On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union was signed, it is also called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The pact was signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. According to the agreement, Germany and the USSR undertook to resolve all disputes and conflict situations between themselves "only by peaceful means in the manner of a friendly exchange of views." The second article of the pact stated that if one of the contracting parties was attacked by a third country, the other contracting party would not support the aggressor in any form. The treaty remained in force until June 22, 1941, when the Third Reich violated it and attacked the USSR.

From the prehistory of the Soviet-German rapprochement

By the time the treaty was signed, the Third Reich had annexed the Sudetenland, incorporated the Czech Republic and Moravia into Germany as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. All attempts by Moscow to create a "collective security system" in Europe have failed. The main role in the failure of the peacekeeping efforts of the USSR was played by Paris and London, which pursued a policy of "appeasement" of Germany (at the expense of third-rate countries and the USSR). The last attempt by Soviet diplomacy to stop the big war was the Moscow talks between the USSR, Great Britain and France. However, they did not lead to success either, since the British and French actually sabotaged them.

Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on a mutual assistance pact began in April 1939 and lasted four months. Initially, the British put forward unacceptable conditions that ignored the principle of reciprocity and equal obligations. Despite this, the Soviet government did not abandon negotiations. Moscow tried to agree on specific military measures against the aggressor. However, military negotiations failed. Poland refused military assistance from the USSR. London not only did not try to overcome the resistance of Warsaw, but also supported it.

The position of England and France was very interesting. First, they wanted firm commitments from the USSR, but they themselves did not want to give them. In the end, the British and French agreed to guarantee military assistance to the USSR in case of German aggression. But they made so many reservations that help could become formal, there was a legal basis for evading assistance to the Union. The future "allies" actually wanted to deceive the Soviet delegation. Secondly, representatives of the Western powers demanded that the USSR provide military assistance to Poland in the event of German aggression. At the same time, the Poles refused to let Soviet troops into their territory, and the USSR did not have a common border with Germany, so the Soviet state could not provide serious military support to the Poles. The Polish military-political elite was sure that Germany would not attack Poland, which was supported by England and France, and would strike the USSR through the Baltic and Romanian territories. Thirdly, England and France showed extreme slowness and a frivolous attitude to the negotiations, which were entrusted to minor persons who did not have the authority to conclude a pact.

Thus, London and Paris did everything to delay and disrupt the negotiations. It should be noted that at that time the Conservatives were at the head of England: Neville Chamberlain was the Prime Minister, and Edward Wood, Lord Halifax, was in charge of foreign policy. When England surrendered Czechoslovakia, Halifax very well voiced the essence of the British policy of that time (in a conversation with Hitler): "... based on the fact that Germany and England are the two pillars of the European world and the main pillars against communism and therefore it is necessary to peacefully overcome our current difficulties ... Probably, it will be possible to find a solution acceptable to everyone except Russia.”

I must say that in England there were also nationally oriented politicians, the military, who demanded an alliance with the USSR against Germany. So, although Churchill hated communism, he believed that at the moment German Nazism was more dangerous for England. He proposed to create an Eastern Front from the USSR, Poland and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). In his opinion, Berlin would not risk starting a world war, having such powerful and united opponents in the West and East. British generals also demanded an alliance with the USSR. On May 16, 1939, the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the armed forces of Britain submitted a memorandum to the government stating that the mutual assistance pact between the USSR, Great Britain and France "would represent a solid front of imposing force against aggression." The military emphasized that a diplomatic defeat in negotiations with the USSR "would entail serious military consequences." However, Lord Halifax said that political considerations against the pact with Moscow were more important than military interests. And the head of government said that he would "rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets." At the same time, the British decided that it was expedient to continue negotiations with Moscow, that is, to continue to deceive the Soviet side.

The French position was more inclined towards a military alliance with the USSR, the French understood that they could be left alone with Germany and tried to find a common language with Poland. But the Poles stubbornly refused to let Soviet troops into their territory. When Moscow announced that it would do the same as England, France, Poland and the Baltic states - it would conclude a pact of neutrality and non-aggression with Berlin, the French made a last attempt to put pressure on Warsaw. On August 22, 1939, the French Foreign Minister ordered the French ambassador in Warsaw to make new efforts before Rydz-Smigly to remove the only obstacle to the conclusion of tripartite agreements in Moscow. The Minister spoke of the need to emphasize "in the most emphatic way that Poland, neither morally nor politically, can refuse to experience this last chance to save the world." The Poles refused and soon paid the price. Already on September 1, 1939, German soldiers will trample on Polish soil, on which Polish politicians refused to let those who could defend the country - Soviet soldiers.

Why did England and Poland so stubbornly refuse Soviet aid? There is only one answer - in 1939 they were completely sure that Hitler was attacking the USSR. Germany was supposed to strike through the Baltic states and Romania, before that these territories were supposed to fall into the sphere of influence of the Third Reich. This confidence was based on several factors. The British (together with the Americans) themselves took part in the revival of the German military and economic power, Hitler was actually a protege of the "world behind the scenes." However, the “world behind the scenes” was not (and still is not) a single whole, it consists of several centers and clans that can solve various problems. As a result, part of the world elite (British and French) believed that Germany would immediately strike at the USSR after the capture of Czechoslovakia. Another part, more powerful, decided to give Poland and France to Hitler in order to further strengthen the Third Reich. In addition, in Warsaw and London, they were well aware of the tough anti-communist position of Berlin, the dreams of Hitler, who wanted "living space" for the Germans. The fact was also taken into account that in 1939 Germany still did not have the army that would defeat the Franco-British troops in 1940, and in 1941-1942. inflict heavy defeats on the Red Army. At the beginning of 1939, the German army, which began to be restored just a few years ago, was still weak, both in numerical and organizational, and in logistical and moral terms. The German generals, who plotted against Hitler in order not to go to war with Czechoslovakia and its allies, were well aware of this (they did not know that Czechoslovakia would simply be given to Germany).

