Walther Wenck was born on September 18, 1900 in Wittenberg, German Empire.

At the end of the war, he surrendered with his army to the United States, in order not to fall into Soviet captivity. Took part in the Battle of Berlin.

The third son of officer Maximilian Wenck, Walter was born in Wittenberg, Germany. In 1911 he entered the Naumburg Cadet Corps of the Prussian Army. From the spring of 1918 - to the secondary military school in Gross-Lichterfeld. He was in the ranks of Freikorps, in the ranks of which in February 1919, during the storming of one of the newspaper publishing houses, he was wounded. On May 1, 1920, he was enrolled as a private in the 5th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr, and on February 1, 1923, he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In February 1923 he graduated from the infantry school in Munich.

For some time he was adjutant of Hans von Seeckt.

Wenck met World War II with the rank of major. On 18 September 1939 he received the Iron Cross 2nd Class and two weeks later, on 4 October, the Iron Cross 1st Class.

From 1939 to 1942, Wenck was the head of the operations department of the 1st Panzer Division. In 1940, for the rapid capture of the city of Belfort, Wenck was awarded the rank of colonel. December 28, 1942 was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, promoted (March 1, 1943) to Major General. In 1942 he was an instructor at the Military Academy, Chief of Staff of the 57th Tank Corps and Chief of Staff of the 3rd Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.

From 1942 to 1943, Wenck was chief of staff of the Hollidt Army Group (later reorganized into the 6th Army), assigned to the same 3rd Romanian Army. In 1943 he became chief of staff of the 6th Army. From 1943 to 1944 Wenck served as Chief of Staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943, he withdrew his 1st Army from the Kamenetz-Podolsk pocket. In 1944 - chief of staff of the Army Group "Southern Ukraine".

Since February 15, 1945, at the insistence of Heinz Guderian, Wenck commanded the German troops involved in Operation Solstice (German: Unternehmen Sonnenwende). It was one of the last tank offensives of the Third Reich. Approximately 1200 German tanks attacked the positions of the Soviet troops in Pomerania. However, the operation was poorly planned, the troops did not have sufficient support, and on February 18 it ended in the defeat of the attackers.

In February 1945 he was seriously injured in a car accident (5 ribs were damaged). After the accident, he had to wear a corset.

On April 10, 1945, with the rank of General of the Panzer Forces, Wenck commanded the 12th Army, located by that time to the west of Berlin. She was faced with the task of protecting Berlin from the advancing allied forces on the Western Front. But, since the troops of the Western Front were moving east and vice versa, the German troops, which were opposite fronts, were actually pressed against each other. As a result, in the rear of Wenck's army, east of the Elbe, a vast camp of German refugees appeared, fleeing from the approaching Soviet troops. Wenck tried his best to provide the refugees with food and accommodation. According to various estimates, for some time the 12th Army provided food for more than a quarter of a million people every day.

On April 21, Hitler ordered SS Obergruppenführer and SS General Felix Steiner to attack the positions of Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. Zhukov's forces surrounded Berlin from the north, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev from the south. Steiner was to attack Zhukov with his Army Group Steiner. With few active tanks and about an infantry division, he refused to do so. Instead, he retreated, fleeing encirclement and utter annihilation.

On April 22, due to the retreat of Steiner's detachments, General Wenck's 12th Army became Hitler's last hope to save Berlin. Wenck was ordered to deploy his troops to the east and link up with the 9th Army of General of the Infantry Theodor Busse. According to the plan, they were supposed to surround the Soviet units from the west and from the south. Meanwhile, the 41st Panzer Corps under General Holste was to attack from the north. Unfortunately for the Germans in Berlin, the majority of Holste's troops consisted of remnants of Steiner's units.

Wenck's army, newly formed, made an unexpected turn and, in the general confusion, surprised the Red Army units surrounding Berlin with a surprise attack. The troops of Walter Wenck were not prepared in the best way, and their attacks quickly stopped on the outskirts of Potsdam due to the strong opposition of the Soviet troops.

Neither Busse nor Holste made any significant progress towards Berlin. By the end of the day on April 27, Soviet troops closed the ring around Berlin, cutting off the German capital from the rest of Germany.

On April 28, German General and Chief of Staff Hans Krebs telephoned from the Führerbunker and called Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel to the new Supreme Command in Fürstenberg. Krebs informed Keitel that if help did not arrive within 48 hours, all would be lost. Keitel promised to put all possible pressure on Generals Wenck and Busse.

On the night of April 28, Wenck informed the High Command of the Ground Forces that parts of his 12th Army were forced to begin a withdrawal along the entire front. Including XX Corps, which managed to establish temporary contact with the Potsdam garrison. He also said that no movement on Berlin is now possible. Moreover, the support of Busse's 9th Army was no longer expected.

Late on the evening of April 29, Krebs contacted Jodl (with the High Command of the Army) by radio: “Request for an immediate report. First, the whereabouts of Wenck's 12th Army. Secondly, the time of the offensive he is preparing. Thirdly, the location of the 9th Army. Fourthly, the exact place where the ninth army will break through the front. Fifth, the whereabouts of Holst.

On the night of April 30, Jodl answered Krebs: “Firstly, Wenck’s troops got bogged down south of Lake Shvilou. Secondly, the 12th Army is not in a position to continue the attack on Berlin. Thirdly, the core of the 9th Army is surrounded. Fourth, Holst's corps is on the defensive."

When his attempt to reach Berlin became impossible, Wenck devised a plan to move his army into the Halbe Forest. There he planned to link up with the remnants of the 9th Army, Helmut Reimann's Army Group Spree, and the Potsdam garrison. Wenck also wanted to provide escape routes for as many Berliners as possible.

Arriving at the edge of the front line, Wenck made a radio message: "Hurry, we are waiting for you." Despite constant attacks on his retreat, Wenck ferried his troops, the remnants of the 9th Army, as well as many civilian refugees across the Elbe to the territories occupied by the American army. The data varies, but most likely, Wenck and his army helped up to 250,000 refugees go west, including up to 25,000 troops of the 9th Army. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then a young sapper in the 12th Army, described his emotions at the time as "a sense of loyalty, a sense of responsibility and camaraderie."

Wenck was arrested and sent to a POW camp. He was released in 1947. From September 1948 he worked as a manager in the company "Hubert Schulte GmbH, Apparate- und Rohrleitungsbau", in Bochum-Dahlhausen, a branch of the factory company "Dr. C. Otto & Comp. GmbH, Feuerfeste Fabriken. In 1953 he was transferred from the board to the board of directors, where in 1955 he became chairman. Since 1960, Wenck has been the general director of the Diehl company in Nuremberg, which was engaged in the manufacture of military equipment and weapons for the Bundeswehr. In 1966 he retired, retaining his office in Bonn.

Military ranks: Chief Fenrich (11/01/1922), lieutenant (02/01/1923), chief lieutenant (02/01/1928), hauptmann (05/01/1934), major (03/01/1939), lieutenant colonel of the General Staff (01/12/1940), colonel of the General Staff (06/01/1942), major general (03/01/1943), lieutenant general (04/01/1944), general of tank troops (11/01/1944).

The third son of officer Maximilian Wenck, Walter was born in Wittenberg, Germany. In 1911 he entered the Naumburg Cadet Corps of the Prussian Army. From the spring of 1918 - to the secondary military school in Gross-Lichterfeld. He was in the ranks of Freikorps, in the ranks of which in February 1919, during the storming of one of the newspaper publishing houses, he was wounded. On May 1, 1920, he was enrolled as a private in the 5th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr, and on February 1, 1923, he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In February 1923 he graduated from an infantry school in Munich. For some time he was Hans von Seeckt's adjutant. Wenk met World War II with the rank of major. On 18 September 1939 he received the Iron Cross 2nd Class and two weeks later on 4 October the Iron Cross 1st Class. From 1939 to 1942, Wenck was chief of operations for the 1st Panzer Division. In 1940, for the rapid capture of the city of Belfort, Wenck was awarded the rank of colonel. December 28, 1942 was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, promoted (March 1, 1943) to Major General. In 1942 he was an instructor at the Military Academy, Chief of Staff of the 57th Tank Corps and Chief of Staff of the 3rd Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.FEAR 2 - Project ORIGIN - Series 17 [Final] army group "Hollidt" (later reorganized into the 6th army), assigned to the same 3rd Romanian army. In 1943 he became chief of staff of the 6th Army. From 1943 to 1944, Wenck served as chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943, he withdrew his 1st Army from the Kamenetz-Podolsk pocket. In 1944, he was chief of staff of the Southern Ukraine Army Group. Since February 15, 1945, at the insistence of Heinz Guderian, Wenk commanded the German troops involved in Operation Solstice (German: Unternehmen Sonnenwende). It was one of the last tank offensives of the Third Reich. Approximately 1200 German tanks attacked the positions of the Soviet troops in Pomerania. However, the operation was poorly planned, the troops did not have sufficient support, and on February 18 it ended in the defeat of the attackers. In February 1945, he was seriously injured in a car accident (5 ribs were damaged). After the accident, he had to wear a corset. On April 10, 1945, with the rank of general of tank troops, Wenck commanded the 12th Army, located by that time to the west of Berlin. She was faced with the task of protecting Berlin from the advancing allied forces on the Western Front. But, since the troops of the Western Front were moving east and vice versa, the German troops, which were opposite fronts, were actually pressed against each other. As a result, in the rear of Wenk's army, east of the Elbe, a vast camp of German refugees appeared, fleeing from the approaching Soviet troops. Wenck tried his best to provide the refugees with food and accommodation. According to various estimates, for some time the 12th Army provided food for more than a quarter of a million people every day. On April 21, Hitler ordered SS-Oberstgruppenführer and SS General Felix Steiner to attack the positions of Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. Zhukov's forces surrounded Berlin from the north, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev from the south. Steiner was to attack Zhukov with his Army Group Steiner. With few active tanks and about an infantry division, he refused to do so. Instead, he retreated, fleeing encirclement and utter annihilation.

