Intro. article prepared. text and comments. Z.I. Peregudova. T. 1. - M .: New literary review, 2004.

"GUARDS" IN THE EYES OF THE GUARDS

In the late 1870s, a characteristic feature of Russian life was the terrorism of the populist revolutionaries who fought against the tsarist government. Section III, which carried out the functions of the political police, could not cope with them, and it was decided to carry out transformations in this area.
On August 6, 1880, a new institution arose in Russia - the State Police Department, which became the highest political police body in the Russian Empire.
Substantiating his proposals, Minister of Internal Affairs M.T. Loris-Melikov pointed out that “clerical work in this (State Police Department. - Z.P.) can be entrusted only to such persons who, having the knowledge and abilities necessary for service in a higher government institution, are fully trustworthy in their moral qualities, consistency of character and political reliability”1. The old cadres were not suitable both in terms of their professional qualities and due to the fact that some of them were gendarmes, military people. Loris-Melikov sought to ensure that the new institution consisted of "lawyers", civilians and those with legal training.
By a decree of November 15, 1880, the State Police Department was entrusted with the leadership of both the political and general police. According to Art. 362 "Institutions of the Ministry", the Department was obliged to deal with the following issues: 1) prevention and suppression of crimes and protection of public safety and order; 2) conducting cases on state crimes; 3) organizing and monitoring the activities of police institutions; 4) protection of state borders and border communications; issuance of passports to Russian citizens, residence permits in Russia to foreigners; expulsions of foreigners from Russia; monitoring all types of cultural and educational activities and the approval of the statutes of various societies2.
An important role belonged to the Special Section of the Department created in 1898. He was in charge of domestic and foreign agents, monitored the correspondence of suspicious persons, supervised the mood of workers, student youth, as well as the search for persons on political issues, etc.
The Police Department and its Special Department carried out their main functions through local institutions subordinate to them: provincial gendarme departments (GZhU), regional gendarme departments (OZhU), gendarmerie-police departments of railways (ZhPU railway), as well as search points, part which was later renamed into security departments.
The first provincial gendarme departments were created on the basis of the Regulations on the Corps of Gendarmes of September 16, 1867. Until the middle of 1868, they arose in almost all provinces. At the same time, gendarmerie observation posts are set up in some localities for a fixed period and abolished as needed.
The head of the provincial gendarme department had several assistants who were in the counties and headed the county gendarmerie departments. As a rule, one assistant to the head of the GZhU was responsible for several counties.
The main purpose of the gendarme departments was the political search, the production of inquiries on state crimes. Until the 1880s, they remained the only institutions of political investigation in the field.
As part of the state police, the GJU was part of the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, being a military unit, they were financed from the budget of the Military Ministry and were subordinate to it in terms of combat, military, economic part. The GZhU were independent from the governors, who were responsible for the security and tranquility in the province; this kind of duality sometimes introduced considerable difficulties in their activities and relations with the authorities.
The police department exercised the political leadership of the GJU, but rarely had the opportunity to influence their personnel; the career of the chiefs of the GZhU depended primarily on the leadership of the headquarters of the gendarme corps.
Since the creation of the capital's GZhU, gendarmerie cavalry divisions were organized under them. The main purpose of the divisions was to carry out patrol service and fight unrest. The number of the division, together with officers and non-combatants, practically did not exceed 500 people.
The gendarmerie-police departments of the railways arose in the early 1860s as a result of the transformation of the gendarmerie squadrons and teams that guarded the first railways.
The original ZhPU railways were subordinate to the Ministry of Railways (through the inspectors of the relevant roads) and only in December 1866 were all police departments removed from the Ministry of Railways and completely subordinated to the chief of gendarmes. The rights and obligations of ZhPU railways were expanded. They had to perform all the duties of the general police, using all the rights assigned to it. The area of ​​operation of the ZhPU railways extended to the entire space alienated by the railways, and to all the buildings and structures located on this lane.
At the head of the ZhPU of the railways were chiefs with the rights of regiment commanders with the rank of major generals or colonels, they were appointed by orders of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes. Until 1906, they did not take part either in the production of inquiries on state crimes, or in political search and surveillance. However, the active role played by the performances of the railroad workers in the October strike of 1905 forced the government to take urgent measures and entrust the ZhPU of the railways with the responsibility of conducting inquiries about all "criminal actions" of a political nature committed in the right of way of the railways. During the production of inquiries, the heads of departments were subordinate to the heads of the local GZhU. A secret agent supervision was also created on the railways, which obliged the ZhPU of the railways to have their own secret agents.
In parallel with the metropolitan provincial gendarmerie departments, security departments operated, to which the main functions of the political police in the field quite quickly passed. The first security department, called the Department for maintaining order and tranquility in the capital, was created in 1866 at the office of the St. Petersburg mayor in connection with the beginning of the assassination attempts on Alexander II. The second was the Moscow (Secret Investigation Department under the office of the Moscow chief police officer), created on November 1, 1880 by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs M.T. Loris-Melikova. The third - created in 1900 in Warsaw.
The activities of the first security departments were, according to the authorities, successful. In connection with the growing revolutionary movement and the weakness of the provincial gendarme departments, the authorities are increasingly thinking about how to improve the political investigation, make it more organized and flexible. In cities where protests by workers and student youth were increasingly taking place, at the initiative of the Police Department, search points (departments) began to be created. From August 1902 they open in Vilna, Yekaterinoslav, Kazan, Kyiv, Odessa, Saratov, Tiflis, Kharkov, Perm, Simferopol (Tavrichesky), Nizhny Novgorod.
These institutions were supposed to carry out political search, conduct surveillance and lead secret agents. In the Regulations on the heads of the search departments, approved on August 12, 1902 by the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve noted that "the duties of the heads of departments are the acquisition of secret agents, the management of their activities, as well as the selection and training of surveillance agents"3. In the same year, a "Code of Rules" was sent out in a circular to the heads of security departments, which states that the task of these departments is to search for political affairs, carried out through secret agents and filer surveillance. The duties of the heads of departments also included the recruitment of internal agents. They had to know the history of the revolutionary movement well, follow the revolutionary literature, and, if possible, acquaint their secret collaborators with it, developing in the latter a “conscious attitude to the cause of the service”4. The heads of the search and security departments reported directly to the Police Department, which gave the general direction of their activities, disposed of the personnel.
The creation of a network of new security departments occurred largely as a result of the initiative taken by the head of the Moscow security department, then head of the Special Department of the Police Department S.V. Zubatov. However, his resignation in the fall of 1903 prevented him from realizing his plans in full.
As the number of security departments grows, rivalry arises and intensifies between the provincial gendarme departments and the security departments. In its circulars, the Department repeatedly urges them to "mutual assistance", the exchange of information. In many respects, these conflict situations arose due to the fact that, although the functions of the GZhU and the security departments were separated, in reality, the search activity (for which the security departments were responsible) and the observation activity, as well as the conduct of inquiries (which were handled by the GZhU) were closely intertwined. In practice, it was sometimes impossible to separate one from the other. Those leaders of the security departments who passed through the headquarters of the gendarme corps were subordinate to the head of the GZhU in combat terms. The latter, as a rule, was in the rank of colonel or major general. But in relation to the official, he sometimes had to obey the junior head of the security department.
In 1906-1907, on the initiative of the director of the Department, M.I. Trusevich, work is underway to create new security departments, search units, and the entire network of political investigation institutions is expanding. In December 1907, there were already 27 security departments.
On February 9, 1907, Stolypin approved the "Regulations on Security Departments"5. The Regulations also included items relating to relations with the GZhU, the exchange of information between security departments. Gendarmerie and political authorities, receiving information related to the type of activity of the security departments, had to report them to the security department for development, searches, seizures and arrests, which could not be carried out without the knowledge of the head of the security department. In turn, the heads of the security departments were supposed to inform the GZhU about the circumstances that were of interest to the latter in the course of their inquiries.
In 1906-1907 security posts appeared. They are organized primarily in places far from the center, where at that time there was an increase in “fighting” moods among the population. The first security posts were established in Khabarovsk, Penza, Gomel, Vladikavkaz, Yekaterinodar, Zhitomir, Kostroma, Poltava, Kursk and a number of other cities.
Simultaneously with the work on the creation of security posts, at the suggestion of the same Trusevich, completely new institutions are being created in the system of political investigation - district security departments. December 14, 1906 Stolypin approves a special regulation on the district security departments. They were created in order to "successfully combat the revolutionary movement, expressed in a whole series of continuously ongoing terrorist acts, agrarian unrest, intensified propaganda among the peasants, in the army and navy"6. The regulation on the district security departments entrusted them with the task of uniting all the political investigation bodies functioning within the district (covering several provinces). Much attention was paid to the adoption of quick decisions, well-coordinated joint work of security departments and gendarmerie departments, "so that the activity was more lively and systematic." In one of the notes, dated 1913, the director of the Police Department called the district security departments the "branch office" of his Department. It is noteworthy that the regional branches were organized in such a way that their sphere of activity coincided (or almost coincided) with the areas of operation of the district party committees of the RSDLP and other revolutionary parties.
The heads of the local security departments were directly subordinate to the head of the district security department. Provincial and county ZhU and ZHPU railway in matters of search, they also had to be guided by the instructions of the head of the district security department.
Among the main tasks of the district security departments were the organization of internal agents for the "development" of all local party organizations and the management of the activities of agents and searches within the boundaries of the district. To this end, the heads of the district security departments had the right to convene meetings of officers directly involved in the political search. They also had to inform the higher investigative institutions about the state of affairs in the revolutionary movement of the region, to help the corresponding institutions of other regions in the political search. The officers of the district security departments could use all the investigative and intelligence materials of the gendarme departments and security departments. If necessary, they should also have known secret employees - agents under the jurisdiction of one or another officer of the gendarme department and security department.
At the initial stage of their activities, the district security departments played a significant role in defeating party organizations, party committees, and coordinating the activities of detective services in the field. Their successes raised the prestige of investigative activities among the authorities, created the illusion of a possible defeat of the revolutionary organizations.
However, there were also difficulties. As the involvement of district security departments in the activities of local police authorities increased, their relationship with the employees of the GZhU became more and more complicated. The periodic circulars issued by the Department with a reminder of the need for joint efforts in the fight against the forces of the revolution and the obligatory mutual information did not help either. Officials of the district security departments sometimes did not show proper tact towards their provincial colleagues. Complaints and dissatisfaction often led to conflicts and slanders, which the Police Department had to deal with. Since 1909, the activities of the district security departments have been weakening, which was largely due to a lull in the activities of revolutionary organizations.
V.F. Dzhunkovsky, appointed in January 1913 as deputy minister of the interior, head of the police, raised the question of the expediency of the existence of security departments. By this time, the Police Department gradually began to abolish the security departments in those areas "where there was no urgent need for such for the suppression of revolutionary movements." Part of the security departments was merged with the provincial gendarme departments. The unification took place in those provinces where the head of the State Bureau of Statistics was sufficiently trained in the search business. Carrying out these activities, the Police Department justified them with “state benefit”, however, as some police officers believed, the main reason was that the Department did not find “another way out of the situation” when obviously “abnormal” situations began between the GZhU and the security department. relations. In his memoirs, V.F. Dzhunkovsky writes in detail about his attitude to security departments. “While still the governor in Moscow,” Dzhunkovsky writes, “I always had a negative attitude towards these regional security departments that arose before my eyes in general and, in particular, to that of the Moscow Central District, observing all the negative aspects of this innovation.<...>All these district and independent security departments were only breeding grounds for provocation; what little benefit they might have been able to bring was completely obscured by the colossal harm they sowed during these few years.
On May 15, 1913, Dzhunkovsky distributed a circular, by which “top secret”, “urgently” the heads of the Baku, Yekaterinoslav, Kyiv, Nizhny Novgorod, Petrokovsky, Tiflis, Kherson and Yaroslavl GZhU, Don and Sevastopol regional gendarme departments were informed about the liquidation of security departments in their provinces. The circular stated: “Having discussed the situation of setting up a search at the current moment, in connection with the manifestations of the revolutionary movement in the Empire and taking into account that security departments, in addition to those established by law (meaning Petersburg, Moscow, Warsaw. - Z.P. ), were considered as temporary institutions, I found it expedient, in terms of achieving uniformity in the organization of the search business and managing it, to pour the remaining independent security departments into the local provincial gendarmerie departments "8. Soon, all security departments (except for the capital ones) were liquidated, and their chiefs became leaders of the newly created search units of the GZhU.
Understanding that the measures taken cannot but cause dissatisfaction with the heads of the abolished security departments, Dzhunkovsky wrote in the same circular: “... I consider it necessary to point out that the unification in your person of the activities of both institutions should not be considered as a humiliation of the official dignity of the head of the abolished security department, because the establishment of such an order<...>is caused not by any other considerations, but by the interests of the most important duties for the ranks of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes, by improving the conditions for conducting a search case.
Following the liquidation of the security departments, Dzhunkovsky proceeds to prepare measures to abolish the district security departments. In 1914, all regional security departments, except for Turkestan and East Siberian, were abolished. The rest operated until 1917. Once again, as before 1902, the GZhU became the central link in the political investigation on the ground.
Thus, an important link in the structure of political investigation was eliminated. As subsequent events showed, the measures taken by Dzhunkovsky did not contribute either to strengthening the political police or to improving the situation in relations between its leading cadres.
The works mentioned above contain a detailed and multifaceted description of the activities of political investigation in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. However, they mainly provide an external, "objective" view of the work of the Police Department and security departments. But for understanding these institutions, the subjective side is also very important - the motives and goals of the activities of their employees, the specificity of their vision of the situation, their self-esteem. Indeed, in their service, along with the career side, the mercantile side was also the ideological side, connected with their understanding of the current political situation and their duty, their function in state and public life.
Here, for example, is the “Review of the current conditions of the official position of the provincial gendarme department and a number of considerations regarding the change in their organization and procedure”, prepared by the head of the Voronezh GZhU N.V. Vasiliev. The author critically assessed the state of political investigation and its personnel. He saw a way out of the situation, in particular, in the unification of the Gendarme Corps with the general police, as well as in organizing courses to improve the skills of detective workers.
Before us is a gendarme-philosopher. He writes: “You can’t kill an idea. The evolution of human thought takes place unceasingly, irresistibly transforming the views, beliefs, and then the social structure of peoples' lives. The history of revolutionary movements teaches us that it is impossible to stop the course of major historical events, just as it is impossible for a person to stop the rotation of the Earth. But the same story provides on its pages too full evidence that the pioneers of the revolution, full of energy and enthusiasm, have always been utopians and in their struggle against social inertia, in their desire to recreate new forms of life, usually not only did not contribute to the progress of their homeland, but often served as a brake on the correct course of the development of social self-consciousness. The role of the pioneers in history has been condemned by history itself. It is human nature to err, and the foremost theoreticians, no matter how ideal, apparently, their aspirations, were not and will not be the true leaders of the people ... "
Vasiliev believed that the system, which had “steadfastly withstood the struggle” for half a century, “hardly needs a radical transformation”, but “the existing building of gendarmerie supervision should be completed, adapted to modern requirements” ... But not subjected to “breaking” and “ re-creation"9.
An important source of information on this issue is the memoirs of officials of the Police Department, the gendarmerie, persons associated with the Russian political investigation. However, the vast majority of them were published in exile, and only a few were republished in Russia10. This collection is intended to fill the existing gap. Of the five books of four authors presented in it, only one (A.V. Gerasimova) was published in Russia, and the book by A.T. Vasiliev is published in Russian for the first time.

