for the offensive.

The representatives of the Headquarters and the commanders of the fronts, placed in such a strict framework, were forced to abandon the plan of attack on Kharkov, developed earlier. According to it, the creation of powerful flank groupings of the Voronezh Front was supposed, the concentric strikes of which would have to endanger the encirclement of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group. However, the implementation of this plan, which required a covert regrouping of large tank formations, seemed impossible under the circumstances.

As a result, the offensive operation plan was developed almost from scratch, distinguished by simplicity and originality. The planning itself was also highly unusual. The fact is that, as such, a graphic or written document of the operation did not exist until its very beginning.

Representatives of the Stavka on the ground in the troops worked out with the army commanders the tasks for the upcoming operation. On August 1, Zhukov agreed in Moscow on the general provisions of the plan with Stalin. Looking ahead, it is still worth noting that already on the third day after the start of the offensive, updated plans for the offensives of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were presented to Moscow, which were approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on August 6 and 8, respectively.

The plan of the operation assumed that the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh (5th and 6th Guards armies) and the Steppe (53rd and 69th armies) fronts would break through the German defenses. After that, two tank formations will be introduced into the gap formed on the front of the 5th Guards Army - the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General M. E. Katukov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov. They faced the most ambitious tasks. After reaching the area west of Kharkov, the 1st Panzer Army was to turn its front to the west, holding the defense along the Bogodukhov-Valki-Novaya Vodolaga line. The 5th Guards Tank Army, which was advancing east of the army of M.E. Katukov, aimed at enveloping Kharkov from the south-west to the Merefa area. Parts of the right-flank 57th Army of the South-Western Front were supposed to come out here to meet the tankers of P. A. Rotmistrov. Thus, it was supposed to surround a significant part of the Kempf group in the Kharkov region.

The task of liberating Belgorod was set before the troops of the Steppe Front. Her decision was somewhat reminiscent of the operation of the Voronezh Front to cover Kharkov. The 53rd Army of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov, reinforced by the 1st Mechanized Corps, was supposed to bypass the city from the west, reaching its southern outskirts, while simultaneously ensuring the advancement of the left flank of the Voronezh Front. Here she was supposed to meet with the 7th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Shumilov, whose task was to force the Seversky Donets and intercept the roads leading from Belgorod to the south.

On the third day of the operation, it was also planned to deploy the offensive of the 27th and 40th armies, reinforced by three tank corps, in a southwestern direction towards Akhtyrka and Boromlya, which, on the one hand, expanded the breakthrough in a western direction, and on the other hand, ensured the right flank of the strike force of the Voronezh Front. As you can see, the plan of the offensive operation "Commander Rumyantsev" provided for the dismemberment of the left wing of Army Group "South" with powerful blows and its destruction in parts.

Perhaps now is the time to consider the state in which the aviation of the opposing sides came to the beginning of the offensive on Belgorod and Kharkov, as well as what tasks the Soviet and German commands assigned to it.

In fact, the commander of the BRF decided to immediately develop a breakthrough that had emerged at the junction of the 3rd and 63rd armies, so at 21.15 on July 12 he gave the 1st Don Guards. maybe an order in which he set the task on the night of July 13 to go to the western bank of the Zushi River and concentrate in the Ivan - Calm - Vyazhi area; in the morning, as soon as the infantry occupies the Yevtekhovo-Grachevka line, immediately enter the gap in this sector and, building on success, capture the Mokhovoe area by the end of the day 148
Cm.: Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. pp. 396–397.

In the composition of the 1st Guards. the shopping mall included three tank and one motorized rifle brigades, a tank regiment, anti-tank, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, as well as a motorcycle battalion (about 13 thousand soldiers and officers, over 200 tanks); the introduction of the corps into the breakthrough was provided by the main forces of the 15th VA and the 2nd automatic regiment of the 63rd A (at the beginning of the operation, the tank corps was transferred under the control of the command of the 63rd A) 149
Cm.: Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. pp. 319, 397, 756; The ratio of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3. The ratio of armored forces near Kursk. Appendix 4 // Kursk battle. The decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 362, 367.

