Army 3 Reich size. Russian and Cossack SS troops

During the Second World War, the Nazi leadership created numerous military units and units on a national basis from representatives of those peoples who could fight on the side of Germany. The Nazis, like their opponents, sought to play the card of "national liberation" and "anti-colonialism" fashionable in the 20th century.

In the troops of the Third Reich there were formations from representatives of the Muslim nationalities of the USSR, Georgians, Armenians, Arabs, Indians, Russians. Of these, parts of the SS were even created, in which, in theory, only "true Aryans" could serve. But, as Reichsführer Himmler said, "in my department, only I decide who is Aryan and who is not."

Troops from the Caucasian and Muslim peoples of the USSR

In the very first months of the war, hundreds of thousands of citizens of the USSR of various nationalities fell into German captivity. After hesitation caused by unwillingness to share a "purely German" victory with anyone, Hitler in December 1941 agreed with the arguments about the creation of volunteer units from representatives of the Muslim and Caucasian nationalities of the USSR. The so-called eastern legions began to form. Initially there were four of them: Turkestan, Georgian, Armenian and Caucasian-Muslim. Later, the latter was divided into Azerbaijani and North Caucasian, and the Volga-Tatar Legion (or the Idel-Ural Legion) was also formed. In February 1942, the Headquarters of the Command of the Eastern Legions was created, uniting the leadership of all formations formed as part of the Wehrmacht from representatives of the peoples of the east and south of the USSR.

In total, the eastern legions included 86 battalions with a total strength of about 100 thousand people. The most numerous was the Azerbaijani Legion - 40 thousand soldiers and officers, the rest were from 5 to 20 thousand. The first units of the legions took part in the battles against the Soviet troops in the autumn of 1942 in the North Caucasus.

The wide combat use of the eastern legions was preceded by an OKW order in August 1942, in which the Caucasian and Muslim peoples of the USSR were called "allies" of the Reich. At the same time, Hitler noted that he fully trusted only Muslims from among the citizens of the USSR, but was wary of the creation of military units from Georgians and Armenians. In September 1943, all the eastern legions were redeployed to the West.

In addition to the eastern legions, the Wehrmacht operated the 162nd Infantry Division, which from the beginning of 1942 was replenished mainly by representatives of the Turkic peoples. The division fought in 1943-1945. on the Italian front. The Kalmyk cavalry "corps" (numbering only 3600 people) of the Wehrmacht, organized in the autumn of 1942 and fought until the end of the war, can also be attributed to the eastern legions.

The Eastern Legions are often and unreasonably referred to as the SS troops, where they were formally enlisted only at the end of 1944. Initially, the SS included only the Eastern Turkic connection from representatives of the eastern peoples of the USSR (numbering - 8500 people).

Russian and Cossack SS troops

In August 1942, the Cossacks were officially named "allies of the Reich", and in January 1943, the Nazis recognized both the Cossacks and the Russians as "Aryans". The most numerous Russian SS formations were the 29th and 30th Waffen Grenadier Divisions and the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps. Their formation dates back to the final period of the war. The 29th division was created from the retreat from the Bryansk collaborator "Russian Liberation People's Army" B.V. Kaminsky. The division participated in battles against partisans in Eastern Europe. Moreover, during the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising, Kaminsky - such is the irony of fate - was shot by the SS men themselves for the atrocities (!) Of his subordinates.

The 30th division operated in France for a short time at the end of 1944, after which it was disbanded due to massive defections to the enemy. The 15th Cossack Corps was deployed from the 1st Cossack SS Division in early 1945 and took part in the final battles of World War II in Hungary and Austria.

Legion SS "Free Arabia"

For a long time, the Nazis were prevented from turning to the Arabs with a call to start an uprising against the British colonialists by the fact that the German ally Italy also owned the vast Arab country of Libya. But after the troops left the "axis" of North Africa, the recruitment of Arabs into the Wehrmacht began. At that time, many Arabs lived in various countries of Southern Europe, some of them were among the British and French prisoners of war.

The inspirer of the Arab Legion was the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, who was expelled by the British in 1940. Earlier, he met with Hitler, in whose person he welcomed the "defender of Islam." Al-Husseini helped equip the Muslim units with Bosnians and Albanians, and on March 1, 1944 he called (by radio from Berlin) the entire Arab world to jihad on the side of the Third Reich against the Jews. The Arab Legion (more than 20 thousand) was formed in the Balkans at the end of 1943. Until May 1945, he served in the occupation and fought with the partisans in Greece and Yugoslavia.

