The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945
Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.
Their fighters dominated the battlefield.
Their bombers wiped entire cities off the face of the earth.
And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.
The Air Force of the Third Reich - the famed Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. The resounding victories of the Wehrmacht would have been impossible in principle without air support and air cover.
Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was forbidden to have combat aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build a modern and efficient air force in the shortest possible time, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. .
This book, published by the British Air Office in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the just ended war, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. This is a detailed and highly competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and disastrous fall of the Third Reich air force.
Sections of this page:
Summer Campaign on the Eastern Front
Direction of the main attack
Contrary to expectations, the summer campaign of the Soviet troops began on June 10 with a major offensive on the Finnish border in Karelia along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which resulted in the capture of Vyborg on June 20. At first, the Germans did not try to strengthen the Luftwaffe grouping in this direction, not wanting to weaken the main front in order to support the Finns, but the rapid deterioration of the situation forced them to transfer 50 dive bombers and single-engine fighters from Narva to Finland.
When the main offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23, German aviation north of the Pripyat marshes was already somewhat weakened by the events on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which was aggravated by the withdrawal of another 50 fighters to Germany to strengthen the Reich air defense system, weakened by the transfer of significant forces to Normandy. By July 3, the advancing Soviet troops had already occupied Vitebsk, Mogilev and Minsk. It was necessary to urgently strengthen the central direction, and literally every aircraft that could be removed from other fronts was hastily transferred here.
40 fighters from among those transferred to the Reich air defense were immediately returned, about the same number were transferred to the north from the 4th Air Fleet, but the need for attack aircraft was most felt for operations against the advancing Soviet columns. Accordingly, the already weakened Italian front was forced to give up another 85 FV-190, having lost (and irretrievably) the last strike forces that could be thrown to support the ground forces. 40 aircraft were transferred from Normandy, despite the critical situation that developed there after the capture of the bridgehead by the Allies (however, they did not play a big role there), and another 70 aircraft from the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, to relieve pressure on the central sector of the front, which was already beginning to fall apart, by the beginning of July, about 270 aircraft were sent.
These forces were clearly not enough to stop the flight. During the day of July 12, Soviet troops in the Baltic advanced more than 30 km; On July 13 they occupied Vilnius; it was followed by Pinsk and Grodno. South of the Pripyat marshes, the retreat was also in full swing. During the period from July 24 to July 28, the Germans left Brest, Lublin, Lvov and Przemysl. The defeat was so complete that all possible forces were transferred to this sector, even despite the risk of exposing the Carpathian and Balkan directions in Romania. In an attempt to plug the gap in the 4th Air Fleet, the last forces in close support of the ground forces were selected. There was nothing more to throw into battle.
Thus, by the end of July, the distribution of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front had undergone noticeable changes, and the losses incurred during July far exceeded the reinforcements received, as a result of which the number of aircraft on the main front from the Baltic to the Black Sea was reduced to about 1750 aircraft:
| Fleet | Long range bombers | Stormtroopers | Night bombers | Single engine fighters | twin-engine fighters | Long range scouts | Tactical scouts | Total |
| 1st WF | - | 155 | 110 | 70 | - | 30 | 35 | 400 |
| 6th WF | 305 | 375 | 50 | 215 | 50 | 55 | 110 | 1160 |
| 4th WF | 30 | - | 35 | 30 | 40 | 25 | 40 | 200 |
| Total | 335 | 530 | 195 | 315 | 90 | 110 | 185 | 1760 |
Moreover, the constant changes in airfields, caused not only by the transfer of units from other sectors of the fronts, but also by constant retreats and relocations, led to severe disorganization and a serious deterioration in the state of technology. As a result, despite the significant strengthening of the central direction, the average aviation activity did not exceed 500-600 sorties per day, which was completely insufficient to ease the pressure on the battered and exhausted ground forces.
Events in the Balkans
It was at this moment that the situation in the Balkans suddenly escalated. The weakness of the Luftwaffe in Romania was already shown by Allied air raids from Italy on the Ploiesti oil fields on July 9 and 15, against which no more than 50 sorties were made in total (of which half were made by Romanian units), and on July 22 the activity of fighter aircraft was even lower. Thus, the transfer of fighters from the southern direction to Poland and Galicia has already begun to affect.
However, the greatest concern among the Germans at this moment was the political situation. By the end of July, it became clear that it was hardly worth counting on Turkey's neutrality any longer. The expected actions of Turkey required the Luftwaffe to take early action. The Directorate of the II Air Corps, released from duties in France, was sent to Bulgaria on July 31 solely for the purpose of organizing defense and ensuring security, since there were no longer enough large forces for offensive operations.
The front line roughly corresponds to the situation at the time the Soviet offensive began (see also map 21). The 5th Air Fleet (Vostok) continued to control aviation operations in Finland and Northern Norway, and the 1st Air Fleet covered the Baltic. The zone of responsibility of the 6th air fleet completely included the Polish and Belarusian direction up to the Carpathians, and the 4th air fleet occupied the section from Galicia to the Black Sea along the line of the Prut River. In the Balkans, operations in Yugoslavia, Albania and Northern Greece were still the responsibility of a separate Luftwaffe Command "South-East".
Coup in Romania
An alarming lull set in on the southern sector of the front, interrupted on August 23 by a coup in Romania, which coincided with the forcing of the Prut River by Soviet troops. The Germans, taken by surprise, immediately sent additional aviation forces to the new threatened area. 40 Yu-87s were transferred to the Ziliste airfield from Estonia, and 30 FV-190 fighters arrived from the other side of the Carpathians. Attempts were made to airlift reinforcements to Bucharest, but since most of the airfields, including Baneas, were now in Roman hands, and Otopeni, held by the Germans, became unusable after the American bombardment, the results were insignificant and did not affect the situation. An attempt to bring in airborne troops from Yugoslavia had to be canceled on 25 August due to bad weather, a shortage of trained crews, and a lack of sufficient serviceable Me-323s. Thus, the attempt to recapture Bucharest by airborne forces failed, and similar operations against Ploiesti and Focsani had to be cancelled. The last attempt to restore the situation in the capital by bombing Bucharest on the same day did not produce any results.
It was clear that the situation was rapidly spiraling out of control, and any attempt to stop the Soviet offensive with limited resources would be futile. Constanta was occupied on the 29th, Ploiesti on the 30th, and on August 31, Soviet troops entered Bucharest. It only remained to save what could still be saved from complete destruction, and to withdraw all the remaining units of German aviation as soon as possible, mainly to Hungary, destroying airfield facilities, equipment and supplies before retreating. For the units withdrawn to Bulgaria, the respite was short-lived. Already on September 6, Bulgaria declared war on Germany, and the Balkans had to be abandoned less than two weeks after the start of the disaster.
By mid-September, the front line was restored in the eastern and southeastern directions (this time on the borders of Yugoslavia), and the Luftwaffe forces in the Banat region in the northern part of this region were included in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet in early October. However, one can hardly speak of a significant strengthening, and the reorganization did not compensate for the weaknesses of the Luftwaffe in the southern direction, for which reinforcements were still not expected. In addition, it was precisely at this time that in the East, as in the West, a shortage of fuel began to be felt, and the intensity of military operations was sharply reduced. In view of the tense situation with fuel in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet, combat operations were carried out extremely economically and with small forces. The consequences of such a decision can be judged at least from the fact that during the day of September 11, German aviation made only 250 sorties on the entire Eastern Front against 2000-2500 sorties of Soviet aviation. The advantage of Soviet aviation was so overwhelming that the actions of the Luftwaffe in the Balkans, as well as in other sectors of the Eastern Front, could no longer affect the overall development of the situation.
Eastern front from October to December
Meanwhile, the collapse in the northern and central sectors of the front continued. On September 4, an armistice was signed in Finland, on October 9, Soviet troops reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and on October 13, Riga fell. Soon Soviet troops entered East Prussia. Belgrade was taken in the Balkans on the 20th.