Hitler had to have absolutely reliable information about the inaction of the powerful French army and the British armed forces in order to decide to occupy Czechoslovakia and strike at Poland. The alliance of England, France and Poland left Hitler only one way - to hit the Soviet Union through the Baltic states and Romania. There was no doubt that after the first victories of the Wehrmacht over the Red Army, the "hyena of Europe" - Poland - would have joined the "crusade" against the USSR. Another important factor must be taken into account. From the beginning of July 1939, the USSR was already involved in a conflict in Mongolia with Japan, Germany's ally under the Anti-Comintern Pact (Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis). The USSR was threatened with a war on two fronts: in the East with the Empire of Japan, in the West - with a coalition of countries led by Germany.

Moscow took the only sure step possible to postpone the start of the war and split a possible broad enemy coalition. The Soviet Union was unable to stop the world war, but was able to turn off some of the enemies and push back the timing of its involvement in the battle of the giants.

Signing

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, signed on August 23, 1939 by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov.

Text of the treaty

Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.

In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of hostilities by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support that power in any form.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties shall remain in future contact with each other for consultation, in order to inform each other of matters affecting their common interests.

None of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers which is directly or indirectly directed against the other side.

In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes or conflicts exclusively by peaceful means through a friendly exchange of opinions or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, so long as one of the Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year before the expiration of the term, the term of the treaty will be considered automatically extended for another five years.

This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification is to take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.

The agreement had a secret addition, the so-called secret protocol, the existence of which the public of the USSR learned only during the years of Perestroika. In it, the USSR and Germany defined the spheres of their state interests in Eastern Europe.

Text of the secret protocol

1. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.
2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the regions that are part of the Polish State, the border between the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the rivers Nareva, Vistula and San.
The question of whether the preservation of an independent Polish State is desirable in mutual interests, and what the boundaries of this state will be, can only be finally clarified in the course of further political development.
In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.
3. Regarding the south-east of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the interest of the USSR in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.
4. This protocol will be kept strictly secret by both parties.

The essence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was that Germany, confident in the inviolability of its eastern borders, acquired freedom of action against England and France, and the Soviet Union, having increased its territory at the expense of Poland and the Baltic States, received time to rearm the army

The history of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

• 1939, March 15 - Germany occupied the Czech Republic, declaring it its protectorate under the name of Moravia and Bohemia
• 1939, March 18 - Initiative of the Soviet government to convene a conference of representatives of the USSR, Great Britain, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey to discuss measures to prevent further aggression
• March 19, 1939 - The British government found such a proposal premature.
• 1939, April 17 - The USSR proposed a draft tripartite treaty providing for "providing all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering on the USSR, in case of aggression against these states." the proposal did not find support from England and France
• April 29, 1939 - France put forward a declaration of intent: to provide military support to each other or solidarity support to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the event of German aggression. In the USSR, the proposal did not find support
• May 8, 1939 - England put forward the idea of ​​an agreement in which the USSR would express its intention to help England and France if they were drawn into the war with Germany, fulfilling their guarantees to the Eastern European countries. This proposal was rejected by the USSR because it did not meet the principle of reciprocity.
• 1939, May 27 - British Prime Minister Chamberlain, fearing a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany, spoke in favor of discussing the pact proposed by the Soviet Union on April 17 to help states that could be attacked by the Nazis

In the negotiations, the parties did not trust each other. Particularly difficult was the issue of military assistance that the Soviet Union had to provide to England and France, because for this Poland would have to let the Red Army through its territory, which she did not agree to.
“I must admit that I do not trust Russia at all. I do not believe that she will be able to conduct effective offensive operations, even if she wants to ... Moreover, she is hated and treated with suspicion by many small states, especially Poland, Romania and Finland ”(personal letter from British Prime Minister Chamberlain dated March 28, 1939 of the year).

“There is no doubt that the USSR wants to conclude a military pact and does not want us to turn this pact into an empty piece of paper with no specific meaning ... The failure of the negotiations is inevitable if Poland does not change its position” (message to Paris by the head of the French military mission, General Doumenka, August 20, 1939)

“An obstacle to the conclusion of such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these same border states experienced before Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and simultaneously include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most violent opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation ”(W. Churchill“ World War II ”)

Diplomatic contacts of the Soviet Union with England and France were interrupted by the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was negotiated with Germany at the same time.

• 1939, March 10 - Stalin, in a speech at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), among other things, stated: “... Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthen business ties with all countries .... Do not let our country be drawn into conflicts by war provocateurs who are used to raking in the heat of strangers hands"

  Stalin's words were taken by Ribbentrop as an allusion to the possibility of improving relations between Germany and the USSR. Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Pact, Molotov called it "the beginning of a turn" in Soviet-German relations.

