It is known that the question "Does Russia need an ocean-going fleet, and if so, why?" still causes a lot of controversy between supporters and opponents of the "big fleet". The thesis that Russia is one of the world's major powers, and as such it needs a navy, is countered by the thesis that Russia is a continental power that does not really need a navy. And if she needs any naval forces, then only for the direct defense of the coast. Of course, the material brought to your attention does not claim to be an exhaustive answer on this issue, but nevertheless, in this article we will try to reflect on the tasks of the navy of the Russian Empire.

It is well known that at present approximately 80% of all foreign trade, or rather, foreign trade cargo turnover, is carried out through maritime transport. It is no less interesting that maritime transport as a means of transportation leads not only in foreign trade, but also in world cargo turnover as a whole - its share in total commodity flows exceeds 60%, and this does not include inland water (mainly river) transportation. Why is that?

The first and key answer is that ocean shipping is cheap. They are much cheaper than any other type of transport, rail, road, etc. And what does it mean?

It can be said that this means additional profit for the seller, but this is not entirely true. It was not for nothing that in the old days there was a saying: “Across the sea, a heifer is a half, but a ruble is transported.” We all understand perfectly well that for the end buyer of a product, its cost consists of two components, namely: the price of the product + the price of delivery of this very product to the consumer's territory.

In other words, here we have France in the second half of the 19th century. Suppose she has a need for bread and the choice is to buy wheat from Argentina or from Russia. Let's also assume that the cost of this very wheat in Argentina and Russia is the same, which means that the profit extracted at an equal selling price is the same. But Argentina is ready to deliver wheat by sea, and Russia - only by rail. Russia's shipping costs for delivery will be higher. Accordingly, in order to offer an equal price with Argentina at the place of consumption of the goods, i.e. in France, Russia will have to reduce the price of grain by the difference in transport costs. In fact, in world trade in such cases, the supplier has to pay the difference in the cost of transportation out of his own pocket. The buyer country is not interested in the price "somewhere out there" - it is interested in the price of the goods on its territory.

Of course, no exporter is willing to pay the higher cost of transportation by land (and today air) transport from their own profits, therefore, in any case, when the use of sea transport is possible, they use it. It is clear that there are special cases when it is cheaper to use road, rail or other transport. But these are just special cases, and they do not make the difference, but basically land or air transport is resorted to only when, for some reason, sea transport cannot be used.

Accordingly, we will not be mistaken in declaring:
1) Sea transport is the main transport of international trade, and the vast majority of international cargo transportation is carried out by sea.
2) Maritime transport has become such as a result of cheapness relative to other means of delivery.

And here one often hears that the Russian Empire did not have sea transport in sufficient quantities, and if so, then why does Russia need a navy?

Well, let's remember the Russian Empire of the second half of the 19th century. What then happened in its foreign trade and how valuable it was for us? Due to the lag in industrialization, the volume of Russian industrial goods supplied for export fell to ridiculous levels, and the bulk of exports were food products and some other raw materials. In fact, in the second half of the 19th century, against the background of a sharp development of industry in the USA, Germany, etc. Russia quickly slipped into the rank of agrarian powers. For any country, its foreign trade is extremely important, but for Russia at that moment it turned out to be paramount in particular, because only in this way could the newest means of production and high-quality industrial products get into the Russian Empire.

Of course, it was necessary to purchase wisely, because by opening the market to foreign goods, we risked destroying even the industry that we had, since it would not withstand such competition. Therefore, for a significant part of the second half of the 19th century, the Russian Empire followed a policy of protectionism, that is, it imposed high customs duties on imported products. What does this mean for the budget? In 1900, the revenue part of the ordinary budget of Russia amounted to 1,704.1 million rubles, of which 204 million rubles were formed by customs duties, which is quite noticeable 11.97%. But these 204 million rubles. the benefit from foreign trade was by no means exhausted, because the treasury also received taxes on exported goods, and in addition, a positive balance between imports and exports provided a currency to service the public debt.

In other words, the producers of the Russian Empire created and sold for export products worth many hundreds of millions of rubles (unfortunately, the author did not find how much they shipped in 1900, but in 1901 they shipped products worth more than 860 million rubles). Naturally, due to this sale, tidy sums of taxes were paid to the budget. But in addition to taxes, the state additionally received additional excess profits in the amount of 204 million rubles. from customs duties, when foreign products were purchased with the proceeds from export sales!

We can say that all of the above gave a direct benefit to the budget, but there was also an indirect one. After all, producers did not just sell for export, they made a profit for the development of their farms. It is no secret that the Russian Empire bought not only colonial goods and all sorts of junk for those in power, but, for example, also the latest agricultural equipment - not as much as it needed, but still. Thus, foreign trade contributed to an increase in labor productivity and an increase in total production, which, again, subsequently contributed to the replenishment of the budget.

Accordingly, we can say that foreign trade was a super-profitable business for the budget of the Russian Empire. But... We have already said that the main trade between countries goes by sea, right? The Russian Empire is by no means an exception to this rule. Most, if not to say - the vast majority of cargo was exported/imported from/to Russia by sea.

Accordingly, the first task of the fleet of the Russian Empire was to ensure the security of the country's foreign trade.

And here there is one very important nuance: it was foreign trade that brought super-profits to the budget, and by no means the presence of a strong merchant fleet in Russia. More precisely, Russia did not have a strong merchant fleet, but significant budget preferences from foreign trade (carried out by 80 percent by sea) did. Why is that?

As we have already said, the price of the goods for the country-buyer consists of the price of the goods in the territory of the country-producer of the cost of delivery to its territory. Therefore, it does not matter at all who carries the products: a Russian transport, a British steamship, a New Zealand canoe or Captain Nemo's Nautilus. The only important thing is that the transport is reliable, and the cost of transportation is minimal.

The fact is that it makes sense to invest in the construction of a civilian fleet only in cases where:
1) The result of such construction will be a competitive transport fleet capable of providing the minimum cost of sea transportation in comparison with the transport of other countries.
2) For some reason, the transport fleets of other powers cannot ensure the reliability of cargo transportation.

Unfortunately, even if only due to the industrial backwardness of the Russian Empire in the 2nd half of the 19th century, it was very difficult for it to build a competitive transport fleet, if at all possible. But even if it was possible - what will we achieve in e that case? Oddly enough, nothing special, because the budget of the Russian Empire will have to find funds for investments in the maritime transport industry, and it will only receive taxes from the newly formed maritime shipping companies - perhaps such an investment project would be attractive (if indeed we could build a maritime transport system at the level of the best in the world) but still did not at all promise profits in the short term, and super-profits - never at all. Oddly enough, to ensure Russia's foreign trade, its own transport fleet turned out to be not too necessary.