By this time, the 1st Air Fleet was blockaded in Courland, and the 6th Air Fleet occupied the entire front from the Baltic coast of East Prussia to Slovakia. The 4th Air Fleet is responsible for operations on the outskirts of Austria through Hungary and Yugoslavia. The 1st Air Corps, which repels the attack on Budapest in Hungary, and the Luftwaffe South-East Command in northern Yugoslavia are subordinate to him.
By this time, the pace of the Soviet offensive in Poland and the Balkans had temporarily slowed down, and the main air battles were taking place in the Baltic states and East Prussia, where the 1st Air Fleet was eventually cut off and blocked in Latvia. However, the lack of fuel had grounded virtually all long-range bomber aircraft, depriving the exhausted German armies of air support, except for the continued minor actions of four squadrons specially assigned to operate against the railway lines. Despite the measures taken, the activity of other types of aviation also had to be reduced, and on average no more than 500 sorties were made per day, of which 125-150 were in the area south of the Carpathians.
The area was in need of significant reorganization. In mid-October, Oberst General Dessloh, who had not spent long in the West as commander of the 3rd Air Fleet after the removal of Sperrle, was again appointed to the post of commander of the 4th Air Fleet. At the same time, all the forces of the Luftwaffe South-East Command were placed at his disposal. These forces were now based in the region of the city of Pec and operated against the Soviet troops advancing along the Danube from Belgrade, but they were weakened during the evacuation from southern Yugoslavia, from Albania and from northern Greece. The rest of the forces, which made up the bulk of the 4th Air Fleet, were now under the command of the 1st Air Corps in the area of the city of Kecskemét and covered the approaches to Budapest. Thanks to the reorganization, any of the sectors could easily be strengthened at the expense of the other, but nevertheless it was clear that all the forces available were far from sufficient even with a normal supply of fuel.
Until the end of the year, relative calm was established, and the front line, now running from the Carpathians to East Prussia, changed little. At the end of October, heavy fighting broke out in the Kecskemét area, and all the forces of the 1st Air Corps were thrown into these battles against the Soviet tank columns advancing on Budapest. This situation continued throughout November, and although the Soviet advance was halted at Lake Balaton, the threat to Budapest from the north and south increased. The calm in the north allowed the 4th Air Fleet to be slightly strengthened, the number of which was increased to 500-600 aircraft (compared to only 200 machines in July), of which 200 were attack aircraft. Coinciding with the arrival of reinforcements, a slight improvement in the supply of fuel allowed for a partial recovery of forces, and by mid-November activity on this sector of the front increased to 400 sorties per day. However, no matter what the Luftwaffe did, they could not stop the Soviet advance on Budapest, and on December 9 the Red Army reached the Danube north of the city.
The six months from June to December 1944 were the time of unparalleled catastrophes of German weapons both in the East and in the West. In the East, the last gains so easily won in 1941 were lost, and there was not the slightest glimmer of hope like von Rundstedt's offensive in the West, although plans were already being prepared for a major counter-offensive in early 1945. On all fronts, the Germans faced the complete superiority of the enemy in people and equipment. The deplorable inability of the Luftwaffe to influence the situation was fully manifested. Numerous Soviet aviation outnumbered by 5-6 to 1 the most powerful forces that the Luftwaffe could put up against them, and it was quite clear that the Luftwaffe again, as in 1943, could not play a big role either in the East or in the West. They again did not have reserves, and the battles in the West and the defense of the Reich from the air attack "ate" the entire annual increase in the number of fighters. Now the situation was hopeless, and although in 1945 the Germans threw all possible forces into the last battle in the East, they were no longer able to prevent the impending catastrophe.
The Great Patriotic War- the war of the USSR with Germany and its allies in - years and with Japan in 1945; an integral part of World War II.
From the point of view of the leadership of Nazi Germany, the war with the USSR was inevitable. The communist regime was regarded by him as alien, and at the same time capable of striking at any moment. Only the rapid defeat of the USSR gave the Germans the opportunity to ensure dominance on the European continent. In addition, he gave them access to the rich industrial and agricultural regions of Eastern Europe.
At the same time, according to some historians, Stalin himself, at the end of 1939, decided on a preemptive attack on Germany in the summer of 1941. On June 15, Soviet troops began strategic deployment and advance to the western border. According to one version, this was done in order to strike at Romania and German-occupied Poland, according to another, to frighten Hitler and force him to abandon plans to attack the USSR.
The first period of the war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942)
The first stage of the German offensive (June 22 - July 10, 1941)
On June 22, the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 was carried out in the USSR, and from the first days of the war, a mass registration of volunteers began. On June 23, in the USSR, an emergency body of the highest military administration, the Headquarters of the High Command, was created to direct military operations, and there was also a maximum centralization of military and political power in the hands of Stalin.
On June 22, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made a radio statement supporting the USSR in its struggle against Hitlerism. On June 23, the US State Department welcomed the efforts of the Soviet people to repel the German invasion, and on June 24, US President Franklin Roosevelt promised to provide the USSR with all possible assistance.
On July 18, the Soviet leadership decided to organize a partisan movement in the occupied and frontline regions, which gained momentum in the second half of the year.
In the summer-autumn of 1941, about 10 million people were evacuated to the east. and more than 1350 large enterprises. The militarization of the economy began to be carried out with harsh and energetic measures; all the material resources of the country were mobilized for military needs.
The main reason for the defeats of the Red Army, despite its quantitative and often qualitative (T-34 and KV tanks) technical superiority, was the poor training of privates and officers, the low level of operation of military equipment and the lack of experience among the troops in conducting major military operations in modern warfare. . The repressions against the high command in 1937-1940 also played a significant role.
The second stage of the German offensive (July 10 - September 30, 1941)
On July 10, Finnish troops launched an offensive and on September 1, the 23rd Soviet Army on the Karelian Isthmus withdrew to the line of the old state border, occupied before the Finnish war of 1939–1940. By October 10, the front had stabilized along the line Kestenga - Ukhta - Rugozero - Medvezhyegorsk - Lake Onega. - river Svir. The enemy was unable to cut the communication lines of European Russia with the northern ports.
On July 10, the Army Group "North" launched an offensive in the Leningrad and Tallinn directions. August 15 fell Novgorod, August 21 - Gatchina. On August 30, the Germans reached the Neva, cutting off the railway communication with the city, and on September 8 they took Shlisselburg and closed the blockade ring around Leningrad. Only the tough measures of the new commander of the Leningrad Front, G.K. Zhukov, made it possible to stop the enemy by September 26.
On July 16, the Romanian 4th Army took Kishinev; the defense of Odessa lasted about two months. Soviet troops left the city only in the first half of October. In early September, Guderian crossed the Desna and on September 7 captured Konotop ("Konotop breakthrough"). Five Soviet armies were surrounded; the number of prisoners was 665 thousand. Left-bank Ukraine was in the hands of the Germans; the way to the Donbass was open; Soviet troops in the Crimea were cut off from the main forces.
The defeats on the fronts prompted the Headquarters to issue order No. 270 on August 16, qualifying all soldiers and officers who surrendered as traitors and deserters; their families were deprived of state support and were subject to exile.
The third stage of the German offensive (September 30 - December 5, 1941)
On September 30, Army Group Center launched an operation to capture Moscow (Typhoon). On October 3, Guderian's tanks broke into Orel and took to the road to Moscow. On October 6-8, all three armies of the Bryansk Front were surrounded south of Bryansk, and the main forces of the Reserve (19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies) - west of Vyazma; the Germans captured 664,000 prisoners and more than 1,200 tanks. But the advance of the 2nd tank group of the Wehrmacht to Tula was thwarted by the stubborn resistance of the brigade of M.E. Katukov near Mtsensk; The 4th Panzer Group occupied Yukhnov and rushed towards Maloyaroslavets, but was held up near Medyn by Podolsk cadets (October 6–10); the autumn thaw also slowed down the pace of the German offensive.