• 1939, April 17 - Conversation of the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Berlin A.F. Merekalov with the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry E. von Weizsacker, in which they agreed that "Ideological differences should not become a stumbling block in relation to (USSR) and Germany"
• 1939, May 3 - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Jew Litvinov, was dismissed. Molotov took his place. In Berlin, this step was appreciated
• May 5, 1939 - German newspapers are prohibited from any attacks on the USSR
• 1939, May 9 - Rumors appeared in Berlin that Germany "has made or is going to make proposals to Russia aimed at dividing Poland"
• 1939, May 20 - Molotov, at a meeting with the German ambassador Schulenburg, had conversations with him in an extremely friendly tone, saying that for the success of economic negotiations "an appropriate political base must be created"
• 1939, May 31 - Molotov reciprocated England's curtsey (see May 27), but at the same time made the reservation that the USSR did not refuse "business relations on a practical basis" with Italy and Germany, and avoided attacks on Germany, which was also noticed rated in Berlin
• 1939, June 28 - At a meeting with the ambassador of Germany, Schulenburg, Molotov spoke out that the normalization of relations with Germany was desirable and possible
• 1939, July 24-26 - Soviet and German diplomats in an informal setting discussed the way to improve relations between their countries
• 1939, August 3 - Ribbentrop's official statement about Germany's readiness for rapprochement with the Soviet Union with a hint of the division of spheres of influence: "On all problems related to the territory from the Black to the Baltic Sea, we could easily agree ..."
• August 15, 1939 - Moscow officially learned from Schulenburg that Ribbentrop was ready to come for negotiations. In response, Molotov put forward a proposal to conclude a full-fledged pact, instead of the joint declaration proposed by Schulenburg on the non-use of force against each other
• 1939, August 17 - Schulenburg gave Molotov an answer about his readiness to conclude a pact for 25 years. Molotov conditioned the conclusion of the pact with the signing of a trade and credit agreement
• 1939, August 19 - an economic agreement was signed between the USSR and Germany and the signing of the pact was agreed on August 26-27, but at the personal request of Hitler, who was in a hurry to attack Poland, the matter was accelerated

  The non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was signed on August 23, 1939, ratified by the Supreme Council on August 31

• 1939, August 24 - “The friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Germany, driven into a dead end by the efforts of enemies, must henceforth receive the necessary conditions for its development and flourishing”(leading article of the Pravda newspaper). Since then, anti-fascist propaganda in the media of the Soviet Union has been banned, even the film has been withdrawn from distribution.

  "AT. V. Vishnevsky wrote in his personal diary in December 1940: “Hatred for the Prussian barracks, for fascism, for the“ new order ”is in our blood ... We write under military restrictions, visible and invisible. I would like to talk about the enemy, to raise rage against what is happening in crucified Europe. We must remain silent for now…” Vishnevsky took the manuscript of the first part of “The Fall of Paris” from me and said that he would try to “smuggle” it. Two months later, he came with good news: the first part was allowed, but he would have to go for bills. Although it was about Paris in 1935-1937 and there were no Germans there, the word "fascism" had to be removed. The text described the Paris demonstration, the censor wanted instead of exclaiming: "Down with the Nazis!" - I put: "Down with the reactionaries!" (I. Ehrenburg "People. years, life")

  Results of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

  • September 1, 1939 - Germany invaded Poland. Start
  • September 17, 1939 - The Red Army crossed the eastern border of Poland
  • September 18, 1939 - a joint parade of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in Brest.
    The parade was received by General Guderian and brigade commander Krivoshein
  • September 28, 1939 - the Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was signed

  The government of the USSR and the German government establish a line as a boundary between mutual state interests on the territory of the former Polish state, which is marked on the map attached to this and will be described in more detail in an additional protocol ....
  The government of the USSR and the German government consider the above reorganization as a reliable foundation for the further development of friendly relations between their peoples.

  • October 12, 1939 - the USSR demanded that Finland move the border 70 km from Leningrad, cede the military base on the island of Hanko. give up the polar territories around Petsamo
  • October 25, 1939 - Agreement on the supply of grain, oil and other goods from the USSR to Germany
  • October 26, 1939 - the USSR transferred Vilna and the Vilnius region to Lithuania. belonging to Poland
  • November 1-2, 1939 - The Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the accession to the USSR of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus
  • November 30, 1939 - March 12, 1940 -

The window of truth opened briefly. This happened in 1989 after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the “revolution of acts”. The veil of secrets of the empire was lifted, and the unpleasant truth, stored in documents since 1917, gradually came to light. At the same time, the biggest lie of the second half of the 20th century was destroyed, that the USSR, being Hitler's worst enemy, defeated fascism with the support of loyal communists from all European countries. This is only half true.

Now the window of truth must be closed again. Stalin is back in fashion in Russia, the victory in the Great Patriotic War is celebrated in a big way, and the collapse of the USSR is “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” not only for Putin. This revision of history is noticeable when interpreting the events of August 23, 1939. On this day, a non-aggression pact was signed between Germany and the USSR. It was signed a day later in Moscow in the presence of Joseph Stalin, who the day before dismissed the people's commissar for foreign affairs, Maxim Litvinov, a Jew by nationality.