The author of this article is by no means against a strong transport fleet for Russia, but it should be understood: in this respect, the development of railways was much more useful for Russia, because in addition to domestic transportation (and in the middle of Russia there is no sea, like it or not, but goods have to be transported by land) this is also a significant military aspect (acceleration of the terms of mobilization, transfer and supply of troops). And the country's budget is by no means rubber. Of course, some kind of transport fleet of the Russian Empire was needed, but the development of the merchant fleet should not be prioritized by the agrarian power at that time.

The navy is needed to protect the country's foreign trade, i.e. cargo carried by the transport fleet, while it does not matter whose transport fleet carries our cargo.

Another option - what will happen if we abandon maritime transport and focus on land transport? Nothing good. Firstly, we increase the cost of delivery and thereby make our products less competitive with similar products in other countries. Secondly, unfortunately, or fortunately, Russia traded with almost all of Europe, but it bordered far from all European countries. Organizing trade "on land" through the territory of foreign powers, we always have the danger that, for example, Germany, for example, will at any moment introduce a duty for the transit of goods through its territory, or oblige it to be transported only by its own transport, breaking up an exorbitant price for transportation and ... what do we do in this case? Let's go to the adversary with a holy war? Well, all right, if it borders on us, and we, at least theoretically, can threaten it with an invasion, but what if there are no common land borders?

Maritime transport does not create such problems. The sea, in addition to being cheap, is also remarkable because it is nobody's. Well, with the exception of territorial waters, of course, but in general they don’t make much weather ... Unless, of course, we are talking about the Bosphorus.

As a matter of fact, the statement about how difficult it is to trade through the territory of a not too friendly power perfectly illustrates Russian-Turkish relations. For many years, the tsars looked at the Straits with lust, not at all because of innate quarrelsomeness, but for the simple reason that while the Bosphorus was in the hands of Turkey, Turkey controlled a significant part of Russian exports that went by ship straight through the Bosphorus. In the 80s and 90s of the 19th century, up to 29.2% of all exports were exported through the Bosphorus, and after 1905 this figure increased to 56.5%. According to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, for a decade (from 1903 to 1912) export through the Dardanelles amounted to 37% of the total export of the empire. Any military or serious political conflict with the Turks threatened the Russian Empire with colossal financial and image losses. At the beginning of the 20th century, Turkey closed the Straits twice - this happened during the Italo-Turkish (1911-1912) Balkan (1912-1913) wars. According to the calculations of the Russian Ministry of Finance, the loss from the closure of the Straits for the treasury reached 30 million rubles. monthly.

Turkey's behavior perfectly illustrates how dangerous the position of a country whose foreign trade can be controlled by other powers. But this is exactly what would happen to Russian foreign trade if we tried to conduct it overland, through the territories of a number of European countries that are by no means always friendly to us.

In addition, the above data also explains how the foreign trade of the Russian Empire was interconnected with the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. For the Russian Empire, the mastery of the Straits was a strategic task not at all because of the desire for new territories, but to ensure uninterrupted foreign trade. Consider how the navy could contribute to this task.

The author of this article has repeatedly come across the opinion that Turkey, if it gets really tight, we could conquer by land, i.e. simply occupying its territories. This is largely true, because in the 2nd half of the 19th century, the Brilliant Porta gradually slipped into senile insanity, and although it still remained a fairly strong enemy, it still could not resist Russia in a full-scale war alone. Therefore, it would seem that there are no special obstacles for the conquest (temporary occupation) of Turkey with the withdrawal of the Bosphorus in our favor, and the fleet does not seem to be needed for this.

There is only one problem in all this reasoning - not a single European country could desire such a strengthening of the Russian Empire. Therefore, there is no doubt that in the event of a threat to seize the Straits, Russia would immediately face the most powerful political, and then military pressure from Britain and other countries. Strictly speaking, the Crimean War of 1853-56 arose due to similar reasons. Russia always had to take into account that its attempt to seize the Straits would face political and military opposition from the strongest European powers, and as the Crimean War showed, the Empire was not ready for this.

But an even worse option was possible. If suddenly Russia nevertheless chose such a moment when its war with Turkey, for some reason, would not cause the formation of an anti-Russian coalition of European powers, then while the Russian army would cut its way to Constantinople, the British, having carried out a lightning landing operation, could well to “grab” the Bosporus for ourselves, which would be a grave political defeat for us. For worse than the Straits in the hands of Turkey for Russia would be the Straits in the hands of Foggy Albion.

And therefore, perhaps, the only way to capture the Straits, without getting involved in a global military confrontation with a coalition of European powers, was to conduct their own lightning operation with the landing of a powerful landing force, capturing the dominant heights and establishing control over the Bosphorus and Constantinople. After that, it was necessary to urgently transport large military contingents and strengthen the coastal defenses in every possible way - and prepare to withstand the battle with the British fleet "in pre-prepared positions."

Accordingly, the Black Sea navy was needed for:
1) The defeat of the Turkish fleet.
2) Ensuring the landing of troops (fire support, etc.).
3) Reflection of a possible attack by the British Mediterranean squadron (based on coastal defenses).

It is likely that the Russian land army could conquer the Bosphorus, but in this case, the West had enough time to think and organize opposition to its capture. It is a completely different matter to quickly seize the Bosphorus from the sea and present the world community with a fait accompli.

Of course, one can object to the realism of this scenario, bearing in mind how much the Allies got into trouble by besieging the Dardanelles from the sea in the First World War.

Yes, having spent a lot of time, effort and ships, landing powerful landings, the British and French, as a result, were defeated and were forced to retreat. But there are two very significant nuances. Firstly, one cannot compare the slowly dying Turkey of the second half of the 19th century with the "Young Turk" Turkey of the First World War - these are two very different powers. And secondly, for a long time the allies tried not to capture, but only to force the Straits, using exclusively the fleet, and thus gave Turkey time to organize land defense, the concentration of troops, which subsequently repelled the Anglo-French landings. Russian plans did not provide for forcing, namely, the capture of the Bosphorus, by conducting a sudden landing operation. Consequently, although in such an operation Russia could not have used resources similar to those that were thrown by the allies into the Dardanelles during the First World War, there was a certain hope for success.

Thus, the creation of a strong Black Sea fleet, obviously superior to the Turkish one and corresponding in power to the British Mediterranean squadron, was one of the most important tasks of the Russian State. And you need to understand that the need for its construction was by no means determined by the whim of those in power, but by the most vital economic interests of the country!

