Riga operation. Liberation of Riga

In October 1944, SMERSH officers entered occupied Riga and seized the Abwehr file containing data on several hundred agents abandoned behind Soviet lines.

The daring idea of ​​Lieutenant Colonel Shurepov

October 1944. The offensive of the Red Army in Latvia is being prepared. Nikolai Ivanovich Zheleznikov, head of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 2nd Baltic Front, was visited by the head of the investigative department of the department, Alexander Alekseevich Shurepov.

Allow me?
- Let's.
- Comrade General, we neutralized a German agent from Latvians, a certain Langas. During interrogations, he sings like a nightingale. So, among other things, Langas gave us exact data on the deployment in Riga of one of the Abverstelle-Ostland divisions, exactly where the file cabinet is stored ...

Reference: "Abverstelle - Ostland" - a structural unit of the Abwehr, conducted intelligence and counterintelligence work in the Baltic States, Belarus and the Pskov region. It had an extensive network of agents and informers, several intelligence schools.

So this is what I think, comrade general: instead of calculating and catching Abwehr agents one by one, seize the entire filing cabinet!
- Select a separate group during the storming of Riga?
- The Germans are not stupid. As soon as we start the assault, they will take out the documentation, and what they do not have time to take out will be burned. I propose to capture the filing cabinet before the assault on the city. I already have in mind and there is a suitable officer for the task.

Personal file of Captain Pospelov Mikhail Andreevich

1921, from the workers. In 1941 volunteered for the front. Since the autumn of 1941 - the commissar of the partisan detachment. He showed himself as a talented organizer of sabotage: he took part in the development of operations to free more than 400 Soviet prisoners of war, the defeat of the German garrison in a village near Staraya Russa, and the explosion of an ammunition depot. In 1942, he was recalled from behind the front line and sent to work in military counterintelligence, where he gained extensive experience in counterintelligence work and proved himself to be a highly qualified specialist.

Captain Pospelov's group

Pospelov, having received the task, expressed his thoughts:
- I propose to go in a small group, 5-6 people. So it is easier to seep through the front line and in Riga a small group of attention will not attract. We will penetrate the city under the guise of locals. We will attack at night, when there will be no one in the building occupied by the Abverstelle (AST), a few hours before the assault on Riga. If we manage to do everything quietly, we will take away the file cabinet and hide in the city, if not, we will capture the building and hold the defense until our own approach. Please include Langas in the group - he will not only show us the exact location of the AST, but also lead us to it through quiet courtyards.
- Aren't you afraid that he will hand you over to the Germans?
- I don't think. Well, the Germans will give him a cross on his chest for the "feat", and then they will send him with a new task across the front line. He will be caught again, only this time he will be shot. Langas understands this very well. In addition, he will always be in front of my eyes, if anything - the first bullet to him. He understands this too.

Capture of the intelligence center

On the night of October 13, Pospelov's group crossed the front line and went to the outskirts of Riga. Langas led the Smershevites through narrow streets to the old part of the city and finally stopped:
- Here it is, - he nodded in the direction of an inconspicuous two-story building.
- Forward, - ordered Pospelov quietly.

The guards were removed silently and entered the building of the intelligence center. And then the unexpected happened: the Germans ended up in the Abverstell - more than a dozen Abwehr employees were preparing documentation and property of the AST "Ostlad" for evacuation. The Chekists opened fire and 12 Abwehr workers remained at their jobs.

"Safe! Look for the safe! - Pospelov urged his comrades. The safe was found and opened. "Commander, there is!" - Chekists raked stacks of documents out of an iron box. There was only a little left: to leave with a precious filing cabinet.

Fight in old Riga

But the Smershevites could not leave - the patrol heard the shots, the building was surrounded by the Nazis. The security officers took their places at the window openings and began to shoot back. Weapons and grenades found in the building were used. "Hold on, hold on! At dawn, the offensive will begin, you just have to hold out until the morning ”- each of the group understood that this was their only chance.