Gerasimov's memoirs, small in size, were first published in 1934 in German and French. Alexander Vasilyevich Gerasimov was born on November 7, 1861, was educated at the Kharkov real school, then graduated from the Chuguev infantry cadet school in the first category. After graduating from college, he entered military service in 1883 with the rank of ensign, which he took part in the 61st Reserve Infantry Battalion. In November 1889, he transferred to the Gendarme Corps and rose from lieutenant to major general. His first place of service was associated with Samara, where he was sent as an adjutant of the Samara provincial gendarme department. Two years later, he continued his service in Kharkov, at first also as an adjutant, and then as an assistant to the head of the Kharkov provincial gendarme department (since September 1894)11.
The correspondence of the Police Department highly appreciates the diligence and diligence of Captain A.V. Gerasimov. One of the certificates about his activities stated that Gerasimov "attracted attention to himself with his abilities and diligence", during his three years of service in the GZhU "provided very significant services in matters of political investigation." Gerasimov was periodically sent to various localities to provide assistance to colleagues, and sometimes for inspections, and he always “carried out the assignments entrusted to him with excellent success, fully justifying the trust placed in him”12.
In 1902, when security departments began to be created, Gerasimov was appointed head of the Kharkov security department. The already cited document stated that “from the first steps of his leadership of the department, Captain Gerasimov managed to put the business entrusted to him to the proper height, which resulted in the constant successful activity of the department, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich, in addition to the city of Kharkov, other cities of the Kharkov province were included. In addition, the named officer quite successfully fulfilled the instructions assigned to him to organize search and surveillance in other areas outside the surveillance area. In 1903, Gerasimov "outside the rules" was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In February 1905, on the proposal of the director of the Police Department A.A. Lopukhin, he took the post of head of the St. Petersburg security department. The service record indicated that his appointment took place as an officer who distinguished himself by "tried experience, deep knowledge of the matter and rare devotion to duty ...".
In St. Petersburg, he actively gets down to business, putting things in order in the security department itself and actively engaging in the fight against the revolutionary movement. Major General D.F. Trepov, extremely pleased with his actions, believed that thanks to his "extremely skillful diligence and energy,<...>all the main managers of unrest”, “workshops of explosive shells were discovered, a number of actions were warned”, and “all the work was carried out under the constant threat from the revolutionaries”.
In June 1905, "outside the rules" Gerasimov received the rank of colonel, in 1906 the Order of St. Vladimir of the 3rd degree, the next year, in 1907, he was awarded the rank of Major General, in 1908 he was awarded the highest gratitude, and on January 1, 1909 he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav 1st degree.
The constant attention and benevolence of Trepov, then Stolypin, fueled Gerasimov's ambitions: the St. Petersburg security department, which he headed, was one of the largest in Russia; he achieved independent reports to the minister (which had not happened before).
Four years lasted his service as head of the St. Petersburg security department. His memoirs are mainly devoted to this period. Correspondence between the Police Department and the Ministry of the Interior indicated that over the years he had undermined his health, often turning to doctors.
In April 1909, Gerasimov transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as a general for special assignments under the minister. He often travels on business trips to check the activities of political investigation institutions and the work of individuals.
Working at one time with Stolypin, Gerasimov intended to get the post of Deputy Minister of the Interior, head of the police. But after the death of Stolypin and the departure of A.A. Makarov, from the post of Minister of the Interior, the thread that firmly connected him with this ministry broke. And the appointment of V.F. Dzhunkovsky in January 1913 as Deputy Minister of the Interior, head of the police, finally destroyed his plans. New people came to the ministry, with whom Gerasimova had practically nothing to do with. His service career ended in early 1914, after he submitted a letter of resignation in December 1913. Upon his retirement, he was given the rank of lieutenant general for his previous services.
Gerasimov's memoirs are devoted almost exclusively to the fight against one direction in the revolutionary movement - terror. One of the leaders of the Social Revolutionary movement V.M. Chernov, having read Gerasimov’s book, wrote: “Only after the memoirs of General Gerasimov came out (in German), did we finally find out the general picture of the catastrophe that befell our combat work, just at the very time when Bo (military organization. - Z.P.), according to the plans of the party, was to bring its attacks on the tsarist regime to maximum energy”14. Gerasimov's memoirs are also interesting in that they reflected a very important moment in the life of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, its "inside out" and the crisis that it was going through in connection with the betrayal of Azef.
Another author whose memoirs are included in the collection is Pavel Pavlovich Zavarzin. While in exile, he was one of the first in 1924 to publish his memoirs, The Work of the Secret Police. Six years later, in 1930, he published a second book - "Gendarmes and Revolutionaries", which partially repeats and partially supplements the first.
Zavarzin was born on February 13, 1868 in a family of noblemen of the Kherson province. He received a general education at the Odessa Real School, then graduated from the Odessa Infantry Junker School in the first category. In 1888, with the rank of second lieutenant, he entered the service in the 16th Rifle Battalion of His Majesty and served there for 10 years. As part of this battalion, he is in Livadia during the death of Alexander III, guarded the Hessian Princess Alix (future Empress Alexandra Feodorovna) on the days of her arrival in Russia, in Livadia, for which he was awarded the Cavalry Cross of the 2nd class of the Hessian Order of Philip the Magnanimous.
In May 1898, with the rank of lieutenant, he transferred to the Gendarme Corps. Initially, Zavarzin served as an adjutant in the Bessarabian GZhU, from August 1899 an adjutant in the Tauride GZhU, where he received the rank of captain. A few months later, in May 1900, he was transferred as an assistant to the head of the Volochissky branch of the Kyiv gendarmerie and police department of the railway. At the end of the year, in December, he receives the rank of captain. In June of the following year, he was transferred to the post of head of the Lubensky branch of the Moscow-Kyiv gendarmerie-police department, and two years later he was seconded to the Bessarabian GZhU and appointed to the post of head of the newly created Bessarabian security department.
The following year, from June 1904, he was transferred to the post of assistant chief of the Mogilev GZhU in the Gomel district. The revolutionary events of 1905 in Russia and the dramatic situation in Odessa required the fortification of this area by experienced personnel familiar with this city and the situation. Therefore, Zavarzin, who had not served even a month in his new position, was transferred to Odessa as the head of the security department, and from July 7, 1905, he headed the Don Regional Security Department, on August 11, 1906 he was transferred to the head of the public security department in Warsaw15.
Service in Warsaw lasted almost three and a half years. It was a rather difficult period of Zavarzin's activity, since the revolutionary organizations in Warsaw were very strong, they had a well-established conspiracy.
Based on his already fairly extensive experience, Zavarzin was able to effectively use the work of secret officers who worked in the Warsaw Security Department. Unfortunately, Zavarzin talks very sparingly about his secret agents, mostly mentioning only those who died before the revolution.
The successful implementation of the political investigation in Chisinau, Odessa, Rostov-on-Don and especially in Warsaw ensured Zavarzin a reputation as a high-class specialist, and at the end of 1909 he was appointed head of the Moscow Security Department (lieutenant colonel from December 6, 1906)16.
Zavarzin was the initiator of the creation of the Instructions of the Moscow Security Department for organizing and maintaining internal agents. It was based on the secret Instruction of the Police Department, published in 1907. The reason that prompted him to write "his" instruction was that the instruction of the Department was published in a limited number of copies and sent only to the heads of eight district security departments. Many chiefs of the GZhU saw her only from the hands of the leaders of the district secret police. The instruction was strictly classified, because they were afraid that it might fall into the hands of the revolutionaries, who would reveal all the "tricks" of the secret police.
The instruction of the Moscow Security Department, prepared by Zavarzin, was more interesting, written in a more accessible language and gave specific advice on acquiring secret agents, communicating and working with these agents, concretized various categories of secret employees: auxiliary agents, craftsmen, etc.17 However, its text was not agreed with the Police Department. And when, at the beginning of 1911, through the Minister of Internal Affairs, the instruction came to the head of the Special Department of the Police Department A.M. Eremin, who was one of the developers of the instruction of the Police Department, she led him into indignation. The director of the Department18 was also indignant.
Zavarzin's normal, and even sometimes friendly, relations with the Moscow authorities contrasted sharply with the increasingly tense relations with the Police Department. In July 1912, Zavarzin was transferred to Odessa as the head of the gendarme department. This was not considered a demotion, but in reality meant that the peak of his career was left behind.
Describing Zavarzin, Martynov writes in the memoirs published in this collection: “I must say that Colonel Zavarzin, despite all the primitiveness of his nature, insufficient general development, so to speak, “lack of culture”, nevertheless, after fourteen years of service in the gendarmerie corps, he had the practice search case." Paying tribute to his professionalism, Martynov at the same time believes that he was dismissed from the post of head of the Moscow Security Department not only for omissions in implementing the measures of the Police Department, but simply because of the inadequacy of this difficult position.
However, one cannot agree with Martynov on everything. Zavarzin really did not have enough stars from the sky, but he was hardworking and diligent, did not conflict with colleagues, knew his business and left his department to Martynov in excellent condition.
On June 2, 1914, the family of Nicholas II was returning from Romania through Odessa. This trip of the royal family was planned as a secret bride of the heir to the Romanian throne. There were rumors that he was tipped to be the husband of the eldest Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna. The princess was not told anything about this, but the prince clearly did not impress not only Olga Nikolaevna, but the whole family.
The meeting of the emperor in Odessa was well organized. "For the excellent order in Odessa during the stay of His Imperial Majesty Nicholas II and the august family" Zavarzin was declared "Highest Favor"19.
On June 3, 1916, Zavarzin was appointed head of the Warsaw provincial gendarme department. However, in connection with the war and the evacuation of the Warsaw GZhU, he moved to Petrograd. There he is temporarily seconded to the Petrograd GZhU and placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Periodically, the Ministry and the Police Department send him on business trips around Russia.
The events of February 1917 found him in Petrograd. Like most of the top St. Petersburg officials, Zavarzin was arrested in the early days of the February Revolution by the Extraordinary Investigative Commission to investigate the actions of former ministers and other officials. He was imprisoned for a little over a month and was soon able to leave Russia.
The most detailed memoirs (“My service in the Separate Corps of Gendarmes”) were left by the youngest representative of this gendarme cohort, Colonel A.P. Martynov. They were written later than his colleagues did; the author worked on them intermittently for five years (1933-1938). Therefore, perhaps, they are more thoughtful, and sometimes more frank in their assessments, likes and dislikes. They were published in 1972 in the USA after his death.
Martynov was born on August 14, 1875 in Moscow into a noble family. He was educated in the 3rd Moscow Cadet Corps, then graduated from the 3rd Alexander School in the first category. He served in the 2nd Sofia Infantry Regiment, then in the 7th Samogitsky Grenadier Regiment. At this time, his older brother Nikolai was already serving in the Gendarme Corps, and the author of the memoirs also had a constant desire to be determined in the Gendarme Corps, where he was admitted in May 1899.
His entire life path before the October Revolution - service in the Main Department of Internal Affairs and security departments - can be traced through his memoirs. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to only brief information about it. Immediately after entering the Corps, he was appointed as a junior officer in the Moscow Gendarmerie Division. After passing the courses of the headquarters of the Gendarme Corps, he served as an adjutant in the St. Petersburg GZhU, in January 1903 he was transferred as an assistant to the head of the Petrokovsky GZhU, in February 1903 he returned to the St. Petersburg GZhU; began independent work in the Saratov security department, where he was sent in July 1906 as the head of the department. After six years in this position, he was transferred (July 12, 1912) to Moscow as the head of the Moscow Security Department.
Giving a general assessment of the work and business qualities of Martynov and petitioning in May 1916 for awarding him the Order of Prince Vladimir of the 4th degree “out of all rules”, the Moscow mayor, Major General V.N. Shebeko wrote: “From the first reports made to me personally by Colonel Martynov about the vigorous activity that the ranks of the Department have shown and are showing in the fight against anarchy, I was convinced of the personal remarkable abilities and energy of the aforementioned staff officer, who constantly tirelessly personally leads all political search in such a difficult place as the city of Moscow, the maintenance of order in which is reflected in the activities of revolutionary organizations throughout the Empire<...>the ranks of the Branch, despite the overwhelming mass of occupations, especially increased due to the circumstances experienced by their homeland, work willingly with excellent zeal - thanks to the ability of Colonel Martynov to settle among his subordinates the spirit of striving for honest performance of official duties.<...>The systematic and persistent work of Colonel Martynov in the fight against revolutionary leaders, with the undoubted availability of outstanding abilities for searching and with great ability to work, had as a result the complete disorganization of the Moscow underground organizations of these leaders.
On the very first day of unrest in Petrograd (and they immediately became known in Moscow), on February 28 Martynov turned to the accounting department of the treasury of the Moscow city government with a request to issue 10,000 rubles for the expenses of the security department. The money was distributed to the employees of the department as an advance payment for the month of March. In 1918, he was prosecuted for this act and accused "of embezzlement and misappropriation of state money entrusted to him by position." But all the witnesses confirmed the receipt of the money, which was also proved by the financial documentation. For himself, Martynov left 1,000 rubles, "keeping them also at the expense of his maintenance for the month of March." He was acquitted. In his conclusion of May 11, 1918, signed by E.F. Rozmirovich and N.V. Krylenko, it was said: “Under the circumstances of that time” this was caused by “a simple everyday necessity, in view of the special official position of the officers of the security department” and the need to “ensure their existence in the near future”21.
A few days after the uprising in Petrograd, unrest broke out in Moscow. On March 1, 1917, the crowd broke into the premises of the security department and Martynov’s apartment, which was located in the same building, broke cabinets, file cabinets, threw documents into the street and kindled fires. Files, albums, catalogues, photographs were on fire22. Judging by Martynov's memorandum dated March 13, 1917, he was not in the city at that time, but some believe that he was in Moscow and even took part in this action. In any case, during the pogrom one felt "one's own" hand. The materials of all divisions of the Moscow Security Department were practically not touched, except for one - the intelligence department, where the materials of intelligence reports were stored, the card index of the intelligence department, by which it was possible to identify secret employees of the Moscow Security Department. Some photographs and documents were later taken from the desk of the head of the Okhrana.
In the first days of March, the new authorities were looking for Martynov, but, as he later wrote, it was difficult for him to return to Moscow. Upon his return, he wrote a report submitted to the Commissar of Moscow on March 13, 1917. The report is interesting not only from the point of view of purely official relations, but also as a document containing a political assessment of what was happening. Considering the situation difficult and especially difficult for the former head of the security department, he writes: “First of all, I consider it my duty to declare my complete subordination to the present government and that I have not taken and never will take any measures or actions that could cause him any harm, from the very beginning of his assuming power, stopping all work of the department entrusted to me.<...>I must also report that since the last days of February of this year, when no instructions were received from Petrograd in the town authorities, but it was definitely known that the Provisional Government had taken control of the country into its own hands - any opposition to it only complicated the situation, so I ordered according to the Department, so that no arrests are made, so that those arrested who were listed as being held in custody by the mayor would be released.<...>I am deeply convinced that not one of my subordinates, both from the officer corps and from officials and lower employees, would not take any measures leading to harm for the Provisional Government, since it was completely clear that it was pointless, harmful to go against the general desire and could only create highly undesirable complications, especially in the difficult times we are all going through. The incredible blindness in which the old government was, unable to listen to those warning reports that were repeatedly made to it, indicating both the decline in the prestige of the dynasty and general indignation, made it impossible to serve under this regime. It is worth noting that Martynov's reports were carefully read by the immediate leadership, but many materials of this kind were put together by the Minister of Internal Affairs Protopopov "under the cloth."
Further in the report, Martynov speaks of his desire and the desire of his subordinates to go to the front - "to join the army on a common basis both by his service and in its ranks and by virtue of being the real defenders of the motherland and faithful servants of the Provisional Government"24.
In early April 1917, A.P. Martynov was arrested. Initially, he was kept in the palace guardhouse in the Kremlin, in June he was transferred to the Moscow provincial prison. He was interrogated at the Commission for the Provision of the New Order. The questions concerned his direct service in political investigation and his leadership and secret agents. Martynov issued his testimony in the form of a "Note on the organization of the system of political investigation." To the question about specific secret employees, and in particular, about the presence of agents among the military in the Moscow security department, Martynov answered orally. “As far as I remember,” he said, “there were no detectives of military agents in the Saratov security department, just as there were none with me in the Moscow security department. Regarding the list presented to me (Martynov was presented with a list of auxiliary agents of the MOO, dated 1911 - Z.P.) I can’t say anything, then I did not serve. I did not accept military agents from Zavarzin and did not start one myself, personally taking this negatively, believing that a political search from the military environment is useless and can be delivered if needed from outside. It is worth noting that Martynov's negative attitude towards the establishment of secret agents among the military coincided with the position of the former comrade of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.F. Dzhunkovsky, who also sharply opposed the presence of agents in the army and by his order abolished it26. However, if Martynov considered the establishment of agents in the army to be useless, then Dzhunkovsky motivated his decision with ethical considerations, considering denunciation of colleagues and superiors in the military environment as an immoral phenomenon.
One of the main tasks of the Commission for Ensuring the New System, which interrogated Martynov, was to identify the secret agents of the Moscow Security Department. The materials of the intelligence department were practically destroyed by fire, so the lists of secret employees were compiled according to indirect data, and then specified, much was restored based on the materials of the Police Department, during interrogations of Okhrana officers. Judging by Martynov's answers, he did not hide the names of those agents with whom he worked, he gave information about the appearance of some employees, their business qualities. Judging by the protocols, he sought to leave an impression of himself as a specialist whose knowledge could still be useful to the new authorities.
Circumstances were favorable for him, including after the October Revolution. In November 1917, the opportunity arose to be released on bail. His wife, Evgenia Nikolaevna, deposited a deposit of 5,000 rubles with the Moscow Treasury, and D.P. Evnevich signed a decree on the release of Martynov from prison. Even earlier, his son Alexander, who was arrested with him, was released.
However, it was clear to him that it was impossible to remain in Russia.
In the spring of 1918, Martynov and his family managed to escape to the south. He joined the White Army, served in counterintelligence in the Black Sea Fleet, then left the Crimea for Constantinople. Together with the former head of the Moscow detective department A.F. Koshko organized a private detective bureau in Constantinople.
In 1923, Martynov and his family moved to the United States, where for some time he worked in New York to protect banks, offices, etc. In 1951 he moved to California and died soon after in Los Angeles.