A small note: it is unlikely that anyone reading these lines considers Nicholas II an exemplary statesman and a beacon of state wisdom. But the Russian shipbuilding policy in the First World War looks completely reasonable - while the construction of the Izmails in the Baltic was completely curtailed in favor of light forces (destroyers and submarines), dreadnoughts continued to be built in the Black Sea. And it was not at all the fear of Goeben that was the reason: having a fairly powerful fleet of 3-4 dreadnoughts and 4-5 battleships, one could take a chance and try to capture the Bosphorus, when Turkey completely exhausted its forces on the land fronts, and the Grand Fleet was all the High Seas Fleet, which is quietly dying in Wilhelmshaven, will still be on guard. Thus, placing our valiant allies in the Entente before the fait accompli of the "dream come true" of the Russian Empire.

By the way, if we are talking about a powerful fleet for capturing the Straits, then it should be noted that if Russia did reign on the shores of the Bosphorus, then the Black Sea would finally turn into Russian Lake. Because the Straits are the key to the Black Sea, and a well-equipped land defense (with the support of the fleet) was probably able to repel any onslaught from the sea. And this means that there is absolutely no need to invest in the land defense of the Black Sea coast of Russia, there is no need to keep troops there, etc. - and this is also a kind of savings, and quite considerable. Of course, the presence of a powerful Black Sea Fleet to a certain extent made life easier for the ground forces in any war with Turkey, which, in fact, was perfectly demonstrated by the First World War, when Russian ships not only supported the coastal flank with artillery fire and landings, but, perhaps more importantly, , interrupted Turkish shipping and thereby excluded the possibility of supplying the Turkish army by sea, "locking" it to land communications.

We have already said that the most important task of the Russian Imperial Navy was to protect the country's foreign trade. For the Black Sea theater and in relations with Turkey, this task is very clearly concretized in the capture of the Straits, but what about the rest of the countries?

Of course, the best way to protect your own maritime trade is to destroy the fleet of a power that dares to encroach on it (trade). But building the most powerful navy in the world, capable, in case of war, of crushing any competitor at sea, driving the remnants of its navy into ports, blocking them, covering up its communications with masses of cruisers and all this ensuring unhindered trade with other countries was obviously outside opportunities of the Russian Empire. In the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the construction of the navy was perhaps the most science-intensive and technologically advanced industry among all other human occupations - it was not for nothing that the battleship was considered the pinnacle of science and technology of those years. Of course, tsarist Russia, which with a certain difficulty reached the 5th place in the world in terms of industrial power, could in no way count on the construction of a navy superior to the British.

Another way to protect our own maritime trade is to somehow "convince" countries with more powerful navies to stay away from our goods. But how can this be done? Diplomacy? Alas, political alliances are short-lived, especially with England, which, as you know, "has no permanent allies, but only permanent interests." And these interests lie in not allowing any European power to become excessively stronger - as soon as France, Russia or Germany began to demonstrate power sufficient to consolidate Europe, England immediately threw all its efforts into forming an alliance of weaker powers in order to weaken the power of the strongest.

The best argument in politics is strength. But how to demonstrate it to the weakest power at sea?
To do this, remember that:
1) Any first-class maritime power itself conducts a developed foreign trade, a significant proportion of which is carried out by sea.
2) Attack always takes precedence over defense.

This is how the theory of “cruising war” appeared, which we will consider in more detail in the next article: for now, we will only note that its key idea: gaining dominance at sea through cruising operations turned out to be unattainable. But the potential threat to maritime navigation, which was created by the fleet, capable of carrying out cruising operations in the ocean, was very great, and even the mistress of the seas, England, was forced to take it into account in her policy.

Accordingly, the creation of a powerful cruiser fleet served two tasks at once - the cruisers were excellently suited both to protect their own cargo transportation and to interrupt enemy maritime trade. The only thing cruisers couldn't do was fight much better armed and protected battleships. Therefore, of course, it would be a shame to build a strong cruising fleet in the Baltic and ... be blocked in ports by a few battleships of some Sweden.

Here we touch on such a task of the fleet as protecting its own coast, but we will not consider it in detail, because the need for such protection is obvious to both supporters and opponents of the ocean fleet.

So, we state that the key tasks of the naval forces of the Russian Empire were:
1) Protection of Russia's foreign trade (including by capturing the Straits and creating a potential threat to the foreign trade of other countries).
2) Protection of the coast from the threat from the sea.

How the Russian Empire was going to solve these problems, we will discuss in the next article, but for now we will pay attention to the issue of the cost of the navy. And indeed - if we are talking about the fact that the navy is necessary to protect the country's foreign trade, then it would be necessary to correlate budget revenues from foreign trade with the costs of maintaining the fleet. Because one of the favorite arguments of the opponents of the "large fleet" is precisely the gigantic and unjustified costs of its construction. But is it?

As we said above, in 1900 the income from customs duties on imported goods alone amounted to 204 million rubles. and, of course, the benefits from the foreign trade of the Russian State were far from exhausted. And what about the fleet? In 1900, Russia was a first-class maritime power, and its fleet could well claim the title of the third fleet in the world (after England and France). At the same time, mass construction of new warships was carried out - the country was preparing to fight for the Far Eastern borders ... But with all this, in 1900, the expenses of the Naval Department for the maintenance and construction of the fleet amounted to only 78.7 million rubles. This amounted to 26.15% of the amount received by the Ministry of War (expenditures on the army amounted to 300.9 million rubles) and only 5.5% of the total budget of the country. True, an important caveat must be made here.

The fact is that in the Russian Empire there were two budgets - an ordinary and an emergency, and the funds of the latter were often directed to finance the current needs of the Military and Naval Ministries, as well as to wage wars (when they were) and some other purposes. The above 78.7 million rubles. the Naval Ministry passed only under the ordinary budget, but the author does not know how much money the Maritime Department received under the emergency budget. But in total, according to the emergency budget, 103.4 million rubles were allocated for the needs of the Military and Naval Ministries in 1900. and it is obvious that from this amount, quite large funds were spent on suppressing the boxer uprising in China. It is also known that much more was usually allocated from the emergency budget for the army than for the fleet (for example, in 1909 over 82 million rubles were allocated for the army, and less than 1.5 million rubles for the fleet), so it is extremely difficult to assume that the total expenditure figure of the Naval Ministry in 1900 exceeded 85-90 million rubles.

But, in order not to guess, let's look at the statistics of 1913. This is a period when the combat training of the fleet was given increased attention, and the country was implementing a colossal shipbuilding program. In various stages of construction were 7 dreadnoughts (4 "Sevastopol" and 3 more ships of the type "Empress Maria" on the Black Sea), 4 giant battlecruisers of the "Izmail" type, as well as six light cruisers of the "Svetlana" type. At the same time, all the expenses of the Naval Ministry in 1913 (according to the ordinary and emergency budgets) amounted to 244.9 million rubles. At the same time, income from customs duties in 1913 amounted to 352.9 million rubles. But the financing of the army exceeded 716 million rubles. It is also interesting that in 1913 budget investments in state property and enterprises amounted to 1 billion 108 million rubles. and this is not counting 98 million rubles, budgetary investments in the private sector.

