48 tank corps of the Wehrmacht.

BA-MA, RH24-48/4

Command post Berestechko, warm, sunny

The night passed quietly. The command of the 1st TG in its radiogram once again informed the command of the 57th infantry division and the 11th infantry division about a possible attack by enemy tank forces in the Toporuv area in a general direction to the north.

05:30 The reconnaissance unit of the 16th TD, already on the march from 03:30, reached Plyashchev around 05:30 without much opposition from the enemy (in those places there are two settlements with this name; judging by the context, we are talking about a settlement near the road to Kremenets, about 15 km southeast of the intersection - M.S.); the tank regiment of the division occupied Ivashchuky (settlement at the intersection of the Brody-Dubno highway and the road to Kremenets).

06:30 At 05:00, the 11th TD set out from Dubno in an easterly direction. The advance is proceeding at a good pace. The advanced units of the division captured Mlodava at 06:30.

09:00 A report was received from the 57th Infantry Division that a long-awaited counterattack by the enemy tank forces had begun to the south of Leshnev (the 12th tank division of the 8th mechanized corps went on the offensive - M.S.). The large forces of the 57th Infantry Division are located near Lopatin and cannot be diverted to repulse this counterattack, since they are there to protect the flanks, exposed due to the ongoing offensive of the division. In this regard, another request was made to the command of the tank group for the speedy allocation of 44 AK to cover the flanks up to the river. Styr. After noon on June 27, this task will be performed by 44 ak.

The situation near Leshnev becomes critical. The reinforced 1st Battalion of the 179th Infantry Division put up stubborn resistance and suffered heavy losses. Despite the resistance of our troops, the Russians managed to break through with the help of strong artillery support and tanks across the river [Slonovka] and bypass the village from both flanks. Due to the incessant enemy fire, it was not possible to undermine the bridge located south of Leshnev. Separate tank units of the enemy broke into the area of the colonyMytnikaand went to the Styr River in the area west of Berestechko (It is noteworthy that not a single Soviet document speaks of such a deep advancement of units of the 8th mechanized corps - M.S.). Our infantry and artillery units in the area north of Leshnev began to retreat in places under pressure from the enemy. Only the lack of coordination of the Russian attack and the personal intervention of the commander of the 57th Infantry Division prevented the situation from worsening further.

By order of the command of the corps, units of the reinforced 199th Infantry Division, which was advancing to the Sitno area to carry out the task of securing the flanks, were turned in order to push back the enemy that had broken through.

12:10 The situation, unfortunately, forces us to use the 16th TD to repel the enemy's attack. The division was ordered to throw into battle all available forces in the sector where the enemy had broken through.

The corps command is trying to bring up all available anti-tank units. On urgent requests from the ground forces, the Luftwaffe conducts constant raids on large concentrations of enemy units seen on both sides of the road in the Brody, Leshnev area.

By noon, the current situation has not yet been clarified; the outcome of the battles is also completely unobvious. The enemy, using tanks, is trying to break through in the Radzekhov area (in the report of the 15MK commander we read : "The 19th Tank Regiment at 10.00 on 26.6.41 attacked the enemy in the direction of Okhladów"- M.S.); this made the position of the corps critical.

The tank regiment of the 11th TD was only able to move slightly deeper into the enemy's location. Aerial reconnaissance data indicate the slow movement of enemy tank units, starting from 13:00, from HRuzwica in the direction of Mlodava (settlement 10 km northeast of Dubno). Since 14:00, our tanks have been fighting with these enemy units in the Varkovice area (this began an offensive on Dubno by the 43rd Panzer Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps - M.S.). The advance of the rifle brigade is developing better; its advanced units have already reached Wielka Moszczanica.

14:00 The forward units of the 16th TD are fighting in the Kremenets region, while the rifle brigade, cut off from the rest of the forces in the Leshnev region during the enemy’s breakthrough, is still on the western bank of the river. Styr.

The situation in the area south of Berestechko remains critical even in the evening. The enemy, using tanks, is advancing from the forest area northeast of Leshnev - through Redkow to Ostrow (this is the offensive of the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps - M.S.). In the evening, he manages to temporarily block the road in the Ostrow region.

At 18:00, in view of the situation, the corps command ordered the preparation of bridges across the river. Stitch for demolition. After all the anti-tank units located on the southern outskirts of Berestechko were thrown into battle, the Russian tanks that had broken through to Ostrow were driven back with heavy losses. The leadership of our units in this battle was carried out by the commander [of the anti-aircraft regiment] "General Goering".

In the meantime, the 179th regiments and units of the 199th regiments, performing the task of protecting the flanks, were able to create a solid line of defense. This allows the corps command to positively assess the situation in the breakthrough zone, despite all the vicissitudes of the past day.

The corps commander, who, due to the extremely difficult situation on the front line, had to leave Dubno at 17:35, arrived safely in Berestechko. The trip along the Dubno-Ostrow highway, which was partially blocked by the enemy, was not without incident.

19:25 The 11th TD with its rifle brigade, continuously pursuing the retreating enemy, reached Buszcza. The tank regiment continues to fight near Varkovic in the evening (settlement 18 km north-east of Dubno - M.S.). Combat reports from the advanced units of the 16th TD (tank regiment, reconnaissance battalion and battalion of motorcyclists) located near Kremenets have not yet been received. The corps command cannot yet assess the scale of the fighting taking place there. The remaining parts of the division are still cut off and are located on the western bank of the river. Styr.

20:30 Since Russian tanks approached 6 km to the command post of the corps (underlined by me - M.S.), and also due to constant enemy air raids, which made orderly work impossible, control was transferred to a spare command post located in the estate 2 km northwest of Berestechko.

Assessment of the situation:

Factors requiring a deviation from the original plan have not yet been observed(tanks 6 km from the command post of the corps are nothing more than an annoying nuisance, M.S.)

24:00 Radiograms were sent to the headquarters of the divisions with instructions for June 27th. A general order for the corps will not be issued.

The 57th Infantry Division is to recapture a section of the [Slonowka] river near Leshnev. If the enemy tries to counterattack, take all measures to repel these counterattacks.

The goals of the 11th TD are the same as on June 26: an offensive through Ostrog in the direction of Shepetovka.

Since it is necessary to reckon with a possible enemy strike on the unprotected flank of the corps and in the area east of Leshnev (for example, near Sitno), the 16th TD is instructed to continue advancing on 27.6. only when the rifle brigade can come out of the area of the river. Styr.

Combat experience:

1) In the light of recent events and Russian methods of fighting, it is debatable whether units can move forward without looking at their own flanks, as was practiced in previous campaigns. This question should be answered in the affirmative, since otherwise the corps units run the risk of being drawn into protracted battles for the flanks and losing the operational pace. In this case, however, numerous critical situations will arise that require the transfer of additional forces for localization. The subordination of the infantry division, moving on foot, to the command of the tank corps, in order to protect the flanks with a "roll", fully justified itself.