More and more units arrived at the building, the German officer constantly drove the soldiers into the attack - the Nazis also understood the value of the file cabinet: when the personal files of agents abandoned behind Soviet lines are in the hands of the Soviet counterintelligence, it will be a matter of technology to find them and neutralize them.

Pospelov's group held the defense for several hours. Many of the Smershevites were wounded.
At dawn, Pospelov and his comrades heard the dry bursts of their favorite PPSh: this was the Red Army entering Riga. The Nazis rushed away from the building: now they were no longer up to the filing cabinet - the question was about their own lives.

All participants in the operation were presented for awards. Captain Pospelov - to the Order of the Red Banner.

Germany Commanders
A. Eremenko
I. Maslennikov
I. Baghramyan
F. Schörner
Side forces Losses
Baltic operation (1944)
Narva Tartu Riga Tallinn Landings in Estonia moonsund memel Vilnius

The idea of ​​the Soviet command was as follows: the troops of the Baltic fronts, with strikes in converging directions to Riga, were to cut the enemy's Riga grouping and destroy it in parts (the main forces of the 18th and 16th armies). With the forces of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, reach the coast of the Gulf of Riga and cut off the escape routes for the forces of Army Group North to Prussia.

balance of power

the USSR

  • 3rd Baltic Front (commander General of the Army I. I. Maslennikov)
  • 2nd Baltic Front (commander General of the Army A. I. Eremenko)
  • 1st Baltic Front (commanded by General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan)

Germany

  • parts of the Army Group "Center" (commander Field Marshal F. Schörnerd)
    • 3rd Panzer Army (since September 20 in Army Group North)

The course of hostilities

The offensive of the fronts began simultaneously on September 14, 1944. The 4th shock and 43 armies of the 1st Baltic Front, by the end of the first day of the offensive, broke through the enemy defenses in a 25-kilometer section and advanced more than 10 kilometers in depth. On September 16, the 43rd Army broke through to the city of Baldone, and a detachment of the 3rd Motorized Corps went to the Western Dvina. The strike groups of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts met fierce resistance, and only on September 21, using the success of the Leningrad Front, which began the Tallinn operation on September 17, completed the breakthrough of the defense, freeing the cities of Valmiera and Smiltene. In response to the actions of the right wing of the 1st Baltic Front, which captured Baldone, the German command transferred 2 divisions from Estonia to the city area and launched strong counterattacks. On September 24, the headquarters of the command decided to transfer the main attack from the Riga to the Memel direction in order to reduce losses and quickly cut off the Baltic enemy grouping from East Prussia. Regrouping and continuing the offensive, by September 27, the Soviet troops reached the enemy's strong line of defense "Sigulda", 60 kilometers from Riga. The strike of the 1st Baltic Front in the Memel direction (Memel operation) forced the German command to begin the withdrawal of its troops from the Riga region on October 6. Troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts proceeded to pursue the enemy, breaking through a number of defensive lines on the move, and liberated Riga on October 13. On October 16, the disbandment of the 3rd Baltic Front took place, its troops were transferred to the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts, as well as the Leningrad Front. The troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, continuing the offensive, reached the enemy's Tukum defensive line by October 22, and, together with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, blocked the enemy on the Courland Peninsula. Aviation and submarines of the Baltic Fleet, by their actions in the Gulf of Riga, made it difficult to supply, regroup and evacuate enemy forces, forming the so-called Courland cauldron.

Operation results

As a result of the operation, Soviet troops defeated the forces of Army Group North, and almost completely liberated the territory of the Latvian SSR from German troops.

Sources

  • / ed. M. M. Kozlova. - M .: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1985. - S. 613-614. - 500,000 copies.
  • F. M. Zharkoy/ Ed. M.F. Zharky. - Ed. 4th, revised. and additional - St. Petersburg. : Publishing House of the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy, 2014. - 212 p. - ISBN 978-5-98709-303-0.

