A word of 7 letters, the first letter is "O", the second letter is "P", the third letter is "L", the fourth letter is "O", the fifth letter is "Sh", the sixth letter is "K", the seventh letter is "A", the word for the letter "O", the last "A". If you do not know a word from a crossword puzzle or a crossword puzzle, then our site will help you find the most difficult and unfamiliar words.

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The ostrich is the largest living bird, its height reaches 2.7 meters and its weight is 160 kg. Their oval body is covered with soft feathers, chickens (both males and females) are brown in color with darker (to black) mottling. With age, males become black (first-order flight feathers are white), and females become gray-brown (flight feathers are brown with black tips). Ostriches have a long, very flexible neck, thanks to which they can reach the ground and tree branches, as well as see danger from afar. Ostriches are essentially herbivores, and feed on grass in pastures, bushes, bushes, and tree shoots. Often eat insects and small vertebrates. Since ostriches are used to living in dry areas, they are very resistant to drafts.

ACTION WRONG- the general name for a whole class of actions "with a defect", during the execution of which errors of a different nature are detected. This includes slips of the tongue, misprints, slander, hearsay, forgetting, losing, hiding, memory errors and errors-delusions - an expression of the struggle of two incompatible unconscious aspirations (intentions and resistances), as a result of which the planned action is violated and an erroneous act occurs. The appearance of erroneous actions is explained by:

1) the clash of mutually contradictory intentions of the individual;

2) the manifestation in such a peculiar form - against the will of the subject - of the intention that he is trying to hide, or which is unconscious for him at the moment. Akin to erroneous actions are the so-called symptomatic actions, seemingly random, aimless (singing melodies to oneself, “sorting out” things, etc.); according to Z. Freud, they have a hidden meaning. In psychoanalysis, two groups of erroneous actions are distinguished as especially significant: repetitive and combined. According to Z. Freud, the main motive for erroneous actions is the tendency to avoid unpleasant feelings in connection with memories or other mental acts - a mental escape from the unpleasant. These actions are full-fledged and full-fledged mental acts, in which both meaning and intention are revealed; when two different intentions collide, one of them is pushed aside, its execution is not allowed, but it still manifests itself as a violation of the other intention (=> accidental action | symptomatic).

ERROR ACTIONS

Peter Herlin

Erroneous actions form a special category of psychopathological phenomena, namely the psychopathological phenomena of everyday life. An erroneous action is a misfire in the work of the mental function, in which the repressed intention, carried out bypassing consciousness, makes it difficult or distorts the intended action, or the person performs another action instead of the intended one. In this case, the boundaries of the sphere of erroneous actions are set, according to Freud, by the following conditions. 1) An erroneous action does not go beyond certain limits, it must remain “within the limits of normal phenomena” (IV, 267). If, in neurotic conflicts, repressed intentions cause significant damage to the most important areas of activity (for example, eating, sexuality, work, communication), then erroneous actions are by their nature not so large-scale and noticeable, and the affects that accompany them are insignificant. (Here, however, it should be noted that there are exceptions: in some neuroses, erroneous actions are sometimes so serious that they can lead to the death of the patient or another person.) Nevertheless, erroneous actions arise according to the scheme of neurotic conflict, similar in structure to the conflict underlying intentions. The study of erroneous actions shows that the gap between the sick and the normal person is not so great, it serves as an introduction to the theory of neuroses and allows a deep understanding of the work of repressed motives and the psychoanalytic dynamic model of conflict. 2) An erroneous action (unlike a neurotic disorder) has the character of a transient, temporary disturbance. Before an erroneous action, a person performed this action correctly, or considers himself capable of correcting a mistake, and when a person is corrected by another, he immediately recognizes that the remark is right, and his action is wrong (which again does not happen with neurotic disorders). 3) Having noticed an erroneous action, we usually do not know anything about its motives, it seems to us that it was committed accidentally and unintentionally.

