Under the hot sun of Syria

SYRIA... You pronounce this word, and the ancient history of the country and the turbulent events of recent decades are resurrected in your memory. Many other things are connected with this word, in particular, the excitement and feelings caused by the proposal to go to Syria.

Inviting me to his place, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov began the conversation with a tough and direct question: "Tell me honestly, General, did we choose you right?" Then Dmitry Fedorovich briefly but succinctly described the situation in the Middle East, directly in the Syrian Arab Republic. He spoke about the growing contradictions between the Arab countries, about the beginning of the war between Iran and Iraq, about the expansionist aspirations of Israel, the intensification of the actions of the extremist organization "Muslim Brotherhood" aimed at destabilizing the situation in Syria.

Before the departure, there were also detailed conversations with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, other officials of the Ministry of Defense. Of great importance was also familiarity with the documents that determine the nature and dynamics of the development of Soviet-Syrian military cooperation.

The situation in the region appeared before me in more detail after the first meetings with the USSR Ambassador to Syria Vladimir Ivanovich Yukhin, as well as with the officers of the office of the chief military adviser. In the very first days, I was received by President Sarhafez Assad, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, and other top officials of the country. Subsequently, I maintained constant working contacts with military leaders through personal meetings or by telephone.

Of interest are some facts of the biographies of the President of the CAP and the Minister of Defense.

X. Assad was born in 1930 in a small town in the northwest of the country, not far from Latakia. He was the eldest son in a large peasant family, he became interested in social and political activities at school. At the same time as Syria gained independence, he joined the Baath (Arab Socialist Renaissance Party). In 1955, H. Assad entered the air force school. Diligence and talent made him the best pilot in the country. He improved his flying skills in the Soviet Union, at the aviation training center near Frunze. I have often heard from President Assad warm words about this period of his life.

In 1963, an underground military group organized by H. Assad

could the Ba'ath party take power. A cautious and pragmatic leader who knows how to balance "on the edge", H. Assad has earned respect in the party and the people.

Syrian Defense Minister M. Tlas graduated from a tank college, served and fought in Egypt. Being the commander of a tank battalion, he met H. Assad. They agreed in their views, together participated in the political struggle. In 1970, Tlass played one of the important roles in the removal of the former head of state from power. In 1972, he received the rank of Corps General, became Minister of Defense, and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief. M. Tlas studied in the Soviet Union, graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. One of his many scientific works is devoted to the military heritage of Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. M, Tlas is a comprehensively educated person and, undoubtedly, gifted. He is the author of several collections of poetry, a portrait painter, an excellent photographer, a recognized specialist in improving cameras in Syria. ... But let's go back to the autumn of 1980.

Events developed rapidly. In early October, Iraq and Jordan began to accuse Syria of fueling the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In Baghdad and Amman, there were reports that Syrian and Lebanese units were allegedly operating as part of the Iranian troops. In a conversation about this, the Chief of the General Staff of the Syrian Armed Forces, Corps General X. Shehabi, told me: "Iran does not need foreign volunteers. It has millions of its valiant fighters ready to repel the Iraqi invaders."

These days, Syria announced the establishment of new relations with the USSR. On October 9, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Moscow between the Soviet Union and Syria. This document obliged the entire apparatus of the chief military adviser to a great deal. First of all, it was necessary to step up work to improve the forms of operational and combat training of the Syrian troops and headquarters. To solve these difficult tasks, it was necessary to strengthen the composition of advisers with hard-working, knowledgeable specialists. The USSR Ministry of Defense agreed to our proposals: in a short time, the main links of the Soviet apparatus were staffed with experienced generals and officers. Major General V.N. arrived at the post of deputy for armaments. Guryev is a highly qualified specialist and an excellent organizer. Lieutenant General K.S. became Senior Advisor for Air Defense (Air Defense). Babenko. He was transferred to Syria from the post of deputy commander of the Baku Air Defense District. Air Force Major General V.A. Sokolov and Major General Yu.S. Ulchenko.

We worked regardless of the time. Already in mid-November, to the surprise of CAP Minister of Defense M. Tlas, documents on operational and combat training for 1981 were developed and translated into Arabic.

Supreme Commander-in-Chief H. Assad gratefully accepted our proposals and ordered them to be implemented in all levels of the Syrian armed forces.

From about mid-November, some dissatisfaction began to appear on the part of the Syrian military leadership with respect to the Soviet representatives. About the reasons for it, Ambassador V.I. Yukhin learned on November 19, when they were invited to the Minister of Defense of Syria. He said that Syria has mobilization resources. In the event of war, and it is not far off, the country can deploy a million-strong army, but there are no weapons for it, and for some reason Moscow does not understand this.

The conversation ended with the delivery of a message from the Chairman of the CAP Council of Ministers A. Kasem addressed to A.N. Kosygin. The letter expressed the dissatisfaction of the Syrian leadership with the decisions taken in Moscow on the supply of weapons and military equipment, and a request was made to be sent to Syria in 1981-1982. new special property worth about 2 billion rubles, as well as a revision of the balance of payments.

The question of the priority of deliveries over all other aspects of the Soviet-Syrian military cooperation remained for a long time in the center of attention of both countries. Significant progress has been made on this issue since the beginning of 1982, when the approach of a major military conflict was increasingly felt in the Middle East.

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov demanded a detailed report on the state of the Syrian armed forces with conclusions and proposals. For several days in a row they prepared a document, arguing for each position. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR agreed with our conclusions. However, a call soon followed from Ogarkov with a question about the strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli army. I reported my point of view. Nikolai Vasilyevich listened attentively, considered my considerations reasonable and wished me success.

Ogarkov's call was probably connected with the invitation to the Chief of General Staff of CAP X. Shekhabi that followed a few days later. He gave me two messages addressed to N.V. Ogarkov, which are given below with abbreviations. The first specifically stated:

"Dear Comrade Marshal! On behalf of the government, I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with the decision of the political leadership of Syria, our delegation will only have the authority to sign a supply agreement, with regard to the agreement

on accommodation and calls, then this agreement is under consideration by the political leadership of the country, taking into account the development of current events within the country, in the region and in the world. [...]

We express the hope that our delegation will be received by you at a certain time for the final signing of the supply agreement. X. Shekhabi" The second message read: "Dear friend, comrade. marshal! The conditions that our Soviet friends put forward, linking the signing of an agreement on supplies with the signing of an agreement on calls, lay a new direction in relations between our two countries, and this direction does not correspond to the spirit of the agreement signed by our two presidents in October 1980. [...]

I hope our friends understand that the question of entry and accommodation is a special matter. It is related to many issues in the region, as well as independence and sovereignty, and therefore needs more detailed bilateral study and reflection in order to prevent irreparable mistakes.

We have rejected and continue to reject all attacks and comparisons made by the enemies of our cooperation with you and the parallels they draw regarding the alliance between the United States and Israel. But it is impossible not to take into account, and even more so to forget, that in the last year alone the United States provided Israel with $3 billion in aid, and Egypt with $1.5 billion, and, as we know, without preconditions.

Finishing the letter, I would like to say: we see it as our duty to develop and consolidate our cooperation. Such cooperation that would serve our common interests and raise our relations to an even higher level than at present. X. Shekhabi".

Two days later the ambassador received instructions from Moscow. First:

"Damascus, Soviet ambassador. Together with the chief military adviser to the Minister of Defense, visit Tlass and convey from the political leadership of the USSR our consent to receive in Moscow in April 1982, within the agreed time frame, the Syrian government delegation for negotiations and

signing an agreement on the supply of special equipment in accordance with the decisions of the Soviet government known to the Syrian side. Telegraph about execution. Gromyko".

"Only for you and the chief military adviser.

Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 723 of April 8, 1982

In order to support the H. Assad regime in its fight against anti-government protests inside the country and the Arab reaction, it was considered expedient on our part not to link the accommodation agreement with the supply agreement. L. Brezhnev. April 8, 1982." These telegrams became a real balm for the ambassador and me. They meant that the main thing had been achieved: to prevent such a development of events when the USSR would, voluntarily or involuntarily, be drawn into the Middle East conflict.

On June 3, I sent a cipher telegram to Moscow: “To the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. I report that in the coming days we should expect an invasion of the ground grouping of the Israeli Armed Forces into Lebanon” 3.6.1982

He reported his proposals to CAP Minister of Defense M. Tlas, then to the President. They fully agreed with this assessment of the situation.

As we expected, on June 5 Israeli aircraft attacked concentrations of Palestinian militias in the areas of Nabatiyah, Arnun, Saida and others.

A new war has begun in Lebanon. It was assessed differently, and even now it is still considered contradictory by political and military figures, the media. Looking ahead, I will say that the war, despite the fierceness of the fighting, the size of the losses of the parties in personnel and military equipment, was limited, the operations did not extend to the deep regions of Syria and Israel.

The combat plan developed by the Israeli General Staff provided for the exit of Israeli units to the approaches to Beirut as soon as possible.

In the Bekaa Valley, through which the shortest route to Damascus ran, an Israeli armored division was advancing. It was reinforced by "Nakhal" (military youth formations) units. The paramilitary Palestinian formations opposing it, of course, could not stop it.

Taking into account the current situation, the Syrian command has put forward here three forward detachments, one tank battalion each from the 91st tank brigade, to the lines equipped in advance in engineering terms. Each battalion was reinforced by a company of machine gunners from the commando regiment and was covered by Osa anti-aircraft missile systems. Advance detachments with similar means of reinforcement were also advanced in the central sector of the defensive zone. The main forces of the Syrian group in Lebanon (three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second) were in spare areas by the beginning of the war. Only limited forces were left in the defense zone. At the same time, decoys were widely used: inflatable tanks camouflaged to match the color of the terrain, guns, anti-aircraft missile systems coated with metallized paint and equipped with thermal emitters. Due to this, the Israeli troops' fire strike before forcing the Zahrani River on June 8 did not reach the real goal. But the airborne assault and the advanced enemy detachments that crossed to the opposite bank of the river met an organized rebuff. The enemy was stopped, and in some places driven back to their original lines.

The main forces of the Israeli troops on the northern bank of the Zahrani River concentrated by the morning of June 9th. By this time, Syrian troops had moved out of the reserve areas and occupied pre-equipped defensive zones. At dawn, four armored divisions of Israel, supported by artillery and aviation on a front of more than 100 km - from the Mediterranean coast to the mountainous regions of Harmon - went on the offensive. The most powerful armed forces in the Middle East clashed in confrontation. On both sides, the battle involved: more than 200 thousand personnel (excluding Palestinians); about 3,000 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles; over 3,000 guns and mortars; about 900 aircraft. According to the reports of Soviet military advisers to the commanders of corps, divisions, brigades, the Syrian troops fought well on the whole.

At a meeting with the leadership of the General Staff, which was personally held by Commander-in-Chief H. Assad, it was reported that within four days the Syrian Air Force made 958 sorties and shot down 23 Israeli aircraft in air battles. CAP air defense systems destroyed 35 air targets, including 27 combat aircraft, the Ground Forces destroyed 160 Israeli tanks, more than 10 artillery and anti-aircraft missile batteries, the enemy troops suffered heavy losses in manpower. On June 10, the initiative passed into the hands of the Syrian command. A favorable environment has developed for the transition to more active actions. The Syrians began to prepare a counterattack by the forces of the 1st and 3rd tank divisions, the 47th and 51st separate tank brigades and four commando regiments against the flank and rear of the enemy, who had broken through along the Mediterranean coast and reached Beirut. There was a real opportunity to surround and destroy the aggressor.

However, events took a different turn, undesirable for Syria. The United States and its allies hastened to the rescue of Israel. A series of visits by high-ranking representatives of the American administration followed in Damascus. The result of their negotiations with the leaders of the CAP, accompanied by pressure and promises, was the order of President X, Assad, dated June 11, 1982, to stop the hostilities of the Syrian troops against the Israelis and consolidate them on the achieved lines. This truce was not in favor of Syria. The Americans and their NATO allies used the respite to concentrate their fleets in the Mediterranean, and in particular off the coast of Lebanon. The Israeli command received time to regroup forces and assets.

In world public opinion, the impression could have been that Syria was defeated and capitulated. It was especially disappointing that even in Moscow not everyone understood the current situation. From various branches of the armed forces and military branches, one commission after another began to arrive in Damascus, without asking the consent of the CAP leadership. They were interested, in particular, in the reasons for the destruction of anti-aircraft missile systems, and, oddly enough, they were looking for the culprits primarily among their own. It is not difficult to imagine how the officers of the Soviet apparatus felt in this confusion. It was no longer possible to put up with this state of affairs, and I decided to turn to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov. By phone, I reported that the truce was not for long, the fight between Syria and Israel was still ahead. The conversation went on for over an hour. Dmitry Fedorovich did not interrupt, listened attentively to me, in conclusion he said: “We must agree with you. We will take measures to improve the situation. Tell the Syrian leadership: let them immediately, today, send a delegation to Moscow to determine what equipment, weapons and ammunition should be put in the first place. Let your deputy for armaments fly out with this delegation. The inspectors, except for Yurasov and Gorshkov, should be seconded immediately to Moscow."

In continuation and reinforcement of a telephone conversation with D.F. Ustinov, I sent a cipher telegram to him with the following content: "According to various sources, and sometimes from persons who were far from the real events, conclusions are drawn about some kind of defeat and even complete defeat of the Syrian armed forces in Lebanon in repelling Israeli aggression. It is impossible to agree with such conclusions and reports.

Firstly, such conclusions are completely in line with the desire of the United States and the entire world Jewish mafia: to discredit Soviet weapons, our operational art and tactics, to create the "myth of invincibility" they desire at this stage.

Secondly, this is not true. The Syrian armed forces, as you know, entered into active hostilities only on June 9, 1982, when the Israelis transferred the hostilities to their zone of responsibility, i.e. on the fourth day of the war. Four armored divisions and two separate brigades of Israeli troops were severely defeated. By the morning of June 11, the Syrian troops completely seized the initiative and began to counterattack in an organized manner. In the Damascus direction, artillery counter-preparation was carried out in the area of ​​​​concentration of the arrived enemy 14th Panzer Division and thwarted its entry into the battle. Syrian troops also repelled a psychic attack in Lebanon, undertaken with the aim of breaking through the defenses in the Bekaa Valley and capturing the Beirut-Damascus highway. It was this current situation - the transfer of the initiative into the hands of the Syrians - that frightened the United States. They realized that at this stage they could lose their "mace" in the face of Israel in the Middle East and undertook political and diplomatic pressure, deceit and blackmail to force the Syrian leadership to agree to a ceasefire.

Thirdly, Soviet weapons and military equipment, with their skillful use, have shown their reliability over the latest American-Israeli ones, and our tanks, especially the T-72 and T-62, are completely superior.

Fourthly, the Syrian formations and units that took part in the hostilities not only did not lose their combat ability, but, on the contrary, became stronger, believing in their strength, convinced of the reliability and superiority of Soviet weapons in their hands. They continue to firmly hold the defensive lines they occupy in Lebanon for the hour of the ceasefire, improve them in engineering terms and are ready to repel enemy attacks in the event of a resumption of hostilities.

The operational-strategic leadership was carried out and continues with the help of our advisers at the central apparatus of the Syrian Ministry of Defense. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief - President H. Assad and the Minister of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic M. Tlas are working in close contact with us. Decisions on military matters are worked out jointly.