Indian Legion SS "Free India"

There were many Indians among the British prisoners of war in Germany. Even in the First World War, there were popular sentiments among some Indians to use the alliance with Germany to free themselves from British rule. During World War II, Indian leader Subhas Chandra Bose formed the Indian National Army in the countries occupied by Japan. The Nazis also decided to play the Indian card.

In August 1942, the Indian Legion was formed in North Africa (since 1944 - the SS legion "Free India"), which was joined by about three and a half thousand swarthy "true Aryans". It is curious that the language of military commands in the legion was English. His participation in the hostilities in the West and in Italy was limited. After surrendering to the Allies, several of his leaders were shot by the British for treason. Others were imprisoned in the Red Fort in Delhi, they were later convicted at the famous trial, but soon released under the pressure of the Indian independence movement.

Dreams of British and American SS troops

Considering the British a "Nordic" people and a natural ally in the fight against Bolshevism, the Nazis announced the creation of the British SS Volunteer Corps. However, only ... 27 people out of several hundred thousand British prisoners of war enrolled in it. The plan to create Irish SS units against the British also failed.

In early 1943, the Germans had their first American prisoners of war. The SS leadership had a plan to create volunteer American divisions named after Confederate figures in the Civil War of 1861-1865. - "Jefferson Davis" and "Robert Lee". However, there were not even one platoon of Americans willing to fight for Hitler.

In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat the Soviet Union during a short-term campaign in the summer and autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready unit of the German armed forces 1 was deployed on the border with the USSR.

Wehrmacht

For Operation Barbarossa, out of the 4 headquarters of army groups available in the Wehrmacht, 3 were deployed ("North", "Center" and "South") (75%), out of 13 headquarters of field armies - 8 (61.5%), out of 46 headquarters of army corps - 34 (73.9%), out of 12 motorized corps - 11 (91.7%). In total, 73.5% of the total number of divisions available in the Wehrmacht was allocated for the Eastern Campaign. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. So, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 (81.9%) participated, and the remaining 28 were partially manned by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht (see table 1). The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of the flying units, 16.9% of the air defense troops and over 48% of the signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.

German satellites

Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for a war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, who allocated the following forces for waging war (see table 2). In addition, Croatia provided 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, who arrived later. Consequently, there were 767,100 men, 37 calculated divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks, and 886 aircraft in the German allied troops deployed there.

In total, the forces of Germany and its allies on the Eastern Front numbered 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 settlement divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4,364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4,795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and together with 8.5 thousand people of the Air Force personnel are not taken into account in further calculations).

Red Army

Under the conditions of the outbreak of war in Europe, the armed forces of the Soviet Union continued to increase, and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world (see Table 3). In the five western border districts, 56.1% of the ground forces and 59.6% of the air force were stationed. In addition, since May 1941, the concentration of 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from the internal military districts and from the Far East began in the Western Theater of Operations (TVD). By June 22, 16 divisions (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized) arrived in the western districts, in which there were 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks.

The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 4, judging by the data of which the enemy outnumbered the Red Army only in terms of the number of personnel, because his troops were mobilized.

Mandatory clarifications

Although the above data gives a general idea of ​​the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed the strategic concentration and deployment in the theater, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. How figuratively described this situation A.V. Shubin, "a dense body was moving from the West to the East at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block was slowly moving forward, the mass of which was growing, but not at a fast enough pace" 2 . Therefore, the correlation of forces at two more levels should be considered. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on the scale of the district (front) - army group, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on the scale of the army - army. At the same time, in the first case, only the ground forces and the Air Force are taken into account, and for the Soviet side, the border troops, artillery and aviation of the Navy are also taken into account, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops of the NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.

Northwest

In the North-West direction, the troops of the German Army Group "North" and the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) opposed each other. The Wehrmacht had a rather significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be borne in mind that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. As a result, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the Army Group "North" managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see Table 5).

Western direction

In the Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group Center and the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of PribOVO confronted each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest air fleet of the Luftwaffe (43.8% aircraft) were concentrated here. Only 15 Soviet divisions were located in the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions arrived at the place, and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District - with a total number of 72,016 people, 1241 guns and mortars and 692 tanks. As a result, the troops of the ZAPOVO, contained in peacetime states, were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but surpassed him in tanks, aircraft, and slightly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to smash them piece by piece.

Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the ZapOVO troops located in the Bialystok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. From the south (from Brest) the main blow was delivered. On the northern flank (Suwalki) the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was deployed, which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of PribOVO. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Panzer Group were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army. In these areas, the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority (see table 6).

Southwest

In the South-Western direction, Army Group South, which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts (KOVO and OdVO). The Soviet grouping in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was she who was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete their concentration and deployment. So, in KOVO in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 16 divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In the OdVO, there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border zone, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km zone. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived in the districts, from which by June 22 concentrated 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks. Even without being staffed according to the wartime staff, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft, and somewhat less in artillery. But on the direction of the main attack of the Army Group "South", where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by units of the 6th German Army and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for himself (see Table 7).

The situation in the North

The most favorable for the Red Army was the ratio on the front of the Leningrad Military District (LVO), where it was opposed by Finnish troops and units of the German army "Norway". In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by the German units of the mountain infantry corps "Norway" and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant in artillery (see Table 8). True, it should be borne in mind that, since hostilities on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides were building up their forces, and the data given do not reflect the number of troops of the parties by the start of hostilities.

Results

Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, units of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly at the border. Such an arrangement of Soviet troops made it possible to smash them piece by piece. On the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create superiority over the troops of the Red Army, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern campaign was dealt. In other directions, even in the bands of the covering armies, the Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The overall balance of forces allowed the Soviet command to prevent the enemy's superiority even in the directions of his main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.

Since the Soviet military-political leadership did not correctly assess the degree of threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun in May 1941 the strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations, which was to be completed by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and did not had neither offensive nor defensive groupings. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and were only completing the creation of command and control bodies in the theater of operations. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army covering forces in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If, however, we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions into the offensive, it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a solid front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. By preempting the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, by creating powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in the chosen directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative and successfully conducting the first offensive operations.

Notes
1. For more details, see: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Scramble for Europe 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 3rd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2008. S. 354-363.
2. Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004. S. 496.

Defeat in the West. The defeat of the Nazi troops on the Western Front

Milton Shulman Documentary literature Missing No data

In his book, Milton Shulman makes it possible to look at the events of World War II through the eyes of the enemy. Analyzes the reasons for the victories and defeats of the German army from the fall of France to the battle for Berlin. Based on many documents, he studies the military mistakes of Germany, as well as the role of Hitler and his general staff in the rise and fall of the Third Reich.

From the Kharkov catastrophe to the Stalingrad triumph, from the "Rzhev meat grinder" to the breaking of the Leningrad blockade - this book allows you to take a fresh look at the decisive battles of the war, revealing the background of events and restoring the true history of the turning point of the Great Patriotic War.

New tourist routes have been opened in the region, which have already been evaluated by federal tour operators, and tourists are mastering a new type of transport - the tourist express. The Moscow region has made a real breakthrough in the field of tourism. About what the outgoing year will be remembered for and what events in the cultural sphere of the Moscow region to expect in the future, says the Minister of Culture of the Moscow Region Oksana Kosareva.

This year in the Moscow region passed under the sign of the anniversary date - it was on the borders of the Moscow Region in the autumn-winter of 1941 that the myth of the invincibility of the German army was dispelled and Hitler's plan for a "quick war" finally failed. 75 years ago, the defeat of the fascist troops near Moscow became a decisive turning point in the course of the war and the entire history of the world.

Exhibitions, film screenings, meetings with veterans of the Great Patriotic War, commemorative events dedicated to the memorable date were held in almost all museums, cultural centers, libraries of the region. The culmination of the anniversary year was a large-scale event near the village of Dubosekovo in the Volokolamsk region.

Details are in the report from the scene. The outgoing Year of Russian Cinema will be remembered for its high-profile premiere, also associated with the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow. The film "Panfilov's 28" is called truly popular - the creators of the film collected over 34 million rubles in voluntary donations from more than 35 thousand people, setting a world record for crowdfanting in cinema.

About how the film was received in Volokolamsk, actually at the scene, read in the latest issue of Horizons of Culture magazine.

NKVD and SMERSH against Abwehr and RSHA

Anatoly Tchaikovsky Military affairs, special services Secrets of military history

The first military upheaval during the Second World War in the autumn-winter of 1941 near Moscow forced the Abwehr and the RSHA to look for new forms of waging an "invisible war": reconnaissance and sabotage groups with the help of aviation began to be thrown not only into the front-line, but also into the deep regions of the USSR.