"Protection - the Russian secret police" - this is the name given to his memoirs by the last director of the Police Department A.T. Vasiliev. The word "protection" in these memoirs had a rather capacious meaning and denoted both the political police as a whole and its constituent parts: the governing body - the Police Department, provincial gendarmerie departments and security departments. "Protection" is practically a synonym for the word "Okhrana", which was widespread at that time.
Vasiliev, the only memoirist presented in the book, was not a military man and did not belong to the Gendarme Corps. However, according to his official duties, he had to fight the opposition forces, like the gendarmes.
The post of director of the Police Department was the peak of Vasiliev's service career. In the future, he was supposed to become a Deputy Minister of the Interior, but by the February Revolution of 1917 he managed to become only an acting Deputy Minister. Of all four memoirists, Vasiliev held the highest position, was at the center of events, but turned out to be less perspicacious than his colleagues. Evidence of this can be the words spoken by Vasiliev at an audience with Empress Alexandra Feodorovna in October 1916 when he was appointed to the post of director of the Department. When asked by the empress about the unrest, he replied that “revolution is absolutely impossible in Russia. Of course, there is a certain nervous tension among the population due to the ongoing war and the heavy burden that it has caused, but the people trust the king and do not think about rebellion, ”and further added that any uprisings would be quickly suppressed.
A.T. Vasiliev was born in 1869 in Kyiv. In the same place, in 1891, he graduated from the law faculty of the University of St. Vladimir and entered the public service in the prosecutor's office in the Kyiv judicial district. In 1894, he was appointed an investigator in the city of Kamenetz-Podolsk, and a year later he moved to the position of assistant prosecutor of the Lutsk District Court. In this position, Vasilyev later worked in Kyiv (1901-1904), then was transferred to St. Petersburg. In the first years of his service in the prosecutor's office, Vasilyev was mainly involved in criminal cases, and in St. Petersburg he worked in close contact with the St.
In 1906, Vasiliev moved from the department of the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior; He served in the Police Department as a Special Assignment Officer, 5th Class. Due to the fact that during this period there were difficulties in the selection of the leaders of the most responsible division of the Police Department - the Special Department, he was in charge of this department for several months. At the same time, by order of Comrade Minister of Internal Affairs P.G. Kurlov and Minister of Internal Affairs P.A. Stolypin, he inspected a number of security departments, institutions of political investigation.
As an officer for special assignments, he oversaw the work of the Special Section, sometimes acting as vice director of the Police Department. Vasiliev worked in the Department for two years and returned to the prosecutor's office. In 1908 he was appointed to the St. Petersburg Court of Justice, from 1909 he held the former position of Deputy Prosecutor of the St. Petersburg District Court. Four years later, Vasiliev returns to the Police Department to his former position as an official for special assignments, but already in the 4th grade and acts as vice director of the Police Department for political affairs.
In many ways, this return was facilitated by the new comrade of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.F. Dzhunkovsky. In his memoirs, he wrote: “... I invited Comrade Prosecutor State Councilor Vasilyev to correct the post of vice director for managing a special department of the Department. I didn’t know him, but he was recommended to me as a noble and honest person, and besides, I was seduced by the fact that at one time he already served in the Department of Political Affairs, therefore, he was familiar with the mechanism of this case. Further, Dzhunkovsky, however, supplements this characterization with by no means flattering words: “Then I had to repent greatly of this appointment, to admit my mistake, I was too hasty. Vasiliev turned out to be lazy and little capable of his position and was not alien to the negative methods of protection, although he was a completely decent person.
On November 3, 1915, Vasiliev was appointed a member of the Council of the Main Directorate for Press Affairs. But Vasiliev parted with the Department for only a year. The new Minister of Internal Affairs A.D. Protopopov had a friendly disposition towards him and soon after his appointment invited him to take the post of director of the Department. On September 28, 1916, the highest personal decree on the appointment of Vasiliev followed. This appointment was unexpected for many and, judging by the testimony of Vasiliev, for himself. In an interview with journalists immediately after his appointment, he said: “I spent almost all my service in the prosecutor's office, law and law are the only guiding principles. These principles, which I strove to carry out throughout my previous service, I intend to lay at the foundation of my present activity as Director of the Police Department. - In all particular individual cases, I will treat the interests of the population with complete benevolence, but, of course, to the extent that this will allow the observance of public benefit. I have no bias, no bias. In the foreground should be the observance of the highest state interests and the benefit of the many millions of the population of the Empire.
Judging by the reviews of people who knew him well, Vasiliev was a benevolent person, an experienced lawyer, he liked to advise, "train" his colleagues. But in difficult situations, he did not take much on himself. In this regard, his interview given to the correspondent of the Kolokol newspaper about his plans is characteristic: “I, the director of the Police Department, have no special program. All the activities of the Department subordinate to me are reduced to the execution of orders from above. The Minister, in charge of which the Department is located, has his own program, and I must adhere to this program ... "28
In his written explanations given to the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, he expressed his attitude to the work more clearly: “I have always believed that the Police Department should not play any independent role, but should serve as a center where certain information is concentrated, essentially which only the Minister of the Interior should operate in one way or another. That is why I promised the latter when I took office: diligence, truthfulness and the complete absence of any business that would be done without him, the minister, knowledge.
I was convinced that I was one of the many directors of the central offices, that no special advantages were assigned to me, and that I would not, and could not, engage in any special politics, since I was not inclined to this by the nature of my character. I believed that I would only be the head of the institution, to whom I would try to instill decent principles, and that if such intentions of mine did not correspond to the types and desires of the authorities, then I would leave the post without any regret.
Such a view of one's duties explains a lot in the activities of Vasiliev himself and the institution subordinate to him in the months preceding the revolution.
These statements sound all the more unexpected since Protopopov was the Minister of Internal Affairs during this period - a person who was not experienced in the affairs of the Police Department and in organizing a system of political investigation. Historian P. Shchegolev wrote that Vasiliev acted as a second person, played along with his minister and, apparently, assisted him in using the Police Department for personal purposes. Sending an agent to find out what is being said about the minister in government circles, reading letters from people who are of interest to the minister - this is the daily work of the director of the Police Department under Protopopov30.
This characteristic is confirmed by the statement of S.P. Beletsky, former director of the Police Department, then Deputy Minister of the Interior. In his testimony given to the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, he wrote that Protopopov became close to Vasiliev thanks to Kurlov and Badmaev. "In Vasiliev<...>Protopopov, as he personally told me, valued mainly the exclusive devotion to his personal interests, to which Vasiliev recently sacrificed even his old friendly ties with P.G. Kurlov"31.
There were rumors that other comrades of the minister did not want to take on the responsibility of managing the police32. In this case, obviously, Protopopov did not want to have any figure between himself and Vasiliev, preferring direct contact.
In October 1916, newspapers reported on the redistribution of powers between the Minister of the Interior and the Director of the Police Department. If earlier the director of the Department was subordinate to the Deputy Minister of the Interior, who was in charge of the Police Department, now - directly to the Minister of the Interior. In addition, “according to a special report, it was supposed to grant Vasiliev the rights of a deputy minister”33. And indeed, the highest command on this issue was soon published: “On November 25, 1916, His Imperial Majesty graciously commanded deigned to entrust the duties of Comrade Minister of the Interior in charge of the police department to the director of the department, real state adviser Vasiliev, with the right to be present for the minister in the governing Senate and the highest state institutions, as well as the right to sign papers on this department and decide current reports of an estimated and administrative nature of the Police Department”34.
The February Revolution brought many surprises to Vasiliev. In early March, he came with a letter to M.V. Rodzianko to the State Duma, in which he wrote: “I consider it my duty to bring to your attention that only today, having recovered from the events I have endured, I will come to the State Duma to place myself at the disposal of the Provisional Executive Committee of the State Duma.” On the same day, together with the letter, he was arrested and taken to the Taurida Palace35.
Subsequently, Vasiliev was kept in the Trubetskoy bastion of the Peter and Paul Fortress. On September 5, due to a “morbid condition,” he was transferred to the surgical department of the Petrograd solitary prison, and in October he was released on bail36.
Subsequently, he and his wife managed to go abroad.
Vasiliev's memoirs were written in France. He spent the last years of his life in the "Russian House" in Saint-Genevieve-des-Bois, where the poor Russian emigrants of Paris found refuge.
He died in 1930, the same year that his memoirs were published in London in English. The book was written in Russian, then translated into English. Unfortunately, the Russian original could not be found, so the book is published in reverse translation. Obviously, the specifics of the book were difficult for the English translator, who was not strong enough in Russian terms relating to the police, and, perhaps, did not know all the nuances and complexities of the work of the Russian special service.

The memoirs of four representatives of the political police of tsarist Russia in the last years of its existence included in the book are not equal in content and volume, in some details they complement each other, in some they demonstrate a different assessment of the same events. Without any doubt, such a "discordance" allows you to feel more deeply the complexities and contradictions, including contradictions of a personal nature, which left a significant imprint on the nature and activities of the detective services.
All four authors talk about the same events, deeds and people: about the methods of work of the political police, about the attitude towards provocation and what they consider a provocation, about Azef, Rasputin, the murder of Karpov, the murder of Rasputin. But each of them brings his own vision of events, additional nuances, his own attitude to persons and facts. As a result, the reader receives a multidimensional, three-dimensional picture of what happened.
Drawing without embellishment and competently a picture of the local political investigation of Russia, the authors enable the reader to see real people and real institutions of this investigation, and at the same time to discard the primitive clichés that were imposed on him in the recent past.

I thank O.V. Budnitsky, D.I. Zubareva, G.S. Kana, K.N. Morozova, G.A. Smolitsky, A.V. Shmelev, M. Shrubu for information and consultations, and Professor of the University of Chicago J. Daley for copies of books published abroad and used in the preparation of this edition.

Z. Peregudova

Read here:

Zavarzin P.P. Gendarmes and revolutionaries. In the book: "Protection". Memoirs of leaders of political investigation. Volume 2, M., New Literary Review, 2004.

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The main role in the formation of security departments in the Russian Empire belongs to the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Pleva and the head of the Moscow security department, Colonel S.V. Zubatov. It was according to the project of the head of the Moscow Security Department that the structure of the gendarmerie was organized on the ground, the main task of which was to covert and operational search work. Since 1826, the gendarmerie departments in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw have been engaged in such activities.

Benckendorff’s employees also carried out operations abroad, but in the provinces the gendarmerie performed the functions inherent in the division of the current Russian Guard. Many officers in the provinces simply did not understand the political situation in the empire, the situation urgently needed to be corrected. This reform was 20 years late, the first Marxist circles appeared in Nizhny Novgorod as early as the mid-80s of the 19th century, and in the 90s Lenin visited them more than once.

The management staff of NGZhU, consisting of 37 people located in Nizhny Novgorod, could not physically monitor the political processes taking place in the entire Nizhny Novgorod province, and in fact the population at the beginning of the 20th century was already 1.6 million people. Only two scribes served in the office of the NGJU, the document flow at the gendarmerie department was quite large, it is doubtful that two people would be able to process such an array of documents in time with all the consequences, especially for operational work.

The number of employees of the NGJU was not increased, even during the growth of revolutionary activity in the early twentieth century. As a result, by the beginning of the economic crisis of 1900, out of 11 districts of the province, 9 were outside the supervision of NGZhU.

A special temporary department for the protection of order and security in Nizhny Novgorod appeared in November 1894 and lasted until November 1, 1896. The reason for the appearance in our city of the gendarme department was the All-Russian Art and Industrial Exhibition of 1896 and the arrival of Nicholas II in Nizhny Novgorod timed to coincide with its holding. This gendarme institution has proven itself very well. Here, for example, is how Nizhny Novgorod revolutionary A.I. Piskunov recalled the great pogrom in 1896. Thanks to numerous arrests and deportations, the social-democratic work that had been carried out until now was fundamentally undermined, and a proper organization could not be established. We had to put in a lot of work to make connections with the workers until we found the threads through which we established a connection with the Kurbatov plant, and by the spring of 1900 we had a circle of youth from this plant. Subsequently, he was the main core of the organization with. - d. in the city.

In view of the difficult political situation with socialist circles in Nizhny Novgorod, on October 2, 1902, a search department was formed, and since 1903, the Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Law and Order of the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire. This reform was 20 years late - the first Marxist circles appeared in Nizhny Novgorod back in the mid-80s of the 19th century, and in the 90s Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) visited them more than once.

The structure of the department consisted of the office, the department of external surveillance and the undercover department of internal surveillance. At the head was the head of the department, captain Zasypkin, in the office there was a clerk and three scribes, and M. I. Rozhdestvensky, who had previously served as a police overseer in the Moscow Security Department, was appointed the first clerk. During business trips, thanks to his experience, he replaced the head of the department, and in 1903 he was appointed head of surveillance. At the beginning of work, the department had 18 lower ranks, several night watchmen and policemen to guard the building. Secret office work was conducted alphabetically on cards of different colors. For example, blue cards were for social democrats, red for socialist-revolutionaries, green for anarchists, yellow for students, and gray for soldiers. White cards were issued to the Cadets and all other citizens who showed interest in politics, that is, almost the entire intelligentsia in the city was "under the hood".

The Surveillance Department had 11 fillers on staff, from 1908 15, recruited from former non-commissioned officers, the gradation went from junior filler, filler to senior filler. On August 10, 1907, Comrade Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Makarov sent a letter No. 132539 to the Governor of Nizhny Novgorod with a request to enroll surveillance agents of the LEO as police guards in order to increase their meager allowance. On December 17 and 18, 1907, the governor's office enrolled only three fillers as guards. In 1908, the position of head of external surveillance appeared, before that, in the department, the senior filer Semenov was considered the secret head, and from 1903 to 1908 Rozhdestvensky, the senior filer Mochalov with a salary of 100 rubles became the official head. And on July 25, 1909, a peasant woman from the village of Yuryevsky district, Vladimir province, Matryona Antonovna Semenova, was accepted as a filer, with a salary of 30 rubles a month. But already on December 1, 1909, the filer of the hem of the resignation letter, the work is both hard and still dangerous.

It was forbidden to use fillers for injection, as they were quickly exposed. This was facilitated by the receipt by the fillers of the same civilian clothes, purchased with state money. The monthly salary of these employees was 25-40 rubles. A nickname was chosen for the object of observation - for example, Yakov Sverdlov was given the nickname "Kid", and Genrikh Yagoda - "Owl". From June 7, 1904, fillers could be called in as witnesses, but this practice led more to the falsification of facts.

The undercover department of internal surveillance consisted of the head of the department, his assistant, and the secret agents themselves. The head of the department himself was engaged in recruiting agents and working with them. For meetings with agents, there were two secret apartments, hotel rooms were rented. The most valuable agent during the revolutionary events of 1905 was a woman under the pseudonym "Preobrazhenskaya", her name could not be figured out until today. In April 1912, due to a shortage of personnel, the clerk Rozhdestvensky and the head of surveillance Mochalov were allowed to work with agents. If the agent failed, a fatal outcome could be expected. So, in 1903, agents Pyatnitsky were killed by members of the RSDLP, and in 1906 agent Tatarov was liquidated by militants of the Social Revolutionary Party.

In addition to political agents, auxiliary agents were also recruited. This agency consisted of tavern owners and their regulars, volost and rural clerks, and servants of persons under surveillance. Agents - "tricks" or "confessors" - were special agents who demanded remuneration for each information obtained. But they were more annoying than helpful. So, for example, in 1912, in the security department in the city itself, there were 8 secret agents, 4 auxiliary, and 1 "confessor". The salary of an agent was 20 rubles, valuable agents were paid 50-100 rubles. According to Captain Greshner, the first head of the department, Zasypkin, was predatory towards agents, involving agents as witnesses in trials. The Nizhny Novgorod gendarme department was engaged in recruiting agents in the province, but, due to not the warmest relations with the security department, in 1906, with the sanction of Colonel Levitsky, a repentant revolutionary, a resident of the city, who appeared in the gendarmerie department, was recruited, and captain Tereshchenkov demanded that the Police Department transfer the agent to the security department. department. By the way, at the reception of the department from the acting captain of the murdered Greshner, captain Zaglukhinsky, only one secret agent was transferred to captain Tereshchenko. This caused a strong suspicion among the new chief of the waste of agents by Zaglukhinsky during the month of his duties as head of the department.

The Nizhny Novgorod gendarmerie was also engaged in perusal of postal correspondence. The perusal point itself appeared in Nizhny Novgorod as early as 1894. By the way, for these actions, according to the law, the permission of the district court was required, but there was not enough time for such trifles, and breaking the law became commonplace. Two auxiliary agents were recruited at the post office, who did a titanic job for only 10-15 rubles a month. The results turned out to be very effective, the gendarmerie revealed deeply hidden revolutionaries, often on the wanted list, revolutionary and party "appearances" were opened. For example, the revolutionaries coded Ulyanov as "Ilyin", Krupskaya as "Katya". The pseudonyms for the organizations were also unpretentious - the Mensheviks were called "Mish", and the Bolsheviks were "Boris". The passports of many revolutionaries were called "boots". In 1902, the Iskra newspaper was found in a letter that came from abroad, and in 1903 the identified recipients of the newspaper, the owners of the underground printing house and distributors were arrested.

The gendarmerie also had to deal with checking anonymous letters, but, as always, most of them only distracted from work. A lot of information was obtained during interrogations, but it was not possible to find facts of beatings of the defendants, scuffle remained the prerogative of the police. By the way, it was precisely because of the talkativeness of the police officers involved in joint events that information was leaked. But, due to strained relations with the provincial gendarme department, the security department often had to involve police officers in all kinds of operations.

The main task for the newly arrived head of the department, Captain Greshner, was to search for secret agents. Since he undertook this work competently, the result was the discovery and closure of two printing houses by December 1904 and the arrest of active revolutionaries. The information of Moscow colleagues also helped. The village of Sormovo, where 15,000 workers lived, caused particular tension. The workers gathered gatherings of several hundred people in forested areas, posting armed guards around the perimeter. From 1903 to 1904 alone, in Sormovo, police officers came under fire seven times from militant workers, and during searches, pistols and revolvers were more and more often confiscated from workers. But, thanks to arrests among agitators from among the Nizhny Novgorod intelligentsia, strikes from August 1904 had only economic demands. Leaflets were now printed only on a hectograph, which also reduced the campaign work.

Sormoff's plan in 1905

The first Russian revolution in Nizhny Novgorod began on January 14, 1905 with a strike by workers at the Molitov factory. By the end of January - beginning of February, strikes swept not only the workers of most factories in the province, but also employees, city clerks and employees of pharmacies, employees of printing houses were on strike. Initially, the demands were of an economic nature, the gendarmerie carried out active arrests among agitators who called for the overthrow of the autocracy, army units were brought into Sormovo. In March, the strikes began to subside, but on April 28, Captain Greshner was killed by order of the committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Right at the entrance to the security department, while pursuing a terrorist, guard Kuritsyn was mortally wounded. The killer was caught up and detained, he turned out to be a nobleman of the Penza province Nikiforov. On August 12, 1905, by a court verdict, the terrorist was hanged. Interestingly, connections from Nikiforov led to the Moscow dairy millionaire Chichkin. During a search of the millionaire, they found revolutionary literature, compromising correspondence and two revolvers. True, the moneybags were quickly released from custody under solid guarantees.

For about a month, the duties of the head of the department were performed by captain Zaglukhinsky, captain Treshchenkov took over from him. At this time, a difficult situation developed in the village of Sormovo, up to a thousand workers gathered daily and listened to the speeches of speakers who directly called for the overthrow of the autocracy. Most of all, Captain Treshchenkov was outraged by the position of the governor, since he did not take any serious measures to disperse anti-government gatherings. In early July, the Nizhny Novgorod Committee of the RSDLP held a meeting with the Socialist Revolutionaries and local Mensheviks. The general decision was to strike on July 9 with political demands. With the joint efforts of the Cossacks and the police, groups of demonstrators were dispersed in different parts of the city. On July 10, the crowd gathered at about 6 pm and headed for Ostrozhnaya Square, shouting anti-government slogans. But on the square the demonstrators were stopped by the Cossacks and the police. On the other side of the square, a crowd of loyal subjects of the sovereign gathered and rushed at the demonstrators with their fists. The pharmacist Heinze took out a weapon and fired at the pro-government-minded townspeople, wounding the cab driver Klochyev. The mob torn to death the novice revolutionary, and other fighters for the people's happiness suffered greatly from the people themselves. On July 11, the workers of the Sormovo plant incited the hook workers to strike, but they got into a fight, and the strikers began to shoot at the hook workers, killing six people, including the overseer of the river police Tumanov. In the Proletary newspaper, these events were colorfully described as clashes between revolutionaries and the "vile Black Hundreds" on July 9, 10 and 11.

The Security Department responded to these events on July 12 by seizing the printing house of the RSDLP and arresting most of the members of the "technical group" of the party. On September 8, 1905, another printing house was liquidated, two party members from the “technical group” were caught at work. The action was very successful, as active revolutionaries complained about the lack of propaganda literature. In addition, searches of members of the RSDLP helped to reveal aspects of the creation of a combat squad in Sormov, literature on the manufacture of explosives and the charter of a combat group were found. At the same time, the gendarme department liquidated the "Peasant Group" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had united with the Social Democrats. These actions normalized the situation until September, but already on the 1st day of this month strikes began, which by October were joined by seminarians, students and students.

