Coursework

Military confrontation between the USSR and Germany during the Second world war: socio-economic aspect

Introduction

"Century" is not necessarily 100 years. It is believed that the 19th century began in 1789 and ended in 1914, with the outbreak of the First World War. The next century, the twentieth, took only 77 years, but this historically short period included two world wars, scientific and technological and several social revolutions, man's spacewalk and the mastery of nuclear weapons.

The “age of totalitarian wars” is the heyday of the industrial phase of development and the beginning of its death. Industrial production is always credited: money for the construction of a plant is spent before this plant gives and, moreover, sells products. Therefore, the industrial economy does not know "stagnant" equilibrium solutions - it either expands or faces a catastrophic non-payment crisis. That is why industrial states are constantly fighting - first for markets, then (wishing to reduce production costs) - for sources of raw materials.

It was the totalitarian wars that became the final phase of resolving the intolerable contradictions between the limited land surface and resources and the constant expansion of the world economy. Total war "legitimately" justified the consumption of a huge amount of industrial products. By itself, the global war is a giant market. Skillfully and cynically playing on it, the United States, for example, in just a few years has turned from a world borrower into a world lender.

World War II lasted six long years. It became the largest military conflict in human history. 72 states were directly or indirectly involved in the war, 110 million soldiers were put under the bayonet. This war was tragic for Eastern Europe and, above all, for the European peoples of the USSR, who became victims of the confrontation between two colossal military-economic machines. The Soviet Union, as a state, suffered heavy economic losses in the early stages of the war: it lost vast industrial and agricultural territories, and partially lost its material, technical and resource base, which had been developing over centuries and decades. But despite this, at the cost of exerting all his strength, thanks to competent, but sometimes tough decisions, he was able to break the back of not only the Reich military machine, but also defeat it economically.

The economic confrontation between the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany and its allies became very acute. With a smaller industrial base, the Soviet Union achieved a fundamental turning point in the economic confrontation with the enemy, ensuring a high growth in the total volume of military production and the production of military equipment and weapons than Nazi Germany. In the economy of the Axis, despite the presence of even greater opportunities and a significant increase in the output of military products, the level of military production lagged behind the rapidly growing needs of the armies of the Wehrmacht and the countries allied with Germany.

This course work examines the problems of socio-economic confrontation between two opposing social systems: the socialist USSR and National Socialist Germany during the Second World War. This confrontation reached its highest intensity directly in the military conflict, which led to profound irreversible shifts in the military, political, economic, and cultural spheres that determined the balance of forces of the participants, their capabilities and ability to influence the further course of the war.

The relevance of the topic I have chosen lies in the fact that the consequences of the Second World War had a rather strong impact on the economic condition of countries.

The purpose of the course work is to identify the economic aspects of the USSR and Germany during the war, which is important when summing up its results.

The main task of this work is to consider the socio-economic situation of the USSR and Germany during the Second World War. Along with this, it is necessary to identify the economic state of both countries at the time of the war and assess their ability to resist each other. Also of great importance is the question of the development of science and culture in the war period.

1. Economic development of the USSR and Germany during the Second World War

.1 Economy of the USSR during the war years

The great victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was possible due to the fact that the USSR surpassed it not only in military, but in economic and moral-psychological confrontation. The war required the maximum mobilization of forces and means to defeat the enemy.

At the beginning of the war, the total industrial power of Germany exceeded the Soviet one approximately twice. The first six months of the war were the most difficult for the Soviet economy. Industrial production has more than halved, rolled ferrous metals - three times, non-ferrous metals - 430 times, etc. The production of aircraft, tanks, ammunition was sharply reduced, since at that time the main capacities were transferred to the east of the country.

Under the extremely strict leadership of the State Defense Committee (GKO), established on June 30, 1941, plants and factories were evacuated and the civilian sector of the economy was transferred to a military way. Enterprises exported to the east relatively quickly began to produce products for the front. New factories “grew up”, which after 4-6 months worked at full capacity, and by the middle of 1942 they managed to fully launch the evacuated equipment and ensure the growth of production in heavy industries.

In general, by the beginning of the war, the Soviet economy was more efficient than the German one. For all the war years, the USSR produced almost twice as much military equipment and weapons.

Along with human losses during the hostilities, the Gulag system continued to operate during the war years, where a huge number of people declared “enemies of the people” stayed. The labor of prisoners was used in industry, construction, mines, mines, and logging. For 1941-1944 315 tons of gold, 6.5 thousand tons of nickel, 8.9 million tons of coal, etc. were mined in the NKVD system.

Since the main material resources went to military needs, the economic situation of the Soviet people was very difficult. The card supply system, introduced at the very beginning of the war, provided the urban population with food only to a minimal extent. There were several categories in the distribution of products. The highest standards were set for workers employed in the mining and chemical industries, metallurgy, and military factories.

They were supplied according to the first category: from 800 g to 1-1.2 kg of bread per day. In other industries, production workers were assigned to the second category and received 500 grams of bread each. Employees received 400 - 450g each, dependents and children under 12 years old - 300 - 400g each. According to the usual norm, per person was given 1.8 kg of meat or fish, 400 g of fat, 1.3 kg of cereals or pasta, 400 g of sugar or confectionery. There were also increased and super-increased norms.

The military restructuring of the Soviet economy proceeded in an exceptionally difficult political situation. In the autumn of 1941, the Nazis were on the outskirts of Moscow. The most important economic regions of the country were in their hands. About 40% of the population lived in the occupied territory by November 1941. These regions accounted for 68% of the pig iron produced in the country, 63% of coal mining, 60% of aluminum production, and 58% of steel smelting. These were the most important areas of agricultural production. products.

According to these data, we can say that the country, by the beginning of the war, had lost half of its capacity. Industrial equipment, raw materials and food, historical and artistic values ​​were exported from the occupied regions. A lot of damage was done to agriculture. The invaders took to Germany or destroyed 137 thousand tractors, 49 thousand combines. They captured 7 million horses, 17 million cattle, 20 million pigs, etc.

The loss of a number of important economic regions sharply raised the question of accelerating the construction of new industrial facilities, establishing new economic ties, extracting minerals, creating new energy capacities, building railways, and so on.

First of all, the industry was given the task of ensuring a sharp increase in the production of weapons. In the first years of the war, this was achieved mainly by transferring to the production of military equipment thousands of plants and factories that had previously produced civilian products. In July, military production accounted for 70-80% of all gross industrial output. The construction of new industrial facilities began. For the period from July 1, 1941 to January 1, 1946, capital investments in industry amounted to 75.9 billion rubles, of which 93% was directed to heavy industry. On September 11, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the ChChChR adopted a resolution "On the construction of industrial enterprises in wartime conditions." It was allowed to construct buildings for industrial purposes of a temporary type, designed for a shortened service life. This decree made it possible to drastically reduce the construction time for "buildings for industrial purposes", approximately these terms decreased by two to three times. During the war years, 30 blast furnaces, 169 open-hearth furnaces, 88 rolling mills, 78 coke batteries were built and restored.

In 1942, compared to the previous year, the country received 40% of iron ore, 34% of pig iron, 45% of steel, and 50% of coal. But already in 1943, a steady rise in the industry of the USSR began.

Over the last 2.5 years of the war, electricity generation increased 1.5 times, coal mining - almost 2 times, production of trucks - more than 2 times. However, on the whole, the pre-war level of industry was not reached.

The war also sharply worsened the situation with / x. In 1942 the tractor park

decreased in comparison with 1940 by 44%, the number of grain harvesters - by 34%, motor vehicles - by 89%.

During the war years, 9,000 km of new public railways were put into operation. As a result of the construction of the railway. The total length of the railway network increased, a more rational distribution of freight traffic on the territory of the USSR was achieved, and the supply of industrial enterprises with raw materials and fuel improved. In the first period of the war, the volume of cargo transportation dropped sharply. In 1942, they accounted for 53% of the 1940 level. Since 1943, there has been a gradual increase in freight traffic. In 1945, the volume of freight traffic reached 77% of the 1940 level. On January 3, 1942, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution "On the restoration of railways." As the Soviet territory was liberated, the scale of restoration work on the railway transport increased.

By the end of the war, traffic was resumed on all roads.

Water and road transport was used to transport troops, ammunition and food. Air transport was used not only for military purposes, but also for economic ties with hard-to-reach regions of the USSR and with foreign countries.

The card system covered 80.6 million people. This made it possible, in the most difficult economic conditions of wartime, to ensure uninterrupted supply of tens of millions of rear workers. As far as possible, the state sought to extend various forms of additional supply to an ever larger circle of the population. They were used to stimulate growth

labor productivity.

To improve the supply of workers and employees in the middle of 1942, part-time farms began to be created at the departments of working supplies (ORSs). This made it possible to obtain additional resources of meat and

other products. In 1945, ORS accounted for about 1/3 of all

goods sold.

During the war years, the role of public catering increased. The contingent of consumers served by public catering enterprises doubled, and its turnover for 1942-1944. increased by 56.5%.

The war also posed extremely complex and responsible tasks for Soviet finance. It was necessary to provide funding for the military measures of the state, to cover the costs caused by the transition of the economy to a war footing. It was necessary to provide funding for the national economy and socio-cultural events in the specific conditions of wartime. In 1942, the total amount of state revenues decreased from 180 billion rubles. (1940) to 165 billion rubles. (1942), the amount that the country received in 1940 from turnover tax and deductions from profits decreased by 1942 from 165 billion rubles. up to 81.3 billion rubles.

The incomes and savings of the national economy increased on the basis of the growth of labor productivity and the observance of the austerity regime. For example, during the war years, savings in industry gave the country 50 billion rubles. Government loans played a big role. As a result of the measures taken, state revenues grew (with the exception of 1942). During the war years they increased from 1.77 billion rubles. in 1941 to 302 billion rubles. in 1945. The increase in state revenues made it possible to fully finance the needs of the fund, as well as to increase spending on the development of the national economy and socio-cultural events.

In 1941-1945, 582 billion rubles, or 50.8% of all budget expenditures, were spent on military purposes. The budget deficit was covered by the issuance of paper money. During the war years, the amount of paper money in circulation increased 3.8 times. But even in 1942-1943. when money supply reached its highest level, the Soviet ruble was relatively stable. This was due to the strength of the Soviet

economy, state price policy (maintenance of fixed prices for rationed goods, unchanged procurement prices for agricultural products), limiting the issuance of paper money. Already in 1944, the state achieved a deficit-free budget and abandoned the use of money emission as a method of financing.

Speaking about the factors that played a major role in the victory, one cannot ignore the external factor - this is the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition "Big Three" (USA, England, USSR) and its assistance in the war (the law on Lend-Lease, the supply of weapons, ammunition, food .). In total, during the war, the USSR received from the allies 18.7 thousand aircraft, 10.8 thousand tanks, 9.6 thousand artillery pieces, 44.6 thousand machine tools, 517.5 thousand tons of non-ferrous metals, 1860 locomotives , 11.3 thousand railway platforms, a large number of canned food, medicines, clothes, etc.

Thus, we can say that with the incredible efforts of the State bodies and the people, the country managed to cope with losses in the shortest possible time and even in wartime to maintain the economy (national economy) at a sustainable level.

1.2 German objectives in World War II

Analyzing the goals of Germany in the East of Europe in the Second World War, first of all, let us ask ourselves the question of how they differed from the goals pursued by Germany in this region during the First World War. Comparison of Germany's goals in the two world wars allows us to say with good reason that they show great similarities, including in details. We also note that before the First World War and immediately after it, that is, before the appearance of Hitler on the political scene and independently of him, German society was infected with expansionist ideas. The slogan about "living space" in the East and other geopolitical plans, racial and colonial ideas, imperialist foreign economic attitudes, as well as those that arose after the defeat of Germany in the First World War and the revolutions in Russia and Germany in 1917-1918. revanchism and anti-Bolshevism were an integral part of this ideology.

However, in the Second World War, the goals that Germany set for itself in the East acquired a new quality and a different scale. This is evidenced by its plans for annexation, the establishment of German military dominance up to the borders of Asia, the program of colonization and economic robbery of the occupied territories, long-term imperialist economic and military-strategic attitudes.

The methods of achieving these goals have also changed, they have become openly criminal: the destruction of the so-called "Jewish Bolshevism" and all forms of Soviet statehood, the policy of extermination of people, which has acquired the scale of genocide.

One of the prerequisites for the First World War was a fundamental change in the nature of relations between Imperial Germany and Tsarist Russia, their departure from the former policy of more or less benevolent neutrality, determined not least by the close dynastic ties of the Hohenzollerns and Romanovs. During the First World War, Germany, which had long been hatching imperialist plans, in particular with regard to Russia, for the first time declared them openly. Already in September 1914, Reich Chancellor T. von Bethmann-Hollweg emphasized that "the main goal of the war" was "ensuring the security of the German Empire in the West and East for all time." His program was aimed at "pushing Russia as far as possible from the German frontier and undermining her dominance over the non-Russian vassal peoples."

These goals were achieved in 1915 when German troops occupied the entire Russian part of Poland, Lithuania and Courland. "Upper East" - so the Kaiser generals called these territories, which were directly subordinate to the commander of the German troops on the eastern front, E. von Ludendorff.

Goals in Eastern Europe, which were expected to be achieved during the war of 1914-1918. The most reactionary circles of German big business, the landowners and the nationalist-minded intelligentsia, had a barbaric character from the very beginning. The memorandum of the Pan-German Union, prepared in September 1914 by its chairman G. Klass and approved by leading representatives of large-scale industry, stated: the “Russian enemy” must be weakened by reducing its population and preventing in the future the very possibility of its growth, “so that he never would not be able to threaten us in the same way in the future."

The western border of Russia was planned to be pushed back to St. Petersburg and the Dnieper, and the occupied territory, after the expulsion of the entire population from there, if possible (the Class believed that it would have to be “cleared” of approximately seven million people), to be populated by the Germans. Important milestones in determining the military goals of Germany were the memorandums of the unions of industrialists, agrarians and the middle class of March 10 and May 20, 1915, the "memorandum of professors" of July 15 of the same year, as well as later statements of industrialists and bankers.

All of them showed great interest in mastering the economic resources of Russia, especially Ukraine and the Caucasus (manganese ore, iron, oil). It was in the “memorandum of professors”, prepared on the initiative of the Pan-German Union by 1347 intellectuals with the active participation of E. Kirdorf, A. Hugenberg, K. Duisberg, G. Stresemann, that all those “national arguments” (“German spirit”, "the flow of barbarism from the east", etc.), which were later characteristic of Nazi writings, especially Himmler's "General Plan East".

However, in 1914-1918. the German army, as the US historian G.L. Weinberg, was not like the one that, under Hitler in 1941, moved to the East.

“It can hardly be disputed,” writes Weinberg, “that already during the First World War in Germany there were all sorts of radical ideas regarding the “reorganization of the land” in the East, but these were, firstly, so far only ideas, and secondly , the population whom they touched, still practically did not feel the influence of these ideas on themselves. In World War II, things were different."

The predatory Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded in March 1918, according to which Russia lost Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine and the Caucasus, became an important stage in the development of German expansion in Eastern Europe. These territories were open to control and penetration by Germany. Although the German Empire did not have time to take advantage of the fruits of the victory, the defeat of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were not forgotten in post-war Germany. They remained in the memory of representatives of the German political, economic and scientific elites as proof of the weakness of the Russian "colossus". This memory was intertwined with the hatred that the German reactionary and conservative forces had for the Soviet regime.

Immediately after the defeat in the First World War, attempts began to be made in Germany to adapt to the new foreign and domestic political conditions. Already at the turn of 1918-1919, that is, even before the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty, R. Nadolny, at that time the head of the Russian department of the Foreign Ministry, and later, in 1933-1934, the German ambassador in Moscow, speaking of the "threat Bolshevism”, clearly outlined the alternative that Germany faced: either “to unite with the Entente for a joint action against Bolshevism”, or “to negotiate with the Bolsheviks and in this way put pressure on the Entente to achieve a cheap peace”. The presence of such an alternative for a long time determined the view of the influential circles of Germany on Russia and their "Russian policy".

It should be noted that after 1918 representatives of the German elites assessed the prospects for the development of political and economic relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, and then the USSR, in different ways. Many believed that the Soviet government would certainly collapse in the near future. It was believed that the military power of Russia after the revolution and the civil war was completely undermined. Nevertheless, it was still too early to talk about a new attempt to achieve the goals that Germany set for itself during the years of the World War, using military force methods, and to eliminate the revolutionary regime in Russia.

1.3 Economic aspects of the Soviet-German agreements of 1939

adversary war economic confrontation

On August 23, 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a document around which historians and politicians argue to this day. We are talking about the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It is believed that it was this treaty that untied the hands of Germany to attack Poland and opened the way for the USSR to join the Baltic states. The real story is much more complicated. On the eve of a major war, future adversaries, regardless of the interests of third countries, sought to extract as many benefits as possible from each other's military-political aspirations and economic situation for their own strengthening.

Critics of the USSR often reproach the Soviet leadership for the fact that, literally on the eve of the war, trains with grain continued to go from the USSR to Germany. But it should be borne in mind that trains crossed the border in two directions: trains with industrial equipment, metals and even weapons followed from West to East. Such an exchange of goods was the result of another document signed in August 1939: four days before the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union and Germany also concluded a bilateral trade and credit agreement.

The history of the pre-war development of the Soviet economy is a vivid example of how easily political declarations can diverge from economic realities.

While the politicians of the Soviet Union and Western countries from high tribunes sent deadly curses to each other and threatened to grind their opponents to powder, the sharks of capitalism, like Morgan and Ford, took an active part in the industrialization of the USSR.