Ensuring the Oryol operation from the southwest was entrusted to the troops of the right wing of the Central Fleet, which on July 15 were to go on the offensive against Kromy. Despite the fact that fighting did not stop in the zone of the Central Front, the troops of the right wing of the front, in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme High Command, intensively prepared for the transition to the counteroffensive, having as their immediate task to destroy the enemy who had penetrated the defenses and restore their previous position, and in the future to develop the offensive in the north -west, in the general direction to Kromy. On July 12, the commander of the Central Fleet set the task for the troops to go on the offensive on July 15, so that 3 days were given to prepare the operation. The units regrouped their forces, concentrated artillery, tanks, replenished ammunition, and intensified their actions bomber aircraft. The 48th, 13th, 70th, 2nd Tank and 16th Air Armies were allocated to go on the offensive. The front commander set them the general task of destroying the enemy strike force in the area of ​​Nizhny Tagino - Awakening - Ponyri - Protasovo - Gremyachevo, so that by the end of July 17 the main forces would reach the Nagorny - Shamshin - Novopolevo - Kamenka - Lebedikha - Morozikha - Katomki line.

In the future, it was supposed to develop a strike to the north in the general direction of Orel, entering into interaction with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

Fulfilling the order of General Rokossovsky, given to the troops on July 12, the armies of the right wing of the Central Fleet on the same day began to regroup forces for the offensive, so that by July 15, a strike group was formed in the area of ​​Ponyri and Olkhovatka, consisting of the 18th rifle and 16th tank buildings 150
Cm.: Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. S. 400.

At the same time, the enemy did not show activity, limiting himself to reconnaissance actions. The main attention of the German command was drawn to the offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts on Orel, so the Germans began to withdraw part of the troops from the sector against the right wing of the Central Fleet and hastily transfer them to the north. During July 13, Soviet aviation recorded the movement of railway echelons with artillery materiel and tanks to the Glazunovka and Zmievka stations to the north. In the same direction, columns of vehicles and infantry were moving along dirt roads.

According to General Greben 151
Cm.: Newton S. Battle of Kursk: German view. pp. 145–146.

Initially, the command of the GA "Center" (commander Field Marshal Hans Kluge, chief of staff General Hans Krebs. - P. B.) paid special attention to keeping Orel, otherwise, due to the loss of this key transport hub, as well as the blocking of the railroads and highways leaving the city, there was a threat to the supply of the 9th and 2nd tank armies. Therefore, on July 12, Field Marshal Hans Kluge (Hans-Guenther Kluge) ordered the 2nd, 18th and 20th Panzer, 36th Infantry Divisions, as well as Ferdinand tank destroyers and heavy artillery, to be sent to the 2nd TA band. The field marshal hoped that the critical situation on the front of this army could improve as a result of the lightning intervention of the allocated reinforcements. At the same time, at the direction of Hitler, a change in command of the troops of the Oryol group was made. At the very beginning of the Soviet offensive (according to some sources 152
Haupt W. Battles of Army Group Center. View of a Wehrmacht officer. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006. S. 257.

In the afternoon of 12 July. - P. B.) the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, General Rudolf Schmidt, was removed from his post (the reason for this decision was that Schmidt's brother was arrested for treason, and letters were found in his apartment where the general criticized Hitler 153
It is noteworthy that the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who during the Second World War served in the Red Army on the Soviet-German front as an artillery officer and was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree and the Red Star, for his critical remarks in his letters to the political leadership of the Soviet state not just removed from office, but brought to trial by a military tribunal and sentenced to 8 years in prison. Moreover, this did not happen during the critical period of the war, but in 1945, which was victorious for the Red Army. General Rudolf Schmidt, who escaped serious reprisals from Hitler, was also arrested by the Soviet authorities after the war and was imprisoned until the early 1950s, having been in Butyrskaya, Lefortovo and Vladimir prisons. ( Note. ed.)

), and General Walter Model was appointed to this post (Walter Model, at 17.45 on July 12, the chief of staff of the 2nd TA Colonel August Winter (August Winter) received an order to transfer command to General Model 154
Cm.: Newton S. Hitler's "firefighter" - Field Marshal Model. M.: AST; Keeper, 2007. S. 295.

(actually Model took command on 13 July, officially took office on 15 July. – P. B.), which, thus, united under its control all the German troops on the Orlovsky bridgehead (the duties of the 9th A command and control model were temporarily taken over by the chief of staff of the army, Colonel Harald Elverfeldt. - P. B.) At the same time, the headquarters of both armies remained where they were, so this measure only provided a unified operational command of the troops on the Oryol ledge.

