In Chuchkovo, on the basis of the 16th special forces detachment of the Moscow Military District, the 370th separate special forces detachment was formed, the commander of which was Major I.M. Krot, the detachment became part of the 22nd brigade.

All detachments were formed according to a special "Afghan" state, according to which the detachment had 538 personnel (which is two times more than in a regular state).

According to the decisions made on February 22, 1985, the commander of the 22nd Special Forces Special Forces of the Central Asian Military District, Colonel D.M. The 525th separate special-purpose detachment, staffed according to peacetime states, remained at the place of permanent deployment of the brigade (soon it will be reduced to a separate company). On the night of March 14-15, 1985, a convoy of the 22nd Special Forces Special Forces, as part of the brigade administration and a special radio communications detachment, crossed the border with Afghanistan through Kushka and on March 19, 1985, arrived in Lashkargah at the place of the paratrooper battalion, which changed its deployment.

The 370th oSpN entered the DRA on the night of March 15-16 and soon arrived at the location of the headquarters of the 22nd brigade;

The 186th oSpN entered the DRA on April 7, 1985, and on its own through Kabul on April 16 arrived in Shahdzhoy.

The 173rd ooSpN was also included in the 22nd brigade.

In March 1985, the 15th Special Forces Special Forces of the Turkestan Military District, led by Colonel V. M. Babushkin, was also introduced into Afghanistan.

Together with the command of the 15th brigade, a detachment of special radio communications of the brigade and the 334th ooSpN were introduced into Afghanistan. The brigade administration and a special radio communications detachment were located in Jalalabad along with the 154th ooSpN.

The 334th Special Forces was located in the village of Asadabad, in the province of Kunar. The location of the detachment was considered unsuccessful. The detachment was subjected to mortar and rocket attacks from the rebels almost every night (as was the 668th detachment). The 15th brigade also included the 177th and 668th separate detachments.

Observing the regime of secrecy, separate special forces were called "separate motorized rifle battalions", and special forces brigades - "separate motorized rifle brigades". Also, these names were associated with the fact that the personnel of the detachments were put on armored vehicles in a special state.

With the advent of brigades in Afghanistan, the following tasks were set for the GRU special forces:

Finding ways to transfer weapons and equipment for the rebels from the territory of Pakistan, Iran and China;

Search and destruction of enemy weapons, ammunition and food depots;

Organization of ambushes and destruction of caravans;

Reconnaissance, transferring information to the command about the detachments of the rebels, their movements, capturing prisoners and interrogating them;

Elimination of rebel leaders and their instructors;

Particular attention to identifying and capturing MANPADS from the enemy;

Destruction of pockets of resistance, especially in the border areas.

By the summer of 1985, the grouping of special forces units of the GRU General Staff in Afghanistan included seven separate special forces, a separate special forces company, two special radio communications detachments and two headquarters of special forces brigades, one detachment was under formation.

Management of the 15th ObrSpN (1st Omsbr) of the military unit No. 71351 Jalalabad:

OSRS Jalalabad;

154th ooSpN (1st Omsb) military unit No. 35651 Jalalabad, Dr. A. M. Dementiev;

334th ooSpN (5th Omsb) military unit No. 83506 Asadabad, Dr. G. V. Bykov;

177th ooSpN (2nd omsb) military unit p. No. 43151 Ghazni, Mr. A. M. Popovich;

668th ooSpN (4th Omsb) military unit No. 44653 Soufla in the Baraki-Barak area, post office M. I. Ryzhik.

Management of the 22nd ObrSpN (2nd Omsbr) of the military unit No. 71521 Lashkargah;

Campaign Squad;

OSRS Lashkargah;

173rd ooSpN (3rd Omsb) military unit No. 96044 Kandahar, Dr. T.Ya. Mursalov;

370th ooSpN (6th Omsb) military unit No. 83428 Lashkargah, Mr. I. M. Krot;

186th ooSpN (7th Omsb) military unit No. 54783 Shahdzhoy, Ph.D. A. I. Likhidchenko;

411th ooSpN (8th Omsb) military unit No. 41527 Farahrud - was in the process of formation.

And also companies:

459th OrSpN military unit No. 44633 (RU 40th OA), Kabul;

897th ORRSA military unit No. 34777 (RU 40th OA), Kabul.

The units introduced into Afghanistan almost immediately began to carry out combat missions.

On April 20, 1985, companies of the 334th Special Forces Detachment advanced into the Maravar Gorge, with the task of combing the village of Sangam, in which the reconnaissance post of the rebels was supposedly located. It was assumed that no more than 10 people could be in this post, and therefore the task was considered more like a training one, which was reflected in the order.

Captain Nikolai Nesterovich Tsebruk commanded the first company (shortly before that, he, along with part of the personnel, arrived in the 334th detachment from the 14th detachment of the Far Eastern Military District). The 2nd and 3rd companies were supposed to support the 1st company in the event of an emergency. In addition, there was an armored group nearby, ready to immediately move to the rescue. At five o'clock in the morning on April 21, the head patrol entered the village. Following it included two groups of the first company. Soon, after a thorough inspection of the village, it turned out that there were no rebels there. From the commander of the 334th detachment, an order was received to advance to the village of Daridam, which was located a little further. There, the company disappeared from the field of vision of the covering units, and almost immediately the head group of Lieutenant Nikolai Kuznetsov met two rebels who began to leave towards the village of Netav. Kuznetsov rushed after them and ran into a significant force of rebels and soldiers of the Pakistani special forces "Black Stork" in the village. A fight ensued. Tsebruk, hearing the shots, took four fighters and advanced to the battlefield to help. The commander of the 3rd company saw how the rebels entered the 1st company from the rear, and tried to correct the situation on their own, but, having met massive fire, was forced to retreat to their previous positions. The armored group called for help fell into a minefield and could not approach the battlefield.