2) Despite the fact that the Russians hit a very vulnerable spot on the flank of the corps, they could not use the fruits of their successful attack near Leshnev. In the depths of the breakthrough zone, there is no systematic control of the battle on their part. (underlined by me - M.S.) . The enemy pulverizes his shock fist in scattered attacks, unrelated either in time or in place, by small groups of tanks (or even single vehicles), which are almost never accompanied by infantry. It was because of this dispersal of forces that our relatively small anti-tank weapons managed to push back the enemy tank units and destroy many Russian tanks in the process. Without these anti-tank weapons found nearby, our troops would not have the necessary resistance against enemy tank attacks. The anti-tank weapons themselves showed their superiority over the enemy and the ability to respond to any requirements of the situation.

3) As in previous days, on the quality of radio traffic 26.6. atmospheric disturbances were severe. Radiograms (including "lightning") are received in most cases late and distorted. Radio exchange with the Tank Group is the most difficult. Since, due to the rapid advance, telephone communication is available only in a few cases, the combat control of the corps is often greatly hampered due to insufficient information about the current situation.

After the capture of Dubno, large stocks of ammunition, fuel and lubricants and food, numerous light and medium guns, as well as 42 units of 210-mm mortars fell into the hands of the 11th TD.

Command post Berestechko, warm, sunny

Radiograms from the 16th TD, received until the morning, allow us to conclude that the position of the advanced units near Kremenets during yesterday's day was by no means favorable.

05:00 The report that the advanced units broke into Kremenets on June 26 at 1 pm does not seem to be true. Apparently, the division managed to create a small foothold on the section of the river. Ikva, who, however, was bypassed by the enemy from the rear and subjected to a strong attack. The march communications of the division near Sitno were also cut by the enemy. The location of the division commander is currently unknown.

Starting in the early morning, the enemy crosses the river north of the bridgehead and again attacks our units with large forces. (a very strange message, because early in the morning the infamous "stop order" was received by the 8th mechanized corps with an order to leave the battlefield and retreat beyond the Podkamen line, Pochaev - M.S.). Many of the enemy tanks that broke through at Sitno were destroyed. Thus, Russian attempts to break through in this sector, as expected by the corps command, are in full swing. In this regard, it seems vital to bring up the rifle brigade as soon as possible. According to a report from the division, however, no action should be expected before 09:00.

08:00 At about 5 a.m., the 11th TD, after a night march, occupied Ostrog with the forces of the rifle brigade; the tank regiment of the division is still fighting west of Mizoch (settlement 25 km east of Dubno - M.S.).

At 07:30, the 57th Infantry Division during the attack, overcoming the slight resistance of the enemy (The 12th Panzer Division had already rolled away beyond Brody by that time - M.S.), again took up old positions on the section of the river. Slonuvka near Leshnev. The division is no longer under the control of the corps and is placed at the disposal of the command of 44 AK, which from now on is responsible for covering the flank up to Leshnev. To cover the flanks of the corps, which is necessary at the moment, the command of the tank group is pulling up the 16th motorized division through Sokal to Berestechko. As was notified, the division will be subordinate to the command of the corps.

In response to a request for the immediate delivery of additional PTO funds dated 26.6. 670th anti-tank division was sent (reserve of the 1st TGr, 47-mm cannon on a tracked chassis of a light tank - M.S.) and a battery of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.

A radiogram from the Tank Group for the past day, received, however, only now, informs the corps command about possible retreat of the enemy (Did the Germans get a copy of the "stop order"? - M.S.) in the zone of responsibility of the Tank Group and indicates the need for immediate pursuit. The command of the corps cannot agree with such an assessment of the situation, because the tank divisions of the corps fought and are fighting the hardest battles with the enemy, who himself is attacking vigorously. Therefore, the immediate start of the pursuit, which the Panzer Group requires, is not possible at the moment. Before any further action, the corps must first bring up its panzer divisions, which are scattered far apart due to the constant threat to the flanks.

08:20 The chief of staff of the Tank Group came to the same conclusion after a telephone conversation with the corps commander. The chief of staff instructed the corps to regroup for further advance after the goals scheduled for June 26 were achieved: the occupation of Kremenets and Ostrog. Following this, appropriate orders were issued on the radio.

09:30 The 13th TD advances from Lutsk through a fork in the road 4 km northeast of Dubno towards Rivne. 11th AP must establish a connection ( apparently with the command of the corps - approx.trans.).

The relocation of the corps command post to Dubno, which was scheduled for yesterday, is not yet possible, especially since traffic along the highway leading from Demidowka in Dubno, is also constantly violated due to enemy actions. The 108th Artillery Directorate, which had left with groups sent forward, received an order according to which it should create a commandant's office in Dubno and at first perform its functions.

The corps withdrew the request for air support until the situation at the 16th TD, which was fighting near Kremenets, was completely cleared up.

14:30 Around 06:00, the 11th TD managed to capture the crossing over the [r. Goryn] in the Ostrog region; after that, parts of the division from 10:00 are constantly attacked by large enemy forces (this is the 11th TD flew from a run into the formations of the Second Strategic Echelon of the Red Army represented by the 16th Army Lukin - M.S.). The tank regiment pushed back enemy units west of Mizoch and captured many heavy guns in the process; the regiment continues its offensive against Ostrog.

Cover forces were left in Dubno. After the corps had already taken measures in previous days to reduce the excessive length of the columns of the 11th TD, which interfered with the units following this formation, it is necessary to issue a similar order now; according to him, the rear units should be pulled up at least to Dubno and in general should be closer to the front line.

The position of the 16th TD is still unclear. Again there are reports of large concentrations of heavy and super-heavy enemy tanks in the area of Sitno, r. Ykva. Apparently, separate parts of these formations moved further north and reached the highway west of Verba (this began the offensive of the "Popel group" on Dubno - M.S.). Traffic on the highway towards Dubno has stalled. The phone line also doesn't work. The movement of the rifle brigade is constantly interrupted by enemy tanks operating from the forests south of the road [Ostrow-Kozin]. The brigade has been in combat near Khotyn since noon. Air support in battles against enemy tank formations is associated with certain difficulties: in particular, the pilots are afraid to hurt their units, since in places it is only difficult to distinguish where the German units are and where the Russians are.

17:25 The 16th MD is subordinated to the command of the corps in order to cover the flank in the area east of Leshnev. Since the division is still on the march in the direction of Stoianow, the formation will not be able to start its task until tomorrow.