Let us now turn, proceeding from the definition given above, to different types of erroneous actions. This will give us material for a detailed discussion of concepts and will allow us to single out groups or categories of erroneous actions according to formal features.

They are: reservation - a person wants to say something, but does not say the word that he intended to pronounce. The same thing happens with a misspelling. When stonecropping, a person reads something from the text that is not there. When he hears, he hears not what was actually said. If, when intentions, names and impressions are forgotten, the function of recall is blocked, then in case of memory errors, substitute thoughts are produced, which are either immediately rejected as false, or are not immediately recognized as such. When hiding and losing, they put a thing somewhere, and then they don’t know where to look for it.

The most common types of erroneous actions are slips of the tongue and forgetting. According to Freud, speech disorders are the easiest to develop among mental disorders. Let's start with them. The first group is formed by those reservations, the intention and meaning of which lie on the surface. Here, first of all, we are talking about cases where a person, instead of the word that he was going to pronounce, pronounces a word that is opposite in meaning. Thus, the Chairman of Parliament once opened the meeting with the words: “Gentlemen, let me announce that so many members are present and declare the meeting closed” (XI, 27). A pair of words opposite in meaning is in close conceptual relationship and they are close to each other in an associative connection. This circumstance leads to the substitution of one word for another, but this, as the theory of psychoanalysis says, only facilitates the explanation, and the reservation is fully explained only taking into account the repressed motive - for example, the desire to close the meeting.

It also happens that the right word, although not replaced by a word of the opposite meaning, but because of a reservation, what was said acquires a meaning opposite to what the speaker intended to express. So, one professor in his speech on taking office said: “I am not inclined (instead of “not able”) to appreciate the merits of my respected predecessor” (XI, 27). “Geneigt” (inclined) is not a direct antonym of “geeignet” (capable), but, when used instead of the latter, reflects an intent that is the opposite of merit evaluation.

The second group of reservations differs in that instead of replacing words, the meaning of which is quite clear, the words are distorted and acquire an unusual sound, while remaining more or less clear. For example, a gentleman who was asked about the state of health of his horse replies: “Ja, das draw... Das dauert vielleicht noch einen Monat” [Yes, it will last, maybe another month]. Explaining a nonexistent word draw, he said it was sad story. From the collision of words traurige and dauert a new word was born (XI, 35). Another example is provided by Brenner (Brenner 1967, 157-158). One patient said that in his youth, when he was fond of physical culture, he misspoke and said physical culture instead of physical culture. At the same time, it occurred to him that “physible” sounds almost like “visible” (that is, “visible”). Thus his associations led him to an unconscious desire to show others his naked body and, on the other hand, a desire to see others naked; these desires were important unconscious determinants of his interest in sports. The patient's exhibitionistic and voyeuristic desires clashed at some point with his conscious intention to say physical, and thus from the words physical and visible this ambiguous word was formed. Mixed formations of this kind, as we have seen in the examples above, are the result of a compromise and "mean that each of the two intentions is half realized, half not" (XI, 61).

It would be wrong to assume that the first type of erroneous actions, in which the repressed intention leads to a complete replacement of words, gives grounds for the conclusion about the conscious or almost conscious nature of these actions. “So, for example, it may happen that a patient at the first meeting with a doctor mistakenly calls his wife mother. He continues to make this mistake even after it is pointed out to him. Moreover, he will even explain in detail that his wife is not at all like his mother. It is only after long months of analysis that the patient is able to realize the fact that in his fantasies the wife played the role of the mother whom he wanted to marry many years ago, at the height of his oedipal complex. In such cases, erroneous actions clearly reveal the content of the id, in relation to which the patient's ego for many years retained an exceptionally strong countercathexis” (Brenner 1967, 155).

Slips are so similar to reservations that one can hardly add anything to their account.