These figures irrefutably testify that the construction of a first-class fleet was not at all an unbearable task for the Russian Empire. In addition, it should always be borne in mind that naval construction required the development of a huge amount of technology and was a powerful stimulus for the development of industry as a whole.

To be continued…

Navy Russian Federation- one of the three types of the Armed Forces of our state. Its main task is the armed protection of state interests in the sea and ocean theaters of military operations. The Russian fleet is obliged to protect the sovereignty of the state outside its land territory (territorial waters, rights in the sovereign economic zone).

The Russian Navy is considered the successor to the Soviet naval forces, which, in turn, were created on the basis of the Russian Imperial Navy. The history of the Russian Navy is very rich, it has more than three hundred years, during which time it has come a long and glorious military path: the enemy has repeatedly lowered the battle flag in front of Russian ships.

In terms of its composition and number of ships, the Russian Navy is considered one of the strongest in the world: in the global ranking, it ranks second after the US Navy.

The Russian Navy includes one of the components of the nuclear triad: submarine nuclear missile carriers capable of carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles. The current Russian fleet is inferior in its power to the Soviet Navy, many of the ships that are in service today were built back in the Soviet period, so they are outdated both morally and physically. However, in recent years, active construction of new ships has been underway and the fleet is replenished with new pennants every year. According to the State Armaments Program, by 2020 about 4.5 trillion rubles will be spent on updating the Russian Navy.

The ensign of the Russian warships and the ensign of the Russian naval forces is the St. Andrew's flag. It was officially approved by presidential decree on July 21, 1992.

Russian Navy Day is celebrated on the last Sunday of July. This tradition was established by the decision of the Soviet government in 1939.

At present, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy is Admiral Vladimir Ivanovich Korolev, and his first deputy (Chief of the General Staff) is Vice Admiral Andrey Olgertovich Volozhinsky.

Goals and objectives of the Russian Navy

Why does Russia need a navy? American Vice Admiral Alfred Mahen, one of the greatest naval theorists, wrote as early as the end of the 19th century that the navy influences politics by the very fact of its existence. And it's hard to disagree with him. For several centuries, the borders of the British Empire were fastened by the sides of its ships.

The oceans are not only an inexhaustible source of resources, but also the most important global transport artery. Therefore, the importance of the Navy in the modern world is hard to overestimate: a country that has warships can project armed force anywhere in the oceans. The ground forces of any country, as a rule, are limited to their own territory. Maritime communications play an important role in the modern world. Warships can effectively operate on the enemy's communications, cutting him off from the supply of raw materials and reinforcements.

The modern fleet is characterized by high mobility and autonomy: ship groups are able to stay in remote areas of the ocean for months. The mobility of naval groupings makes it difficult to strike, including with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The modern navy has an impressive arsenal of weapons that can be used not only against enemy ships, but also to strike at ground targets hundreds of kilometers away from the coastline.

The navy as a geopolitical instrument is highly flexible. The Navy is able to respond to a crisis situation in a very short time.

Another distinguishing feature of the Navy as a global military and political instrument is its versatility. Here are just some of the tasks that the navy is capable of solving:

• demonstration of military force and flag;
• combat duty;
• protection of own sea lanes and protection of the coast;
• conducting peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations;
• conducting humanitarian missions;
• the transfer of troops and their supply;
• waging conventional and nuclear war at sea;
• ensuring strategic nuclear deterrence;
• participation in strategic missile defense;
• conducting landing operations and combat operations on land.

Sailors can operate very effectively on land as well. The most obvious example is the US Navy, which has long been the most powerful and versatile instrument of American foreign policy. To conduct large-scale ground operations on land, the fleet needs a powerful air and land component, as well as a developed rear infrastructure capable of supplying expeditionary forces thousands of kilometers from its borders.

Russian sailors repeatedly had to participate in land operations, which, as a rule, took place on their native land and were of a defensive nature. An example is the participation of military sailors in the battles of the Great Patriotic War, as well as the first and second Chechen campaigns in which the Marine Corps fought.

The Russian fleet performs many tasks in peacetime. Warships ensure the safety of economic activity in the World Ocean, monitor the strike ship groups of potential enemies, and cover the patrol areas of potential enemy submarines. The ships of the Russian Navy participate in the protection of the state border, sailors can be involved in the elimination of the consequences of man-made disasters and natural disasters.

Composition of the Russian Navy

As of 2014, the Russian fleet included fifty nuclear submarines. Of these, fourteen are strategic missile submarines, twenty-eight submarines with missile or torpedo weapons, and eight submarines have a special purpose. In addition, the fleet includes twenty diesel-electric submarines.

The ship structure of the surface fleet includes: one heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (aircraft carrier), three nuclear missile cruisers, three missile cruisers, six destroyers, three corvettes, eleven large anti-submarine ships, twenty-eight small anti-submarine ships. The Russian Navy also includes: seven patrol ships, eight small missile ships, four small artillery ships, twenty-eight missile boats, more than fifty minesweepers of various types, six artillery boats, nineteen large landing ships, two landing hovercraft, more than two dozens of landing craft.

History of the Russian Navy

Kievan Rus already in the 9th century had a fleet that allowed it to carry out successful sea campaigns against Constantinople. However, these forces can hardly be called a regular Navy, the ships were built immediately before the campaigns, their main task was not battles at sea, but the delivery of ground forces to their destination.

Then there were centuries of feudal fragmentation, invasions of foreign conquerors, overcoming internal turmoil - besides, the Moscow principality did not have access to the sea for a long time. The only exception was Novgorod, which had access to the Baltic and conducted successful international trade, being a member of the Hanseatic League, and even made sea voyages.

The first warships in Russia began to be built during the time of Ivan the Terrible, but then the Moscow principality plunged into the Time of Troubles, and the navy was again forgotten for a long time. Warships were used during the war with Sweden in 1656-1658, during this campaign the first documented Russian victory at sea was won.

Emperor Peter the Great is considered to be the creator of the regular Russian navy. It was he who defined Russia's access to the sea as a paramount strategic task and began the construction of warships at the shipyard on the Voronezh River. And already during the Azov campaign, Russian battleships for the first time took part in a massive naval battle. This event can be called the birth of the regular Black Sea Fleet. A few years later, the first Russian warships appeared in the Baltic. The new Russian capital St. Petersburg for a long time became the main naval base of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Empire.