19:00 The situation in the Verba region has noticeably worsened. A strong enemy tank formation seems to be trying to break through from Brody to Dubno. For the third time in the few days during which hostilities have been going on, the highway along which the tank formations of the corps are moving has been cut. An extremely difficult situation has arisen. The rifle brigade has not yet been able to establish contact with the advanced units of the 16th TD. The brigade is fighting with large enemy forces in the area Honoratka, while many enemy tanks were destroyed.

Apparently, the vanguard of the enemy tank units managed to break through to Dubno; formations of the enemy avant-garde attacked in the Tarakanov area (southern suburb of Dubno - M.S.) units of the corps battalion of communications and supply units sent forward. The main enemy force is still south of the highway; only near Tarnavka (on a small road, southeast of Kozin) up to 50 super-heavy enemy tanks were counted. As before, there is no clarity with the position of the forward units near Kremenets. General Hube, apparently, along with part of his headquarters, is surrounded in the Kamennaya Verba area (settlement at the intersection of the roads Brody-Dubno and Berestechko-Kremenets, M.S.).

The corps command also knows little about the situation of the 11th TD. Due to atmospheric interference reception of radiograms is impossible(underlined by me - M.S.)

21:00 The corps commander informs the chief of staff of the 1st TGr about the situation and gives the following assessment of the situation:

Parts of the 11th TD are still disconnected; it is necessary to group the division in the Ostrog region, to expand the bridgehead [on the river. Goryn] and only then continue the offensive. In the opinion of the corps commander, the situation in the Sitno area after the counterattack of enemy units is quite serious, and this situation must be corrected before the 16th TD goes on the offensive. If the enemy manages to advance further in this sector and, in particular, to occupy Dubno, then the supply of the 11th TD may at least temporarily be in jeopardy. A possible turn of the enemy forces to the southeast would also extremely aggravate the position of the 16th TD. The pulling up and regrouping of the rifle brigade must be carried out tomorrow at all costs. The chief of staff of the 1st TGr agrees with this assessment of the situation.

After that, corresponding radiograms with tasks for June 28 were sent to the troops.

11 TD should hold a bridgehead near Ostrog, and also send strong reconnaissance units in the direction of Shepetovka.

The 16th TD should pull up the rifle brigade to the forward units, if necessary with the help of tanks. After that, the division should advance at an accelerated pace to Izyaslav.

The 16th MD should pull up its units to the Berestechko area as soon as possible.

Combat experience:

Today, the corps was again drawn into heavy fighting. All parts of the corps showed their best side and again proved their superiority over the enemy. It should be noted, however, some nervousness in the personnel of some units. There are two explanations for this: firstly, the constant threats to our flanks and repeated breakthroughs of enemy units to the main communications of the corps did not go unnoticed by the troops. The greatest effect, however, was produced by enemy tanks appearing in front of our soldiers in large numbers. In fact, since the second day of the campaign, the corps has been fighting fierce battles with the enemy's tank units. These battles are eloquently evidenced by 120 destroyed tanks, knocked out in just two days: 26.6. and 27.6.

Command post Berestechko, thunderstorm, rain

The night passed without much incident. The radio messages from the previous day's reports, which arrived only in the morning, shed light on certain circumstances that had hitherto remained obscure. In the evening, numerous motorized and tank formations of the enemy, forming a long column, broke through from the direction of Brody to the northeast, passing between the forward units and the rifle brigade of the 16th TD.

The rifle brigade continued to fight at night in the forest near Honoratka.

An attack near Tarakany by enemy tank units in the general direction of Dubno inflicted more serious losses than previously thought. Near the southwestern outskirts of Dubno, another enemy tank attack was repulsed.

The 111th Infantry Division is advancing from Mlyny towards the area east of Dubno, the vanguard of the division reached the outskirts of Dubno in the early morning. Thus, the immediate danger that threatened the city was eliminated.

Our reconnaissance established the location of the enemy's tank and motorized units, which were advancing yesterday from the Brody area through Sitno. Numerous tanks were seen standing well camouflaged west and south of the highway in the Verba area. There are again reports of a very long motorized column, escorted by tanks, moving from Brody to Dubno. (this began the advancement of the main forces of the 8th mechanized corps - M.S.) Impressed by these reports, the command of the corps instructed the commandant of Dubno to create barriers on the south side of the highway.

With the onset of the day, enemy aircraft constantly attacked the bridgehead of the 11th TD in the Ostrog area. Despite a corresponding request to the Panzer Group, our own fighter aircraft cannot operate due to bad weather.

14:00 Finally, it is possible to pull up and regroup the 16th TD and establish contact with the advanced units. We also managed to rescue the division commander, who had been surrounded for a long time with part of his headquarters. A battalion of motorcyclists located in front of the city of Kremenets east of the river. Ikva, was subjected to very heavy fire from fortified gun emplacements and retreated to the west bank. The rifle brigade is fighting south of Kozin, as well as in its immediate vicinity; the brigade managed to completely destroy several strong Russian infantry formations, as well as knock out many enemy tanks (so modestly described is the complete defeat of two divisions of the 8th mechanized corps: the 12th tank and the 7th motorized - M.S.).

After the approach of the 111th Infantry Division, the situation in the Dubno region stabilized. The task of the division, however, is to advance east of the river. Ikva in a southerly direction. Since the situation after the departure of parts of the division is precarious, the commandant of Dubno decided for the time being to leave in the city a weak cover from the 11th TD, equipped with relatively strong anti-aircraft weapons.

Due to extremely poor radio communications, very little information is received from the 11th TD. The corps commander, who returned from the location of the division on the Fieseler "Storch" aircraft, said that the division had expanded the bridgehead in the morning and was forced to fight off constant enemy attacks there. This and also incessant enemy air raids(underlined by me - M.S.), leads to numerous losses.

The corps command assesses the current situation as follows:

Enemy resistance in the Kremenets region increased markedly, as the enemy clearly pulled up strong artillery formations. Attacking the dominant heights in the sector will be costly and time consuming. It will be difficult to knock out the strong tank and motorized formations of the enemy, which are located in the forests west of the Verba-Dubno highway. These units must, however, be destroyed before our troops resume their offensive, otherwise they will pose a constant threat to the Corps' main supply line. Using the 16th MD against this enemy grouping, whose advanced units have already arrived in the Berestechko area, is inappropriate: firstly, parts of the division have not yet been assembled into a single shock fist, and secondly, the enemy has a great advantage in tanks. Therefore, the command of the corps decides to abandon the attack on Kremenets and, with the freed forces of the 16th TD, destroy the mentioned enemy grouping in the forests west of the Verba-Dubno highway.

14:10 The corps commander informs the chief of staff of the 1st TGr about his intention to attack and destroy this grouping with the main forces of the 16th TD after the sector south of Kozin is cleared of the enemy. The plan is awaiting the approval of the commander of the Panzer Group.