The Soviet side countered the enemy's attempts with a noticeably improved rear guard system: SMERSH began to occupy a leading position in matters of military counterintelligence. The final period in the "secret war" fell at the end of 1944-1945.

When the Nazi secret services sought to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops at any cost by strengthening contacts with various collaborators and nationalist organizations. At the same time, units of the Waffen SS Jagdverband, the "popular resistance" were organized with the participation of the Volssturm and the Nazi underground, called the "Werwolf" ("Werewolves").

Despite the two-fold numerical superiority (two Nazi divisions against our rifle brigade), it took the enemy a month and a half to break the resistance of the Soviet troops - and this was in the midst of the Battle of Leningrad, when the Wehrmacht threw the last reserves into battle, each battalion was on the account, the fate of the city hung in the balance and two divisions could decide the outcome of the assault ... Is it true that the defenders of Moonsund, who fought to the death in the deep German rear, saved Leningrad? Do you know that it was from these islands that our long-range aviation bombed Berlin for the first time in August 1941 (although Goering swore that “not a single bomb would ever fall on the capital of the Reich”)? Should we believe the German reports on the results of the battles for Moonsund, which stated that "the Russian soldier fights stubbornly and bravely, but the command, as elsewhere, turns out to be untenable"? And could the Moonsund garrison have been evacuated to avoid excessive losses?

The author talks about the methods of recruitment, indoctrination and training of recruits called up for the Wehrmacht or the Waffen SS. Considers the reasons that forced them to fight on the side of Nazi Germany. The book is supplied with maps and photographs.

occupation of Europe. Military diary of the Chief of the General Staff. 1939-1941

Franz Halder Documentary literature Missing No data

The military diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Land Forces of Nazi Germany contains Franz Halder's daily service records covering the period from 1939 to 1941. Detailed information about the Norwegian campaign, the occupation of Poland, Belgium and France.

This play was the first work that exposed the betrayal of the allies - prominent American figures at the time of the capitulation of Nazi Germany, seeking to take advantage of the fruits of our victory with the greatest benefit - to seize all the equipment of the German division, opening the way for the German grouping to the territory occupied by their troops.

By this they wanted to deprive the Russians of legitimate trophies and save the German raiders for future wars. At the heart of the conflict are not the convictions and actions of individuals, but the strictly thought-out policy of the reactionary circles of American imperialism, striving for world domination.

The foresight of the Soviet command, not only in terms of military strategy, but also in terms of politics and diplomacy, destroyed all the plans and intentions of the American allies and brought freedom and independence to the peoples of Europe on their banners. Central Academic Theater of the Soviet Army.

Radio show. Recorded in 1948. General Klimov, division commander - Sagal Daniil; Zhilin, chief of staff - Sergey Kulagin; Major Lagutin - Bykadorov Evgeny; Kudrov, fighter - Petr Konstantinov; Nozhkin, fighter - Vladimir Zeldin; Good day, fighter - Konstantin Nassonov; Fokin, fighter - Gerasimov; Sokol, Klimov's adjutant - Chodrishvili; Zoya, field postal worker - Lyudmila Kasatkina; Alekseev, communications officer - Nikolai Pastukhov; Warne, commander of the American army - Polezhaev; General Willard, commander of the American division - Khovansky Alexander; Edgar, his nephew - Andrey Popov; Martin, Willard's chief of staff - Mark Pertsovsky; Stevens, Willard's adjutant - Fedor Savostyanov; Jim Pool, photojournalist - Shahet I.

; Ridgi, the commander of the sapper company - Khaletsky Yakov; Joe, a Negro, Willard's driver - Antony Khodursky; Moller, German General - Georgy Rumyantsev; Czechoslovak announcer - I. Kamensky; The explanatory text is read by Mikhail Mayorov. Music - Khrennikov Tikhon.

In addition, the book contains a detailed description of all the major battles fought by the Soviet troops; special attention is paid to the Battle of Stalingrad.

“I forged the Wehrmacht for six years,” Hitler once said,
referring to the years from 1933 to 1939, i.e., from the moment he came to the supreme power in Germany to the start of the world war by himself. However, he officially announced the creation of a new army only in March 1935.