The economic crisis that struck in the late 1920s Western economy, led to a stagnation in world trade: by the beginning of the 30s, trade in the world had fallen by two-thirds. Industrial companies in Europe and the US suffered from overproduction. The American Association of Industrial Exporters stated in plain text: huge stocks of machines have accumulated in warehouses that cannot be sold, those who wish can buy this equipment for almost nothing. Prices have indeed declined, though not as much as it seemed to American traders. According to Soviet trade missions, construction equipment fell in price by 5-30%, electrical equipment - by 17-18%, German optics and high-class measuring instruments, respectively, by 10% and 13%.

The eyes of Western manufacturers inevitably turned towards the USSR, which began the industrialization of the economy, and represented an immense sales market for engineering companies. And the Soviet Union had a chance to acquire machinery, equipment and metal in the right quantities. Of course, everything was not so simple. After all, world prices for raw materials and foodstuffs, the export of which was the main source of foreign exchange earnings in the USSR, fell even more. And the more cheap grain, oil, hemp and timber became, the more they had to be exported, and, consequently, the burden on Russian and Ukrainian peasants, who took on the brunt of financing industrialization, increased.

It is worth noting that Germany occupied far from the last place in the cooperation of the Land of Soviets with the West. Actually, Germany became the first European country to establish economic relations with the USSR. In 1922, at the Genoa Conference, the Weimar Republic and the RSFSR signed the Rappala Treaty (later it spread to other republics of the Union), which actually meant the breakdown of the international blockade of the Soviet Union.

Of course, this decision was extremely politicized, and was taken in defiance of the Versailles agreements, which consolidated the dominance of England and France. One way or another, the parties agreed to restore diplomatic relations in full, renounced claims for compensation for military losses, the German government recognized the nationalization of German property. In addition, Germany and the Soviet Union proclaimed the principle of most favored nation and promoting the development of trade and economic ties. The German government even promised help to its companies that decided to do business with the Soviets.

The Soviet Union was reproached more than once that, by cooperating with Germany, it helped the latter to restore its military potential in circumvention of the Versailles agreements, and, in fact, armed the future enemy. Indeed, German designers were engaged in developments on the basis of Soviet enterprises. Moreover, the Germans even placed pilot production facilities on the territory of the USSR. But control over the observance of the Versailles agreements was the responsibility of England and France, and not the USSR at all. And for the Soviet government, it was an opportunity to gain access to advanced military technologies and use the achievements of German designers.

By the beginning of the 1930s, Germany, along with the United States, had become the main supplier of technology and equipment for Soviet industry, the Soviet Union came out on top in German exports, and Germany's share in trade with the USSR reached 32%.

Soon, due to the high external debt, Soviet-German economic cooperation began to slip, and with the coming to power of the National Socialists, with their policy of militant Russophobia and anti-communism, relations completely cooled. Since 1934, employees of the Soviet trade missions began to complain about the increase in the number of commercial disputes in Germany, and about unfair court decisions that ruled exclusively in favor of German companies. However, the Soviet leadership was not very upset by this circumstance.

While the Western economy was hit by a crisis, there was no shortage of people willing to master the Soviet market. Beginning in 1935, Germany, which was the leading trading partner of the USSR, began to lose ground, letting the USA and England go first, and later even such small countries as Belgium and Holland.

Until now, historians cannot give an unambiguous answer whether the resumption of economic relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany in 1939 was dictated by political considerations, or whether they were still dominated by economic calculation. There are no rigorous calculations and conclusions as to who benefited more from the 39th Trade and Credit Agreement concluded in August.

Estimates available today, as a rule, reflect the political views of the author. Soviet apologists often present the Trade and Credit Agreement as a victory for Soviet diplomacy. They say that Germany, two years before the start of the war, provided the USSR with a seven-year loan of 200 million Reichsmarks for the purchase of the most modern industrial equipment in Germany, and the drawings and samples of the most modern German military equipment were at the disposal of Soviet designers.

Critics claim that the Soviet leadership on the eve of the war turned the country almost into a raw materials appendage of a potential enemy. Indeed, the loan provided was to be repaid through the supply of raw materials, including those needed for military production. Moreover, during the first two years, the USSR undertook to supply Germany with raw materials worth 180 million Reichsmarks.

It is unlikely that Germany was going to strengthen the defense capability of the USSR, as some experts believe. Models of military equipment were transferred to the Soviet Union with the expectation that the industry of the latter would simply not be able to master the production of this equipment in the coming years. Equally, the Soviet side was well aware that it was not the only supplier of raw materials for the war machine of Nazi Germany.

2. Socio-economic situation of the USSR and Germany during the Second World War

.1 Military-economic confrontation between the USSR and Germany

During the war, the economy of the USSR surpassed the extremely strong enemy in the pace and scale of production of military equipment, it provided the Armed Forces with aircraft, tanks, guns that were not inferior or even superior to the weapons of the Wehrmacht.

Of exceptional importance was the achievement of military-technical superiority over the enemy. It was very difficult to do this, because the enemy had a powerful industrial potential, a developed military-industrial base, significant human and raw materials resources, and the ratio of the main types of industrial products with the start of the war changed even more not in favor of the USSR.

A decisive turning point in the development of military production and the balance of military-economic forces took place from July 1942 to October 1943. The main emphasis at that time was placed on the maximum use of production capacities, the all-round increase in the output of military products. At the end of 1942, the ratio of the main types of military equipment between the active armies of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany changed in favor of the Soviet Army. By July 1943, the advantage of the Soviet Army increased even more, and after the Battle of Kursk it continued to increase. The aviation industry provided the needs of the Air Force for aircraft. The structure of tank production is changing, a new type of military equipment is being created - self-propelled artillery installations. The superiority of the Soviet troops in artillery and mortar weapons becomes indisputable. Enemy attempts to change the unfavorable balance of forces in the production of military equipment have not been successful. For most samples, the superiority remained with the Soviet Union. The scale of production of military equipment in the USSR more and more covered the size of losses, as a result, the saturation of the Armed Forces with military equipment and other materiel increased. All branches of the defense industry and related branches of production have made a significant contribution to the material support of victory over the enemy.

Since the beginning of the war, significant growth has been achieved in all major types of military equipment. The industry ensured the mass production of military equipment. Some reduction in the production of guns in 1944 is associated with a change in the structure of production and the transition to the production of artillery pieces of a larger caliber. Even earlier, the production of mortars, mainly of small calibers, was reduced.

During the war there was a continuous qualitative improvement of artillery systems, mortars. In this, great merit belonged to the outstanding Soviet scientists and designers V.G. Grabin, I.I. Ivanov, M.Ya. Krupchatnikov, F.F. Petrov, B.I. Shavyrin and others. Successes in the production of small arms were achieved with the leading role of scientists and designers N.E. Berezina, S.V. Vladimirova, P.M. Goryunova, V.A. Degtyareva, S.G. Simonova, F.V. Tokareva, G.S. Shpagina, B.G. Shpitalny and others. The vast majority of new models of artillery systems and about half of all types of small arms that were in service with the Soviet Army in 1945 were created and put into mass production during the war. The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery have increased by almost 2 times, and the armor penetration of shells by about 5 times. In terms of the average annual production of field artillery guns, the Soviet Union exceeded the average annual production of Germany by more than 2 times, mortars - 5 times, anti-tank guns - 2.6 times, but somewhat inferior to it in the production of anti-aircraft guns.

Through the efforts of Soviet tank builders, the enemy's numerical advantage in armored vehicles was relatively quickly overcome. Then, throughout the war, the predominance in the saturation of the Soviet Armed Forces with tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts remained. While the Soviet industry in 1942-1944. monthly produced over 2 thousand tanks, the German industry only in May 1944 reached its maximum - 1450 tanks. On average, the Soviet tank industry produced more armored vehicles per month than the industry of Nazi Germany. This technique combined powerful weapons, strong armor, high maneuverability. Domestic tanks and self-propelled guns surpassed the corresponding types of foreign-made vehicles in their combat characteristics. A huge merit in their creation belongs to N.A. Astrov, N.L. Dukhov, Zh.Ya. Kotin, M.I. Koshkin, V.V. Krylov, N.A. Kucherenko, A.A. Morozov, L.S. Troyanov and other outstanding designers.

Despite the fact that the forced evacuation of enterprises complicated the work of the aviation industry, in the first half of 1942 it restored and expanded its capacities, and from the second half of the same year began to steadily increase the production of aircraft and aircraft engines. The main types of Soviet aircraft, maximally adapted to serial production, were produced in thousands and tens of thousands. The Il-2 attack aircraft became the most massive aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. having powerful armor and weapons.

If at the beginning of the war, Soviet fighters and bombers, with the exception of new types, were somewhat inferior to German ones in terms of flight performance, then in 1943 most types of Soviet aircraft surpassed them. During the war, 25 new aircraft models (including modifications) and 23 types of aircraft engines entered mass production.

A great contribution to the creation and improvement of new aircraft was made by talented aviation designers under the leadership of A.A. Arkhangelsky, M.I. Gurevich, S.V. Ilyushin, S.A. Lavochkin. A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Myasishchev, V.M. Petlyakova, N.N. Polikarpova, P.O. Sukhoi, L.N. Tupolev, A.S. Yakovlev and others, as well as aircraft engine designers V.Ya. Klimov, A.A. Mikulin, S.K. Tumansky, A.D. Shvetsov and others.

The Soviet shipbuilding industry met the needs of the fleet and partially the army (for example, the Krasnoye Sormovo plant produced tanks). Torpedo boats, submarines, auxiliary vessels and support equipment left the stocks. During the war years, more than 1,000 warships and boats of various classes were built. Weapons were improved, new technical means, new torpedoes, various types of mines, radar and hydroacoustic devices were mastered. A considerable merit in the creation of submarines and surface ships belongs to B.M. Malinin, V.A. Nikitin, M.A. Rudnitsky and others.

The ammunition industry played a huge role in the material support of the Armed Forces. At the beginning of the war, many enterprises in this industry were out of order, it was very difficult to evacuate enterprises for the production of gunpowder and explosives. The enterprises of other people's commissariats and departments had to be involved in the production of ammunition. New chemical industry plants were expanded and built, supplying the necessary raw materials: nitric acid, toluene, ammonia and other types of products. In an exceptionally short time, the production of new types of ammunition was mastered. In the course of the war, the possibilities for providing the front with various types of artillery ammunition, aerial bombs, mines, and land mines increased. If during the battle of Moscow, Soviet troops were forced to strictly limit ammunition, then in offensive operations in 1944-1945. their daily consumption has increased several times.

The successful development of military production ensured the superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the Wehrmacht in the main types of military equipment, which made it possible to increase their combat power, mobility and firepower.

The military-economic confrontation with Nazi Germany and its allies continued throughout the war. In this stubborn battle, socialism withstood and won, demonstrating the perfection of economic organization, the ability to concentrate all resources, capacities and forces on the solution of priority tasks. History has shown the advantages of the command-administrative system of the economy, based on the fact that enterprises and transport, the supply system and raw materials, natural wealth and material resources are in the hands of the state, in the ownership of the people.

The planned economy, combined with the art of management, opens up opportunities that no capitalist state has and cannot have.

Firstly, the socialist economy turned out to be more mobile and maneuverable, that is, capable of reorganizing itself faster and more quickly responding to changing demands, despite wartime conditions.

Secondly, the socialist economy has demonstrated the ability to make full and efficient use of material resources and capabilities to meet the needs of the front. Yielding to fascist Germany in the production of the most important types of industrial products, the Soviet Union was able to use every ton of metal and fuel, every piece of machine tool equipment with maximum efficiency, therefore, based on every thousand tons of steel smelted, Soviet industry produced five times more tanks and artillery pieces, a thousand metal-cutting machine tools produced - eight times more aircraft than the German industry.

The efficiency of socialist production also manifested itself in the reduction of costs per unit of military output. At the beginning of the war, the growth of military production was ensured mainly through the redistribution of resources, more intensive use of capacities, an increase in the number of workers and the length of the working week. From the middle of 1942, the growth of military production and the increase in the output of heavy industry was carried out due to an increase in labor productivity and a reduction in material costs.

Thirdly, the superiority of the Soviet economy in its confrontation with the economy of fascist Germany was ensured by a high concentration of industry, especially defense industry. So, having a smaller number of tank factories, the Soviet Union produced significantly more tanks than the enemy. Soviet tank building was large and highly concentrated.

Fourthly, the planned socialist economy concentrated forces and affinities on the solution of the main tasks. It met the needs of the country and the Armed Forces to the fullest extent and on an increasing scale. As a result, the technical equipment of the troops, their provision with ammunition and other materiel increased. The weight of an artillery and mortar salvo of a rifle division, which in July 1941 was 548 kg, increased by December 1944 to 1589 kg. During the war years, the Soviet Armed Forces received more than 10 million ammunition dumps, over 16 million tons of fuel, 40 million tons of food and fodder, as well as a large number of other materiel. The expansion of combat capabilities created the prerequisites for improving the organizational structure of the troops.

In preparing aggression against the Soviet Union, Germany used the economic potential of almost all of Europe.

The use of the economic resources of the occupied and dependent states, the expansion of basic industries and the military industry in Germany itself served as the basis for the rapid build-up of military production. In 1940 alone, the growth in the production of military products compared with 1939 amounted to about 54 percent. Directly in the pre-war and early war years, a series of new types of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and other types of military equipment were tested and launched. The military industry has sharply increased the production of artillery and infantry, armored and aviation weapons, and expanded the construction of submarines.

However, shortcomings were revealed in the production of certain types of military products, such as ammunition, which hindered an increase in their output.

In the context of a protracted military-economic confrontation, the German war economy faced a number of insurmountable difficulties. The lack of manpower was especially palpable. Mobilization in the Wehrmacht reduced the number of people employed in the human resources economy from 38.7 million in May 1939 to 34.5 million in May 1942, although the number of people employed in the military industry increased during this time from 2.4 million to 2.4 million. up to 5.0 million people. The shortage of workers was filled by the use of forced labor of foreign workers, prisoners of war, and prisoners of concentration camps.

The volume of capital construction contracted and continued to decline. During the war, imports of raw materials decreased, and an increasing amount of metal and fuel was directed to the needs of the military industry. The fascist leadership was forced to repeatedly revise military-industrial programs. For example, the construction of large surface ships was stopped, and the production of artillery pieces, ammunition, mortars, tanks and anti-tank artillery increased.

In the spring of 1942, measures were taken to centralize the management of the war economy. The Imperial Ministry of Armaments and Munitions has strengthened the leadership of the planning and production of military equipment for all branches of the armed forces. As a result, the output of military products increased significantly. At the beginning of 1943, the next stage of total mobilization was carried out, which contained a series of emergency measures to increase the production of weapons, ammunition and other types of military products.

The situation in the theaters of war, especially on the Soviet-German front, had a decisive influence on the development of military production. The losses of military equipment and the consumption of ammunition here far exceeded the losses of military campaigns in Poland and France. Despite the expansion of the production of weapons, the German war economy could hardly make up for the losses.

In 1943, German military production was about four times the level of 1939. It increased until the middle of 1941. Then its growth stopped. Priority was increasingly given to the production of means of armed struggle in the continental theater - armored vehicles, aircraft, artillery pieces, ammunition. The structure of produced weapons has changed. The aviation industry accelerated the production of fighters and attack aircraft, while at the same time the production of bombers, transport aircraft and aircraft for naval aviation was reduced. The production of tanks increased sharply. The production of assault and anti-tank guns expanded even more rapidly. In 1943, the production of V-1 projectiles was mastered, and in 1944, V-2 missiles. In total, 2034 thousand V-1 and 6.1 thousand V-2 were produced.

In July 1944, military production reached its maximum in Germany, after which its non-stop decline began. The end of 1944 - the first half of 1945 is characterized by an increasing decline in military production. In March 1945, it decreased in comparison with July 1944 by 2.2 times. The gap between the aggressive, adventuristic aspirations of fascist Germany and the limited possibilities of the economy became one of the reasons for its defeat.

In Germany, in 1944, compared with 1939, the level of military production by the communes increased fivefold, significantly exceeding the maximum level of the First World War, with an incomparably higher efficiency and complexity of the equipment produced. The increase in the production of weapons occurred spasmodically, military programs were repeatedly revised. It was not possible to maintain the military-technical advantage achieved at the beginning; in terms of the overall size of military production, the Axis countries were inferior to their opponents.

The main economic efforts of Germany were aimed at ensuring the actions of the Wehrmacht in land theaters in Europe, primarily on the Soviet-German front. This was one of the reasons that the leadership of the Reich was unable to allocate sufficient funds for operations at sea. The mass production of submarines, which represented the main force in the struggle on sea lanes, was deployed already during the war, about two years after it began.

2.2 Ways of communication and means of communication during the war years

The focus of any operational planning has always been and will be questions related to transport, communication routes, their condition and suitability for use, as well as questions related to the degree of their vulnerability to the enemy. Due to the fact that the German high command dismissively reacted to these issues and in the fall of 1941 did not take into account the difficulties encountered in Russia (thaw and harsh Russian winter), the fate of transport in this war turned out to be truly tragic.

The most reliable and most efficient means of communication in World War II were the railroads. With the highly developed railway network of Western Europe, of course, one could not expect otherwise. In Russia, the importance of railways has increased even more. This was facilitated by vast distances, the poor quality of highways and dirt roads, harsh climatic conditions, as well as the need for rapid deployment of troops to strengthen one or another sector of the front. In the end, the railway communication turned into an operational factor of the first magnitude, because everything depended on it, from the supply to the evacuation of troops. The criterion for the overall capacity of the railway network was not only the capacity of individual sections of the track, but also all operational devices and structures, that is, the communication network, the signaling system, railway workshops and the loading and unloading capacity of stations. While in Western Europe almost all of these prerequisites were available, primitive Russian equipment required additional effort. Of all the jobs, probably the simplest was re-gauging. The most time-consuming was the construction of temporary field railways in roadless areas, where, due to mudslides, all communication was sometimes completely stopped.