During the battle, Lieutenant Kuznetsov pulled the wounded ensign Igor Bakhmutov to a safe place and returned to his subordinates. In battle, he destroyed 12 rebels, but was wounded in the leg, surrounded, and at the last moment, when the enemy came close to him, he blew himself up with a grenade. His body was not identified for a long time. Subsequently, Nikolai Anatolyevich Kuznetsov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The two groups of the first company fought in complete encirclement, seeing that no one could come to their aid. Several times the 3rd company tried to unblock, but each time was forced to retreat, meeting heavy fire from the rebels.

Afghan rebels and Pakistani special forces competently took the company into a fire bag and proceeded to destroy it. Only a few scouts managed to break out of the encirclement. Ensign Igor Bakhmutov was the first to leave with his jaw torn by a bullet and with an APS in his hand. It was not possible to get any information from him about what was going on. Then private Vladimir Turchin came out, who in battle was able to hide in a ditch and saw how his comrades were finished off by "spirits". He came with a grenade without a ring clutched in his hand, which for a long time they could not pull out of their fingers closed with fear. Subsequently, in 1991, on behalf of the permanent Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, Turchin received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and underwent mental rehabilitation for a long time from the stress he had experienced. Currently works in the administration of the Moscow region.

Also, the commander of the second group, Lieutenant Kotenko, went to the location of our troops. Subsequently, Kotenko was transferred from the active detachment to the headquarters of the 40th Army.

Seven encircled scouts (Gavrash, Kukharchuk, Vakulyuk, Marchenko, Muzyka, Mustafin and Boychuk), preferring death to Dushman captivity, blew themselves up with an OZM-72 mine. From a bullet in the neck, the company commander, Captain N.N. Tsebruk, also died in battle. Local residents helped the rebels finish off the wounded commandos.

By the afternoon of April 21, the battle had ceased. The 1st company suffered heavy losses - two reconnaissance groups were almost completely destroyed, a total of 26 people died. Three more people of the 334th detachment died within two days, when, under the fire of the rebels, the mutilated bodies of scouts were carried out from the battlefield. Assistance in the removal of the bodies of the dead was provided by a company of the 154th detachment under the leadership of Captain Lyuty. After this battle, for a long time, the 334th detachment was actually unfit for combat. People were psychologically broken. They were waiting for another war, but the war turned out to be not the same as the movies were made about it...

IN MEMORY of the special forces soldiers of the 370th detachment .... On January 24, 1995, forty-eight intelligence officers of the 16th GRU special forces brigade died at once. Such losses were not suffered by special intelligence units either before or after that fateful day. On January 13-15, 1995, a detachment (370 oSpN was formed on the basis of 16 ObrSpn for operations as part of VOGOiP) consisting of 250 people marched along the route Mozdok-Beslan-Samashki-Grozny. The detachment suffered its first losses on January 23 in the area of ​​the Chernorechensky bridge across the Sunzha - Lieutenant Vyacheslav Litvinov and Private Alexei Zernov were killed. And the next day, an explosion occurred in the building where the special forces were deployed, as a result of which more than 40 people died: Major Bobko Alexander Ivanovich Major Peremitin Andrey Ivanovich Major Petryakov Igor Vladimirovich Major Sanin Vitaly Nikolaevich Major Frolov Alexander Vladimirovich Captain Kozlov Valery Ivanovich Captain Kuzmin Viktor Valerievich Captain Laptev Vladimir Nikolaevich Captain Samsonenko Sergey Alexandrovich Captain Filatov Alexei Stepanovich Captain Chunkov Andrey Ivanovich Captain Shapovalov Oktavian Viktorovich Senior Warrant Officer Mishin Anatoly Borisovich Warrant Officer Komov Ruslan Mikhailovich Junior Sergeant Illarionov Pavel Vladimirovich Junior Sergeant Korablev Alexei Anatolyevich (04/08/1995) Junior Sergeant Khokhlov Alexey Alekseevich Corporal Borisov Igor Valentinovich Corporal Denisenkov Kirill Valeryevich Corporal Popov Vladimir Viktorovich Private Abubakrov Roman Abudovich Private Bakanov Sergey Vasilievich Private Bobuchenko Eduard Robertovich (02/08/1995) Private Bokov Dmitry Gennad Private Volkov Vladimir Alekseevich Private Volkov Vladimir Alekseevich Private Voronov Vladimir Vladimirovich Private Goncharov Vladimir Vladimirovich Private Gornoyashchenko Vladimir Yurievich Private Grebennikov Nikolai Fedorovich Private Demut Edwin Yanisovich Private Demut Andrey Alexandrovich Zavgorodny Private Katunin Andrey Vladimirovich Private Lukashevich Pavel Vladimirovich Private Mukovnikov Andrey Viktorovich Private Mytarev Alexei Nikolaevich Private Pionkov Alexey Nikolaevich Private Rybakov Alexey Alexandrovich Private Skrobotov Alexander Aleksandrovich Private Tsukanov Mikhail Vladimirovich Private Shapochkin Anatoly Vladimirovich Private Shestak Nikolai Petrovich Private Shpachenko Pavel Vasilievich Private Yablokov Igor Lvovich Private Yatsuk Sergei Vladimirovich Special Forces at that time worked "both for himself and for all those guys" who, although they wore military uniforms, did not know how to fight. Sometimes the impossible was demanded from the Main Intelligence Directorate, and the commandos solved these impossible tasks. But it was not their task! Special intelligence was created and always prepared to operate only outside the borders of its state in a global war. But not on their own territory... Once in Chechnya at the end of 1994, the special forces perceived the territory of this rebellious republic as part of their united Motherland, and not as the territory of an enemy state, where the intelligence officer operates according to the laws of self-preservation, and not according to criminal and civil codes. They could not even imagine that they would be met as occupiers, and not as liberators from bandit lawlessness. For this, one might say, naivety, they often paid with their lives. Much later, they managed to rebuild their consciousness, began to fight the way they should fight behind enemy lines. Enemy! And they paid again. The Ulman case was a stain on the GRU, and it is still unclear to many whether this is a white spot or a black one. On the night of January 23-24, the special forces battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Sergeev, provided access to the intended line of the marine battalion. In addition, reconnaissance groups took part in skirmishes with militants and suffered their first losses. They returned to the location exhausted and tired. The battalion was located in a solid brick building of a former school on the outskirts of Grozny. The commander gathered the officers for a meeting. There was one very fundamental question to be solved. Sergeev stated his position, suggested that the officers discuss all the details without him and make the decision that the officer team considers necessary. In order not to put pressure on his subordinates with his authority, the battalion commander left the building to the street. And at that moment there was a terrible explosion. Under the rubble of the collapsed part of the building, everyone who was there then died. Sergeev himself received a terrible concussion, from which he never recovered. Various versions of the explosion have been put forward. Many were inclined to believe that the school had been mined and blown up by Chechen fighters in advance. However, the battalion commander was a professional among professionals in reconnaissance and sabotage activities with the richest experience of the war in Afghanistan. And before placing his battalion in the school building, he personally examined it very carefully. No signs of mining were found. However, the building could have been mined very discreetly in the expectation that some military headquarters or an entire unit would definitely be quartered in the surviving school. And then, waiting for the moment, blow it up with a radio signal. However, in this case, the entire building would have collapsed, and on January 24, only the part where the special forces were located collapsed. A more thorough analysis of the nature of the destruction clearly indicated that a stray shell hit the school building. Alas, there were many such cases in the first Chechen campaign. Artillerymen often thrashed into the white light according to the principle: whom God will send. From the "friendly" fire of Russian soldiers died not much less than from the fire of militants. And there is nothing to say about civilians ...