Germany Germany Type of army Years of service Rank Part commanded

2nd Panzer Regiment (Eisenach),
12th Army.
Chief of staff:

• LVII Panzer Corps,

Battles/wars

• Exit from the Kamenetz-Podolsky boiler

Awards and prizes

Biography

The third son of officer Maximilian Wenk, Walter was born in Wittenberg, Germany. In 1911 he entered the Naumburg Cadet Corps of the Prussian Army. From the spring of 1918 - to the secondary military school in Gross-Lichterfeld. He was in the ranks of Freikorps, in the ranks of which in February 1919, during the storming of one of the newspaper publishing houses, he was wounded. On May 1, 1920, he was enlisted as a private in the 5th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr, and on February 1, 1923 he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In February 1923 he graduated from the infantry school in Munich.

The Second World War

Wenck met World War II with the rank of major. On 18 September 1939 he received the Iron Cross 2nd Class, and two weeks later on 4 October the Iron Cross 1st Class.

From 1939 to 1942, Wenck was Chief of Operations for the 1st Panzer Division. In 1940, for the rapid capture of the city of Belfort, Wenck was awarded the rank of colonel. December 28, 1942 was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, promoted (March 1, 1943) to major general. In 1942 he was an instructor at the Military Academy, Chief of Staff of the 57th Tank Corps and Chief of Staff of the 3rd Romanian Army on the Eastern Front.

From 1942 to 1943, Wenck was chief of staff of the Hollidt Army Group (later reorganized into the 6th Army), assigned to the same 3rd Romanian Army. In 1943 he became Chief of Staff of the 6th Army. From 1943 to 1944, Wenck served as Chief of Staff of the 1st Panzer Army. In 1943 he withdrew his 1st Army from the Kamenetz-Podolsk Pocket. In 1944 - Chief of Staff of Army Group South Ukraine.

From February 15, 1945, at the insistence of Heinz Guderian, Wenck commanded the German troops involved in Operation Solstice (German: Operation Solstice). Unternehmen Sonnenwende). It was one of the last tank offensives of the Third Reich. Approximately 1200 German tanks attacked the positions of the Soviet troops in Pomerania. However, the operation was poorly planned, the troops did not have sufficient support, and on February 18 it ended in the defeat of the attackers.

In February 1945, he was seriously injured in a car accident (5 ribs were damaged). After the accident, he had to wear a corset.

Western Front

On April 10, 1945, with the rank of General of Panzer Troops, Wenck commanded the 12th Army, which by that time was located west of Berlin. She was faced with the task of protecting Berlin from the advancing allied forces on the Western Front. But, since the troops of the Western Front were moving east and vice versa, the German troops, which were opposite fronts, were actually pressed against each other. As a result, in the rear of Wenk's army, east of the Elbe, a vast camp of German refugees appeared, fleeing from the approaching Soviet troops. Wenck tried his best to provide the refugees with food and accommodation. According to various estimates, for some time the 12th Army provided food for more than a quarter of a million people every day.

Berlin's last hope

Walter Wenk in cinema

In many films reflecting the last days of Berlin, one can hear references to the offensive of the Wenck, uttered by Hitler in hysterical fits. As an example, we can cite the words spoken in the last part of the epic film "Liberation":

Marriage

On October 3, 1928, he married Irmgard Wenelt (German). Irmgard Wehnelt). On August 1, 1930, their twins were born.

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Notes

Sources

• Antony Beevor. Berlin, The Downfall 1945. - Viking, 2002.
• Cornelius Ryan. Last Battle. - New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. - P. 443.
• Antony Beevor. Berlin 1945 - Das Ende. - Goldmann. - ISBN 3-442-15313-1.
• Dermot Bradley. Walther Wenck - General der Panzertruppe. - Osnabrück: Biblio, 1982. - ISBN 3-7648-1283-4.
• Gunter G. Fuhrling. Endkampf an der Oderfront - Erinnerung an Halbe. - Langen/Müller. - ISBN 3-7844-2566-6.
• Günther W. Gellermann. Die Armee Wenck. Hitlers letzte Hoffnung. Aufstellung, Einsatz und Ende der 12. deutschen Armee im Frühjahr 1945. - Bernard U. Graefe Verlag. - ISBN 3-7637-5870-4.
• Richard Lakowski, Karl Stich. Der Kessel von Halbe - Das letzte Drama. - Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus/Siegler. - ISBN 3-87748-633-9.
• Dermot Bradley. Walther Wenck, General der Panzertruppe. - Biblio Verlag, 1981. - ISBN 3-7648-1177-3.

Links

Excerpt characterizing Wenck, Walter

“Kiss the doll,” she said.
Boris looked into her lively face with an attentive, affectionate look and did not answer.
- You do not want? Well, then come here, - she said and went deeper into the flowers and threw the doll. - Closer, closer! she whispered. She caught the officer by the cuffs with her hands, and solemnity and fear were visible in her reddened face.
- Do you want to kiss me? she whispered in a barely audible voice, looking at him from under her brows, smiling and almost crying with excitement.
Boris blushed.
- How funny you are! he said, leaning towards her, blushing even more, but doing nothing and waiting.
She suddenly jumped up on the tub, so that she stood taller than him, hugged him with both arms, so that her thin bare arms bent above his neck, and throwing her hair back with a movement of her head, kissed him on the very lips.
She slipped between the pots to the other side of the flowers and, head down, stopped.
“Natasha,” he said, “you know that I love you, but ...
- Are you in love with me? Natasha interrupted him.
- Yes, I am in love, but please, let's not do what is now ... Four more years ... Then I will ask for your hand.
Natasha thought.
“Thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen…” she said, counting on her thin fingers. - Good! Is it over?
And a smile of joy and reassurance lit up her lively face.
- It's over! Boris said.
- Forever and ever? – said the girl. - Until death?
And, taking him by the arm, with a happy face she quietly walked beside him into the sofa.

The countess was so tired of the visits that she did not order to receive anyone else, and the porter was only ordered to call everyone who would still come with congratulations to eat without fail. The Countess wanted to talk face to face with her childhood friend, Princess Anna Mikhailovna, whom she had not seen well since her arrival from Petersburg. Anna Mikhailovna, with her tearful and pleasant face, moved closer to the countess's chair.
"I'll be completely frank with you," said Anna Mikhailovna. “There aren’t many of us left, old friends!” That's why I treasure your friendship.
Anna Mikhailovna looked at Vera and stopped. The countess shook hands with her friend.
“Vera,” said the countess, turning to her eldest daughter, who was obviously unloved. How do you have no idea? Don't you feel like you're out of place here? Go to your sisters, or...
Beautiful Vera smiled contemptuously, apparently not feeling the slightest insult.
“If you had told me long ago, mother, I would have left at once,” she said, and went to her room.
But, passing by the sofa, she noticed that two couples were sitting symmetrically in it at two windows. She stopped and smiled contemptuously. Sonya was sitting close beside Nikolai, who was copying for her the poems he had composed for the first time. Boris and Natasha were sitting at the other window and fell silent when Vera entered. Sonya and Natasha looked at Vera with guilty and happy faces.
It was fun and touching to look at these girls in love, but the sight of them, obviously, did not arouse a pleasant feeling in Vera.
“How many times have I asked you,” she said, “not to take my things, you have your own room.
She took the inkwell from Nikolai.
“Now, now,” he said, wetting his pen.
“You know how to do everything at the wrong time,” Vera said. - Then they ran into the living room, so that everyone felt ashamed for you.
In spite of the fact, or precisely because what she said was perfectly true, no one answered her, and all four only looked at each other. She hesitated in the room with an inkwell in her hand.
- And what secrets can there be between Natasha and Boris and between you at your age - all just nonsense!
“Well, what do you care, Vera? - Natasha spoke intercessively in a quiet voice.
She, apparently, was to everyone even more than always, on this day kind and affectionate.
“It’s very stupid,” Vera said, “I’m ashamed of you. What are the secrets?...
- Everyone has their own secrets. We don’t touch you and Berg,” Natasha said, getting excited.
“I think you don’t touch it,” Vera said, “because there can never be anything bad in my actions. But I'll tell my mother how you get along with Boris.
“Natalia Ilyinishna treats me very well,” said Boris. “I can't complain,” he said.
- Leave it, Boris, you are such a diplomat (the word diplomat was in great use among children in the special meaning that they attached to this word); even boring,” said Natasha in an offended, trembling voice. Why is she coming to me? You will never understand this,” she said, turning to Vera, “because you have never loved anyone; you have no heart, you are only madame de Genlis [Madame Genlis] (this nickname, considered very offensive, was given to Vera by Nikolai), and your first pleasure is to make trouble for others. You flirt with Berg as much as you like,” she said quickly.
- Yes, I’m sure I won’t run after a young man in front of the guests ...
“Well, she got her way,” Nikolai intervened, “she told everyone troubles, upset everyone. Let's go to the nursery.
All four, like a flock of frightened birds, got up and left the room.
“They told me trouble, but I didn’t give anything to anyone,” Vera said.
— Madame de Genlis! Madame de Genlis! laughing voices said from behind the door.
The beautiful Vera, who produced such an irritating, unpleasant effect on everyone, smiled and, apparently not affected by what she was told, went to the mirror and straightened her scarf and her hair. Looking at her beautiful face, she seemed to become even colder and calmer.