Fifthly, the Air Force and Air Defense, electronic warfare units, radio and radio engineering units equipped with our equipment have done and are doing everything possible to complete the tasks. But we must admit that our technology is inferior to the technology of the United States and Israel. There are many vulnerabilities in these types of armed forces, military branches and special forces of the CAP Armed Forces, which I reported to you earlier and will be reported in detail upon L.I.'s arrival in Moscow. Gorshkov - Deputy Chief of the Military Industrial Complex under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense, Colonel-General E.S. Yurasov. Yashkin.

June 12, 1982." I must emphasize that after this report, the situation began to improve, including with regard to the coverage of events in the Middle East in the domestic media. Correspondents of Krasnaya Zvezda, TASS, political observers of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company appeared in Damascus.

The Syrian leaders made a significant contribution to debunking the myth created by Western propaganda about the backlog of our equipment and weapons.

"This is a baseless lie," President X. Assad said at the 20th Syrian Trade Union Congress. The President gave the following example: “They talked a lot about the Israeli Merkava tank, claiming that it was the best in the world. However, the battles showed that the T-72 tank was the best among the tanks participating in the battle. Where this tank opposed the Israeli , the latter could not stand it." Similar statements have been repeatedly made by CAP Minister of Defense M. Tlas.

Many examples refuting the fabrications of Zionist propaganda were published by the Syrian press.

"Our weapons are good, and our fighters are able to use them with maximum efficiency" - under this headline, the Syrian newspaper "Tishrin" published a report from the air defense unit in two issues. In one of the battles, the soldiers of this unit shot down an Israeli Phantom aircraft, which was making a reconnaissance flight over the positions of Syrian units.

Among the measures taken at that time by the Soviet leadership in order to support Syria in its struggle against Israeli aggression, the arrival of a representative delegation from Moscow headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov.

The delegation's working group was engaged in determining the needs of the Syrian armed forces for new equipment, weapons, and ammunition. It was about the ammunition of the so-called volumetric explosion, as well as air-to-air missiles of the AA-8, AA-7 types. Soon, Soviet MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft began to arrive at CAP. In terms of their combat qualities, they were not inferior to the American F-15 and F-16 vehicles.

The intensification of the supply of Soviet weapons to Syria, the moral support provided by the dispatch of such a representative delegation to Damascus, were all the more important because a few days earlier, on July 18, Israeli troops, violating the terms of the truce, launched fire strikes on Syrian positions. Israeli troops made one attempt after another to break through the defenses of the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley, but they were unsuccessful. And here an important role was played not only by the stubbornness of the Syrian infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers, not only by the skills acquired by the commanding staff in the rapid concentration of forces and means in threatened areas. Skillful engineering equipment of positions meant a lot. I must admit that it was not easy for our advisers to achieve this. Syrian officers said: why waste strength, dig into the ground, if a truce has been reached? Later, having learned in battles the role of the engineering equipment of the area, they sincerely thanked us.

In the course of hostilities, mobile anti-tank units armed with bassoon anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) have proven themselves well. The story of their appearance in the Syrian mechanized brigades is as follows. On one of the first days of the war, an adviser to the commander of the Syrian troops in Lebanon, Major General M.P. Nosenko started talking about a mobile anti-tank reserve.

"The idea is good, Mikhail Petrovich, but what to create it from?" I asked.

"Our Bassoon ATGMs will do. I know their capabilities well. We will pick up vehicles for their installation here," MP replied. Nosenko.

At the next report to Moscow, I shared this idea with the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. He supported our proposal. Literally on the second day, 120 Fagot ATGMs and six sets of ammunition for them were delivered by special flights to Syria. In the mechanized brigades of the 1st and 3rd tank divisions and in the newly created 10th mechanized division, mobile anti-tank platoons were formed on all-terrain vehicles. For several days of fighting, they destroyed more than 150 enemy tanks. Only one 21st mechanized brigade of the 3rd Panzer Division in the battles on the outskirts of the Damascus Plateau destroyed 59 combat vehicles.

I would like to give other examples of the skillful actions of our advisers and specialists, their courage and valor.

In the battles to hold the Beirut-Damascus highway and on the approaches to the Damascus Plateau, the situation sometimes developed in such a way that they had to take up arms. On July 20, I had to worry about Major General M.P. Nosenko. The enemy landed a tactical landing in the rear of the Syrian troops. Part of it leaked in the direction of the M.P. Nosenko. A control group consisting of five Soviet and three Syrian officers, as well as two crews of radio stations, entered the fray. For about an hour, she repelled the onslaught, until a tank company approached. Together, the enemy was destroyed. In this battle, two of our sergeants and two Syrian officers were killed. Was wounded and M.P. Nosenko.

Anything happened during the fight. Military adviser to the commander of the 10th mechanized division, Major General V.V. Gubkin had to temporarily take command of the formation. The division received the task of occupying a defense zone in the mountainous regions of Aley. During the reconnaissance, the division commander, Brigadier General Et-Din Akla, fell ill. Before being evacuated to the hospital, he asked General Gubkin to complete the work. He ordered the unit commanders to unquestioningly follow the adviser's instructions. The division occupied the defense zone in a timely manner and equipped it in engineering terms. Then she successfully repelled all enemy attacks.

Remembering the time spent under the hot sun of Syria and Lebanon, I always feel a sense of pride in my comrades-in-arms, military advisers and specialists. The vast majority of them are people of high duty and honor, true masters of their craft. This is evidenced by the high awards that marked their contribution to strengthening the defense capability of Syria, Major General M.P. Nosenko was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star, as well as four orders of the Syrian Arab Republic. Military Advisor to the Commander of the CAP Air Force Lieutenant General of Aviation V.A. Sokolov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Red Star and two Syrian awards. Courage and courage were shown by advisers who were in the air defense forces under the leadership of Lieutenant General K.S. Babenko.

A team of advisers worked purposefully in the electronic warfare units under the leadership of Major General Yu.S. Ulchenko. In a short time, he managed to introduce new equipment in the CAP armed forces.

Kind words deserve advisers to the commanders of divisions, brigades and battalions. Most of the time they worked on the front line, helping the Syrian commanders organize the battle, while showing courage and courage. I would like to mention the adviser to the commander of the 7th mechanized division, and then to the commander of the 1st army corps, Major General N.V. Logvinov, advisers to major generals N.A. Lisovsky, V.V. Gubkin.

On the events of the second half of 1982, as well as 1983-1984. I'll tell you briefly.

At the end of August, Israel resumed air strikes and artillery attacks on Syrian positions and attacks along the entire front. A new offensive was launched in Beirut with the aim of taking the city. Syria, in response, was forced to send commando regiments, two mechanized brigades and four independent tank battalions into eastern Beirut. The Israeli attacks faltered.

New Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel turned to US President R. Reagan with a request for assistance. Washington was just waiting for this. In mid-September, NATO naval forces set up a naval blockade around Beirut. These days, Israel again tried to break through the defenses of the Syrian troops, and again failed. It was, in fact, the last serious attempt by Israel to achieve its goals in Lebanon. It ended in complete failure both militarily and politically. At the same time, Israel defiantly began to concentrate fresh troops in southern Lebanon, to regroup them in order to liberate the territory for the deployment of NATO forces.

We understood that the leadership of Syria needed support, and we reported on this. At the end of October 1982, the ambassador and I were summoned to Moscow. We were followed by a Syrian delegation led by President X. Assad.

Negotiations began. From our side, L.I. Brezhnev, N.A. Tikhonov, Yu.V. Andropov, D.F., Ustinov, A.A. Gromyko, N.V. Ogarkov, Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic V.I. Yukhin and the author of these lines. The main result of these negotiations can be called the decision to transfer to Syria two anti-aircraft missile regiments, electronic warfare units.