After Peter's death, the situation in domestic shipbuilding deteriorated significantly: new ships were practically not laid down, and the old ones gradually fell into disrepair.

The situation became critical in the second half of the 18th century, during the reign of Empress Catherine II. At that time, Russia pursued an active foreign policy and was one of the key political players in Europe. The Russian-Turkish wars, which continued with short breaks for almost half a century, forced the Russian leadership to pay special attention to the development of the navy.

During this period, Russian sailors managed to win several glorious victories over the Turks, a large Russian squadron made the first long-distance voyage to the Mediterranean Sea from the Baltic, the empire conquered vast lands in the northern Black Sea region. The most famous Russian naval commander of that period was Admiral Ushakov, who commanded the Black Sea Fleet.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian fleet was the third largest in the world in terms of the number of ships and gun power after Great Britain and France. Russian sailors made several trips around the world, made a significant contribution to the study of the Far East, Russian sailors Bellingshausen and Lazarev discovered the sixth continent - Antarctica in 1820.

The most important event in the history of the Russian fleet was the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Due to a number of diplomatic and political miscalculations, Russia had to fight against an entire coalition, which included Great Britain, France, Turkey and the Kingdom of Sardinia. The main battles of this war took place in the Black Sea theater of operations.

The war began with a brilliant victory over Turkey in the naval battle of Sinop. The Russian fleet under the leadership of Nakhimov completely defeated the enemy. However, in the future, this campaign was unsuccessful for Russia. The British and French had a more advanced fleet, they were seriously ahead of Russia in the construction of steam ships, they had modern small arms. Despite the heroism and excellent training of Russian sailors and soldiers, Sevastopol fell after a long siege. Under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty, Russia was no longer allowed to have a Black Sea navy.

The defeat in the Crimean War led to the intensification of the construction of steam-powered warships in Russia: battleships and monitors.

The creation of a new steam armored fleet actively continued in the late XIX - early XX century. To overcome the backlog from the leading maritime world powers, the Russian government purchased new ships abroad.

The most important milestone in the history of the Russian fleet was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The two strongest powers in the Pacific region, Russia and Japan, entered the fray for control of Korea and Manchuria.

The war began with a sudden Japanese attack on the harbor of Port Arthur, the largest base of the Russian Pacific Fleet. On the same day, the superior forces of Japanese ships in the port of Chemulpo sank the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Korean".

After several battles lost by the Russian ground forces, Port Arthur fell, and the ships in its harbor were sunk by enemy artillery fire or their own crews.

The second Pacific squadron, assembled from the ships of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, which went to the aid of Port Arthur, suffered a crushing defeat near the Japanese island of Tsushima.

The defeat in the Russo-Japanese War was a real disaster for the Russian fleet. He lost a large number of pennants, many experienced sailors died. Only by the beginning of the First World War, these losses were partially compensated. In 1906, the first submarines appeared in the Russian fleet. In the same year, the Main Naval Staff was established.

During World War I, Germany was Russia's main adversary in the Baltic Sea, and the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea theater of operations. In the Baltic, the Russian navy followed a defensive tactic, as the German navy outnumbered it both quantitatively and qualitatively. Mine weapons were actively used.

The Black Sea Fleet since 1915 almost completely controlled the Black Sea.

The revolution and the civil war that broke out after it became a real disaster for the Russian fleet. The Black Sea Fleet was partially captured by the Germans, some of its ships were transferred to the Ukrainian People's Republic, then they fell into the hands of the Entente. Some of the ships were sunk by order of the Bolsheviks. Foreign powers occupied the coasts of the North Sea, the Black Sea and the Pacific coast.

After the Bolsheviks came to power, a gradual restoration of the naval forces began. In 1938, a separate type of armed forces appeared - the Navy of the USSR. Before the outbreak of World War II, he was a very impressive force. There were especially many submarines of various modifications in its composition.

The first months of the war were a real disaster for the Soviet Navy. Several key military bases were abandoned (Tallinn, Hanko). The evacuation of warships from the Hanko naval base resulted in heavy losses due to enemy mines. The main battles of the Great Patriotic War took place on land, so the Soviet Navy sent more than 400 thousand sailors to the ground forces.

After the end of the war, a period of confrontation began between the Soviet Union with its satellites and the NATO bloc led by the United States. At this time, the Soviet Navy reached the peak of its power, both in terms of the number of ships and their quality characteristics. A huge amount of resources was allocated for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, four aircraft carriers, a large number of cruisers, destroyers and missile frigates (96 units at the end of the 80s), more than a hundred landing ships and boats were built. The ship structure of the USSR Navy in the mid-80s consisted of 1380 warships and a large number of auxiliary vessels.

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to catastrophic consequences. The USSR Navy was divided among the Soviet republics (however, most of the ship's composition went to Russia), due to underfunding, most projects were frozen, part of the shipbuilding enterprises remained abroad. In 2010, the Russian Navy included only 136 warships.

Structure of the Russian Navy

The Russian Navy includes the following forces:

• surface;
• underwater;
• naval aviation;
• coastal troops.

Naval aviation consists of coastal, deck, tactical and strategic.

Associations of the Russian Navy

The Russian Navy consists of four operational-strategic formations:

• The Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy, its headquarters is in Kaliningrad
• The Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy, its headquarters is located in Severomorsk
• The Black Sea Fleet, its headquarters is located in Sevastopol, belongs to the Southern Military District
• The Caspian Flotilla of the Russian Navy, headquartered in Astrakhan, is part of the Southern Military District.
• The Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok, is part of the Eastern Military District.

The Northern and Pacific Fleets are the strongest in the Russian Navy. It is here that submarines carrying strategic nuclear weapons are based, as well as all surface and submarine ships with a nuclear power plant.

The only Russian aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, is based in the Northern Fleet. If new aircraft carriers are built for the Russian fleet, then, most likely, they will also be placed in the Northern Fleet. This fleet is part of the Joint Strategic Command North.

Currently, the Russian leadership is paying a lot of attention to the Arctic. This region is disputed, in addition, a huge amount of minerals has been explored in this region. It is likely that in the coming years it is the Arctic that will become a “bone of contention” for the largest world states.

The Northern Fleet includes:

• TAKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" (project 1143 "Krechet")
• two nuclear missile cruisers of project 1144.2 "Orlan" "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Peter the Great", which is the flagship of the Northern Fleet
• missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov" (project "Atlant")
• four BOD project 1155 "Frigate" and one BOD project 1155.1.
• two destroyers of project 956 "Sarych"
• nine small warships, sea minesweepers of various projects, landing and artillery boats
• four large landing ships of project 775.