The conversation continued in the living room.
- Ah! chere, - said the countess, - and in my life tout n "est pas rose. Can't I see that du train, que nous allons, [not all roses. - with our way of life,] our state will not last long! And it's all a club, and its kindness. We live in the country, do we rest? Theatres, hunts, and God knows what. But what can I say about me! Well, how did you arrange all this? I often wonder at you, Annette, how it is you, at your age, ride alone in a wagon, to Moscow, to Petersburg, to all the ministers, to all the nobility, you know how to get along with everyone, I'm surprised!
- Ah, my soul! - answered Princess Anna Mikhailovna. “God forbid you find out how hard it is to be a widow without support and with a son whom you love to adoration. You will learn everything,” she continued with a certain pride. “My process taught me. If I need to see one of these aces, I write a note: “princesse une telle [princess such and such] wants to see such and such” and I myself go in a cab at least two, at least three times, at least four, until I achieve what I need. I don't care what they think of me.
- Well, what about, whom did you ask about Borenka? the countess asked. - After all, here is your officer of the guard, and Nikolushka is a cadet. Someone to bother. Whom did you ask?
- Prince Vasily. He was very nice. Now I have agreed to everything, I have reported to the sovereign,” Princess Anna Mikhailovna said with delight, completely forgetting all the humiliation through which she went through to achieve her goal.
- Why is he getting old, Prince Vasily? the countess asked. - I didn’t see him from our theaters at the Rumyantsevs. And I think he forgot about me. Il me faisait la cour, [He dragged after me,] - the countess remembered with a smile.
- Still the same, - answered Anna Mikhailovna, - amiable, crumbling. Les grandeurs ne lui ont pas touriene la tete du tout. [The high position did not turn his head at all.] “I regret that I can do too little for you, dear princess,” he tells me, “order.” No, he is a nice person and a wonderful native. But you know, Nathalieie, my love for my son. I don't know what I wouldn't do to make him happy. And my circumstances are so bad,” Anna Mikhaylovna continued sadly and lowering her voice, “so bad that I am now in the most terrible position. My unfortunate process eats up everything I have and does not move. I don't have, you can imagine, a la lettre [literally] no dime of money, and I don't know what to equip Boris with. She took out her handkerchief and wept. - I need five hundred rubles, and I have one twenty-five-ruble note. I am in such a position ... One of my hopes is now on Count Kirill Vladimirovich Bezukhov. If he does not want to support his godson - after all, he baptized Borya - and assign him something to support, then all my troubles will be lost: I will have nothing to equip him with.
The Countess shed a tear and silently pondered something.
“I often think, maybe it’s a sin,” said the princess, “but I often think: Count Kirill Vladimirovich Bezukhoy lives alone ... this is a huge fortune ... and what does he live for? Life is a burden for him, and Borya is just starting to live.
“He will probably leave something for Boris,” said the countess.
“God knows, chere amie!” [dear friend!] These rich people and nobles are so selfish. But all the same, I’ll go to him now with Boris and tell him straight out what’s the matter. Let them think what they want about me, it really doesn't matter to me when the fate of my son depends on it. The princess got up. “Now it’s two o’clock, and at four o’clock you have dinner.” I can go.
And with the manners of a Petersburg business lady who knows how to use time, Anna Mikhailovna sent for her son and went out with him into the hall.
“Farewell, my soul,” she said to the countess, who accompanied her to the door, “wish me success,” she added in a whisper from her son.
- Are you visiting Count Kirill Vladimirovich, ma chere? said the count from the dining-room, also going out into the hall. - If he is better, call Pierre to dine with me. After all, he visited me, danced with the children. Call by all means, ma chere. Well, let's see how Taras excels today. He says that Count Orlov never had such a dinner as we will have.

- Mon cher Boris, [Dear Boris,] - said Princess Anna Mikhailovna to her son, when the carriage of Countess Rostova, in which they were sitting, drove along a straw-covered street and drove into the wide courtyard of Count Kirill Vladimirovich Bezukhoy. “Mon cher Boris,” said the mother, pulling her hand out from under the old coat and placing it on her son’s hand with a timid and gentle movement, “be kind, be attentive. Count Kirill Vladimirovich is still your godfather, and your future fate depends on him. Remember this, mon cher, be nice, as you know how to be ...
“If only I knew that anything other than humiliation would come of this,” the son replied coldly. “But I promised you and I do it for you.
Despite the fact that someone's carriage was standing at the entrance, the porter, looking at the mother and son (who, without ordering to report about themselves, went straight into the glass passage between two rows of statues in niches), looking significantly at the old coat, asked whom they whatever, princes or count, and, having learned that it was a count, he said that their excellency is now worse and their excellency does not receive anyone.
“We can leave,” the son said in French.
– Mon ami! [My friend!] - said the mother in an imploring voice, again touching her son's hand, as if this touch could calm or excite him.
Boris fell silent and, without taking off his overcoat, looked inquiringly at his mother.
“My dear,” Anna Mikhailovna said in a gentle voice, turning to the porter, “I know that Count Kirill Vladimirovich is very ill ... that’s why I came ... I’m a relative ... I won’t bother, my dear ... But I just need to see Prince Vasily Sergeyevich: because he is standing here. Report it, please.
The porter sullenly pulled the string up and turned away.

In 1911 he entered the cadet school in Naumberg, in 1918 - in the military school in Gross - Lichterfeld. In 1920 he joined the Reichswehr as a private, and in 1923 he was promoted to non-commissioned officer. In May 1933, Wenk, with the rank of lieutenant, was transferred to the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Regiment. After completing a training course at the General Staff, Wenck in 1936 was enrolled in the headquarters of the tank corps stationed in Berlin. On May 1, 1939, he was promoted to the rank of major and was appointed staff officer of the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar. As part of this division, Wenk participated in the fighting in Poland and on the Western Front, where he was wounded in the leg. December 1, 1940 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. On June 22, 1941, the 1st Panzer Division was transferred to the Eastern Front, where it took part in the battles near Leningrad, and then near Moscow. In December 1941, the division was surrounded, but thanks to the plan developed by Wenck, it managed to break out of the encirclement, for which Wenck was awarded the Golden Cross and admitted to the Academy of the General Staff. On June 1, 1942, he was promoted to the rank of colonel and again sent as a staff officer to the Eastern Front. Wenk took part in the battle for the Caucasus.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, he was the chief of staff of the 3rd Romanian army, where he managed to form combat-ready units that defended Rostov from the defeated and demoralized units. December 28, 1942 Wenck was awarded the Knight's Cross, and February 1, 1943 promoted to major general. On March 11, 1943, he became chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army, which took part in the most difficult battles near Kamenetz-Podolsk and managed, thanks to Wenck's talent and abilities, to break out of the encirclement in the Dniester region. After that, Wenk was appointed to the post of chief of staff of the Army Group "Southern Ukraine" with the rank of lieutenant general. Shortly thereafter, he became Chief of Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces. Now he passed his reports directly to Hitler, who was able to appreciate the directness, dignity and intelligence of Wenck.

In mid-February 1945, when Soviet troops reached the banks of the Oder, the German General Staff developed a plan for launching a counterattack, which was to be carried out by the Fistula group under the command of SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Heinz Guderian, persuaded the Fuhrer to appoint Wenck to the post of Chief of Staff of the Fistula group, which gave at least some hope of success. The coordinated counter-attacks developed by Wenck brought first results. However, on February 14, 1945, having to travel daily from the front line to meetings in Berlin, overcoming several hundred kilometers, the completely exhausted Wenck got into a car accident, while receiving severe injuries. Without Wenck sent to the hospital, the counterattacks of the group completely choked. On April 1, 1945, while still recovering, Wenck received the rank of General of the Panzer Troops.

After the 12th Army was hastily formed, Wenck was appointed its commander. The poorly equipped army was first thrown against the Americans, and on April 20 it was transferred to the Berlin area with an order to stop the Soviet units on the outskirts of the city and save the 9th army of General Theodor Busse, who was surrounded near Potsdam, from defeat. However, the only thing that the 12th Army, which did not have sufficient resources, succeeded in was to delay the enemy’s rapid offensive until May 1 and allow the refugees to leave to the west, and separate units of the 9th Army that had broken through from the encirclement to connect with Wenck’s troops. Gathering together all the forces, burdened with thousands of refugees from the civilian population, Wenk managed to break through to the west, cross the Elbe and surrender to the Americans on May 7, 1945. After the war, Wenck worked in various commercial and industrial firms, becoming in 1953 a member of the board of directors, and in 1955 the chairman of the board of one of them. At the end of the 60s. Wenk retired.