Riga is a beautiful city and Riga was liberated on October 13, 1944 as a result of a beautiful, swift operation of the Soviet troops. One of the main elements of this swiftness was the crossing of Kish Lake by the soldiers of the 119th Rifle Corps of Major General Nikishin. The crossing started from Jaunsiems on 12 October. Paratroopers on amphibians and boats crossed the two-kilometer expanse of Lake Kish and occupied Mezhaparks. Over 3,000 people were transported here overnight. The enemy, fearing the threat of complete encirclement, was forced to urgently withdraw his troops.

By the evening of October 13, Riga was free and Moscow saluted the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts. The Riga operation became part of the Baltic strategic operation to liberate the Soviet Baltic.

In Soviet times, the day of the liberation of Riga was widely and solemnly celebrated. I remember how in 1966 the Riga Kirov District Committee of the Komsomol organized an event to cross Kish Lake. We left from the side of Suzha (a regiment of civil defense troops was stationed in Suzha at that time) on a small steamboat, crossed the lake and landed in Mezhaparks near the boat pier.

Today, the Komsomol idea - to repeat the path of the landing of Soviet troops - is again pretending to be a reality. Russian public organizations organized a swim across Kish Lake in inflatable boats. On September 30, 2006, a rehearsal of the historic crossing took place, in which, among other things, the Olympic rowing champion Ivan Klementyev took part.

On October 14, the main group of enthusiasts started from Jaunciems. The sailing route through Kish Lake took about an hour. At that time, a rally dedicated to the 62nd anniversary of the liberation of Riga was organized in Mezhaparks.

Yuri Melkonov
October 2006
Photo by Sergey Melkonov

The Baltic operation of 1944 is a strategic offensive operation of the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic, Leningrad fronts and the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in September - October 1944 to defeat the Nazi troops in the Soviet Baltic. The Baltic operation includes 4 front-line and inter-front operations: Riga, Tallinn, Moonsund and Memel. During the summer offensive of 1944, in July-August, Soviet troops liberated a small part of the Estonian SSR, a significant part of the Latvian SSR and most of the Lithuanian SSR, reaching the line by the beginning of September: west of Narva, Lake Peipsi, Tartu, east of Valga, west of Gulbene, Krustpils , Bauska, Jelgava, west of Siauliai, Raseiniai.

In the Baltics, the Nazi troops of the Army Group North (commanded by Colonel General F. Schörner) defended themselves as part of the army group Narva, the 16th and 18th armies, as well as the 3rd tank army from the army group " Center "with the support of the 1st and 6th air fleets (a total of 56 divisions and 3 brigades, over 700 thousand people, about 7 thousand guns and mortars, over 1200 tanks and assault guns, 400 combat aircraft). The enemy had a strong multi-lane defense throughout the entire depth from the front line to the coast of the Baltic Sea.

The idea of ​​the Soviet Supreme High Command was to deliver powerful strikes in converging directions to Riga by the forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts and the forces of the Leningrad Front together with the Baltic Fleet in the Tallinn direction in order to dismember the enemy’s defenses, surround and destroy his groupings in parts and completely liberate the Baltic states. Soviet troops numbered: 900 thousand people, about 17,500 guns and mortars of 76-mm caliber and above, 3,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, over 2,500 combat aircraft (in addition, aviation of the Baltic Fleet and Long-Range Aviation were involved in the operation). The general management of the operations of the Baltic fronts was carried out by the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky.

On September 14, the troops of the Baltic Fronts: 3rd (commander General of the Army I. I. Maslennikov), 2nd (commander General of the Army A. I. Eremenko) and 1st (commander General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan) launched the Riga Offensive operation. The troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts in the first three days fought only within the enemy's main line of defense. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front successfully broke through the enemy's defenses and by the end of the third day of the offensive advanced fighting up to 50 km, threatening to cut communications leading to East Prussia. The enemy was forced to begin withdrawing the Narva group from Estonia and the left flank of the 18th Army from the region of Lake Vyrtsjärv in order to strengthen the group near Riga. In an effort to alleviate the position of his troops south of Riga, on September 16, the enemy launched two strong counterattacks in the area southwest of Dobele and from the area northwest of Baldone, but was not successful.