At sedum the role of the word that prompts the conversation is taken over by a sensory stimulus - the text. Speech is an active action, while reading, on the contrary, is a passive, copying act of understanding images. With stonecrops, this action is distorted by the active action of creating images. They can be caused by expectation or expected content. Corrective proofreading turns out to be such hard work precisely because a person is determined to see the correct word on paper and sees it instead of the one printed with an error. Erroneous actions in the strict sense of the word are nevertheless determined by the motive of “personal interest” or “complex”. So, Freud in one newspaper read the headline: "Der Friede von Görz" (consent in Hertz), although in fact it was "Die Feinde vor Görz" (Hertz's enemy). At the same time, he remarked: “Is it wise to make a mistake when reading to a person who escorted two sons to this front” (IV, 125). A compositor typing a book on biology constantly misspelled the word "Verschmelzung". This word in the book denoted bodily intercourse during copulation and fertilization. The compositor, however, constantly read "Verschmutzung" (pollution), and the fault was that in his mind the act of intercourse was something dirty (HeiI 1956, 116).

In most cases, stonecrops consist in the complete replacement of the written word with another one, in one way or another related to the first one. There is not always a semantic connection between the text and the misread word, but they can be even more closely related. This rule especially applies to those cases when a person reads something unpleasant, causing pain and suffering, and the substitution of words protects him from this; it allows a person to move away from the text. In this case, a person must first (unconsciously) correctly perceive the text, and only after that he will be able to correct it at will.

Forgetting intentions is a mistaken action only when it concerns an intention that we really wanted to fulfill and which remains unfulfilled, whether it is an action performed from time to time or habitual (for example, brushing our teeth). That is, if a person consciously or voluntarily abandons some plan or intention and thereby appropriately erases it from memory, then there is no erroneous action. When intentions are forgotten, there is a reluctance and desire to do the opposite, which successfully counteract recall and execution. This resistance and unwillingness opposes the intention, either directly or indirectly. Thus, for example, one may forget an appointment because of antipathy towards the person with whom one was to meet, but equally dislike for the place of the arranged meeting, with which a painful memory may be associated, sometimes leads to forgetting.

Mechanism forgetting names“consists in a violation of the intended reproduction of the name by an outsider and at the moment unconscious flow of thoughts. The connection between the distorted name and the complex that causes this violation either exists from the very beginning, or is established due to a superficial (external), often seemingly artificial association. Among the complexes causing disturbance, the most effective are the complexes of one's own relations with people (personal, family, professional)” (IV, 47-48).

Forgetting impressions can be attributed to erroneous actions only when this forgetfulness clearly goes beyond the known limits of a person’s normal ability to store memories.

Along with simple forgetting, there are name forgetting with false recall(instead of the desired name, a substitute name pops up, which is immediately recognized as incorrect) and memory errors, which do not cause distrust at first. This form of forgetting is similar to covering memories, which are explained by the process of displacement: indifferent memories of childhood are stored in the memory in the form of substitute memories, which are associated with really important repressed memories.

motive losing and hiding things(as well as their damage) is the desire to get rid of it: for example, from some thing with a flaw that you want to replace with a better one, or from an object that reminds you of a person with whom relations have deteriorated. Loss is sometimes explained by the desire to do it one's own way or the motive of self-punishment, it can even have a magical meaning: a person, trying to avoid other losses, sacrifices a thing to fate. Sometimes, in the presence of a symbolic mental connection, the tendency to lose things is transferred from one object to another; it happens that the lost object symbolically reflects the repressed thought.

Taking things by mistake is often used to ensure that a wish that has met with refusal is nevertheless fulfilled. Mastering the subject is presented as a happy accident. Freud forbade one patient to call his beloved, but he, under the pretext of needing to call Freud, “accidentally” dialed the wrong number and got straight to his passion (XI, 74).

Some of the named groups or types of erroneous actions in combination with each other can form erroneous actions of a mixed type.