"Faith and Beauty" ("Glaube und Schinheit"), a women's youth organization within the Union of German Girls. Created in 1937 by Baldur von Schirach. It was entered by girls aged 17 to 21 years. They were taught housekeeping and prepared for marriage and motherhood in accordance with the National Socialist concept of the "ideal German woman".

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Wenk Walter

(09/18/1900-05/01/1982) - General of the Wehrmacht tank troops (1945) Walter Wenk was born in Wittenberg on September 18, 1900. At the age of eleven, Wenck entered the cadet corps in Naumburg, and in 1918 he was enrolled in the secondary military school in Lichterfels. During the First World War, Wenck served in the formations of the volunteer corps, and after its completion he was enrolled in the Reichswehr with the rank of private. In February 1923, he was awarded the rank of non-commissioned officer. After ten years of service, he became a lieutenant and in May 1933 was transferred to the 3rd motorized reconnaissance battalion. Then, having received the rank of Hauptmann, Wenck was trained at the General Staff and in 1936 was transferred to the headquarters of the tank corps stationed in Berlin. In May 1939, Wenck was promoted to major and, as an operations officer, was accepted into service with the 1st Panzer Division in Weimar. With this division, he went through the Polish and Western campaigns. Even after being wounded in the leg, he remained in the ranks. In June 1940, the Wenck Panzer Division carried out an independent operation to take Belfort. The plan of operation was completely developed by Wenck and approved by Guderian. The initiative and professional execution of the operation did not go unnoticed by the leadership, and in December 1940 Wenck was awarded the rank of Oberst Lieutenant. At the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, the Wenck division took part in the attack on Leningrad, and then was transferred to Army Group Center to participate in the attack on Moscow. During the Soviet counter-offensive in December 1941, the division was surrounded, from which it was able to get out only thanks to the skillful actions of Wenck. For his success, Wenk was awarded the Golden Cross. At the beginning of the next year, he was sent to study at the military academy of the General Staff. After graduating from the academy, Wenk was promoted to oberst, and in September 1942 he was transferred to the headquarters of the 57th corps, in which he took part in a campaign in the Caucasus. Wenk also participated in the Battle of Stalingrad: he was appointed chief of staff of the 3rd Romanian army. This was already during the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad, in which the Romanian troops were utterly defeated, and the German units that were part of the Romanian army were divided. Wenck tried to collect the remnants of the defeated military units and combine them into new units. And he largely succeeded in this - soon the units formed by him were sent to the front. In his sector of defense, he repulsed all attempts to break through the Soviet troops, which made it possible for Army Group Don (formerly Army Group A), under the command of Field Marshal Manstein, to break through from the Caucasus and lead the operation near Stalingrad instead of the displaced Weichs. In December 1942, Wenck was awarded the Knight's Cross and appointed Chief of Staff of Holidt's army. In February 1943, Wenk was promoted to major general, and in March became chief of staff of the 1st Panzer Army. Participating in the most difficult battles, the 1st Army more than once found itself under the threat of encirclement. By this time, Wenck had established himself as a master of crisis management. So, in March 1944, the 1st Army fell into the Kamenetz-Podolsk pocket on the Dniester, but thanks to the energy of the chief of staff, it successfully escaped from it. Wenck was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, and he was transferred to the chief of staff of Army Group South Ukraine. Four months later, Wenk is appointed Chief of Operations and Assistant Chief of Staff of the OKH. Now he worked in direct contact with the Fuhrer, passing him reports from the Eastern Front. Hitler liked Wenck's intelligence and directness, and he forgave him even very unpleasant comments on the reports. By mid-February 1945, Soviet troops reached the Oder. The chief of staff of the ground forces, Guderian, developed a plan for a counterattack on the flanks of the Soviet troops, hoping to stop the advance of the enemy. Walter Wenk was appointed chief of staff of the shock group. This operation could well have been successful for the German command, since the flanks of the Soviet units were indeed vulnerable, and the experience and initiative of Wenck also gave hope for success. Wenck concentrated all his efforts on this operation and, as a result, succeeded in stopping the enemy troops at the initial stage of the counterattack. But Hitler began to demand the presence of Wenck at the daily evening meetings. In order to get to the Fuhrer at these meetings, Walter Wenck had to make many kilometers every evening from the headquarters of the operation to Headquarters. During one of these journeys, the lieutenant general replaced his tired driver at the wheel, but he himself fell asleep. The car Wenk was driving lost control and crashed into the parapet of the bridge. The driver rescued him by pulling out of the car and putting out the burning clothes on him. In addition to numerous bruises and broken ribs, Wenck suffered a serious skull injury. He was sent to the hospital, and the leadership of the operation was transferred to Heinrich Himmler - a man clearly incapable of performing this task. While still in the hospital, Walter Wenck in April 1945 was promoted to the rank of general of tank troops. After leaving the hospital, although not completely cured, Wenck is appointed to the post of commander of the newly created 12th Army and is sent to the Western Front. Unexpectedly, on April 20, Wenck received an order from Hitler to turn his troops to the east and strike at the Soviet troops already blockading Berlin. Panzer General Walter Wenck (although there were no tank units in his army) understood that he would not be able to save Berlin, since he did not have any means for an offensive operation, but he could save the troops of the 9th Army, which was also surrounded . Despite the fact that he sent his troops towards Potsdam, he did this only in order to enable the troops of the 9th Army to break out of the encirclement, and at the very last moment wanted to go west with them and surrender to the Americans there. In the Potsdam area, Wenk held out until 1 May. By this time, separate units of the 9th Army had broken through from the encirclement and joined the 12th Army of Wenck. It then moved rapidly west and surrendered to American forces on 7 May. After the war, Walter Wenck went into the business world. In 1950, Wenck joined the board of a large West German firm, in 1953 he became a member of the board of directors, and in 1955 - chairman of the board. In the late 1960s, Wenck retired from all business, retaining only an office in Bonn. He died on May 1, 1982.

Steiner group. The first mention of Steiner's army group appears in German documents immediately after breaking through the "Wotan position" of the Oder line of defense. Then, with a blow from the 2nd Guards. tank armies of the 3rd shock and 47th armies, the adjacent flanks of the CI army corps and the LVI tank corps were separated. On the night of April 21, SS General Steiner received an order to launch an offensive from the bridgehead in the Eberswalde region to the south in order to restore the elbow connection between the CI and LVI corps. At that time, Felix Steiner was listed as the commander of the III SS Panzer Corps. Steiner commanded the corps from the moment it was formed and only briefly left his post in February–March 1945, leading the 11th Panzer Army. After the SS divisions "Nordland" and "Nederland" were removed from the III SS Panzer Corps, Steiner actually remained in command without an army. However, the corps soon began to fill with hastily formed troops. One of its first units was the SS Regiment "Solar", formed from "SS fighter units", including the 600th SS parachute battalion, intended for special operations. During the Ardennes offensive, he was supposed to capture Eisenhower. Also for Steiner's corps, the 4th SS division "Policeman" was restored from the remnants taken out in Swinemünde.

“The first task of the Steiner Army Group is to attack from the north with the forces of the SS Police Division, the 5th Chasseurs and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, which can be released by replacing units of the 3rd Marine Division, in order to restore communication with the LVI Panzer Corps, standing under Werneuichen and southeast of it, and hold it at all costs.

All military units are prohibited from retreating to the west. Officers who do not unconditionally follow this instruction are to be taken into custody and immediately shot. You personally answer to me with your head for the fulfillment of this order.

The fate of the capital of the May Reich depends on the successful completion of your task.

Adolf Gitler".

In this document, for the first time, the name "army group" appears in relation to the troops subordinate to the SS general. Also, the 5th Jaeger and 25th Panzer-Grenadier Divisions are transferred to Steiner. It should be noted that on April 20-21, due to the lagging of the 1st Polish Army behind the 47th Army, there was a gap in the formation of the Soviet troops, a blow to which could lead the attackers into some confusion. To cover the gap between the 47th and 1st Polish armies, on the orders of G.K. Zhukov was advanced by the 7th Guards. the cavalry corps is Steiner's old acquaintance from the battles in the Arnswalde area.

However, by the time of its appearance, the order to the Steiner army group did not correspond to the situation - the advancing Soviet troops broke through to Berlin through Bernau. Therefore, on the same day, a new order was received from the headquarters of the group, in which offensive and defensive tasks were combined. Steiner was charged with responsibility for a rather long section of the front from the Finov Canal to Spandau: "The III Panzer Corps, transformed into the Steiner group, from now on takes over the defense of the Spandau (inclusive) - Oranienburg - Finowfurt (inclusive) section."

At the same time, no one removed the offensive task from Steiner. The commander of the newly created army group was instructed:

“To launch an offensive from the Zerpenschluise area with the forces of a strike force, which should be formed immediately in order to inflict a deep flank attack on the enemy, cut off and destroy his advanced detachments and inflict maximum damage on enemy tank groups with their mobile actions. The attack should start as soon as possible."