Special forces fighters

The most responsible tasks were active actions to search for and destroy caravans that proved their effectiveness. The corresponding goals were set for many units and subunits, including aviation, but the main role was assigned to the GRU special forces (special forces units in the GRU system of the General Staff were created for targeted sabotage tasks - the detection and destruction of rocket launchers, headquarters and other key objects behind enemy lines; by order Minister of Defense of March 1950 provided for the deployment of 46 companies of Special Forces in military districts). The training, methods and tactics of their actions almost completely corresponded to the tasks set, however, until 1984, special forces units in the 40th Army were used to a limited extent, and often not for their intended purpose. After the introduction of troops, the forces of the Special Forces of the GRU in Afghanistan were limited to one 469th separate reconnaissance company in Kabul, which was involved from time to time for separate tasks - reconnaissance, additional reconnaissance in order to verify information, capture prisoners and destroy opposition leaders and commanders. Later, two more detachments of the Special Forces were introduced (a detachment of the Special Forces of the GRU, numbering about 500 people, corresponded to an army battalion). When entering Afghanistan, for reasons of secrecy, they were called “separate motorized rifle battalions” with serial numbers - 1st, 2nd, etc. So, the 154th OOSPN became the 1st battalion, the 177th OOSPN became the 2nd battalion. These names were used in internal documentation and everyday life. The 154th Special Forces from Chirchik and the 177th Specialized Special Forces from Kapchagay, Alma-Ata Region, were transferred to the ARA in October 1981.

Special forces platoon of Lieutenant Sergei Melnichuk of the 1st company of the Jalalabad 154th Special Forces, summer 1987. Uniformity in clothing was observed in the unit - all fighters were dressed in camouflage KZS, which, for convenience, were often divided into separate jackets and trousers, cut in the belt.

The Chirchik detachment received its own name - the 154th - just before the entry, on October 21, 1981, and was deployed in the city of Akcha, Jowzjan province in the north of the DRA. His first commander in the 40A was Major I.Yu. Stoderevsky. Since August 1982, the detachment was transferred to Aibak in the neighboring province of Samangan.

177 sospn lieutenant colonel B.T. Kerimbaev was formed in February 1980 from scouts from the Chuchkovskaya 16th brigade of the Special Forces (MVO) and the Kapchagai 22nd brigade (SAVO), but the unit received the battle banner only in September 1981 before leaving for the DRA. The detachment crossed the border together with the 154th Special Forces on October 21, and a week later received the first combat mission.

The special forces had their own armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), off-road trucks, mortars and anti-aircraft guns (the high rate of fire of automatic ZU-23 and Shilok significantly increased the fire capabilities of the unit, and high elevation angles made it possible to fire at steep slopes).

The activity of the Special Forces was initially limited to the protection of industrial facilities, few and therefore of particular importance - gas fields in Shibargan and the pipeline in Puli-Khumri in the north of the country. They were staffed by officers of motorized rifle units and practically lost their former capabilities.

The states and structure of the detachments also resembled ordinary army ones: each OOSPN included six companies (three - Special Forces, one engineer-flamethrower, grenade-launcher-mortar and repair and material support and transport) and two groups - communications and anti-aircraft. They were armed with heavy equipment, including Shilki, and a variety of armor. So, the 1st and 2nd companies were equipped with BMP-1, the 3rd - BMD-1, BRDM and BTR-60PB. During the offensive during the Panjshir operation, the forces of the 177th Special Forces were involved. At the end of the operation, his scouts were stationed at the outposts near Rukha, compensating for the weakness of the imposed "people's power" and covering their units. The just "defeated" enemy did not even think of giving up - on July 18, the post of the 31st reconnaissance group of Lieutenant I.A. Egiazarov (15 people, 2 AGS-17, 1 DShK and 1 Tradnos mortar) near the village of Marishtan had to repel the attack of a large group of dushmans who, under the cover of heavy machine guns, managed to break into the height, but were mowed down by fire already at the outpost.

Special forces of the Kandahar detachment before flying on a mission. As part of the group - a grenade launcher squad with "Flame". AGS-17 is disassembled for carrying, the weapon itself is packed in a bag. In addition to the drum, they take a spare tape with shots with them.