The non-aggression pact was concluded for a period of ten years, it secured the neutrality of the USSR during the German attack on Poland and its Western neighbors. The secret additional protocol “in case of territorial and political transformations” allowed the USSR to rejoin the territories of tsarist Russia lost during the First World War in Eastern Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, while Western Poland and Lithuania were declared a sphere of German interests. When the Wehrmacht occupied western Poland and the Red Army occupied eastern Poland, there were joint parades in the cities where German and Russian soldiers met. Before 1940, both dictatorships divided Central and Eastern Europe and turned the region into the worst hotbed of hostilities (Timothy Snyder). And the Holocaust became possible only because of the silent position of the Soviet Union.

Germany and the Soviet Union were both losers in World War I and had long sought a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. The division of Poland in 1939, as well as the occupation of the Baltic states, continued the tradition of Prussian-Russian cooperation that had been maintained between Moscow and Berlin since the Treaty of Rapalle concluded in 1922. Stalin initially saw in Hitler not an antipode, but an accomplice. When comparing dictatorships, the reasons are often weighed, analyzed, but the state between cooperation and confrontation that was achieved around 1940 is called a collusion by lawyers - a secret agreement between two parties to the detriment of a third. This fact, difficult to grasp, changes the view of the 20th century.

For sincere anti-fascists, such a misalliance should be a heavy blow. The two powers, which were previously considered politically-ideologically and politically-economically antagonists, carried out common affairs. But already at the end of the 1920s, the communist parties identified the "social fascists", that is, the social democratic and socialist parties, as their main opponent. Documents from earlier times show how often communists and national socialists entered into de facto alliances. And Stalin's plan to eliminate the old Bolshevik elite, among which there were a large number of German communists, was being implemented since 1939 in agreement with the Gestapo. Only a few, such as the Trotskyist Willy Münzenberg, voiced their opinion - "You, Stalin, are a traitor!"

The pernicious treaty did not end with the attack on the USSR in June 1941, to which a discouraged and taken aback Stalin reacted by voluntarily dissolving the Comintern. The “security layer” created in 1939 by force remained until 1991 in the territory from Estonia to Bulgaria. There, May 8, 1945 was not a day of liberation, but an instant transition from one domination to another. In the period from August 23, 1939 to May 8, 1945, the central axis of memory of the peoples living there passes, which neither Russia nor Germany wants to perceive.

There are enough reasons to remember, and August 23, to the surprise of many Europeans, is a semi-official holiday. In 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism by a majority vote. The parliamentarians, with the support of their colleagues from the Baltic states, called for considering this day “objectively and with a sense of dignity”, thus making their contribution to the common vision of history. They wanted to emphasize in a special way that this process will not be used for political purposes. To this end, a pan-European documentation center and a memorial must be created, Eastern European archives must be opened, including those of the internal special services, secret police and intelligence.

As of today, the European Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinist and Nazi Crimes, despite the support of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, is celebrated only in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. In Sweden, Ireland and Malta, he caused a stir, in contrast to the larger EU countries. It is generally rejected in Germany. In Russia, it is generally not subject to consideration. It is those countries that signed the treaty on August 23 that ignore this date and do not officially consider it a date of remembrance.

Both countries following the Hitler and Stalin regimes instead settled on the date of May 8-9, 1945. From this perspective, a picture emerges of the anti-Hitler coalition that won in 1945, the war of extermination launched by the National Socialists in 1941 against the Soviet Union with many millions of victims, the liberation of the extermination camp by the Red Army.

But can Europe face the whole truth? In the Soviet Union, which was on the verge of collapse, the presence of a secret additional protocol was no longer hidden; its consequences were condemned at the Congress of People's Deputies at the end of 1989. On the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, Putin, then prime minister, said in a 2009 address to Poland that the pact was immoral. And he added that Poland was the first to resist the Germans, while earlier he always claimed that the country wanted to unite with Hitler in the fight against the Soviet Union and annexed Czech territory in 1938. And now it looked like this: "All agreements to pacify the Nazis were morally unacceptable, and politically meaningless, damaging and dangerous."

Stalin made this diabolical pact with Hitler only to prevent a confrontation between Germany and the USSR. But even this partial “self-enlightenment”, which did not reach the broad masses of post-Soviet society, was abandoned by Russian opinion leaders in the course of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The dogma of May 9th, as a day of liberation, which is supported by representatives of Russian minorities in the Baltic countries, is consolidated, Stalin's atrocities are justified as measures to protect the Soviet Union. The term "fascist" is experiencing a renaissance and is also used in official documents in relation to America, the West and the EU. At the same time, real fascists appear at all sites in the region. Populists from the National Front to the anti-Semitic Jobbik Party in Hungary view Putin positively as they share his goal of weakening the European Union. It is not about understanding history, but about self-affirmation.

In Germany, memorial staff and representatives of the Left are criticizing the pan-European Memorial Day on August 23, dismissing the theory of the equation of "red" and "brown" dictatorships. But this paradigm is no longer hidden in the serious study of history, which compares the experience of dictatorships and occupations. The European culture of memory does not emerge from the shadow of the conflict between East and West. But one cannot say goodbye to the hope expressed ten years ago by Jorge Semprun, who survived Buchenwald and said goodbye to the Spanish Communist Party, that "we will no longer be half paralyzed and that Russia will take a decisive step towards democratization."