GENERAL THEORY OF ERROR ACTIONS

Before the advent of psychoanalysis, erroneous actions were interpreted in different ways. Some explanations approached the views of psychoanalysts, others interpreted the subject in the exact opposite way. The fact that erroneous actions only outwardly seem unintentional, but in fact there are reasons behind them, was noted not only by poets and philosophers (for example, Goethe, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann): even in ordinary consciousness, even before the era of Freud, not all “mistakes” were considered random. Thus, forgetfulness in certain relations between people has always been considered reprehensible. When a person forgot to respond to an invitation, this was seen as a sign of disdain and an intent to offend; if a subject, turning to his sovereign, "forgot" the prescriptions of etiquette, he could be executed for this. An old proverb says: “Lingva lapsa verum dicit” [a clause betrays the truth (lat.) - Ed.]. Each person, writes Freud, is constantly busy with the psychic analysis of his neighbor and at the same time invariably judges the unconscious intentions and intentions of another by his actions, by which he says more about himself than he thinks and intends to tell. “And this, perhaps, is the punishment for inner insincerity, when people, referring to forgetfulness and unintentionality, allow such impulses to spill out into the narrka, in which it would be better for them to admit to themselves and others, since pic cannot cope with them” (IV, 236) .

And yet, a consistent interpretation of an erroneous action as an act pursuing certain goals, even if it was done involuntarily and out of ignorance, is alien to ordinary consciousness. It interprets it differently - in full agreement with a scientific concept that is completely opposite to the theory of psychoanalysis - as an accident or as a kind of product of physiological and psychophysiological factors, such as mild malaise, circulatory disorders, fatigue, exhaustion, excitement, absent-mindedness. In addition, reservations are also explained by such factors as the ratio of sounds, consonance of words and verbal associations, associated with the words the person is about to say. According to Wundt, in a tired person, associative tendencies begin to prevail over the intention to correctly pronounce words.

Psychoanalytic theory does not deny the role of these factors, however, it refers to the category of technical or concomitant conditions that contribute to the commission of erroneous actions. It proceeds from the fact that, firstly, somatic and other contributing factors are absent in a number of cases, and secondly, these factors do not provide an exhaustive explanation of erroneous actions, that is, their effect or content, do not give an answer why, for example, the person made a reservation in this way, and not in any other way. About this form of erroneous actions, Freud writes: “... until we answer this question, until we explain the result of the reservation from a psychological point of view, this phenomenon will remain an accident, although a physiological explanation can be found for it. If I happen to make a reservation, I can do it in infinitely many ways” (XI, 25). Psychological analysis shows that many erroneous actions are "serious mental acts" (Freud) that have meaning and purpose. Consequently, they need a dynamic explanation as an expression of the "interaction in the soul of forces" (Freud). In addition to the fact that they have meaning and are the product of the superposition of two or more different aspirations, another condition for the appearance of erroneous actions is the following: the violating intention will manifest itself in the form of a violation of the original intention only after overcoming a certain number of obstacles in its implementation; before he distorts something, he himself has to distort.

Thus, what outwardly looks like just a failed action, and not only from a purely descriptive, but also from a purely causal-analytical point of view (this negative aspect is manifested in the one-sided translation of the French term “erroneous actions” by the expression acte manque), being considered in dynamics it also reveals the positive nature of the action corresponding to the intention, the action rejected, but at the same time not completely losing the opportunity to manifest itself. At the same time, Freud admits that reservations and omissions are sometimes caused by purely physiological reasons, which he could not say about forgetfulness, while unintentional loss, on the contrary, is quite likely.

Freud's well-known metaphor illustrates how non-meaningful factors can contribute to erroneous action. “Imagine that I am walking on a dark night through a deserted place where a robber attacks me, takes my watch and my wallet. After that, I file a complaint with the police, but since I didn’t see the robber’s face properly, I formulate my complaint as follows: just desertion and darkness deprived me of my wallet. The police commissioner might have replied: “It seems to me that you are subject to an overly mechanistic understanding of things. Let's better imagine it this way: under the cover of darkness in a deserted place, an unknown robber took away valuable things from you” (XI, 39).