19:00 The main forces of the 11th TD, meanwhile, began to move forward, but they, as before, were attacked by enemy aircraft.

The commander of the 1st TGr decided that the 16th TD would not attack the heights near Kremenets, and instead, after the final capture of the sector south of Kozin, it should be ready to attack enemy units southwest of Dubno when they advanced from the forest. Then the 16th TD should advance with a ledge behind the 11th TD. Thus, the plan proposed by the corps was fully approved by the higher command.

19:20 In the afternoon, towards evening, the enemy at the front in front of Dubno pulled up reserves and artillery, conducted reconnaissance in battle with tanks and infantry. Since the command of the corps expects a full-scale attack this night or early in the morning, it requested the Panzer Group about reinforcements in the form of a reinforced battalion (underlined by me - M.S.) from the 55AK. Otherwise, the city may fall. 55 AK satisfies this request of the corps and allocates one battalion.

20:00 Air reconnaissance established the presence of about 80 tanks in the forest southwest of Dubno! (if the compiler of the document knew how many of them could / should have been there, he would probably have put not an exclamation point, but a question mark - M.S.) The commander of the 16th TD receives an order by telephone for June 29, according to which the division should set up guards against Kremenets, block the highway leading from Brody to Dubno, and keep a strong mixed battle group ready against the enemy grouping southwest of Dubno. The attack must begin as early as possible.

24:00 The 11th TD should hold a bridgehead in the Ostrog area on June 29. The situation near Dubno is critical, the enemy has been attacking with infantry and tanks in the western part of the city since late evening. The outcome of the battles is still unclear. The commandant of Dubno requested urgent reinforcements, but the corps could not yet provide additional forces that night.

Command post Berestechko,

rain at night from 28 to 29, overcast in the daytime.

06:00 Our troops managed, straining all their forces, to push back the advancing enemy with large forces from the outskirts of Dubno. From 04:00, the enemy continues to attack with infantry and tanks, among them super-heavy tanks with a 150-mm gun. Since the offensive of our own tanks is being postponed, the situation in the Dubno region remains serious even further.

06:15 The commander of the 16th TD informs the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the corps that the battalion of motorcyclists was again attacked by heavy tanks and cavalry from the southeast and west directions. In this regard, the division commander decided to regroup the tank regiment in the area of Kamennaya Verba, Stolbets (settlement at the crossroads - M.S.) so that it can act both against the enemy grouping in the southwestern direction, and against Dubno (which will require refueling). Since the motorcyclists cannot continue the fight for a long time in such conditions, it was decided to take them to the northwest.

The position of the 11th TD remains unchanged. The division still has no connection with the 3rd TC, which is fighting in the Rovno region.

To date, from the 16th MD, only a reinforced reconnaissance battalion located in the area Bokujma, performs the task of covering. At the moment, the battalion is delivering heavy anti-tank guns to the Dubno garrison through Mlynov. The main forces of the division are still on the march to Berestechko; the speed of movement of these parts is greatly slowed down by off-road and numerous traffic jams.

08:00 The division is instructed as soon as possible to form a battle group in the Berestechko area of approximately a regiment for operations against the enemy, who, possibly, will break through from Verba in a northerly direction.

09:20 The chief of staff of the tank group informs the corps command that the 44th infantry division is already 15 km north of Dubno; the task of the division is to clear the area around the city from the enemy.

09:45 Since the enemy advanced west of the highway and occupied Verba, the corps commander ordered the commander of the 16th TD to immediately drive the enemy out of this settlement in order to secure his rear.

11:30 From 06:00 strong enemy units supported by tanks attack units of the 11th TD located on the bridgehead in the Velbovno area (Eastern suburb of Ostrog - M.S.). Since reports of strong tank formations are coming from 3 TC (parts of the emerging 9th and 19th mechanized corps - M.S.) enemy in the Goshcha region and to the south (near Tessow), the corps command believes that during the day the pressure on the bridgehead in the Ostrog area from this group will only increase. Due to light rain, the condition of the roads in the location of the 11th TD also noticeably deteriorated, in places to complete impassability.

12:15 During a telephone conversation with the corps commander, the chief of staff of the TGr informs the first of the decision regarding the further actions of the 16th TD. The corps commander believes that as long as there is a strong enemy grouping southwest of Dubno, further advance of the division in an easterly direction is not possible. Thus, the division will not move directly behind the 11th TD, but will be used against the mentioned enemy grouping. For these purposes, a strong battle group will have to be created, which will be able to impose a battle on the enemy tanks and then destroy them. For the speedy execution of this order, the corps commander personally went to the location of the 16th TD.

From 13:00 the enemy continues to vigorously attack Dubno with infantry and tanks and with strong artillery support. Apparently, in the course of our counterattacks, the enemy was thrown back.

14:35 Radiogram received: "Dubno is taken by the Russians!". Fortunately, the radiogram has not been confirmed.

However, the situation remains tense. Reports are accumulating, but the picture remains unclear. Apparently, the enemy managed to break through the battle formations of the 111th Infantry Division southwest of Dubno and continue the offensive on the eastern outskirts of the city. The position of the 111th pd is also not yet clear.

17:00 Finally, a report arrives from the commandant of the city, Major General von Stumpfeld: all enemy attacks are repelled, a large number of enemy tanks are destroyed. The 44th infantry division and units of the reconnaissance battalion of the 16th infantry division have not yet arrived.

In the meantime, at about 14:00, the 16th TD took Verba and, obviously, continues the offensive in a northerly direction.

The enemy, supported by artillery and tanks, is still carrying out stubborn attacks on the positions of the 11th TD on the bridgehead in the Velbovno area. As expected by the corps command, large enemy tank units north of Ostrog are beginning to put pressure on our troops. The enemy has the 11th TD in the area absolute dominance in the air(underlined by me - M.S.), enemy planes, using airborne weapons, fire at our troops from strafing flight.

19:00 The division (11th TD) receives a radiogram with an order for tomorrow's offensive in the direction of Shepetovka.

19:25 The command of the tank group set tasks for the corps for June 30:

Capture Izyaslav and Shepetovka with further movement in the direction of Polonnoe and to the south. Additional air cover was promised in case enemy tanks appeared.

22:00 Based on the order of the 1st TGr, a radiogram was sent to the command of the 11th TD with instructions to occupy the heights northeast of Krupets (settlement on the river Goryn, 20 km east of Ostrog - M.S.) from there to cover the flanks for further advance. Since no more reports were received from the division in the evening, the situation there still remains unclear.

24:00 16th TD and 16th MD receive preliminary instructions for June 30 by telephone. After that, a general order is issued for the corps.

The 16th TD should move as soon as possible through Dubno in the direction of Yazaslav and further in the direction of Labun.