The Syrian Air Force and Air Defense were replenished with new Soviet equipment. As a result of the measures taken, Syria's air defense has become much more effective than it was in June 1982. This was clearly manifested in December 1983, when the naval blockade of Lebanon began by the forces of four NATO states - the USA, England, France, and Italy. High-capacity naval artillery and bomber aircraft began to deliver massive strikes against the troops of the national-patriotic forces of Lebanon, the defensive positions of the Syrian troops in its central part. At the same time, Israeli aircraft, missile forces and artillery fired on Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley and in the mountainous regions of Barouk.

The Syrian army retaliated. According to intelligence, this caused significant damage to the Israelis. The fire from their side became much weaker.

In March 1984, in connection with a change in the situation, it was decided to withdraw our military contingent from the territory of the CAP and transfer Soviet military equipment and weapons to the armed forces of Syria.

Soviet military advisers and specialists continued to carry out their friendly mission in Syria in subsequent years. I would like to believe that their contribution to strengthening the defense capability of this ancient and beautiful country will be duly appreciated by its grateful people.

Retired Colonel General G.P. YASHKIN

The October Liberation War began on Saturday, October 6, 1973, according to the most unfortunate version of the “Combat Action Plan”. In addition, the Saman, who came from the desert, forced them to postpone the offensive for several hours. At 1400, artillery and aviation from the Arab countries attacked Israeli positions. At 15.00 the ground troops went forward.

In the first hour of the war, Syrian Air Force aircraft attacked: the Hebron aviation control center (12 Su-20s and 8 MiG-21s); three RLP and PN (20 Su-7B, 16 MiG-17 and 6 MiG-21); three strongholds on the Golan Heights - (three groups of 8-10 MiG-17s under the cover of MiG-21s). Troopers landed from ten Mi-8s and seized the jamming complex on Mount Jebel Sheikh. During the day, due to difficult weather conditions, Syrian aviation carried out only 270 sorties. 1 enemy aircraft was shot down with the loss of one of his own.

On October 6 and 7, groups of 6-12 Su-20s, Su-7Bs, MiG-17s, accompanied by 4-6 MiG-21s, were involved in operations against ground targets. Sometimes fighters covered the IBA planes already on the way back. So, on October 7, two flights of the MiG-21 took off from the Nasrie airfield to meet those returning from the Su-7B mission. This group did not have a general leadership. The flight was carried out at an altitude of 2000-3000 m. The battle formation was a “column of links”. At the command of the command post, the MiGs left the loitering zone for the meeting area with the Sukhoi group. Soon the leader of the first link Art. Lieutenant Sukes discovered a pair of "Mirages" (in fact there were four of them), marching in a column at the same height with him on a collision course. Without notifying the link, the commander energetically performed a turn towards the enemy with a large overload. At the same time, the link broke up into separate pairs, which subsequently did not interact with each other. Sukes went into the tail of the Israeli fighter and from a distance of 1000-1500 m at a speed of about 1000 km / h launched a rocket that hit the Mirage nozzle. The plane exploded. Continuing the search and not finding either the enemy or his own, Sukes returned to base with his wingman.

Leading the second pair of the first link Art. Lieutenant Dauvara, after losing contact with the commander, found a second pair of Mirages to the left at an angle of 30 °, also flying on counter-intersecting courses with him. The Syrian pilots performed a turn towards the enemy with a large overload, which led to a short-term loss of consciousness. Having finished the maneuver, a pair of MiGs entered the rear hemisphere of the Israelis at a distance of 600 - 800 m. The leader pressed the "Start" button, but could not stand the time of pressing, and the rocket did not leave the guide. Wing Lt. Dibs attacked the second Mirage and shot it down with a rocket salvo. The leader of the pair of Mirages, having turned on the afterburner, with a sharp maneuver with a decrease and acceleration, left the battle. Due to the small remaining fuel, the Syrians did not pursue him and returned to the airfield.

The second link of the MiGs met another link of the Mirages, which was flying at an altitude of 3000 m, and engaged in a maneuverable battle with it, mainly on horizontal lines. During the battle, the link broke up into pairs that acted independently. In none of the attacks, the Syrians managed to achieve favorable conditions for launching missiles or firing cannons. Having not achieved success, without the permission of the commander, without warning him, the pilots of the second pair of MiGs left the battle and went to their airfield. The commander and his wingman continued the battle. When there were 500 liters of fuel left in the tanks, they went to low altitude and began to land at the nearest Blei airfield. Due to poor coordination between command posts and the untimely change of codes, the “friend or foe” air defense of the airfield mistook these vehicles for enemy ones. As a result, one MiG was shot down by a missile, and the second by anti-aircraft guns. The pilots managed to eject safely.

After October 7, reduced groups of IBA aircraft (2-4 Su-20, 4-8 MiG-17) began to be allocated for attacks on ground targets. Overcoming the air defense system was provided by:

following the route at extremely low altitude,

anti-aircraft maneuvers in height, direction and speed,

jamming of radars and missile defense systems "Hawk" by special An-12PP aircraft and a ground-based complex of the "Smalta" type,

applying BSHU at control points and radar posts.

To destroy troops and military equipment, high-explosive fragmentation bombs OFAB-250, -250sh and unguided missiles S-24 and S-5k were used. The strikes were delivered from level flight or a gentle dive with an angle of 10-12 ° from a height of 100-200 m. To destroy tanks, PTAB-2.5 bombs in RBC-250 were used, dropped from a pitch-up with an angle of 10-20 °, and NURS S- 5k and S-Zk, which were launched in level flight at an altitude of 25-50 m. FAB-500, -250, -100 bombs were used for operations against strongholds. They were dropped from a gentle dive with an angle of 10-20 ° from a height of 300 m after performing a slide or a combat turn, as well as from a low-altitude horizontal flight with a climb of 250-300 m for 8-10 seconds, followed by a sharp descent and performing an anti-aircraft maneuver. When attacking an oil refinery near the city of Haifa, ZAB-250 incendiary bombs and OFAB-250 high-explosive fragmentation bombs were used. The reset was carried out from level flight after a preliminary "jump" to 200 m.

The strike groups left the target in different directions, maneuvering and moving to extremely low altitudes. IBA aircraft suffered losses from the fire of ZUR, ZUR and fighters after dropping ammunition, while avoiding the target, during a repeated attack, when the pilot climbed over 200 m and did not perform or performed a very sluggish anti-aircraft maneuver. Escort fighters were not allocated to each strike group. MiG-21s carried out cover from the barrage zone in the most dangerous directions. For the first days of the war (until October 11), it was characteristic that fighter aircraft were involved mainly to cover their airfields and facilities in the depths of the country, and were not sent to support the ground forces. With this, the command of the Air Force and Air Defense provided its ZRV and FOR "work without restrictions." As a result, the probability of an erroneous hit by air defense systems of their aircraft was minimized, and the Israelis suffered significant losses.

On October 10, the MiG-21 link of Captain Maurice, which had risen from the Nasrie airfield, loitered at an altitude of 4000-6000 m. went on the attack. At this time, the leader of the second pair of Art. Lieutenant Khadra discovered four more Mirages (strike group), which flew behind the first pair and below it by about 1000 m in the battle formation "bearing pair". Without warning the flight commander, he and his wingman turned on them and attacked the enemy from behind and from above. From a distance of 800-1000 m Art. Lieutenant Khadra and his wingman simultaneously launched missiles and destroyed the guided pair of Mirages, and then, approaching the leading pair and firing two more missiles, destroyed it as well. It should be noted that the Syrian pilots attacked very competently: first the wingman, and then the leading pair. Subsequently, Art. Lt Khadra was awarded the title of Hero of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Meanwhile, the first pair of Mirages, attacked by a pair of MiG flight commanders, began to maneuver vigorously, mainly horizontally. As a result, the Syrian pilots were unable to launch missiles and open fire from cannons. With a remaining fuel of 800 liters, they left the battle at maximum speed and extremely low altitude and returned safely to the airfield.