On October 10, the Germans attacked the right wing of the Reserve Front (renamed the Western Front); On October 12, the 9th Army captured Staritsa, and on October 14 - Rzhev. On October 19, a state of siege was declared in Moscow. On October 29, Guderian tried to take Tula, but was repulsed with heavy losses for himself. In early November, the new commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, with an incredible effort of all forces and constant counterattacks, managed, despite huge losses in manpower and equipment, to stop the Germans in other directions.
On September 27, the Germans broke through the defense line of the Southern Front. Most of the Donbass was in the hands of the Germans. During the successful counter-offensive of the troops of the Southern Front, Rostov was liberated on November 29, and the Germans were driven back to the Mius River.
In the second half of October, the 11th German Army broke into the Crimea and by mid-November captured almost the entire peninsula. Soviet troops managed to hold only Sevastopol.
Counteroffensive of the Red Army near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942)
On December 5-6, the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts switched to offensive operations in the northwestern and southwestern directions. The successful advance of the Soviet troops forced Hitler on December 8 to issue a directive on the transition to defense along the entire front line. On December 18, the troops of the Western Front launched an offensive in the central direction. As a result, by the beginning of the year, the Germans were pushed back 100–250 km to the west. There was a threat of coverage of the army group "Center" from the north and south. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army.
The success of the operation near Moscow prompted the Stavka to decide on the transition to a general offensive along the entire front from Lake Ladoga to the Crimea. The offensive operations of the Soviet troops in December 1941 - April 1942 led to a significant change in the military-strategic situation on the Soviet-German front: the Germans were driven back from Moscow, Moscow, part of the Kalinin, Oryol and Smolensk regions were liberated. There was also a psychological turning point among the soldiers and the civilian population: faith in victory strengthened, the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht collapsed. The collapse of the lightning war plan gave rise to doubts about the successful outcome of the war, both among the German military-political leadership and among ordinary Germans.
Luban operation (January 13 - June 25)
The Lyuban operation was aimed at breaking through the blockade of Leningrad. On January 13, the forces of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts launched an offensive in several directions, planning to link up at Lyuban and encircle the enemy's Chudov grouping. On March 19, the Germans launched a counterattack, cutting off the 2nd shock army from the rest of the forces of the Volkhov Front. Soviet troops repeatedly tried to release it and resume the offensive. On May 21, the Headquarters decided to withdraw it, but on June 6 the Germans completely closed the encirclement. On June 20, soldiers and officers were ordered to leave the encirclement on their own, but only a few managed to do this (according to various estimates, from 6 to 16 thousand people); commander A.A. Vlasov surrendered.
Military operations in May-November 1942
Having defeated the Crimean Front (almost 200 thousand people were captured), the Germans occupied Kerch on May 16, and Sevastopol in early July. On May 12, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the Southern Front launched an offensive against Kharkov. For several days it developed successfully, but on May 19 the Germans defeated the 9th Army, throwing it behind the Seversky Donets, went to the rear of the advancing Soviet troops and on May 23 took them into pincers; the number of prisoners reached 240 thousand. On June 28-30, the German offensive began against the left wing of the Bryansk and the right wing of the Southwestern Front. On July 8, the Germans captured Voronezh and reached the Middle Don. By July 22, the 1st and 4th tank armies had reached the Southern Don. On July 24, Rostov-on-Don was taken.
In the conditions of a military catastrophe in the south, on July 28, Stalin issued order No. 227 “Not a step back”, which provided for severe punishments for retreating without instructions from above, detachments to deal with unauthorized leaving positions, penal units for operations on the most dangerous sectors of the front. On the basis of this order, during the war years, about 1 million military personnel were convicted, of which 160 thousand were shot, and 400 thousand were sent to penal companies.
On July 25, the Germans crossed the Don and rushed south. In mid-August, the Germans established control over almost all the passes in the central part of the Main Caucasian Range. In the Grozny direction, the Germans occupied Nalchik on October 29, they failed to take Ordzhonikidze and Grozny, and in mid-November their further advance was stopped.
On August 16, German troops launched an offensive against Stalingrad. On September 13, fighting began in Stalingrad itself. In the second half of October - the first half of November, the Germans captured a significant part of the city, but could not break the resistance of the defenders.
By mid-November, the Germans established control over the Right Bank of the Don and most of the North Caucasus, but did not achieve their strategic goals - to break into the Volga region and Transcaucasia. This was prevented by the counterattacks of the Red Army in other directions (the Rzhev meat grinder, the tank battle between Zubtsov and Karmanovo, etc.), which, although unsuccessful, nevertheless did not allow the Wehrmacht command to transfer reserves to the south.
The second period of the war (November 19, 1942 - December 31, 1943): a radical change
Victory at Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943)
On November 19, units of the Southwestern Front broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army and on November 21 took five Romanian divisions in pincers (Operation Saturn). On November 23, units of the two fronts joined at the Soviet and surrounded the Stalingrad enemy grouping.
On December 16, the troops of the Voronezh and South-Western Fronts launched Operation Little Saturn on the Middle Don, defeated the 8th Italian Army, and on January 26, the 6th Army was cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern grouping led by F. Paulus capitulated, on February 2 - the northern one; 91 thousand people were captured. The Battle of Stalingrad, despite the heavy losses of the Soviet troops, was the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht suffered a major defeat and lost the strategic initiative. Japan and Turkey abandoned their intention to enter the war on the side of Germany.
Economic recovery and transition to the offensive in the central direction
By this time, a turning point had also occurred in the sphere of the Soviet military economy. Already in the winter of 1941/1942 it was possible to stop the decline in engineering. In March, ferrous metallurgy began to rise, and in the second half of 1942, energy and the fuel industry began to rise. By the beginning there was a clear economic superiority of the USSR over Germany.
In November 1942 - January 1943, the Red Army launched an offensive in the central direction.
Operation "Mars" (Rzhev-Sychevskaya) was carried out in order to eliminate the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead. The formations of the Western Front made their way through the Rzhev-Sychevka railway and raided the enemy rear, however, significant losses and a lack of tanks, guns and ammunition forced them to stop, but this operation did not allow the Germans to transfer part of their forces from the central direction to Stalingrad.
Liberation of the North Caucasus (January 1 - February 12, 1943)
On January 1–3, an operation began to liberate the North Caucasus and the Don bend. On January 3, Mozdok was liberated, on January 10-11 - Kislovodsk, Mineralnye Vody, Essentuki and Pyatigorsk, on January 21 - Stavropol. On January 24, the Germans surrendered Armavir, on January 30 - Tikhoretsk. On February 4, the Black Sea Fleet landed troops in the Myskhako area south of Novorossiysk. On February 12, Krasnodar was taken. However, the lack of forces prevented the Soviet troops from encircling the enemy's North Caucasian grouping.
Breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad (January 12–30, 1943)
Fearing the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center on the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, the German command began on March 1 their systematic withdrawal. On March 2, units of the Kalinin and Western fronts began pursuing the enemy. On March 3, Rzhev was liberated, on March 6 - Gzhatsk, on March 12 - Vyazma.
The January-March 1943 campaign, despite a series of setbacks, led to the liberation of a huge territory (the North Caucasus, the lower reaches of the Don, the Voroshilovgrad, Voronezh, Kursk regions, and part of the Belgorod, Smolensk, and Kalinin regions). The blockade of Leningrad was broken, the Demyansky and Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledges were liquidated. Control over the Volga and Don was restored. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (about 1.2 million people). The depletion of human resources forced the Nazi leadership to conduct a total mobilization of older (over 46 years old) and younger ages (16-17 years old).
Since the winter of 1942/1943, the partisan movement in the German rear has become an important military factor. The partisans caused serious damage to the German army, destroying manpower, blowing up warehouses and trains, disrupting the communications system. The largest operations were the raids of the detachment of M.I. Naumov in Kursk, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovograd, Odessa, Vinnitsa, Kyiv and Zhytomyr (February-March 1943) and S.A. Kovpak in Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kyiv regions (February-May 1943).
Defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge (July 5–23, 1943)
The Wehrmacht command developed Operation Citadel to encircle a strong group of the Red Army on the Kursk ledge through counter tank strikes from the north and south; if successful, it was planned to carry out Operation Panther to defeat the Southwestern Front. However, Soviet intelligence unraveled the plans of the Germans, and in April-June a powerful defensive system of eight lines was created on the Kursk ledge.
On July 5, the German 9th Army launched an attack on Kursk from the north, and the 4th Panzer Army from the south. On the northern flank, already on July 10, the Germans went on the defensive. On the southern wing, Wehrmacht tank columns reached Prokhorovka on July 12, but were stopped, and by July 23, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts pushed them back to their original lines. Operation Citadel failed.
The general offensive of the Red Army in the second half of 1943 (July 12 - December 24, 1943). Liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine
On July 12, units of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the German defenses at Zhilkovo and Novosil, by August 18, Soviet troops cleared the Orlovsky ledge from the enemy.
By September 22, units of the Southwestern Front pushed the Germans back beyond the Dnieper and reached the approaches to Dnepropetrovsk (now the Dnieper) and Zaporozhye; formations of the Southern Front occupied Taganrog, on September 8, Stalino (now Donetsk), on September 10 - Mariupol; the result of the operation was the liberation of Donbass.
On August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts broke through the defenses of Army Group South in several places and captured Belgorod on August 5. On August 23 Kharkov was taken.
On September 25, by means of flank attacks from the south and north, the troops of the Western Front captured Smolensk and by the beginning of October entered the territory of Belarus.
On August 26, the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts launched the Chernigov-Poltava operation. The troops of the Central Front broke through the enemy defenses south of Sevsk and occupied the city on August 27; On September 13, they reached the Dnieper at the Loev–Kyiv section. Parts of the Voronezh Front reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv-Cherkassy section. The formations of the Steppe Front approached the Dnieper in the Cherkasy-Verkhnedneprovsk section. As a result, the Germans lost almost all of Left-Bank Ukraine. At the end of September, Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper in several places and captured 23 bridgeheads on its right bank.
On September 1, the troops of the Bryansk Front overcame the Wehrmacht's defense line "Hagen" and occupied Bryansk, by October 3, the Red Army reached the line of the Sozh River in Eastern Belarus.
On September 9, the North Caucasian Front, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, launched an offensive on the Taman Peninsula. Having broken through the Blue Line, Soviet troops took Novorossiysk on September 16, and by October 9 they completely cleared the peninsula of the Germans.
On October 10, the Southwestern Front launched an operation to eliminate the Zaporozhye bridgehead and on October 14 captured Zaporozhye.
On October 11, the Voronezh (since October 20 - 1st Ukrainian) Front began the Kyiv operation. After two unsuccessful attempts to take the capital of Ukraine with an attack from the south (from the Bukrinsky bridgehead), it was decided to launch the main attack from the north (from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead). On November 1, in order to divert the attention of the enemy, the 27th and 40th armies moved to Kyiv from the Bukrinsky bridgehead, and on November 3rd, the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front suddenly attacked him from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead and broke through the German defenses. On November 6, Kyiv was liberated.
On November 13, the Germans, having pulled up their reserves, launched a counteroffensive against the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Zhytomyr direction in order to recapture Kyiv and restore the defense along the Dnieper. But the Red Army held the vast strategic Kyiv bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper.
During the period of hostilities from June 1 to December 31, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses (1 million 413 thousand people), which it was no longer able to fully compensate for. A significant part of the territory of the USSR occupied in 1941–1942 was liberated. The plans of the German command to gain a foothold on the Dnieper lines failed. Conditions were created for the expulsion of the Germans from the Right-Bank Ukraine.
Third period of the war (December 24, 1943 - May 11, 1945): defeat of Germany
After a series of failures throughout 1943, the German command abandoned attempts to seize the strategic initiative and switched to a tough defense. The main task of the Wehrmacht in the north was to prevent the breakthrough of the Red Army into the Baltic states and East Prussia, in the center to the border with Poland, and in the south to the Dniester and the Carpathians. The Soviet military leadership set the goal of the winter-spring campaign to defeat the German troops on the extreme flanks - in the Right-Bank Ukraine and near Leningrad.
Liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea
On December 24, 1943, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front launched an offensive in the western and southwestern directions (Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation). Only at the cost of great effort and significant losses did the Germans manage to stop the Soviet troops on the Sarny-Polonnaya-Kazatin-Zhashkov line. On January 5–6, units of the 2nd Ukrainian Front struck in the Kirovograd direction and captured Kirovograd on January 8, but on January 10 they were forced to stop the offensive. The Germans did not allow the connection of the troops of both fronts and were able to keep the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, which posed a threat to Kyiv from the south.
On January 24, the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts launched a joint operation to defeat the enemy's Korsun-Shevchensk grouping. On January 28, the 6th and 5th Guards Tank Armies joined at Zvenigorodka and closed the encirclement. Kanev was taken on January 30, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky on February 14. On February 17, the liquidation of the "cauldron" was completed; more than 18 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers were taken prisoner.
On January 27, units of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck from the Sarn region in the Lutsk-Rivne direction. On January 30, the offensive of the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts began on the Nikopol bridgehead. Having overcome the fierce resistance of the enemy, on February 8 they captured Nikopol, on February 22 - Krivoy Rog, and by February 29 they reached the river. Ingulets.
As a result of the winter campaign of 1943/1944, the Germans were finally driven back from the Dnieper. In an effort to make a strategic breakthrough to the borders of Romania and prevent the Wehrmacht from gaining a foothold on the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the Headquarters developed a plan to encircle and defeat Army Group South in Right-Bank Ukraine through a coordinated strike of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts .
The final chord of the spring operation in the south was the expulsion of the Germans from the Crimea. On May 7–9, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet, stormed Sevastopol, and by May 12 they defeated the remnants of the 17th Army that had fled to Chersonese.
Leningrad-Novgorod operation of the Red Army (January 14 - March 1, 1944)
On January 14, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts launched an offensive south of Leningrad and near Novgorod. Having inflicted a defeat on the German 18th Army and pushed it back to Luga, they liberated Novgorod on January 20. In early February, units of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts reached the approaches to Narva, Gdov and Luga; On February 4 they took Gdov, on February 12 - Luga. The threat of encirclement forced the 18th Army to hastily retreat to the southwest. On February 17, the 2nd Baltic Front carried out a series of attacks against the 16th German Army on the Lovat River. In early March, the Red Army reached the defensive line "Panther" (Narva - Lake Peipsi - Pskov - Ostrov); most of the Leningrad and Kalinin regions were liberated.
Military operations in the central direction in December 1943 - April 1944
As the tasks of the winter offensive of the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts, the Stavka set the troops to reach the Polotsk-Lepel-Mogilev-Ptich line and liberate Eastern Belarus.
In December 1943 - February 1944, the 1st PribF made three attempts to capture Vitebsk, which did not lead to the capture of the city, but exhausted the enemy's forces to the limit. The offensive actions of the Polar Front in the Orsha direction on February 22-25 and March 5-9, 1944 were not successful either.
On the Mozyr direction, the Belorussian Front (BelF) on January 8 dealt a strong blow to the flanks of the 2nd German Army, but thanks to a hasty retreat, it managed to avoid encirclement. The lack of forces prevented the Soviet troops from encircling and destroying the Bobruisk enemy grouping, and on February 26 the offensive was stopped. Formed on February 17 at the junction of the 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian (since February 24, the 1st Belorussian) fronts, the 2nd Belorussian Front began the Polessky operation on March 15 with the aim of capturing Kovel and breaking through to Brest. Soviet troops surrounded Kovel, but on March 23 the Germans launched a counterattack and on April 4 released the Kovel group.
Thus, in the central direction during the winter-spring campaign of 1944, the Red Army was unable to achieve its goals; On April 15, she went on the defensive.