The second most important way of communication for overcoming long distances was the auto-drawn road. The highways were basically of two types: firstly, a widely ramified network of first-class highways and, secondly, more powerful, but few German motorways with separate traffic. Interestingly, the German high command from the very beginning asserted that these roads were not of great importance for the war. It was absolutely certain that in the event of an air attack, these roads were easily found by enemy aircraft, and such a road made it almost impossible for a large military formation attacked from the air to evade. During the war, it also became clear that, despite attempts to disguise the highways, they always served as good reference points for enemy aircraft.

Even at the beginning of the war, it was decided to streamline and expand the road network in the occupied areas, continuing the road network of Germany in all directions, and designate through roads running from east to west and from north to south with letters and numbers. In 1942, that is, at the time when the length of land communications was maximum, one of them began at the Atlantic Ocean and ended at the Volga.

Of course, the degree of suitability of roads in individual sections was different: wide and straight French roads were replaced by winding and sometimes very narrow German roads, and in Russia (not counting the Minsk-Moscow highway and some other roads in industrial areas) the so-called "tracts" began, that is, natural carriageways, the state of which, according to European concepts, was completely unsuitable for operation.

In the process of expanding the theaters of operations, sea routes along the coast of Norway, in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean Sea became important communication routes for the German armed forces. All of them were under the strong threat of enemy air raids, the ships were blown up by mines, they were often attacked by submarines. As with railroads, the reliability of communication by sea depended to a large extent on the availability of well-equipped ports and fuel stations, which in turn determined the size of the vessels used.

In the Second World War, for the first time in history, air transport was widely used. Aviation played a large role in the transport of troops and military materials, not to mention the fact that it was the only means of transport during airborne operations.

The exceptional features of aviation made it possible to use it to supply, replenish and evacuate encircled groupings. It was from this time that the history of the creation of air bridges began, which, having undergone a number of organizational and technical improvements, became the main means of communication between disparate groupings of troops.

Air bridges to Narvik, Crete and the Demyansk pocket were a great success, although there were very heavy losses. This is explained by the fact that with the lengthening of the air route laid over the territory of the enemy, the vulnerability of the air route also increases. Without significant air superiority, it is impossible to build your operational plans on the smooth operation of air transport, because this invariably carries with it a huge risk. That is why the air supply of the German group surrounded by Stalingrad turned out to be impossible.

Finally, for the unloading of railways, especially when transporting oversized cargo, inland waterways were widely used. However, the last war showed that they were very often mined. Apart from the rivers that were intended to transport coal in Germany itself, the main waterway was the Danube, because Romanian oil was delivered through it to Germany. For its acceptance in Vienna and Regensburg, there were appropriate port equipment and warehouses.

The Germans did not use (probably due to lack of raw materials) another means of transport - the oil pipeline, which in the future will certainly become very important. He will free the rest of the lines of communication, easily vulnerable to the enemy. The Soviet Union had such an oil pipeline even before the war. It passed from the Caucasian oil fields to the Donets Basin.

Finally, a specifically Russian way of communication was the railway laid on the ice. Through the southern tip of Lake Ladoga, the Russians laid a rather powerful temporary railway across the ice, through which the encircled Leningrad was supplied. A prerequisite for such an enterprise is the presence of a shallow, current-free basin.

2.3 Development of science and culture during the war period

The main directions of the scientific and technological policy of the Soviet state at the end of 1942 and in 1943 were determined by the growing needs of armed struggle and the military economy, the requirements of scientific and technological progress in military production and in the basic industries, the development of transport, agriculture, the need to solve complex problems of the restoration of the national economy, as well as the further development of scientific potential, the organization of work in new fundamental areas of science, defense and national economic significance.

The scientific and technical policy of the Soviet state provided for a system of measures for the regrouping of scientific forces, re-evacuation and restoration of scientific institutions in the central and western regions, the expansion of scientific bases in the rear regions of the country, for the most effective use of them for defense and the development of the national economy, culture and the solution of a number of foreign policy tasks.

The war caused serious damage to the scientific potential of the country. Many talented scientists died at the fronts, died of starvation and disease, were tortured to death by the occupiers, and were subjected to repression.

Evaluation of the achievements of German science is controversial. On the one hand, it descends to the cause of Germany's defeat in the war, and on the other hand, it rises to enormous heights, causing admiration even among the most highly developed opponents, which means that the activities of German research scientists in the Second World War cannot be reduced to some general simple denominator, but should be considered as a versatile and comprehensive set of scientific relations.

In 1939, the political leaders of Germany, guided by the experience of the war with Poland, hoped mainly for a short-term war. They strongly argued that the war must be won with the weapons with which it was started. New improvements, which were "ripe for the front" only in subsequent years, were considered of no interest. Scientists whose work was only in its very early stages, and who still needed years to achieve results useful for the war, were of no practical value to the government. Therefore, scientists were assigned to the category of human reserves, from which replenishment for the front was scooped.

Some time passed, and sobering blows rained down on the German army. The war in Russia radically changed its original character. In submarine warfare, the superior quality and quantity of enemy aircraft caused a deep crisis. There was no doubt that without new aircraft the war would be lost, that the weapons, equipment and vehicles used in Russia would have to meet the deadly conditions of climate and terrain, that high-frequency technology had now become the most important link in all military equipment.

In order to prevent the extinction of entire scientific disciplines and to preserve irreplaceable personnel, it was even decided to recall 100 scientists from the humanities from the front. It was necessary to save what could still be saved.

But even these measures could not completely restore the former state of German science.

Sharing the fate of their people, literary and artistic figures made a great contribution to the formation of public consciousness and the education of millions of Soviet people under the exceptionally difficult conditions of the second period of the war.

The events of 1943 were reflected in all types of artistic creativity.

If the initial period of the war brought to life the most massive and operational forms of creativity, then from 1942-1943. works of a generalizing nature appear, comprehending the decisive events and facts of the war.

During all the years of the war, essays and journalism remained the most important form of literary creativity; they were directly subordinated to the combat tasks of the day. The speed of response - that's what the situation demanded first of all, what the front and rear were waiting for. In 1943, as in the first period of the war, on all fronts next to the soldiers were correspondents from central and front-line newspapers.

The successful offensive of the Red Army and the expulsion of the Nazis from the Soviet land was also reflected in the work of front-line artists. They were in the midst of military events and that is why they were able to recreate the pictures of the war with great expressive power: heavy battles and everyday front-line life, portraits of soldiers and officers, liberated cities and villages.

In 1943, cultural life in the rear was intense. New performances and concert programs, exhibitions, celebrations of anniversaries of outstanding figures of Russian and world culture introduced tens of thousands of Soviet people to the cultural life.

Soviet literature and art actively contributed to the military alliance and solidarity of freedom-loving peoples, helped to reveal the truth about the struggle and victories of the Red Army, about selfless work in the rear and in cities and villages resurrecting from ruins and ashes. Soviet art and literature brought up patriotism, hatred of fascism, feelings of international unity and friendship of peoples.

Conclusion

After conducting this study, analyzing the course of the war, with all its pluses and minuses for both sides, we can draw the following, quite logical, conclusion: the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was possible due to the fact that the USSR surpassed it not only in military, but in economic and moral and psychological terms.

In the context of a protracted military-economic confrontation, the German war economy faced a number of insurmountable difficulties. Particularly noticeable was the lack of manpower, and in the last stages of the war, a catastrophic shortage of resources.

In the military field during the Second World War, one of the main problems was determined - the capture, retention and consolidation of the strategic initiative. In terms of the quantitative production of weapons and equipment, the USSR surpassed Germany already in 1940; the qualitative characteristics of domestic weapons were still inferior to German ones, but here, too, the Soviet Union was closing its gap, ahead of the enemy in a number of new technical developments.

The economic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and its allies became very acute and continued throughout the war. Possessing a smaller industrial base, the Soviet Union achieved a radical change in the economic confrontation with the enemy, ensuring a high growth in the total volume of military production and the production of military equipment and weapons than fascist Germany. In the economy of the fascist bloc, despite the presence of even greater opportunities and a significant increase in the output of military products, the level of military production lagged behind the rapidly growing needs of the armies of the Wehrmacht and the countries allied with Germany.

The successful development of military production ensured the superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the Wehrmacht in the main types of military equipment, which made it possible to increase their combat power, mobility and firepower. In this stubborn battle, the Soviet Union withstood and won, demonstrating the perfection of economic organization, the ability to concentrate all resources, capacities and forces on the solution of priority tasks.

It is impossible to accurately calculate the human and material losses in the Second World War. If in the First World War the losses amounted to 10 million killed and 20 million wounded, then in the last war the total number of deaths alone is about 50 million people. The Soviet Union suffered especially great losses in the war, losing more than 20 million of its sons and daughters. Most of them are civilians. As a result of the war, 21,245 thousand people lost their homes. 30 million dwellings were destroyed. Huge damage was done to the infrastructure of central and eastern Europe, cities and factories lay in ruins. The war forced the development of new technologies and production solutions at an accelerated pace. With all its sacrifices, it gave impetus to the industrial development of Siberia, the eastern and southern regions of the USSR, where many industrial production facilities were evacuated during the war years.

In the course of the work, the socio-political prerequisites for the war, the economic situation of the participating countries before its start, and, directly, the military, and at the same time the political and ideological confrontation between the USSR and National Socialist Germany, were considered. Some causes and consequences of the defeat of the Nazi Reich and the victory of the USSR in World War II are also highlighted.

List of used literature

1.Aniskov V.T., Basov A.V. Soviet rear during the period of a radical change in the Great Patriotic War. Moscow, 1989

2.Vasiliev A.F. Industry of the Urals during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Moscow, 1982

.Zaritsky B.E. Economy of Germany. Moscow, 2003

4.History of the world economy. / Ed. G.B. Polyak, A.N. Markova. - M., 1999

5.History of Economics./ Ed. V.V. Naukhatsky. - Rostov-n/D, 2005

.History of the economy. / Ed. O.V. Kuznetsova, I.N. Shapkina. - M., 2000

7.Kalinin I. Memory of the war after 60 years. Moscow, 2005

8.Kondakova N.I. Ideological victory over fascism, 1941-1945 Moscow, 1982

9.Konotopov M.V., Smetanin S.I. History of the economy of foreign countries. - M., 2001

10.Kudrov V.M. World economy. - M., 2004

11.Kravchenko G.S. Military economy of the USSR, 1941-1945. Moscow, 1963

12.Patrushev A.I. Germany in the twentieth century. Moscow, 2004

.Sekistov V.A. War and politics. Moscow, 1989

14.Economic history of foreign countries. / Under the general editorship. IN AND. Golubovich. - Minsk, 1997.

15.Sergei Pereslegin. World War II between Realities / author's edition. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

system of knowledge about laws, military strategist. the nature of the war, ways to prevent it, the construction and preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for war, the laws, principles and methods of conducting weapons. struggle. War as a complex socio-political. the phenomenon is studied by many societies., natural. and tech. sciences. Main the subject of V.N. is armed. fight. V.n. explores the problems of war and armament. struggle, taking into account the dependence of its course and outcome on the ratio of economics., Moral-polit., Scientific and technical. and military capabilities of the belligerents, its forms, methods of preparation and conduct in strategic, operational. and tact. scale in large-scale, regional, local wars and armed conflicts; composition, organization and technology. aircraft equipment; problems of military training and education, training of the population and mobilization. resources for war; content, forms and methods of management (leadership) of troops (forces) in peacetime and military. time.
Originating in ancient times, V.n. went through a difficult path of development. In the era of slavery, the first military-ist. and military theory. works. Based on the study of wars and battles, their analysis, historians, writers, generals, philosophers Dr. Greece, Dr. Rome and Dr. China created a number of works (descriptions of military campaigns, treatises, instructions), in which recommendations were made for the preparation and conduct of wars and battles. The most important were the works of the military. Chinese theorists - Sunzi, Dr. Greece - Vegetia, Herodotus, Xenophon, Onisander, Polybius, Frontipa, Thucydides.
In the era of feudalism, before the formation of centralization. absolutist state-in, typical of the West. Europe were limited in purpose and scope of the war, to-rye were not numerous. armies (see Knight's army). This predetermined stagnation in the development of the military-theoretical. thoughts. A major step in the development of the military. knowledge was made during the period of the decomposition of feudalism and the emergence of bourgeois. relations. Among the military Theorists of this period are distinguished by N. Machiavelli, who in his treatise "On the Art of War" (1521) outlined the principles of warfare and the patterns of development of the military. claims of his era. In the 16th - 17th centuries. military regulations are being developed, to-rye reflect the experience of wars and regulate military relations. One of the first statutes was created by Moritz of Nassau in the Netherlands. A noticeable trace in the history of the development of the fatherland. military theory. thoughts in this era were left by Ivan Peresvetov, who compiled in the 16th century. for Ivan the Terrible, the program of military reform, the clerk of the Ambassadorial order, Onisim Mikhailov (Rodishevsky), who developed in 1607 the "Charter of military, cannon and other matters relating to military science ..." (supplemented in 1621). In 1647, by decree of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, "The Teaching and Cunning of the Military Structure of Infantry Men" was published.
At 18 - 1st floor. 19th century Russia has put forward talented commanders and naval commanders, such as Peter I, P.S. Saltykov, P.A. Rumyantsev, A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov, F.F. Ushakov and others, to-rye made a great contribution to the formation and development of the fatherland. theory and practice of military and naval forces. lawsuit. Peter I developed one of the first fathers. concepts of preparing the state for war, organization, training and education rus. troops, their conduct of hostilities. He was the author and editor of a number of military regulations, military-theoretical. and ist. works (see the Military Charter of 1716, the Marine Charter of 1720, etc.). Suvorov's "Science of Victory" was the advanced theory of military art of its time. In Zap. In Europe during this period, a galaxy of major military figures and theorists appeared - Napoleon I, A. Jomini, K. Clausewitz, H. Moltke (Senior), and others.
At the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries. mass armies were created, new weapons appeared and began to be used. struggle: tanks, aircraft, rapid-fire cannons, machine guns, submarines. The scale and nature of warfare has changed. actions, which led to a new leap in the development of military-theoretical. thoughts. At this time, among the German military The most famous theorists were K. Goltz and A. Schlieffen. In France, the military theorist Marshal F. Foch in his works "On the principles of war", "On the conduct of war" and "Memoirs" of the main. military way. action claimed offensive. English and Amer. theorists (F. Colomb, A. Mahan and others) play a decisive role in armaments. the fight was assigned to the naval. forces and dominance at sea were considered as the basic law of war and a necessary condition for victory over the avenue.
In the development of Russian military theory. thoughts of the 19th century A significant contribution was made by A.I. Astafiev, G.I. Butakov, M.I. Dragomirov, G.A. Leer, S.O. Makarov, D.A. Milyutin, N.P. Mikhnevich, P.S. Nakhimov. They discarded the obsolete military-theoretical. views and put forward new concepts, created works that reflected many new phenomena in the military. deed. In con. 19 - beg. 20th century in Russia, two (the second - incomplete) military encyclopedias were carried out. publications: "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences" and "Military Encyclopedia", summarizing the theory of military. affairs of that time. In the last of them, in particular, the definition of V.n. and formulated the principles of military. lawsuits (see military encyclopedias).
1st world. the war served as a new impetus for the development of V.N. It contributed to the disclosure of patterns that reflect the dependence of the conduct of war on politics and economics, as well as on the state of the rear of the state. During the war, experience was gained in preparing and conducting a front. and arm. come. and defend. operations, as well as sea. operations, organization of combined arms., Mor. and air. fight. The theory of breakthrough positional defense has received great development. At the same time, the problem of developing a breakthrough in operations was not fully resolved. and strategist. scale.
In the interwar During the period, multimillion-strong armies were created, all types of aircraft were developed, with special attention being paid to the tank. troops and aviation. Under the influence of extensive motorization of the Armed Forces in the 20-30s. theories of "mechanized (tank) warfare" and "air warfare" appeared, incl. and the use of air. landings.
Means. role in the formation and development of V.N. Owls. state-va played major owls. scientists, talented military leaders, military specialists. So, M.V. Frunze did a lot to develop the theoretical. the basics of owls. military doctrine, general principles of military science, strategy and tactics, construction of the Armed Forces, military training and education. M.N. Tukhachevsky explored the development of the theory of strategy and the main directions of the development of the military. technology. A.I. Egorov and S.S. Kamenev summarized the experience of Citizens. war and formulated a number of recommendations on the military. building B.M. Shaposhnikov wrote the fundamental work "The Brain of the Army", in which he outlined the basics of a strategist. control of the sun, showed the value of Gen. headquarters for the defense of the country. A.A. Svechin gave a deep analysis of the development of strategy and tactics from ancient times to the present day. Fatherland military theory. thought also summarized the experience of preparing and conducting modern. operations, on the basis of new to-rogo in the middle. 30s the theory of deep operation was developed. It was a major achievement of V.N. and received a wide practical. application in Vel. Fatherland war. The most significant contribution to the development of the problems of V.N. during these years, V.A. Alafuzov, Ya.I. Alksnis (Astrov), K.I. Velichko, G.S. Isserson, K.B. Kalinovsky, D.M. Karbyshev, S.N. Krasilnikov, A.N. Lapchinsky, S.A. Mezheninov, V.K. Triandafillov, I.P. Uborevich, E.A. Shilovsky, R.P. Eideman and others.
In the USSR for the years Vel. Fatherland war V.N. rose to a new level of development. Development of flexible forms of preparation and conduct of defense. operations with the subsequent transition to the counteroffensive, the theory of strategist. come. operation, solving the problem of breakthrough tact. and oper. defense with the subsequent encirclement and destruction of large gr-k troops, the development of new methods of combat use and interaction of various types of the Armed Forces and combat arms, the development of such an effective form of fire destruction of the pr-ka as art. and aviation offensive, new battle formations, comprehensive support for operations, firm command and control, and many others. other issues have made a great contribution to the development of the theory of military action and V.N. in general, and ensured victory over a strong and dangerous pr-com.
After the 2nd world. war V.N. receives further development, which is due to the growth of scientific and technical. base, the emergence of new powerful weapons. struggle, primarily nuclear missiles and other means of mass destruction. There was a real threat of a nuclear war. Under these conditions, V.n. Owls. the state was forced to concentrate its efforts on studying possible ways for the aggressor to unleash and then wage such a war. At the same time, the search for ways to prevent nuclei was of paramount importance. war.
In the 80s. in the USSR, in the 90s. 20th century and early 21st century in the Russian Federation, the development of military-theoretical. thought was directed at preventing both nuclear and conventional war; development of response measures to repel possible aggression; search for the most effective ways of building aircraft.
In modern the structure of V.N. distinguish: general foundations (general theory) VN, military theory. lawsuit, construction of the Armed Forces, military training and education, weapons, control of the Armed Forces, military. economy and rear, types of aircraft, as well as corresponding. military sections. stories. Each of the components of V.n. has its own structure, in which, in addition to the basics of the correspondences. branches of knowledge can be divided into several sections (private theories).
General foundations (general theory) V.n. include logical-methodical. and general theoretical problems of V.N.: subject, structure, tasks, internal. and ext. interrelation V.n.; definition of the system of its categories and methods; study of the laws and patterns of weapons. struggle, construction of the Armed Forces, other phenomena and processes. To new tasks V.n. can be attributed: the development of the concept of non-traditional wars and armed conflicts, forms and methods of information confrontation; tactical and technical justification of the requirements for fundamentally new types of weapons; scientific support for the development of automated control systems for troops (forces) built on the basis of computer networks; further development of the theory of military art; increasing the effectiveness of military training based on the comprehensive computerization of the educational process in military universities and combat training of troops; improvement of forms and methods of comprehensive provision of troops; optimization of forms and methods of military scientific research, development of military systemology, military futurology, and other new branches of military science; improvement of the methodology of V.n.
The theory of military art - is part of V.N. and includes the theory of strategy, operators. claims and tactics. The theory of strategy explores the military strategist. nature of war, laws, principles and methods of armament. struggle in strategist. scale. Theory of operators. lawsuit studies the nature, patterns, principles and methods of preparing and conducting general-skovye (general fleet) joint and independent. operations (combat operations) operators. united types of aircraft. The theory of tactics deals with the preparation and conduct of combat subdivisions, parts and connections. on land, sea and in the air. In accordance with this, it includes the theory of combined arms tactics. combat and the theory of tactics of types and types of the Armed Forces, as well as special. types of troops, with the maximum use of the possibilities of new means of armed struggle.
The theory of organizational development of the Armed Forces is the most important component of military organizational development. It explores the problems of maintaining the troops and forces of the fleet in a high degree of combat readiness for the performance of combat missions and for mobilization; determining and improving the most appropriate organization. structures of the armed forces; defines and substantiates the principles and methods of manning the aircraft, their tech. equipment, preparation of reserves; develops military training systems. personnel and their passage of military. services; prepares recommendations on the organization of the service of troops and the quartering of troops (forces) in peacetime and military. time, etc.
The theory of military training and indoctrination develops the forms and methods of operations. and combat training, the formation of high moral and combat qualities among soldiers, their military education in the process of combat training, military. service, strengthening military discipline, coordinating subsections, units (ships) and conn. in order to ensure their high combat capability and combat readiness.
Armament theory develops scientifically based conclusions and recommendations for conducting a unified military-technical. politics in the armed forces.
The theory of command and control of the Armed Forces explores the laws, principles and methods of work of the command (commanders, chiefs), headquarters and other control bodies to maintain constant combat readiness of troops (forces), to prepare operations and conduct combat operations, to lead troops (forces) in the performance of assigned tasks. , as well as for the management of combat training, life and activities of troops (forces) in the world. and military time.
The theory of the military economy and logistics of the Armed Forces explores the nature, volume, methods of accumulation and use of material resources necessary to ensure the activities of the Armed Forces and conduct a predictable war, military. aspects of the transfer of the country to the military. time, ways to improve the sustainability of household-economy. complex of the country during the war.
The theory of types and genera of VS explores the basics of their preparation and use.
Military history within the boundaries of the subject V.N. studies the history of wars, the history of the military. thoughts, military art-va, the history of the construction of the Armed Forces, weapons, and other areas of the military. affairs.
V.n. also associated with society., natural. and tech. sciences, which leads to the allocation of military-en. problems and the formation of special. branches of knowledge aimed at solving problems in the interests of strengthening the country's defense. In the field of societies. Sciences important for the Armed Forces are the theory of military. law, military psychology, military pedagogy, etc. Development of the military. problems in the field of natural sciences. Sciences led to the emergence of such military-special sciences as military. geography, military cartography, military geodesy, military topography, military hydrometeorology, military. navigation, military medicine, etc. In the field of tech. sciences revealed branches of knowledge, to-rye called military-technical. sciences. Being inherently, like all tech. sciences, applied, they explore tech. problems that are directly or indirectly related to the military. needs. This includes military theories. communications, military radio electronics, military cybernetics, ballistics, shooting, bombing, etc. V.n. and military sections of knowledge (problematics) of other sciences can be considered in aggregate as an interconnected system of knowledge.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 5/2004