A drawing of the bomb that was supplied to the fighting squad

Homemade cannon of the worker Parikov, who stood in the house near the main barricade in Sormovo

Homemade bomb-Macedonian, Sormovo production

Despite the manifesto of Nicholas II on the granting of freedoms, the operational situation in the city deteriorated. At the rallies held, agitation was carried out for the revolution and the creation of armed squads with the aim of overthrowing the autocracy. But on October 21, a patriotic party was formed in the city, and on the 23rd, a demonstration of the pro-government party took place, at which white flags appeared. The largest Black Hundred association in the empire began to be called the "White Banner".

In November, the situation escalated sharply in Sormovo. The workers created their own militia, subjecting policemen and gendarmes to shelling when the latter appeared on the Sormovo streets. The RSDLP had a city and Kanavinskaya fighting squads. In early December, the revolutionary militants were systematically armed. It all ended in a shootout in Sormovo between the police and the workers, but the very next day, December 13, the workers were building barricades and engaging in skirmishes with the troops. The troops had no losses.

In Kanavin on December 14, the guards of a revolutionary rally near the railway station opened fire on the attacking Black Hundreds, as a result, two attackers died. After that, the revolutionaries barricaded themselves in the station building. But already on the morning of the 15th, army artillerymen, after several hits on the station building, forced them to surrender.

In response to the speeches of the revolutionaries, Governor Fredericks forms a "patriotic squad" and arms it. The armed uprising was put down fairly quickly. The use of artillery in urban conditions has proven itself well. The security department, together with the Gendarme Directorate and the police, begins general searches of identified persons involved in revolutionary and terrorist activities. Already during the first searches in mid-December, encrypted lists of the fighting squad were found at the prominent revolutionary Zhdanovsky, and two laboratories for making bombs were discovered. On December 17, according to undercover information, two terrorists were detained who were trying to blow up the Makaryevskaya police unit. In parallel, searches were carried out at the militants of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, only 50 revolvers were seized. The most important thing was that by the end of December the activities of the strike committee, which coordinated the revolutionary measures, had been suppressed. At the beginning of 1906, active measures were taken against members of the RSDLP. On February 16, the party printing house was liquidated. In addition to the usual propaganda literature, many were found with weapons and explosive devices.

The remaining members of the RSDLP decided to direct their efforts to agitation of the peasants, but due to small funds and a lack of literature, this activity was not particularly successful. By August 1906, thanks to good intelligence work, the remaining group of members of the RSDLP was identified. On August 8, the activities of the underground printing house were suppressed, mass arrests were carried out. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, together with the anarchists, began to carry out "exes" to conduct their activities, that is, they engaged in banal robbery. Thanks to undercover information, many expropriators managed to be detained. On August 2, the fighting group of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (hereinafter referred to as the AKP) that remained at large was liquidated. Also, thanks to agents, a raid was prevented with the involvement of Moscow AKP militants on the State Bank. Only from April to October 1906, 3 mimeographs, 2 printing presses, 2 hectographs, false passports, 21 revolvers, 3 guns, 3 bombs and propaganda literature were confiscated. In September, at the direction of Stolypin, the department draws up lists of civil servants who are members of revolutionary organizations or sympathize with them, for further dismissal. Attacks on the Black Hundreds by the revolutionaries became quite frequent, on the other hand, the gendarmes themselves had to look after the "black hundreds" so that they did not stage pogroms. By the end of the year, the Nizhny Novgorod security department entered the central search area with subordination to the Moscow security department, the reform was carried out at the initiative of the Minister of the Interior, P. A. Stolypin, according to Trusevich's project.

From the beginning of 1907, anarchists began to loudly declare themselves. Especially mentally unbalanced revolutionaries, often prone to sadism, went to the anarchists, which increased their danger to ordinary citizens, inclusive. Already on March 10, anarchists robbed the factory office, stealing 1,165 rubles. At the same time, a group of anarchist communists was formed who broke away from the AKP, it was they who committed this robbery, but thanks to undercover data, almost all were soon detained. In August, the anarcho-communists who remained at large attacked the Surovatikha station, shooting two gendarmes, then robbed the Kamenskoye post office. 12 people were arrested in the case.

At the beginning of 1907, the jurisdiction of the Nizhny Novgorod security department was expanded to the backwater in view of the active revolutionary propaganda among rivermen and ship repairmen. Already in August, the employees of the branch liquidated the central bureau of the AKP Shipping Organization. As a result of arrests in this case, an underground printing house of the Socialist-Revolutionaries was discovered during a search. The gendarmes did not forget about the RSDLP either. In July, several forged passports, 58 seals of various institutions, and revolutionary literature were confiscated from party members in different apartments. This find helped expose a number of revolutionaries and their presence. Since May, the security department had to actively deal with the Union of Teachers, in which a large number of citizens were members of the RSDLP. On October 8, after a search of Kasatkin's only revolutionary brochures, 28 different titles were seized. In August 1907, members of the AKP agitated the printing workers of Mashistov to go on strike, but the demands were only of an economic nature, and after negotiations with the owner of the printing house, the strike ended, despite threats to the workers from members of the AKP.

The beginning of 1908 was marked by an aggravation of class relations in the countryside, which was associated with the Stolypin reform and the unwillingness of the peasants to leave the community. This forced the allocation of additional forces. On February 19, 1908, Captain Treshchenkov was replaced by Captain Erandakov. Since the anarcho-communists were under surveillance, the new head of the department was in for a surprise. During the robbery of the Malinovsky Skete, a member of the anarchist party was detained, who agreed to secret cooperation. Thanks to his information, members of a group of expropriators were detained, a weapons depot in Sormov was liquidated, and a secret printing house of the AKP was also liquidated there. In April, it became known from undercover sources about a group of anarchists, numbering 13 militants, who were preparing the assassination of the director of the Sormovo plant, Moskvin. To prevent crime, the members of the group were searched. As a result, 2 revolvers, 92 revolutionary brochures, and various poisons were seized. On April 28, an arrest and search took place at the home of the tradesman Andreev, the police carried it out on the personal order of the governor. Not coordinating their actions, as expected, with the Nizhny Novgorod security department, the police harmed the operational development of the gendarmes.

On March 4, 1908, a temporary military district court sentenced the peasant Pyotr Yegorovich Shtine to death by hanging. Shtine committed the murder of a theater worker and resisted the police during the arrest. On the same day, in the courtyard of the 1st building of the Nizhny Novgorod prison, the following criminals were hanged at night: Kuznetsov, Potarakin and Khlebopashtsev, well-known expropriators and murderers with revolutionary romance.

For the first time, the security department faced cases of betrayal of its employees. Bombs, revolvers and edged weapons were found in the cells of the revolutionaries in the Nizhny Novgorod prison. A search was conducted at the suspect in carrying prohibited items, as a result, 3 letters were found from a senior filer of the security department, who was immediately dismissed due to compromising circumstances. Another shameful incident involved the betrayal of a night watchman who worked for the AKP militants and gave descriptions of fillers and agents.

In May, the Sormovo organization of the AKP, having regained its strength, having received information about the upcoming layoffs, decided to carry out a series of assassination attempts on employees of the plant's administration in order to attract workers to its side. According to intelligence information, searches were carried out, but as a result, only forbidden literature was found. Unfortunately, the main punishment for terrorists was deportation to remote provinces of the empire. The next blow was dealt by the Nizhny Novgorod security department to the provincial organization of the AKP. On June 8, according to the information of the "Fiftieth" agent, the technical group of the AKP, which published the newspaper "Socialist" in a legal printing house, was liquidated. In July, the delegates of the party conference in Ryazan were arrested. In November, "Fiftieth" identified two Moscow emissaries of the AKP. On March 22, 1909, thanks to the same agent, the secret printing house of the AKP was liquidated. Also in 1908, the agents in the military units of the Nizhny Novgorod garrison gave installation data both to the agitators who worked with the soldier's environment, and to the soldiers who sympathized with them.

At the beginning of 1909, the anarcho-communists decided to move to active actions, they were run by 17-year-old Heinrich Yagoda. It was the future People's Commissar of Internal Affairs who advised visiting party members on the subject of robbing local banks, planned to receive weapons from Finland. But an agent appeared among the anarchists, and all the undertakings of the terrorists failed. Another group of anarchists extorted 50,000 rubles from the Kamensky merchants; to demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions, two explosions were made on the Kamensky steamers. The insolent terrorist called the owner of the ship from the hotel room. Captain Erandakov, who expected such a development of events, prepared himself in advance. He introduced himself as the owner's brother and began to drag out the negotiations, and at that time the gendarmes were already bursting into the room.

On March 22, 1909, thanks to the same agent, the secret printing house of the AKP was liquidated. Moreover, the newspaper "Volgar" described how the father and son of the Vlasovs, working on a set of the Black-Hundred newspaper "Minin" in the printing house, simultaneously printed out the proclamations of the Socialist Revolutionary Party on the "Boston" typewriter.

Also at the beginning of the year, AKP activists decided to kill the governor, since he was driving around at night to visit his mistresses completely unguarded. However, for some reason they did not commit a terrorist attack. In general, after the March searches and arrests and the seizure of the secret printing house on May 25, the party members regained their strength. The gendarmes did not forget about the RSDLP either. On August 11, arrests were made, a mimeograph and 300 brochures of a criminal nature were seized, and most importantly, correspondence containing important information. On December 6, according to intelligence data, the party library of the RSDLP was seized, only 807 books and pamphlets of a criminal nature were seized. On December 13, mass arrests of members of the RSDLP took place. On August 21, a congress of the Muslim Union of the AKP was to be held in Nizhny Novgorod. Members of the State Duma Gireev, Tukaev and St. Petersburg mullah Iskhakov were to take part in the work of the congress. By personal order of the governor, the congress delegates were searched, but nothing forbidden was found.

The year 1910 was marked by work within party organizations and various societies. For example, the Red Cross Society not only helped the families of arrested and exiled revolutionaries, but many of its members carried out SR propaganda. True, pro-government organizations also had to be watched. On August 1, Captain Erandakov transferred his affairs to Lieutenant Colonel Karaulov, 11 people were transferred alone to secret agents. But already on September 1, Lieutenant Colonel Karaulov handed over cases to Lieutenant Colonel Strekalovsky. He immediately began by getting to know the agents, and quite quickly the gendarmerie lieutenant colonel revealed a deceitful agent named "Rul" and began to acquire new agents. At the same time, a circular arrives on the involvement of security departments in counterintelligence activities. Two more circulars demanded that close attention be paid to Islamic and Jewish societies and organizations. And all this without increasing the staff of departments. After the auditor's visit to the Nizhny Novgorod security department, Lieutenant Colonel Strekalovsky received his first reprimand for playing cards in a social club, but even a year later, having received a similar remark, the gallant lieutenant colonel was still playing. Since the revolutionary organizations were under a relative intelligence "cap", the new boss decided to closely deal with all kinds of societies. A total of 104 societies and organizations were checked.

The year 1911 began with the liquidation of a group of Sormovo anarcho-communists. On February 2, activists of this group were arrested, after which serious groups of this kind did not appear until 1917. True, in August, the three activists who remained at large organized a robbery of the merchant Sotnikov, and then sent him a letter threatening to kill him, demanding 1,000 rubles. But soon they all left the city without visiting the merchant. And on September 23, the bomber Shamanin, who remained in the city, was searched, revolvers and revolutionary literature were seized. Also on April 30, searches were carried out at active members of the RSDLP, but only prohibited literature was seized.

Anarchists' verdict to their comrade. GKU GOPANO f.1866 op.1 d.143 l.1

On August 15, 1907, the Nizhny Novgorod leaflet newspaper reported that the corpse of Dmitriev, nicknamed "Burzhuichik", was found in the punishment cell in the 1st building of the Nizhny Novgorod prison. Suspicion fell on the cellmates: Kuznetsov, Sokolov and Potarakin. Patarakin was detained with a bomb on Blagoveshchenskaya Square, and Sokolov, Kuznetsov and Dmitriev were members of the Sormovo gang of expropriators "Terrorist Anarchists" led by a certain Spiridonov.

Leaflet "White Banner". GKU GOPANO f.1866 op.1 d.167 l.167

In 1912, 7 strikes were held at the Sormovo plant, economic demands were the main ones, but the last one, in November, was purely political in nature. The work of the department was complicated by a large group of newly arrived workers employed in the expansion of production. Also, many workers did not register at their new place of residence. On April 14, members of the RSDLP, who had gathered to discuss the organization of elections to the State Duma, were arrested on an undercover tip. In August, the Social Democrat Kondratiev was detained for propaganda among the soldiers, but the search did not turn up compromising materials. In November, a strike by Sormovo workers began against the execution of Sevastopol sailors. This forced the Security Department to pay close attention to the Sormovo group of the RSDLP, which had obviously grown stronger by that time.

1913 was the last year of the work of the Nizhny Novgorod security department. Half of the remaining employees were transferred in June to the Nizhny Novgorod provincial gendarmerie department to work at a search center. From the very beginning of the year, preparations began for the visit of Nicholas II to Nizhny Novgorod. From all over the empire, orientations came for revolutionaries who, according to intelligence data, were preparing an assassination attempt on the tsar. A plan of measures was developed to protect the sovereign. But, besides this, on January 24, the Police Department received a report on Governor Khvostov, who, in the elections to the State Duma, legally removed the prominent cadet Savelyev from the lists, which sharply undermined the position of right-wing forces in the city. But in view of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty and the arrival of the tsar, all this faded into the background. Since the beginning of the year, painstaking work began on checking the documents of all those entering the city. The crew of the tsar's ship was selected and tested. The whole city was divided into 14 districts, passes were introduced at the locations of the august person. 255 fillers worked in the city. On May 15 and 16, there were mass searches of unreliable persons. Since the coordination between the newly arrived members of the gendarmerie and the police was at its best, as well as all the preliminary work, the Security Department successfully completed its last important task. It should be noted that in the fight against terrorism, not only too liberal legislation interfered, but also a lack of understanding by Nicholas II himself of many processes within the country.

Sources
1. GKU TsANO funds: 179; 915; 916; 918; 919.
2. GKU TsANO fund 2 inventory 7 case 430
3. From the history of the Nizhny Novgorod special services. Volume 1. Nizhny Novgorod, 2003.
4. The revolutionary movement in Nizhny Novgorod and the Nizhny Novgorod province. Gorky, 1971.
5. V. I. Lenin and the Nizhny Novgorod Revolutionary Workers. Gorky, 1986.
6. GKU GOPANO fund 1866 op 2 case 67.
7. Newspaper "Volgar" for March 24, 1909.
8. Simple as it is, really. Memoirs of Nizhny Novgorod residents about V. I. Lenin. Gorky 1988.
9. Ryzhakov Denis Germanovich “Political investigation bodies in the fight against the RSDLP and the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in 1902-1917.” Abstract of the dissertation for the degree of candidate of historical sciences. Nizhny Novgorod, 2009.

At From the history of the Security Departments of the Police Department of the Russian Empire.

As an addition to the material of a colleague imperium_ross"Founder of the spy service of the Security Department of the Police Department".

1. A Brief History of the Security Departments
2.Instruction to the heads of security departments on the organization of outdoor observations(1908? I would be grateful for help in accurately dating the document).

Employees of the St. Petersburg Security Department and with its head Alexander Vasilyevich Gerasimov (in the first row, in the center), not earlier than 1905:

The departments for the protection of public security and order of the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire - so ornate, in the classic "Empire" style of the Russian imperial bureaucracy, they were officially called, and colloquially simply: "The Okhrana" - were "sharpened" specifically for "political investigation ". Simply put, the main task of these power structures (sorry for the neologism) of the Empire was precisely the fight against revolutionary organizations, revolutionary propaganda and revolutionary terror.
The Security Departments owe their birth to the populist stage of Russian revolutionism in the 1860s and 70s, when dangerous young dreamers (mostly from the raznochin, but "pure public"), disappointed in the prospects for the socialist transformation of the peasant masses by educational methods, began desperately "to call Rus to the ax", and then they themselves took up improvised explosive "infernal machines" and revolvers of the Leforchet system ...

Dmitry Krakozov's shot at Alexander II (Krakozov missed) on April 4, 1866, which brought to life the Security Departments:

When, on a sunny April day in 1866, a lone terrorist, Dmitry Krakozov, shot at Emperor Alexander II (a liberator of the serfs and a bold reformer - that's why the conspirators in Russia were itching to threaten the progressive tsar ???), It became clear to the Empire's security guards that special agencies were needed to deal with the new threat that was gaining momentum.
In the capital of the Empire, a "Department for the production of affairs for the protection of public order and tranquility in St. Petersburg" was formed under the leadership of Privy Councilor F.A. Kolyshkin, who was directly subordinate to the St. Petersburg Governor. In 1886-87. it was reformed into the "Department for the protection of public security and order in the city of St. Petersburg" with a permanent staff of the General Chancellery, the Registration Bureau, the Central Filer and gendarmerie security teams. The number of full-time employees of the capital's Okhrana reached 200 people.
Officers of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes and class officials of the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were appointed to official positions in the Security Departments. For operational work "in the field" (as modern employees of the "organs" would say), a staff of civilian agents-snitches was created, which will be discussed in the document below. It is difficult to say who inspired more awe in the revolutionaries (although, as a rule, not shy guys went into the revolution) - a polished ruthless gendarmerie officer from the Okhrana, or the ubiquitous inconspicuous filer ...

Employees of the Security Department in civilian clothes, early 20th century:


Officers of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes, from which commanding personnel for the Security Departments were recruited:

In 1880, a similar structure appeared in the capital, initially under the name "Secret Investigation Department at the Office of the Moscow Chief Police Chief", and since 1881 - as "Department for the Protection of Public Security and Order in the City of Moscow." By the way, the Moscow Security Department for a long time "gave odds" to the St. Petersburg. This is understandable: in Northern Palmyra, the “guards” were mainly vigilant over the safety of the imperial family (Alexander II, however, was not saved), and their Moscow colleagues often took on the functions of organizers of political investigation throughout the Empire. It was in Moscow that the system of introducing secret informants into revolutionary circles, entwining suspicious persons with a frequent network of surveillance by surveillance agents - famous snitches, began to work. In the same place, on the initiative of the head of the Department, S.V. expeditions anywhere in the country.