According to Heiss (HeiYa 1956), erroneous actions in the psychoanalytic sense of the word should be distinguished from violations of more or less automated processes due to insufficient coherence (lack of coordination) of voluntary conscious impulses and involuntary behavioral automatisms. But at the same time, this type of erroneous action is the general form of any erroneous action and, therefore, underlies the erroneous action in the narrow sense.

Lack of congruence between impulse and automaticity (eg, speech, writing) occurs when a person is subjected to excessive stress (eg, forced to speak at high speed, nervous, takes dictation, or counts too fast) or when they are unable to ensure proper flow actions (for example, a fright at the wheel of a car leading to an accident, or when the consciousness is fixed on another subject instead of the intended action). The systemic area to which general depth psychology refers erroneous actions in the psychoanalytic sense of the word is, according to Heiss, erroneous actions in the broadest sense of the word. “Mechanical side all erroneous actions consists in a violation of the consistency between the schemes of automated and purposeful behavior, that is, the stimulating or restraining impulses of consciousness” (ibid., 130). And only in the second turn, with the already existing lack of coordination, suppressed intentions can manifest themselves and influence the formation of an erroneous action. According to Heiss's theory, such intentions are not a sufficient condition for the occurrence of erroneous actions in the narrow sense, but psychoanalysis claims that without them erroneous actions are impossible, only in some cases this condition is simultaneously sufficient, in others it is necessary to transform a conscious intention into an erroneous action. supporting factors.

Against Heiss's theory it can be objected - if the psychoanalytic theory is right, considering that there are cases when the "inconsistency" of intentions is the only reason for an erroneous action - that this "inconsistency" sets the stage for some autonomous form of insufficient coherence of intention with automatism, standing in the same row with such forms as excessive demands and uncontrollable automatism, that is, not reducible to them. In addition, Heiss makes a clear mistake when, illustrating the phenomenon of lack of coordination, in which he sees the main condition for the occurrence of an erroneous action in a narrow sense, he, in particular, writes: sure when we write something unpleasant or protesting to us, as well as many other processes of this kind allow this incoordination to arise. The divergence of conscious impulses creates a state in which the corresponding automated process of writing or speaking can fail. It is highly significant that at such moments a previously arisen and rejected conscious intention that existed in the form of a thought or feeling can manifest itself” (ibid., 131). But is not the "unreliability of consciousness" (Heiss) described the result of the (original) violation of one intention by another? After all, one can doubt one intention only if one has another intention that criticizes and weakens the first. And why can't such a doubt arise on its own - that is, without connection with uncontrollability or overload of automatism (having other reasons), - generating indecision, weakening the ability to control the action in the course of its implementation? Why can't conflicting intentions serve as a self-sufficient, autonomous cause of lack of coordination?

FORMAL CLASSIFICATION OF ERROR ACTIONS

According to the first classification (proposed by Heiss), erroneous actions are divided into active and passive. In one case, the action that a person intended to perform completely falls out (for example, blocking memories), in the other, it is replaced or distorted by another involuntary violating intention.

Forms of active erroneous action are "substitution" and "distortion". If the planned action is distorted, compromise and mixed formations arise, condensations characteristic of the primary process that occurs, for example, in a dream. Based on the psychopathological phenomena of everyday life related to the primary process, Freud concludes regarding the phenomena of condensation: and while awake” (IV, 308-309).

Brenner points out that other mechanisms inherent in the primary process may also be involved in erroneous actions: “Displacement, the image of the whole through a part and, conversely, the image through analogy, the image through opposition and symbolism in the psychoanalytic sense” (Brenner 1967, 158).