The 16th MD should take on the task of blocking the highway leading from Brody to Dubno and preventing the retreat of the enemy group [from the area] southwest of Dubno to the south.

The corps command plans to move the command post to Dubno.

At night, a disappointing report was received from the 16th TD that the battle group, which had advanced in the Verba area, ran into superior enemy tank forces and was forced to retreat. In addition, she had to fight a night battle with superior enemy infantry. The enemy units, attacking with wild cries of "Hurrah!", Used flamethrowers. The battle group had to retreat even further south of Verba. Given these circumstances, it is too early to talk about favorable conditions for the further offensive of the division.

Command post Berestechko,

warm, sunny

02:00 Reports received at night indicate the difficult situation of the 11th TD, located on the bridgehead in the Ostrog region. After heavy fighting with many times superior enemy forces, which attacked with tanks and infantry, in the late evening of June 29, units had to be evacuated from the advanced bridgehead in the Velbovno area. The new formations of the enemy succeeded, advancing from the northeast and southwest, and despite very heavy losses of their own, made their way even closer to the bridgeheads. Despite heavy shelling and air raids, the division, straining its last forces, continues to hold the crossings in the area Willja. According to the command of the division, a full-fledged attack is necessary for further advancement. For today's attack, the division requested full air support, including both fighter cover and bombers. The corps was able to allocate only fighters.

In Dubno the night passed without much incident. Apparently, the 16th TD suffered heavy losses during heavy night fighting in the Ptichye area. For this reason, the attack on Dubno, which was planned for the early morning, had to be postponed. The offensive was postponed to the second half of the day; it must be preceded by careful reconnaissance and artillery preparation.

08:20 Reinforcements constantly arrive at the enemy in front of the bridgehead in the Ostrog area; its number in this sector is estimated at about one division. The beginning of the offensive of the 11th TD also had to be postponed due to the ongoing night fighting.

Air reconnaissance reports a new accumulation of tanks in front of the front of the 16th TD south and north of Ptichye. Tanks are on the field on both sides of the highway in the starting position for the attack. In total, more than 100 vehicles were counted, among them there are also super-heavy types. The Corps requested immediate air cover in the event of an attack by this force.

11:15 In the morning, the enemy continues to attack with the same fury the bridgeheads in the Ostrog area with the southeastern direction of the main attack. Due to completely muddy roads at night

failed to bring ammunition, which affects the defensive actions of the 11th TD. The division command reports that due to constant air raids, the division's offensive is delayed by 1.7 (with the beginning of dawn), and the direction of the strike is limited to the area north of Ostrog. The necessary regrouping of formations is already being carried out, at the same time, air support against the attacking enemy units has been re-requested. Since 09:30, reports have been coming in about new enemy tank formations that are moving out of the Izyaslav region towards Ostrog.

At 11:45 the headquarters of the corps departed through Mlynov to a new command post in Dubno(!!!). Arrival at 15:00.

15:10 The chief of staff of the corps radioed the command of the 11th TD that, according to the order of the commander of the 1st TGr, the division must break through the river at any cost today. Goryn and develop an offensive on Shepetovka. The division should not concentrate exclusively on the crossing near Ostrog, but could force the river in other places as well. It should be remembered that it is extremely important to move further even today.

Meanwhile, the corps commander, despite the indescribably poor condition of the roads, nevertheless arrived at the location of the 11th TD and, after clarifying the situation, was convinced that the division could not attack today. After continuous attacks by the enemy, the amount of ammunition at the formation is only half of the ammunition load. According to the corps commander, tomorrow's offensive is possible only under two conditions:

a) If ammunition is delivered in a timely manner.

b) If air support is provided by both fighters and bombers, not only in the initial stages, but also during the further development of the offensive.

Meanwhile, the division repelled numerous massive enemy attacks and inflicted very heavy losses on him. In this sector, the enemy was stopped in front of the division's battle formations along the entire front, but pressure from the southeast and east continues.

Due to the lack of air support, the 16th TD again postponed its attack, scheduled for noon. Enemy attacks by infantry and tanks in the Verba area were successfully repelled.

After the corps commander returned by plane Fieseler "Shtorch", the chief of staff of the corps, in turn, also flew by plane to the location of the 11th TD in order to discuss on the spot the necessary measures to prepare tomorrow's attack and, if necessary, expedite their implementation.

19:00 During a telephone conversation between the corps commander and the chief of staff of the Tank Group, the first gave the following assessment of the current situation:

The 11th TD, which suffered heavy losses during enemy air raids, is in a very difficult situation. If tomorrow's attack is not accompanied by strong air support, the division will not be able to advance any far. Further, the corps commander reported that the attack of the 16th TD, apparently, did not bring much success. The reason for this was the lack of forces allocated for the attack (the tank regiment was not ready for active combat due to heavy night battles). After the planned artillery preparation, carried out by all available forces, the division must repeat the attack. For this reason, the corps commander decides to place a ledge behind the 11th TD instead of the 16th Panzer Division, which has not yet been freed, the 16th Motorized Division and bring it into battle next to the 11th TD in the strip of the river. Goryn.

Corps commander also vehemently denied the commander's allegations(underlined by me - M.S.), consisting in the fact that the command of the corps allegedly kept the 16th MD in the rear for too long. From the very first day, when the division was subordinated to the command of the corps, the latter tried with all its might to speed up its advance, but constant delays on the march and the exceptionally poor condition of the roads led to great delays. If the command of the Tank Group approves the advance of the 16th MD, then, as the corps commander assures, tomorrow's attack by the 11th TD will end in complete success. The corps commander also considers the plan, which was apparently put forward by the Panzer Group, to be unrealistic. According to this plan, the 16th MD should take on the task of destroying the enemy grouping southwest of Dubno, and place the 16th TD in a ledge behind 11 TD. The fact is that the 16th TD will only be able to speak for the 11th TD when the mentioned enemy grouping near Dubno is destroyed. 16 TD is at the disposal of the corps to solve this problem in the first place.

19:45 From the chief of staff of the Tank Group, an instruction was received as follows: after a preliminary strike by bombers, the 16th TD should be attacked and destroyed 1.7. enemy tank group southwest of Dubno. Thus, the 16th MD will be echeloned behind the 11th TD.

20:15 The corps commander gives the order to the commander of the 16th TD. Start of the attack: July 1 at 09:00, in order to improve interaction, the division must establish contact with the 55th AK (44th infantry division).

Based on the proposals of the chief of staff of the corps, who had already personally discussed all the details regarding tomorrow's attack with the command of the 11th TD, in the late evening of the same day, the following instructions were given to the divisions on the conduct of the battle:

Early in the morning, the 11th TD advances in the area Kuniow and Stojlo, and with a lapel part of the connections frees the crossing in the Ostrog area to advance the 16th MD.