The return of the reconnaissance group from the ambush. Every second is armed with a PK or PKM. The machine gun was the most suitable weapon for ambush operations, where a high density and range of fire was required, capable of stopping a caravan, knocking out cars and suppressing the resistance of guards, and success often depended on the strength of sudden preemptive fire. Kandahar, summer 1987.

By the end of the winter of 1984, they decided to use the special forces for their intended purpose. The 177th Special Forces was transferred to Ghazni, which lay on the main highway encircling the whole of Afghanistan, the 154th was placed in Jalalabad in the Pakistani direction. On February 10, a third detachment was introduced into the DRA, the 173rd Special Forces from Kirovograd, formed by order of the USSR Minister of Defense on February 29, 1980, on the basis of the 12th Special Forces Brigade (then it was stationed in Lagadehi ZakVO). However, uncertainty about the role of special forces in Afghanistan has led to a delay in deployment. The detachment crossed the border on February 10, and by February 14, on its own, arrived at Kandahar, where it was deployed in a military camp near the airfield. These places were the hottest: the city, lying near the border, was at the crossroads of ancient caravan routes and served as a key in the control of the south-west of the country.

By the fall, another detachment appeared in the Army - the 668th OOSPN (“4th battalion”) from the 9th Kirovograd brigade from Ukraine, freshly formed by order of August 21, 1984, was formed. He was placed in the village of Kalagulay near the Bagram air base, and in March 1985 he was transferred to the village of Sufla not far from the "hot spot" - the Dushman stronghold of Baraki, because of which he became known as the "Barakin battalion".

To ensure mobility and fire support, each of the Special Forces detachments was assigned 4 Mi-8 transport helicopters and 4 Mi-24 combat helicopters from the Jalalabad 335th Separate Combat Helicopter Regiment based near the locations of the special forces, the Kandahar 280th Separate Helicopter Regiment (OVP) and the 262nd Separate Helicopter Squadron (OVE) from Bagram. Helicopters of the Kabul 50th separate mixed air regiment were also involved in working with special forces.

The Kandahar Special Forces are sent out with Afghan gunners who have stocked up with everything they need for several days - water canisters, clothing, sun covers and soldier blankets. One of the scouts, in a KZS suit and kimry sneakers, has an assault rifle equipped with a RPK-74 horn with a capacity of 45 rounds.

The scouts lead the Afghan gunners to the helicopter. In order not to betray assistants, they were brought to the very departure, hiding from prying eyes and wrapping their faces in turbans. In the same unrecognized form, they left the airfield after the mission.

With the advent of new tasks, the states, structure and armament of the detachments were changed: the detachments were "unloaded", getting rid of heavy weapons, and eliminating inconsistency in technology. Now the OOSPN included five companies (three Special Forces and one each for mining and RMO), as well as communication groups and ZSU. In addition, four groups of ATS-17 and RPO-A "Bumblebee" were introduced into the Special Forces companies from among the former flamethrower and grenade launcher platoons of the corresponding detachment companies. The 1st company was armed with BMP-2, the 2nd and 3rd - BTR-60 and BTR-70.

Prior to the introduction of a mining company into the state, each of the detachments had an attached platoon (group) of special mining from the 45th Engineer Regiment. If necessary, artillery units were allocated to support the actions of the Special Forces near the garrisons and bases.

The most combat-ready in the entire 40A, special forces units received the latest equipment and weapons, including special ones - communications, surveillance and signaling, silent shooting and explosive equipment. They were equipped and supplied better than others, although adjusted for the well-known sluggishness of the rear services. Until the very end of the war, the army did not receive modern mountain equipment and appropriate uniforms; camouflage and heavy body armor left much to be desired. A few experimental samples of overalls, overalls, capes and equipment remained isolated. There were especially many complaints about medical supplies, unsuitable shoes and low-calorie food rations, which forced them to improve the supply at the expense of trophies, to buy and make on their own the most necessary items of equipment - backpacks, vests, pouches and knapsacks.

Mi-8MT go on a mission. After the first losses, all sorties - from communications and transport to shock and search and rescue - were carried out only in pairs and links. Such an order made it possible to provide quick assistance to the crew, shot down or forced to land in inhospitable places. The pilots and landing troops were picked up by the partner himself or helped them wait for help, covering them with fire from the air.

Mi-8MT of the Kandahar helicopter detachment of the 205th OVE, attached to the 173rd special forces unit. During the formation of "special forces" squadrons, they were equipped only with the newest helicopters of the latest series. To ensure fire support capabilities, it was prescribed for all Mi-8s operating with airborne reconnaissance groups in the Veil system, in addition to onboard machine guns, to hang two 32-round UB-32-57 rocket units each.

Battalion Commander Major I.V. Solonik characterized the equipment as follows: “Basically, all the soldiers and officers altered the equipment and uniforms, since it hampered movement and was uncomfortable. No one went to ambushes in army shoes. In the mountains, she was uncomfortable and heavy, and in her footsteps the enemy could easily determine the place of the ambush. In the 177th OOSPN, personnel were "dumped" with money in order to order 200-300 sets of the necessary ammunition with vacationers at home in a sewing cooperative. In the defeated caravans, boots, the same "bras", camouflage, sleeping bags and, especially, high-quality medicines, painkillers, blood substitutes, disposable syringes, tourniquets and tires were in great demand.

Reconnaissance and search operations were carried out in small mobile groups, usually a squad of 7-10 people. The group moved on several armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and "Urals" along the known caravan routes. Acting autonomously for 5-6 days and counting in the event of a collision, mainly only on their own forces, on armor and trucks, they took heavy machine guns and ATS-17. Special forces groups were sent to check intelligence, to capture weapons and prisoners, to detect parking lots, caravans, warehouses and gangs, installed reconnaissance and signal equipment and mined trails, including special means - radio control kits for the PD-530 explosion, non-contact explosive devices "Hunting " and others. Conducting a search in the area east of Surub in November 1986, a group of Major G. Bykov from the 154th Special Forces in one three-day raid exterminated 15 dushmans and identified three warehouses, taking trophies.