About structure and content military science at the present stage development of military thought

Retired Lieutenant GeneralS.A. BOGDANOV ,

doctor of military sciences

MILITARY SCIENCE has passed, as is well known, a difficult path of development. At each historical stage, from the era of edged weapons to the era of nuclear weapons, the experience of armed struggle acquired by peoples and states led to the accumulation of a wide variety of knowledge about military affairs, which military and statesmen, scientists, theorists and practitioners described in the form of a theory of armed combat, the theory of military affairs and generalized in the form of a certain system of military-theoretical knowledge of military science, formed its structure and content.

The First and Second World Wars became a powerful impetus for the development of military science as a system of knowledge about the laws, the military-strategic nature of wars, the development and preparation of the armed forces and the population of states for wars, and the methods of conducting armed struggle. The generalization and development of this knowledge in our country and abroad manifested itself most clearly, in my opinion, in the second half of the 20th century, both in the form of the publication of fundamental monographs and sound scientific articles, among which articles in the journal Military Thought were notable for their time. ".

An analysis of these publications shows that the interpretation of the structure and content of military science has always depended on understanding the essence of war, its social and military-technical side; the degree of maturity and level of development of military science in general and its theoretical and methodological foundations in particular; the nature and characteristics of the development of the material and technical base of military affairs; the nature of economic, socio-political relations in society and the political system of the state; the nature and main trends of each particular era, its contradictions and trends.

In recent years, the attention to the problems of the development of military science has again increased in the journal's publications. Among them, in my opinion, the articles by M.A. Gareeva, S.A. Tyushkevich, V.A. Vinogradova, V.D. Ryabchuk and V.A. Kulikov (see Military thought. 2000. No. 2, 3, 6; 2001. No. 1, 2, 6; 2002. No. 3). In these articles, the authors, on the basis of rich personal experience, give their vision of the system of military scientific knowledge, their role in shaping the structure and content of military science, show that today the effectiveness of solving complex problems of the military security of the state is directly related to the level of development of the methodology of military scientific research.

Doctor of Philosophy S.A. Tyushkevich, for example, emphasizes in his article that “the state of military science does not fully meet modern requirements, and some of its provisions, conclusions and recommendations are simply outdated ... Some of their provisions and principles are uncritically discarded, and the formation of new ones is difficult, because schools and trends collide in this process, explaining the current stage in the development of military affairs in different ways.

Of particular interest is the article by Doctor of Historical Sciences V.A. Kulikov, in which it is proposed to "determine the general concepts of the military affairs of the state, the system of its military-scientific knowledge." According to the author of the article, “in the vast majority of scientific reference publications of recent years, the term “military science” was either simply absent, or it was defined not as an activity, but as a “conditional term” ... or as “theory and practice” ... As a result, not only did the unjustified substitution of the concept of "theory of military affairs" by the concept of "military science (or sciences)", which some political scientists and military experts ambiguously elevated to the "science of sciences", begin to take place, but the effectiveness of the military affairs of the Russian state began to decline.

I consider it necessary to emphasize that, in my opinion, there is no substitution of the concept of "theory of military affairs", and there has not been, and the effectiveness of military affairs has decreased due to the radical democratic transformations of our society. V.A. Kulikov admits that the core of the "theory of military affairs of the state" is military science, but at the same time, in the proposed version of the structure of this theory, he singled out for military science, in my opinion, a small, isolated cell with limited functions, and military-political, military - strategic, military-technical and military-economic foundations and scientific foundations for the development of military doctrine included in the structure of the theory of military affairs of the state in place of the first, fundamental element of this structure, with which one cannot agree.

It is common knowledge that there is a special relationship between military science (including military affairs) and military doctrine. The doctrine in the broad sense expresses the views and attitudes of nations, states on the possibilities and ways of achieving their political goals using military means. The special status of military doctrine is determined by the fact that it is formed on the basis of the achievement of all military-theoretical knowledge and specific military-political practice, contains the most important provisions developed by many sciences and adopted by bodies of the highest political and military leadership, which gives these provisions an official and directive character. . But at the same time, it cannot be an integral part of the theory of military affairs.

We cannot agree with the statement of V.A. Kulikov that "military scientific reference publications published both in our country and abroad reflect military knowledge, interpret concepts and terms at the level of generalization, as a rule, 2030 years ago." In my opinion, in recent years, more precisely at the beginning of the 21st century, all military scientific concepts and terms have undergone a radical reformation. Apparently, for this reason, the publication of the Military Encyclopedia, which V.A. Kulikov is delayed.

However, new dictionaries and reference books are being published and are being prepared for publication. For example, in the Dictionary of Basic Terms and Concepts in the Sphere of Military Security prepared for publication, edited by State Duma deputy D.O. Rogozin and Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, General of the Army A.V. Kvashnin, the concept of "military affairs" is interpreted as follows. This is “a collective term covering all issues of military theory and practice related to the construction, preparation and actions of the armed forces of the state in peacetime and wartime, as well as the preparation of the economy, population and the country as a whole for war. In a narrow sense, this is a system of knowledge and skills of military personnel to fulfill their military duty.

The same dictionary also gives a new interpretation of the definition of military science: “This is a system of knowledge about the strategic nature and laws of war, the construction and preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and methods of conducting armed struggle. The object of knowledge of military science is war, which it investigates along with other social, natural and technical sciences. The subject of military science is armed struggle during various wars and conflicts. These definitions of the terms "military science" and "military science" allow us to reason about the military-scientific theory of the state.

The change of historical epochs, changes in the nature of international relations, turns in the social technology of the state, the transformation of Russia into a corrupt oligarchic state with a disrupted economy, the emergence of fundamentally new types of weapons, armaments and equipment on a new technological basis lead to the fact that trends in the construction of the Armed Forces are changing. Forces, their technical equipment, training and education of personnel, and, accordingly, in the field of military art. Some of them leave the stage, others are born, some are preserved, but acquire new features. All this leaves an imprint on the nature of the structure and content of military science and military affairs as a whole.

With the collapse of the bipolar world, the geopolitical situation in it has changed dramatically. The United States, remaining the only superpower, has vigorously launched what former British Environment Secretary Mike Mitcher has called the "Project for a New American Century." Every year their desire for globalism is more and more clearly visible. At the initiative of the United States in various regions of the world, the number of wars (armed conflicts) has sharply increased, during which the States achieve their military and economic goals. An analysis of the content of these wars (armed conflicts) shows that they cover all spheres of life of the opposing states, include all forms and methods of struggle, of which armed is not always the main one.

As a result of the emergence of fundamentally new means of warfare, as well as methods of its conduct, the role and importance of the spheres of armed struggle has been redistributed. The aerospace sphere has come to the fore, with a simultaneous sharp increase in the influence of information warfare on the course and outcome of the war. These cardinal changes made it necessary to develop and use in the course of modern wars (armed conflicts) completely new forms and methods of conducting military operations. And this, of course, requires the use of new methods for predicting the totality of military phenomena, a unified approach to solving both general and particular problems of military science.

In this situation, a new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought began, reflecting new phenomena in the content of regional (local) wars of the 21st century and armed struggle in particular, the influence of the economic, social and military capabilities of the state, its military organization on the conduct of modern war and the war of the future. The outcome of the war began to depend on the military-technological development of the opposing states, the availability of a sufficient number of high-precision weapons of various bases and the ability of the parties to proactively use information technology. Other trends in modern warfare have also developed. In this regard, there is a need to clarify the laws of its conduct, which have a certain significance for the content and structure of military science.

At a new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought, the main efforts of military science will also be directed to the knowledge of the social and natural-technical forms of movement occurring in modern warfare in general and armed struggle in particular. The specific aspects of war, which are studied only by military science and which no other branch of knowledge can cognize, will be, as in the past, primarily the definition of the strategic nature of war, the knowledge of its laws, the development of principles and methods for the preparation and conduct of armed struggle in the strategic, operational and tactical scale, etc.

Military science, while investigating the content of armed struggle, will continue simultaneously to consider its connections with the general laws of war, socio-economic and socio-political factors, to form military-strategic provisions for the military doctrine of the state, to ensure its military security. And at a new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought, military science in our country will, in all likelihood, be considered as a system of knowledge about the laws, the military-strategic nature of wars, armed conflicts, ways to prevent them, build and prepare the Armed Forces and the country for military security , about the patterns, principles, forms and methods of conducting armed struggle to protect the Russian state, its interests in the international arena.

Without any doubt, military science as a system of military scientific knowledge, covering a significant number of interrelated subjects, disciplines, theories, will have a complex structure. Of course, when clarifying the latter, it will be necessary to use the principles of scientific logic, according to which one or another particular theory is required to be singled out on one basis, not to allow duplication, that is, to include in this theory questions that make up only its content.

The structure of military science has had and will have a significant impact on the creation of research structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, its research institutes, research centers, problem laboratories and other research organizations. It will help to more accurately determine the participation of other sciences in military research and to obtain significant results, purposefully solve the problem of training scientific personnel and their specialization.

In this regard, the structure of military science at a new stage of its development, adjusted to the new military-political realities in the Russian state and in the whole world, can be represented as a system of knowledge about war and military security in the aggregate of the following interrelated components: general theory; theory of military art; theory of construction of the Armed Forces; theory of military training and education; the theory of war economy; theory of command and control of the Armed Forces; comprehensive support theory; weapons theory; theory of military history; theories of types and arms of the Armed Forces; private theories of other troops of the military organization of the state (Fig.). It should be noted that initially such a scheme in the form of a system of knowledge about the war, the army and defense security was developed and published by General of the Army M.A. Gareev.

V.A. Kulikov. However, the radical changes that have taken place in the world as a whole, and in Russia in particular, necessitate an urgent need to introduce some clarifications into the content and structure of military science.

At the new stage in the development of military theoretical thought, military science will occupy a central place in the general system of military theoretical knowledge. It will be closely connected with the basic social sciences and military doctrine, social, natural and technical sciences, which develop specific military problems in the interests of ensuring armed struggle. Acting as a coordinating core, military science will enrich other sciences with concrete knowledge about the future development of military affairs, aim at topical problems, orient them in a certain way, using its own concepts, categories, laws and research methods. At the same time, military science must actively use the results obtained by other sciences and include some of them in its content.

The most important component of military science will be the theory of state military security, which studies the goals and state strategy in the field of ensuring the security of society, the Armed Forces and the state from external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, man-made, environmental, informational and other nature, taking into account available resources and capabilities of the Armed Forces and the state in close interaction with adjacent sciences that are intertwined with military sciences.

In the new conditions of the country's development, the system of scientific knowledge about war and military security will continue to be filled with military-social, military-natural and military-technical sciences related to military security issues, the creation of means of armed struggle and its conduct (military problems of social, natural and technical sciences, adjacent, butt with military science).

As an analysis of the evolution of military science shows, its structure never remains unchanged. With the development of military science itself, the emergence of new tasks for it, the increase in the range, depth and volume of knowledge, the structure of military science will be refined and improved, new components or sections will appear, and the interconnections between them will change. This will also be facilitated by the processes of integration and differentiation of knowledge, which are characteristic of the development of modern sciences, including military sciences.

At a new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought, the general theory will reflect the results of studying, first of all, the laws of modern warfare and armed struggle, which express essential connections in these phenomena themselves. At the same time, an important factor will remain the general methodological requirement of dialectical logic, which consists in considering this or that phenomenon to take into account not one law or category, but all the basic laws and categories of materialistic dialectics in their interaction, since each of them in application to cognition military affairs serves as a methodological principle that makes it possible to reveal certain features and essential aspects of the new processes of modern warfare in general and armed struggle in particular, to clarify the relationship and interdependence with other laws of military science. That is, the general theory of military science must have uniform methodological fundamental principles for all its constituent parts.