Thus, the direction of the counterattack shifted from the Eberswalde bridgehead further to the west. Now the axis of the offensive was to be Reichsstrasse No. 109. Various parts of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS troops continued to arrive in the Steiner Army Group, including the rocket-propelled mortar division of the People's Artillery Corps. Also, the first echelon with units of the 3rd Marine Division and units of the 15th Latvian SS Division arrived in Tsedenik. On April 22, the Steiner strike force gradually concentrated in the designated area, but did not go on the offensive.

On the afternoon of April 22, at a report in the Reich Chancellery, Jodl and Krebs were puzzled by Hitler's question: "Where is Steiner with his army?" As a result, at 17.15, a telegram was sent from the Reich Chancellery to the headquarters of the Wisla Army Group: “The III SS Panzer Corps is categorically ordered to act today. The Führer expects the offensive to begin today. General Krebs will contact Steiner personally at a later date."

The commander of Army Group Vistula, Heinrici, relayed this order to Steiner:

“The deep flank offensive ordered by me on April 21, 1945 against the enemy troops rushing to the west should be launched tonight, without waiting for the rest of the shock group to approach. The main objective of the offensive is the area from Wenzikendorf to Wandlitz and the motorway to the east of it.

I hope that you will apply all your energy and determination to the success of this offensive. Please let me know about the timing."

If we consider the situation from the point of view of the actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, then in itself the idea of ​​a counterattack by the Steiner group does not seem completely hopeless. 3rd shock and two corps of the 2nd Guards. the tank army turned their backs to Steiner, launching an offensive against the northern suburbs of Berlin. The 47th Army advanced with its front to the west in the direction of Potsdam through the northwestern suburbs of Berlin: Helingensee, Hennigsdorf. Army troops F.I. Perkhorovich were preparing to force the Hohenzollern Canal and Havel See. In the direction of the offensive of Steiner's army group, there were Polish divisions stretched along the front.

T-34-85 tanks and SU-100 tank destroyers in a forest near Berlin. The cars are already marked with white stripes in case of a meeting with the allies.

The offensive of Steiner's troops began on the morning of April 23, but was not successful. Moreover, the advancing strike group, under pressure from the east, was forced to retreat and leave a bridgehead on the southern bank of the canal. The commander of the 1st Polish Army recalled this episode: “By noon on April 23, our formations, closely cooperating with the Soviet cavalrymen, crossed the canal in the Oranienburg region and defeated the enemy’s 3rd Naval Division, hastily transferred from another sector of the front.”

The surviving documents allow us to restore the composition of the Steiner group. It was a patchwork of separate parts typical of the final period of the war. See the appendix for more details on the composition of the Steiner group.

Taking this opportunity, in the middle of the day on April 23, Steiner asked that the SS Nordland division and the 25th Panzergrenadier Division be transferred to him from the 9th Army. The withdrawal from Berlin, which was at that time semi-encircled by Nordland, could only cause a smile. However, the evacuation of the bridgehead in Eberswalde and the use of parts removed from it for a new counterattack were quite possible.

"The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Solar) and the 3rd Marine Division (the last units left the island of Vollin) are being transferred to the area northwest of Oranienburg at the disposal of the Steiner group."

The condition of the 4th SS division "Policeman" being restored after the defeat in Eastern Pomerania was miserable. According to the testimony of a prisoner from the 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, captured by units of the 61st Army near Eberswalde, the regiment consisted of three battalions of four companies each. The companies had 20 active bayonets, four light machine guns.

Reinforcements poured into Steiner's group in a thin stream. An afternoon report from Army Group Vistula indicated that three of the thirteen echelons with the remnants of the 7th Panzer Division left Swinemünde on 24 April. Steiner was also sent five marching battalions of the Kriegsmarine - about 2200 people under the command of the frigate captain Preuss. It was supposed to arm them "due to the weapons that can be taken away from elderly soldiers and Volkssturm battalions."

On the morning of April 25, Steiner's group launched another offensive in the Hermannsdorf area. The troops subordinated to the III SS Panzer Corps once again went on the offensive, again changing their starting positions and the ultimate goal of the counterattack. This time the spearhead of the German attack was aimed at Spandau, west of Havel. As later events showed, the purpose of the counterattack was not so meaningless. The crossings at Spandau were held by parts of the Hitler Youth, and they were able to sit on them until the surrender of Berlin. It was the Spandau area that became one of the points through which the remnants of the Berlin garrison made their way to the west on May 3, 1945. On the morning of April 25, the situation was much more favorable than on May 3. Despite the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the direction of Potsdam, positions were still held on the Teltow Canal southeast of Berlin. Forcing the Teltow Canal of the 3rd Guards. tank army began only on 25 April. That is, on April 25, the entire space east of Spandau to Berlin was under the control of German troops. At the same time, the XLI tank corps of the Wenck army was transferred to the Nauen area, which became an opponent of the Soviet troops in the area.

So, on the morning of April 25, the offensive began. However, the Polish units actively prevented the development of the offensive. In the morning report of the Vistula Army Group, the results of the previous day were described as follows: “The offensive of the 25th Panzer-Grenadier Division was stopped north of Hermensdorf due to numerous enemy attacks from all sides. In the evening (April 25), our shock detachments were pushed back to the edge of the forest, 1 km north-west of Germensdorf.

In the memoirs of the commander of the 1st Polish Army, these events were described as battles that went on with varying success:

“The very next day showed that the enemy harbors the most aggressive plans. At dawn, units of the 25th motorized, 3rd naval and 4th police divisions launched a counterattack in the Sandhausen area. Especially strong pressure was made at the junction between the 5th and 6th infantry regiments. Unable to withstand the onslaught, they retreated three kilometers. At the same time, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Colonel Surzhits, made a mistake, leaving the enemy a small bridgehead on the southern bank of the Ruppiner Canal. It was possible to stop the Germans thanks to the courage and resourcefulness of the artillerymen of the 2nd howitzer brigade, Colonel Kazimir Vikentiev and the anti-tank artillery brigade, Colonel Pyotr Deinekhovsky. They put their guns on direct fire and fired at point-blank range on the counterattacks. The liberation of the territory south of Sandhausen from the enemy lasted two days - Surzhitsa's miss was expensive. True, he was a young commander. It was evident that the colonel was experiencing a hard failure, as, indeed, was the recent commander of this division, J. Rotkevich.

Further developments are reflected in the next daily report of the Wisla Army Group on April 26: “The ongoing offensive of the 25th Panzergrenadier Division in order to expand our bridgehead north of Hermendorf did not produce results. Enemy counterattacks from the southwest, south and southeast, undertaken by forces of up to one battalion with the support of tanks, were partially repelled. In the evening, after a strong fire preparation, the enemy resumed the counteroffensive.

A big and bold cross on the actions of the Steiner group was put by the 61st Army. After the liquidation of the bridgehead at Eberswalde, the troops of the army of P.A. Belov, on April 27, the forces of the 89th Rifle Corps crossed the Hohenzollern Canal and went on the offensive along the northern bank of the canal. Such a maneuver meant reaching the rear of the Steiner group. On the morning of April 29, the right-flank formations of the 61st Army reached the Foss Canal, the last water barrier in front of the flank and rear of the Steiner group. At the same time, units of the 80th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army, advancing south of the Hohenzollern Canal, entered the Oranienburg region and thereby created a direct threat to Steiner's troops at Germendorf (west of Oranienburg). The remnants of the Steiner group retreated to the Elbe.

Army of Wenck. With the closing of the encirclement ring around the main forces of the 9th Army on April 22, the fate of Berlin was decided. The “Oder Shield”, which the command of the Vistula Army Group had so hoped for in the battle for the capital, no longer existed. From a practical point of view, the most expedient was the transition to the implementation of the Alpine Fortress plan, i.e. evacuation of the highest military and political leadership to Berchtesgaden. However, Hitler's decision to remain in the capital meant the continuation of the battle for Berlin. In view of the emerging encirclement of the city, new troops were needed, capable of inflicting a deblocking blow from the outside.

Commander of the 12th Army Walter Wenck

Oddly enough, such troops were found. True, by that time they had occupied positions with the front to the west - their opponents were the Americans. But in April 1945, in the Berlin region, the Western and Eastern fronts were already so close to each other that the distance between them could be overcome even on foot. Therefore, with some risk, it was possible to play the old game of the German staff officers - "to transfer reserves from west to east." It was decided to deploy to the east the 12th Army of Walter Wenck, which was stationed on the Elbe. Field Marshal Keitel attributes this decision to himself in his memoirs, although it is sometimes said that Jodl was its author. The latter carefully studied documents recently seized from the Allies, in which the zones of occupation of Germany after the war were designated. The border between the American and Soviet zones marked on the map attached to them allowed Jodl to conclude that the Americans would not go far beyond the Elbe. Accordingly, the risk of turning the 12th Army to the east in a hopeless situation seemed justified. One way or another, Keitel personally had to inform Wenck about the new tasks.

Field Marshal Keitel arrived at the command post of the 12th Army around 02:00 on April 23. Greeting the officers staring at him with a touch of the marshal's baton to his cap, he immediately pointed to the map. In his memoirs, he described his visit as follows: “I went to the location of the 12th Army of Wenck directly from the Reich Chancellery in an official car. […] Face to face, I briefly outlined the situation near Berlin to Wenck and added only that I see the only way to save the Führer in breaking through his army to the capital and connecting with the 9th Army. Now everything depends on him, otherwise it remains only to go against the will of the Fuhrer and "kidnap" him from the Reich Chancellery ... Wenck called the chief of his staff, Oberst of the General Staff Günther Reichhelm. On the staff map, I showed them the situation in the direction of Berlin, in any case, the one that was there a day ago. Then he left them alone, and went to have dinner himself, while Wenck dictated the order for the army, a copy of which I was going to take to the Fuhrer.