Well-armed and trained special forces were also involved in combined arms operations, where they were used not only for special events, but also as ordinary units that took fortresses and villages and cleared the area. However, they also played a special role.

Mi-8MT is going to land a reconnaissance group over the Registan desert. Clinging to the ground for stealth, the car goes over the very dunes, almost touching its own shadow with the wheels. Low level flight at a speed of 150-180 km / h, prohibited by all instructions, required jewelry aerobatics, an eye and a reaction.

After several false landings that distracted possible enemy observers, the Mi-8MT hovered to parachute the group. The landing site was usually chosen near the foot of the mountains, where the landing party was hiding from a likely chase.

The landing of a special forces group near the Pakistani border in preparation for the Khosta operation. Alizai-Parachinar area, summer 1986.

The inspection team returns to the helicopter after checking the camp of nomads. For inspection, even close, they took a walkie-talkie with them - to report on the progress of the control and, if necessary, call for help or demand evacuation. Sand is spreading towards the scouts, thrown up by the propeller of the helicopter engines that continue to work. They were not jammed, so as not to waste extra minutes on launching when leaving or “jumping” to help.

Kandahar special forces after a successful exit. In the desert, a caravan with raw materials for drugs was packed, in which they took 1,700 kg of “goods” and prisoners. The exit was without loss on its part. June 1987

Having stopped the caravan with fire, the special forces blocked it in a lowland near the border and called in combat Mi-24s. Cars with ammunition were destroyed on the spot by an air strike. Kandahar Province, February 12, 1988.

BTR-80 armored groups of the 173rd Special Forces are preparing to leave. Winter 1988.

The special forces took prisoners. Many Afghans were undocumented, and the nomads were often unaware of them. Having delivered them to the base, they were handed over to the local state security, which decided the fate of suspicious persons. The two fearsome men have their hands tied.

Prisoners brought from a helicopter search. It was common for militants handed over to the Afghan authorities to be paid off or released “due to lack of evidence” and soon found themselves back in caravans and gangs. In this case, prisoners taken to the airfield or to the garrison of their unit were blindfolded so that they could not properly examine and remember the situation and forces.

A captive "spirit" taken with a weapon in hand. A bandolier hangs around his neck, a paratrooper-escort carries a selected rifle.

The famous "drill" is an English magazine rifle of the Lee-Enfield system, various models of which came to Afghanistan in large numbers back in the 20-30s, becoming known under the name that has been attached to the weapon since the time of the Anglo-Boer War. With a caliber of 7.62 mm, a powerful cartridge and good ballistics made it a dangerous weapon with sniper characteristics. The aiming range of the "drill" reached 2500 m, and even a bulletproof vest did not save from a bullet.

Caravan search. The clothes of the Afghans had no pockets, everything they needed was carried in bags, and money and documents were usually hidden in a turban. An Afghan man sits on sacks of smuggled hash found in a shipment.

The landing of the reconnaissance group on the "Kalatka" - the road from Shahjay to Kalat. On a crowded road, cars with smuggled goods were often encountered, and many drivers who changed the craft of a caravan driver to a driver's profession earned money by delivering cargo to local gangs. Zabal Province, end of 1987.

Inspection of cars on the road near the Pakistani border. According to local custom, men rode on the roof, and inside were cattle and women. Forbidden property, in addition to smuggling, weapons and ammunition, included uniforms, equipment and medicines necessary in military affairs.

The semi-truck "Toyota Simurg" was often found in caravans. A reliable, roomy and unpretentious car was a coveted trophy and was a success in the Soviet units, where it received the nickname "Simurka". This car even managed to get the numbers of the military traffic police of the 40th Army.

Dushmansky shooter - a strong fellow under two meters tall, taken prisoner during the inspection. The militant was given a bruise on his right shoulder - a trace of a butt when a powerful "drill" or a machine gun was returned.

A Toyota pickup truck intercepted from the air in the middle of the desert. The Afghans, who were going about their business without any road, noticed the helicopter of the 205th ove, poured out of the car and ran to the side, showing the absence of weapons and hostile intentions, and at the same time trying to get away from the car in case of shooting.

RESULTS OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF THE 186th OOSPN

So, during the capture of the Vasatichignai fortified area in the province of Kandahar in March 1986, a special forces group of Art. Lieutenant Kravchenko was mistakenly landed directly on the anti-aircraft positions of the dushmans. Both of her helicopters were shot at point-blank range, but 12 paratroopers managed to gain a foothold and knocked out the enemy from a height, and then captured the neighboring one, ensuring the success of the operation. On March 20, 1986, during the assault on the base in the Khadegar Gorge near Kandahar, large forces were involved - two battalions of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, a howitzer division, two helicopter and two assault squadrons. The gorge was blocked from the surrounding mountains by four groups of the 173rd Special Forces, 16 people each (each had an ATS-17 and two PCs). They intercepted the retreating enemy, shot him with fire from ambushes and directed aircraft. The whole operation took 4 hours, its result was 20 killed dushmans and trophies without losses on their part.

For the most part, nevertheless, the detachments had to deal with "piece" tasks - hunting for caravans, for which the special forces worked out their own methodology. According to the headquarters of the 40th Army, the special forces soldiers were "real professionals who had excellent physical and military training." It is curious that the special forces were more often selected by no means tall and massive soldiers. According to the Chirchik battalion commander Colonel Yu.M. Starov, "pitching" is better suited for sports companies. We need to carry a mountain of all sorts of junk, weapons and supplies, and helicopters and armored personnel carriers are not made of rubber. We don't need Gullivers, we need compact guys.