The vanguard of the 16th MD should occupy the sector to the southeast by 08:00 on July 1 Wierzchow and be ready to develop an offensive through Ostrog in the direction of Shepetovka.

The 16th TD is to destroy the encircled enemy units in the Verba area and to the north.

Checked:

For Corps Headquarters:

translated by Dmitry Baranov

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In the 48th tank corps

Arriving at the headquarters of the 48th Panzer Corps, I saw that the situation here was not pleasant. After an unsuccessful corps counterattack, his commander and chief of staff were removed from their posts, and this was done so hastily that they did not even have time to transfer matters to their successors. It is quite clear that this is not the way to do it, but that was Hitler's manner. The only person to whom I could turn for advice in this troubling situation was the first officer of the staff, Major von Ohlen, a good friend of mine. In the good old days, we took part in steeplechases together more than once.

In order to find out the real state of affairs, I went to the tank regiment of the 13th Panzer Division, which was preparing for a counterattack in order to restore the position lost the night before. The counterattack was successful, the two abandoned villages again passed into our hands, and the Russians, seized with panic, literally fled from the battlefield. Success was achieved thanks to the excellent interaction of artillery, motorized infantry and tanks. In this battle, as in many others that I had to observe later, the absolute superiority of the German tank forces over the Russians was clearly revealed. But the German tank formations resembled only separate islands in the vast ocean of Russian hordes, rapidly advancing from the right, left and far in the rear.

I also visited the Romanian units attached to our corps, where, unfortunately, I had to make sure that they could not withstand the powerful onslaught of the Russians. The Romanian artillery did not have such modern guns as the German and, to our misfortune, the Russian artillery had. The means of communication was not enough to ensure the rapid and flexible massing of fire necessary in defense conditions. The armament of the anti-tank units was also completely inadequate, and their tanks were obsolete vehicles purchased in France. I thought again about North Africa and the Italian divisions operating there. Poorly trained units, like the Italian ones, with outdated weapons, are not able to withstand a serious test.

On November 30, General Kramer temporarily assumed command of the 48th Panzer Corps (later Kramer was captured by the British in Tunisia, where he commanded the Afrika Korps; he was a veteran of combat operations in the desert who distinguished himself in the battles of Sidi Rezegh). At this time, the situation at the front was too serious and urgently required decisive action. Although the Romanian 3rd Army, whose most combat-ready formation was the 48th Panzer Corps, managed to create a defensive line along the Chir River, I, however, seriously feared that it would not be able to withstand a decisive Russian offensive. The reserves were very weak, and the defensive line was occupied by units formed from soldiers withdrawn from rear services and lagging behind their units. At this time we were still holding a small bridgehead on the left bank of the Don at Nizhne-Chirskaya, only forty kilometers from the nearest units of the 6th Army, which were near Marinovka. But the Russians were well aware that it was necessary to push us further west, and in early December the troops of their 5th Panzer Army launched decisive attacks and crossed the Chir River in several places.

When the Russians launched their offensive, the headquarters of the 48th Panzer Corps left Petrovka and on December 4 settled in the Nizhne-Chirskaya area, where the Chir flows into the Don (the 13th Panzer Division and Romanian tanks were left to support the 3rd Romanian Army). It was assumed that the 48th Panzer Corps would unite the 11th Panzer, 336th Infantry and one airfield divisions, which on December 4 were still on their way to the front.

When Gotha's 4th Panzer Army began its attack on Stalingrad, 48th Panzer Corps would cross the Don and link up with its left flank. Colonel Adam from the headquarters of the 6th Army was in Nizhne-Chirskaya with the improvised units that he managed to gather there.

On December 4, the newly appointed commander of the 48th Corps, General von Knobelsdorff, arrived at our headquarters. I had the honor of being his chief of staff during the almost continuous defensive and offensive battles on the Chir and Northern Donets rivers, and then near Kharkov and Kursk. He was a man with remarkable knowledge, a flexible mind and a broad outlook, he was highly valued by all staff members. The new commander immediately found himself drawn into the maelstrom of the disturbing events we were going through.

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CHAPTER THREE IN THE CORPORATION OF PAGES From letter to letter At the beginning of 1808, Vyazhla was anxious: there were rumors that a plague had come from the south, from the Astrakhan steppes, to the Tambov region. Abram Andreevich was worried about the children: small, small, smaller, and the smallest, Sergei, had not yet left the

Tankers of the 5th Guards. tank army prepare the tank for battle.

The offensive of the 48th tank corps.

The 11th Panzer Division and the Great Germany Division, which were part of the strike group of the 48th Corps, were supposed to break the defenses of the 67th Guards Rifle Division northeast of Cherkassky and break through to the Belgorod-Oboyan road. Here they were to unite with parts of the SS corps. The 167th Infantry Division, together with units of the 11th Panzer Division and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, was supposed to destroy the Soviet troops that would be surrounded between two German tank corps.

At 09:30 on July 6, the strike group of the 48th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. Around noon, units of the 11th Panzer Division and the Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland" went to the rear of Baksov's 67th Division. At 12.00 Chistyakov ordered the three regiments surrounded to retreat. But it was already too late. By evening, German tanks reached the Dmitrievka area, the 199th and 201st Guards Rifle Regiments of the 67th Guards Division and the 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division were surrounded. The "cauldron" was cleaned up by units of the 167th Infantry Division. By July 8, part of the units of the guards regiments was able to break into the location of the Soviet troops.

The 48th Panzer Corps reached the second Soviet army line. By the time the German troops reached Dubrov, the main forces of the German tank corps entered the defense zone of the 3rd mechanized corps under the command of Semyon Krivoshein. The mechanized corps included: 1st, 3rd, 10th mechanized, 1st guards tank, 49th tank brigades, 265th mortar, 35th anti-tank artillery regiments and other units. On July 6, 1943, the corps had 222 combat-ready tanks. Due to the encirclement of units of the 5th Guards Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Brigade under the command of Guards Colonel Vladimir Gorelov and part of the 49th Tank Brigade fought with advancing German tanks from the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte" at the village of Yakovlevo. The battle continued on 6 July. The tank guards beat the German armored vehicles from ambushes. As a result, on July 6, Krivoshein could use tanks from only three mechanized brigades - 113 vehicles, and several tanks from the 34th separate armored car battalion and those left over from the 1st Guards Tank Brigade against the troops of the 48th Tank Corps.

The German command wanted to break through the corridor in the second line of the Soviet defense before dark, and began attacking the positions of the 3rd mechanized corps. To break into Soviet positions, the 39th Panzer Regiment and the Great Germany Panzer Regiment were united into a single fist. The Germans brought large masses of tanks into battle. However, on the evening of July 6, it was not possible to break into the defenses of the 3rd mechanized corps.