What was the army that became the last hope of the "Thousand Year Reich"? The history of the appearance of the army of Wenck is as unusual as its last mission. The successes of the allies in the west not only forced the Soviet command to hurry up with an attack on Berlin, but also forced the Germans to create a new front to replace the collapsed positions on the Rhine. When the Ruhr pocket closed at the end of March 1945, Hitler ordered the OKW to form a new army on the Elbe, around Dessau and Wittenberg. The army was to be formed from newly enlisted juniors (17 and 18 years old) and RAD personnel. The army, which still exists only on paper, was tasked with:

"Assemble at the Harz, west of the Elbe. Attack in a western direction in order to free Army Group B. Form a solid front by cutting the forces of the Western Allies and conducting large-scale operations.

So from the very beginning, the new army got the role of the "savior of the drowning", called to come to the aid of troops in a hopeless situation. However, at that time the army did not even have a number and headquarters. These two problems turned out to be the easiest to solve. The headquarters of the new army was the administration of the North Army Group, defeated in East Prussia. It arrived by sea between 12 and 15 April. Together with him, the headquarters of several corps that had ceased to exist arrived. The army was assigned a vacant number since 1943 - "12". Now it was up to the commander. General of the Panzer Troops Walter Wenck was appointed to this position. He was an experienced staff officer who had been fighting in the east since June 1941. The finest hour of his career was the restoration of the front, which collapsed after the encirclement of the Paulus army in November 1942. commanders of the detachments occupying a new front in the bare steppe. The task of the 12th Army was similar to the one that Wenk solved in November 42nd. Only now a new front was being created not in the Volga steppe, but in the heart of Germany.

At the beginning of April 1945, Wenck was away from the front in Bavaria, receiving treatment after a car accident in Eastern Pomerania, of which he had been a victim in February. On the morning of April 6, the convalescent Wenck was awakened by a phone call. At the other end of the wire was the chief adjutant of the Wehrmacht, General Burgdorf, who headed the personnel department. He said that the next day Wenck was expected at the Fuhrer's headquarters in connection with his appointment as commander of the 12th Army. When the taken aback general asked what kind of army it was and why he had not heard about it yet, the answer was: “You will learn everything you need from the Fuhrer personally. The army is just being created.” On April 7, he already appeared before Hitler in a new capacity. Wenck learned that he was to form "an integral front by cutting the forces of the Western Allies and conducting large-scale operations."

Formally, ten divisions being formed were subordinated to the headquarters of General Wenck for "large-scale operations", the "last call" of the Third Reich:

1) tank division "Clausewitz";

2) tank-grenadier division "Schlageter";

3) infantry division "Potsdam";

4) infantry division "Scharnhorst";

5) infantry division "Ulrich von Hutten";

6) infantry division "Friedrich Ludwig Jan";

7) infantry division "Theodor Kerner";

8) infantry division "Ferdinand von Schill";

9) an infantry division from northern Germany (never arrived in the area of ​​​​operations of the 12th army);

10) SS Panzer Division in southern Germany, formed from SS training units (was put into action before the 12th Army completed its formation).

The formations were named after German national heroes, mostly from the Napoleonic era. Although among them was the medieval knight von Hutten, and Schlageter, who was executed for sabotage in the Ruhr in 1923. Despite the "nominal" designations, uncharacteristic for the Wehrmacht, the infantry divisions of the 12th Army were formed according to army standards PD-44, i.e. consisted of three regiments of two battalions each.

The only tank division of the 12th Army at the time of Wenck's appointment existed only on paper. The order for the formation of the Clausewitz Panzer Division followed only on April 4, 1945. It became the last Panzer Division formed in the Third Reich. Shortly after the formation of the Clausewitz and Schlageter divisions, they were defeated in battles with the 9th American Army. Not a single mechanized formation had to participate in the last offensive of the 12th Army. The last hope of the Third Reich was not the "Royal Tigers" and "Panthers", accompanied by coffin-shaped armored personnel carriers, but several infantry divisions.

During the two weeks that passed from the beginning of the formation of the 12th Army to the breakthrough of Soviet troops to Berlin, Wenck's divisions managed to engage in battle with the Americans. The details of these battles are not so important for our narrative, so we can limit ourselves to one phrase "the outer front of the encirclement." The enemy of the 12th Army was the American divisions located on the outer front of the Ruhr "boiler". They were obviously weaker than the main forces of the American troops, crushing the encircled Army Group "B". Relying on the Elbe as a natural barrier, the newly minted divisions of the 12th Army gave them battle. The most intense was the battle for the bridgehead at Barbie captured by the American units. However, Wenck's ambitious plans for the Barbie bridgehead and other areas were buried with a visit to Keitel's headquarters. Wenk returned to the Eastern Front again.

Strictly speaking, Wenk felt the chilling breath of the panzer armies on the back of his head even before turning east on Keitel's orders. The first formation of the 12th Army, which entered into battle with the Soviet troops, was the Friedrich Ludwig Jahn division. It was formed from RAD personnel and was located deep in the rear of the 12th Army, which was fronting to the west. The division had 285 officers, 2172 non-commissioned officers and 8145 soldiers, armed with 900 pistols out of 1227 in the state, 826 rifles out of 3779 in the state and 1060 Sturmgevers out of 1115 in the state. There were 0 (zero) submachine guns out of 400 in the state. Of the 9 standard 75-mm PAK-40 anti-tank guns, there was not a single one, and not a single 105-mm leFH howitzer. But out of 2700 regular faustpatrons, all 2700 pieces were available.

On April 23, the emerging division came under attack from the 4th Guards, advancing on Berlin from the south. tank army. She was quickly defeated and retreated north to Potsdam. Commander of the tank army D.D. Lelyushenko later recalled this episode: “A captured colonel was brought to us, he showed that the division was formed in the first days of April from young men of 15–16 years old. I could not stand it and said to him: “Why are you on the eve of an inevitable catastrophe driving innocent teenage boys to slaughter?” But what could he say to that? His lips only moved convulsively, the eyelid of his right eye twitched convulsively, and his legs trembled.

However, the loss of divisions in the west and east was compensated by new formations. Together with the new task, Wenk received new troops, hitherto directly subordinate to the OKH (high command of the ground forces). These were Holste's XLI corps and Arndt's XXXIX corps, also located on the Elbe with a front to the west. Keitel later wrote: "With my power, I subordinated Holste's tankers to the command of the 12th Army and explained to my former fellow soldier that the fate of the 12th Army and the capital of the Reich ultimately depends on his success or failure." This meant that all the troops to the west and south-west of Berlin, scattered over a fairly wide front, were subordinate to Wenck. Interestingly, the 12th Army was not transferred to the subordination of the Vistula Army Group. Only the 3rd Panzer Army in Western Pomerania remained at Heinrici's disposal. The encircled 9th Army also came under direct command of the OKN.

On the evening of April 23, a telegram was received at the headquarters of the 12th Army, officially fixing the new tasks. It read: "The primary task of the 12th Army is to use the XLI Panzer Corps (General Holste) to attack the enemy between Spandau and Oranienburg and drive him back across the Havel River." That is, the main task was received by Holste's corps, which had just been subordinated to Wenck, and was located to the west of Berlin. He (Holste) was subordinate to the XXXIX Panzer Corps.

“a) XLI Panzer Corps leaves only weak guards on the Elbe, while transferring the main forces to a defensive line east of Brandenburg - along the line of lakes between Potsdam and Brandenburg - west of Neu-Ferbellin, facing the front to the east, and is looking for contact with the rear units of the group armies "Vistula".

b) The commander of the XX Army Corps, General of Cavalry Koehler, whose headquarters is again fully combat-ready, is given the task of preparing and conducting a battle with a front to the east. Division "Scharnhorst" should be mainly used according to the previous order in the area of ​​the Barbie bridgehead. The combat-ready parts of the corps should be immediately deployed on the Elbe between Coswig and Dessau with the front to the south. The "Gutten" division is transferred to the Belzig region and is subordinate to the "Kerner" division.

c) The "Gutten" division moves out of contact with the enemy at night, leaving only a weak guard at the key points of the previous battles and at the crossings, and marches in one passage through Greifenheinichen to Wittenberg.

Task for the division "Gutten":

Defending the Wittenberg bridgehead with a front to the east and northeast and setting up guards on the Elbe with a front to the south between Wittenberg and Coswig.

Subordinates to the command of the XX Army Corps (see the relevant order in the previous section).

d) The Kerner division is concentrating in the Belzig area. Its task is to provide security and reconnaissance in the northeast, east and southeast directions, establishing contact with the Gutten division north of Wittenberg. Submission to the XX Army Corps.

e) The "Schill" division completes its deployment and begins on April 25 to move through Ceysar to the area west of Niemegk. Subordination to the command of the XX Army Corps.

f) XLVIII Panzer Corps retains its previous mission. A quick withdrawal of all combat-ready units behind the Elbe between Wittenberg and Dessau, scheduled for April 25, should be prepared. Further task: defending the Elbe line between Wittenberg and Dessau with a front to the south.