Offensive in Karelia (June 10 - August 9, 1944). Finland's exit from the war
After the loss of most of the occupied territory of the USSR, the main task of the Wehrmacht was to prevent the Red Army from entering Europe and not to lose its allies. That is why the Soviet military-political leadership, having failed in their attempts to reach a peace agreement with Finland in February-April 1944, decided to start the summer campaign of the year with a strike in the north.
On June 10, 1944, LenF troops, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as a result, control was restored over the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the strategically important Kirov Railway connecting Murmansk with European Russia. By early August, Soviet troops had liberated all of the occupied territory east of Ladoga; in the Kuolisma area, they reached the Finnish border. Having suffered a defeat, Finland on August 25 entered into negotiations with the USSR. On September 4, she broke off relations with Berlin and ceased hostilities, on September 15 she declared war on Germany, and on September 19 she concluded a truce with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The length of the Soviet-German front was reduced by a third. This allowed the Red Army to free up significant forces for operations in other directions.
Liberation of Belarus (June 23 - early August 1944)
Successes in Karelia prompted the Headquarters to conduct a large-scale operation to defeat the enemy in the central direction with the forces of three Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts (Operation Bagration), which became the main event of the summer-autumn campaign of 1944.
The general offensive of the Soviet troops began on June 23–24. The coordinated strike of the 1st PribF and the right wing of the 3rd BF ended on June 26–27 with the liberation of Vitebsk and the encirclement of five German divisions. On June 26, units of the 1st BF took Zhlobin, on June 27–29 they surrounded and destroyed the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy, and on June 29 they liberated Bobruisk. As a result of the rapid offensive of the three Belorussian fronts, an attempt by the German command to organize a line of defense along the Berezina was thwarted; On July 3, the troops of the 1st and 3rd BF broke into Minsk and took the 4th German army in pincers south of Borisov (liquidated by July 11).
The German front began to crumble. Formations of the 1st PribF occupied Polotsk on July 4 and, moving downstream of the Western Dvina, entered the territory of Latvia and Lithuania, reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga, cutting off Army Group North stationed in the Baltic states from the rest of the Wehrmacht forces. Parts of the right wing of the 3rd BF, having taken Lepel on June 28, broke through into the valley of the river in early July. Viliya (Nyaris), on August 17 they reached the border of East Prussia.
The troops of the left wing of the 3rd BF, having made a swift throw from Minsk, took Lida on July 3, on July 16, together with the 2nd BF - Grodno, and at the end of July approached the northeastern ledge of the Polish border. The 2nd BF, advancing to the southwest, captured Bialystok on July 27 and drove the Germans across the Narew River. Parts of the right wing of the 1st BF, having liberated Baranovichi on July 8, and Pinsk on July 14, at the end of July they reached the Western Bug and reached the central section of the Soviet-Polish border; On July 28 Brest was taken.
As a result of Operation Bagration, Belarus, most of Lithuania and part of Latvia were liberated. The possibility of an offensive in East Prussia and Poland opened up.
Liberation of Western Ukraine and offensive in Eastern Poland (July 13 - August 29, 1944)
Trying to stop the advance of Soviet troops in Belarus, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer formations there from the rest of the sectors of the Soviet-German front. This facilitated the operations of the Red Army in other areas. On July 13–14, the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front began in Western Ukraine. Already on July 17, they crossed the state border of the USSR and entered South-Eastern Poland.
On July 18, the left wing of the 1st BF launched an offensive near Kovel. At the end of July, they approached Prague (the right-bank suburb of Warsaw), which they managed to take only on September 14th. In early August, the resistance of the Germans intensified sharply, and the advance of the Red Army was stopped. Because of this, the Soviet command was unable to provide the necessary assistance to the uprising that broke out on August 1 in the Polish capital under the leadership of the Home Army, and by the beginning of October it was brutally suppressed by the Wehrmacht.
Offensive in the Eastern Carpathians (September 8 - October 28, 1944)
After the occupation of Estonia in the summer of 1941, the Tallinn Metropolitan. Alexander (Paulus) announced the separation of the Estonian parishes from the Russian Orthodox Church (the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church was established on the initiative of Alexander (Paulus) in 1923, in 1941 the bishop repented of the sin of schism). In October 1941, at the insistence of the German General Commissar of Belarus, the Belarusian Church was established. However, Panteleimon (Rozhnovsky), who headed it in the rank of Metropolitan of Minsk and Belarus, retained canonical communion with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky). After Metropolitan Panteleimon was forcibly retired in June 1942, Archbishop Filofei (Narko), who also refused to arbitrarily proclaim a national autocephalous Church, became his successor.
Given the patriotic position of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky), the German authorities initially hindered the activities of those priests and parishes who claimed to belong to the Moscow Patriarchate. Over time, the German authorities became more tolerant of the communities of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to the invaders, these communities only verbally declared their loyalty to the Moscow center, but in reality they were ready to assist the German army in the destruction of the atheistic Soviet state.
In the occupied territory, thousands of churches, churches, prayer houses of various Protestant denominations (primarily Lutherans and Pentecostals) have resumed their activities. This process was especially active on the territory of the Baltic States, in the Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev regions of Belarus, in the Dnepropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporozhye, Kyiv, Voroshilovgrad, Poltava regions of Ukraine, in the Rostov, Smolensk regions of the RSFSR.
The religious factor was taken into account when planning domestic policy in areas where Islam was traditionally spread, primarily in the Crimea and the Caucasus. German propaganda declared respect for the values of Islam, presented the occupation as the liberation of peoples from the "Bolshevik godless yoke", guaranteed the creation of conditions for the revival of Islam. The invaders willingly went to the opening of mosques in almost every settlement of the "Muslim regions", provided the Muslim clergy with the opportunity to contact the believers through the radio and the press. Throughout the occupied territory where Muslims lived, the positions of mullahs and senior mullahs were restored, whose rights and privileges were equated with the heads of administrations of cities and settlements.
When forming special units from among the prisoners of war of the Red Army, much attention was paid to confessional affiliation: if representatives of the peoples who traditionally professed Christianity were mainly sent to the "army of General Vlasov", then to such formations as the "Turkestan Legion", "Idel-Ural", they sent representatives of the "Islamic" peoples.
The "liberalism" of the German authorities did not extend to all religions. Many communities were on the verge of destruction, for example, in Dvinsk alone, almost all of the 35 synagogues that operated before the war were destroyed, up to 14 thousand Jews were shot. Most of the Evangelical Christian Baptist communities that found themselves in the occupied territory were also destroyed or dispersed by the authorities.
Forced to leave the occupied territories under the onslaught of Soviet troops, the Nazi invaders took out liturgical objects, icons, paintings, books, items made of precious metals from prayer buildings.
According to the far from complete data of the Extraordinary State Commission for Establishing and Investigating the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders, 1670 Orthodox churches, 69 chapels, 237 churches, 532 synagogues, 4 mosques and 254 other prayer buildings were completely destroyed, looted or desecrated in the occupied territory. Among those destroyed or desecrated by the Nazis were priceless monuments of history, culture and architecture, incl. relating to the XI-XVII centuries, in Novgorod, Chernigov, Smolensk, Polotsk, Kyiv, Pskov. Many prayer buildings were converted by the invaders into prisons, barracks, stables, and garages.
The position and patriotic activities of the Russian Orthodox Church during the war
On June 22, 1941, the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Met. Sergius (Stragorodsky) compiled a "Message to the Shepherds and Flocks of the Orthodox Church of Christ", in which he revealed the anti-Christian essence of fascism and called on the faithful to defend themselves. In their letters to the Patriarchate, believers reported that voluntary collections of donations for the needs of the front and the defense of the country had begun everywhere.
After the death of Patriarch Sergius, according to his will, Met. Alexy (Simansky), unanimously elected at the last meeting of the Local Council on January 31-February 2, 1945, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. The Council was attended by Patriarchs Christopher II of Alexandria, Alexander III of Antioch and Kallistratus (Tsintsadze) of Georgia, representatives of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Serbia and Romania.