2.2. Development of the situation on July 13

In the Bolkhov direction, all the efforts of the troops of the 11th Guards. And during July 13 they were sent to eliminate enemy strongholds and centers of resistance and to break through the rear defensive line of the enemy. To do this, on the second day of the operation, the command of the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps brought into battle two rifle divisions of the second echelon. In turn, the Germans, clinging to well-fortified settlements (Medyntsevo, Ulyanovo, Staritsa, Rechitsa, Durnevo, Slobodka, etc.), put up stubborn resistance, trying to prevent the development of a breakthrough, pull up reserves from the depths and restore the situation with their help. On July 13, the most stubborn battles began in the area of ​​​​Medyntsevo - Ulyanovo - Staritsa. The units of the 211th and 293rd German infantry divisions that retreated here relied on the strong fortifications of these key points of the second defensive line, and also received the support of the tanks of the 5th TD, so they tried to hold the rear line with strong fire and repeated counterattacks until larger reserves approached.

During the night from July 12 to July 13 and the next day, aviation of the 1st VA ZapF carried out bombing attacks on enemy troops and positions in the areas of Khatkovo, Moilovo, Ktsyn - Sorokino (in total, 652 sorties were made in a day) 155

On the morning of July 13, the 8th Guards. sk resumed the offensive. He was given the task of breaking through the rear defensive line of the Germans in the Staritsa-Rechitsa sector; to ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the 5th TC; in cooperation with him, advance in the direction of Ulyanovo - Krapivna. At dawn on July 13, after a 30-minute artillery preparation, units of the 8th Guards and 5th Tank Corps of the 11th Guards. And they continued to move forward, trying to capture a large stronghold of the enemy’s second line of defense in the village of Staritsa, but they were met by a counterattack of the 13th and 14th panzer-grenadier regiments of the 5th TD, which received the task of creating a defense line west of Rechitsa. Using pre-prepared fortifications and terrain folds, the Germans met the attackers with strong crossfire and counterattacked on the flanks with forces of up to two or three infantry battalions with 15–30 tanks 156
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. S. 211; Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. S. 346; fiery arc. S. 348.

At the same time, German assault aircraft, operating in small groups of 4 to 8 aircraft, tried to strike at the battle formations of the advancing Soviet troops (in total, 80 sorties of German aviation were taken into account in the ZapF band on July 13 157
TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 2424. L. 324.

). However, the counterattacks not only did not bring success to the Germans, but at the same time was partially pushed back from their positions, and partly surrounded by the 13th infantry fighting regiment of the 5th TD under the command of Colonel Heinrich Bronsart-Schellendorff (Heinrich Bronsart-Schellendorff) 158
Cm.: Haupt W. Battles of Army Group Center. View of a Wehrmacht officer. Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2006, pp. 258–259.

After repulsing the counterattacks, General Malyshev ordered the corps artillery group to make a ten-minute fire raid, for which more than 250 guns and mortars were concentrated on a two-kilometer front. 159
Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. S. 211.

The fire raid was supplemented by a strike by the 224th assault air division of Colonel Mikhail Kotelnikov (Mikhail Vasilyevich Kotelnikov), assigned to the 5th TC, on artillery positions and accumulations of equipment in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe strong point in Staritsa. After this, parts of the 11th Guards. sd of the 8th corps, commanded by General Ivan Fedyunkin, operating with the support of the 43rd Guards. brigade Colonel Mikhail Lukashev (Mikhail Pavlovich Lukashev), captured Staritsa from the east, secretly advancing through ravines and hollows with small groups of infantry and tanks and at the same time diverting the attention of the enemy with fire and a demonstration of an offensive from the north. Having completed the coverage by 13 o'clock, parts of the division suddenly attacked the stronghold from the southeast, started fighting on the outskirts, and then broke into the village. After a street battle, the remnants of the defeated German garrison tried to retreat to Medyntsevo, but were dispersed by a blow from the left-flank 1st Guards. sd 16th guards. sk under the command of General Nikolai Kropotin and the 10th Guards. brigade of Colonel Andrei Burlyga, who advanced to block the Staritsa-Ulyanovo road, who bypassed Staritsa from the west and south-west.

Thus, by the middle of the second day of the operation, the second line of defense of the German 53rd ac. The advancing Soviet troops opened their way to the south and southeast, while the German units hastily consolidated at the turn of Zhelyabovo - Empty - Medyntsevo.