Filer of the Moscow Security Department Krylov before going on a mission:

Since 1885, the Foreign Bureau "Okhranka" also began to work, which was in charge of spying on Russian political emigrants and conducting covert operations "behind the cordon". Its headquarters were in Paris.

The highest point of development "Okhranka" passed at the beginning of the twentieth century. in connection with a sharp surge in the revolutionary movement. During the First Russian Revolution of 1905-07. in the Russian Empire, the Security Departments functioned (the guards themselves preferred the modest and archaic-sounding term: "worked") in 27 provincial cities, their staff exceeded a thousand chief and staff officers and class ranks of the commanding staff. The departments had at their disposal a many times larger number of detectives, informers and other agents, the exact account of which is not known, not only for reasons of secrecy, but also because in the fateful 1917 the "guards" themselves finally managed to destroy most of the lists ... of their own in " The Okhrana was not handed over, this was the cornerstone principle of the cohesion of its cadres and the guarantee of a constructive comradely atmosphere that usually reigned between superiors and subordinates in this department.

Briefing of police district guards (what chic police types of the Russian Empire!) in the Kiev security department, not earlier than 1902:

At the end of 1906, in addition to the provincial city and capital, District Security Departments were also created, covering entire regions of the Empire (several provinces each, plus some regions outside the official administrative division, for example, the Black Sea region). As of the end of 1907, there were 10 district branches.
By the way, in many "provincial" security departments, only a few officers and officials were full-time employees, whose main task was to create an intellectual and organizational center for the work of a network of civilian fillers, systematize the information they collected and conduct an investigation. To carry out operational tasks (arrest of suspects, searches, cordons) were involved. as a rule, the personnel of the gendarmerie and the police, less often (on the basis of the relevant regulations on the state of emergency) - military teams.
"The unifying and directing center for all security departments," as stated in the January circular of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1907, was the Police Department.

Employees of the Security Department and police officers are training in the storming of the apartment, hiding behind a tactical armor shield:

Individual means of armor protection have been used by law enforcement officers of the Russian Empire since 1905, more about this: http://world-war-first.livejournal.com/293012.html
At least two plainclothes agents in the photo are armed with powerful Mauser C96 self-loading pistols, which were not in regular service, but very beloved by Russian officers, police and not only...

In the work of the Security Departments, advanced police technologies of their time were widely used, for example, the use of specially trained service dogs. The trainer (cynologist, as they would say now) of the Moscow branch is working out with his four-legged friend the position described as: "Lie still, guard the wounded":

The level of efficiency of the work of the Security Departments in comparison with other law enforcement agencies in the Russian Empire was quite high. With their most active participation in Russia, they managed to "knock down the revolutionary wave" twice - at the end of the 19th century. and after the revolution of 1905-07. However, it was impossible to completely eradicate the causes that brought Russian revolutionary spirit to life and finally led the country to the October Revolution of 1917 by police measures alone... But it was not the fault of the employees of the Security Departments, who honestly defended the throne and the state, in this.

In the Security Departments, a huge amount of material was collected on active revolutionaries, incl. and on many future celebrities.
Personal file of V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin):

... and Vladimir Mayakovsky (you can immediately see - a poet! Too big a poet to be a serious revolutionary!):

...V.P. Nogina:

...and some simple Jewish guy from the Bund (given for mass character):

By the way, the revolutionaries also managed to inflict several sensitive retaliatory blows on the Okhrana. For example, they killed two heads of the St. Petersburg security department - G.P. Sudeikin in 1883 and S.G. Karpov in 1909.

A safe house destroyed by an explosion of a Socialist-Revolutionary bomb, in which the head of the St. Petersburg branch, Colonel Sergei Georgievich Karpov, was killed:

In the worst tradition of the Russian state bureaucracy, the Security Departments, like many other successful structures, have gone through several destructive "reforms".
In 1913, Comrade (Deputy) Minister of the Interior G.F. Dzhunkovsky, apparently considering the revolutionary danger minimized, proceeded to eliminate the "peripheral" Security Departments. In 1914, the same fate befell many District ...
By 1917, there were only three city security departments in the Russian Empire - in Petrograd, Moscow and Warsaw, and three regional departments - East Siberian, Caucasian and Turkestan.
The February revolution swept away them too. The provisional government abolished the Okhrana, which was too strongly associated with the tsarist regime. Revolutionaries and pseudo-revolutionaries furiously rushed to settle scores with the "guards". On March 4, 1917, the head of the Petrograd branch, Colonel M.F. von Kotten, was killed by a crowd near Helsingfors; his fate was shared by many officers and officials. But the carefully conspiratorial scammer network basically managed to "lay low" and survived ...

The destruction of the police archive in Petrograd in 1917:

The lists of Okhrana detectives, with rare exceptions, never got to the revolutionaries.

Mikhail Kozhemyakin.

Instructions to the chiefs of security departments on the organization of outdoor observations.

1. One of the means of covert investigation is external surveillance of persons who are in contact with the revolutionary movement, for which special persons of the filera are invited - ["treadmills"]

2. Surveillance from the outside appears to be mostly an auxiliary means, and therefore, in the absence of coverage by internal agents, it can only in exceptional cases provide independent material for elucidating communities. Therefore, the greatest benefit from external surveillance can be obtained only if it is strictly conformed to the indications of internal agents as to the significance of the observed persons and the events outlined by the detectives.

3. In the absence of incidental coverage from internal agents, excessive development of external surveillance should not be allowed, because, being very extensible, it can provide all the extensive, incomprehensible material that makes the work of fillers and departments extremely difficult.

4. Detailed rules for the activity of fillers are set out in a special instruction.

5. In the types of more successful observation, fillers should be timed to remember the faces of the observed as carefully as possible, and not to identify them by one clothing.

6. With regard to the presentation of filers for interrogation as witnesses during the inquiry, be guided exactly by the rules set forth in the circular order to the Heads of the Provincial and Regional Gendarmerie Directorates dated March 20, 1903 No. 2821.

7. Observation information that deserves serious attention is submitted weekly to the District Security Department for each organization separately.

8. All information on external surveillance of each individual person is recorded daily by filers in evening report books: for each organization, reports of persons and houses under surveillance are compiled separately.

9. For quick reference, have an arc of information about houses, on which sheets of three colors are put on in the order of the number of houses in each street separately. On the first - red - all information about this house is entered on agents, affairs, and so on. The second - green - is a summary of outdoor surveillance for this house. On it for each organization separately, it is noted: who, when and whom visited in this house. The third - white - is an extract from the house books of persons living in the indicated house, whose apartments, according to the proposal, could include visits, intelligence information or information by correspondence. All three sheets for one house are placed in order, one under the other.

10. By the 5th day of each month, the heads of security departments submit to the District Security Departments and the Police Department lists of persons who have been under observation, for each organization separately, with a full list of acquaintances, last name, first name, patronymic, rank, occupation, nickname by observation and organization and a brief indication of the reasons for observation. The most serious /central/ persons should be briefly described in a special note to this list.

11. The head of surveillance in the districts and the senior filers in the departments must know the addresses of those of all other security departments for sending conditional telegrams and letters.

12. ________________________________________ _________________________

13. Only persons should be accompanied by observation on out-of-town trips:
a/ for whom there are special orders of the Police Department in this regard;
b/ thoroughly suspected of terrorist mischief and
in / about whom it is known for certain that their trip has a revolutionary purpose.

14. To accompany those observed on out-of-town trips, at least two agents are sent, since only in this case the success of the observation can be ensured and unwanted accidents / loss, failure, etc. / are eliminated.

15. Filer, who left with the observed, at the first opportunity, telegraphs the head of surveillance in the area and his boss. Telegrams should be in the nature of commercial correspondence, for example: "Cherny's Goods I'm Bringing Tula", etc.

16. In the event of the departure of the observed, accompanied by filers, to the area of ​​​​conduct of another security department or Directorate, immediately telegraph to the head of the latter in a cipher with the obligatory indication: what date, by what train and by what road, in what class car and for what number, to what place the person being observed left, how his surname / not established, then nickname /, who accompanies him, what organization he belongs to, what significance he has for the search and what is required in relation to him to take: relentless surveillance, identification, detention. In the same telegrams, indicate the conditional signs by which you can recognize the accompanying filer.

From the instructions for organizing outdoor / filer / surveillance

I. To carry out the external / spy / service, combatant reserve lower ranks are selected, preferably non-commissioned officer rank, not older than thirty years. Preference, when meeting the conditions set out below, is given to those who graduated from military service in the year of entering the spy service, as well as cavalrymen, scouts who were in the hunting team, who have an award for intelligence, excellent shooting and insignia of a military order.

2. The filer must be politically and morally reliable, firm in his convictions, honest, sober, courageous, dexterous, developed, quick-witted, hardy, patient, persistent, cautious, truthful, frank, but not a talker, disciplined, self-possessed, accommodating, serious and conscientiously related to the business and assumed duties, good health, especially strong legs, with good eyesight, hearing and memory, such an appearance that would enable him not to stand out from the crowd and would eliminate his observant memory.

3. Persons of Polish and Jewish nationality cannot be filers. The newly arriving filer should be explained: what is a crime against the state, what is a revolutionary; how and by what means revolutionary leaders achieve their goals; the failure of the teachings of the revolutionary parties; the task of the filer is to observe and communicate with internal agents; the seriousness of the duties assumed by the filler and the need for an unconditionally truthful attitude to the service in general, and to the information given, in particular; harm from concealment, exaggeration and, in general, false testimony, and it should be pointed out to him that only the totality of information that is unconditionally accurately transmitted leads to the success of observation, while the distortion of the truth in reports and the desire to hide failures in his work lead to a false trail and deprive the filer, probably opportunities to be different.

4. When there are several young fillers, ask the priest to the department and swear them allegiance to the service.

5. It is necessary to take fillers with great caution, in case of doubt, to test a newcomer, keeping him in the department for two weeks without instructions for observation, trying during this time to study his character, based on the data of his communication with other employees. With all its merits, excessive tenderness for the family and weakness for women are qualities that are incompatible with the spy service and have a harmful effect on the service. On the very first day of his service, he must be impressed that everything he heard in the department is an official secret and cannot be known to anyone. During the test, the novice should be sent to study the city in detail: to know the courtyards, taverns, pubs, gardens, squares with their entrances; departure and arrival of trains, tram tracks, parking place for cab drivers, their tax; educational and other institutions, class time; factories and plants; time, start and end of work; uniforms of officials and students, etc.
The knowledge gained in this area by the spy must be submitted daily in writing to the head of observation, in order to judge the degree of his suitability for the spy service.

6. When verifying the availability of the qualities required from the filer, you can send him to observe his employees, showing him some methods of observation; in the future it will be possible to move on to real observation, for which purpose to appoint a beginner to help an old experienced filer who gives him advice, practical instructions and corrects his mistakes. Until then, one should not talk about official receptions that make up a secret.

7. Since a spy is useful for service only when he is little known by sight and does not know his profession, the spy must keep himself secret, avoid acquaintance, especially at his quarters, so that they do not know that he serves in the security department . By no means should anyone talk about the methods of the spy service, and every spy should be inspired that the less outsiders know the methods of the spy service, the more successful the search. An apartment is chosen where there are no students. A lonely man should look for a room in a family where they would be less interested in his service and late return home. The type of occupation should be indicated in such a way that one can return home late / service on the railway, in commodity offices, trams, hotels, etc. /, give the filler the opportunity to have at home some evidence of this type of occupation.

8. The filler must dress, in accordance with the conditions of service, usually in the same way as middle-class residents dress in a given area, not standing out with their suit in general and its individual parts / also boots / in particular, from the general mass of residents.

9. Filer, under no circumstances should know persons who are secret employees and vice versa.

10. Surveillance is established for a well-known person in order to clarify his activities, connections /acquaintances/ and relations. As a result, it is not enough to enter one given person, but it is necessary to find out the persons with whom he sees and whose apartments he visits, as well as the connections of the latter.

11. In order to acquire the skill to quickly / at a glance / memorize the observed, it is necessary to use all sorts of convenient cases for practice in memorizing on the faces of the observed. Having looked at those, the spy, turning away to the other side, or closing his eyes for a minute, must imagine all the signs of this person and check whether such a person is in reality.

12. Signs should be noticed in the following order: summer, height, body type, face /eyes, nose, ears, mouth and forehead/, hair on the head and so on, color, length of hair and features in haircut, gait or manners. For a more accurate determination of hair color, fillers show an example on living faces.

13. When reporting information about each observed, at the very beginning should indicate where he lives. If the place of residence is not established, then write so.

14. When visiting the monitored houses, besides the streets, the number of the property and the name of the owner, if there is no number, should also be indicated accurately, as well as the apartment, if possible. /Walk, floor, outbuilding, windows, balcony, etc./.

15. If in a given house the observed visit two or more different rooms, then each time it is necessary to indicate exactly where they go.

16. Each person who went into observation is given a nickname, as well as persons who, in the opinion of the fillers, will be of interest, or often meet them on observation.

17. The nickname should give a short / from one word /. It should characterize the appearance of the observed, or express the impression that this person makes.

18. The nickname must be such that it can be judged whether it refers to a man or a woman.

19. You should not give the same nicknames to several people. Each observed must have one nickname given to him for the first time when he was recognized.

20. ________________________________________ _____________________

21. A certain number of filers appointed to watch a certain person, or house, is called an observation post. At least two spotters are assigned to each observation post.

22. It is necessary to change the spotters when they are appointed to posts, firstly: the observed notice the same spotters watching them, and, secondly: so that all the spotters get acquainted with the entire observed group and have an idea of ​​the importance of one or another person in observation. The latter is important so that the spotters standing at the post, seeing a serious observed without observation, therefore, lost, could leave their post as less important, and take it into observation for transmission by the lost spotter. In order not to leave your post without observation, you can separate only one. It is also necessary to know all the observables in order to timely hide oneself from a random passing one of the observables, since he may involuntarily pay attention to standing fillers, and the latter may have to watch him tomorrow.

23. The filer appointed to the post is indicated the place from where the observed person should be taken, the signs of the latter are described, given / if any / a photographic card, reported, if known, the time of departure or arrival; in general, the sum of the available data is given by which it is possible to recognize the person subject to its observation.

24. In order to avoid failures, and in general for covert surveillance, it is sometimes recommended to dress fillers as messengers, merchants, newspapermen, soldiers, watchmen, janitors, etc., depending on the area and need.

25. Filers should come to the post no more than an hour before the known time of the exit of the observed; if the time is unknown, then one must be at the post by the time the general movement in the given area begins.

26. When carrying out observation, it is necessary to act in such a way that no one pays attention to you, do not walk noticeably quietly and do not stop in one place for a long time.

27. In anticipation of the exit of the observed person, the filler stands at such a distance from the place of exit that he can only see the latter / as far as his eyesight is enough / in order to unmistakably identify the person given for observation by signs upon exit.

28. The filler position should be as closed as possible, i.e. so that the filer does not catch the eye of the observed person. To do this, you need to apply to the area.

29. When the observed filer exits, he must keep calm, not get lost, not break away. If the observed has not yet seen the filer watching him, then it is better for the latter to take cover, but if the observed has noticed, then it is better to stay without changing position and move only when the observed moves far away or turns around the corner.

30. Having noticed the exit of the observed and its direction in their direction, the fillers must quickly figure out, according to the conditions of the area, how to avoid meeting with the observed; the latter must be achieved by all means, but without fuss and haste. To do this, the fillers, knowing the courtyards, shops, gates, hide there, and after giving time to pass the observed, follow him on one side with him, or the opposite, depending on the conditions of the area.

31. Following the observed, the detective must study his gait, characteristic movements, pay attention to how the observed holds his head, hands, how he steps with his feet, etc. To look into the face of the observed, one must use crowded streets, bazaars, cross streets, tram , Konka, etc., since in these places you can see the face of the observed unnoticed by the latter. On the back streets and alleys, it is absolutely impossible to look into the face of the observed.

32. If the meeting of the observed with the filer is inevitable, then in no case should you meet the eyes / did not show his eyes /, since the eyes are the easiest to remember.

33. The distance that must be kept when following the observed depends on many reasons. For example: if the street is straight, long, not very busy, the fillers keep behind at such a distance that they can only see the observed. When following a busy street, the distance is reduced; in the crowd you have to stay close.

34. If the observed begins to look around, then the detective must determine why exactly he began to look back: whether it is because he intends to visit some secret place and is afraid that he will not be noticed, or because he himself noticed the observation. In the first case, it is necessary to continue the observation with greater caution / if the place allows, then bypass, bypass / if there is reason to believe that the observed can notice even cautious observation, then it is better to stop it; if there is reason to believe that a serious observer may leave the city, then a railway station must be provided. If the observed is generally very strict / looks around, conspires /, then it is necessary to change fillers more often and in general to conduct observation more carefully.

35. Escorting the observed into the house, the detective must examine the house, i.e. find out if it is a through passage and, if it is through, then provide all exits.
Passage yards in the city where the filer has a permanent residence, he must know everything by heart.

36. All the places where the observed went should be firmly remembered and at the first opportunity recorded: the time of stay, arrival and exit, street, house number, front door, if the latter has a card, then remember and write it down.

37. If the house is corner, it is mandatory to indicate under what numbers it appears from both streets and from which street there is an entrance to such a house.

38. In the information you should write: "I went to such and such," as well as to the house of such and such, to such and such.

39. The information should indicate those places where the observed are for private needs /lunch, employment, relatives, etc./, if this has already been clarified earlier.

40. When the monitored shops and workshops are visited, it is obligatory to indicate the names of the owner and their streets on which these shops are located.

41. When the observed visits any house, to establish the apartment in which he entered, which is relatively rare at once, why is the detective limited at first, that he finds out what numbers are in the front door, where the observed entered and who lives there / by door cards /; with further observation, you can sometimes go a little ahead of the observed and come to the highest floor, and when the observed enters, then, going down, notice the apartment into which he entered. For the same purpose, you can prepare a filler in advance for a messenger, or for one of the fillers, somewhere nearby take off your coat, hat, even frock coat, letting out a colored shirt and go into the front door, as if a person were living here.