In 1945, the so-called Estonian schism was overcome, and Orthodox parishes and the clergy of Estonia were accepted into communion with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Patriotic activities of communities of other confessions and religions
Immediately after the start of the war, the leaders of almost all religious associations of the USSR supported the liberation struggle of the peoples of the country against the Nazi aggressor. Addressing the faithful with patriotic messages, they called for worthy fulfillment of their religious and civic duty to defend the Fatherland, to provide all possible material assistance to the needs of the front and rear. The leaders of most religious associations in the USSR condemned those representatives of the clergy who consciously went over to the side of the enemy and helped to impose a "new order" on the occupied territory.
The head of the Russian Old Believers of the Belokrinitsky hierarchy, Archbishop. Irinarkh (Parfyonov), in his Christmas message of 1942, called on the Old Believers, a considerable number of whom fought on the fronts, to serve valiantly in the Red Army and to resist the enemy in the occupied territory in the ranks of the partisans. In May 1942, the leaders of the Unions of Baptists and Evangelical Christians addressed the believers with a letter of appeal; the appeal spoke of the danger of fascism "for the cause of the Gospel" and called for "brothers and sisters in Christ" to fulfill "their duty to God and to the Motherland", being "the best soldiers at the front and the best workers in the rear." Baptist communities were engaged in tailoring, collecting clothes and other things for the soldiers and families of the dead, helped in the care of the wounded and sick in hospitals, and took care of orphans in orphanages. Funds raised in the Baptist congregations were used to build a Merciful Samaritan ambulance to transport seriously wounded soldiers to the rear. The leader of Renovationism, A. I. Vvedensky, repeatedly made patriotic appeals.
With regard to a number of other religious associations, the policy of the state during the war years remained invariably tough. First of all, this concerned “anti-state, anti-Soviet and savage sects”, which included the Dukhobors.
- http://www.pravenc.ru/text/150063.html
Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts - 02.03-31.03.1943
In the spring of 1943, the position of the German troops on the southern wing of the front deteriorated significantly. In connection with the beginning of the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the German command ordered the transfer of troops from the Rzhev region to the area of the Soviet offensive.
On January 26, 1943, the commander of Army Group Center, General von Kluge, recommended that Hitler leave the Rzhevsky ledge to level the front line and prevent a possible encirclement of the bloodless 9th and 4th armies. The withdrawal operation was named "Buffalo". Therefore, the Western and Kalinin fronts were tasked with eliminating the Rzhev-Vyazma salient and developing the offensive in the general direction of Smolensk.
Operation Buffel. Front line from 1 to 30 March 1943
Operation progress
On March 2, the troops of the fronts, following the order, launched an offensive. The Germans widely used various kinds of barriers, and, retreating, left barriers in advance prepared defensive positions. Along with a strong spring thaw, this sharply reduced the pace of advancement of the Red Army, fettered the maneuvers of mobile detachments. As a result, the Soviet troops were unable to cut off the enemy's paths. On March 15-31, the Germans reached a pre-prepared and heavily fortified line northeast of Dukhovshchina, Yartsevo, Spas-Demensk. Here the enemy offered stubborn resistance and the offensive stopped.
Outcome
The only major strategic result of the offensive of the Soviet troops was the elimination of the immediate danger to Moscow. The Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge and the bridgehead on it were eliminated. The cities of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Sychevka, Bely, Vyazma, Olenino were liberated.
The results of the Rzhev battle
The number of Soviet troops at the beginning of operations
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To date, the official point of view on losses is set out in the book "Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study". Here are the figures for the total losses (irretrievable and sanitary) of the fronts in offensive operations:
Rzhev-Vyazemskaya - 01/08? 04/20/1942 - 776889 people
The first Rzhev-Sychevskaya (Gzhatskaya) offensive operation - 07/30? 08/23/1942 - 193683 people
The second Rzhev-Sychevskaya offensive operation ("Mars") - 11/25? 12/20/1942 - 215674 people
Rzhev-Vyazemskaya offensive operation - 02.03? 03.31.1943 - 138,577 people
In just 8 months of fighting (out of 15) - 1324823 people. The figure is not final, because does not take into account the missing, captured. In addition, it does not take into account losses for 7 months when there were no offensive actions. These losses are comparable to the losses of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad.
Vostochny Val or the Panther-Wotan line is a defensive line of German troops, partially erected by the Wehrmacht in the fall of 1943 on the Eastern Front. The shaft passed along the line: the Narva River - Pskov - Vitebsk - Orsha - the Sozh River - the middle course of the Dnieper River (the basis of the Eastern Wall) - the Molochnaya River. The dual name was adopted to avoid confusion with the German border fortifications of 1939.
Map of the Eastern Front in July-December 1943. The Panther-Wotan line is indicated by a red zigzag.
The decision to build the Eastern Wall was made by order of Hitler on 08/11/1943. The shaft was divided into two frontiers - "Panther" (northern) and "Wotan" (southern). The defensive line of the German troops "Panther" was created in the zone of the Army Group "North" and the Army Group "Center". The Wotan line was built on the southern front in the zone of action of Army Group South and Army Group A.
In the north, the fortifications were erected approximately from Vitebsk and included two lines of defense: the 1st ran along the shores of Lake Pskov, the Velikaya, Pskov and Cherekha rivers, the 2nd ran along the western bank of the Velikaya River and the Narova River to the Baltic Sea near Narva. The Wotan line ran from the Sea of Azov, along the right bank of the Molochnaya River to the Dnieper floodplains. From Smolensk to the Black Sea, the line ran for the most part along the right bank of the Dnieper or its large tributaries. The Wotan line, connecting with the Panther line, created a continuous defensive line from the Azov to the Baltic Sea.
The Panther line extended over 550 km from the Baltic Sea. Only in the sector of the army group "North" there were about 6 thousand fortifications, incl. 800 reinforced concrete. The rest of the fortifications were small log dugouts, although some of them had towers. In addition, 180 km of barbed wire barriers were installed, about 30 kilometers of anti-tank ditches were dug, and barriers were erected in tank-prone areas.
Construction work on the Panther line began in September 1943. The detachment of builders numbered 50 thousand people, despite the fact that, according to the calculations of engineers, at least 70 thousand workers were needed. According to some estimates, about 400 thousand people were required to carry out all the work on the Eastern Wall. However, according to experts, it is unlikely that the total number of workers available to all four army groups exceeded 200,000.
In the sector of Army Group Center in August 1943, key defensive points were created on sections of roads and railways that ran in the east-west direction. Defensive fortifications were also built on the lintel between the Dnieper and the Dvina. At the junction of the fronts of Army Group North and Army Group South, by November 1, 1943, the main points had anti-tank and anti-personnel defensive structures. These structures included barbed wire fences, trenches, anti-tank ditches, and other types of anti-tank fortifications.
According to the requirements of the Wehrmacht, the Panther line was to consist mainly of field positions with strongholds in the main deployment areas, which were to include separate concrete bunkers made of reinforced concrete. The priorities were distributed as follows:
1) anti-tank ditch and natural obstacles in the main direction of resistance;
2) winter shelters on the first line;
3) a continuous line of battle trenches;
4) anti-tank positions;
5) observation positions;
6) wire fences;
7) open firing points of heavy infantry weapons;
8) creation and clearing of the firing zone;
9) artillery positions;
10) communication trenches and communication passages.
The demolition of houses, the clearing of sectors of fire and the creation of a zone of devastation to a depth of 20 kilometers in front of the main direction of resistance were envisaged. The main line was also to be located 10 kilometers in front of the vital airfields of Gomel and Vitebsk. The work had to continue until the winter of 1943/44, since the positions had to be marked out before the snow fell. In addition, it was necessary to organize the quartering of troops.
It was also planned to build roads and bridges on the Panther line. The construction of the second line of defense, which ran along the Dnieper and was named the "Bear" line, was planned for August 1943. The line was to stretch along the Dnieper bank from the right flank of the army group to the Mogilev fortified area. In this area, the Dnieper is quite wide, and the high western bank of the river near Orsha rises above the eastern one.