Assault aircraft of the 1st VA ZapF began to strike along the Staritsa-Dudorovsky-Ktsyn road and destroyed the bridge across the Ressetu River near Ktsyn, completely blocking the movement of vehicles in this area and preventing the approach to the breakthrough site of enemy reserves. Now, in order to develop success and deeply dismember the enemy's defenses, the command of the 11th Guards. And it decided to introduce a large group of tanks from the 5th TC into the breakthrough with the task of pursuing the enemy in the direction of Krapivna - Afonasovo. The tank group entered the gap from 2:30 p.m. and, in cooperation with the forward detachments of the infantry, pursuing the enemy to the southeast, immediately captured the villages of Vesniny, Krapivna, continuing to develop the attack on Yagodnaya by separate detachments. By the end of the day, formations of the 8th Guards and 5th Tank Corps reached the line Bely Verkh - Staritsa - Vesniny - Krapivna.

However, as Marshal Baghramyan notes 160
Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. pp. 213–214.

Strike force of the 11th Guards. And she cut the German defenses with a narrow wedge and, although she successfully advanced in depth, her flanks were poorly covered. The enemy was preparing a counterattack from the west, from the Medyntsev area, in order to cut off the units of the 5th Tank Corps that had advanced far ahead. At the same time, the main forces of the German 25th MD, with the assistance of units of the 293rd Infantry Division and aviation support, were preparing to launch a counterattack on the left flank of the 36th Guards Corps, pushing a reconnaissance detachment of MD to the village of Mekhovoe. Air reconnaissance data and the testimony of prisoners testified that large columns of enemy tank and motorized troops were approaching from the southeast, from the Orel region. From noon on July 13, the activity of enemy aviation increased sharply: groups of 20-30 dive bombers attacked the combat formations of tank and rifle corps. Under the prevailing conditions, in order to achieve the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one, it was necessary, first of all, to use the combat capabilities of the tank corps attached to the army.

Accordingly, given the threat of flank counterattacks, Bagramyan ordered General Sakhno to consolidate the main forces of the 5th TC at the reached line and pull back the tank brigades that had broken away from other units. In particular, the army commander considered that leaving the 70th brigade in Yagodnaya, when it was separated from the rest of the corps by more than 15 km, was inexpedient and dangerous, since this gave the enemy the opportunity to relatively easily cut it off from the main forces of the army. Based on this, Bagramyan ordered the brigade to withdraw to the Krapivna area. 161
Cm.: Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. S. 347.

The abandonment of Yagodnaya subsequently required two days of stubborn fighting with the enemy reserves that had approached here, which slowed down the rate of advance of the Soviet troops and increased their losses. On the other hand, the command of the 11th Guards. And it decided to increase efforts in the Medyntsevo direction in order to defeat parts of the 5th TD of the Germans before the approach of their reserves, advanced from the Orel region.

On the afternoon of July 13, formations of the 1st TC, General Vasily Butkov, entered the battle in the Medyntsevo direction. At 14.30, the commander of the 11th Guards. And he introduced the 1st TC after the 5th TC into a breakthrough in the Staritsa - Ulyanovo sector, setting the task of striking at Medyntsevo, in cooperation with the left-flank units of the 16th Guards. sk, destroy the 5th TD of the Germans. The offensive of the corps of General Butkov was supported by the 231st assault air division of the 1st VA under the command of Colonel Leonid Chizhikov, whose units on July 13 delivered a series of attacks on enemy strongholds in Medyntsevo and Dudorovo (Dudarovo, 6 km southwest of Ulyanovo). According to Baghramyan 162
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. S. 214; Haupt W. Battles of Army Group Center. S. 259.

As a result of the battle, the 5th TD of the enemy suffered enormous damage, it lost a large number of tanks and turned out to be bled (according to German sources, the frontal counterattacks that the 5th TD made on July 13 caused the loss of 45 tanks, while the enemy had 40 combat vehicles were knocked out).

By 7 p.m., two brigades of the 1st TC, in cooperation with the rifle units of the 1st Guards. The SD of General Kropotin captured Medyntsevo and Dudorovo. As a result of the fighting on July 13, units of the 1st TC managed to advance 12–15 km and capture three large strongholds of the enemy, who lost 47 tanks, 7 self-propelled guns, 2 armored vehicles, 43 guns of various calibers, 6 mortar batteries, 800 servicemen killed and taken prisoner, and besides this, he left three large warehouses. The losses of the 1st Tank Corps amounted to 350 servicemen killed and wounded, 10 tanks were destroyed and 13 vehicles received combat damage.