The 48th Panzer Corps was more successful on 6 July than on 5 July. But he suffered serious losses, which seriously reduced his strike capabilities. In particular, if on July 4 the tank regiment of the Grossdeutschland division had 112 combat-ready tanks, including 14 heavy Tiger tanks, then by the end of the day on July 6, the regiment had lost 59 vehicles, including 12 Tigers. The 10th Tank Brigade had 160 Panthers on the morning of July 6, and by the end of the day only 40 vehicles remained in service.

The infantrymen of the division "Das Reich" help to pull out the stuck "Tiger".

StuG 40 Ausf G assault gun shot down by Captain Vinogradov.

July 7

On the evening of July 6, commander Vatutin ordered the forces of Katukov's 1st Tank Army and the remnants of Kravchenko's 5th Guards Tank Corps to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough in the Luchkov area. Mikhail Katukov decided to launch a counterattack with the forces of five tank brigades of the 3rd mechanized corps and the 31st tank corps from the north and northeast. The 31st tank corps under the command of Dmitry Chernienko included the 100th, 237th, 242nd tank brigades. On July 4, it consisted of 208 T-34 and T-70 tanks.

In turn, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army Goth sent orders No. 3 to the troops, which determined the goals and objectives for two days. The 2nd SS Corps and the 48th Tank Corps were to destroy the main obstacle on the way to Kursk and Oboyan - the forces of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies. On July 8, the corps were to destroy the threat in front of their flanks. Soviet tank units were supposed to be surrounded and destroyed in the area of Sukho-Solotino, Rylsky, Pokrovka, Yakovlevo, Syrtsevo. On July 7, the troops were to prepare for the offensive and improve their starting positions. Particularly serious work was to be carried out by the 48th Tank Corps. He was supposed to go deep into the defense of the Soviet troops along the Oboyanskoe highway in the center. Cross the Pena River on the left flank. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps achieved more success on July 6, so on July 7 they reduced the intensity of hostilities. To continue the offensive of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, a serious improvement in the situation at the junction with the 48th Corps was required. On July 7, Hausser's corps repulsed the attacks of the 3rd Mechanized and 31st Tank Corps on the left flank and tried to push back the troops of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on the right.

The main battles were fought in the offensive zone of the 48th Panzer Corps. On the morning of July 7, German troops attacked again. Katukov's army occupied the line of defense along the Pena River. The left flank was fortified by Chernienko's 31st tank corps, Krivoshein's 3rd mechanized corps defended in the center, and Hetman's 6th tank corps defended on the right flank. Here the defense was held by the remnants of the 90th and 67th Guards Rifle Divisions.

German troops advanced on the positions of the 3rd mechanized and 31st tank corps. The main blow was directed at the 3rd mechanized brigade under the command of Colonel Hamazasp Babajanyan. The strike group included armored vehicles from the 11th Panzer Division, the Grossdeutschland Division and the Panther Brigade. Attacks by tank subunits were traditionally preceded by powerful air strikes by the 8th Air Corps. The Germans were able to overcome the engineering structures and after a few hours of battle broke through the orders of the 3rd mechanized brigade. Of the 30 tanks of the mechanized brigade, only 10 T-34s survived. In the evening, during the counterattack, 4 more tanks were lost. Having penetrated 3-4 km into the defensive formations of the 3rd mechanized corps, the German troops continued to develop the offensive to the north and at the same time tried to reach the rear of the 1st and 10th mechanized brigades of the Soviet corps on their flanks.

After the direction of the main attack of the German troops was clarified. Katukov got the opportunity to attract units from non-attacked sectors. The 112th tank brigade was seized from the Hetman's corps and advanced in the direction of the movement of the German wedge. At 15.00 the brigade entered the battle and led it until dark. Having lost 20 tanks, the 112th Brigade held back the movement of the Grossdeutschland division to the north. The movement of the 11th Panzer Division along the Oboyanskoye Highway to the north was suspended with the help of reserves sent by the front command - the 180th Tank Brigade of Colonel M. Z. Kiselev (70 tanks) and two anti-tank divisions armed with 85-mm anti-aircraft tools. The Germans could not overcome the resistance of the arriving units on the move.

A German soldier looks at a wrecked Soviet T-34 tank.

Thus, on July 7, the 48th Tank Corps crushed the defenses of two mechanized brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, one regiment of the 90th Guards Rifle Division and advanced 6 km. But the Germans could not completely break the defense on the second army line of defense. Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army lost most of the 51st, 52nd, and 67th Guards Rifle Divisions. The 90th Guards Rifle Division was visibly drained of blood. The 5th Guards Tank Corps lost most of the tanks, their number was reduced to the composition of only one full-fledged brigade. Artillery and anti-tank units also suffered heavy losses. However, Gotha's 4th Panzer Army was unable to achieve decisive success with access to the operational space, and the number of tanks in strike formations was seriously reduced. By the morning of the fourth day of the battle, the "Grossdeutschland" division, out of more than 300 tanks that were in formation at the beginning of the battle, had only 80 vehicles. The SS Panzer Corps, which on July 4 had 578 tanks and self-propelled guns, had 306 combat-ready units on the morning of July 8.

July 8

On the 4th day of the Battle of Kursk, the Voronezh Front began to receive mobile formations from other fronts. The 10th tank corps of Vasily Burkov arrived from the Steppe Front (the Steppe District - until July 9), the 2nd tank corps of Alexei Popov from the South-Western Front. The arrival of new tank formations prompted the command of the VF to prepare a new counterattack. They also wanted to involve units of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 6th Tank Corps from Katukov's army. However, following the results of the battles on July 7, it became clear that the 1st Panzer Army could not participate in the counterattack. In total, about 530 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns were to take part in the counterattack on July 8. The tank corps were to deliver a series of attacks on the right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Almost all the tank corps that were supposed to take part in the counterattack had their own problems. The 5th Guards Tank Corps, after an oncoming battle and encirclement, lost most of the tanks. The rest were consolidated into two brigades (76 vehicles). The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was separated from the enemy positions by a river, which reduced its ability to maneuver. The 2nd Panzer Corps moved under its own power from the Urazovo area. His motorized infantry moved under its own power, lagging behind tank formations, which reduced the combat capabilities of the corps.

Simultaneously with the preparation of the counterattack, there was a significant strengthening of the 1st tank army of Katukov. She was transferred from the 38th and 40th armies: the 309th rifle division, the 86th tank brigade (64 tanks), the 9th anti-aircraft division, the 36th guards mortar regiment, three anti-tank regiments from the reserve of the Main Commands armed with 76 mm guns. In addition, the 203rd Separate Heavy Tank Regiment (21 KV) was transferred from the 38th Army to the Katukov Army Reserve.