The general theory, as before, will investigate the object, subject, structure and methods of military science, its role and place in the general system of military theoretical knowledge; to identify and cognize the categories, laws and principles of armed struggle, the development of the Armed Forces in conjunction with general knowledge about the war. But at a new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought, the search for more effective methods and forms of solving the problems of military science will acquire special significance in the study of general principles.

It must be assumed that the theory of military art at a new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought will remain one of the main components of military science, continuing to explore and learn the nature, patterns, principles, forms and methods of preparing and conducting armed struggle of all scales. In its research, this theory, even at a new stage, will be based on objective laws, will use the provisions and conclusions obtained by other sections of military science, as well as branches of the social, natural and technical sciences participating in the study of problems of military affairs.

At a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces on October 2, 2003, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation emphasized that "the relationship between strategy, operational art and tactics has changed, although all these categories of military art will retain their significance." In this connection, the tasks of the theory of military art must undergo some refinement. It is quite natural that, as in the past, the most important of them will be the study of the principles, types, forms and methods of preparing for and conducting military operations. However, the content of all of them needs to be improved. The structure of this theory will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future: strategy, operational art, and tactics.

The theory of strategy has been and will be the same for all branches of the Armed Forces and will continue to occupy a leading place in the theory of military art. The Minister of Defense, in his instructions at the above-mentioned meeting, noted that in the future, “internal and external indicators of armed struggle will change. It will tightly link the actions of a large number of branches of the Armed Forces, branches of service and special forces, performing a huge number of the most complex interrelated strategic, operational and tactical tasks simultaneously in all areas of armed struggle.

Under these conditions, taking into account the changes that have taken place, it is the theory of strategy that will be able at the new stage to develop the foundations of national-state military security; determine the possible nature of wars in the modern era and military-technical ways to prevent them, identify new patterns of armed struggle, determine the content of the tasks of the Armed Forces and methods for their solution; develop the basis for planning the use of the Armed Forces in the new conditions and measures for their preparation to repulse possible aggression; to clarify the requirements and recommendations for building up the Armed Forces, preparing the population, economy and territory of the country in the interests of repelling possible aggression, as well as the principles of leadership of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime.

In addition, the theory of strategy will have to deal with the study and evaluation of the military-strategic views of a potential adversary and his capabilities to wage war and the strategic evaluation of possible areas, regions of military operations.

The theory of operational art at the new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought must also undergo a substantial refinement. The redistribution of the role and importance of the spheres of armed struggle that has taken place in the last decade, the emergence of means of struggle based on modern technologies, and new methods of its conduct cause an urgent need to make appropriate adjustments to the system of scientific knowledge on the preparation and conduct of future operations by associations of various types and branches of the Armed Forces. , other troops (forces) in a single grouping.

The main tasks of this theory will be: knowledge and study of the new nature and content of future warfare operations; determination of new methods of preparation and conduct of operations, the use of associations, formations and units of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces and other troops in them; development of requirements for a new organizational structure and armament of the future Armed Forces and clarification of the basics of command and control of the formations, formations and units of the branches and arms of the Armed Forces, other troops (forces) participating in the operation and their unified comprehensive support; development of requirements and recommendations for the operational equipment of basing areas, concentration of troops and their actions; studying the views of a potential adversary on the preparation and conduct of military operations on an operational scale.

The structure of the theory of operational art will apparently remain unchanged: combined arms and general naval operational art; operational art of the Air Force; operational art of the Strategic Missile Forces; operational art of the Space Forces. Each of these sections will have to learn and study the forms and methods of preparing and conducting joint operations of all types and branches of the Armed Forces, to develop special issues related to the use of formations and formations of one or another type of the Armed Forces in combined arms, general fleet operations.

Since the theory of tactics is closely interconnected with the theory of operational art, significant adjustments to the latter will cause appropriate refinements in the system of knowledge about the preparation and conduct of combat by formations, units (ships) and subunits of various types and branches of the Armed Forces and other troops. Under the new conditions, the theory of tactics will continue to explore the nature and content of combat, develop new methods and methods for its preparation and conduct, and study the combat properties of weapons and military equipment on a new technological basis used by the parties in combat. The new tasks of the theory of tactics will be: the study of the nature and content of modern combat (combat operations); influence on the course and outcome of the battle of concentrated fire, impact, mobility and maneuver; determination of rational methods of preparing and conducting combat; establishing optimal conditions for studying the combat capabilities of weapons and means of protection; definition of tasks of formations, units (ships) and subunits in various types of combat and situational conditions; development of methods for organizing and maintaining close interaction between formations, units and subunits in combat; development of recommendations on command and control of troops, forces, their combat, technical and logistic support; development of requirements for weapons and the organizational and staffing structure of formations, units and subunits.

At the new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought, it will be necessary to introduce significant clarifications into the theory of organizational development of the Armed Forces. Changes in the social system of Russia, the adoption of the concept (doctrine) of building a new Armed Forces, which, in addition to powerful nuclear forces, will be based on highly mobile general-purpose forces equipped with the latest weapons and equipment and contract manning, will cause an urgent need to adjust the system of knowledge about the laws and principles of creation, improvement and development of the Armed Forces, methods of their recruitment and technical equipment.

The main tasks of the theory of development of the Armed Forces in the new conditions will be: to determine their rational composition, a new organizational structure, the correlation and role of the services and branches of the Armed Forces and other troops; clarification of the ways and order of acquisition and technical equipment; development of recommendations on the organization of military service, quartering of troops, training of personnel, creation of reserves and stocks of all kinds. The structure of the theory of development of the Armed Forces will include: the basics of combat and mobilization readiness; staffing and technical equipment, training of military personnel; organization of military service and quartering of troops; creation of reserves and stocks.

The theory of military training and indoctrination at the new stage in the development of theoretical thought must also be further developed. The equipping of our army and navy with the latest weapons and equipment, the transition to the contract method of manning will be the main factor causing the need to introduce appropriate clarifications into the system of knowledge about the content, forms and methods of individual training of personnel, training of subunits, units (ships), formations, associations and command and control bodies to conduct military operations. The theory of military training and indoctrination will cognize and explore the regularities of the educational process in relation to the new Russian Armed Forces, the organization, planning and management of this process, the forms and methods of training and indoctrination. Under the new conditions, the tasks of the theory of military training and indoctrination will be: clarifying scientifically based recommendations on the formation of high moral, psychological and combat qualities, military skills among soldiers of the army and navy; improvement of field, air and sea training of troops and forces; maintaining a constant high combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces for the defense of the Fatherland.

The theory of all-round support at the new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought will also be further developed. The integration of the entire supporting process of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation as a result of the transition to interdepartmental systems for the comprehensive support of their official activities will lead to the need to make appropriate adjustments to the system of scientific knowledge about the comprehensive support for the preparation and conduct of future military operations.

The theory of weapons, without any doubt, will not be a system of knowledge, which is described in the article by V.A. Kulikov. Under the new conditions, it will constitute a system of knowledge on the development of weapons and military equipment (WME) for the army and navy. The object of its knowledge will be the military-technical side of the war, armed struggle and scientific and technological progress, and the subject of equipping the army and navy with weapons and military equipment, their operation and liquidation.

The content of the problems of armament theory will probably remain unchanged. Among them: analysis and generalization of the experience of creating, improving and developing means of armed struggle in the new conditions, drawing conclusions, lessons and trends from this analysis; knowledge and development of new methodological foundations of the theory, patterns, principles, requirements for the development of weapons and military equipment systems; substantiation of promising state armament programs; determination of methods of organization, comprehensive support of processes related to the development of weapons systems and military equipment, as well as their management; study and development of recommendations on the problems of operation and liquidation of weapons and military equipment systems.

An analysis of the experience of military operations of the federal troops in both Chechen campaigns gives reason to believe that at the new stage in the development of military-theoretical thought, the theory of command and control of the Armed Forces will also undergo significant changes. Under the new conditions, the content of the system of knowledge about the command and control of troops in various types of their activities will apparently change, the principles and methods of purposefully influencing the composition, condition and functioning of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime will be clarified. The main objectives of the management theory in the new conditions will be: to study the operational, organizational and technical aspects of the problems of command and control of the Armed Forces at all levels; identification of patterns of management and the mechanism of their manifestation in practice; determination of the principles, trends in the construction, functioning of military and naval command and control systems in peacetime and wartime; determination of directions and ways to improve and develop systems, organizational forms and management methods; development of practical recommendations for the work of commands and staffs in preparation for and during combat operations to improve the forms and content of combat documents, taking into account the development and use of new technical means and automated control systems; development of methods for studying management problems, criteria and methods for evaluating the effectiveness of command and control of troops and forces.

The change in the social system in Russia, the market relations between the enterprises of the military-industrial complex (OPK) and the Armed Forces and other social transformations will significantly affect the content of the theory of the military economy, which, in my opinion, will have to systematize the system of knowledge about the economic support of the Armed Forces and armed struggle at a new stage development of military-theoretical thought. The object of knowledge of the theory of military economy in the new conditions will be the economy of the state, and the subject of economic support of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime.

The main tasks of the theory of the military economy will be: to clarify the knowledge of the patterns of development and functioning of the country's military economy in peacetime and wartime at a new stage; determination of the probable material needs of the war and the conditions for the economic support of the Armed Forces in it; improvement of substantiated provisions on the development of the military-economic potential of the state and the preparation of its economy for war; development and substantiation of requirements for the economy of the state, arising from the nature of war and armed struggle, as well as from the provisions of military doctrine; finding ways and means of timely transfer of the economy to a state of war, increasing the stability of its functioning; analysis of the state and development of recommendations on the preparation and use of the military-economic base of the regions of Russia in the interests of armed struggle; development of principles and methods of economic support for military operations of the Armed Forces; development of problems of managing the military economy.

Military history in the new conditions will certainly continue to study the wars and armed forces of the past, their dependence on the material, technical, socio-economic and political conditions of society, and the experience of the military activities of states. Unlike other branches of military knowledge, it will deal with real events, that is, with fait accompli, events, processes, which will give the results of research greater reliability and the possibility of their critical evaluation from the standpoint of modernity.

In conclusion, we note that in the future the study of the development of military thought will occupy a special place in military science. This will make it possible to determine and cognize the main directions, laws and principles of the development of military science in general and its branches in particular.

Military Encyclopedia: In 8 vols. M .: Military Publishing House, 1994. T. 2. S. 130134.

See: Kozlov S.N., Smirnov M.V., Baz I.S., Sidorov P.A. About the Soviet military science, M.: Military Publishing House, 1964. S. 404; 3 em s to V.I. On the question of the general theory and structure of military science//Military Thought. 1972. No. 8, 10; Gareev M.A. The system of knowledge about the war and the army//Military thought. 1976. No. 8 and others.

Tyushkevich S.A. A necessary condition for the development of military science// Military Thought. 2000. No. 3. S. 36.

Kulikov V.A. Logic and theory of military affairs//Military thought. 2002. No. 3. S. 44.

There. S. 44.

There. S. 51.

There. S. 44.

Gareev M.A. Ariadne's threads of military affairs//Independent military review. 1998. No. 32.

Kulikov V.A. Logic and theory of military affairs. S. 47.

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An article by Erich Schneider published in the collection "Results of the Second World War" (Russian translation published in 1957) is of undoubted interest to the analyst. If only because it contains unique data on the little-known Operation Paper Clips, carried out by the allied forces in 1946, during which the most powerful stocks of patent and scientific and technical documentation were confiscated from Germany and Japan, and the most valuable scientific frames.

The article is devoted to the problems associated with the lack of proper state coordination of scientific activities, the low quality of information support for scientific work, as well as the problem of disunity of commercial scientific divisions. This is all that was initiated in Russia by the transition to a market economy.

The article is also of interest to those who are interested in history, in particular, the history of scientific and technological progress. The article reveals the background of that powerful post-war technological leap that was made by the USA and further increased the technological backlog of the USSR.

The article is also interesting in that it was included in one of those publications that did not undergo ideological adaptation and smoothing - the entire ideological (however, very calm and constructive) component was given in the introduction to the collection. Therefore, the article preserved those assessments that were given to the Soviet Union by its opponents in the Cold War.

Here is the article in text:

Schneider E. The heyday and decline of German science during the Second World War // Results of the Second World War. Collection of articles / Per. with him. - M.: Publishing house of foreign literature, 1957.

Erich Schneider, retired lieutenant general, engineer

The rise and fall of German science during the Second World War

(The original - German - text of the article appeared in the book "Bilanz Des Zweiten Weltkrieges" in 1953.)

"Research is the foundation of technical superiority over the enemy.
Research is the basis for worldwide competition." Prof. P. Thyssen

Since the last world wars destroyed the old form of "heroic battle" between warriors and replaced it with "war of engines", and the soldier began to "bid his time" under a barrage of hurricane fire, since it was enough just to press the buttons that open the bomb hatches to instantly disappear in fire and smoke the monuments of a culture that has been created for centuries, since the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that hundreds of thousands of innocent people can be destroyed with one blow, since, finally, when self-destruction humanity in modern atomic warfare has become a theoretical possibility, it can be said with confidence that technology has radically changed both the forms and the whole character of war. But at the heart of all technology is science, moreover, technology is science itself. And this means that the course of modern warfare and, consequently, the fate of the peoples leading it depend decisively on scientific achievements and on the potential capabilities of the peoples in the field of technology.

The old saying “The muses are silent in war”, which, among other things, means the weakening of the spiritual activity of the people, is completely inappropriate in our age. With feverish haste and maximum effort, work is being carried out in the laboratories and research institutes of the warring parties in order not only to neutralize the technical progress of the enemy by creating new types of weapons, but also to surpass it, which in turn is an impulse for the enemy to new research. Thus, from the point of view of the growth of technical capabilities, modern warfare is a kind of pendulum that rises to an even greater height with each swing. This phenomenon is observed not only in the field of technology. In the age of ideological struggle and the struggle of views and worldviews, it is also of decisive importance what ideological weapons and what forces can cause an upsurge in all fields of science. Therefore, The Results of the Second World War cannot be written without all the functions of science in this era remaining unilluminated.

The submarine war of Germany against England and America, which began so effectively, was actually nullified by the superiority of the enemy in radar technology, which literally paralyzed the efforts of the selfless and brave German submariners. In the air battle for England, the technical data of the German fighters were insufficient to reliably protect their bombers. When later on the enemy radar screens, despite the dark night, fog and clouds, the outlines of cities and the desired targets became visible, the air defense of the German living space lost all meaning, and German aviation, despite all the courage of its soldiers and officers, more and more gave up their positions.

Based on the study of all these events, the fatal question arises: did German science justify itself in this war? (At the end of the war, according to the most conservative estimates, 346 thousand German patents were confiscated by the winners.) The results of research in industry and in all public and even private research institutions were seized from their owners and were calculated not by the number of pages, but by the number of tons, Yes! Yes! tons, as stated by the American central research station Wrightfield (Ohio), exported from Germany "by far the most significant collection of secret scientific documents" with a total weight of 1.5 thousand tons.

Having analyzed all the captured materials and carried out many of the ideas contained in them, American experts, by their own admission, "advanced American science and technology for years, and in some cases for a whole decade ahead."

The Australian Prime Minister Chifley, speaking on the radio in September 1949, said that the benefits that Australia brought from 6,000 patents inherited from the division and the transfer of 46 German specialists and scientists to Australia cannot be expressed in monetary terms at all. "Australian industrialists," he declared, "are able, with the help of German secret materials, to put their country in the field of technology among the most advanced countries in the world."

If, therefore, the assessment of the achievements of German science can be so contradictory, that is, on the one hand, sink to the cause of Germany's defeat in the war, and on the other, rise to enormous heights, causing admiration even among the most highly developed opponents, then the activities of German research scientists in the Second World War cannot be reduced to some common simple denominator, but should be considered as a versatile and comprehensive set of scientific ties. Indeed, in that era, German science was not in some definite stable state, but in a constant and to some extent even dramatic, contradictory development. Since neither the documents nor the scientists themselves, who are now scattered all over the world, remain from those years, it is not possible to compile a complete picture of their activities.

Therefore, now we can only talk about some of the most characteristic features of German science of that time. The German scientist of that era lived in isolation, interested only in his science and not getting involved in any politics, not thinking about either the state or the public. The “apolitical German professor” became that symbolic figure that often appeared in the pages of the German and foreign press in the most caricatured form. In this regard, a counter question arises: what could interest a German scientist in the political life of that time? Germany did not have centuries-old national traditions, such as France. Germany has never followed the path of imperialist development, like England. It was a heterogeneous conglomeration of small states, not united by either foreign or domestic policy. When National Socialism came to power between the two world wars, the “apolitical German intellectual” preferred to take refuge in his hole rather than make any protest. The new regime, however, was uncomfortable that such a large and necessary professional category remained neutral in relation to the new state. Therefore, propaganda was launched against the "intellectuals" and "arrogant academicians."

The National Socialist Party at that time sought to win over the worker to its side. She tried to free him from Marxist traditions and make him a nationalist. But it was not easy, because class consciousness was already firmly rooted among the workers. The Party then resorted to a simpler means. The class of "academicians" and "intellectuals" began to be vilified at all crossroads. Numerous party orators, right up to the very beginning of the war, did not miss a single opportunity so as not to scold scientists. So, for example, the statesman Robert Ley, speaking at a large meeting of workers in the military industry, illustrated his idea with such a "bright example." “For me,” he said, “any janitor is much higher than any academician. A janitor sweeps hundreds of thousands of bacteria into a ditch with a single sweep of a broom, and some scientist is proud that in his entire life he has discovered a single bacterium!