By 21 o'clock, all the tank and motorized rifle brigades of the 1st TC were concentrated in the area of ​​​​Medyntsevo, Dudorovo and in a grove east of Dudorovo, and the advanced detachments of the 16th Guards that approached the Cherebet River. sk began pursuing units of the 5th tank and 293rd infantry divisions of the enemy, retreating in a southwestern direction to Kholmishchi - Dudorovsky. At the same time, due to the fact that the 211th Infantry and 5th Tank Divisions were to the north and northwest of the breakthrough area, having lost contact with the 293rd Infantry Division, the Muller task force came under the command of the commander of the 55th ak, General Erich Yashke (Yashke, Erich Jaschke).

At the same time, the formations of the 16th Guards. sk, advancing to the southwest, continued to expand the breakthrough towards the right flank of the 11th Guards. And by the end of July 13, they fought to the Chernyshino-Dudorovo line, having captured several strongholds in the defense zone of the German 211th Infantry Division. At the same time, in the evening of the same day, the commander of the 16th Corps, Hero of the Soviet Union, General Afanasy Lapshov, died, and the acting head of the artillery group of the corps, General Lavr Mazanov, was taken prisoner by the Germans (Lapshov and Mazanov went to the Medyntsevo area to inspect the wrecked German tanks, among which allegedly there were "Tigers", and on the way they ran into one of the retreating enemy groups). At the end of July, the commander of the 16th Guards. sk was appointed General Ivan Fedyunkin.

On the left flank of the army, in the offensive zone of the 36th Guards. sk of General Ksenofontov, on July 13, fierce battles continued for the strongholds of Dolgaya, Durnevo, Debri, Slobodka. Troops of the 36th Guards. sk, continuing the offensive to the southwest, fought with the 293rd Infantry Division of General Karl Arndt, as well as with units of the 25th MD under the command of General Anton Grasser (Anton Grasser), transferred by the command of the 53rd AK to the line Vytebet river. Using prepared positions, the Germans sought to hold a bridgehead on the left bank of the river as a starting point for preparing a flank counterattack. Strong fire, repeated counterattacks, and the terrain crossed by a number of ravines made it difficult for the attackers to advance and maneuver, but by the end of July 13, units of the 36th Guards Corps had captured the enemy’s key strongholds of Dolgaya (2 km west of Durnevo), Durnevo, Debri (2 km north of Durnevo), Slobodka and reached the line of the Vytebet River. The forward detachments of the corps seized the crossings across the river south of Dolgaya and east of Durnevo and crossed to the eastern bank, but their attempts to develop success in the direction of Sorokino were unsuccessful. On the night of July 14, corps reconnaissance discovered the approach of enemy tanks and infantry, the captured prisoners showed that units of the 18th and 20th tank divisions (from the 41st and 47th tank corps of the 9th A .- P. B.), which will operate in conjunction with the 25th MD 163
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. S. 216.

Intelligence also noted the approach of artillery, including large calibers. The corps command reported to the army headquarters that a counterattack was being prepared on the left flank. As a response, the command of the 11th Guards. And put forward an anti-tank reserve - iptap - to the threatened area.

By the end of the day on July 13, the troops of the 11th Guards. And we reached the line Chernyshino - Medyntsevo - Vesnina - Krapivna and further along the Vytebet River to Zhukovo. For July 12 and 13, the 11th Guards. And it broke through the tactical defense zone of the enemy and wedged into its location to a depth of 25 km, expanding the breakthrough along the front to 23 km and inflicting serious losses on the 5th Panzer, 211th and 293rd Infantry Divisions 164
Cm.: Battle Near Kursk: From Defense to Offensive. pp. 348–349.

Ways for the development of the offensive both on Bolkhov and on Khotynets, to the railway and the Orel-Bryansk highway were open. The offensive of the troops of the 11th Guards. And already on the second day of the operation, it created a serious threat to the coverage of Bolkhov from the northwest and west and access to the rear and communications of the entire Oryol group of Germans.