42. If the observed turned around the corner, it is necessary to speed up the steps in order to see that the observed does not go somewhere around the corner. If the observed is lost around the corner, then it means that he went to a place located not far from the corner. Having calculated in time the place where the observed person could approximately enter, it is necessary to again choose a place and stand so that several front exits and gates can be seen.

• Butyrin Dmitry Alexandrovich

Keywords

Revolution 1905–1907 / The State Duma / Ministry of the Interior / Police Department / Separate corps of gendarmes / provincial gendarme department / security department / gendarme officer / Primorsky region/ Vladivostok / Vladivostok fortress / political police/ terror / provocation / deputy request/ P.A. Stolypin / V.I. Dzyubinsky / A.D. Zavaritsky

annotation scientific article on history and historical sciences, author of scientific work - Butyrin Dmitry Aleksandrovich

The article deals with the official activities of an officer of a secret political police Russian Empire A.D. Zavaritsky. In 1909 his name became known throughout Russia as a master of provocation. For career reasons, he "created" a revolutionary underground organization in Vladivostok, which he then allegedly uncovered and liquidated. The military court gave him a well-deserved verdict. When studying and discussing the “Azef case”, deputies III State Duma made two inquiries on the "case of Zavaritsky". Discussion of the report of the commission on the "Azef case" and the answers of P.A. Stolypin, in response to inquiries on the "Zavaritsky case", was used by the Duma opposition to criticize the methods of work of the secret political police. Provocation was especially sharply criticized by the deputies as a method of combating the revolutionary underground, since it created the ground for police arbitrariness and falsification, as well as for the spread of terror. As a result III The State Duma condemned the provocations organized by the secret political police against revolutionary organizations. However, the government refused to reform the political investigation system. This resulted in new political assassinations, including that of Prime Minister Stolypin.

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Gendarmes and Deputies: “Lieutenant-Colonel Zavaritskiy’s Case” in the State Duma and the Fortress of Vladivostok (1909)

The article examines the professional activity of A.D. Zavaritskiy, an officer of secret political police of the Russian Empire. In 1909 he became notorious throughout Russia as a master of provocation. For his career ambitions he ‘initiated’ an underground revolutionary organization which he later on exposed and eliminated. He was court-martialed and received a just verdict. As the 3rd State Duma discussed ‘Azef’s case’ it also submitted two requests for information concerning ‘Zavaritskiy’s case’. The opposition in the 3rd State Duma used the debate following the Inquiry Commission’s report on ‘Azef’s case’ to criticize the methods of the secret political police. The sharpest criticism was directed against provocations as a means of combating the revolutionary underground movement. It was argued that was made for abuse, outrage and falsification on the part of the police as well as spread out terrorism. consequently, the 3rd State Duma condemned the provocations the secret political police used against revolutionary associations. Nevertheless, the government opted not to reform its political search system. This resulted in a new series of political assassinations, including the killing of Prime Minister P. Stolypin.

The text of the scientific work on the topic "GENDARMES AND DEPUTIES: "CASE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ZAVARITSKY" IN THE STATE DUMA AND VLADIVOSTOK FORTRESS (1909)"

D.A. Butyrin

GENDARMES AND DEPUTIES: "THE CASE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ZAVARITSKY" IN THE STATE DUMA AND VLADIVOSTOK FORTRESS (1909)

Gendarmes and Deputies: "Lieutenant-Colonel Zavaritskiy"s Case" in the State Duma and the Fortress of Vladivostok

Forced to be adopted under the threat of revolution, the Manifesto of October 17, 1905 turned Russia into a constitutional monarchy. The birth of the legislative State Duma changed the process of passing laws. Political and public figures could directly participate in the work of the legislative mechanism. The work of the Duma, in particular, deputy requests, became an important factor in the political development of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, which influenced many spheres of public life and public sentiments1.

The manipulations with the electoral legislation carried out after the coup d'état on June 3, 1907, gave the government of Nicholas II a relatively obedient Third State Duma, which was dominated by Octobrists, nationalists and monarchists. But even this Duma was not considered by the government. Head of government P.A. Stolypin considered the endless debates of deputies an unaffordable luxury. His favorite weapon was Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, designed to make urgent decisions at a time when the Duma was not working. In all the most important questions, the government presented the Duma with a fait accompli or bombarded it with unimportant matters.

Permanent contributor to the journal "Bulletin of Europe" V.D. Kuzmin-Karavaev wrote: “The State Duma turns to the legislative institution for “small” matters. A county town needs an extra police officer or an extra midwife in the infirmary, the fundamental laws are being steadily applied... The same is punctually observed with respect to the allocation of unbudgeted loans for thousands, and sometimes even hundreds of rubles. But as soon as the question concerns the rights of the population, even if a measure desirable for the executive power causes an expense of millions, the complex legislative order is simplified, and the measure becomes the norm, apart from its consideration in institutions, in order to

existing"2.

As a result, during the work of the III and IV State Dumas, 612 legislative acts were issued, and 609 of them the deputies had to discuss retroactively, when their approval or disapproval no longer had practical significance. The discussion by the deputies of the issue of taking emergency measures against the revolutionaries on February 11, 1909 was no exception.

In January 1909, information appeared in the press about the provocative activities and cooperation of E. Azef with the Okhrana. This event caused heated discussions in the State Duma, and on January 20 two requests were made to the Minister of the Interior P.A. The Octobrists and the rightists rejected the haste of the requests, passing them on to a specially created Duma commission to prepare a report within ten days.

On that day, the Social Democratic factions used the discussion of the commission's report to sharply criticize the entire internal political course and directly accuse government institutions of using unscrupulous methods of fighting the revolution. As one of the examples that reveal the essence of these methods, the “case” of Lieutenant Colonel A.D. Zavaritsky, head of the Vladivostok security department. Referring to the facts known to them and distorting the name of the gendarme (this unintentional distortion - Zavarnitsky - is found in many documents and materials, in historical literature), the deputies who spoke argued that provocation is the main method of work of law enforcement agencies: “Agents of security departments and other government agents commit murders, robberies, violence, and not just commit serious, criminal offenses, no, but give them the mask of terrorist acts committed by political parties and individuals”, in order to create a “picture of revolution” and justify repressive measures and the lack of promised reforms3.

Although the State Duma had limited legislative powers, it became a platform where many socially significant topics were discussed. The speeches of the deputies of the State Duma were widely published in the newspapers. True, they were often published with strong cuts, for censorship reasons, especially where local interests were touched upon or local officials were mentioned. Therefore, in the Vladivostok press in 1909, one cannot find any publications about the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky, although they were directly related to Vladivostok.

On January 7, 1909, the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party made public the report on the "Azef case". This event caused a wave of indignation in Russian society, articles devoted to the provocative scandal appeared in the newspapers, the meaning of which is revealed in one of the publications of the Vladivostok newspaper Dalniy Vostok: “Azefshchina is a comedy! The revolution is led by secret police agents. Here, even a copper penny cannot be given for any of the revolutionary committees. What is the liberation movement worth if it was staged by secret agents?

On January 20, 1909, two requests were submitted to the III State Duma about the provocation of Azef and the provocative activities of the police to the Minister of Internal Affairs P.A. Stolypin from the faction of the Social Democrats, supported by the Labor Group (fraction), and from the faction of the Party of People's Freedom (cadets). The deputies were also worried about the fact that “the activities of the police department and its bodies show a consistently consistent system of political provocation, that this provocative tactic threatens the safety and life of individuals and brings deep demoralization to society”5.

The issue under discussion was very sensitive. The deputies of the Third State Duma remembered only too well what had happened to the Second Duma. In the spring of 1907, when the Duma raised the question of how to "curb the revolution in the country," heated discussions and disputes did not stop among the deputies. The government demanded the condemnation of revolutionary terrorism, but most of the deputies refused to do so. On May 17, 1907, the Duma voted against the "illegal actions" of the police. The government decided to announce its dissolution, and the reason was the accusation of the deputies of a conspiracy against the imperial family. June 1 P.A. Stolypin demanded that the Duma expel 55 deputies (Social Democrats) and deprive 16 of them of their parliamentary immunity. Without waiting for its decision, Emperor Nicholas II announced on June 3 the dissolution of the Duma and appointed the convocation of the next Duma for November 1, 1907.6

Taught by the bitter experience of their predecessors, the deputies of the Third State Duma decided to act within the bounds of the law, avoiding unnecessary conflicts with the government, although the experience of discussing such issues showed that they could not be avoided. In the autumn of 1908, cadet V.A. Maklakov made a request about the provocative activities of officials of the Vilna security department. Agents of the Okhrana were convicted of bribing soldiers of the Border Guard to ensure the transport of revolutionary literature. Involving a large number of people in illegal activities, the agents pursued one goal: to “successfully” expose another revolutionary organization. November 20, 1908 in the Duma was held

a meeting at which provocation as a method of activity of the employees of the Vilna security department was condemned by the parliamentary majority, while not without high-profile inter-party disputes7.

And on January 20, 1909, Ivan Petrovich Pokrovsky spoke on behalf of the Social Democratic faction, who, based on the documents of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries on the “Azef case”, stated in his speech: “A government that uses provocation finds itself in a vicious circle, so how a provocation becomes an end in itself, a source of personal enrichment for acting agents and police officers”8.

During his speech, he reminded the Minister of Internal Affairs P.A. Stolypin about the meeting on November 20, 1908 and about the promises made then: “... You use such methods that degenerate into criminal acts; you undertook, declaring that you have all the power, not to allow such criminal consequences to come to fruition - they nevertheless came - take the trouble to answer for them.

The position of the Social Democrats and the Trudoviks was supported by the Cadets F.I. Rodichev, P.N. Milyukov, V.A. Maklakov and O.Ya. Parchment, which in its speech noted that the information establishing the fact of provocation "shake the foundations of respect for the authorities, disturb public thought, deprive people of the possibility of faith in a calm and lawful existence"10.

This statement caused a heated discussion among the deputies, after which, at the suggestion of the Octobrists and the right, it was decided to submit requests to the Duma commission on the "Azef case" for the preparation of a report within ten days. The commission's report was scheduled for February 11, 1909.11

On February 11, 1909, the topic of discussion was not only the fate of Azef, but also the entire political search: if provocation is not abandoned, what consequences can this lead to. On the day of the discussion, the Tauride Palace was full of people, in the halls one could see not only ministers and almost all members of the State Council, but also members of the royal family and representatives of foreign powers.

The rapporteur of the commission on the "Azef case" Vladimir Alekseevich Bobrinsky, a monarchist and leader of the moderate-right party, read a brief and concise report on the "Azef case", after which he announced that the request of the Social Democrats was rejected on the grounds that it was based on "risky and groundless" generalizations. “Even if the facts cited in the request were proven,” he declared, “it is still impossible to draw the conclusions that they made - in sympathy for crimes, in the connivance or negligence of the Government. This would only prove the complete failure of the investigation in the Empire and the need to improve it"12.

Then the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior P.A. Stolypin, whose speech came down to defending both Azef and the provocative methods of the police. He assured the deputies that "there is no evidence to accuse officials of any criminal or illegal acts" and the revolutionary parties deliberately spread "monstrous, legendary rumors about the crimes of the Government"13.

After him, Vladimir Ivanovich Dzyubinsky, a deputy from the Tobolsk province, a deputy chairman of the Labor Group, who, before being elected a deputy of the Third Duma, served for more than a dozen years in local institutions of the Ministry of Finance, participated in the revolutionary movement in 1905, and published a lot in Siberian newspapers. Sharply criticizing Stolypin's speech, the deputy accused him of trying to hush up the case and protect the agent provocateur. He stated that if the prime minister needs evidence of Azef's guilt, the absence of which he complains, then there is no need to look for them for a long time: they can serve as a notice from the Central Committee of the Party of Social Revolutionaries, which detailed and described Azef's revolutionary activities, and Azef's own letters. But for this it is necessary to show a politically honest attitude to the case14.

Raising the topic of the provocative activities of the police, Deputy Dzyubinsky noted from the Duma rostrum that, unlike Stolypin, he had evidence sufficient to prove the correctness of his statements. “Provocateurism reaches grandiose proportions at the present time! - he began his next speech in the Duma, - I want to take your attention to one of the grandiose provocations discovered in Vladivostok last year, to tell about the head of the security department, Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky. From the hall came a cry: “This is not relevant to the case!”, To which Dzyubinsky replied: “This is a very typical case: it reveals a picture of those techniques that are universal in all our security departments to one degree or another, only more or less. My report is based on the report of Major General Ignatiev, commandant of the fortress in Vladivostok.

Anatoly Dmitrievich Zavaritsky, who was discussed in Dzyubinsky's report, was born in 1865, graduated from the Alexander Cadet Corps, then the 1st Pavlovsk Military School. He began military service in 1886 in the 28th infantry regiment of Polotsk, in 1891 he was transferred to the Separate Corps of Gendarmes to the post of adjutant of the Finnish Gendarmerie Directorate, where his service career began. In 1905, when revolutionary speeches, rallies and strikes swept the country, Zavaritsky was seconded to the Baku provincial gendarme department, and on October 11, 1905 he was appointed assistant chief of the Baku provincial gendarme department, where he served for a very short time: on April 19, 1907, lieutenant colonel transferred to a position

head of the Vladivostok fortress gendarmerie team. His predecessor, Lieutenant Colonel Yu.M. Girilovich, headed the Vladivostok security department, which had just been organized by the Police Department (it was subordinate to the East Siberian District Security Department). It was created in a timely manner: the Social Democrats stepped up their activities, which led to the growth of revolutionary propaganda and violations of discipline in the troops16.

The city police and the Okhrana provided little resistance to members of the revolutionary parties, who set up safe houses in Vladivostok and carried out anti-government propaganda among the workers of the port, the lower ranks of the Vladivostok fortress mine battalion and the sailors of ship crews, since the workers were hired to work in the port without hindrance17.

The military governor of the Primorsky region, General Vasily Yegorovich Flug, sent a report to the Governor-General of the Amur region, General Pavel Fedorovich Unterberger, in which he pointed out the reason for the unsatisfactory work of the political search: “Previously, 18 thousand rubles were released a year, but this is not enough, since the security department it is time to open not a single secret printing house in Vladivostok. In view of the foregoing, I again apply for the release of funds, without which the struggle against the underground activities of the revolutionaries cannot be successful. The Amur Governor-General granted the request of the military governor18.

There was also a second reason: the lack of professionals in the political investigation, capable of leading the work of the secret political police, able to conduct undercover work within revolutionary organizations. In a report to the Amur Governor-General and the commander of the Amur Military District, General Unterberger, the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General V.A. Irman noted that there are guilty people in this situation and they will be punished. “The incapable activity of lieutenant colonel of the gendarme security department Girilovich could not only curb and neutralize the activity of revolutionary elements in the city and in the port of strangers and locals,” he wrote, “but even determine and point to its existence. It turned out to be impossible for the gendarmerie lieutenant colonel Girilovich, who was in charge of secret intelligence, to open and arrest the propagandists-agitators in advance due to his complete inability to play this role.

In mid-August 1907, by order of the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General Irman, Lieutenant Colonel Girilovich was removed from the post of head of the security department and Zavaritsky was appointed in his place, who simultaneously headed the security department and the fortress gendarmerie team20.

Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky began his activities with the reorganization

station of the Vladivostok security department. The staff has grown significantly. In addition to the department of external surveillance and the office, an undercover department was created, whose task was to collect information about persons belonging to revolutionary organizations. Zavaritsky realized that the most important task - the suppression of revolutionary agitation in the troops - could only be solved with the help of secret agents, and their recruitment required caution and secrecy. This mission required people with liberal views or sympathizers with the liberation movement, since often information about what was happening in the troops was delivered by persons “extremely ignorant and positively understanding neither the essence of the speeches of the speakers, nor the general mood of the participants in the meeting”21.

Over time, Zavaritsky created secret agents in the fortress, capable of conducting successful work. Thus, the Vladivostok organization of the Bolsheviks, which launched work among sailors and soldiers, suffered a significant loss with the arrest by the police of agitator Grigory Shamizon and members of the military organization of sailors M. Ivanov, M. Morozov and V. Telyatyev in the summer of 1907. Shamizon was betrayed by provocateur sailor Dyatlov22.

But Zavaritsky did not manage to organize the work of the “okhrana”: despite the reports of secret agents, they could not prevent the actions of the workers of the Vladivostok port and the sailors of the Siberian flotilla in the fall of 1907. These events are vividly described in the book of one of the first researchers of the revolutionary movement in the Far East, V.P. . Golionko23, as well as in the works of modern Far Eastern authors24.

On the morning of October 16, miners raised an uprising in the Diomede Bay area, and workers went on strike in the military port. This speech was suppressed. On October 17, revolutionary-minded sailors captured the destroyers Fast, Angry, Vigorous and Alarming. "Angry" and "Alarming" were soon freed from the rebels, and the destroyer "Ambulance" opened fire on the governor's house and other administrative buildings, but was fired upon by destroyers who remained loyal to the government. The troops crushed the uprising. All the workers of the military port were fired, and the participants in the uprising were arrested25.

On the same day, the Amur Governor-General, General Unterberger, received an urgent telegram from Stolypin: “I ask Your Excellency to take the most energetic measures to stop the disorder, to prevent further speeches, using all the full power granted by martial law, which in 12 Art. allows for the adoption of measures, even quite exceptional ones, without applying to the guilty in a judicial proceeding”26.

Due to circumstances, the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress

General Irman, by special order, subordinated to Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky, head of the Vladivostok security department, the port and city police to maintain order. A state of siege was introduced in the city.

Employees of the Vladivostok police and security department expelled all the unemployed and people without passports from the city. In a short time, an address desk was created at the Vladivostok City Police Department. A commission began to work in the port to develop rules for the admission of workers, giving a guarantee of their political reliability. On October 20, the port resumed work. The People's House was closed, meetings and activities of public organizations were banned. A significant number of taverns, pubs and shops have been closed28.

On October 29, 1907, in the basement of one of the houses on Suifunskaya Street, near the police headquarters, police officers discovered a bomb warehouse, which became known from the reports of agents introduced into the revolutionary underground, who were supervised by Zavaritsky himself. They also discovered a secret laboratory in Kordes' house at the corner of Svetlanskaya and Posietskaya streets, where, as experts established, explosive devices were made. On the same day, illegal literature, weapons, correspondence and the seal of the “Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization” were found in the workshops of the military port during a routine search. The police arrested port workers suspected of participating in the October 16-17 riots and the activities of an anti-government organization. In addition, they prevented an attempt by workers to remove personal belongings from the port area in order to “hide important evidence” about their participation in the riot29.