As we can see, the first order in the new direction still contains measures to keep American troops in the Barbie bridgehead. In general, the order details the process of regrouping from the Western Front to the Eastern. Let's also not forget that it was not about the transfer of tank formations on their own, but about foot marches of infantry divisions. For them, even a few tens of kilometers were a noticeable obstacle, causing a loss of time.

It must be said that the observance of the secrecy of the introduction of fresh forces into battle was not observed in the case of the Wenck army. On the contrary, it was actively used for propaganda purposes. Accordingly, information about the 12th Army was leaked to Soviet intelligence officers even before the start of its offensive from ... ordinary Berliners. In the intelligence report on the mood in Berlin dated April 25, 1945, it was said: "There are rumors among the population that Hitler withdrew 10 divisions from the Western Front to the defense of Berlin." However, there was no response to this message.

With the beginning of the regrouping, Wenck's troops began to be drawn into battles in a new direction. The second division of the 12th Army, which entered into battle with the Soviet troops, was Theodore Kerner. As early as April 23, the division, with the support of assault guns, attacked Troyenbrizen, occupied in the middle of the previous day by a brigade of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps of the 4th Guards. tank army. However, the Germans failed to recapture the city, because. the main forces of the 5th Guards soon approached him from the east. mechanized corps. Storming Troyenbrizen, occupied by a fairly strong group of Soviet motorized infantry, was already insanity. On the other hand, battered in Silesia in March 1945, the 5th Guards. the mechanized corps also did not have significant strike capabilities. Therefore, a blow to the flank of the 12th Army, which was ready for the offensive, also did not follow from his side.

Even before the regrouping was complete, in the early hours of 25 April, Wenck's headquarters received the following order from the OKW:

“The 12th Army immediately launches an offensive with all available units through the Wittenberg-Niemegk line east to the Uteborg area and joins the 9th Army breaking through to the west for a subsequent joint offensive north to release Berlin.”

With this order, the last precaution was abandoned. It was impossible to solve problems on two fronts at the same time. General Keller ordered the Scharnhorst division to leave their positions at the American bridgehead. The division was transferred to its original position north of Wittenberg. As a result, only two bicycle construction battalions remained on the Western Front. They began to mine the main line of defense. The mines were the only thing blocking the way for the Americans to the east.

On the evening of April 25, the Fuhrer himself intervened in the fate of the 12th Army. At the same time that the 9th Army was tasked with breaking through, Hitler sent a telegram to Wenck at 19:00 on April 25, stating:

“The aggravation of the situation in Berlin and the ensuing blockade of the German capital make it urgently necessary to carry out offensive operations as soon as possible in the previously ordered directions in order to deblockade.

Only under the condition that the advancing groupings do not pay attention to their flanks and the position of their neighbors and their actions are firm and resolute, aimed solely at making a breakthrough, will the 9th Army be able to reconnect with the troops in Berlin and at the same time destroy large units enemy. The concentration of forces of the 12th Army in one area or local actions with clearly insufficient forces do not ensure success. So I order:

1) The 12th Army, with its southern flank group, leaving guards in the Wittenberg area, advance from the Belzig area to the Beelitz Ferch line and thereby cut off the 4th Soviet tank army advancing on Brandenburg from its rear and immediately continue the offensive in an easterly direction before joining the 9th Army.

2) The 9th Army, holding its present eastern front between the Spreewald and Fürstenwalde, advance by the shortest route to the west and establish contact with the 12th Army.

3) After joining the two armies, turn north, by all means destroy the enemy formations in the southern part of Berlin and unite with the troops in Berlin in a large area.

So, one more task was added to the tasks already set for the 12th Army - the release of the 9th Army of Busse. In fact, the army was scattered in two directions that were little connected with each other. On the one hand, it was supposed to break through to Berlin from the west (Holst), on the other hand, to go to join the 9th Army, and then attack Berlin from the south.

With a general lack of forces, the dilemma of choosing the direction of the strike became doubly relevant. Strictly speaking, the 12th Army had two possibilities:

1) At the suggestion of the command of the XX Corps - an attack from the Belzig region through Potsdam to Berlin. The advantages of this plan included the ability to make all the necessary regroupings during one night and, presumably, the weak enemy defenses in this direction.

In addition, such an offensive made it possible to establish contact with the 9th Army, which was breaking through to the west, north of Troenbrietsen.

2) Advance in the XLI Panzer Corps zone between the chain of lakes north of Havel, maintaining contact with the left flank of Army Group Vistula, whose front seemed to have stabilized in the Verbelin area.

Although the implementation of the second plan, proposed by General Wenck on April 23 to Field Marshal Keitel, would require significant regroupings, he had undoubted merits. It was not for nothing that Holste's strike was already designated as Wenck's top priority on April 23. The command of the 12th Army itself saw in option 2) the following advantages:

a) The 12th Army was in a long narrow corridor between the two clearly defined last fighting groups of German troops in the south and in the north of Germany. Communication with the southern group was to be interrupted with the already prepared withdrawal of the XLVIII Panzer Corps to the north beyond the Elbe in the Wittenberg-Dessau region. Moreover, on April 25, communication with the southern group was lost due to the meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe near Torgau.

b) If Army Group Vistula had been able to muster forces southeast of Verbelin for an offensive towards Berlin, then, in combination with an attack by the 12th Army from the west, it might have been possible to defeat the Soviet forces northwest of Berlin along parts.

c) The lakes in the area of ​​Havel, which constitute an obstacle to any movement of troops, would be bypassed.

The prevailing situation, therefore, made it necessary to look for connections with the northern group in Western Pomerania. In this case, the main forces of the 12th Army should be located on its northern wing, maintaining an elbow connection with the Vistula Army Group. Thus, it would be possible to concentrate the forces of the army in a smaller space and use at least two army corps for the offensive. Concentration of efforts in one direction promised at least limited and temporary, but almost guaranteed success. Sufficient for the withdrawal of troops encircled in Berlin.

However, a radio proposal from the 12th Army to act in accordance with option 2) was rejected by the OKW. Despite this, the army group "Vistula" was ordered to advance on Berlin from the north (Army Group Steiner). Thus, the two groups, called upon to release the blockade of Berlin, had to advance in different directions, without even being able to coordinate their actions. Moreover, Holste's corps, operating northwest of Berlin at Verbelin XLI, subsequently fought in isolation from the main forces of the 12th Army.

After long negotiations between the commander of the 12th Army and the OKW, option 1) was approved. At the same time, the army leadership was aware that in this way contact would also be lost with the units fighting in the north, i.e. in a short time. with Army Group Vistula and possibly Holste's XLI Corps. The only gain was time to regroup troops. The vigorous assault on Berlin, carried out by the troops of two Soviet fronts, made the time factor one of the most significant. Considering that the units of the 12th Army were moving on foot, a change in the direction of the main attack meant the loss of several days.

Destroyed self-propelled guns "Sturmgeshyuts". Such self-propelled guns became the last hope of the Reich both on the streets of Berlin and in the army of Wenck

It is also possible that the High Command insisted on option 1), hoping for the success of the Steiner group. The success of the strikes by Wenck and Steiner promised the unification of the troops in Berlin - the 12th Army, the Steiner Group and the 3rd Panzer Army - into one grouping in northern Germany. One way or another, Potsdam became the immediate goal of Wenck's army. In Potsdam, the remnants of the Jan division and the Potsdam division, under the command of General Reinmann, the former commandant of Berlin, were to wait for the 12th Army. They had to hold out for at least a few days and become a bridge connecting Wenck with the Berlin garrison.

The strike capabilities of the 12th Army were quite modest. It could not even be compared with Kirchner's tank corps, which was trying to break through to the encircled Paulus. Since Wenck's army consisted of infantry divisions, armored support for the offensive was limited. Basically, these were self-propelled guns of the Sturmgeshütz and Hetzer types, typical for the German infantry formations of that period. Sometimes they were diluted with other types of technology. So, the battle group of the assault artillery school in Burg, which became the basis for the Schill assault artillery brigade, on April 13, 1945, consisted of the following units:

headquarters company with anti-aircraft self-propelled guns with 37-mm guns;

1st company of 12 Hetzers;

2nd company of 11 "Sturmgeshyutsev";

3rd company on armored personnel carriers (37 vehicles);

4th company with 17 armored vehicles;

batteries of 3 Horneyse (tank destroyer with 88-mm cannon), 2 Hummels (self-propelled guns with 150-mm howitzer), 4 Sturmgeshütz with a short-barreled gun and 1 armored car. According to some reports, among the armored vehicles there were several heavy eight-wheeled armored vehicles armed with short-barreled 75-mm guns. This whole zoo of equipment was in direct support of the attack of the Schill division on Potsdam.

Another division of Wenck's army, Scharnhorst, received as a reinforcement the 1170th assault gun battalion, numbering 19 StuG and 12 StuH on April 6, 1945. In addition, the 12th Army included the 243rd Assault Gun Brigade. On 18–20 April 1945, it consisted of 3 StuGs and 7 StuHs. Also formed in April 1945, the divisions of the Wenck army (“Jan”, “Scharnhorst”, “Gutten”, “Kerner” and “Potsdam”) received 10 Hetzers each. Three of them even received one ARV on the Hetzer chassis. In addition, the 12th Army included the 3rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, which received 21 Hetzer self-propelled guns on April 7th. It is not known, however, how many of the above self-propelled guns remained in service after the battles with the Americans.