According to the experience of the Kandahar detachment, typical equipment for 3–4 days of independent work was determined as follows: 2–3 sets of ammunition for personal weapons, 4 hand grenades (2 RGD-5 and 2 F-1), one RPG-18 grenade for two, two 200-g TNT bombs, 5 smoke bombs and 5 signal jet cartridges, 4 mines for an 82-mm mortar (if you took it with you) or a drum with a tape for ATS-17, a food supply for 3-5 days, 2-3 flasks water or tea, raincoat and blanket. The equipment varied according to the time of year and conditions - in winter and in the mountains, warm clothes, pea coats and sleeping bags were added. Massive ATS-17, mortars and machine guns were disassembled into "lifting" parts of 15-20 kg. Sometimes part of the food was donated in favor of ammunition - as the same Starov taught, "if you have enough cartridges with you, you will always get food." The general equipment of a fighter weighed, at best, and the "summer" version, 35-40 kg, and the most necessary. The group preparing for the exit consisted of 10 to 25 people, and, in addition to the obligatory sniper, grenade launcher and signalman, could include grenade launchers from the ATS-17, artillery spotter and aircraft gunner, miners and flamethrowers from chemical troops units armed with RPO-A with volume explosion ammunition .

Inspection of the cargo "Mercedes". The driver and the owners of the cargo are waiting at gunpoint for the results of the check. Bags and bales were pierced with a probe and controlled by mine detectors, looking for weapons and ammunition - the main purpose of the inspection. Paktika province, winter 1988.

There were no searches at night - the caravan stalking in the dark was obviously not carrying raisins and nuts. The fate of those who came out to the ambush was decided unequivocally: by fire to kill. In the photo - "Simurg", seen at night on the road and blown up by a controlled mine. The driver and attendant died in the cockpit, and in the morning the car was finished off by helicopters. Registan, January 18, 1988.

The group was divided into capture, fire and cover units, the actions of which were coordinated in advance and worked out, clarifying the balance of forces and mutual support on the spot. The basis was the troika, the seniority in which was not always assigned by rank, but by experience and subordination to a knowledgeable sergeant, a young officer could well get.

Getting to the ambush site where the caravan or gang was expected remained the most difficult part of the plan. Not only success, but also the fate of the group depended on his secrecy. In places where the appearance of any stranger became noticeable, nomads, shepherds and local residents could give out an ambush, dushman posts monitored the situation, immediately reporting the danger by radio, signal fires and mirror "bunnies".

Inspection of a caravan in the desert. Cameleers at gunpoint drive the camels together and lay them on the ground to check the packs. Covering helicopters continue to circle nearby, ready to stop the caravaners' attempts to scatter or to support the scouts with fire if they resist. In this caravan, 15 prisoners were taken, suspected of being sent from an overseas training camp to one of the local gangs. Kandahar Province, February 12, 1988.

On the site of a pack caravan destroyed in the desert. The ambush was organized on April 3, 1988 by the "Kid" group - Lieutenant Igor Vesnin from the 173rd Special Forces. By the spring of this year, his combat work was evaluated by the Orders of the Red Star and the Red Banner.

Fighters of the 370th near the burned-out Toyotas of the Dushman caravan. In the bodies - ammunition and motorcycles "Yamaha", at the door - the body of the burnt driver. Helmand Province, 1987

After a night ambush near Shahjoy. A surviving pickup truck with cargo and caravaners who did not have time to scatter, mowed down in a fleeting battle.

The machine gunner tries on shooting, getting used to the SPS - a small arms and machine gun structure. The SPS were built from stones collected nearby and provided protection from small arms fire. Due to the speed of preparation and the abundance of building materials around, the location of the reconnaissance group or the ambush site, several SPS were equipped, which made it possible to transfer fire in different directions. In the cells ahead of time, grenades and a supply of cartridges could fit.

A large caravan whose camels carried weapons and ammunition. About a hundred Chinese rockets were found in packs of slaughtered animals.

The cargo taken with battle, which had nothing to take out, was doused with diesel fuel and burned on the spot.

In the morning at the battlefield - a dead caravane near the scattered bags of drugs. They tried not to let any of the drivers and those accompanying the cargo leave - if shooting in the mountains was a common thing and almost did not attract attention, then the departed could call for help and bring trouble.

Mi-8MT 335 obvp removes an ambush of Jalalabash special forces. Most of the scouts have characteristic flat packs RD-54, some are ordinary backpacks with additional pockets sewn on. Soldiers at the helicopter carry anti-vehicle mines PTM-62. An impressive hole is visible on the overalls of the trailer - a trace of a raid on stony mountains. Nangarhar, summer 1986.

Special Forces soldiers at the headquarters of the 22nd Special Forces Brigade in Lashkargah before being sent home. All the property of the soldiers and sergeants who had served their time fit into the “demobilization” diplomat, but on the chest almost everyone had not only the obligatory badges “From the grateful Afghan people”, but also the military orders of the Red Star.

Andrei Goryachev, sergeant of the Kandahar detachment of the 173rd OOSP, before leaving for an ambush in the fall of 1987. Afghan clothing and a turban allowed the fighters of the group to pass for one of the local gangs and use the advantage won. In the outfit - sneakers, a belt with pockets for shots for the GP-25 underbarrel and a tactical vest, in the pockets of which, in addition to automatic "horns", grenades and signal cartridges. Sergeant Goryachev died on October 24, 1987 from multiple wounds in a battle in the village of Kobai.

The most valuable trophies are rockets and MANPADS "Stinger", for the capture of which a presentation to the order was promised ahead of time.

RESULTS OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF THE 334th OOSPN

Trophies taken after the destruction of the Dushman warehouse: cartridges and weapons of various systems, including hunting rifles, several “drills” of different models and years of manufacture, an SKS self-loading carbine and RPG, boxes with fuses, grenades, explosive packages, coils of incendiary and demolition cord, cartridge boxes for machine guns and mines in ribbed plastic cases that are not detected by mine detectors.