From October 11, fighters began to boldly engage in battle with the enemy, moving away from their airfields. This day was the most productive in the war - the Syrians shot down 56 aircraft, of which 10 were MiG-21 pilots. There were no losses. However, a number of air battles, especially from 7 to 17 October, were unsuccessful for the Syrians. An analysis of about 60% of the battles showed that the main reason for the failures was shortcomings in tactical training.

Air battles were often fought in groups of 30-60 aircraft at altitudes from 50 m to 5000-6000 m and speeds from 200 to 1500 km / h with overloads up to 9d. As a rule, they were maneuverable and fierce in nature and were fired outside the zone of fire of the ZRV. Most often, the outset of the battle took place on a head-on or head-to-head course with a "bait" group, followed by maneuvering, usually on horizontal lines, often without taking into account the possible presence of strike groups in the enemy. With the "bait" the Israelis sought to break the battle order of the Syrians and, when it was possible, to drag them along. This created favorable conditions for the actions of the strike group, which was often located below the "bait" outside the radar visibility of the Arab command posts. Approaching secretly from below-behind, she suddenly attacked the Syrians, carried away by the fight. If this type of battle could not be imposed, the enemy left it or generally tried to avoid a meeting. Unfortunately, the Syrians, in their desire to make the most of the MiG-21's flight characteristics, often forgot about tactics and therefore suffered unjustified losses.

For example, on October 16, a pair of MiG-21s took off from the Hama airfield and at an altitude of 4000 m entered the loitering area near the city of Tartus. Because of the thick haze, visibility in the air did not exceed 5-6 km. While patrolling, the presenter discovered a single "Phantom" ("bait"), performing a left turn at a distance of 2-3 km. Its pilot clearly provoked the Arab pilots to attack, which he achieved. The Syrian couple, dropping outboard tanks and not assessing the air situation, rushed forward at full afterburner. The first rocket fired by the leader from a long distance did not hit the target. Continuing the rapprochement, the commander of the Syrian couple saw in his immediate vicinity a second F-4 coming out of the attack (which shot down his wingman, the Syrian pilot ejected). He fired a missile at the Phantom, but again unsuccessfully, this time due to the small distance to the target. At this time, the MiG's engine stalled. About further events, the presenter in the report told a real fairy tale: “Despite the idle engine, having a large excess of speed, I continued to approach the Phantom ... I managed to fire four bursts of cannons from a range of 300-400 m. I observed shell explosions in at the junction of the fuselage and the plane, then a fire broke out on the Phantom, the ion fell into the sea with a right turn. I started the engine at an altitude of 1500 m and returned to the airfield. In fact, the downing of the Phantom has not been confirmed, and one MiG-21 has been lost. The reasons are obvious: the leader did not follow the follower and the air situation; the same applies to the slave; they did not know the tactics of the enemy. Taking advantage of the lack of objective control, the leader invented his story about the battle in order to justify the loss of the follower.

The next day, the same commander conducted an air battle with a group of "Phantoms" tactically extremely illiterate. The wingman of the second pair of his link was lost, and no one followed him and did not see how he was shot down. Again there was no interaction both between pairs and between pilots in pairs. Radio discipline was not respected and objective control was not carried out.

The Israelis tried to impose air battles in areas favorable to them, where they were provided with control from land, sea or air. Such zones were: South Lebanon (Lebanese Valley), Tartus, Tripoli and the sea coast near them. Conversely, the Syrians in these areas were not provided with command and guidance. The Israelis carried out air battles according to a variant worked out in advance on the ground and in the air, which contributed to success in battle even with the loss of control and communication with the land or sea. The Syrian pilots did not have their own option. Pairs and units that flew on a mission were not flown off, had different levels of training, the followers could not always keep their place in the ranks, especially with energetic maneuvers of the leaders. Group commanders and leaders, as a rule, did not control the battle. They maneuvered without taking into account the capabilities of the followers, trying to complete their combat mission at any cost. Pairs and links crumbled, control was lost, as a result of which the wingmen were often shot down. Squadron commanders did not go into battle, and flight commanders became the leaders of the groups. Battles involving large forces were fought in mixed groups, which included links from different squadrons and even different brigades, which further worsened control. The battle formations of the group were frontal, not echeloned in height. The exit from the battle was carried out in an unorganized manner, without the command of the leader, and often the followers in pairs, as well as the followers in pairs, abandoned the leaders. In battle, the rules of radio exchange were not observed, and everyone who considered it necessary worked on the transmission, which led to a loss of control both on the part of the group commanders and the command post. The calculations of the Syrian CP and PN did not know the plan of the air battle of the controlled group and did not take into account the tactics of the enemy, which did not allow them to bring their fighters into a position advantageous for starting the battle. The air brigade commanders weakly controlled the course of the battle, shifting their duties to the guidance navigators. The lack of visual observation points also reduced the ability of combat control. All this led to predominantly defensive rather than offensive actions, which the enemy used.

As another example, the battle on October 21 can be cited. The main PN led the MiG-21MF link of captain Merze to the eight Mirages in the area of ​​Jebel Sheikh mountain. MiGs flew at an altitude of 2000 m at a speed of 1000 km/h. The enemy marched at an altitude of 4000 m in the battle formation "column of links" with a distance between links of 3-4 km. Instead of attacking the last link, the Syrian commander attacked the enemy's first link on the move. Having detected the attack, this link opened (the left pair performed a left combat turn, and the right pair performed a right one) and continued to fly as a "bait". The second link, as a strike group, remained behind-higher and, observing the events, did not take part in the outset of the battle. Arab pilots attacked the "bait": Captain Merze with the wingman - the left pair of "Mirages", and the second pair of his link - the right one. As a result, the MiGs lost speed, and the wingmen fell behind. They proved to be a good target and were shot down by an Israeli strike group. The pilots ejected. The leaders managed to escape to their base. Upon arrival, each of them stated that they had destroyed a Mirage, but objective control did not confirm this.

A helicopter brigade took part in the hostilities throughout the war. Its crews carried out tactical landings, reconnaissance of the movement of their troops, evacuation of pilots from landing sites after ejection, delivery of the wounded to hospitals and combat orders to the troops. The flights were carried out from pre-prepared hidden sites.

When landing, tasks were assigned to Mi-8 squadrons 30-40 minutes before departure, and the paratroopers arrived for landing 20-30 minutes before and were placed 15-17 people in a helicopter. Following the route was carried out at an altitude of 10-15 m at a maximum speed (up to 250 km / h) in the battle formation "column of links", each link in the "wedge of helicopters" formation. The landing was carried out on mountain peaks with a height of 1200-1300 m in the areas where Israeli strongholds were located. At the time of landing, the helicopters were fired upon from all types of weapons and suffered heavy losses. So, on October 9, eight Mi-8s landed troops in the Zl-Kuneinra region, while the enemy motorized infantry battalion fired at the vehicles from small arms. As a result, three crews did not return from the mission, and four more made emergency landings before reaching the base. To perform special tasks, 2-3 crews were constantly on duty. The takeoff was carried out on command from the TsKP no more than 10 minutes after receiving the order.

In the October War, ground-based air defense systems proved themselves well. Not a single object covered by them was completely destroyed or put out of action for a long time. Syrian anti-aircraft missiles operated in a difficult ground and air situation: on some days, crews and command posts of brigades were 1-1.5 km from the enemy, under fire from his artillery and small arms, but at the same time they successfully completed combat missions. Over the entire period of the war, the Israelis inflicted more than 100 BSHU on the positions of the air defense system and FORA. During the fighting, according to the Syrian command, Syrian anti-aircraft gunners destroyed 197 enemy aircraft (110 Phantoms, 25 Mirages, 60 Skyhawks and 2 Ryan unmanned reconnaissance aircraft). Their losses amounted to 13 divisions (1 "Volga", 2 "Dvina", 5 "Pechora", 5 "Cube"), of which one is irretrievable, six were disabled for a period of 2 to 5 months, and six by October 31, 1973 were put into operation.