On September 17, the troops of the Leningrad Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov), with the support of the forces of the fleet, began the Tallinn operation of 1944, broke through the enemy’s defenses and liberated Tallinn on September 22. On September 23, the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front proceeded to pursue the 18th army of the enemy, which hastily retreated to the Sigulda line, prepared 60-80 km around Riga. September 22 overcame the enemy defenses and the 2nd Baltic Front.

On September 27, the troops of both fronts were stopped by the enemy at the Sigulda line. By September 26, the troops of the Leningrad Front had liberated the entire territory of Estonia, except for the Moonsund Islands. At this stage of the strategic operation, the Soviet troops failed to cut off Army Group North from East Prussia. The enemy was able to concentrate a large grouping (over 30 divisions) in the Riga region due to the withdrawal of the 18th Army and the Narva Task Force. In the Memel direction, in the sector from Auce to the Neman, at that time there were no more than 8 divisions of the 3rd Panzer Army, which on September 21 became part of Army Group North.

Based on the changed situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on September 24 decided to shift the direction of the main attack to the Memel direction in order to cut off Army Group North and defeat it. The regrouping of troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the Siauliai region began. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts also had to regroup their forces to resume the offensive on Riga. On October 5, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, with the assistance of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, launched the Memel operation and broke through the enemy defenses. Developing the offensive in depth, on October 10, the mobile forces of the front broke through on the coast of the Baltic Sea north and south of Memel (Klaipeda) and blocked the port city from land; another grouping of troops from the front reached the border with East Prussia near Taurags. By October 22, the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front pushed the enemy back beyond the river. Neman from Tilsit to Yurburg. The plan of the fascist German command to withdraw the troops of Army Group North to East Prussia was thwarted, it was cut off from Army Group Center and forced to begin a retreat from Riga to the Courland Peninsula.

On the night of October 5-6, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts resumed their offensive against Riga and, in the course of pursuing the retreating enemy, reached the outer defensive line by October 10, and on October 12, battles began for the city. On October 13, the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front liberated the right-bank part of the city, and on October 15, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front - the left-bank.

On October 16, the 3rd Baltic Front was disbanded, and the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts continued their offensive in the directions of Tukums and Saldus. By October 31, they reached the line: west of Kemeri, Letskava, south of Liepaja.

September 27 - October 10, the troops of the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet, carried out the main part of the Moonsund operation of 1944. The 8th Estonian and 130th Latvian rifle corps and the 16th Lithuanian rifle division participated in the liberation of the Baltic states. The successful solution of tasks was ensured by the close interaction of the ground forces, aviation and navy.

As a result of the Baltic operation, the liberation from the fascist occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was completed, 26 divisions of the Army Group North were defeated and 3 divisions were completely destroyed. The main forces of this group - 27 divisions and 1 brigade - were pressed to the sea on the Courland Peninsula and lost their strategic importance. The encircled Courland group capitulated on May 8, 1945. (TSB).

For the capture of Riga, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin I.V. dated October 13, 1944, many soldiers and officers were thanked for participating in the liberation of the capital of Latvia, Riga, from the Nazi invaders. The most distinguished military units and formations were given the name "Rizhskaya":

22nd Stalinist Riga Rifle Division of Siberian Volunteers

85th Guards Rifle Rizhskaya Red Banner Division

4th Guards Rifle Division Riga (formed in the Gorohovets camps of the Moscow Military District in November 1941).

315th Riga Fighter Aviation Division

52nd Guards Riga Rifle Division

30th Guards Rifle Rizhskaya Red Banner Division

168th Riga Rifle Division

43rd Guards Latvian Rifle Division Riga

12th rifle Riga division

225th Assault Riga Aviation Division

Yuri Melkonov

Photo by Sergey Melkonov

Latvia, Riga

The territory of Latvia was one of the first among the Soviet republics to be completely occupied by the Nazis. The troops of Army Group North occupied Riga on July 1, 1941, and the entire territory of the republic passed to the invaders on July 8. Since August 1941, Latvia became part of the Reichskommissariat "Ostland".