In order to "outplay" the enemy, deceptive maneuvers and landing methods were invented. At first, it was carried out by advancing in armored vehicles and trucks, sometimes accompanying the exit with the direction of false armored groups in other directions. Having reached the desired area, the group dismounted and, true to the rule of "the scout's legs are fed," with a forced march at the fastest possible pace, went to the side. The transition to the ambush site, which confused the tracks, took 10–20 km (and sometimes much more). They tried to complete it before sunrise, having managed to disguise themselves. The equipment continued to move on, distracting enemy observers with noise, but continuing to remain in a close area in order to support the fighters if necessary. Nevertheless, the waiting zone had to be assigned no closer than 30-50 km, so as not to frighten away the caravan. In the ambush, they knew that, if something happened, help would not arrive soon, and they remained only with light weapons, counting on preparation, surprise and luck.

Having taken a position (“sitting on the path”), the special forces tried not to betray the ambush place in any way, avoiding movement and not making fire - at best, the enemy who discovered something was amiss blocked the route, waiting or changing the path of the caravan. At worst, having noticed the group, the dushmans pulled up forces and tried to destroy it, having superiority both in numbers and in weapons. The danger of oncoming dushman ambushes could await the group even at the exit. On hostile territory, even with good organization and camouflage, the group, as a rule, remained unnoticed for no more than 2–3 days, and, in the absence of results, they tried to remove ambushes without waiting for enemy responses.

The group of the Kabul 469th company of the Special Forces takes up positions near the stone ridge above the gorge at the mouth of the Panjshir. Blocking the caravan route in the area flooded with dushmans required the concentration of firepower. The group included flamethrowers with reactive RPO-A Shmel, whose volume explosion ammunition provided the detachment with firepower that was not inferior to heavy artillery shells. Anava area, September 1986

RESULTS OF COMBAT ACTIVITIES 1985–1988 370th OOSPN

Such an organization, reminiscent in miniature of combined arms operations with the release of columns and escort of equipment and military operations on the spot, quickly showed its shortcomings. The effectiveness of the actions of the special forces depended, first of all, on secrecy and surprise, and the cumbersome and time-stretched landing of groups did not contribute to this. To a large extent, this was due to the low effectiveness of ambushes in the first year of combat work of the Special Forces: during the winter of 1984/85, the OKSV forces conducted 1,460 ambushes, but the percentage of their success remained at the same low level.

More successful were operations involving helicopters that landed groups and remained ready to support them with air fire, and, if necessary, quickly evacuate. A milestone change took place in March 1985, when the special forces forces were reorganized and significantly strengthened. While maintaining the 469th Kabul company of the Special Forces, the number of detachments was increased to eight, transferring an additional three from the Union and forming one more on the spot. In addition to the already existing Special Forces units in Kandahar, Jalalabad and Ghazni, the 334th OOSPN (“5th Battalion”), the 370th OOSPN (“6th Battalion”), the 186th OOSPN (“7th Battalion”) arrived battalion") and the 411th OOSPN ("8th battalion").

The 334th smallpox was formed in the winter of 1985 on the basis of the 5th brigade from Maryina Gorka (BelVO) and replenished with personnel from the 2nd, 14th, 9th and 22nd detachment. After being transferred to Chirchik, he went under his own power to the place of deployment, arriving in Asadabad on March 29. Major V.Ya. became the first commander of the detachment. Terentiev. The point of permanent deployment of the 334th smallpox, already operating in the most difficult border area, was so close to the Pakistani border that there were militant bases almost next to the Kunar River, from where the garrison was shelled every now and then. The valley of Kunar, which abounded with dushmans, soon confirmed its notoriety - a group of the unfired first company of the 334th smallpox, having gone out to comb the Maravar Gorge, on April 21 came under fire from ambushes, was cut off from its own and almost completely died, The company commander captain N. N. Tsebruk, group commander Lieutenant N.A. Kuznetsov blew himself up with a grenade, and seven more encircled fighters did the same. The dead had to be carried out with a fight, and in three days the detachment lost 29 people.

Soon after that, the commander was replaced - Major G.V. became him for two years. Bykov, who became famous as "Grigory Kunarsky".

The 370th OOSPN, formed on January 1, 1985 in Chuchkovo (MVO), under the command of Major I.M. Crota arrived at the base in Lashkargah (Helmand province) on March 21. On April 14, the 186th Special Forces, which arrived from Izyaslav (PrikVo), was deployed in Shakhdzhoy nearby. It was formed on the basis of the 8th brigade on the basis of the directive of the General Staff of January 6, 1985 in the same state No. 21/422. The formation of the "southern belt" by the fall was completed by the 411th Special Forces in Farah, organized on the basis of the 70th Special Forces and the 5th Guards. msd. The task of these detachments was to block the routes through the deserts of Khash and Registan, where there were practically no outposts and garrisons.

Organizationally, the detachments of the Special Forces were consolidated into two brigades - the 15th and 22nd detachments with headquarters in Jalalabad and Lashkargah (better known as Lashkarevka). Directive of the General Staff No. 314/2/0208 in April introduced the management and support units of the brigades. The 15th brigade included the 154th, 177th, 688th and 334th special forces, the 22nd brigade - the 173rd, 370th, 186th and 411th special forces (the latter was fully staffed by the winter of 1985).

Special Forces were attracted to work as "fire brigades" - conducting special events and operations in other areas. An-26 delivered the reconnaissance group of the 173rd Special Forces with equipment and weapons back to Kandahar after the operation.

The group commander leads to the helicopter gunner Afghan. In order to remain unrecognized and to keep secret cooperation with the Shuravi, the Afghans hid their faces under a turban, opening it only in the cockpit of a helicopter.

At the Army headquarters, the general management of the special forces was carried out by the Ekran task force, which supplied the brigades with intelligence and coordinated their actions. Each of the battalions consisted of about 500 people, and the entire spetsnaz force consisted of more than 4,000 fighters. Their level and correlation with combined arms units is evidenced by the fact that, according to the estimates of the Army command, up to 80 thousand people were required to perform the same tasks of closing the border with conventional forces. The belt along the Pakistani border and in the south was to control a zone of almost 1200 km.