At the same time, on July 13, the 50th A ZapF under the command of General Ivan Boldin, which carried out the task of covering the right flank of the 11th Guards, went on the offensive. And with the help of an auxiliary strike in the direction of Zikeevo. The 110th, 296th, 134th and part of the forces of the 211th infantry divisions of the enemy defended themselves in front of the army front: in front of the right flank and the center of the 50th A, on the Zaprudnoye - Puzanovka section, 21 km long, the 110th and 296th divisions were located , and further, in a strip with a width of more than 26 km, they occupied the positions of the 134th and 211th divisions; in tactical depth, in the area of ​​​​Zhizdra - Lyudinovo, the 5th TD remained in reserve 165
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 1–1 rev.

On the other hand, the forces and means of the ZapF concentrated here for the offensive were about two to three times smaller than the strike force of the 11th Guards. A. So, 50th A, consisting of 7 rifle divisions (3 of which are under the control of the 38th sk); 3 artillery cannon, 3 anti-aircraft artillery, 3 mortar, 1 anti-tank artillery regiments; 2 engineering b-nov; 2 divisions of armored trains consisted of "only" about 63 thousand people, over 530 guns (236 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, 241 anti-tank guns, 50 anti-aircraft guns) and 594 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber, and received a separate 196- Yu TBR, as well as a tank regiment and a heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - a total of 75 tanks and 12 self-propelled guns 166
See: Combat Schedule of the Red Army, July 1, 1943 Appendix 2. Balance of Forces and Losses in the Battle of Kursk. Annex 3 // Kursk battle. The decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 305–306, 362; fiery arc. S. 592; Pankov F. D. Fiery frontiers: the combat path of the 50th Army in the Great Patriotic War. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1984, pp. 128–143; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century. S. 286.

According to the operational department of the headquarters of the 50th A, by the beginning of the operation, the following balance of forces had developed in its zone, which was not entirely favorable for an attack on the enemy’s pre-prepared defenses (Table 2).

table 2

The balance of forces and means on the front of the 50th A ZapF by July 13, 1943167
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 1v.-2.

Note.

Data only for the 196th brigade.

According to the initial decision of the army commander, which was in accordance with the provisions of the Infantry Combat Regulations, the main blow was to be delivered by two left-flank infantry divisions on the Kolpino front - mark 199.9, with the aim of breaking through in the direction of Khromyli - Maryinsky, and an auxiliary blow - by one rifle regiment 64- th sd in the direction of Kremischnoye; The 38th sk under the command of General Alexei Tereshkov, deployed on the right flank of the 50th A (17th, 326th and 413th rifle divisions), received the task of holding the defense and providing army formations from a possible enemy counterattack, as well as being ready to attack Maryinka 168
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 2–5.

Here, on the right flank of the army, in the area of ​​Zagorichi - Bukan - Usty, a camouflage operation was carried out, and on July 12 - reconnaissance in force. To fulfill the decision of the command to break through the enemy defenses, the 50th A regrouped and delivered the main blow with the left flank from the Kolpino area in the direction of Budskie Vyselki - Maryinsky - Khromyli. The 212th and 324th Rifle Divisions were concentrated on a 6-kilometer-long breakthrough along the front, operating with the support of the 196th brigade, two artillery and two mortar regiments, as well as one artillery and one mortar battalion. As a result of this strike, carried out with the assistance of the 440th Rifle Division of the 64th Rifle Division, which attacked Kremishchnoye, it was supposed to encircle and destroy units of the 134th German Infantry Division of General Hans Schlemmer in the area of ​​Paliki - Rechitsa - Dubrovka, and later develop success on Zikeevo, using the 49th rifle division and the tank regiment, which remained in the reserve of the army commander in the area of ​​​​the village of Maklaki. For artillery support of the breakthrough, an artillery group was concentrated, which included three divisional artillery regiments (64th, 212th and 324th divisions), the 39th and 188th cannon artillery regiments of the RGK, the 54th and 307th mortar regiments, artillery and mortar divisions : 113 45 mm guns, 88 76 mm regimental and divisional artillery guns, 48 ​​122 and 152 mm guns, 182 82 mm mortars and 68 120 mm mortars, 40 M-13 rocket launchers 169

As you can see, in total there were 539 guns and mortars in the group, that is, 90 barrels per kilometer of a 6-kilometer breakthrough section, although the headquarters of the 50th A indicates a different artillery density - 56 barrels per kilometer 170
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 3.