Behind the "Panther" line, another defensive line was to be built under the name "Tiger" line - in the area of the so-called earthen bridge and around Vitebsk. The creation of a bridgehead in Bobruisk was planned for August, the importance of which increased even more in 1944, after most of the southern sections of the Panther line were lost in 1943.
However, the builders of the line had neither material nor human resources. And most importantly, they were catastrophically limited in time. In this regard, the southern part of the line was completed by no more than 30%. Since in the area of the northern part of the line, active hostilities were not carried out by the Red Army at that time, the readiness of construction work reached 60%.
The line "Wotan" was much weaker fortified than the "Panther", especially in places where it departed from the Dnieper. The most powerful fortifications were in the area of Zaporozhye and Melitopol. They consisted of anti-tank ditches, barbed wire in 4-6 rows, deep trenches and communication passages, dugouts, minefields, pillboxes and bunkers, reinforced concrete shelters and command posts. For every kilometer of defense, there were an average of 8 armored caps and 12 bunkers.
Despite the loud name, Vostochny Val was formidable only in German propaganda. In fact, all the structures belonged to the field fortification and were the second defensive line of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, after the Hagen line. It was not for nothing that the commander of Army Group North suppressed such propaganda in his troops, so as not to inspire false hope in them.
By the end of September, Manstein's Army Group "South" and Army Group "A", located to the south, were pushed back to the Eastern Wall. The 6th Army, which was driven out of the Wotan line and thrown back beyond the Dnieper, was included in Army Group A. The Eastern Wall caused disappointment among the German soldiers, since the Todt Organization completed only a small part of the planned work in the short time allotted to it. In addition, a large number of experienced OT workers who needed construction were sent to destroy buildings and material resources in areas subject to evacuation, since from 1943 Hitler began to pursue a policy of "scorched earth". Nevertheless, the Dnieper River, with its steep, steep western bank and low eastern bank occupied by Soviet troops, formed a serious natural obstacle in many areas. In some places, the width of the river was more than 3 kilometers.
The Red Army immediately tried to break through the line in order to prevent the German troops from strengthening for a long-term defense, launching a strategic offensive operation on a 300-kilometer front along the Dnieper. The line was particularly weak in the area north of the Black Sea, where it branched off from the Dnieper to cover the approaches to the Crimea. The Soviet Southern Front broke through the barely fortified line with relative ease, thereby cutting off the German 17th Army on the Crimean Peninsula from its route of withdrawal to the mainland. This was followed by the gradual establishment of several Soviet footholds across the Dnieper. Despite the fact that the crossing of the Dnieper was extremely difficult for the Red Army, the German troops were unable to throw off the Soviet troops from any bridgehead, which grew as troops were deployed to them. By the beginning of November 1943, Kyiv was liberated by the Red Army, which broke the line along the Dnieper, forcing the Wehrmacht to retreat to the Polish border in 1939.
The only part of the line that remained at the disposal of the Wehrmacht after 1943 was the northernmost part, the Panther line between Lake Peipus and the Baltic Sea at Narva. This small part of the line was attacked during the Battle of Narva, and the Baltic states and the Gulf of Finland remained in German hands well into 1944.
Thus, weak defensive positions along the Dnieper were able to slow down, but not stop the advance of the Soviet troops. The river was a significant obstacle, but the length of the defensive line made it difficult to defend. The inability of the Germans to eliminate the Soviet bridgeheads meant that this line would inevitably be broken. The much better fortified northern part of the defensive line turned out to be a more difficult task for the Red Army to break through it and was able to hold out for almost a year longer in comparison with its southern part. At the same time, the entire defensive line was more of a binding of field fortifications to favorable landscape conditions, rather than a fortification. Therefore, she was able to partially fulfill only the tactical tasks of the Wehrmacht, and absolutely did not influence the strategic plans - to strengthen herself on the occupied line for a long time, making it the eastern border of the Third Reich.
Vladimir Viktorovich Volk - expert of the Center for Scientific Political Thought and Ideology
Photo: One of the countless battles on the Mius Front. July 1943 near the village of Stepanovka
Anyone who has ever been to Taganrog, Matveev-Kurgan, Kuibyshevo, Rostov region, Snezhnoye and Torez, Donetsk, Krasny Luch and Vakhrushevo, Lugansk regions, knows that the first thing guests are taken to is the legendary Mius heights. Here, in each settlement at different times, unique memorial complexes were built at the expense of folk funds - the pride of local residents.
For a long time, the events of the Mius Front were rarely written and spoken about, there was not a word about them in the history books, as well as about the battles near Rzhev and Vyazma, and the archives were closed for a long period. This silence is associated with the colossal loss of life - about 830 thousand people - the battle, which ranks fourth in terms of the number of losses of the Red Army. In terms of its significance, bloodshed and the scale of losses, the breakthrough of the Mius Front is comparable to the Battle of Kursk. And the impregnability of this defensive line, which ran from Taganrog to Krasny Luch, can be compared with the Mannerheim and Maginot lines. By the way, the title of "city of military glory" was given to Taganrog precisely for the Mius Front.
The small Mius River, overgrown with forests, which originates from the village of Fashchevka, which is almost near Debaltseve, and flows into the Sea of Azov, first became a solid obstacle for the Nazi troops during their southern offensive operation.
Mius River
During the fighting from September 29 to November 4, 1941, the Nazi troops lost about 50 thousand soldiers and officers, over 250 tanks, more than 170 guns, about 1200 vehicles with military supplies. In defensive battles, the 383rd and 395th Mining Rifle Divisions, formed mainly from local workers, especially distinguished themselves.
In early November 1941, the front stopped at the Mius and the Seversky Donets. The constant counterattacks of our troops fettered the large enemy forces on the southern wing during the crucial period of the battle near Moscow. The most terrible in Primiusye, the old-timers from the inhabitants of Ryazhenny and Matveev-Kurgan, always considered 1942, when in just a few days all the snow-covered beams, fields and hills around became red-black from the blood and overcoats of our soldiers. This despite the fact that under the snow in these fields, thousands of those who died in the unsuccessful December and January attempts to storm the German fortifications were already lying uncleaned. All the slopes of the Mius hills in the spring of 1942 were littered with corpses. And these dead lay there, before the eyes of local residents, for several months. Those who saw this picture as a child admitted that they had never seen anything worse before or after ...
In February 1942, Marshal Timoshenko decided to launch an offensive. The troops of the Southern Front near Rostov were to cut off the German ledge between Matveev Kurgan and Sambek and liberate Taganrog. Three such “attempts to break through” were made in a few days: near Matveev Kurgan, near the village of Kurlatskoye and near the Soleny barrow in the Neklinovsky district. According to official figures alone, more than twelve thousand people died during the operation. Twenty thousand were injured or frostbitten.
Under Matveyev Kurgan, during the assault on Volkovaya Gora and other heights from March 8 to March 10, 1942, 20 thousand people were killed and wounded. During the three days of the offensive from July 30 to August 1, 1943, 18,000 people were put out of action west of the village of Kuibyshevo. Search engines are still working there. They raise sunken Soviet tanks, find the unburied remains of soldiers. The Taganrog offensive operation in March 1942 remained a dark, terrible and unknown page in the history of the war. Nothing is written about her either in military encyclopedias or in history books. The few surviving participants in those tragic battles did not like to remember her either. The sacrifices were too great...
In the summer of 1942, due to strategic and tactical errors in the actions of the command of the Southwestern Front during the Kharkov offensive operation, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to break through the Mius defenses and reach the Volga and the foothills of the Caucasus Range. The troops of the Southern Front were forced to withdraw beyond the Don. Hitler called the line along the Mius "the new state border of Germany - inviolable and inviolable." And after the defeat of the Nazis in Stalingrad, the Mius line was supposed to become, according to the plan of the Nazis, the front of revenge for this defeat.