The available data on the 186th detachment allow us to evaluate its combat work: by the end of 1985, in a little more than 200 days, its fighters completed 202 combat exits and 45 inspection sorties. The actions of reconnaissance groups (200 exits) in ambushes were predominant, and only twice were the forces of the entire detachment involved in raids on Dushman bases. There were 36 successful ambushes (18%), in which 370 spooks, 34 vehicles and a lot of ammunition were destroyed, taking 15 prisoners and 98 weapons. Losses amounted to 12 killed, including two officers.

From the book of the Secret Service of the Third Reich: Book 1 author Chuev Sergey Gennadievich

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Special-purpose caravan In the second half of the 18th century, none of the highest dignitaries of the Russian Empire made grandiose plans to persuade the rulers of Khiva and Bukhara to become allies, so that, using their humility, to beat through those who were subject only to the Russians.

From Kozlov's book "Special Forces GRU-2":

Sergeev:
"In fact, until now no one can say for sure what exploded then. Many high officials and the press tried to blame me and my subordinates personally for everything. Allegedly, we did not check the building, but it was mined. Allegedly, they even found wires that led from the ruins of the house to the fence. However, this is nonsense. Firstly, having been fighting for more than a year, I perfectly understood that there could be surprises in the buildings in the captured city. We were brought up on the books and experience of I. G. Starinov. Therefore, I still I once again confirm that the building was checked by us for mining. But still, if we assume that we could not find a landmine, controlled by wires that we allegedly found later, then I can object to this. The courtyard of the building was also paved in order to to lay the cable, it was necessary to remove the asphalt in the place where the cable passed. And this would certainly have caught the eye. If we assume that the building was mined in advance and the wire was laid long ago, and the place of its occurrence was asphalted in the calculation If Grozny were to be occupied by troops, and the military would settle in a suitable building, it must be assumed that the house would have been mined in such a way that not only one of its corners collapsed. I think that in this case, the pros would work and make a bookmark that would bring down the entire building. Otherwise, there is no need to fence the garden. Therefore, this version does not stand up to criticism.
The second version is that in my room next to the headquarters, explosives were stored that we needed for work. Allegedly, the officer, whose fate we decided, could not bear the shame, entered there and blew himself up and everyone else with a grenade. But this does not seem to be true, because a minute before the explosion, I saw him lying face down on the bed.
The most likely cause of the explosion is a hit by our own artillery shell. The fact that in that war artillery hit the white light and often hit friendly people is no secret to anyone. After that, I heard about a similar case with a Marine Corps unit. The nature of the destruction of the house indicates that this is the most likely version. In any case, it was confirmed by the gunners who were with me in the hospital. And who, if not them, should know what happens when their shells hit the building.
Indirectly, the version is confirmed by how quickly high officials supported her. Finding out whose shell it was is quite difficult. The trial will testify to the mess that is going on in Grozny. The press will begin to shout that if the army indiscriminately hits its own people, then what is happening with the population cannot even be imagined. Which, in essence, would be true, but very unnecessary command. Well, it's your own fault."

The whole story of Sergeev will be in the previous post, when his respected botter unblocks because of the link.

Tests for strength, endurance and perfection of each movement. Participants in large-scale competitions had to not only shoot accurately or defuse mines, but also hit a needle with a thread.

Special Forces detachments carry out the detention of criminals, examining house after house. One wrong move and the stretch kicks in. Here everything is as close as possible to combat conditions. Now the team needs to urgently provide medical assistance to the wounded.

Competitions of special forces of the Russian Guard are held in the Smolensk region, where models of settlements are built - a small village or a high-rise building. In their work, special forces must make quick decisions and adapt to any situation. Competitions of this magnitude are held for the first time, together with detachments of military special forces, SOBR and OMON fighters take part in them.

“We, SOBR employees, are at such competitions for the first time, we take something from these competitions for ourselves, share with others, for example, by storming buildings, we met with many of our comrades, with whom we used to serve, but our paths went to different structures, for different units, ”says a SOBR officer.

Every day of the competition is a new challenge. The obstacle course is replaced by another novelty - guards biathlon. The team passes the distance at speed, and at the same time fires from different weapons - from a pistol to a grenade launcher.

“This is specifically the composition of the unit, which goes on a combat mission. A full-fledged squad that can go out to work for a week, two weeks, a month and for detention. There are specialists, a sniper, a machine gunner, a grenade launcher, all the rest are shooters with machine guns, ”says a SOBR officer.

They need to hit the target and run as fast as possible, but the finish line is yet another test, and perhaps the most difficult. The fighters must try to thread the needle.

At first glance, nothing special, but not after you made a forced march in full gear, shot off a magazine or ran in a gas mask. The test of the needle is a reminder that even in the midst of the most intense battle, there are times when a fighter must calm down, pull himself together and be as focused as possible.

This is how strength and endurance are tested: first you need to carry giant logs, then these wheels, 300 kilograms each - inhuman loads, but then more - the fighters push a 14-ton armored personnel carrier, and immediately after that they must make a forced march for 5 kilometers.

“Technique is more important than power. If it is technically correct to approach this issue, in principle, there was nothing complicated. The unit is much smaller in height and weight than the others, but they coped quite quickly, because they knew how and what, ”says an employee of a separate special forces unit.

The National Guard says that these are not just competitions, but also large-scale exercises that will help all special forces officers in the future.

“A rather serious headquarters has been created here, which summarizes the results of these competitions, which summarizes the methods used by the unit in the course of solving training problems. And on the basis of these methods, a single concept for the training of these units will be developed, ”explains Sergey Melikov, First Deputy Director of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation.

The competition lasted a week, and every day the standings changed, someone lost ground, and someone pulled ahead. As a result, the military special forces of the central district, a detachment based in Smolensk, were declared the winner.