If we compare the attitude towards a scientist and his work in our country and in other countries, we get the following picture. While other states attach great importance to the development of science and technology and link the fate and existence of their nations to it, Germany has done and is doing too little in this respect. We feel the consequences of this until today. The leaders of our state looked at science as something that did not concern them. This can be seen at least from the fact that the most insignificant of all German ministers - Rust - was the Minister of Science. It is characteristic that this "Minister of Science" during the entire war, which was more than all the others, was a war of technology, was never at the report of the head of state. Indeed, Hitler himself spoke to the leading figures of science for the last time in 1934, when Max Planck was at his reception, asking to allow his Jewish colleagues to continue the major research work they had begun.

After 1933, 1,268 associate professors were dismissed from higher educational institutions in Germany as a result of a "worldview test".

The current situation clearly shows that in the "Führer State", which forcibly subjugated even the most private areas of life, there was no real all-embracing scientific organization planning on a state scale that would lead all research work. In fact, there were only many private institutions, each working in its own field and, in essence, independent of each other. There was almost no coordination in their work. If such a situation can still be tolerated in peacetime, then in modern warfare it must lead to the most fatal consequences.

Lack of unity in science

In Germany, there was a large scientific sector in the system of higher educational institutions, to which universities and higher technical educational institutions belonged. This also included 30 research institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. These institutions were organizationally subordinate to the Ministry of Science, Education and Education. This network, which included thousands of scientists, had its own research council, which consisted of. representatives of various fields of science: (physics, chemistry, mining and foundry, medicine, etc.). Each member of the council was the head of a certain group of scientists of the same profile and had to direct the planning and research activities of this group.

Along with this educational research organization there was a completely independent industrial research organization, or, as it was otherwise called, a sector, the enormous importance of which became generally clear only after the winners in 1945 appropriated the results of his research work. This included the laboratories of large industrial enterprises, for example, the concerns of Farbenindustri, Zeiss, Siemens, the General Electricity Company, Osram, Telefunken, etc., which, having large own funds, highly qualified specialists and equipment that meets modern technical requirements, could work with greater productivity than institute laboratories, which often did not have the most necessary means to carry out their research. The scientific research organization of industry was independent, did not need the help of any ministry, state scientific research council or other departments dealing with contingent matters. This organization worked for itself, and at the same time - behind closed doors. The consequence of this was that the research scientist of any higher educational institution not only knew nothing, but did not even suspect about those studies, discoveries and improvements that were carried out in industrial laboratories. This happened because it was beneficial for any concern, for reasons of competition, to keep the inventions and discoveries of their scientists in secret. As a result, knowledge did not flow into a large common cauldron and could only bring partial success for a common cause.

The third major scientific organization was the scientific research apparatus of the armed forces. But even this apparatus was not unified, but again split into parts, scattered over separate branches of the armed forces. People who understood the revolutionary role of science and technology in modern warfare and demanded a unified leadership of scientific research and improvement work insisted that the General Staff should exercise overall leadership, but they did not receive an advantage. During the reorganization of the armed forces, it turned out that each branch of the armed forces - the army, aviation and navy (and later even the "SS" detachments) - created its own weapons department. This is how the Land Army Ordnance Department came into being with its own research facilities and test sites; this is how an independent department of research, improvements and patents appeared under the main command of the Navy; Thus, a technical department was created under the Air Force High Command with well-equipped research and testing stations in Göttingen, Adlershof (a suburb of Berlin), Braunschweig, Oberpfafengofen (near Munich), Ainring and other cities.

Hitler's famous order on non-disclosure of secrets and secrets, issued at the beginning of the war and allowing an individual to know only what concerned him directly, as well as, to put it carefully, the "noble" struggle for primacy between the branches of the armed forces, contributed to the fact that certain areas of research are all more and more isolated from each other, thereby worsening the general state of affairs in science. It was almost impossible for scientists in the laboratories of higher educational institutions to obtain information about even the smallest part of the scientific and experimental work carried out in the apparatus of the armed forces. An individual researcher at a higher educational institution was entrusted with only a small piece of the whole mosaic, which by no means gave him an idea of ​​the overall picture of development. From these researchers one could often hear such a phrase: “We are wandering in the dark, we know too little of what we need to know. We have no idea where our shortcomings are.”

But that is not all. In addition to the research sectors of higher education, industry and the armed forces, there were also a number of private, independent research institutions. Of these, only the exceptionally well-equipped institutes of the imperial post deserve mention, which were not only engaged in improvements in the field of communication technology over long distances, but also paid much attention to nuclear physics, infrared rays, electron microscopy and many other military important areas of science. .

Reading these lines, everyone asks himself the question: was there at least one such instance that summarized the results of research in all scientific sectors, directed them and sent the data obtained to the disposal of those institutions where they were most useful for both military and civilian purposes? ? No. There was no such authority. All research work in Germany lacked a cohesive central body that would summarize the experience of scientists and, on its basis, would guide their searches. German science and technology were deprived of a head, instead of it there were only separate connecting nerve fibers and primitive coordinating organs.

The State Research Council did not have any powers and full information about what was happening outside its sphere of influence. And yet, on his own initiative of his employees and on behalf of various arms departments, he prepared and carried out more than 10 thousand research papers, which received well-deserved recognition from the military.

Another governing body was the Economic Development Administration, created in accordance with Goering's four-year plan and serving the 25 institutions envisaged by this plan. The large funds allocated to him for these purposes were zealously used "only for targeted research", and the distressed research institutes of higher educational institutions, which until now had carried out the main scientific work, did not receive a penny from them. Therefore, in the circles of scientific employees of higher educational institutions, the Department of Economic Development was called derisively "the department for the development of concerns."

During the war, another leading authority, the Speer Ministry, gained extraordinarily great weight. Since during this period the possibilities for the institutes to obtain raw materials, personnel and laboratory equipment were significantly reduced, since the necessary and feasible could no longer be found anywhere, and since the country's industry could hardly cope with orders from various arms departments, this ministry, in turn, sought to obtain the authority to resolve issues about which research work should be discontinued as unnecessary, which should be continued as having "important military importance" and which should be given preference as being "of decisive importance for the war." But science never benefits from a situation where its interests are decided by an instance that aims only at improving and producing what is most in the interests of the day. Such an organization is not able to understand what possibilities lie hidden in the plans and tasks of research institutions. Only because science was deprived of leadership, scientists began to be commanded by authorities alien to science.

If, despite this general position, as a result of long scientific research, new types of weapons, new artificial materials were nevertheless created, new scientific methods and new profiles of science were discovered, then for this, of course, we should thank not the miserable organization of "leaders", but only individual people who in all fields of science worked with full dedication of their strengths and abilities. To this day, there is no information about what they worked on, what German scientists researched and improved. Comprehensive data about this was obtained, using their own "method", only the winners. But even before that, German science, in its dramatic development, passed through many different stages and phases.

Science in the period of "lightning wars"

In 1939, the political leaders of Germany, guided by the experience of the war with Poland, hoped mainly for a short-term war. They, and Goering in particular, strongly advocated that the war should be won with the weapons with which it was started. New improvements, which were "ripe for the front" only in subsequent years, were considered of no interest. Scientists whose work was only in its very early stages, and who still needed years to achieve results useful for the war, were of no practical value to the government. Therefore, scientists were assigned to the category of human reserves, from which replenishment for the front was scooped. It goes without saying that under such circumstances "humanitarian" scientists were considered from the very beginning as quantite negligeable (a quantity that can be neglected). As a result, despite the objections of the weapons departments and various other authorities, several thousand highly qualified scientists from universities, higher technical schools and various research institutes, including indispensable specialists in research in the field of high frequencies, nuclear physics, chemistry, motor building and etc., were drafted into the army at the beginning of the war and were used in lower positions and even as ordinary soldiers. If Goebbels ensured that artists, musicians, writers, singers, athletes, etc. were relieved of military service, since he needed them to organize entertainment at home and at the front, then Minister Rust could not do anything for his researchers. And when scientists, and especially representatives of the younger generation of scientists and researchers, left their laboratories and institutes to go to the front as modest fighters, it even caused pride in everyone. The British (and not the Germans) have calculated that every year every talented nation has one researcher per million people. As you can see, the harvest is not particularly dense. And the fact that in an age when one research scientist can be as important to the conduct of war as entire armies, this expensive and sometimes irreplaceable human material was so easily squandered, could not pass without a trace for us.

After the war with France, Hitler gave the order to stop all research work that could not be completed within one year. This order turned out to be almost fatal not only for aviation (in 1939 there was already a project for the design of a jet fighter), it also affected research work in the field of high frequencies, that is, just the same area in which the enemy soon acquired fatal advantage.

Distress signal in science

Some time passed, and sobering blows rained down on the German army. Lost air battle over England. The war in Russia radically changed its original character. In submarine warfare, the superior quality and quantity of enemy aircraft caused a deep crisis. There was no doubt that without new aircraft the war would be lost, that the weapons, equipment and vehicles used in Russia would have to meet the deadly conditions of climate and terrain, that high-frequency technology had now become the most important link in all military equipment.

Then the steering wheel was turned in the opposite direction. Goebbels had to issue a directive that henceforth in the press, on the radio, in the cinema, in the theater and in literature there should no longer be speeches against scientists and researchers, against teachers and the clergy, but, on the contrary, the great importance of their activities would be emphasized. Despite the fact that Goebbels had nothing to do with science, he invited professors and directors of higher educational institutions to Heidelberg to announce to them that the state highly values ​​the work of scientists.

Doenitz turned out to be the most energetic of all in this matter. He autocratically abandoned the tangled system of scientific leadership, personally convened a conference of leading specialists, informed them with all frankness about the technical crisis of submarine warfare, appointed one of the scientists as head of the research staff of the Navy and excluded all intermediate instances by subordinating this new "chief of staff" to yourself personally. The fact that the commander-in-chief directly subordinated the scientist-researcher was a kind of revolution in the field of military technology.

An alarm sounded for all the scientists. At the same time that “General Unruh” traveled around the country as a special envoy, “mobilizing” the last men left in the rear to the front, a decisive countermeasure was carried out in the interests of science and technology: 10 thousand scientists, technicians, specialists and engineers were removed from the front and placed in their places to solve urgent problems. In order to prevent the extinction of entire scientific disciplines and to preserve irreplaceable personnel, it was even decided to recall 100 scientists from the humanities from the front. It was necessary to save what could still be saved.

But even these measures could not fully restore the former state of German science. Using a kind of “fist law” and wiping out those who had less strong fists, individual authorities achieved authority for themselves, received scientists, auxiliary personnel, equipment, chemicals, scarce materials and funds. But science and technology are incompatible with improvisation. A state that wants to receive the real fruits of science and technology must act not only with great foresight and skill, but also be able to wait patiently for these fruits.

It is clear that of all that was conceived, known, improved and tested in the laboratories of higher educational institutions, in the research institutions of the armed forces and in the laboratories of industrial enterprises, only a part could go into production and be used at the front, because when the war was already in full swing, the fruits of the mental activity of German scientists were just ripening, hiding in the walls of their laboratories.

Subjects of research and achievements of German science

The work done by German scientists in the field of creating new research methods, in the field of discovering the new and improving the technology of the old, in the current situation in Germany, cannot be generalized. During the war, research work related to armaments was carried out exclusively as "secret", and some research was even labeled "state secret". The usual peacetime publication of research results in special scientific journals was not carried out. A researcher who worked on some special assignment but had the right to talk about it even with his colleagues.

A book about the achievements of German science could today be written much more easily not in Germany itself, but outside it, because the main original documents are located there. One American report states: “The Technical Services Department in Washington states that thousands of tons of documents are stored in its safes. According to experts, more than 1 million individual inventions, in fact, relating to all sciences, all industrial and military secrets of Nazi Germany, need to be processed and analyzed. One official in Washington called this collection of documents "a unique source of scientific thought, the first complete expression of the inventive mind of a whole people."

How could this happen? Why did the adversaries of Germany understand before her the importance of research in the present age of technology, not only for the conduct of war, but also for a peaceful economy and cultural development in all areas of life?

The fact is that they looked at the capture of valuable German inventions as a military task. As early as during the invasion of the West, commando units immediately began their hunt for research materials and for the researchers themselves. Prepared by the Allies, Operation Paper Clips was carried out mainly by the Americans. However, British, French and Soviet troops took no less part in this only "trophy campaign" in the history of wars.

The assertion, spread at the end of the war by foreign propaganda under the influence of a general military psychosis, that German science had achieved only insignificant results and that in a country where there was no freedom, science was not capable of much at all, was soon refuted by numerous speeches by foreign scientists themselves. A report by the Society of German Scientists entitled "Research Means Labor and Bread" (September 1950) makes a number of such claims. Due to lack of space, I will cite only a few of them.

Thus, for example, Mr. Lester Walker writes in Harper's Magazine (October 1946): "Materials on secret military inventions, which until recently were only dozens, now represent an accumulation of acts totaling up to 750 thousand ..." For in order to find corresponding English terms for new German concepts, it would be necessary to compile a new German-English dictionary of special words, which would include about 40 thousand new technical and scientific terms.

The American official report cites a number of individual inventions and research results of German scientists in the field of applied physics, in the field of infrared rays, on the invention of new lubricants, synthetic mica, methods of cold rolling of steel, etc., which have received universal recognition from American scientists. So, the report says: “We learned from these priceless secrets how to make the world's best capacitor. Millions of capacitors are used both in radio engineering and in the production of high-frequency equipment ... but this capacitor withstands almost twice as much voltage as our American capacitors. This is a real miracle for our radio technicians.”

Regarding inventions in the textile industry, this report states that "there is so much new in this collection of secrets that most of the American textile specialists have become uneasy ..."

About the trophies from the laboratories of the I. G. Farbenindustry concern, it is said: “... however, the most valuable secrets were obtained by us from the laboratories and factories of the large German chemical concern I. G. Farbenindustry. Nowhere and never has there been such a valuable treasure trove of trade secrets. These secrets apply to the production of liquid and solid fuels, to the metallurgical industry, to the production of synthetic rubber, textiles, chemicals, artificial fabrics, medicines and paints. An American dye specialist stated that German patents contain methods and recipes for obtaining 50,000 types of dyes, and most of them are better than ours. We ourselves would probably never have been able to make some of them. The American paint industry is at least a decade ahead."

A number of other statements contained in various reports can be cited: “No less impressive was the extraction of the special search groups of the allies in the field of food production, in the field of medicine and military art” ... “the “trophies” in the field of recent achievements are absolutely boundless aviation and the production of aerial bombs. “Of the greatest importance for the future,” says elsewhere, “are German secrets in the field of the production of rocket and rocket projectiles ... as it became known, the Germans at the end of the war had 138 types of remotely guided projectiles in various stages of production and development ... all hitherto known remote control and aiming systems were used: radio, short waves, wire communication, directed electromagnetic waves, sound, infrared rays, beams of light, magnetic control, etc. The Germans developed all kinds of rocket engines that allowed their rockets and rockets to reach supersonic speeds.

After the surrender of Japan, President Truman ordered the publication of the confiscated (364,000) patents and other seized documents. On July 27, 1946, 27 former allied states signed an agreement in London according to which all German patents outside Germany and registered before August 1, 1946 were expropriated. The Library of Congress in Washington began publishing a bibliographic weekly that listed declassified military and scientific documents, their summary, the number and cost of copies made from them, etc. These weekly bulletins were sent to 125 libraries in the United States "to make them more accessible for the public."

American businessmen themselves recognize the enormous importance of German discoveries and inventions for practical use in industry and technology. "The public literally devours published military secrets," one of the aforementioned reports says. “In one month alone, we received 20,000 requests for technical publications, and now about 1,000 copies of these bulletins are ordered daily ... authorized firms stand idle all day in the corridors of the Technical Service Department in order to be the first to receive a new publication. Much of the information is so valuable that industrialists would gladly give many thousands to get new information one day ahead of their competitors. But the staff of the Technical Service Administration is careful to ensure that no one receives the report before its official publication. Once, the head of a research institution sat for about 3 hours in one of the bureaus of the Technical Service Administration, making notes and sketches from some documents that were being prepared for publication. As he left, he said, "Thank you very much, my notes will give my firm at least half a million dollars in profit."

Further, the American report speaks of the representatives of the Soviet Union. This passage is sustained in the naive expressions of 1946, but now, in the atmosphere of 1953, it forces the reader to pay more attention to it. With naive pride, the Americans report: “One of our most insatiable clients is Vneshtorg (Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union). One of their leaders came to the publishing office one day with a bibliography in hand and said: "I want to have copies of everything that you have." The Russians sent moms an order in May for 2,000 publications totaling $5,594.40. In general, they bought any edition that came out.

The Russians took care to get themselves the fruits of the labor of the German workers of science and technology also in another way. So, at the end of the war, they took several hundred first-class specialists out of Germany, including: Professor Dr. Peter Thyssen, director of the Institute of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute), who was also the head of the chemistry sector in the state research sonnet; Baron Manfred von Ardenne - the most prominent German scientist in the field of high-frequency technology, television, electron microscopy and isotope separation; Professor Max Vollmer - Ordinary Professor of Physical Chemistry at the Higher Technical School (Berlin - Charlottenburg) and a leading specialist in the field of semiconductors and battery production, who had great authority in matters of military equipment; Professor Gustav Hertz, who until 1938 held the post of director of the Heinrich Hertz Institute for the Study of Oscillatory Phenomena (Berlin), and later - the head of the Siemens-Werke Research Laboratory No. 2, who knew all the numerous secrets of this concern; Dr. Nikolaus Riehl - director of the scientific department of the Auer company, a well-known specialist in the production of luminescent paints, which are of great importance for the military and civilian industries.

The Russians also managed to take out Dr. L. Bevilogua, a student of the world-famous Professor Debier, who emigrated from Germany to the West and was awarded the Nobel Prize. Debier was director of the Institute for Refrigeration in Dahlem.