On the right bank of the Mius, along its entire length and a hundred kilometers deep, three lines of defense were created during the three years of the war. The first passed directly at the river bank, had a depth of 6–8, and in some directions 10–12 km. It was followed by a well-prepared second lane in terms of engineering. The third is along Kalmius (where the line of contact between the punitive troops of Ukraine and the Novorossiya militias passes today). The total length of trenches, trenches and communications only at the forefront along the coast exceeded the distance from Mius to Berlin. Each of the three lines of defense had its own systems of hundreds of pillboxes and bunkers. Minefields were widely used with a density of 1500-1800 mines per kilometer of front and with a depth of fields up to 200 meters. Every square kilometer was littered with machine-gun emplacements under armored caps.
The Nazis used the advantages of the right bank of the river, rich in cliffs, ravines, rocks and heights. The defense system included the mound Saur-Mogila - the dominant height near the village of Saurovka in the Shakhtyorsky district of the Donetsk region. Almost all the main heights near Taganrog, Matveev-Kurgan, Kuibyshevo, Krasny Luch were under the control of the Nazis. An interesting clarification - the old-timers of the region claim that the Ukrainian punishers, trying to capture Primiusye last summer, followed the old German routes ... Accident or heredity?
The July offensive operation of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and on the Mius did not bring success to the Red Army. The Donbass grouping of the enemy retained their former positions. However, this operation had strategic consequences in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The Soviet troops did not allow the German command to transfer part of the forces from the Donbass region to the Kursk salient, reinforcing strike groups during the offensive operation "Citadel". Moreover, the German command had to remove up to five tank divisions from the Kursk direction, as well as significant aviation forces, and redeploy them to hold positions on the Seversky Donets and Mius. This weakened the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht and created more favorable conditions for the operation "Rumyantsev" by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. Thus, the troops of the South-Western and Southern solved the main problem - they did not allow the German command to use all the operational reserves of Army Group South in Operation Citadel and attracted significant enemy forces from the Kursk Bulge.
In the period from August 3 to 10, 1943, the 3rd Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Divisions "Reich" and "Totenkopf" were sent to the Mius Front from the 6th Army, and the SS Panzer Division from the 1st Panzer Army "Viking". Almost simultaneously, the 23rd Panzer and 16th Motorized Divisions were deployed from the Mius River to the Izyumsko-Barvenkovskoe direction, closer to the northern flank of the Donbass grouping. By mid-August, the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies, defending in the Donbass, numbered 27 divisions.
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Gennady Matishov, in his interview, claims that the Mius-Front pulled back and crushed parts that, perhaps, the Wehrmacht did not have enough for success in the battles near Moscow, Leningrad, and on the Kursk Bulge. In 1943, the July offensive of the Southern Front forced the Germans to transfer three tank divisions from the Kursk Bulge to the Mius Front. This helped us win near Kursk. Few people know that on July 30-31, 1943, in the battle near Mius, the elite SS tank corps lost more people and equipment than near Prokhorovka two weeks earlier. We learned to fight in battles. On the Mius Front, for one dead German soldier, there were seven or eight of ours. For many years in the domestic literature they were silent about this, they hid information about the losses incurred then.
Malinovsky and Grechko, commanders of large formations in the south of the country, who were ministers of defense of the USSR in 1957-1976, preferred not to recall the unsuccessful episodes of their military biography.
The Mius pool is three years of stubborn, bloody and unsuccessful battles. Our command clearly imagined that it would not be easy to defeat the opposing enemy. The troops had to advance in extremely difficult conditions - they had to overcome numerous water lines, operate on terrain favorable to the defender, break through powerfully fortified positions with a huge amount of firepower.
The main offensive of the troops of the Southern Front was launched on August 18, 1943. Previously, a 70-minute artillery preparation was carried out, in which 1,500 artillery pieces and mortars took part. After artillery preparation, units of the 5th shock army began to advance. Tanks attacked, sappers walked in front of them, who showed passages in minefields, because due to dust and smoke, the view was difficult and the tankers did not see the flags set by the sappers. The infantry followed the tanks. From the air, the attack was supported by "Ilys" - attack aircraft of the 7th Aviation Corps. The Mius Front was broken through to a depth of 8–9 kilometers.
On August 19, near the village of Kuibyshevo, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Lieutenant General I.T. Tanaschishin advanced 20 kilometers beyond the front line. Their tanks approached Amvrosievka. In the following days, as a result of German counterattacks, the Soviet troops retreated slightly. On August 22-26, the German command transferred a tank division from the Crimea. Having gathered units from neighboring sectors of the front, the Germans tried to surround the attackers with flank attacks. On the night of August 24, Soviet troops went on the attack and occupied the villages of Artemovka, Krinichki, and the Semyonovsky farm. The road to Taganrog was occupied, which deprived the German troops of the opportunity to transfer reserves.
One of the most important stages of the Mius breakthrough - the assault on the dominant height of Saur-Mogila, was launched on August 28. Parts of the 96th Guards Rifle Division, commanded by Guards Colonel Semyon Samuilovich Levin, took part in it. At the top was the central observation post of the sixth German army. On the slopes of the mound, armored caps with fire weapons, dugouts with several rolls and bunkers were dug into the ground. The firing positions of the all-round defense were located in several tiers. Flamethrower tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled artillery mounts, artillery pieces and mortars were also used for defense. On August 29, after an artillery raid, Soviet troops almost captured the summit, but the German counterattack pushed the attackers back. The height was finally taken on the morning of 31 August. During these battles, 18 thousand Soviet soldiers died in just a few days. One of the many songs about the Mius Front and the Saur Grave contains the following lines:
- "Listen to the winds over Saur-Mogila,
And you will understand who saved this earth,
Whose courage in battles freed,
Donbass not submitted to the enemy.
After the war, a memorial was built on top of the mound, which was destroyed last year by a new generation of fascists.
According to the estimates of Gennady Matishov, the Red Army lost more than 830 thousand people on the Mius Front, of which 280 thousand were killed. This is approximately 25-30 divisions, or 3% of the total losses of our army killed during the entire war. For the south of Russia, according to Matishov, Matveev-Kurgan means no less than Mamaev in Stalingrad, and Kuibyshevo, Ryazhenoe, Sinyavskoye, Sambek, and many Primius villages deserve the honorary title of "City of Military Glory".
On the territory of Russia, the DPR and the LPR, there are more than a hundred memorials and military graves associated with the battles on the Mius Front. However, most of them were created in Soviet times, when much about those events was not known. In May 2015, near the village of Kuibyshevo, Rostov Region, the memorial to the soldiers-guards "Breakthrough" was solemnly opened. The search engines propose to build worship crosses on all the key heights of the Mius Front, of which there are 12, indicating all the formations and units that participated in the battles. According to one of the local legends, in the early seventies, the Red Ray was one of the contenders for the title of hero city. Officials and local historians sought such a right and even built a unique memorial and museum of military glory on the Mius River, where every year on May 9 local residents, young and old, gather. Nobody organizes them, they do it at the call of their hearts, raising flowers and wreaths to the top of the mountain near the village of Yanovka. Flowers are laid at the memorial to the victims of fascism at the Bogdan mine, into the pit of which the Nazi executioners dumped more than two and a half thousand unsubdued Soviet people.
Not far from the village of Knyaginovka, searchers erected a monument to the military commissar of the reconnaissance company of the 383rd rifle division, Spartak Zhelezny, and the local partisan Nina Gnilitskaya, heroes of the Soviet Union. In a mass grave, along with them, two dozen Soviet soldiers of Ossetian nationality who took an unequal battle with the Nazis were buried.
Is this a foreign land for the Russians? Are hundreds of thousands of victims of the Mius Front, brought on the altar of our common Victory, cheaper than zeros in the bank accounts of the oligarchs and can be forgotten in favor of the powers that be, who are solving their own problems?
The most important battles during the period of a radical change during the Great Patriotic War, according to the authors of the book "Mius Front in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1942, 1943"