Thus, it was on March 16, 1935 that the Wehrmacht began its ten-year history. On that day, universal conscription was introduced and, under the National Defense Forces Reconstruction Act, every male of military age was required to serve in the army for one year. The Wehrmacht deployed up to 36 army divisions, consolidated into 12 army corps.

Often, the word "Wehrmacht" means only the Ground Forces of Nazi Germany, considering the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine independent parts of its armed forces. This is fundamentally wrong. Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht, which means "defense forces") - this is the German armed forces of 1935-1945, consisting of the Ground Forces, the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. However, the Wehrmacht did not exhaust all the armed forces of the Reich. It is necessary to rank among them the very numerous German police, which later included even tank regiments. And, of course, the SS troops.

For four and a half years, the Wehrmacht developed intensively in the conditions of peace, and the remaining years - even more intensively in the conditions of the world war. The basic military formation of the German army (and many other modern armies) can rightfully be considered a division. This military unit has two important features: self-sufficiency and stability.

The ground forces of the Wehrmacht throughout its history included divisions of the following types:

-infantry,

- stationary infantry,

- light infantry, chasseurs,

-ski-chasseurs,

- African lungs

- mountain,

- motorized,

- light motorized,

-positional,

- serfs,

- reserve,

- spare,

-tank,

- light tank,

- cavalry,

- foreign,

- field training,

- special forces divisions .

Toward the end of the war, many so-called. people's grenadier divisions. Volkssturm divisions, created at the very end of the war, were only operationally subordinate to the command of the Ground Forces, being under the jurisdiction of Gauleiters. Artillery, communications units, engineering, sapper, transport and other support units were part of the above divisions in the form of separate regiments (artillery), battalions or companies. True, there was one purely artillery division (18th, from September 1943 to April 1944), which operated for several months on the Eastern Front.

epaulettes of privates and corporals

According to the uniform of the Wehrmacht approved in 1935, soldiers and corporals (mannshaften category) of the ground forces wore shoulder straps approximately 10-11 cm long and 4-4.5 cm wide on their uniforms. Unlike the pentagonal shoulder straps of the Kaiser's army and the Reichswehr, their top became rounded . The same shoulder straps Since all ranks had the same mannshaften and shoulder straps and buttonholes, they differed only in special stripes on the left sleeve. Appropriate additions were worn by all military personnel and military officials of the Ground Forces.

The word "private" is absent from the German table of ranks. In the Wehrmacht, the lower ranks were called Mannschaften, which roughly translates as "team member", but for convenience we will sometimes call them privates, which, by the way, would obviously sound like "members of the row" in German. Privates were named according to their specialty (position). Here are just a few of the most common ranks for enlisted soldiers:

infantry - fusilier , musketeer ( Musketier),
machine gunner ( Maschinengewehr-Schitze ),

shooter ( Schitze),

grenadier (grenadier)

sniper ( Scharfschiitze);

motorized infantry -(Panzergrenadier)

reconnaissance huntsman (Jager);

mountain rifle units - mountain huntsman (Gebirgsjager)\

cavalry-reiter (Reiter)\

tank units - tanker (panzershiitze)

artillery crew member of the self-propelled guns ( Panzerzug-Schutze), gunner (Kanoier,panzerkanoier)

engineering and sapper units0pioneer (pioneer,Panzerpioneer) military builder (Baupionier,Bausoldat ),

communication parts-signalman (hunker), radio operator (Fernsprecher)

medical service nurse (Sanitdtersoldat )\

transport parts-driver ( Kraftfahrer) coachman (Fahrer);

auxiliary parts-miller (Miil /ermeister), blacksmith ( Schmied);

field police-gendarme ( Feldgendarm) etc.

Name Schitze(literally - defender) was used when a soldier did not have a certain military specialty or for a generalized designation of soldiers of the lower ranks.

The next category, corresponding to the sergeants and senior officers in the Russian army, was divided into two parts in the Wehrmacht: unteroffiziere and unteroffizieremitdemRiemen, i.e. non-commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers with a harness. The first included only non-commissioned officers in the rank Unteroffizier, to the latter - all the rest from the non-commissioned officer to the headquarters of the sergeant major inclusive (in artillery and cavalry from the non-commissioned officer to the headquarters commander, respectively). For simplicity, we will refer to this entire category simply as non-commissioned officers. Next come OberotTiziere (chief officers) - junior officers, StabsotTiziere (headquarters officers) - senior officers and HoehereotTiziere (highest officers) - generals.