Radio-technical troops, working in conditions of powerful radio interference by the enemy, detected and notified about 9,300 Israeli sorties, provided more than 6,500 sorties of their aviation (including non-combat ones) and conducted 282 air battles.

During the 19 days of the war, Syrian aircraft made 4,658 sorties to cover the troops and facilities of the country, to gain air supremacy; 1044 - to support the ground forces and 12 - for reconnaissance. Helicopters made about 120 sorties.

aircraft type	sorties	air battles	Participated pilots	Wins
MiG-21
MiG-17
Su-7B
Su-20	98	282	173	105

Encyclopedia of Aircraft and Helicopters. 2004-2007

Russian servicemen have been present in Syria for quite a long time. This fact was confirmed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, at the recent V Moscow Conference on International Security: “Russian military advisers assist the command of the Syrian army in planning combat operations against bandit formations, participate in the training and preparation for combat operations of reserve formations and military units ". A group of Soviet military specialists, as a consolidated military formation of the USSR Armed Forces, was sent to Syria back in 1956. Later, in 1973 and 1983, the size of the contingent was increased by regular units of the Soviet army, which was seen as a confrontation in the Cold War between the USSR and the USA and a struggle for influence in the strategically important region of the Middle East. For many decades, Syria has been traditionally strong and a staffed apparatus of Soviet military advisers and specialists who were part of all the administrative units of the Syrian army. The range of their duties sometimes went beyond the powers of advisers. Soviet military advisers and specialists - pilots, sailors, anti-aircraft gunners, tankers - took a direct part in the hostilities on the Syrian-Israeli front. Of the most famous - "Six Day War" (1967), "War of Attrition" (1970), "War in the Air" (1972), "Doomsday War" (1973), "Lebanese War" (1982) ), “The occupation and naval blockade of Lebanon by NATO forces” (1983). In subsequent years, Soviet specialists transferred combat experience to the Arabs and taught the Syrians how to use military equipment and weapons that were supplied to Syria from the Soviet Union, and later from Russia. “Already since the late 70s of the last century, our military advisers have not taken part in active hostilities in Syria,” says Colonel Anatoly Matveychuk, former adviser to the head of the Syrian military academy in Aleppo. - For the most part, the work of the office of the chief military adviser at that time was reduced precisely to advisory functions, teaching work, training the Syrians in the use of military equipment that was supplied from our country. The emphasis was on training local instructors, who were supposed to subsequently train local specialists for the Syrian army. Much attention was paid to the political training of the Syrians - the socialist ideology of those times affected. But the technical skills in training were the main ones: the Syrian soldiers, being brave warriors, did not master complex military equipment as successfully as the standards required. The current contingent of Russian military advisers in Syria is increasing, taking into account the development of the situation in this country. Just do not confuse it with ensuring the security of the Russian contingent, which guards the air base at the Khmeimim airfield and a number of Russian facilities on the territory of this country. There, in addition to the flight and technical personnel of the Russian Aerospace Forces, who are the main participants in the operation to destroy the terrorist organization "Islamic State" (banned in the Russian Federation), there are other security forces. It is clear that they do not line up along the runway in Khmeimim and perform their tasks, including those related to the possible evacuation of Russian aircraft crews outside the base. But this contingent is not Russian advisers, but precisely forces designed to ensure security. “Coordination of the actions of the Syrian army by Russian advisers is a strategic task,” says Colonel Anatoly Matveychuk. - The current military operations that were carried out in the province of Aleppo and during the liberation of Palmyra are strategic. The experience of our officers and generals, who are now in Syria, is extremely necessary in such a situation. They have behind them the experience of Afghanistan and the Chechen campaigns. Here's an example: now Syrian drivers are trained by our advisers in one month, instead of the previous three. The effectiveness of the command and staff actions of the Syrian military leaders has increased in exactly the same proportion.” Syrian army. Russian advisers in the junior rank train their colleagues at the brigade to battalion level. Technical specialists are retraining the Syrians for modern types of weapons that Russia regularly supplies under agreements with this Arab republic. There is also a whole staff of Russian military Arabic translators, among whom there are even linguist cadets of the last courses of the Military University. “The advisory apparatus in Syria reached three thousand people, they were specialists of various levels,” says military expert Vladislav Shurygin. - He was severely hacked at one time by the ex-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, multiplying, figuratively speaking, by zero. The number of advisers has decreased by five times. Now a full-fledged structure of advisers is being deployed that can help the Syrian government army to effectively conduct military operations against jihadists, which was demonstrated during the latest offensive operations of the Syrian government army. And their role here is no less than air strikes by the Russian aviation of the Aerospace Forces.” The expert believes that it makes no sense for Russia to send full-fledged combat units to Syria for a ground operation in which heavy casualties are inevitable. The most effective is the use of military advisers, who will train the Syrians at the level of battalion-tactical groups, and, if necessary, coordinate their actions during hostilities. “The role of advisers is a key one,” says Vladislav Shurygin. - To win, you need to learn how to fight. This is what our advisers, who have vast combat experience, are capable of teaching to Syrian colleagues. And the effect is already obvious: if a year ago Syrian tanks were rolling back and forth, firing randomly, now well-thought-out tactics are visible in organizing their offensive. And it was our advisers who trained the Syrians.”

One of the most important components of the strength of this army is its super-draft recruitment principle, the only adequate principle when it comes to defending one's own country. The mercenary army, turned into a kind of fetish in today's Russia, as world experience shows, is best suited for punitive operations (against one's own people or strangers are already details), but by no means for the defense of the motherland. In Israel, as you know, even women are drafted into the army, refuseniks are sent to prison without talking. The term of service for men is 3-5 years (depending on the type of troops and specialty), for women - 21 months. In general, 92% of men and 60% of women are covered by the call. The system of retraining (a month of service annually) and mobilization of reservists has been perfectly worked out, without which the recruiting principle of recruitment largely loses its meaning.

Therefore, Israel won the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, despite the fact that the Arab armies opposing it had a significant numerical superiority in personnel and weapons, and in general they were not inferior to it in terms of the quality of military equipment.

Today, the armies of 18 Islamic countries of the Near and Middle East (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Yemen, Iran, Pakistan) are armed with in total, approximately 21 thousand tanks, almost 27 thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 32.6 thousand artillery systems (self-propelled guns, towed guns, MLRS, mortars), 3.3 thousand combat aircraft, more than 500 combat helicopters. Israel has 3.5 thousand tanks, 10.4 thousand infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 5.8 thousand artillery systems, 400 combat aircraft, 100 attack helicopters. If we take only the most modern models of military equipment, then here the advantage of Islamic countries is very significant. Thus, Islamic countries can oppose 1,525 Israeli Merkava tanks with 1,288 Abrams, 428 Challengers, 390 Leclercs, 320 T-80s and 2,730 T-72s. Islamic countries have 94 Apache combat helicopters, and Israel has 40. In the air, Israeli 89 F-15s and 206 F-16s can be countered by 154 F-15s, 321 F-16s, as well as 39 F / A-18s, 96 "Mirage-2000", at least 150 MiG-29s, as well as 56 not very modern, but very powerful Su-24 front-line bombers. There is no particular point in comparing the Navy, the advantage of Islamic countries is no less great here, it’s just that in all the wars of Israel against its neighbors, naval battles were rather “entertaining” in nature, they did not have any real impact on the outcome of the wars.