The second classification is based on the topical model of the mental apparatus (see the corresponding article by A. Holder). The first group of erroneous actions includes cases when the violating tendency is known to the individual and, in addition, he is aware of the presence of the erroneous action itself. For example, in the "internal dialogue" a person formulates a thought, which is then rejected, because he does not want to express it aloud, but this thought is expressed in a formulated phrase. The second group consists of erroneous actions, when an individual recognizes the existence of a violating intention, but does not realize that it caused his erroneous action; he would be surprised if he knew about it. The third group is characterized by the fact that the individual does not recognize and cannot recognize without analytical work not only the influence of this or that intention on the commission of an erroneous action, but also the presence of such an intention in himself. And if in the first two cases the disturbing tendencies belong to the systems of the conscious or preconscious, then in the third case they are unconscious.

In the third group, a special case should be distinguished: before committing an erroneous action, a person is often momentarily aware that failure may occur, but during or immediately after the erroneous action, he represses knowledge of his intention, so that this fact may again surface in consciousness. only thanks to the explanation of the analyst. Without such an explanation, a person will interpret his mistake as a purely random event.

The third classification uses the categories of the structural model (see the article by A. Holder). Here it is important to which mental instance the violating intention belongs. Violation can come from the impulses of the id or the intentions of the superego (for example, during self-mutilation motivated by self-punishment or redemption), and according to Brenner, from the intentions of the ego. An overdetermination of an erroneous action is also possible, when several motives related to different instances act simultaneously.

The fourth classification is based on the semantic relationship between the violating intention and the violated one, whether it contains an objection, amendment or addition to the latter, or whether they are in no way connected with each other. This case is more rare and incomprehensible. Violation of action is generated here by thoughts that occupied a person shortly before, and these reflections “respond” in an erroneous action. “There is also no lack of an associative connection between what violates and what is violated, however, this connection is not set by the content, but is created by artificial, often forced connections” (XI, 58).

It should be added here that erroneous actions are adjoined by random or symptomatic actions, almost imperceptible, insignificant in consequences and seeming superfluous, in which there is no moment of violation of another intentional action. They border on gestures and movements in which emotions and spiritual impulses are expressed (XI, 55). Such symptomatic actions include apparently aimless, purely playful manipulations with clothes, body parts and objects, or melodies that we sing. Common to random and erroneous actions is that they are full-fledged mental acts, devoid of meaningful motivation. In them, the personality expresses something that it does not know about in itself and about which, as a rule, it is not inclined to report, but strives to keep to itself, that is, symbolically represented desires and fantasies.

The last remark concerns the interpretation of erroneous actions. There is no direct evidence for it. It cannot be obtained without joint analytical work with a person. Without such work, any interpretation will remain a hypothesis. However, interpretation can also be based on circumstantial evidence. The material for proof here is the mental situation in which the erroneous action is performed, knowledge of the character of the person who committed the erroneous action, the impression made by this person before committing the erroneous action, and, if possible, his reaction to this action. One can also draw evidence from events that happened later, but to a certain extent announced themselves in this erroneous action; one can use arguments by analogy (proofs based on similarities to phenomena that are not erroneous actions), such as the assertion that the substitution of one name for another "inadvertently" has the same offensive meaning as the intentional use of another name. The best material for indirect evidence is provided by erroneous actions, performed in a row. One such case is described by Freud (XI, 50): “E. Jones says that once, for unknown reasons, he forgot a letter on his desk for several days. Finally he decided to send it, but the letter was returned because he forgot to write the address. Having indicated the address, he brought the letter to the post office, but, as it turned out, he forgot to stick a stamp. Here he was forced to admit that he did not want to send this letter at all.

LITERATURE

Brenner, Ch.: An elementary textbook of psychoanalysis.

New York: Int. Univ. Press 1967 Freud, S.: Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (1901). G.W.IV

Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalysis (1916-1917) G. W. XI

HeiB, R.: Allgemeine Tiefenpsychologie. Bern: Huber 1956; Geist und Psyche, vol. 2088. München: Kindler

Eixenberger, H.F.: The Discovery of the Unconscious. New York: Basic Books 1970

Laplanche, J., Pontalis, J.-B.: Vocabulaire de la Psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1967