These are just a few names. But what enormous benefit they can bring to the Soviet Union! Prof. Dr. Thyssen, for example, held a leading position in the German research world. Thyssen was a student of the most prominent German specialist in colloidal chemistry, Professor Zsigmondy from Göttingen. The institute, headed by Thyssen, was the largest of the thirty institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and had a staff of about 100 employees. He had the best equipment, and his money was equal to the sum of the budgets of at least a dozen other, of course, equally important institutions of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. Of the 25 electron microscopes then available in Germany, three were at the Thyssen Institute. Thyssen was also Head of the Chemistry Sector at the State Research Council. This meant that he knew all the plans for research work in the field of chemistry, their progress and results. Thiessen was a man who could not only process these results administratively, but also personally review them, giving them a critical assessment. People who have worked closely with Thiessen say he has a phenomenal memory. Finally, Thyssen was one of the main figures of the so-called "chemical headquarters", which consisted of three members: the chairman of the supervisory board of the I. G. Farbenindustry concern, Professor Krauch, the head of the German Society of Chemists, the Sovereign Councilor Schieber, and Thyssen himself. Thus Thyssen was aware of the state of affairs in the whole of German chemistry. The task of the chemical headquarters was to generalize the results of experiments carried out in laboratories, and then to transfer the accumulated experience for its further use in production. It follows that Thyssen knew not only the direction of research work in the field of chemistry, but was also privy to the secrets of the German chemical industry, its methods, planning, and was in contact with the largest chemical industrialists. He knew the most important secrets that are now being used by the Soviet Union.

As for the German scientists now in America, the Pentagon in December 1947 reported that 523 German scientists had been taken there and that this figure would soon increase to 1,000 people. More precise information is not yet available.

Until now, the British have been the most restrained in their reports about captured scientists and specialists. But professors who have returned from the detention camps report that there are many "famous and even celebrities from all fields of science." In total, the victorious countries exported more than 2,000 German scientists and specialists.

The expulsion of German scientists from Germany is the most painful consequence of the past war for our people. Researchers can be compared to the brain of a nation. At the end of the war, our nation underwent a severe operation: this brain was cut out along with everything that the nation had achieved, that is, along with all the results of research, patents, etc. All this went to the victors and merged into their scientific and economic organism. This, of course, is a more modern form of economic influence on the vanquished than military indemnities and monetary reparations of the old days. Such a measure leads to a sharp reduction in the spiritual potential of the defeated people. It represents the artificial fertilization of the science, technology and economy of the victor. The American magazine Life, in its issue of September 2, 1946, quite soberly confirms this, stating that the real purpose of the reparations was not to dismantle the industrial enterprises of Germany, but to excise the brain of the German nation, to seize everything that was accumulated by it in the region science and technology.

The fate of researchers at the end of the war

German science, which had developed strongly in the first half of our century, was reduced to almost nothing at the end of the last war by the following three circumstances: firstly, the loss of all the results of research work, including patents, and their dispersal throughout the world; secondly, the transfer of leading German specialists to the countries of former opponents; thirdly, discrimination of the researchers who remained in Germany.

As a result of the political purge carried out under Hitler, 1628 associate professors were expelled from their departments and from research institutes. According to data published at the beginning of 1950 in the weekly "Christ und Welt", this amounted to 9.5% of the entire teaching staff of higher educational institutions in Germany. This means that every tenth scientist was excluded from the scientific life of the country. The victims of the next political purge, in 1945, fell another 4289 associate professors, which amounted to 32.1% of all scientists. Thus, in 1945, every third German teacher of higher educational institutions lost both his chair and the opportunity to continue research work.

What the Americans thought about the "political danger" of these scientists becomes clear from a number of official statements. Thus, for example, the head of the Paper Clips operation gave the following directive to the commando detachments engaged in "catching" German scientists. “If you come across just anti-fascists who are of no value to science, don’t take it. If they can have a certain scientific interest for us, then their political background does not play any role. And when one US senator expressed his doubts about such "importation of German scientists, basing them on the fact that most of them were members of the Nazi Party, a representative of the US War Department responded this way: "Scientists are usually only interested in their research and only occasionally - politics."

The damage suffered by German science is by no means limited to those scientists who were left without a place during the political purges of the Hitler period. Already after the war, another 1,028 associate professors migrated from the universities of the eastern zone of Germany to the western zone as unemployed refugees. This amounted to 7.7% of the entire teaching staff of German higher education institutions. Putting it all together, it turns out that from 1933 to 1946, according to the Society of the Founders of German Science, 49.3% of all university teachers lost their jobs “for political reasons”. This is about half of the total number of German scientists. No other professional class in Germany was so bled. How such an amputation will affect the German intelligentsia, only the future can show.

A look into the future

It would be wrong to say that the fate that befell German science in World War II no longer worries the leading circles of our state today. In the most diverse sections of the population, up to members of parliament, when they discuss state budgets, one can hear the same argument: “Such an impoverished people as the Germans cannot again raise their science to a high level. He must first get out of his plight."

We Germans have only one answer to this. Precisely because German science has suffered so much damage, we are more concerned than anyone else with the simple truth that the natural sciences today create the prerequisites for the technology of tomorrow, and today's worker will not be able to feed his sons if the further development of science will not create the prerequisites for their independent work tomorrow. If our generation does not now correct the monstrous consequences of the war that has ruined our science, this will bring great harm to the economy and social structure of future generations. We Germans must do much more for our science than others.

However, the figures strongly suggest that not everything is being done. Thus, for example, America allocates for the financing of its research institutes such sums that, calculated per capita, amount to 71 German marks; England - 25.2 marks, and the Federal Republic - only 7.75 marks.

In this regard, another question arises. It would be an empty illusion to believe that any "damage" in science can be compensated by money. Science cannot be bought with money, just as it cannot be borrowed or “organised”. Money can only be an auxiliary means, though necessary, but not decisive. No amount of money will help where there is no talent for research work. And a genuine talent for science and research is extremely rare in any nation: it is a gift of nature. But the way this natural gift was treated over the past few years and how it was literally squandered depending on how people endowed with this gift met certain political requirements of the time is by no means an act of wisdom, but an act of exceptional political myopia. and blindness. The great process of healing which has become indispensable to our science is once again beginning to arouse the deep awe and recognition of the people. Only when the external prerequisites are created, that is, sufficient financial support, and the internal prerequisites, that is, full respect for scientists and reverence for this professional class, can we hope that our younger generation will single out from their midst people whose talents and talents will allow them to turn to the difficult profession of a scientist. After all, the failures of the past act frighteningly for a very short time.

This article is based on conversations with numerous scientists and experts from various fields of science.

The emergence of new types of weapons and military equipment, new types of troops, the rearmament and reorganization of old ones, as well as the transition of fascist states in the mid-1930s to direct acts of aggression, put forward new tasks for Soviet military science. The victory of socialism in the USSR, the successes of the cultural revolution contributed to the solution of these problems.

Soviet military science, which was formed together with the Soviet Army, is a system of developing knowledge about the nature and characteristics of armed struggle, its objective laws and principles of military art, methods and forms of military defense of the socialist Fatherland. It is called upon to develop the theoretical foundations and practical recommendations for building up the Armed Forces and preparing them for a possible war. In unity with practice, Soviet military science determines ways to improve existing and create new means of armed struggle.

Having absorbed all the best from the military-theoretical legacy of the past and the first combat experience in defending the country of socialism, Soviet military science, rapidly developing and enriching itself with new theoretical positions and conclusions, avoided the one-sidedness inherent in the military theories of capitalist states, and surpassed the latter in the development of many problems. .

Lenin developed the most important provisions that form its basis: the features and nature of the wars of the new era; about the nature and essence of the military organization of the socialist state; the need for close military unity of the socialist republics and the militant alliance of the working classes; the transformation of the country in a military situation into a single military camp; the significance and decisive influence on the fate of the war of economic, moral-political, ideological, scientific-technical and military factors proper; the basic laws of modern warfare and their use, taking into account the advantages of a socialist society; about the decisive role of the Communist Party in organizing the armed defense of the socialist Fatherland and the successful solution of defense tasks, and others.

The assertion of Lenin's theses in the theory of military affairs took place in a sharp struggle against the Trotskyists, the left and right opportunists, the conservative wing of the old military specialists.

The development of Soviet military science was guided by the collective wisdom of the Central Committee of the Party, which summarized everything new in the practice and theory of military affairs.

The wonderful works of M. V. Frunze were an example of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to military affairs, party and deeply scientific analysis of the most complex problems of military theory and practice. A true Leninist, he was an unsurpassed master of applying the Marxist method to all branches of military science. In his works, he substantiated a number of fundamental provisions of Soviet military theory.

M. V. Frunze argued that the system of military development and defense of the state should be based on a clear and accurate idea of ​​the nature of a future war; on a correct and accurate account of the forces and means that our potential adversaries will have at their disposal; on the same account of our own resources. MV Frunze developed Lenin's thesis that modern wars are waged by peoples, stressed that their scope in space and duration will inevitably increase. He pointed out the need to prepare for war not only the army, but the whole country, to rapidly develop industry, especially heavy industry, as the material basis for the military might of the socialist state.

A valuable contribution to the development of Soviet military science was made by A. S. Bubnov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. I. Gusev, A. I. Egorov, S. S. Kamenev, I. V. Stalin, V. K. Triandafillov, M. H. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov. An important role was played by military academies, the Headquarters (and then the General Staff) of the Red Army, which were major centers of military-theoretical thought, as well as the commanders and headquarters of military districts.

The most important part of Soviet military science is the theory of military art, in which the leading place is rightfully occupied by a strategy designed to solve the problems of using all the country's armed forces and resources to achieve the ultimate goals of war.

The development of the strategy and the revision of its concepts were reflected in the country's defense plans, which were developed by the General Staff and approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government. Each such plan corresponded to the socio-economic condition of the country, as well as its resources and international position, was based on the developed strategic forms and methods, using which it would be possible to achieve the greatest results with the least expenditure of material and human resources.

In the second half of the 1930s, the imperialist bloc of fascist powers led by Nazi Germany, which aspired to world domination, became the main enemy of the Soviet Union. In the capitalist world he was opposed by a bloc of "democratic" bourgeois powers. The Second World War could have arisen both as a war within the capitalist world and as a war against the USSR.

Soviet military science took into account both possibilities. It did not rule out that in the coming world war, as the Comintern pointed out, the most unexpected situations were possible, for which it was necessary to prepare in advance. Various combinations of efforts of freedom-loving states and peoples were also possible. Under the threat of fascist enslavement hanging over Europe, the prospect of a series of national liberation wars, not only of the oppressed masses of the colonies and semi-colonies, but also of the European peoples, became quite real. Such a prospect was foreseen and scientifically substantiated by V. I. Lenin. He considered the general democratic national liberation movement as a favorable prerequisite for the subsequent struggle for socialism. It was quite obvious that the Soviet Union, invariably true to its internationalist policy and its revolutionary duty, would be a class ally of the peoples waging a national liberation struggle. The forms of realization of this union depended on the specific historical situation.

The indisputable merit of Soviet military-theoretical thought in the mid-1930s was that it did not rule out the possibility of a coalition war against the aggressor, such a war in which the socialist state would fight together with peoples and governments capable of defending in one way or another the national independence of their countries from fascist aggressors. The practical development of issues of conducting coalition operations took place during the preparation of a collective security system in the 30s, during joint hostilities with the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River against Japanese aggression and during the preparation of the conclusion of a military convention with England and France in the summer of 1939 G.

From the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union had to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the west against Nazi Germany and its satellites, and in the east against Japan. The southern direction was also unreliable - from Turkey. The most powerful grouping of enemy forces was in the west. Therefore, in terms of the defense of the country, the Western European theater of war was considered the main one, where it was planned to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops. Thus, ensuring the security of the USSR became much more complicated: the Soviet Armed Forces had to be ready to inflict a decisive defeat on the aggressor both in the west and in the east, and, if necessary, in the south. A strategic deployment on two fronts was becoming inevitable.

The Soviet military strategy, based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, believed that in the fight against the aggressor coalition, the achievement of the final goals of the war would require powerful strategic efforts in several directions (simultaneously or sequentially).

While recognizing the likelihood of a long and difficult war, Soviet military theory did not rule out the possibility of fleeting armed clashes. As a result, she paid great attention to the study of the methods of mobilization deployment of the armed forces, the likely methods of unleashing the war by the aggressors, the features of its initial period, and the problems of leadership.

The imperialists, seeking to disguise their aggression, avoided an open declaration of war and practiced "crawling" into it. This was convincingly evidenced by the Japanese-Chinese war, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain, the capture of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The mobilization of the aggressor's forces for the implementation of their actions was carried out partly in advance, in stages, and ended already in the course of the war.

Covert preparations and the sudden unleashing of war by the imperialists significantly increased the role of its initial period. This, in turn, required, wrote M. N. Tukhachevsky, "to be especially strong and energetic" in the initial operations (629) . He noted: “The first period of the war must be correctly foreseen even in peacetime, correctly assessed even in peacetime, and one must properly prepare for it” (630). The aggressors assigned the operations of the initial period of the war to the invading army, well equipped with mechanized formations and aircraft. Hence, the side threatened by the attack must take preventive measures so that the enemy cannot disrupt the mobilization in the border areas and the advance of the mass army to the front line (631).

Views on the content and duration of the initial period of a future war were refined and developed. If in the 1920s, according to the experience of the First World War, it included mainly preparatory measures for decisive operations, then in subsequent years, the operations themselves began to be considered the main event of this period.

Many works of Ya. I. Alksnis, R. P. Eideman, V. F. Novitsky, A. N. Lapchinsky and others were devoted to the study of the nature of the initial period of the future war. A. I. Egorov, E. A. Shilovsky, L. S. Amiragov, V. A. Medikov, S. N. Krasilnikov and others considered the theoretical solution to the problems of preparing and conducting the first operations of the war.

In the summer of 1933, the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, A.I. Egorov, presented to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR theses on new operational and tactical problems, in which attention was drawn to the qualitative and quantitative growth of powerful technical means of combat, forcing to solve the issues of the initial period of the war and the conduct of modern operations in a different way . According to A. I. Egorov, the enemy, using covert mobilization, can quickly concentrate a strong army of large mechanized, infantry, airborne units, cavalry masses and combat aircraft and suddenly invade foreign territory. Military operations will immediately cover space to a depth of 400-600 km and will cause significant damage to communications, military depots and bases, air and sea forces. With such a strike, the enemy is capable of destroying the covering troops, disrupting mobilization in the border areas, hindering the deployment of the army, and occupying economically important areas. However, he wrote, an invading army alone cannot decide the outcome of a war (632).

AI Yegorov's theses summarized the most important conclusions reached by Soviet military thought as early as the first half of the 1930s, significantly outpacing the development of military theory in the capitalist countries.

These conclusions were improved and developed by a whole galaxy of Soviet military theorists. One of them, E. A. Shilovsky, assessed the course of the initial period of a possible future war as follows. “A fierce struggle ... will unfold from the first hours of hostilities in a larger space of the theater of operations along the front, in depth and in the air ... At the same time, one should not count on the lightning defeat of the armies of class enemies, but prepare for a stubborn and fierce struggle,” in the course of which only final victory can be achieved. However, he acknowledged, the use of new means of combat at the beginning of a war could “shock the enemy so strongly that the result of their actions will have a decisive effect on the course of subsequent operations and perhaps even on the outcome of the war” (633) .

Shilovsky recommended massive use of aviation, subordinating its main forces to the main and front commands, and training the country's armed forces in such a way as to quickly deploy a mass army equipped with modern technology, capable of carrying out major operations from the first day of the initial period of the war (634) .

L. S. Amiragov in his article “On the nature of a future war” proceeded from the fact that a coalition consisting of Germany, Japan and other states, the main carriers of open imperialist expansion, would oppose the USSR. The aggressors will strive to unleash a war suddenly and end it as soon as possible, they will try "to attach decisive importance to the initial period of the war, which in turn presupposes the widespread use of maneuverable forms of struggle" (635).

S. N. Krasilnikov also wrote about the operations of the initial period. Taking into account the lessons of aggression against Ethiopia and China, he assumed that a future war could begin “as a sudden attack by heavy bomber aircraft from the air on the vital centers of the country, combined with a deep invasion of large motorized ... masses, supported by the actions of light combat aircraft along the railways and vehicles necessary for the concentration of combat forces "(636) .

Consequently, in the content of the initial period of the war, Soviet military thought included not only preparatory measures, but also extensive military operations on land, in the air and at sea, in advance mobilized and deployed in the border regions of the invasion armies and cover armies. In the course of these battles, the initial period of the war will develop directly and gradually into the period of operations of the main forces.

Thus, long before the Second World War, Soviet military theory correctly determined the methods of its preparation, unleashing and waging that would be applied by the imperialist aggressors, taking into account the new military-technical factors. It promptly gave appropriate recommendations for the development of plans for the defense of the USSR.

However, these recommendations were not fully implemented at that time. Soviet military theory, as is inherent in any genuine science, looked far into the future. Under the conditions of that time, the Soviet state did not yet have the proper material means to implement its conclusions. The economic potential of the country did not yet make it possible, along with the high rates of socialist construction, to equip the Armed Forces with such a quantity of the latest weapons and military equipment as was required according to the conclusions of military theory.

An important advantage of the Soviet military theory in comparison with the bourgeois ones was the correct assessment of the importance of the moral factor. The Soviet people and its Armed Forces were morally prepared by the Party for the trials that could fall to their lot in the event of a military attack by the aggressors, were in complete patriotic readiness to repulse any enemy.