The German command decided on July 8 to continue the offensive, which was supposed to lead to the encirclement of units of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards armies. The 48th Corps advanced with the forces of the Panzer Grenadier Division "Grossdeutschland", the 11th Panzer Division went on the defensive. The SS Corps formed two shock groups from the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions. On the morning of July 8, SS units hit the positions of Chernienko's 31st Panzer Corps. A powerful blow fell on the body, which he could not stand. By the middle of the day, the SS broke through to Kochetovka, where the command post of the 6th Guards Army was. The situation was critical, but in the evening the strike groups of the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions were ordered to withdraw, leaving part of the territory captured during the day, the plan to join the 2nd Corps with the 48th Panzer Corps on July 8 was thwarted. The withdrawal of the SS troops was associated with the counterattack of the Soviet tank corps.

The morning attacks of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, weakened by previous battles, could not stop the advance of Hausser's corps. They were held back by air strikes, artillery screens and assault guns. But the entry into battle of the 2nd Panzer Corps forced the German command to take drastic measures. Popov's corps launched a counteroffensive at 16.00. The offensive had to go on the move, without reconnaissance and preliminary preparation. The brigades of the corps suffered heavy losses: the 26th tank brigade lost 22 tanks, the 99th tank brigade lost 23 tanks.

However, the corps' counterattacks turned out to be serious enough for the command of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to halt the offensive of the strike groups and withdraw troops from the occupied territories. The 10th Panzer Corps did not go on the offensive, although it reached its original positions already at 13.00. Parts of the corps stood still for half a day, aimed at the enemy's flank. Komkor Burkov simply ignored the orders of the front command.

Soviet T-70 tanks are preparing to attack.

July 9

The German command decided to continue the offensive in a northerly direction, turning towards the flanks. The 2nd SS Corps replaced the "Dead Head" division on the right flank, it was supposed to reinforce the striking forces, with the 167th Infantry Division. This movement lasted quite a long time, so on July 9 the most active role in the offensive was played by the 48th Panzer Corps.

The command of the Voronezh Front quite well predicted the further actions of the enemy. The combat effectiveness of the 1st Panzer Army was constantly declining, so the 309th Rifle Division from the 40th Army was advanced to the third defensive line behind Katukov's army. In addition, the 1st Panzer Army was reinforced by the 10th Panzer Corps.

Launching an offensive early in the morning, the 11th Panzer Division and "Grossdeutschland" broke the resistance of the already bled 67th Guards Rifle Division and hit the 86th Tank Brigade (59 tanks). By 14.00, two vehicles remained in two battalions of the brigade. In the afternoon, German troops almost reached the third army line.

Further movement of the corps was suspended due to an air reconnaissance report about the appearance of a mechanized column on the western flank of the 48th corps. "Greater Germany" deployed to the west.

On July 9, the command of the Voronezh Front was able to stabilize the situation in the Oboyan direction by redeploying the forces of the 38th and 40th armies. In addition, on the way of the 48th corps in the northern and northwestern direction, the corps of the 10th tank corps deployed from near Prokhorovka was deployed.

Strengthening the front due to the reserves of the Headquarters. Already on July 6, the command of the Voronezh Front asked the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to strengthen the front at the expense of the reserves of the Headquarters, which were accumulating for a future counteroffensive. Stalin gave the go-ahead.

On July 5, the 18th Tank Corps of Boris Bakharov was included in the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Pavel Rotmistrov. On July 6, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army of Alexei Zhadov were included in the Voronezh Front. Rotmistrov's army began to move towards the battle area. On July 8, the army received an order to enter the Prokhorovka area. A long march led to the fact that by July 11, out of 721 armored units of the army, up to 200 vehicles fell behind on the march. Bakharov's 18th Panzer Corps withstood the march the worst of all, it left more than half of its equipment on the road: out of 187 tanks that were in the corps on July 8, more than 100 vehicles fell behind. In addition, some of the vehicles had to be sent for repairs after the march. True, the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army that arrived in the Prokhorovka area had some time to put their equipment in order and pull up the stragglers.

Zhadov's 5th Guards Army received an order to advance to the Prokhorovka area on 8 July. The army included the 32nd and 33rd guards rifle corps, which included six divisions: the 13th, 66th, 95th and 97th guards rifle, 6th and 9th guards airborne divisions. Another division, the 42nd Guards Rifle Division, was in reserve with the army commander. On July 11, Zhadov's army was supposed to reach the line of the Psyol River and take up defense, preventing the movement of enemy troops to the north and northeast.

The command of the 4th Panzer Army set the 48th Corps the task of July 10, 1943 - to defeat the Soviet troops in the bend of the Pena River. All the armored vehicles of the "Great Germany" were assembled into one fist. The attack was launched by the infantry, striking to the north and northwest, then the tank group was to go on the offensive in a westerly direction. The infantry attack was supposed to deceive the enemy and at the same time cover the flank of the shock group. By the end of the day, German troops were able to advance in the western direction for about 7 km. The positions of the 6th tank corps of Katukov's army were covered from the flanks.

On the morning of July 11, German troops continued their offensive against the positions of the 6th Panzer, 3rd Mechanized Corps and the 90th Guards Rifle Division. The Soviet group under the command of Hetman numbered about 7.6 thousand people, more than 70 tanks. By 10 o'clock, German troops went to the rear of the Soviet group of troops. By lunchtime, it was divided into several pockets of resistance. The hetman gave the order to withdraw. The fighting went on until the evening, part of the encircled troops made their way to their own. According to German data, more than 4 thousand Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. This was the last success of the 48th Panzer Corps in the Battle of Kursk.

German tanks near Prokhorovka.

While the 48th Corps surrounded part of the forces of Katukov's 1st Panzer Army on the Pena River, SS units in the Prokhorovka direction were fighting for the army's third line of defense. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps concentrated its efforts on a narrow section of the front and broke through the Soviet defenses. The formations of the "Dead Head" division, after a fierce struggle, captured a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psyol River.

On July 11, the battle in the Prokhorovka direction continued. The Soviet command was forced to build defensive formations from suitable reserves. From the march, defensive positions between Psyol and the railway were occupied by the 58th motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd tank corps and the 9th guards airborne division. The defense on the outskirts of Prokhorovka was occupied by formations of the 2nd tank corps: the 26th, 99th and 169th tank brigades, the 15th separate guards breakthrough tank regiment (74 tanks in total). Popov's corps was scattered along the front, not representing a single force, so the shock fist of the Leibstandarte on July 11 made its way along the railway to the Prokhorovka station, occupied the Oktyabrsky state farm. Only by pulling up artillery from the flanks, including guards rocket launchers, did the Soviet troops stop the enemy and force the SS men to move away from Prokhorovka.

Samsonov Alexander

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48 tank corps of the Wehrmacht.

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