Islamic armies are very weak precisely in what the IDF is strong in: in the level of combat and moral-psychological training of personnel, competence and initiative of the command. The Arabs have always lost to Israel, Pakistan has always lost to India, Libya, to put it mildly, unsuccessfully fought against the much weaker Chad. Everyone witnessed the defeat of the Iraqi army in 1991 with the final finishing in 2003, although at the time Desert Storm began, the Iraqi Armed Forces were formally among the ten strongest in the world. The Iran-Iraq war was another evidence of the failure of the Islamic armies. In this case, two Islamic countries were at war with each other. The war was extremely cruel and bloody, the level of combat skill of both sides was extremely low, as a result, the eight-year massacre ended, in fact, in a draw.

The most powerful and combat-ready in the Islamic world are precisely those armies that fought the most against Israel - the Egyptian and Syrian. Their defeats taught them a lot, combat experience increased from war to war. Suffice it to recall how Egypt triumphantly launched the 1973 war by conducting a brilliant operation to force the Suez Canal. During the Lebanese war in 1982, the Syrian army showed a high level of combat prowess, which was recognized by the Israelis. And during the "Desert Storm" in 1991, according to representatives of the American command, not the British, not the French, but the Syrian army was the most combat-ready ally of the US Armed Forces (despite the fact that political relations between Washington and Damascus still remained at the highest stretched degrees).

Today, it is Egypt and Syria that remain the leaders of the Islamic world in terms of the number of weapons (except for the nuclear missile potential of Pakistan), each of the countries individually surpasses Israel in the number of tanks and combat aircraft. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to imagine their war with Israel, since Israel is still stronger, everyone understands this very well. In addition, we must take into account that Egypt has a peace treaty with Israel, and Syria, remaining an implacable enemy of Israel, is squeezed in a vise between itself and American troops in Iraq. The armament and equipment of the Syrian Armed Forces as a whole remained at the level of the late 80s, since after the cessation of gratuitous Soviet assistance, the modernization and renewal of the military and military equipment of the Syrian army is going at a snail's pace.

The Middle East, like forty years ago, still continues to be one of the main pain points of the planet. However, if earlier, in the 60-70s, fierce wars took place one after another in this region of the world, mainly for territories, then in our time everything has changed, and the Egyptian army is now fighting not with Israeli tanks, but with its own citizens - demonstrators.

The former allies of the Egyptians - the Syrians are also busy only with their internal problems, a bloody Civil War is blazing in Syria, the end of which, apparently, is not expected in the near future. The eternal adversary of these Arab countries - Israel still remains surrounded by unfriendly states, or even just enemies, moreover, home-made shells from Hamas fall on the heads of Israelis from time to time. In addition to the citizens of these countries, few people in the world now remember in detail how Egypt and Syria, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other, began a large-scale war in this region, some for the return of their former ancestral lands, while others defended their very right to exist as states.

In the autumn of 1973, on the battlefields in the Sinai desert and on the Golan heights, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers, several thousand tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, many different artillery systems, hundreds of aircraft and helicopters came together against each other. It was at this time that the fifth war of 1973, known as the "Doomsday War", began, then on October 6, 1973, on Judgment Day, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, Egypt attacked the Sinai, and Syria attacked the Golan Heights.

Of all the six Arab-Israeli wars, it was this fifth war that turned out to be the most difficult and even tragic for Israel, it was then, in October 1973, that Israel actually faced the question of whether it would remain a state or not.

Then, in early October, as a result of the breakthrough of the Barlev line and the defeat of the Israeli units, the path to Tel Aviv was actually opened. Front commander Shmuel Gonen, having lost control of the situation, was forced to transfer command to Ariel Sharon.

Doyen (senior) of the Soviet military-diplomatic corps in Egypt, Admiral N.V. Iliev and Ambassador V. Vinogradov recommended A. Sadat to take advantage of the success and continue the offensive. However, the Egyptian president did not heed their advice, saying: "I have a different tactic. Let the Israelis attack, and we will beat them." Perhaps this decision of A. Sadat then saved the world from the Third World War. In any case, as it became known later, it was allegedly during these decisive days that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir gave the order to hang nuclear bombs on the planes of the special purpose squadron.

The fact that the fifth Arab-Israeli war turned out to be the largest is evidenced by such facts and figures, before the start of hostilities, the Egyptian Armed Forces after mobilization totaled 833 thousand people (of which 310 thousand people were in the operational troops). The Egyptians deployed 2 tank divisions, 2 mechanized divisions, 8 infantry divisions and 20 self-propelled brigades (1 brigade of the Presidential Guard, 3 airborne, 3 special forces, 3 tank, 1 tactical missiles, 1 engineering and 3 artillery).

The technical fleet consisted of 2,400 tanks (mostly Soviet-made: T-54/55, T-62, RT-76, and T-34), 2,400 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 1,120 artillery installations with a caliber above 100 mm, 70 tactical rocket launchers missiles, and 30 operational-tactical missiles, 360 air defense missile systems and 2,750 air defense artillery systems, as well as 2,500 anti-tank installations. Aviation consisted of 420 fighters (160 MiG-21, 60 MiG-19, 200 MiG-17), 130 Su-7 bomber fighters, 48 ​​bombers and attack aircraft (18 Tu-16 and 30 Il-28), 70 military transport aircraft (30 An-12, 40 Il-14), approximately 80 Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters. The Navy consisted of 28 ships.

Egypt's closest ally, the Syrian army, after mobilization, numbered 332,000 soldiers and officers (140,000 in operational troops). The ground forces consisted of 2 tank divisions, 3 infantry divisions, 21 self-propelled brigades (1 brigade of the Presidential Guard, 5 infantry brigades, 2 mechanized, 4 tank, 5 artillery, 1 special forces, 1 brigade of tactical missiles, 2 engineering), landing battalion and battalion of the Desert Guard.

The technical park consisted of 1,820 tanks, 1,300 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 655 artillery pieces with a caliber of more than 100 mm, 20 operational-tactical missile launchers, 360 air defense missile systems, 1,900 air defense artillery systems, 900 anti-tank guns, 2,800 anti-tank installations. The Air Force consisted of 230 fighters (110 MiG-21, 120 MiG-17), 45 Su-7 fighter-bombers, 16 transport aircraft (12 Il-14, 4 Il-18), 36 helicopters.

In addition, the troops of other Arab states also acted on the Syrian front. Iraq provided the reinforced 3rd Panzer Division (20 thousand people, 300 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, 54 guns) and 73 aircraft (18 MiG-21, 7 MiG-17, 32 Su-7 and 16 Hawker Hunter), Jordan and Saudi Arabia for an armored brigade, Morocco for a mechanized brigade and the Palestine Liberation Organization for 2 special forces brigades.

After the disgrace of the six-day war, rearmament, or rather, the reconstruction of the armored power of the Arab armies in 1967-1973. was carried out at an unprecedented pace and all this under the leadership and with the direct participation of the main ally of the Arabs - the Soviet Union. So, for example, during this time, Egypt received from the USSR 1260 T-54/55 tanks, 400 T-62, 750 armored personnel carriers BTR-50 and OT-62, 150 of the latest BMP-1 at that time, armored reconnaissance vehicles BRDM. Deliveries of weapons to Syria were no less large-scale. Moreover, all the combat training of the Arab armies was undertaken by Soviet military specialists.

Particular attention was paid to the air defense of the armored units, which were armed with the mobile SAM "Kvadrat" and ZSU "Shilka". As a result, the air defense of the mobile units of the Arab army increased dramatically, this was especially evident at the initial stage of hostilities, during the assault on the Barleva line, when a kind of protective air defense umbrella was created over the advancing Egyptian ground grouping, which Israeli aviation failed to overcome.