Three years later, the Soviet armies began to liberate the Baltic states.

The successful offensive of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1944 as part of Operation Bagration created favorable conditions for the complete liberation of the Baltic republics. The German Army Group "North" was engulfed from the south by the troops of the Belorussian fronts and at the same time pressed against the Gulf of Riga by the forces of the Baltic fronts. A real threat of complete encirclement loomed over the German group.

Despite the fact that a significant part of the German headquarters insisted on the speedy withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states to East Prussia, Hitler's intentions remained the same - to retain control over the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea at any cost.

By the end of July 1944, in a series of successful front-line operations, the Red Army troops broke through the Panther defensive line in the areas of Narva, Daugavpils, Ostrov and Pskov. By the end of August, during the Tartu operation, a bridgehead was captured near the city of Tartu. This further complicated the position of the enemy's Baltic grouping. But even in such a situation, Hitler's position remained unchanged: in the face of a serious shortage of fuel, losing the established production of synthetic gasoline seemed unacceptable to the head of the Reich. Not only resources forced the Germans to literally bite into the Baltic coast. While the key ports of the Gulf of Riga were in the hands of the Wehrmacht, the hands of the Soviet Baltic Fleet were tied, and control of the Baltic, in turn, provided the most convenient transport corridors for raw materials from the Scandinavian countries.

To maintain its position in the Baltic states, the German leadership took a number of measures. In particular, the entire territory under their control was turned, in fact, into one continuous fortified area. To replenish the grouping with personnel, a large-scale mobilization and the formation of new units from the rear units was launched. The morale and fighting spirit of the army was not disregarded either. The Goebbels Office was constantly broadcasting about new super-powerful weapons that could turn the tide of the War. At the same time, the units were reinforced by Gestapo officers, whose duties included suppressing any form of defeatist sentiment and alarmism. Barrage detachments from SS units were placed in key areas in order to completely exclude the possibility of a retreat.

Soviet troops were also preparing for the upcoming offensive in the Baltic states. The units practiced overcoming water barriers and taking well-fortified strongholds. The rear was pulled up, the necessary roads were built. Engineering units were preparing to build bridges and crossings. Very original ways of forcing rivers were also devised. For example, the head of the engineering troops of the 1st Baltic Front, General Vasily Vasilyevich Kosarev, proposed to block the Memele and Musha rivers with dams above the site where the crossing was planned. Subsequently, this idea had a significant impact on the course of the campaign.

The active phase of preparations for the autumn campaign in the Baltics began in early August 1944, when a plan was prepared for the future offensive, called the Baltic Strategic Offensive Operation.

The general plan of the campaign was to strike from three sides with the general direction of Riga by the forces of all three Baltic fronts as part of the Riga operation and a simultaneous strike in the Tallinn direction by the forces of the Leningrad Front.

The initial start date for the operation was to be September 4, 1944. But the deadlines had to be shifted by 10 days, when the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front were able to seize a bridgehead in the Tartu region, from where it was planned to strike at the enemy’s Narva grouping defending Tallinn. Another reason for the postponement of the start date of the operation was the incomplete readiness of the fronts, especially the rear units, for a future offensive. Thus, it was decided to start the attack on Riga on September 14, 1944.

Of course, the Soviet command tried in every possible way to hide the scale and goals of the future offensive, but this was not fully achieved. In particular, the radio intelligence services of both sides studied each other so well that by radio signal, or, more precisely, by the power of the transmitter and the style of the radio operator, they could almost accurately determine the location of the headquarters of the enemy at any level, from the battalion to the army.