MAIN INSIGNIA MILITARY COLORA AND ENCRYPTIONS

Traditionally, in the German army, belonging to a certain type of troops or service was designated by the military color - waffenfarbe ( waffenfarbe ). The edging of epaulettes, gaps on buttonholes, edges of caps and some types of uniform, as well as other colored details of the uniform, were made in its color.

Also, the serviceman's belonging to some units or divisions could be found out by the encryption on shoulder straps. Most often, these were Latin letters (one or more), which denoted either the first letter of the unit name or its abbreviation. The encryption could contain numbers: Arabic denoted the number of the regiment, less often - the number of the battalion or division; Roman numerals denoted the number of the military district, sometimes the number of headquarters of army corps, militia regiments (Landwehr) or military schools.

Ordinary numerals - number of the infantry regiment Number in Roman ciframi - army headquarters

Military district number in Roman numerals - infantry elementary schools

Letter D and below the usual numberin numbers - the headquarters of the infantry division

Letters FI - infantry air defense units

Letter G and below the number in ordinary numbers - the headquarters of the army group

Letters G and D, woven with a monogram of Gothic letters - regiment (later division) "Grossdeutschland"

Letters GW - infantry mortar units Letter K + number in regular numerals - infantry motorcycle units

Letters KS + the first letter of the name of the city in Gothic font - officer infantry school

Letter L - infantry training regiment

The letter M in Gothic font and below the number in regular numbers - infantry machine gun companies

Letter S Gothic - Infantry School Letters SS gothic - army sports schools

US letters + the first letter of the city name in Gothic font - non-commissioned infantry schools

Letter V - cartographic and topographic parts W- garrison battalions of the city of Vienna

Letter W and below the number in Gothic numerals - the recruiting service of the military districts

Letters WB - military authorities

Ordinary numbers - the number of the tank unit (most often the regiment) Number in Roman numerals - the headquarters of the tank army

Letter D and below the number in ordinary numbers - the headquarters of the tank division Letter J - mechanized parts

The letter K and below the number in ordinary numbers - motorcycle divisions

Letters KS and the first letter of the city's name in Gothic script - officer tank school

Letter L - training tank units Letters MS - motorization school

The letter P and below the number in ordinary numbers - anti-tank units S gothic - tank school



epaulettes of non-commissioned officers.



Shoulder straps, badges of distinction and codes of officers

The shoulder straps of officers were fundamentally different from the shoulder straps of the lower ranks in size and design. The epaulette field was formed from two rows of a double silver-colored aluminum soutache cord. The inner cord was folded in half, forming a buttonhole at the place of its fold, the outer cord went around the inner cord. All this was attached to a fabric substrate in color according to the type of troops. Since 1943, shoulder straps began to appear, where instead of a silver soutache, a light gray silk soutache was used. The width of the soutache cord was approximately 8–9 mm, and its thickness was 2 mm. As a result, the shoulder strap was 32-36 mm wide with a length of about 10 cm. The top of the shoulder strap was fastened to the uniform with a uniform button, and the bottom ended with a tie-down strap or, more often, it was sewn directly into the shoulder seam.


There was no fundamental difference between the shoulder strap on a uniform or overcoat, full dress, everyday or field uniform. However, grayish harnesses could go on field shoulder straps, and buttons could be painted with gray paint. The lieutenant's epaulette was clean, the chief lieutenant had one star in the lower part, and the hauptmann (captain) had two stars far apart. The stars were similar to sergeant majors, but of yellow metal. Encryption metal yellow, and sometimes white. Often in the field, stars and ciphers were covered with muffs made of gray-green cloth to camouflage and protect against dirt.