Ironically, the divisions of Wenck's army were among the few who did not experience fuel problems in Germany in April 1945. At the disposal of the 12th Army were barges stuck due to the advance of the Americans on the Elbe, including those with fuel. Therefore, self-propelled guns and a few army vehicles could maneuver freely. They soon needed it.

The study of the 12th Army cannot but arouse astonishment at the discrepancy between the hopes placed in it and its real capabilities. Panzer divisions, which became the hallmark of German offensives and counter-offensives in various periods of the war, were not found in the immediate vicinity of Berlin. Wenk's offensive was an attack by a large mass of infantry from beardless youths, supported by a few Sturmgeshütz and Hetzer. Moreover, the infantry was of various colors: the uniform was taken from different warehouses during the formation of divisions. You could see a completely unimaginable mixture of bluish-gray uniforms of the Luftwaffe, army field grey, and the colors of the RAD (imperial conscription service).

The regrouping of Wenck's poorly trained infantry was slow, and XX Corps did not reach its original positions until the morning of April 28. A serious problem for the troops of the 12th Army was traffic jams created by refugees from the east in the entire army zone. All the refugees wanted to cross the Elbe as soon as possible. Go in the opposite direction, i.e. from west to east, it was quite difficult for the marching columns of Keller's corps. Thus, only on the fifth day after Keitel's visit, units of the XX Army Corps took up their starting positions between Belzig and Wittenberg.

Who stood in their way to Potsdam and Berlin? On April 28, Keller's corps of Wenck's army reached the flank of the 4th Guards. tank army. The turn of both tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Berlin to some extent created a vacuum on the outer front of the encirclement of the German capital. At that time, Lelyushenko's army was scattered between several directions. First, the 10th Panzer Corps stormed the Wannsee in the south of Berlin. Secondly, the 6th mechanized corps occupied Potsdam together with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and was even redirected to Brandenburg. The 16th mechanized brigade of this corps was already engaged in street fighting in Brandenburg on April 28, the other two were on their way from Potsdam to Brandenburg. 5th Guards the mechanized corps took up defensive positions in Troienbritszen and Bielitz. The 68th Tank Brigade was generally deployed back and acted against the breaking detachments of the 9th Busse Army near Barut.

With the first rays of dawn, the XX Army Corps launched an offensive against Berlin. In the center of the strike force of the 12th Army, the Gutten division was advancing. On its left flank, a ledge slightly behind, the Schill division advanced in a northeasterly direction. On the right flank of the Gutten, the Scharnhorst division was advancing. On the afternoon of April 28, "Gutten" and "Schill" broke into the forest of Leniner Forst. The vanguards of the Gutten division were 15 kilometers from the original goal of the offensive - the crossing over the Havel southwest of Potsdam. On April 28, the vanguards of the XX Army Corps had already reached the town of Ferch, south of Potsdam.

One of the participants in the events, the commander of the Gutten division, Lieutenant General Gerhard Engel, subsequently wrote: “The knocked out enemy armored vehicles strengthened our confidence that we attacked the motorized detachments of the flank cover of the 1st Ukrainian Front.” The 70th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade (American SU-57s) and the 17th Mechanized Brigade of the 6th Guards, which was on the march, were hit by divisions of the XX Corps of the Wenck Army. mechanized corps of Lelyushenko's army. They could not hold back large masses of infantry on a broad front. In fact, the 16th mechanized brigade of the 6th mechanized corps in Brandenburg was cut off from the main forces of its corps and the army as a whole. Encirclement, however, did not threaten her - troops of the 1st Belorussian Front came out from the north to Brandenburg.

Descriptions of the successes of Wenck's army formations, given in foreign publications, are most often greatly exaggerated. So, V. Tike cites the memoirs of General Engel, in which it is written that "the division" Hutten "with its two regiments dispersed as many as two Russian rifle divisions." This is obviously not true, because. there was simply not a single rifle division in the offensive zone of the XX Corps. "Gutten" and "Schill" crashed into marching columns of brigades of the 4th Panzer Army hurrying to Brandenburg, which, of course, did not have any positions prepared for defense. Having unconditional numerical superiority, two German divisions were able to slightly push the Soviet motorized infantry.

SAU "Hetzer". It was these unsightly "whistles", and not the "Tigers" and "Panthers" that tried to break through to Berlin as part of the 12th Army

It is also curious to note that if the Germans later talked about some mythical rifle divisions, then the scouts of the 4th Guards. the Panzer Army already on April 28 captured talkative prisoners from the Gutten and Scharnhorst. According to their testimony, the Gutten division was fully manned, but only 60% armed. They also told Soviet intelligence officers about their march from the Western Front.

However, even taking advantage of the moment of surprise, Wenck's troops failed to reach Potsdam. Reimann's garrison had already been driven out of the city. At noon on April 28, a radiogram was sent to him from the headquarters of the 12th Army. She said:

"XX Army Corps has reached Furch. By all means make contact and break through to the 12th Army.

In fact, this meant: "We will not break through to you, break through to us yourself." General Reimann did not take long to beg. He gathered about 20 thousand of his soldiers for a breakthrough. They soon managed to establish contact with units of the Schill and Hutten divisions that had broken through into the Leninsky forest. This minor success was reported to the OKW, and from there the report reached the Fuhrerbunker. Rumors spread around Berlin: "The wreath is already in front of Potsdam!" You shouldn't say "already", but "still". Wenck himself later recalled that he sent a radiogram to Weidling in Berlin with the following content: “The counteroffensive of the 12th Army was stuck near Potsdam. The troops got involved in heavy defensive battles. I offer you a breakthrough to us." Pay attention - "defensive battles".

Actually, April 28 was the first and only day when the 12th Army achieved any noticeable results in offensive operations. Recovering from the unexpected attack of the picturesque youngsters, the Soviet command immediately took effective countermeasures. A hail of blows rained down on Wenck's division from different directions. To counter the emerging crisis, Lelyushenko aimed the 70th self-propelled brigade, two brigades of the 6th mechanized corps and two brigades of the 5th mechanized corps at the advancing units of the Wenck army. The latter provided a fairly vigorous pressure on the flank of the 12th Army. Divisions "Scharnhorst" and "Kerner" completely went over to the defensive in the area of ​​Beelitz. Only two divisions, Hutten and Schill, could now operate in the direction of Potsdam.

On April 29, Lelyushenko was forced to withdraw one brigade of the 10th Panzer Corps from the assault on Berlin. From the point of view of the command of the 4th Guards. tank army, the situation on April 29 looked like this: “The crisis of the battle dragged on sharply. This diverted most of the forces of the 4th Guards TA in the Beelitz area and dragged out the denouement of the Berlin-Brandenburg battle.

The path to Potsdam of the 12th Army was blocked by the 17th and 35th mechanized brigades of the 6th mechanized corps, as well as the 70th self-propelled artillery brigade. They have not yet succeeded in throwing back the advanced units of Wenck, but the Gutten and Schill no longer had any advance. The 12th Army, which did not have tanks, with its Sturmgeshyuts and Hetzers, experienced serious difficulties in the fight against Soviet armored vehicles. In any case, in the canonical descriptions of the actions of the Wenck army, the Joseph Stalin tanks are invariably mentioned, with which the German self-propelled gunners fought, catching pauses in reloading the powerful IS guns. There were indeed several IS-2s in the 6th Guards. mechanized corps, but at that time there were less than a dozen of them. Difficulties in the fight against them only emphasize the depth of the fall of the "last hope of the Reich."

Interestingly, the commander of the 4th Guards. the tank army practically does not mention the 6th Guards. mechanized corps in the description of repulsing the offensive of the Wenck army. All laurels, for unclear reasons, go to his neighbor: “5th Guards Mechanized Corps I.P. Ermakova, in which there were many sailors of the Pacific Fleet, stood invincibly at the line of Troyenbritzen - Beelitz, continuously repelling the attacks of the Wenck army. Strictly speaking, Wenck's main thrust was Potsdam, not Treuenbrietzen or Beelitz. These two settlements lay on the flank of the offensive of the 12th Army. Judging by the documents, it was the 12th mechanized brigade of the Ermakov corps that repelled the attacks of the Venka units near the hospital west of Beelitz. The withdrawal of 3 thousand wounded from this hospital is considered one of the few successes of the 12th Army. In the afternoon of April 29, the mechanized brigades of the 5th Guards. the mechanized corps moved from defense to active operations. However, initially rather weak and battered in Silesia in March, Ermakov's corps could not achieve a turning point in favor of the Soviet troops.

The aviation of the 2nd Air Army also made a feasible contribution to the defeat of the 12th Army. April 28 was non-flying weather, drizzling rain. Therefore, only scouts flew. The next day, April 29, rockets, bombs and shells from VYa Il-2 cannons of the 1st Guards fell on the heads of Wenck's soldiers. assault air corps. The command post of the corps was deployed on the front line, directly in Beelitz. In total, attack aircraft completed 414 sorties per day. In the following days, the air corps operated in the same area, providing support to units of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps in both defensive and offensive battles.

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