Searches and round-ups by the police were not unsuccessful: many people were detained on suspicion of participating in revolutionary activities. So, Boris Pavlovich Clark, who arrived in Vladivostok from Nagasaki, was arrested on November 5 in Vladivostok by Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky, who already knew the purpose of his arrival. The agents on the eve of a special report notified the head of the security department that Boris Orzhikh, a revolutionary who was in Vladivostok in administrative exile and fled to Japan in the fall of 1905, bought in Shanghai for 17 thousand rubles. weapons with ammunition and gave the order to load them into the hold of a hired steamer en route to Vladivostok. Clark was supposed to take the cargo in the city, reload it on Chinese scows and hand it over to the revolutionary organizations. To intercept the ship with dangerous cargo on the evening of November 7, the military authorities sent the destroyer "Tochny", on board of which was the gendarmerie captain A.A. Kareev with 12 riflemen of the 11th regiment. But at night a storm broke out at sea, and the team was forced to return30.

An investigation into the "riots" case began under the leadership of

Military Prosecutor of the Amur Military District Court, General Ignatiev31.

The commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General V.A. Irman, in his report to the Governor-General of the Amur Region and the commander of the Amur Military District, General Unterberger, wrote: “According to intelligence reports, the revolutionaries are very angry with my main assistant in disclosing the underground revolutionary attack, the gendarmerie lieutenant colonel Zavaritsky, and burn with revenge. On November 13, at about 9 pm, the Chinese, including 6 people, sent by some young, decently dressed civilians, brought a coffin to the headquarters of the fortress and in a sealed envelope the death sentence of the main committee of the Vladivostok military revolutionary organization, which said that the coffin was sent as a gift , because Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky will soon need it. 2 Chinese were arrested, the coffin was sent to the local infirmary. A strict inquiry is being made about this impudent insolence.

“For outstanding energy, courage and reasonable activity,” General Irman sent Zavaritsky by telegram to be promoted to the rank of colonel, but “for short service in the rank” he was

“The Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree was most highly granted”33.

On January 6, 1908, Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky was removed from the post of head of the Vladivostok security department and seconded to the Gendarmerie and Police Directorate of the Ussuri Railway, and captain Illarion Evstigneevich Khutsiev was appointed in his place34.

Some time later, Zavaritsky was removed from his post and arrested; a criminal case was opened against him. He came under investigation during the "cleansing" carried out by the director of the police department, Maximilian Ivanovich Trusevich. Such events always ended with the removal from service and the dismissal of employees who, as internal investigations showed, built their activities solely in terms of material benefits and careers.

Obviously, the reports of the secret agent L.P. Rakovsky, who explained not only the zealous desire of Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky to serve in the Far East, but also revealed the details of his provocative activities in Baku. There, he immediately fell under the supervision of secret agents, as soon as it became clear that the career issue was paramount for him, and he was ready to choose any means to achieve career goals. L.P. Rakovsky later recalled: “In May 1905, on the recommendation of the famous M.I. Gurovich, who held the position of the office manager of the assistant viceroy for police

General Shirinkin’s military unit in the Caucasus, I was enrolled as an official of the named office and seconded to Baku, at the disposal of the head of the Baku provincial gendarmerie department to draw up reports on the activities of local revolutionary organizations. In my notes addressed to General Shirinkin and M. Gurovich, I repeatedly pointed out the unseemly provocative methods of the head of the Baku security post, Lieutenant Colonel A. Zavaritsky”35.

An investigation was launched against Zavaritsky in December 1905. He was removed from the post of head of the Baku security post and transferred to Sukhumi for the duration of the investigation. Without waiting for the investigators to become fully aware of his provocative activities, Zavaritsky petitioned the director of the Police Department, Emmanuil Ivanovich Vuich, to appoint him to the Far East. But not only the desire to hide the traces of his malfeasance attracted the lieutenant colonel to the Far East: service in the distant outskirts guaranteed large salaries and official privileges, could quench the thirst for easy money that he was obsessed with. This is probably why the activities of Zavaritsky in 1907, so ebullient and successful, seemed suspicious to the director of the Police Department, Trusevich. It took quite a bit of time for the head of the security department to solve the case, which took other employees months of painstaking work. An official investigation began, during which the investigators began to carefully check every fact in the activities of the head of the Vladivostok security department36.

The investigators, already informed about the provocative activities of the lieutenant colonel, considering the documents of the investigation on the events of October 17, 1907, began to look for inconsistencies or ambiguities. Their attention was immediately attracted by the story of the clerk of the trading house "Churin and Co" Makaldin, who never admitted his guilt, which he was charged with. All employees of the department involved in the search and arrest of Macaldin were immediately interrogated. The behavior of the head of the detective police also seemed suspicious when the investigators expressed a desire to get acquainted with the case, when bombs were found during the searches. Investigators drew attention to the primitiveness of making bombs. After many hours of interrogation, arrests, confrontations, it turned out that the “bombers” turned out to be agents of the security department, acting on the orders of their boss Zavaritsky. The investigation concluded that Zavaritsky in Vladivostok, as once in Baku, was engaged in provocative activities, which was reported to the director of the Police Department, Trusevich. Years later, Trusevich recalled: “I even remember one case in Vladivostok: there a gendarmerie officer was put on trial, at my request, and sentenced to exile. I had to

endure some struggle with the corps of gendarmes and ensured that Zavaritsky was convicted”37.

How did Zavaritsky motivate himself, once again embarking on the path of provocation in Vladivostok? Most likely, the possibility of rapid career growth. A suitable opportunity turned up for the lieutenant colonel in October 1907, when the city was shaken by the speeches of sailors and port workers.

Three days before the revolutionary events, on October 14, 1907, an emergency meeting was held with the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General Irman, which was attended by Colonel V.I. Zhigalkovsky, commander of the Vladivostok fortress mine battalion, military governor General Flug and Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky. The head of the Vladivostok security department stated that in the city "the pressure on the troops of revolutionary propaganda has intensified." According to him, it became known from intelligence reports that on October 21 "an active action of revolutionary elements is expected", which was decided on October 5, 1907 at a meeting of the revolutionary underground. The decision to revolt was made after long disputes under the pressure of a certain "Union of Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists", which had more influence on the revolutionary-minded military units, since it was a terrorist direction in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. His leadership increased in the summer of 1907 in connection with the defeat of the Vladivostok Social Democratic Military Organization and the arrest of its leaders. The leaders of the "maximalists" decided to use the fact that the lower ranks of the 1st company of the Vladivostok fortress mine battalion were brought to trial as an excuse to incite the garrison of the fortress to an armed uprising. That is why the meeting was attended by 18 representatives from the sailors (one representative from each ship). It was decided to "carry out an armed uprising" with the aim of "turning the entire region into a republic, fortifying the cities bordering European Russia, and leading an independent life." The commandant of the Vladivostok fortress assessed this information presented by Zavaritsky and the situation in the city as follows: “Despite the measures of careful observation and protection, which was the merit of the new head of the security department, time has been lost”38.

General Irman during the meeting suggested that if measures are taken, then there is no need to fear a pogrom in the city: the arrest of the miners of the 1st company of the Vladivostok fortress mine battalion, who presented economic demands to the authorities on May 31, was a little-known event for the population. Zavaritsky suggested the complexity of the task for his department due to the small number and inexperience of his employees. Then the commandant instructed the head of the fortress engineers, Colonel Zhigalkovsky, to take all measures in order to avoid a “mutiny”.

zha in the troops "39.

It was not possible to avoid revolutionary actions, since Colonel Zhigalkovsky did not take any action to prevent it, for which he was later removed from his post40.

However, the uprising was quickly put down. But Zavaritsky was unfavorable for such a final. He wished for further developments that would create fertile ground for his activities for the benefit of his career. He well understood: if there were not enough enemies of the monarchical form of government, they needed to be created. And here chance helped him.

During the uprising in the Vladivostok fortress mine battalion in Diomede Bay, on October 16, 1907, a certain “Alexander” was killed, who lived in Vladivostok on a false passport of a former student of Yuryev University Topnikov. Zavaritsky was well aware of this man back in September: “Alexander” led the “Vladivostok military organization”, which called for the unification of the lower ranks of the parts of the fortress garrison and naval teams. Its charter was based on the party program of the “Union of Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists” and required from members, in addition to propaganda and agitation work, readiness for terrorist acts, preparation of escapes for arrested party members, and much more41.

Information about the murder of "Alexander" was classified, a limited number of people had access to it. Zavaritsky understood that if evidence was provided in time, then everyone in the city would believe that there really was a “Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization”, which intended to carry out a series of terrorist attacks in Vladivostok, and which would cease to exist thanks to him, Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky, vigilant labors. Optimal conditions were created for this: the leader of the organization was killed, his surviving comrades-in-arms went into deep hiding, and it is unlikely that any of the authorities or employees of the prosecutor's office would question his decisions and delve into the details of operational-search activities42.

As deputy Dzyubinsky described in his speech, the gendarme Zavaritsky already “knew” those people who were to become members of the “Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization”: these were people who sympathized with the liberation movement, as a rule, registered with the police. They were engaged in the department of external surveillance, which was led by captain Khutsiev. Searches were carried out in the homes of these people more than once, during which illegal literature was also found in many of them. Zavaritsky's plan, according to the deputy, was as follows: to make a fake seal of the "Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization", to stamp with it the confiscated illegal literature available in the department and pick up

steal it during various searches at pre-scheduled persons. The lieutenant colonel was sure that those arrested would deny the charges brought against them and give different testimonies. But Zavaritsky, based on the experience of the service, knew that the words of the arrested meant little to the judges, if there was evidence and reports of "their" agents, compiled retroactively on the basis of false data43.

In order to give significance and publicity to the investigation into the case of the “Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization”, Zavaritsky decided to “revolutionize” the situation in the city: “Prepare a few bombs, put them in a house, then draw up an undercover report about the impending attempt on life the commandant of the fortress, the military governor and himself. In order to verify this report, bombs were to be found in the same place and to express their activities for the protection. According to the deputy, this scenario was invented by him both on the basis of his own experience and not without the help of the press: Russian newspapers often talked about arrested, detained individuals with pistols in their pockets or bombs in their bosoms, about open laboratories where infernal machines were created by revolutionaries, about secret printing houses where appeals to overthrow the emperor were printed44.

From Dzyubinsky's speech, the deputies of the Duma learned that certain secret collaborators Demyanenko, captains Budagovsky and Badirov, who agreed to this for material reward, helped Zavaritsky to carry out the planned provocation in a short time.

Budagovsky allegedly visited the profitable house of the merchant of the 1st guild A.K. Cooper, located on Svetlanskaya Street, and ordered a copper seal of the “Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization. Since the seal was not made at the appointed time, he ordered another one - a wooden one. Thus, having two seals at his disposal, Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky in the security department stamped with false seals the stored illegal literature seized during searches in the port and in the city. After the events of October 17, 1907, searches in apartments became a common event in the city, and the suspicion could be either in possession of illegal literature or in harboring persons involved in the revolutionary movement. Zavaritsky's agents took advantage of this and acted cautiously, but decisively45.

The inhabitant Mironenko, who lives in Zimmerman's house on Korean Street, got into the "Zavaritsky list" after the agents of the security department found that Mironenko sheltered a very nice person in his apartment. There was nothing illegal in this, but the brother of the cohabitant was arrested for participation in the Nikolsk-Ussuri military organization and prosecuted under Art. 102 of the Criminal Code

niya. This fact became the reason for calling Mironenko and his girlfriend to the security department for interrogation, during which the interrogated from well-intentioned loyal subjects turned into "unreliable". While the interrogation was going on, agent Budagovsky, dressed in the uniform of a gendarmerie non-commissioned officer, visited Mironenko's empty apartment and hid illegal literature there, stamped with forged seals. Mironenko was soon released home, but after a while the police came to him with a search warrant, during which illegal literature was found. The detainee could not explain the existence of the forbidden proclamations. During the interrogation, it turned out that the owner of the apartment turned out to be an employee of the Primorye newspaper, who published under the pseudonym Chronicer. Moreover, he lived in Vladivostok and was engaged in journalistic activities, having a fake passport in the name of Ivan Dmitrievich Mironenko. Finally, his identity was also established: Schmuler Meerov Goldbreich, who had already been brought to trial for printing, editing and distributing revolutionary proclamations46.

According to the deputy Dzyubinsky, the clerk of the trading house "Churin and Co" Makoldin found himself on the "Zavaritsky list" because of his political unreliability, being registered with the surveillance department as a "sympathizer." He was summoned several times to the police, but it did not come to searches and charges of participation in the revolutionary movement. But on October 23, 1907, warrant officer Tserpitsky, seconded to the gendarmerie team of the Vladivostok fortress, searched the clerk's house. The ensign showed Macaldin a warrant signed by Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky and announced to him that he was suspected of possessing and distributing illegal literature. During a search in the apartment, a notebook with a list of "illegal literature" was found. Delivered to the police station, Macaldin was unable to explain to the investigators that the notebook was in his home. In addition, he was very surprised by the question of his acquaintance with Goldbreich, about which the clerk only heard during interrogation for the first time in his life. Despite the fact that Macaldin pleaded not guilty, the court-martial sentenced him to indefinite hard labor47.

The clerk's confusion and bewilderment instantly disappeared if he learned that during his absence at home, agent Budagovsky, in the form of a gendarmerie non-commissioned officer, carried out a search, during which he hid a notebook in the apartment with a note of the titles of the proclamations that were confiscated from Goldbreich. It was discovered by the clerk at night during a search by Ensign Tserpitsky48.

Thus, if we rely on the reliability of the information received by Deputy Dzyubinsky from Vladivostok, through the efforts of agents, the number of those arrested in the case of the “Main Committee of the Military Organization” grew every day, and the production of evidence in the office

head of the security department - stamping seized illegal literature with fake seals - became a common pastime for Budagovsky and Zavaritsky. One day, while doing this, they were caught by an unexpected visit from the prosecutor A.A. Khozyainov (probably a deputy prosecutor of the Vladivostok District Court). The lieutenant colonel did not lose his head: having escorted Budagovsky with seals and illegal literature to the next room, he received the prosecutor's servant in his office. During the conversation, Zavaritsky learned about a search planned for October 29 in one of the premises of the military port, where a conspiratorial gathering of workers was to take place. Khozyainov believed that the suspects were members of an underground revolutionary organization, and told the lieutenant colonel the names and names of the workers, who, in his opinion, were the leaders. The lieutenant colonel, without hesitation, decided to take advantage of what he thought was a good moment: with the help of forgery of two seals, it was possible to uncover an entire revolutionary organization. After the prosecutor left, a report was drawn up by Badirov, which stated that in the course of the operational activities of agents of the security department, it was established that the worker of the military port, Sergei Gavryushin, was one of the leaders of an underground organization, the purpose of which, “according to intelligence information, was an armed military uprising. With the support of the workers, it was meant to exterminate the officers and all authorities, take possession of the property and capital of the treasury and rich people, and declare Vladivostok a republic. To achieve this goal, intensified oral and written propaganda was carried out among port workers, students and the lower ranks of the garrison, weapons were intensively prepared and explosives were prepared for a number of terrorist attacks on Vladivostok officials.

Finally, the time has come for the most important provocative performance, directed by Zavaritsky: threats of undermining the planted bombs were used. The lieutenant colonel chose the moment well: on October 28, a solemn funeral took place for those who were killed and died from wounds during the mutiny on October 17, loyal officers and sailors. The townspeople were suppressed, a curfew was introduced in the city. The city shuddered again on October 29: mass arrests took place in the port, explosive devices were defused thanks to the actions of Zavaritsky. On the eve, by order and for the money of the lieutenant colonel, agent Badirov purchased 10 pounds of gunpowder. With money from the same amount, Agent Budagovsky ordered four tin shells in the form of flat rectangular boxes in the shop of the Chinese filed Mangun and purchased two round ones. Also in the pharmacy, he bought the funds he needed and single-handedly prepared four bombs. He made two together with Zavaritsky. After that, the agents took five bombs wrapped in two bundles to 10 Suifunskaya Street and hid them under the stairs leading from the lower floor to the upper one. sixth

Budagovsky planted a bomb not far from the fortress guardhouse. After the agents reported on their work at the meeting, Budagovsky, at the suggestion of Zavaritsky, immediately wrote an agent report. The sixth bomb, according to Badirov's testimony, was supposed to confirm Badirov's intelligence report about a terrorist act being prepared by the revolutionaries - undermining the guardhouse building in order to free the prisoners. After that, Lieutenant Colonel Zavaritsky reported on the impending terrorist attacks to the commandant of the fortress. And on the same night, according to the searches, five bombs were found in house number 10 on Suifunskaya Street50.

On October 29, when, at the direction of prosecutor Khozyainov, an inspection of workshops and other premises of the port began in the port, Badirov, dressed in the uniform of a gendarmerie non-commissioned officer, appeared at the military port, joined the search, during which he hid a briefcase in one of the premises, in which were books, anti-government proclamations and two seals. The briefcase was found by security officers. This list was included in the folder of the criminal case as evidence of the existence of an underground group in the military port, which was engaged in revolutionary activities. Port workers were arrested and taken to the security department51.

Interrogations and face-to-face confrontations began. Innocent people who became victims of the lieutenant colonel's provocation were sent to hard labor by a court-martial or sentenced to death. The lieutenant colonel was afraid that his deeds would become known: many of his colleagues were embarrassed by the speed with which the revolutionary organization was discovered and defeated. And then he decided to turn himself into a "victim of terror." He wrote a letter, where, on behalf of the "Main Committee of the Vladivostok Military Organization", he stated the death sentence ... to himself. For greater effect, on his instructions, the agent Badirov ordered a coffin where he placed the letter, hired Chinese coolies (porters), and sent this "funeral procession" to the headquarters of the fortress. After a little commotion, all the porters were arrested. A wave of arrests swept through the city. The efforts of the lieutenant colonel did not go unrewarded.

All these details of the lieutenant colonel's provocation became known to the public after a long work of the investigators.