On August 23, 1939, the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union (German: Deutsch-sowjetischer Nichtangriffspakt; also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was signed in Moscow. This intergovernmental agreement was signed on the Soviet side by Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and on the German side, by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

The countries that signed the Treaty pledged to refrain from attacking each other and to remain neutral if one of the parties was subjected to external aggression. The treaty was accompanied by a secret additional protocol on the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe in the event of a "territorial and political rearrangement." The protocol provided for the inclusion of Latvia, Estonia, Finland, the eastern "regions that are part of the Polish state" and Bessarabia in the sphere of interests of the USSR, Lithuania and the west of Poland - in the sphere of interests of Germany.
Eight days after the signing of the document, on September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland from the west, and on September 17, Soviet troops entered Poland from the east. Eleven days later, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed in Moscow a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Border, securing the territorial division of Poland.

Winston Churchill, in his memoirs of the Second World War, wrote: "Only totalitarian despotism in both countries could decide on such an odious, unnatural act."

In turn, Hitler, immediately after the signing of the Pact, did not hide his joy: "Thanks to these agreements, Russia's benevolent attitude is guaranteed in the event of any conflict."

In a radio speech on July 3, 1941, Stalin tried to justify the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany: “I think that not a single peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, if this power is headed even by such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladlen Izmozik believes that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact unleashed the hands of both countries, and they hastened to use it to increase their own territories. At the same time, according to Izmozik, the lessons of the First World War remained unlearned:

“The Soviet Union and its Stalinist leadership, pushing, as it seemed to them, the border to a safe distance, made it possible for Germany to go directly to its borders,” the historian notes. “Since 1935, the official ideology was dominated by the thesis that the USSR would fight on foreign territory and with little bloodshed, so it pushed the bulk of its troops to the new frontiers.”

Vladlen Izmozik, in an interview with the Voice of America correspondent, noted that negotiations between the Soviet Union and Germany had been going on since 1937, and intensified in the spring of 1939. At the same time, Hitler was conducting secret negotiations with Great Britain. “Therefore, none of the large countries of that time was “white and fluffy”. Behind France and England was Munich. That is, everyone tried to observe their own interests and set the others against each other, while remaining on the sidelines,” emphasizes Vladlen Izmozik.

In general, according to Izmozik, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remains "a shameful page in Soviet history." Including because after the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact, "the USSR was called the intendant of the German army, supplying the Wehrmacht and the entire Third Reich with everything necessary."

As for the point of view prevailing in official Russian historiography that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the only chance for the USSR to prepare for war with Germany, Mark Solonin, the author of a number of books on the history of the Great Patriotic War, refutes it. He notes:

“In the summer of 1939, Stalin had the most powerful military machine in Europe. In terms of the number of divisions, his army surpassed the newborn Wehrmacht by 2.5 times, by the number of tanks - by 6 times, by the number of tanks with cannon weapons - by 20 times (14 thousand versus 700), by the number of combat aircraft - by three times.

Solonin believes that, given the armed forces of potential allies - Poland, France and Great Britain - the superiority became overwhelming. Hitler at that time could not fight not only on two fronts, but also one on one against the Red Army. That is why the very first hints of the need to develop plans for war against the USSR will appear in the leadership of Nazi Germany only in the summer of 1940.

“In the real situation of August 1939,” continues Mark Solonin, “the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had only one meaning - it was a pact on Stalin’s non-aggression against Hitler, or, to put it more accurately, on the non-interference of the Soviet Union in the aggressive actions of Germany. In exchange for this, Hitler was forced to give Stalin half of his "booty" in Poland, won by blood, and in the future to show the same non-intervention during Stalin's aggression against Finland and the annexation of the three Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Five years ago, the European Parliament proclaimed August 23 the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. At the same time, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by a majority of votes approved the resolution "On the unification of disparate Europe."

It is known that the Russian delegation of PACE opposed this document, believing that "the equalization of the Nazi regime and the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union, which made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism, is an outrage against history."

Boris Sokolov is convinced that there is no abuse of history in the resolution "On the unification of disparate Europe". "I believe that the Stalinist and Hitler regimes - the Soviet and the Nazis - are similar to each other and both of them are responsible for the Second World War," says Boris Sokolov. According to the historian, there are differences between the Nazi and Stalinist regimes, and there are many of them, but they are of a secondary nature.

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Discussion of Viktor Suvorov's book "The Holy Cause". The author focuses on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, or rather, those assessments of this document that prevail in Russian military history. The pact according to this version, according to the official version - well, firstly, it delayed the war with the Third Reich, and secondly, it gave the USSR additional time to prepare for a future war. It is with these two theses that Viktor Suvorov argues.

Pavlova I.V.

In Soviet historiography for many decades, there were provisions that the October Revolution was “the great beginning of the world proletarian revolution; it showed all the peoples of the world the path to socialism. However, as the authors of the six-volume "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" convinced readers, the party "saw its mission not in "pushing", not in "exporting the revolution", but in convincing the peoples of the advantages of the socialist system by practical example. In reality, everything was done exactly the opposite.

Doroshenko V. L., Pavlova K. V., Raak R. Ch.

On November 28 and 29, 1939, a message from the Gavas agency was published in French newspapers, which was a presentation of the speech of I.V. Stalin, uttered at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on August 19 of the same year. The message appeared in such newspapers as Le Figaro, Le Petit Journal, Le Journal, Le Temps, L "Action franaise" and others. These publications were immediately reported to Stalin. His refutation "On the false report of the Gavas agency” was published by the Pravda newspaper on November 30.