Submarines are the main force of the Northern Fleet. These include:

• Ten nuclear submarines armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (projects 941 "Shark", 667BDRM "Dolphin", 995 "Borey")
• Four nuclear submarines armed with cruise missiles (projects 885 "Ash" and 949A "Antey")
• Fourteen torpedo-armed nuclear submarines (projects 971 "Pike-B", 945 "Barracuda", 945A "Condor", 671RTMK "Pike")
• Eight diesel submarines (projects 877 "Halibut" and 677 "Lada"). In addition, there are seven nuclear deep-sea stations and an experimental submarine.

The Northern Fleet also includes naval aviation, coastal defense troops and marine corps units.

In 2007, the construction of the Arctic Shamrock military base began on the Franz Josef Land archipelago. The ships of the Northern Fleet are taking part in the Syrian operation as part of the Mediterranean squadron of the Russian fleet.

Pacific Fleet. This fleet is armed with submarines with nuclear power plants, armed with missiles and torpedoes with a nuclear warhead. This fleet is divided into two groups: one is based in Primorye, and the other is based on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Pacific Fleet includes:

• Missile cruiser "Varyag" project 1164 "Atlant".
• Three BOD project 1155.
• One destroyer of project 956 "Sarych".
• Four small missile ships of project 12341 "Gadfly-1".
• Eight small anti-submarine ships of project 1124 Albatross.
• Torpedo and anti-sabotage boats.
• Minesweepers.
• Three large landing ships of project 775 and 1171
• Landing boats.

The composition of the submarine forces of the Pacific Fleet includes:

• Five missile submarines armed with strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles (project 667BDR Kalmar and 955 Borey).
• Three nuclear submarines with Project 949A Antey cruise missiles.
• One multi-purpose submarine of project 971 "Pike-B".
• Six diesel submarines of project 877 "Halibut".

The Pacific Fleet also includes naval aviation, coastal troops and marines.

Black Sea Fleet. One of the oldest Russian fleets with a long and glorious history. However, due to geographical reasons, its strategic role is not so great. This fleet participated in the international campaign against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, in the war with Georgia in 2008, and its ships and personnel are currently involved in the Syrian campaign.

The construction of new surface and underwater vessels for the Black Sea Fleet is underway.

The composition of this operational-strategic association of the Russian Navy includes:

• Missile cruiser project 1164 "Atlant" "Moskva", which is the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet
• One BOD project 1134-B "Berkut-B" "Kerch"
• Five patrol ships of the far sea zone of different projects
• Eight large landing ships of projects 1171 "Tapir" and 775. They are united in the 197th brigade of landing ships
• Five diesel submarines (projects 877 "Halibut" and 636.3 "Varshavyanka"

  The Black Sea Fleet also includes naval aviation, coastal troops and marines.

  Baltic Fleet. After the collapse of the USSR, the BF found itself in a very difficult situation: a significant part of its bases ended up on the territory of foreign states. Currently, the Baltic Fleet is based in the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions. Due to the geographic location, the BF's strategic importance is also limited. The Baltic Fleet includes the following ships:

  • Project 956 destroyer "Sarych" "Persistent", which is the flagship of the Baltic Fleet.
  • Two Project 11540 "Hawk" patrol ships of the far sea zone. In domestic literature, they are often called frigates.
  • Four patrol ships of the near sea zone of project 20380 "Guarding", which are sometimes called corvettes in the literature.
  • Ten small rocket ships (project 1234.1).
  • Four Project 775 large landing craft.
  • Two Project 12322 Zubr small landing hovercraft.
  • A large number of landing and missile boats.

  The Baltic Fleet is armed with two Project 877 Halibut diesel submarines.

  Caspian flotilla. The Caspian Sea is an inland body of water, which in the Soviet period washed the shores of two countries - Iran and the USSR. After 1991, several independent states appeared in this region at once, and the situation became seriously complicated. Water area of ​​the Caspian International treaty between Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan, signed on August 12, 2018, defines it as a zone free from NATO influence.

  The composition of the Caspian Flotilla of the Russian Federation includes:

  • Patrol ships of the near sea zone of the project 11661 "Gepard" (2 units).
  • Eight small ships of different projects.
  • Landing boats.
  • Artillery and anti-sabotage boats.
  • Minesweepers.

  Prospects for the development of the Navy

  The navy is a very expensive branch of the armed forces, therefore, after the collapse of the USSR, almost all programs related to the construction of new ships were frozen.

  The situation began to improve only in the second half of the "zero". According to the State Armaments Program, by 2020 the Russian Navy will receive about 4.5 trillion rubles. Russian shipbuilders plan to produce up to ten Project 995 strategic nuclear missile carriers and the same number of Project 885 multi-purpose submarines. In addition, the construction of diesel-electric submarines of Projects 63.63 Varshavyanka and 677 Lada will continue. In total, it is planned to build up to twenty submarines.

  The Navy plans to purchase eight Project 22350 frigates, six Project 11356 frigates, more than thirty corvettes of several projects (some of which are still under development). In addition, it is planned to build new missile boats, large and small landing ships, and minesweepers.

  A new destroyer with a nuclear power plant is being developed. The Navy is interested in buying six of these ships. They are planned to be equipped with anti-missile defense systems.

  A lot of controversy raises the question of the future fate of the Russian aircraft carrier fleet. Is he needed? "Admiral Kuznetsov" clearly does not meet modern requirements, and from the very beginning this project was not the most successful.

  In total, by 2020, the Russian Navy plans to receive 54 new surface ships and 24 submarines with nuclear power plants, a large number of old ships must undergo modernization. The fleet should receive new missile systems that will be able to fire the latest Caliber and Onyx missiles. These complexes are planned to equip missile cruisers (Orlan project), submarines of the Antey, Shchuka-B and Halibut projects.

  If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

Fleet during the reign of Alexander I: Second Archipelago Expedition, Russo-Swedish War; fleet during the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I; Crimean War; Russian Navy after the Crimean War

THE FLEET DURING THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER I: THE SECOND ARCHIPELAGOAN EXPEDITION, THE RUSSIAN-SWEDEN WAR

Alexander I

Having ascended the throne in 1801, Emperor Alexander I carried out a number of transformations in the system of state administration, creating ministries instead of collegiums. So in 1802 the Ministry of Naval Forces was established. The Board of the Admiralty remained in its former form, but was already subordinate to the minister. They became the educated and capable Admiral N. S. Mordvinov, who proved himself in the war with Turkey.

However, three months later, Mordvinov was replaced by Rear Admiral P.V. Chichagov. “The trouble is, if the shoemaker starts the pies, and the pieman makes the boots” - these are the words from the famous fable of I.A. Krylov were addressed specifically to Chichagov.