In 1909, the Vladivostok Military District Court recognized A.D. Zavaritsky guilty of abuse of office and illegal provocative activities, during which 29 people suffered: seven of them were executed, three were sentenced to indefinite hard labor, and the rest suffered more or less severe punishments. He was deprived of all the rights of the state and sentenced to 5 years of hard labor53.

In Vladivostok, an investigative commission of the Amur Military District Court was created, headed by the prosecutor Ivan Ivanovich Ignatiev. Its work was personally supervised by the military governor of the Primorsky region, General Flug. The commission reviewed the criminal cases of the persons arrested by Zavaritsky. Thus, the case of the clerk of the trading house "Churin and Co" Makaldin was reviewed, and indefinite hard labor was replaced by "8 years of hard labor with deprivation of the rights of the state"54.

Zavaritsky, according to Prime Minister Stolypin, became the first gendarme officer to be criminally punished for provocative actions. He was an experienced and determined officer in the service, but with a peculiar code of morality, which was formed in the conditions of living in a "police state", where the political police covered the organizers of the murders of public figures and policemen, the Grand Duke and the Minister of the Interior. On the one hand, driven by a thirst for profit, he, covering his tracks in his criminal field, embarked on a dangerous path of provocation. On the other hand, the system itself pushed him to do this, not allowing him to stop “criminal plans” in the bud in his official activities, but giving him the opportunity to “effectively” open up with unpredictable bloody consequences.

At the February meeting of the Duma in 1909, during a discussion of the provocative actions of Zavaritsky and others like him, deputy I.P. Pokrovsky noted that provocation is possible where "where management is based on personal discretion, where unbridled arbitrariness of individual administrators reigns." But the most terrible misfortune, in his opinion, was that the government protected from attacks by the public, including deputies of the State Duma, the Okhrana Institute, its ideology and the key method of its work - provocation.

According to the deputy, agents-performers were not brought to justice in the case of Zavaritsky, since immediately after the implementation of his plan, the lieutenant colonel "got rid" of his accomplices. So, the fate of the secret collaborator I. Demyanenko helped to decide the case. In the autumn of 1907, Demyanenko was introduced into the Vladivostok Fighting Social Democratic Party. In early December, he informed the head of the Vladivostok security department that the Khabarovsk group of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party had turned to the leadership of the party with a very delicate request. The point was that, with the sanction of the Central Committee, it was decided to carry out the expropriation of gold transported from the Amur mines along the Amur to Blagoveshchensk. The amount of valuable cargo amounted to about 1 million rubles. These funds were to be used to arrange the escape of party members arrested in Vladivostok and other cities of the Far East. Raid a convoy that was guarded by a dozen

well-armed Cossacks, it was a risky and daring business. Khabarovsk revolutionaries were not confident in their abilities. After negotiations in Vladivostok, it was decided that the Vladivostok Fighting Social Democratic Party would send a fighting group to Khabarovsk55.

Zavaritsky immediately informed his colleagues from Khabarovsk about the impending terrorist attack, as well as that agent I. Demyanenko would operate in the militant detachment. On the appointed day of the raid, citing urgent business, the agent refused to go as part of the battle group, which, having arrived at the site of the alleged ambush, was arrested and handed over to the court. At the trial, Demyanenko appeared as a “witness”, his further activities took place in Khabarovsk56.

As for the other accomplice, Captain Badirov, thanks to the efforts of Zavaritsky, he was transferred to the post of warden of the Baku security post, where he actively participated in provocative activities57.

These facts, voiced by a colleague from the Duma rostrum, aroused indignation among many deputies. O.Ya. Parchment, a Cadet, a deputy from Odessa, declared: “What more proof is needed that provocateurs are encouraged and protected, listen to a death sentence with a light heart, leave the bench and go back to work?” The deputies presented the government with a demand that Vladimir Ivanovich Dzyubinsky expressed in his speech: “The Minister of the Interior said that he himself makes sure that there are no excesses, he himself holds government officials and police officials accountable when they either provoke or commit lawlessness . But is it really a matter of attracting one police chief to dismiss one city governor on the highest command? After all, they, nevertheless, are growing like mushrooms, one was fired, tomorrow another operates on a larger scale, after tomorrow the third. We need a judicial investigation, open and transparent. But what does the government say, defending the guilty? Give the documents, evidence - and then we will begin an official investigation. In all cases, the government finds an excuse to make it harder to bring the perpetrators to justice. But it’s not about the papers and the evidence.”58

The deputy said that it is possible to bring charges against those who were suspected of "provocative acts" even in the case when the cases were fabricated by the latter and the evidence destroyed. As evidence of his innocence, he cited the “Zavaritsky case”: “This is the interrogation of witnesses who are alive, who were either accused of a crime or contributed to its disclosure. You can interrogate them and they will testify. So, with the help of witnesses and their testimonies, it is possible to bring to punishment the rank of the police, send him to resign or Siberia”59.

During the discussion by the deputies of the Duma of the provocative scandal

the need to reform the entire political police system in Russia was emphasized, which had many powers: police-information, investigative, prosecutorial and prison, and therefore could not function safely. But the Duma opposition considered the preservation of power in this system of police provocation as a necessary means for further delaying the implementation of reforms. Summing up, deputy I.P. Pokrovsky, during his next speech, noted that if the government fails to abandon the method of provocation to justify its policy of "hard labor, torture and gallows", then this will lead to the fall of the autocratic political regime in the country60.

Although Stolypin admitted in the course of the discussion that such “ugly phenomena” as provocation and “spyocracy” take place in the system of political search, but, in his opinion, there are simply no other effective methods for combating the revolutionary underground. Referring to the fact that the greater the scope of the revolution, the tougher and more merciless should be the measures to suppress it, he noted the untimely weakening of punitive measures in the fight against the revolution. But when Stolypin realized that the question of the need to reform the police system, which was actively discussed in the Duma, could not be completely ignored, he began to assure the Duma opposition: not a goal, but a means, a means to give the opportunity to legislate ... And it is possible to improve, soften our life not by destroying punishment, not by facilitating the opportunity to do evil, but by enormous internal work”61.

Stolypin was supported in their speeches by Purishkevich, Bobrinsky, Zamyslovsky, and Markov. As a result, the Third State Duma, by 175 votes against 167, condemned the provocation as a method of fighting the revolutionary forces. But a full-fledged reform, which the system of political investigation so badly needed, did not follow, which led to a new wave of arbitrariness of police officials and a number of political assassinations. The murder in December 1909 of the head of the St. Petersburg security department, Colonel S.G. Karpov, and then the murder of P.A. Stolypin on September 1, 1911, forced many participants in the discussion of the “Zavaritsky case” to reconsider their attitude to the methods of work of the political police.

October 15, 1911, at the first meeting of the Duma after the summer holidays, dedicated to the memory of P.A. Stolypin, leader of the Octobrist faction A.I. Guchkov, who in February 1909 supported Stolypin's resolution, did not restrain his indignation at the Okhrana. In his

In his speech, he pointed out that "terror slows down reforms and gives weapons to the reaction", he spoke of that "gang" that, "swarming around terror, existed only for considerations of career and selfish interests." He stressed, finally, that “under the current situation of protection, the government has become a prisoner of its servants”62.

Cadet F.I. spoke in the same spirit that day. Rodichev: “Now we see that political assassinations are successful only when they are made in the Okhrana, when they specialize in killing officials”63.

This meeting of the Duma, as journalists covering this event noted, “was an involuntary reflection of the thoughts and feelings that the majority of Russian society has been living with since the September 1st murder”64.

The circumstances of the death of Karpov and Stolypin were so unfavorable for the authority and reputation of the political police of the empire that the authorities preferred to refuse a public trial of the murderers. The deputies' hopes for publicity and openness of court hearings, as well as for the long-awaited reform of the political search, were not destined to come true. The words of deputy Pokrovsky became prophetic.

Notes

1 Soloviev K.A. Mechanisms of interaction between the executive and representative branches of government: 1906 - 1914 // Russian history. 2009. N° 4. S. 60-76; Solovyov K.A. Legislative process and representative system in 1906 - 1911. // Russian history. 2012. No. 2. S. 37-51; Solovyov K.A. Interaction of the Council of Ministers and representative institutions during the First World War // Russian History. 2014. No. 5. S. 50-61.

2 Agapov V.L. Before the catastrophe: Russia in the First World War 1914 - 1918. in the mirror of the Russian "thick" magazine. Vladivostok, 2014, p. 21.

3 Provocateur: Memoirs and documents about the exposure of Azef. L., 1929. S.38-39.

5 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70 (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). SPb., 1909. Stb. 1367, 1368.

6 Solovyov K.A. Legislative and executive power in Russia: Mechanisms of interaction (1906 - 1914). M., 2011. S. 51; Solovyov K.A. Legislative process and representative system in 1906 - 1911. // Russian history. 2012. No. 2. S. 38-39.

7 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70: (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). Stb. 13761382.

12 Ibid. Stb. 1429.

13 Ibid. Stb. 1435.

14 Ibid. Stb. 1459.

17 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). Vladivostok, 1960, p. 146.

18 Russian State Historical Archive of the Far East (RGIA DV). F. 702. Op. 3. D. 199. L. 244.

19 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). S. 147.

21 Ibid. pp. 133-139.

22 RGIA DV. F. 1. Op. 1. D. 536. L. 1.

23 Golionko V.P. Essays on the revolutionary movement in Primorye (1900

1916). Khabarovsk, 1940.

24 Avilov R.S. On the way to revolution - the garrison of the Vladivostok fortress in 1905 // Social and humanitarian sciences in the Far East. 2015. No. 2 (46). pp. 7-16.

25 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). P.143.

26 Golionko V.P. Essays on the revolutionary movement in Primorye (1900

27 RGIA DV. F. 87. Op. 4. D. 1676. L. 23.

28 Unterberger P.F. Amur Region: 1906 - 1910: Essay. SPb., 1912. S. 401.

30 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). pp. 144-145.

31 Unterberger P.F. Amur Region: 1906 - 1910: Essay. SPb., 1912. S. 401.

32 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). pp. 144-145.

34 The fall of the tsarist regime. T. 3. L., 1924. S. 21.

35 Secret collaborators and provocateurs: Collection. M.; L., 1927. S. 317

37 The fall of the tsarist regime. T. 3. S. 21.

38 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). pp. 147-148.

39 Golionko V.P. Essays on the revolutionary movement in Primorye (1900

1916). Khabarovsk, 1940. S. 52, 53.

40 Vladivostok: Collection of Historical Documents (1860 - 1907). P.143.

41 Golionko V.P. Essays on the revolutionary movement in Primorye (1900

42 Golionko V.P. Essays on the revolutionary movement in Primorye (1900

1916). Khabarovsk, 1940. S. 54.

43 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70 (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). Stb. 1463.

46 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). S. 179.

47 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70 (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). Stb. 1463.

49 Vladivostok: Collection of historical documents (1860 - 1907). S. 179.

50 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70 (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). Stb. 1463.

54 The fall of the tsarist regime. T. 3. S. 21.

58 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70 (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). Stb. 1459.

60 Ibid. Art. 1385.

61 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, second session: Sessions 36 - 70 (from January 20 to March 5, 1909). Stb. 1463.

63 Verbatim records: State Duma, third convocation, fifth session. Sessions 1 - 41 (October 15 to December 10, 1911). SPb., 1911. Stb. 48.

Butyrin Dmitry Alexandrovich - Candidate of Cultural Studies, Associate Professor of the Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok)

The article deals with the official activities of the officer of the secret political police of the Russian Empire A.D. Zavaritsky. In 1909, his name became known throughout Russia as a master of provocation. For career reasons, he "created" a revolutionary underground organization in Vladivostok, which he then allegedly uncovered and liquidated. The military court gave him a well-deserved verdict. When studying and discussing the "Azef case", the deputies of the III State Duma made two requests on the "Zavaritsky case". Discussion of the report of the commission on the "Azef case" and the answers of P.A. Stolypin, in response to inquiries about the "Zavaritsky case", was used by the Duma opposition to criticize the methods of work of the secret political police. Deputies were especially sharply criticized as a method of provocation

the fight against the revolutionary underground, since it created the ground for police brutality and falsification, as well as for the spread of terror. As a result, the Third State Duma condemned the provocations organized by the secret political police against revolutionary organizations. However, the government refused to reform the political investigation system. This resulted in new political assassinations, including that of Prime Minister Stolypin.

Revolution of 1905-1907, State Duma, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Department, Separate corps of gendarmes, provincial gendarme department, security department, gendarmerie officer, Primorsky region, Vladivostok, Vladivostok fortress, political police, terror, provocation, deputy request, P .BUT. Stolypin, V.I. Dzyubinsky, A.D. Zavaritsky

(Articles from Scientific Journals)

1. Avilov R.S. Na puti k revolyutsii - gamizon Vladivostokskoy kreposti v 1905 g. Sotsialnye i gumanitarnye nauki na Dalnem Vostoke, 2015, no. 2 (46), pp. 7-16.

2. Solovev K.A. Mekhanizmy vzaimodeystviya ispolnitelnoy i predstavitel-noy vetvey vlasti: 1906 - 1914 gg. Rossiyskaya istoriya, 2009, no. 4, pp. 60-76.

3. Solovev K.A. Zakonotvorcheskiy protsess i predstavitelnyy stroy v 1906

1911 gg. Rossiyskaya istoriya, 2012, no. 2, pp. 37-51.

4. Solovev K.A. Zakonotvorcheskiy protsess i predstavitelnyy stroy v 1906

1911 gg. Rossiyskaya istoriya, 2012, no. 2, pp. 38-39.

5. Solovev K.A. Vzaimodeystvie Soveta ministrov i predstavitelnykh uchrezhdeniy v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny. Rossiyskaya istoriya, 2014, no. 5, pp. 50-61.

6. Agapov V.L. Pered katastrofoy: Russia v Pervoy mirovoy voyne 1914

1918 gg. v zerkale russkogo "tolstogo" zhurnala. Vladivostok, 2014, p. 21.

7. Golionko V.P. Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Primore (1900 -1916 gg.) . Khabarovsk, 1940, 97 p.

8. Golionko V.P. Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Primore (1900 -1916 gg.) . Khabarovsk, 1940, pp. 52, 53.

9. Golionko V.P. Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Primore (1900 -1916 gg.) . Khabarovsk, 1940, pp. 52, 53.

10. Golionko V.P. Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Primore (1900 -1916 gg.) . Khabarovsk, 1940, p. 54.

11. Golionko V.P. Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Primore (1900 -1916 gg.) . Khabarovsk, 1940, p. 54.

12. Solovev K.A. Zakonodatelnaya i ispolnitelnaya vlast v Rossii: Mekhanizmy vzaimodeystviya (1906 - 1914) . Moscow, 2011, p. 51.

Author, Abstract, Key words

Dmitriy A. Butyrin - Candidate of Cultural Sciences, Senior Lecturer, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia)

The article examines the professional activity of A.D. Zavaritskiy, an officer of secret political police of the Russian Empire. In 1909 he became notorious throughout Russia as a master of provocation. For his career ambitions he "initiated" an underground revolutionary organization which he later on exposed and eliminated. He was court-martialed and received a just verdict. As the 3rd State Duma discussed "Azef"s case" it also submitted two requests for information concerning "Zavaritskiy"s case". The opposition in the 3rd State Duma used the debate following the Inquiry Commission's report on "Azef's case" to criticize the methods of the secret political police. The sharpest criticism was directed against provocations as a means of combating the revolutionary underground movement. It was argued that was made for abuse, outrage and falsification on the part of the police as well as spread out terrorism. consequently, the 3rd State Duma condemned the provocations the secret political police used against revolutionary associations. Nevertheless, the government opted not to reform its political search system. This resulted in a new series of political assassinations, including the killing of Prime Minister P. Stolypin.

Russian Revolution of 1905, political police, State Duma, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Department (of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Separate Gendarme Corps, Province Gendarme Department, Security Department (Okhranka), gendarme officer, Primorsky region (Primorye), Vladivostok, Vladivostok Fortress, political police, terrorism, provocation, parliamentary inquiry), P.A. Stolypin, V.I. Dzyubinskiy, A.D. Zavaritskiy

security department

Group photo of employees of the St. Petersburg security department. 1905.

Security department, (colloquial security guard common in Soviet historical literature) - the name of the structural bodies of the police department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, in charge of political investigation. In the system of state administration of the Russian Empire in the late XIX - early XX centuries. they occupied one of the most important places.

Story

The first security department was created in 1866 at the office of the St. Petersburg mayor after Dmitry Karakozov's assassination attempt on Emperor Alexander II, it was called " Department for the protection of order and tranquility in the capital". On May 12, 1886, the state of the St. Petersburg Security Department was approved, which from April 9, 1887 became known as " Department for the protection of public safety and order in the city of St. Petersburg". The St. Petersburg Security Department, being an organ of the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, was directly subordinate to the St. Petersburg Mayor. The department included a general office, a security team, a Central spy detachment and a Registration Bureau. The general office consisted of eight tables.

The second security department was Moscow, created on November 1, 1880 by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs M.T. Loris-Melikov. At first it existed as Secret Investigation Department at the Office of the Moscow Police Chief» In 1881 it was renamed into « Department for the protection of public safety and order in the city of Moscow". The Moscow Security Department, also being an organ of the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was directly subordinate to the Moscow mayor. In a number of cases, the Moscow Security Department in its investigative activities went beyond the boundaries of Moscow and the Moscow province, fulfilling the role of an all-Russian center of political investigation. The direct executor of this task was the so-called "Flying Detachment of Filers" or "Special Detachment of Observational Agents", created in 1894 at the Moscow Security Department. The detachment was headed by E.P. Mednikov, the immediate leader of which was the head of the Security Department S.V. Zubatov. In 1902, the "Flying Filer Detachment" at the Moscow Security Department was abolished; it was replaced by permanent search points created under the provincial gendarme departments and the newly formed "Flying Squad" under the Police Department from the most experienced detectives of the Moscow Security Department.

Third Security Department, Department for the protection of public security and order in the city of Warsaw appeared in 1900.

Heads of the Department for the protection of public security and order in the Kholmsky district

Heads of the Department for the Protection of Public Security and Order in Turkmenabat

Chiefs of the Public Security and Order Department of the China Eastern Railway

De Livron, Pavel Rudolfovich

Heads of the Department for the protection of public security and order in the Orenburg province

Heads of the Department for the protection of public safety and order at the station Petersburg