In support of the above, we can cite a funny incident that happened to the 22nd Army of the 2nd Baltic Front. By order of the headquarters, the army was to be redeployed from one wing of the front to the other. The march, as expected, was carried out at night, at the old place of deployment, part of the radio stations were left, which continued to work as usual. At the new place, the troops were ordered to maintain radio silence, but one of the too zealous commanders reported to the headquarters on the completion of the task after the transition. After that, the new position of the army was immediately revealed, and the next morning a German plane scattered leaflets over the new positions with the inscription "Congratulations to the 22nd Army on a safe arrival!".

By September 10, 1944, the preparations for the offensive were generally completed, and the campaign plan acquired its final form. At that time, our troops occupied the lines passing through Tartu, Valga and Gulbene (3rd Baltic Front), along the Gulbene-Bauska line (2nd Baltic Front), west of Siauliai, Raseiniai, in the Jelgava region (1st Baltic Front ).

The following forces were concentrated for the future offensive: 900,000 soldiers and officers, about 17,500 guns and mortars, approximately 3,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, over 2,500 combat aircraft (not counting long-range aviation).

The German forces in the Baltics consisted of 53 divisions with a total strength of over 700,000 men, about 7,000 guns and mortars, over 1,200 tanks and assault guns, and 400 combat aircraft. The commander of the Army Group "North" was Colonel-General Scherner. The main forces of the Wehrmacht were concentrated in the Riga region. It was the liquidation of the Riga grouping that the Baltic fronts were supposed to carry out as part of the Riga operation.

After the German offensive in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina ran out of steam (which, by the way, brought territorial benefits only to the Austrians), the German high command continued, taking advantage of the lull in the West, to search for options for offensive operations on the Eastern Front that would deal a strong blow to the Russians and at the same time would give the Germans valuable territorial gains.

The only place where it was possible to strike a short (otherwise it was impossible because of the low mobility of the German army), but painful for the Russians, was the Riga region. The loss of Riga would be a strong blow for Russia, and for the Germans, Riga would also be a good acquisition in case of further bargaining in peace negotiations. And it was Riga that was chosen as the site of the last major offensive operation on the Russian Front.

As a result, a short Riga operation(from September 1 to September 5, 1917) led to an even more painful defeat for the Russian troops than the retreat from Galicia. And the Russian troops in the north came out of this operation in a much worse condition than the troops of the Southwestern Front. In particular, material losses were much greater, as was the number of deserters. Also, as a result of the defeat near Riga, the Kornilov rebellion occurred, which led to the complete collapse of the Russian army.

This section contains chapters:

In fact, Riga has been one of the most important targets of the German command on the Eastern Front since the summer of 1915, i.e. since the end of the 2nd Šiauliai operation. And from the beginning of 1916 until the spring of 1917, the Riga bridgehead was constantly a source of danger for the Germans. But only in the summer of 1917 did a sufficiently favorable situation develop at the front to try to liquidate the Riga bridgehead. But since the Germans dreamed of taking Riga and gaining control over the entire Gulf of Riga for two years, it is easy to guess that the plans for the operation had been developed for a long time, and by the time the decision was made to attack near Riga, a lot was in engineering and regarding intelligence has been prepared.

Preparations directly for the operation near Riga started on August 4, when the Germans decided to repeat the major successes in Bukovina in the north. On August 11, when it became clear that an offensive into Romanian Moldova from the north and west was impossible due to the poor state of communications in Bukovina, the German command decided to deliver a short but strong blow in the Riga area. (Bad lines of communication are the excuse of the Austrians, who had difficulty coping with the 8th and 1st Russian armies and were themselves completely unprepared for the offensive.) On August 14, the German Naval Headquarters was involved in the work in order to organize a simultaneous offensive on the Western Dvina landing on the island of Ezel (and, possibly, even on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Riga).

To strike near Riga, it was necessary to transport part of the troops that took part in the counteroffensive in Galicia, in particular the 1st and 2nd Guards. Troops were also gathered from other sectors of the Eastern Front. Given the weakness of the railways (the Germans used only two tracks), the regrouping of troops dragged on almost until the start of the offensive, because the first thing the Germans did was bring artillery and shells for it.