Albert L. Weeks

One of the biggest blind spots in Soviet history is the question concerning the intentions and plans of Joseph Stalin during and after the signing of the Soviet-German treaties and secret protocols drawn up by Berlin and Moscow in August-September 1939. As well as questions relating to Stalin's strategy on the eve of the German attack in June 1941.

Great Britain declared war on Hitler not in 1942, but back in 1939, in those very days when the Soviet and Nazi troops were preparing for a joint parade and the transfer of German anti-fascists to the Gestapo in Brest-Litovsk. From that time on, Churchill insisted on the need for a military alliance with the USSR - although Stalin, as we remember, preferred other allies at that time.

Address by Adolf Hitler on June 22, 1941, Speech by V. M. Molotov on the radio on June 22, 1941, Speech by Winston Churchill on the radio on June 22, 1941, Speech by I. V. Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941, Speech by Franklin Roosevelt on December 9, 1941 of the year.

Mark Solonin

In the summer of 1941 something bad happened to the Red Army. In different periods of the history of our country, this "something" received various names: from "temporary failures" to "catastrophic defeat". Accordingly, the search for the causes and explanations of what happened acquired a different severity. It's one thing to look for the causes of "temporary failures." Simple common sense and personal experience of every adult person immediately suggests the obvious answer: "Eka is unseen, with whom it does not happen." It is quite another thing to try to explain the catastrophic defeat of the largest land army in the world. Therefore, before looking for the causes of the phenomenon, we will try as accurately as possible to determine the scale and actual content of what happened.

Original taken from beam_truth On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was signed between Germany and the USSR. part 2.

The beginning of the occupation

By September 16, German troops occupied the Brest Fortress and reached the line Osovets - Bialystok - Belsk - Kamenetz-Litovsk - Vlodava - Vladimir-Volynsky - Zamosc - Lvov - Sambir, at a distance of 150-200 km from the Soviet border. Warsaw was surrounded, the Polish government and the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly were transferred to Kolomyia, near the Polish-Romanian border. Polish divisions, located on the border with the USSR, were transferred to the west to reinforce the Polish-German front.

At 2 a.m. from September 16 to 17, Stalin called Schulenburg and told him that "The Red Army will cross the Soviet border at 6 a.m. ... Soviet planes will begin bombing areas east of Lvov today" At 3 a.m., Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.P. Potemkin read a note to the Polish ambassador in Moscow, W. Grzybowski, in which it was stated that the war had revealed Poland's internal failure and that by now the Polish government had fled, the troops were not resisting, which meant the termination of the treaties between Poland and the USSR. Grzybowski refused to accept the note: “None of the arguments used to justify the transformation of the Polish-Soviet treaties into empty pieces of paper stand up to scrutiny. According to my information, the head of state and the government are on Polish territory […]. The sovereignty of the state exists as long as the soldiers of the regular army fight […]. What the note says about the position of minorities is nonsense. All the minorities demonstrate by their action their full solidarity with Poland in the struggle against Germanism. […] Napoleon entered Moscow, but as long as Kutuzov's armies existed, it was believed that Russia also existed.

On September 17, Soviet troops moved towards the German offensive. 21 rifle and 13 cavalry divisions, 16 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades of the Red Army crossed the border. The offensive involved 700 thousand people, 6000 guns, 4500 tanks, 4000 aircraft. As Molotov stated on the radio the same day, their goal is to "take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus." On the night of September 18, the Polish government fled the country and ordered the Polish military not to enter into armed conflict with the Red Army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, Rydz-Smigly, issued the following order:

Soviet and German officers at a meeting after the Soviet invasion of Poland. From the German newsreel. A German officer shows a Soviet leaflet in broken Russian, which he reads aloud:
“The German army welcomes the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army! We soldiers wish to enter into a good soldierly relationship with the soldiers of R.K.K.A.
The Russian soldier has always been deeply respected by us.
Which should remain so in the future!

On September 23, a delegation of four German officers arrived in Lvov, who reported that large Polish forces were gathering west of the city of Grubeshov (up to 3 infantry, 4 cavalry divisions, as well as artillery). It was said that the German command was going to attack the flank with tanks in a northerly direction against the Hrubeshov grouping. “At the same time, they propose,” Commander Ivanov pointed out in a report to the commander of the KOVO, “that we participate in the joint destruction of this grouping. The headquarters of the German troops is located in Grudek-Jagelionski, where we ask you to send our delegation.” After that, the Soviet 8th Rifle Corps was sent to the Grubeshov area, where it entered into battle with the Polish units.

In the city of Bereza-Kartuzskaya, communists, Jews, Poles, Belarusians, as well as captured German soldiers who were kept in a concentration camp, were released. The offensive of the Red Army in the rear of the Polish army thwarted the last attempts of the Polish command to organize defense in the Lvov region. The remnants of the Polish army had only to break through to Romania through the Polish-Romanian border. Vladislav Anders subsequently claimed that the Soviet Union, true to its treaties with Germany, tried to stop all attempts to break through and even leave individual Polish soldiers across the border

On September 28, German troops captured Warsaw, and the completely Polish army ceased resistance on October 5, when the last regular Polish formation, General Kläberg's Separate Task Force Polesie, pursued by both German and Soviet troops, surrendered to the Germans.