Based on the conclusions drawn by military science, Soviet military doctrine provided that victory at the front in a future war could be achieved only through purposeful, joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces and combat arms, with their close interaction. At the same time, the decisive role was assigned to the ground forces, saturated with artillery, tanks and aircraft (637). Great importance was attached to the air force, which, on the one hand, was supposed to provide solid ground troops from the air, and on the other, to conduct independent operations. The navy was called upon to assist the ground forces in delivering strikes along the coast, as well as to carry out independent operations against enemy ships on sea lanes.

The decisive type of strategic action was considered to be an offensive, carried out by means of large-scale strategic front-line offensive operations carried out in the main operational-strategic axes. The Field Manual of 1939 stated that in one theater of operations the forces of several armies and large air formations could be used under the unified leadership of the front command to fulfill a common strategic task.

Strategic defense was also considered a natural type of armed struggle, which was placed in a subordinate position in relation to the offensive. In defensive operations, the troops had to stubbornly hold the occupied areas or cover a certain operational direction in order to repel the enemy offensive, defeat him and create favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.

Such a type of action as an operational withdrawal was not rejected, in order to withdraw troops from the blow of superior enemy forces, create a new operational grouping and ensure the transition to the defensive. It was believed that the last two types of armed struggle would find application mainly at the operational-tactical level.

The direct leadership of the armed struggle and the activities of the rear of the country was to be carried out by the supreme body of the state and the Headquarters of the High Command subordinate to it.

The study of the organization and conduct of front-line and army operations designed to ensure the achievement of strategic goals was mainly dealt with by operational art and tactics. At the same time, special attention was paid to the problems of operational art. The theory of successive decaying operations and group tactics, which met the conditions of the 1920s, did not meet the requirements of a future war. An urgent task arose to develop a fundamentally new theory of combat and operations, to find such methods and methods of combat operations that would make it possible to successfully overcome the strong fire screen of a continuous enemy front, in a short time to defeat his groupings and achieve strategic success. The fulfillment of this responsible task was entrusted to the General Staff, the central directorates of the armed forces, the Combat Training Directorate, the military academies, the headquarters of the military districts, with the involvement of the military scientific community. The foundations of the new theory, later called the theory of deep combat and operation, were developed for almost six years (1929-1935). As a result of painstaking research, the first official "Instruction for Deep Combat" was created, approved by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on March 9, 1935.

At the same time, the Red Army Headquarters prepared a draft Operations Manual - a kind of operational charter for the entire army. This eliminated the gap between operational art and tactics that had existed for a long time. The development of new provisions, their generalization and thorough testing in practice was carried out by P. A. Belov, P. E. Dybenko, A. I. Egorov, M. V. Zakharov, G. S. Isserson, K. B. Kalinovsky, N. D. Kashirin, A. I. Kork, D. A. Kuchinsky, K. A. Meretskov, I. P. Obysov, A. I. Sedyakin, S. K. Timoshenko, V. K. Triandafillov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, I. F. Fedko, B. M. Shaposhnikov, E. A. Shilovsky and other theorists and military leaders. The study of the theory of deep combat was given a prominent place in the educational and scientific plans of military academies. The Operations Department of the MV Frunze Military Academy, the Academy of the General Staff, and the academies of military branches have done a great job of systematizing, applying and designing many of its provisions. The first stage in the development of the theory of deep combat and operation ended with the release of the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army in 1936, in which this theory received official recognition.

The theory of deep operation covered the forms of armed struggle used on the front and army scales, while the theory of deep combat embraced the types of combat operations of units and formations. Front operations could be both offensive and defensive. Their tasks must be solved by the efforts of several field armies in cooperation with large mechanized formations, air and naval forces.

Simultaneous suppression of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his formation was most fully considered on the scale of a front-line operation carried out in the interests of achieving strategic goals in a specific theater of military operations.

The army operation was considered as part of a front-line operation. Usually it was carried out in one operational direction and solved a particular operational problem. On the axes of the main blows inflicted by the front, it was envisaged to use well-equipped shock armies, and on the auxiliary axes, armies of ordinary composition.

Offensive operations were considered the decisive means of achieving success in armed struggle, in which the troops performed two tasks: breaking through the enemy defenses with a simultaneous strike to its entire tactical depth and developing tactical success into operational action by swift actions of mobile troops, airborne assault forces and aviation. For an offensive with decisive goals, a deep operational formation of troops was envisaged, consisting of the first ground echelon (attack echelon), the second ground echelon (breakthrough development echelon), an air echelon with a range of 300-500 km and subsequent echelons - operational reserves. In an oncoming battle, the advanced (vanguard) ground echelon could stand out.

To conduct the operation, there were two options for the operational formation of troops: if the enemy's defense was strong, rifle formations advanced in the first echelon, and mobile formations in the second; with weak enemy defenses, rifle divisions operated in the second echelon. The width of the offensive zone of the front was set at 300-400 km, the depth of the operation - 150-200 km. For the shock army, respectively, 50 - 80 km and 25 - 30 km. The duration of an army operation is 5-6 days, the average daily rate of advance is 5-6 km.

Possible forms of an offensive operation of the front could be a strike by the concentrated forces of two or three of its adjacent armies in one sector or by several armies of two adjacent fronts in a continuous sector (200–250 km), simultaneous crushing strikes in several directions on a wide front, a strike in converging directions ( double break using a favorable front configuration). The most important conditions for the success of a deep offensive operation of the front were considered to be the gaining of air supremacy, the isolation of the battle area from suitable enemy reserves, and the disruption of the delivery of materiel to his attacked troops.

In an army operation, blows could be used by the center, one of the flanks, by all the forces of the army when it advanced in a narrow sector on the main direction of the front; in special cases, the army could strike on both flanks.

Recognition of the offensive as the main and decisive form of struggle did not exclude the need to use all types of defensive combat and operations. "The defense must withstand the superior forces of the enemy, attacking at once to the full depth" (638), - indicated in the field manuals of 1936 and 1939.

Soviet military science has developed a theory of operational and tactical defense much deeper than the military thought of the capitalist countries. A. I. Gotovtsev, A. E. Gutor, N. Ya. Kapustin, D. M. Karbyshev, M. G. Knyazev, F. P. Sudakov and others (639) took part in its development and improvement.

In general, the defense was supposed to be deep and anti-tank in order to save time and effort, hold especially important areas and objects, and pin down the advancing enemy. The defense was divided into stubborn (positional), created on a normal or wide front, and mobile (maneuverable). The army defensive area 70-100 km wide and 100-150 km deep consisted of four defensive zones: forward, tactical, operational and rear. The forward zone had a strip of developed engineering barriers, the tactical zone had the main and rear (second) strips (640), the operational zone had a barrier strip, and the rear zone was intended for the deployment and operation of army rear areas. An important place in the defense was assigned to the organization of a system of artillery and aviation counter-preparation, counterattacks and counterattacks.

For the uninterrupted supply of troops in offensive and defensive operations, it was planned to create an army rear, which included special units and institutions.

The theory of deep combat and operation was partly tested on large army maneuvers of 1935-1937, during the hostilities that the Soviet Army had to conduct in 1938-1939.

The combat and training practice of the troops, the achievements of science and technology have raised in a new way the question of the use of tanks, artillery and aviation in combat.

A. A. Ignatiev, P. I. Kolomeitsev, P. D. Korkodinov, M. K. Nozdrunov, V. T. Obukhov, A. I. Stromberg and others.

The previously adopted scheme for the use of tanks in three groups - NPP, DPP, DD (641) - in the conditions of the increased strength of anti-tank defense could not ensure the fulfillment of combat missions. Therefore, tank groups DPP and DD were excluded from the combat formations of the advancing troops. Instead of these groups, a reserve of tanks was created (provided that the troops of the first echelons were sufficiently provided with them), intended to reinforce, if necessary, the tank group of the NPP or, in the event of a successful attack, to develop it to the entire depth of the enemy’s battle formation. The transformation of tactical success into an operational one and the achievement of a decisive goal in the main direction were assigned to armored formations - tank brigades and tank groups of operational significance (642).

Practice has shown that light, high-speed tanks with bulletproof armor have become unacceptable for combat missions under the new conditions; it was necessary to expand the production of medium and heavy tanks with anti-ballistic armor, powerful cannon armament and a large power reserve.

Experience has confirmed that of all the ground combat arms, artillery has the greatest power and range of fire impact, which is called upon to clear the way for advancing troops and crush the enemy in defense with massive strikes. Modern combat has increasingly become a fire contest between the opposing sides. Numerous and diverse fire weapons took part in it, for the destruction and suppression of which mobile long-range artillery of various combat missions was needed.

The best use of artillery in combat was greatly facilitated by the successes achieved in such branches of artillery science as internal and external ballistics and artillery shooting. Scientific research of artillery scientists D. A. Wentzel, P. A. Gelvikh, I. P. Grave, V. D. Grendal, N. F. Drozdov, V. G. Dyakonov, D. E. Kozlovsky, V. V. Mechnikov, Ya. M. Shapiro made it possible by the autumn of 1939 to create new firing tables, firing rules for military and anti-aircraft artillery, to revise the manual on fire training and artillery firing course, as well as other manuals.

The draft Field Manual of 1939, in addition to artillery support groups for infantry, long-range and artillery of destruction, introduced subgroups of artillery to support units of the first echelon, separate groups of close combat artillery (consisting of mortars), anti-aircraft artillery groups, long-range groups in the corps (643) . The density of artillery per kilometer of the attack front increased from 30 - 35 to 58 - 136 guns (without anti-tank artillery) (644) . Artillery support for the offensive was divided into periods: artillery preparation, attack support, fighting in the depths of the defensive zone (645).

By the mid-1930s, a theory of the combat use of the air force had been created. Soviet aviation, having completed a complex evolution, turned from a separate type of weapon into an independent branch of the armed forces, and then soon into one of the branches of the armed forces. In parallel with this process, the operational art of the air force was developing, which was engaged in the study of the theory of preparation and conduct of combat operations by large aviation formations and formations in the interests of achieving operational and operational-strategic goals. The founder of this theory is Professor A. N. Lapchinsky, whose fundamental works - "Air Forces in Combat and Operations" (1932) and "Air Army" (1939) - gave it the necessary harmony and clarity. He also worked out in detail the problems of the struggle for air supremacy. In 1936, the theory of the preparation and conduct of air operations was set out in the form of practical recommendations in the Provisional Instructions for Independent Operations of the Air Forces of the Red Army.

In a study presented to the leadership, Commander V. V. Khripin and Colonel P. I. Malinovsky outlined the tasks of aviation in the initial period of the war (646) . In order to test the provisions put forward by them, maneuvers were carried out in 1937, during which the actions of the aviation of the fronts and the aviation army of the High Command were practiced in the initial period of the war and in the conditions of an expanded operation of the front. Important principles of the operational art of aviation were reflected in the field manuals of 1936 and 1939. They emphasized that the main condition for the success of the Air Force is their massive use (647); during decisive periods of hostilities, all types of aviation must concentrate their efforts to promote "the success of ground forces in combat and operation ... in the main direction" (648) .

Great importance was attached to the continuity of the impact of aviation on enemy troops. To this end, during the period of preparation for the operation, it was envisaged to gain air supremacy, disrupt enemy transports, exhaust his troops and disrupt control. During the deployment of hostilities, at first, air preparation for the offensive was carried out in close cooperation with artillery, which later developed into support of the advancing battle order to the entire depth of the breakthrough. At the same time, aviation was supposed to disrupt the enemy’s control and communications, hit his reserves, frustrate counterattacks and prevent him from occupying the second defensive line (649) .

The theory of the combat use of aviation, in addition to operational art, also had tactics as its component, which was divided into the general tactics of the air force and the tactics of individual branches of aviation. Several works are devoted to these issues: in 1935, A. K. Mednis's textbook "Attack Aviation Tactics" was published, in 1936 - the work of M. D. Smirnov "Military Aviation", in 1937 - a large scientific study by A. N. Lapchinsky "Bomber Aviation", in 1939 - the book of P. P. Ionov "Fighter Aviation".

The analysis of everything new that appeared in the naval art was devoted to the studies of V. A. Alafuzov, S. S. Ramishvili, I. S. Isakov, V. A. Belli, Yu. A. Panteleev, A. V. Tomashevich and others.

The theory of "small war" at sea with elements of linearity, which relied on the widespread use of submarines, aircraft and light surface forces, was replaced by the theory of typical naval operations carried out both independently and jointly with ground forces. These operational views were subsequently summarized in the manual on the conduct of naval operations, published in 1940. Particular attention was paid to the organization of interaction between the branches of the armed forces: ground forces, fleet and aviation, as well as the branches of the naval forces - underwater and surface - with aviation and coastal artillery. Offensive actions at sea were given the main place. The role of strike forces in maritime communications was to be performed by submarines and aircraft. The carriers of the greatest offensive and defensive power of the sea and ocean fleets were considered battleships capable of prolonged combat impact on the enemy in cooperation with other classes of ships.

On the eve of the Second World War, a theory was formed of the operational use of naval forces to achieve ultimate goals in the maritime theater, mainly through concentrated strikes delivered by heterogeneous fleet forces against the enemy fleet in the course of a series of successive and parallel operations connected by the unity of the strategic task. Based on the experience of military operations in the First World War, taking into account the actions of naval forces in connection with the wars in Spain and China, the foundations were developed for conducting mine-protecting, landing and anti-amphibious operations, as well as operations against enemy bases and to provide fire support for the coastal flank of land armies.

A great achievement was the creation in 1937 of the Combat Charter of the Navy, in the development of which I. S. Isakov and V. A. Alekin took an active part. It reflects the issues of interaction of maneuverable formations for various purposes, combining their efforts for a joint strike against the enemy on the high seas and at mine-artillery positions created in narrow spaces and on the approaches to naval bases. Raid actions on the enemy coast were studied and practiced in order to destroy fortified objects, strike at enemy convoys, anti-submarine barrages, groupings of ships in coastal waters, ports and naval bases.

There were also shortcomings in the development of Soviet military theory on the eve of World War II. Correctly focusing on conducting strong retaliatory strikes against the aggressor, Soviet military art was unable to fully develop the methods of combat operations of the covering echelon and the strategic deployment of the main forces in the face of the threat of a sudden strike by strong and mobile enemy groupings.

The possibility of a deep breakthrough by the enemy of the strategic defense was considered unlikely. For this reason, the theory of preparing and conducting strategic defensive operations has not received a comprehensive development. The theoretical foundations of the operational-strategic interaction of fronts and types of forces in the conditions of a future major war were also considered in general terms, mainly in the interests of resolving practical issues related to planning the defense of state borders. There was no complete clarity on how to gain air supremacy in the course of initial operations in the theater of operations.

However, the necessary prerequisites for resolving these issues in subsequent years were basically created.

In 1936 - 1939. the results of large-scale maneuvers of the Kiev, Belorussian, Moscow and Leningrad military districts, as well as the combat experience of the Soviet troops near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River, military operations in local wars unleashed by the imperialists in Ethiopia, Spain, China, aggressive acts to seize Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania. The military press widely informed the public about the nature of the struggle in these wars and armed clashes (650).

In the second half of the 1930s, military theorists and major military leaders of the capitalist countries not only recognized the achievements of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also borrowed a lot from their experience. The head of the Italian military mission, General Graziolini, who was present at the “big Russian maneuvers,” wrote: “The Red Army is organized and equipped in a modern way ...” In his opinion, the Russians have a “great passion for mobile troops,” “are fond of large mechanized formations and conduct numerous exercises with their use.

An interesting assessment of the Soviet Army was given by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Loiseau: “I ... saw a powerful, serious army, of very high quality both technically and morally. Her moral level and physical condition are admirable. The equipment of the Red Army is at an unusually high level. With regard to tanks, I would think it right to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place. The parachute landing of a large military unit, which I saw near Kiev, I consider a fact that has no precedent in the world. The most characteristic, of course, is the closest and truly organic connection between the army and the population, the love of the people for the Red Army soldiers and commanders. I will say frankly, I have never seen such a powerful, exciting, beautiful sight in my life” (651) .

Hitler's general G. Guderian paid special attention to "combat groups operating in depth", which "pursued operational targets, struck against the flanks and rear, and simultaneously paralyzed the enemy throughout the entire depth of his defense" (652) . “The mass of tank forces,” he wrote, “should be expediently combined into combat corps, as is the case in England and Russia ...” (653) Guderian, creating the German version of the theory of deep operation, copied many of the provisions of Soviet military theorists.

Soviet military science was the first to develop methods for using airborne troops. Present at the maneuvers of the Kiev Military District in 1935, the English General (later Field Marshal) Wavell, reporting to the government on the use of a large air assault by the Russians, said: “If I myself had not witnessed this, I would never have believed that such an operation was even possible » (654) . The massive use of airborne troops during the maneuvers of the Soviet Army in 1936 astonished many representatives of the military delegations of France, Italy, Japan and other countries. A few years later, one of the American military observers, summing up the use of airborne landings by the Nazis in Western Europe, wrote: demonstrated these methods on a large scale during the maneuvers of 1936. (655) .

Wide display at military maneuvers and exercises 1935 - 1937. achievements of Soviet military science and technology pursued quite specific goals: to test by practice the correctness of the basic theoretical provisions developed by Soviet military science, and also to clearly show that the war against the USSR is a serious and dangerous matter for its organizers, and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace. In subsequent years (1938 - 1939), the defensive power of the USSR was demonstrated in battles with the Japanese invaders in the Far East.

On the whole, the level of Soviet military science on the eve of World War II met the requirements of the time. Relying on the provisions developed by military science, the party aimed design thought at the fastest possible development of modern, promising models of military equipment and weapons.