This is how another contemporary, the famous navigator and Admiral Golovnin, spoke about Chichagov:
“Blindly imitating the British and introducing ridiculous novelties, he dreamed that he was laying the foundation stone for the greatness of the Russian fleet. Spoiling everything that remained in the fleet, and bored with the supreme power with arrogance and squandering the treasury, he retired, placing contempt for the fleet thereof and a feeling of deep chagrin in the sailors.

Nevertheless, the navy at the beginning of the 19th century continued to be an important instrument of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire and was represented by the Black Sea and Baltic fleets, the Caspian, White Sea and Okhotsk flotillas.

During the war with Persia that began in 1804 (the war was won by Russia in 1813), the Caspian flotilla, founded under Peter I, first showed itself by actively helping the Russian ground forces in the fight against the Persians: they brought supplies, reinforcements, food; fettered the actions of the Persian ships; participated in the bombardment of fortresses. Also, the flotilla ships at the beginning of the 19th century transported Russian expeditions to Central Asia, protected trade in the Caspian basin.

In 1805, Russia joined the anti-French coalition and, fearing the union of Turkey with France, as well as the appearance of the French fleet in the Adriatic Sea, decided to send a military squadron to the Ionian Islands. Leaving Kronstadt and arriving in Corfu and uniting with the Russian squadron already there, the combined Russian squadron began to have 10 battleships, 4 frigates, 6 corvettes, 7 brigs, 2 shebeks, schooners and 12 gunboats.

On February 21, 1806, the Russian squadron, with the support of the local population, occupied the area of ​​​​Boca di Cattaro (Kotor Bay) without a fight: the territory that, after the battle of Austerlitz, passed from Austria to France. This event meant a lot to Napoleon, France lost the most favorable sea route for replenishing food and ammunition.
Also in 1806, the Russian squadron managed to occupy a number of the Dalmatian Islands.

In December 1806, Turkey declared war on Russia. England, acting in this war as an ally of Russia, sent a squadron of its fleet to the Aegean Sea, but refused to act jointly with the Russian fleet.

On March 10, 1807, Senyavin occupied the island of Tenedos, after which victorious battles followed: the Dardanelles and Athos. Having tried to land troops on Tenedos, the Turks were defeated in the battle near the Dardanelles and retreated, losing 3 ships. However, the victory was not final: the Russian fleet continued to blockade the Dardanelles until the battle of Cape Athos, which took place a month later.

As a result of the Battle of Athos, the Ottoman Empire lost a combat-ready fleet for more than a decade and on August 12 agreed to sign a truce.

On June 25, 1807, the Treaty of Tilsit was concluded, according to which Russia undertook to cede the Ionian Islands to France. The Russian squadron was forced to conclude a formal truce with the Turks and leave the Archipelago, leaving the British to continue the war. Leaving Tenedos, the Russians destroyed all the fortifications there. By August 14, the Boca di Cattaro area was abandoned by the Russians. The Russian squadron left the Adriatic Sea region.

In the war between Russia and Sweden that began in 1808, mainly due to the policy of the former allies after the conclusion of the Tilsit Peace, the Baltic Fleet supported the actions of our land army throughout the war (until 1809), carrying out bombardment of Swedish fortifications and landing operations. Russia won the war, and as a result, Finland became part of the Russian Empire with the rights of the Grand Duchy.

However, despite the military, as well as research (maps of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans were full of Russian names and titles) successes of the Russian fleet, its condition continued to deteriorate until the end of the reign of Alexander I. This was due to the indifferent attitude of the emperor to the fate of the fleet. So, under him, the question of transferring the entire Russian fleet to England was seriously discussed. By the end of the reign, the state of the fleet was very deplorable: most of the frigates fit for military operations were sold abroad - in particular, to Spain; most of the officers and teams fell into need (for example, senior officers were sometimes settled ten people in one room).

THE FLEET DURING THE BEGINNING OF THE REIGN OF NICHOLAS I

Nicholas I

During the accession of Nicholas I in 1825, only 5 ships of the line were fit for service in the Baltic Fleet (according to the state, it was supposed to have 27 ships of the line and 26 frigates), and in the Black Sea Fleet - 10 out of 15 ships. The number of personnel of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets was supposed to reach 90 thousand people, but in reality 20 thousand people were missing from the regular number. The property of the fleet was plundered.

In the ports, trade in all the accessories of the fleet was carried out quite openly. The delivery of stolen goods to shops in large quantities was carried out not only at night, but also during the day. So, for example, the adjutant wing Lazarev, who was already conducting an investigation on this matter already in 1826, found in Kronstadt alone in 32 shops of state things worth 85,875 rubles.

The beginning of the reign of Emperor Nicholas I was marked by the creation in 1826 of a committee for the formation of the fleet. The name perfectly reflected the state of affairs - after all, the fleet, in fact, no longer existed!

Emperor Nicholas I, unlike his predecessor and elder brother, saw in the naval forces a solid stronghold of the state and, in addition, a means to maintain his own, historically established, necessary influence in the Middle East.

Vice-Admiral Melikov, a contemporary of Nicholas I, about the emperor:
“Taking into account that from now on the actions of naval forces will be necessary in any European war, His Imperial Majesty, from the very first days of his reign, deigned to express an indispensable will to bring the fleet into such a position that it would be a real stronghold of the state and could contribute to any enterprises related to the honor and security of the empire. Everything that was necessary was done to implement this idea on the part of the Sovereign Emperor. States were issued for the fleet in sizes corresponding to the greatness of Russia, and all means were taught to the naval authorities to bring our naval forces to the sizes prescribed by the states. The budget of the Naval Ministry was more than doubled; educational institutions have been increased in number and brought to the level of perfection; in order to provide our admiralties forever in timber, it was appointed to transfer to the maritime department all the forests of the empire; finally, all the assumptions of the naval authorities, which could lead to the nearest execution of the will of His Majesty, were always taken into account.

Successes in the work of Nicholas I to revive the greatness of the Russian fleet could be observed already in 1827. The squadron of the Baltic Fleet visited England, where it made an excellent impression. In the same year, part of the squadron entered the Mediterranean Sea and, together with the British and French squadrons, opposed the Turkish fleet. The decisive battle took place on October 20, 1827 in Navarino Bay. The Turkish fleet consisted of 82 ships, while the Allies had only 28. In addition, the Turkish fleet was in a much more advantageous position.

However, the allied squadrons acted in a coordinated and decisive manner, putting out of action one Turkish ship after another with well-aimed fire. The Turkish fleet was almost completely destroyed: out of 82 ships, only 27 survived.

Battle of Navarva

In the Russian-Turkish war that began the following year, the Black Sea Fleet showed itself. He contributed to the advance of troops in the Balkan and Caucasian theaters of military operations. The brig "Mercury" covered itself with unfading glory, having won a battle with two Turkish battleships.