At the end of September, Soviet and German troops met near Lvov, Lublin and Bialystok. At Lvov, there was a small clash between them, during which both sides had small losses. According to a number of historians, the Wehrmacht and the Red Army held joint parades. In Grodno, the parade was received by commander V. I. Chuikov and a German general, and in Brest by General Heinz Guderian and brigade commander Semyon Krivoshein. A video of the joint parade was shown in the German newsreel Wochenschau N435. Some Russian researchers deny that Soviet units took part in the parade in Brest. Military parades were held as part of ceremonies marking the withdrawal of German troops and the transfer of cities under the control of the Soviet administration.

(see the chronicle of the Brest parade)

Heinz Guderian in his memoirs describes the withdrawal of German troops from Brest as follows:

Krivoshein writes in his memoirs that he insisted on the following scheme:

On October 31, 1939, summing up the results of the operation, Vyacheslav Molotov stated: “It turned out that a short blow to Poland from first the German army, and then the Red Army, was enough to leave nothing left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty, which lived due to the oppression of non-Polish nationalities” . He also stated that the terms "aggression" and "aggressor" "acquired a new meaning", so that Nazi Germany is now the peace-loving side, and its opponents are aggressive.

Heinz Guderian (center) and Semyon Krivoshein (right) watching the passage of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army troops during the transfer of Brest-Litovsk on September 22, 1939 to the Soviet administration

Fight with Hungarian troops

By September 26, the advance detachment of the 16th Soviet cavalry division arrived at the Beskyd station, which, as it turned out, was occupied by Hungarian troops on September 23. An attempt to establish contact with them caused shelling from their side. Soviet troops returned artillery fire from armored vehicles. This led to the cessation of firing from the Hungarian side and the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops into the railway tunnel on the border. According to local residents, the tunnel was mined. The situation on this section of the border was normalized after the Soviet-Hungarian negotiations

"Rendezvous". Caricature by David Lo. Published in the British newspaper Evening Standard September 20, 1939, depicts the meeting between Hitler and Stalin after the partition of Poland.
Hitler: "The scum of humanity, if I'm not mistaken?"
Stalin: "A bloody killer of workers, I presume?"

Results

The Polish state temporarily ceased to exist. Despite the defeat of the army, part of the people of Poland did not stop resistance. A Polish government-in-exile was created in London, servicemen of the Polish army joined the ranks of the armies of a number of states, an extensive network of underground resistance cells of the Home Army was created.

The combat losses of the Red Army during the Polish campaign of 1939, according to Soviet archival data, first published by the historian Meltyukhov, amounted to 1,173 people killed, 2,002 wounded and 302 missing. As a result of hostilities, 17 tanks, 6 aircraft, 6 guns and mortars, 36 vehicles were also lost. According to Polish historians, the Red Army lost about 2.5 thousand soldiers, 150 armored vehicles and 20 aircraft killed.

According to the research of Osmachko S.G. The USSR lost only 882 people and 97 missing

The losses of the Polish side in operations against the Soviet troops amounted to [source not specified 86 days] 3,500 people killed, 20,000 missing and 454,700 prisoners. Of the 900 guns and mortars and 300 aircraft, the vast majority went to the Red Army as trophies.

prisoners

After the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR, tens of thousands of Polish citizens, captured by the Red Army and interned, were found in the territory occupied by Soviet troops - servicemen of the Polish army and officials of local government bodies, "siegemen" (military colonists), policemen.

At the end of 1939, the Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees was created, headed by Pyotr Soprunenko, which was in charge of prisoners from the camps of Central Russia, prisons in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.

In total, during the fighting, the Red Army captured up to a quarter of a million soldiers and officers of the Polish army. Ordinary and non-commissioned officers, natives of the territories of Poland that had ceded to the USSR, were sent home, more than 40 thousand inhabitants of western and central Poland were handed over to Germany (at the same time, about 20-25 thousand more people were sent to work in the mines of Krivoy Rog and Donbass).

According to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of October 3, 1939, 6 thousand policemen and gendarmes were kept in the Ostashkov camp (Kalinin region), 4.5 thousand personnel and officers called up from the reserve - in Kozelsky, and about 4 thousand more - in Starobelsky (near Lugansk).

In April-May 1940, at the suggestion of Lavrenty Beria, about 21,857 Polish officers were shot (see Katyn massacre).

In early November 1940, Beria and Stalin came up with the idea of ​​creating a division of Polish prisoners of war in the Red Army, which could be used in case of war with Germany; however, this idea was abandoned.

On June 30, 1941, in London, between the Polish government in exile and representatives of the USSR, an “Agreement on mutual assistance in the war against Germany and the creation of Polish military formations on the territory of the USSR” was signed. On August 12, an amnesty decree for the Poles followed. A total of 389,000 people were amnestied. A significant part of them joined the Polish army, which was formed on the territory of the USSR by General Vladislav Anders, and left the USSR in 1942 as part of it. Another part in 1943 joined the division. Tadeusz Kosciuszko.

The remains of a Polish officer found in Katyn

There is still a long way to go before a unified view of the Second World War within the European Union.