As a result, by the beginning of hostilities, the Egyptian army totaled about 2200-2400 tanks and self-propelled guns, its ally in the Syrian army was also in service with a fairly decent amount of armored vehicles, about 1350-1820 units. tanks and self-propelled guns. Thus, a whole armored armada, counting from 3500 to 4000 units. armored vehicles were preparing to simultaneously attack the positions of the IDF in two directions at once.

Israel, as if Germany had once, was planned to impose a war on two fronts at the same time, only with the significant difference that thousands of kilometers ran between the Eastern and Western fronts in Europe, and here there was nothing between Sinai and the Golan Heights, literally a few tens of kilometers , so that the slightest mistake or instability in the defense of troops in positions could easily lead Israel to complete disaster.

Unprecedented power was then concentrated in the hands of the Egyptian-Syrian command, and this is not counting their allies - the armies of Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, etc., however, as all subsequent events showed, all this modern equipment, all this military power turned out to be rather inept hands.

In response to preparations for an invasion by its Arab neighbors, Israel is known to have made only partial mobilizations. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, his army numbered 110 thousand people. The ground forces consisted of 4 armored, 9 mechanized, 1 motorized, 1 airborne and 3 artillery brigades.

After mobilization, the size of the army increased to 415,000 (of which 310,000 were in the operational troops). The ground forces after mobilization were to consist of 40 brigades (including 20 tank, 12 motorized and mechanized, 4 airborne and 4 artillery), organizationally consolidated into 12 divisions.

The technical fleet consisted of 1850 tanks (Sherman, M-48, Centurion, AMX, and approximately 150 T-54/55 and RT-76, captured), 3000 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 945 artillery installations of a caliber above 100 mm, 75 air defense rocket launchers , 1000 air defense artillery mounts, 930 anti-tank mounts. The Air Force consisted of 352 fighters (150 A-4, 140 F-4, 50 Mirage-III, 12 Super Mystery) and 56 reserve fighters (20 A-4, 36 F-4), 8 Vautour bombers, 66 transport aircraft (6 C -130, 12 C-47, 10 C-97, 30 Noratlas), 50 attack helicopters (8 Super Frelon, 12 CH-53, 30 AB-205.

After the 1967 war, the United States continued to be the main supplier of weapons and the main ally of Israel after the war of 1967, which, despite the embargo declared against Israel, began to actively supply various military equipment and weapons to this country, including the most modern at that time 150 units. M60A1 tanks.

Even during the 1967 war, 200 M113 tracked armored personnel carriers were urgently received from the USA. In 1972-1973. another 448 armored personnel carriers and M577 command and control vehicles based on the M113 came from there. Another source of replenishment of the fleet of infantry transporters was captured equipment: the captured BTR-50P and its Czech version OT-62 "TOPAZ".

However, the American supply of modern weapons was clearly not enough, and the Israelis were quite actively engaged in the amateur modernization of all the equipment that was in their arsenal, so, for example, the modernized, improved “Centurion” later received its own Israeli name “Shot” (“Knut ”); informally, the tank was called "Ben-Gurion".

By the beginning of the 1973 war, most of the 700 Israeli Centurions were converted into the Shot variant. Captured Soviet-made armored vehicles were also actively modernized to the Israeli standard, for example, several hundred T-54/55 captured from the Arabs were equipped with L7 cannons and American machine guns. Some of these tanks were replaced with diesel engines, also with American ones.

In the Israeli armed forces, the modernized T-54s received the TI-67 index. Captured PT-76s were also put into service, on which machine guns and radio communications equipment were replaced.

Thus, the IDF tank fleet by the fall of 1973. consisted for the most part of obsolete, modernized on their own, modifications of tanks and armored personnel carriers acquired from the arsenals of England, France, from captured Arab trophies of Soviet production and received from the United States, mostly modern samples.

The fighting in the "Doomsday War" did not last long, only 18 days and was officially stopped on October 25, 1973, in general, the fifth Arab-Israeli war ended like the previous four, again with the complete defeat of the Arab armies and only the active intervention of the USSR saved Egypt and Syria from complete catastrophe and additional territorial losses.

As a result of this rather large-scale, but short-term war, military experts noted that the armies of the Arab states acted successfully and competently, only at the initial stage of the operation, this is when they broke through the Israeli defenses on the Barlev line in the Sinai.

The actions of the Israelis are an example of competent active defensive actions in almost the entire course of this military campaign. So in the Sinai Peninsula, they demonstrated a strike on the center of the Arab position, which, moreover, was not occupied by the enemy (the Arab command did not allow the possibility that the Israelis would be able to cross the canal, although they themselves had just demonstrated such a crossing). The center of the Arab position was, naturally, the northern shore of the Great Bitter Lake. It was this point that connected both Egyptian armies. With the loss of it, all interaction between the armies ceased - the channel, which was so hard to force, became an obstacle in the rear of the Egyptian troops.

In Syria, it has been demonstrated that one strike, no matter how strong, can be contained. The method of counterattack was applied to the base of the advancing grouping from two sides. The geometry of the offensive is always such that the depth of the offensive is greater than the width, so the two-sided counterattack reaches the target earlier than the advancing enemy troops.

Data on losses following the war in the autumn of 1973. vary from source to source, so according to some data it is known that Israel lost 2412-4000 people killed, from 3900 to 12 thousand wounded.
Losses in equipment are more accurate: 420 tanks (25%), 390 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers (13%), 160 aircraft (30%).

The losses of the Arab countries are much higher: 7600-21000 killed, 8 - 25 thousand wounded, 1270 tanks (25%), 500 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers (12%), 460 aircraft and helicopters (43%), about 200 stationary and 220 mobile launchers installations. http://www.igstab.ru/materials/black/Ism_ArabIsrael.htm
The American magazine "National Defense" determined in hot pursuit in the issue of May-June 1974 Israeli losses in tanks also at 420 units.

However, in the book “Modern Tanks” by B.S. Safonov and V.I. Murakhovsky it is written that “losses amounted to at least half of the available tanks”, that is, about 850 vehicles. Such a significant discrepancy in the numbers of Israeli losses can be explained by the fact that the battlefield was left behind by Israeli troops, and their repair units were able to restore damaged vehicles, both their own and Arab ones, since the experience of operating the T-55 and PT tanks in the Israeli army 76 was already there.

According to the memoirs of Soviet military advisers in Syria, Arab tanks were often repaired, as they say, “on the knee”, and immediately entered the battle on the side of Israel. Thus, the difference in the numbers of Israeli losses given in various sources can be explained by different methods of calculation - all tanks destroyed or only irretrievable losses, only Israeli armored vehicles themselves, or taking into account trophies.
According to another source, the losses of the Arab states amounted to 368 aircraft and helicopters, 1775 tanks and armored vehicles, 18500 people were killed, 51000 were injured, 9370 were captured; Israel lost 114 planes and helicopters, 810 tanks and armored vehicles, 2569 people were killed, 7500 were wounded and 530 were captured. http://www.istpravda.ru/digest/2279/

The results of the 1973 war as a whole were not in favor of the Arab countries. With the mediation of the USSR and the United States, hostilities were stopped on the Syrian front on October 24, and on the Egyptian front on October 25.

After negotiations in January 1974, Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement. Syria and Israel reached an agreement to disengage troops four months later. Israeli troops left the western bank of the Suez Canal and El Quneitra, retaining, however, control over the Golan Heights.

In March 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty entered into force at Camp David by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin through the mediation of US President Jimmy Carter. Israel withdrew from the Sinai, retaining only the Gaza Strip under its control.

According to materials:
http://www.xliby.ru/istorija/sekretnye_voiny_sovetskogo_soyuza/p8.php
http://www.igstab.ru/materials/black/Ism_ArabIsrael.htm
http://btvt.narod.ru/2/wsd.html
http://www.istpravda.ru/digest/2279/