According to military experts, by 1941 the German army was the strongest in the world. Hardened in battles, knowing the taste of victories, the German units approached the Soviet border with a sense of their superiority. Wehrmacht soldiers considered themselves invincible.
Systems approach
The German historian Werner Picht believed that it was the Treaty of Versailles, according to which Germany did not have the right to have an army of more than 100 thousand people, that forced the Berlin generals to look for new principles for the formation of the armed forces. And they were found. And although Hitler, having come to power in 1933, abandoned the "norms of Versailles", the ideology of military mobility of the new army had already won the minds of German military leaders. Later, the transfer of German soldiers to Spain to protect the Franco regime made it possible to test 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, Me-109 fighters and dive bombers of the Stuka-87 type in real conditions. In the same place, the young Nazi aviation created its own school of air combat. The Balkan campaign of 1941 showed how important it is to coordinate a large amount of equipment. As a result, the German staff officers in front of the Russian company had a successful experience in the use of mobile units reinforced by aviation. All this allowed them to create a military organization of a new and, most importantly, systemic type, optimally tuned to carry out combat missions.
Special training
In 1935, the concept of special training for Wehrmacht soldiers arose in order to make a kind of “motorized weapon” out of a fighter. For this, the most capable young men were chosen from among the youth. They were trained in training camps. To understand what the German soldiers of the 1941 model were like, you should read Walter Kempovsky's multi-volume Echo Sounder. The books provide numerous testimonies explaining the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad, including soldiers' correspondence. For example, it tells about a certain corporal Hans, who at a distance of 40-50 meters could hit a small window with a grenade. the other side of the street. If he were alive, we could easily take this damn house, because of which half of our platoon died. But in August 1941, a captured Russian lieutenant killed him with a shot in the back. It was ridiculous, because there were so many who surrendered that we did not even have time to search them. Dying, Hans shouted that it was not fair. According to official figures, in 1941 the Wehrmacht lost 162,799 soldiers killed, 32,484 missing and 579,795 wounded, most of whom died in hospitals or became disabled. Hitler called these losses monstrous, not so much because of the numbers, but because of the lost quality of the German army. In Berlin, they were forced to state that the war would be different - a war by all available means. Russian soldiers in the summer and autumn of 1941 offered active resistance. As a rule, these were attacks by desperate and doomed Red Army soldiers, single shots from burning houses, self-explosions. In total, 3138 thousand Soviet soldiers died in the first year of the war, most often in captivity or in "boilers". But it was they who bled the elite of the Wehrmacht, which the Germans had been preparing so carefully for six years.
Massive military experience
Any commander will tell you how important it is to have fired soldiers under your command. The German army that attacked the USSR had this invaluable experience of military victories. In September 1939, the Wehrmacht soldiers, having easily defeated 39 Polish divisions of Edward Rydz-Smigly, felt the taste of victory for the first time. Then there was the Maginot Line, the capture of Yugoslavia and Greece - all this only strengthened the self-consciousness of their invincibility. No country in the world then had so many fired fighters motivated for success. Retired infantry general Kurt von Tippelskirch believed that this factor was the most important in the first victories over the Red Army. Describing the concept of lightning wars, he emphasized that, unlike the anxious hours of anticipation of a war with Poland, self-confident German conquerors entered the territory of Soviet Russia. By the way, the multi-day defense of the Brest Fortress is largely due to the fact that the 42nd Rifle Division of the Red Army, which has combat experience in the Finnish War, was stationed on its territory.
Precise Destruction Concept
The Germans also emphasized the rapid destruction of pockets of resistance, no matter how firmly they were protected. According to the German generals, in this case, the enemy has a feeling of doom and futility of resistance. As a rule, accurate, almost sniper shelling was used. This was achieved through the successful use of visual optical observation posts, with the help of which shelling was adjusted at a distance of 7-10 km from our positions. Only at the end of 1941 did the Red Army find an antidote to the all-seeing Nazi artillery, when it began to build defensive structures on the reverse slopes of the hills, out of reach of German optics.
Quality connection
The most significant advantage of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army was high-quality communications. Guderian believed that a tank without reliable radio communication would not show even a tenth of what it was capable of. In the Third Reich, since the beginning of 1935, the development of reliable ultrashort-wave transceivers has intensified. Thanks to the appearance in the German communications service of fundamentally new devices designed by Dr. Grube, the Wehrmacht generals were able to quickly control the huge theater of military operations. For example, high-frequency telephone equipment served the German tank headquarters without any interference at distances up to one and a half thousand kilometers. That is why on June 27, 1941, in the Dubno region, the Kleist group of only 700 tanks was able to defeat the mechanized corps of the Red Army, which included 4,000 combat vehicles. Later, in 1944, analyzing this battle, Soviet generals bitterly admitted that if our tanks had had radio communications then, the Soviet Army would have turned the tide of the war at its very beginning.
And still nothing helped them, not even the elephants! Thanks to the selfless courage and great love for the Motherland of our fathers and grandfathers, the most perfect military machine in the world was defeated and, I hope, will never be reborn!