There is still a long way to go before a unified view of the Second World War within the European Union. This is especially evident in relation to the Hitler-Stalin pact and the partition of Poland. The German historian Stefan Trebs says:

Views and opinions here are very different from each other, but still not so much between East and West, but between the Baltic countries plus Poland on the one hand and Russia on the other. In the countries of Western Europe, the non-aggression pact between dictators is not seriously considered as a factor in unleashing a war. For the Germans, the event of August 23, 1939 was blocked in the minds of the events of September 1, 1939, i.e. attack on Poland. But in Western and Central Europe as a whole, the memory of the Hitler-Stalin pact does not play a big role. Surprising but true. Although this pact untied Hitler's hands not only for attacking Poland, but also for actions in early 1940 against France, and later against England.

It was to be expected that in Western Europe this pact should be considered one of the important reasons for the outbreak of war. But this is not the case; in the public memory of France and Great Britain, the pact practically did not linger at all and does not play any role. He is the subject of controversy and contention only between Moscow and the Baltic countries plus Poland. This is clear. From the Russian point of view, the Baltic countries then voluntarily joined the USSR. And from the point of view of the Baltic countries, it was a seizure that violated the rights of the peoples, which interrupted the short history of their independence, which arose in 1918 and was forcibly interrupted by the "Soviets", which authorized the mass deportations of Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians to Siberia. The elites of the Baltic countries were thus beheaded and independence was lost until 1991.

In Poland, for example, many TV channels show documentaries that are practically unknown in Germany, depicting a joint parade of German and Soviet troops on March 17, 1940 in Brest on the demarcation line that divided these invading armies. Every Pole knows these shots. Soviet and German officers are together, they are cheerful, they laugh at each other's jokes and smoke cigars. The partition of Poland for the Poles puts the German invasion and the Red Army's takeover of eastern Poland on the same plane. There are even footage that captured the negotiations between the Gestapo and the NKVD in Zakopane, which discussed plans for the arrests of prominent representatives of the Polish elite and plans for their isolation. Not a single Pole can look at these shots without feeling a sense of bitterness.

I believe that it makes sense for Europeans to share their memories of the events of those years. But this process will not lead to the fact that such different traces in the people's memory in different countries of Europe, such as between the Baltic countries and Russia, will ever even out, come to a common denominator. Such a prospect seems impossible to me.

The Sejm of Poland adopted a resolution condemning the Red Army's invasion of Eastern Poland on September 17, 1939. The resolution states that Poland fell victim to "two totalitarian regimes - Nazism and communism." The duration and scale of the events that followed the loss of sovereignty give these crimes "signs of genocide," the resolution says.

The Sejm "takes the position that Polish-Russian reconciliation requires respect for historical truth." The deputies condemn attempts to falsify history and appeal "to all people of good will in the Russian Federation with an appeal for joint, solidarity actions to expose and condemn the crimes of the Stalinist era."

From the resolution of the Seimas On September 17, 1939, the troops of the USSR, without declaring war, committed aggression against the Commonwealth, violating its sovereignty and violating the norms of international law. The basis for the invasion of the Red Army was given by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, concluded on August 23, 1939 in Moscow between the USSR and Nazi Germany. Thus the fourth partition of Poland was carried out. Poland fell victim to two totalitarian regimes - Nazism and communism. The invasion of the Red Army opened another tragic chapter in the history of Poland and all of Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish fate was shared by many other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia lost their sovereignty, and a threat hung over the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Finland and Romania. The Gulag archipelago swallowed up hundreds of thousands of human lives of all the peoples of this region, including many citizens of the USSR. The organization of the system, the duration and scale of the phenomenon gave these crimes, including the Katyn crime, signs of genocide. The truth cannot be hushed up, it cannot be manipulated. The Seim of the Commonwealth condemns all attempts to falsify history and appeals to all people of good will in the Russian Federation with an appeal for joint, solidarity actions to expose and condemn the crimes of the Stalinist era.

Poland equated Lenin to Hitler

The Sejm of Poland banned communist symbols. According to the adopted amendments to the Criminal Code, the symbols of communism are equated with Nazi ones. Under the new law, production and possession for the purpose of distributing materials propagating Nazi and communist ideologies carries a prison sentence of up to two years. Thus, one can now go to prison in Poland for wearing T-shirts with the image of Lenin and Che Guevara, for using red flags with a hammer and sickle in mass events, etc.

According to the adopted amendments, communist symbols can be distributed exclusively "for artistic, collection, scientific and educational purposes"

MP Stanislav Penta from the Law and Justice opposition faction, which supported the ruling coalition when voting on changes to the criminal code, said the changes to the Criminal Code were adopted “so that the younger generation knows that communism was as evil as fascism.” “Almost every young person knows what a swastika is and has an unambiguous relation to this symbol, but already a sickle and a hammer, a portrait of Lenin - not everyone knows what it is,” the parliamentarian said.

Recall that in June last year, Lithuania banned Soviet symbols and equated them with Nazi ones. Earlier, the Estonian authorities announced their intention to ban Soviet symbols. According to the amendments to the regulation on punishments, prepared in autumn 2006 by the Ministry of Justice of Estonia, “the demonstration and distribution of the official symbols of the former USSR and the union republics, as well as the symbols of the National Socialist Party of Germany and the Waffen SS, including easily recognizable fragments of this symbols”, will regarded as inciting hatred and subject to criminal penalties. Meanwhile, the document approved by the government was never adopted. According to Estonian lawyers, its provisions do not comply with the principles of the rule of law.