Aivazovsky. Brig "Mercury", attacked by two Turkish ships.

The war ended in September 1829 with a complete Russian victory. Turkey lost the Black Sea coast from the mouth of the Kuban to Cape St. Nicholas. The islands in the Danube Delta went to Russia. She received the right of passage of ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The southern arm of the mouth became the Russian border. Finally, the Peace of Adrianople, concluded on September 14, brought freedom to Greece, which was declared independent (there remained only the obligation of an annual payment to the Sultan in the amount of 1.5 million piastres). The Greeks could now choose a sovereign from any dynasty reigning in Europe, except for the English, French and Russian.

In the war with Persia that began in 1826, the Caspian Flotilla again proved itself, providing serious assistance to the ground forces and winning victories at sea. In February 1828, a peace treaty was concluded between Russia and Persia. According to it, Russia retained the rights to the lands up to the Astara River, received the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates. Persia had to pay 20 million rubles indemnity, and also lost the right to maintain a fleet in the Caspian, which partially repeated the agreement of 1813.

The influence of the Russian Empire on the Ottoman Empire became even stronger after in 1832 the current sultan, having suffered defeat from his vassal Pasha of Egypt, left without money and an army, was forced to turn to the Russian Empire for help. A year later, Rear Admiral Lazarev led the Russian squadron to Constantinople. Her arrival and fourteen thousand troops landed on the Bosphorus put an end to the uprising. Russia, on the other hand, according to the Winkar-Iskelessi treaty concluded at that time, received in the person of Turkey an ally in case of hostilities against a third country, both on land and at sea. At the same time, Turkey undertook not to let enemy warships pass through the Dardanelles. The Bosphorus, under all conditions, remained open to the Russian fleet.

The Russian fleet during the reign of Nicholas I was greatly strengthened, the number of ships of the line increased greatly, order and discipline in the fleet were again established.

The first Russian parahodfrigate "Bogatyr". Modern model.

It is also worth noting that, in addition to traditional sailing battleships, military steamships began to be built for the navy: in 1826, the Izhora steamship armed with 8 guns was built, and in 1836, the first steam frigate was launched from the slipway of the St. Petersburg Admiralty "Bogatyr", armed with 28 guns.

As a result, by the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853, the Russian Empire had the Black Sea and Baltic fleets, the Arkhangelsk, Caspian and Siberian flotillas - a total of 40 battleships, 15 frigates, 24 corvettes and brigs, 16 steam frigates and other small vessels. The total number of personnel of the fleet was 91,000 people. Although the Russian fleet by that time was one of the largest in the world, however, in the field of steamship building, Russia lagged far behind the advanced European countries.

CRIMEAN WAR

During the diplomatic conflict with France over the control of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, Russia, in order to put pressure on Turkey, occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the protectorate of Russia under the terms of the Adrianople peace treaty. The refusal of the Russian Emperor Nicholas I to withdraw troops led to the declaration of war on Russia by Turkey on October 4, 1853, then, on March 15, 1854, Great Britain and France joined Turkey. On January 10, 1855, the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) also declared war on the Russian Empire.

Russia was not organizationally and technically ready for war. The technical backwardness of the Russian army and navy, associated with a radical technical re-equipment in the middle of the 19th century, acquired threatening proportions. armies of Great Britain and France, which carried out the Industrial Revolution. The Allies had a significant advantage in all types of ships, and there were no steam battleships in the Russian fleet at all. At that time, the English fleet was the first in the world in terms of numbers, the French was in second, and the Russian was in third place.

Sinop battle

However, on November 18, 1853, the Russian sailing squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Pavel Nakhimov defeated the Turkish fleet in the battle of Sinop. The successful battle in this battle of the sailing frigate "Flora" against three Turkish steam frigates indicated that the importance of the sailing fleet was still great. The result of the battle was the main factor in declaring war on Russia by France and England. This battle was also the last major battle of sailing ships.

In August 1854, Russian sailors defended the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka Fortress, repulsing the attack of the Anglo-French squadron.

Defense of the Peter and Paul Fortress

The main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol was protected from attack from the sea by strong coastal fortifications. Before the landing of the enemy in the Crimea, there were no fortifications to protect Sevastopol from land.

New tests also fell to the lot of the Baltic sailors: they had to repel the attack of the Anglo-French fleet, which bombarded the fortifications of Gangut, the fortresses of Kronstadt, Sveaborg and Revel, and sought to break through to the capital of the Russian Empire - Petersburg. However, a feature of the naval theater in the Baltic was that due to the shallow waters of the Gulf of Finland, large enemy ships could not approach St. Petersburg directly.

Upon receiving news of the Battle of Sinop, the English and French squadrons entered the Black Sea in December 1853.

On April 10, 1854, the combined Anglo-French squadron fired at the port and city of Odessa in an attempt to force the capitulation. As a result of the shelling, the port and the commercial ships in it were burned, but the return fire of the Russian coastal batteries prevented the landing. After the shelling, the Allied squadron went to sea.

John Wilson Carmichael "The Bombing of Sevastopol"

On September 12, 1854, an Anglo-French army of 62 thousand people with 134 guns landed in the Crimea, near Yevpatoriya - Sak, and took the direction to Sevastopol.

The enemy moved to Sevastopol, went around it from the east and occupied convenient bays (the British - Balaklava, the French - Kamyshovaya). The 60,000-strong Allied army began the siege of the city.
Admirals V.A. Kornilov, P.S. Nakhimov, V.I. Istomin became the organizers of the defense of Sevastopol.

The enemy did not dare to immediately storm the city and proceeded to siege it, during which he subjected the city to multi-day bombardments six times.

Throughout the 349-day siege, a particularly intense struggle went on for the key position of the city's defense - Malakhov Kurgan. The capture of it on August 27 by the French army predetermined the abandonment of the southern side of Sevastopol by Russian troops on August 28, 1855. Having blown up all the fortifications, batteries and powder magazines, they organizedly crossed the Sevastopol Bay to the North side. Sevastopol Bay, the location of the Russian fleet, remained under Russian control.

Although the war was not yet lost, and the Russian troops managed to inflict a number of defeats on the Turkish army and capture Kars. However, the threat of Austria and Prussia joining the war forced Russia to accept the terms of peace imposed by the allies.

On March 18, 1856, the Treaty of Paris was signed, according to which Russia was forbidden to have a navy on the Black Sea, build fortresses and naval bases.
During the war, the members of the anti-Russian coalition failed to achieve all their goals, but managed to prevent the strengthening of Russia in the Balkans and deprive it of the Black Sea Fleet for a long time.

RUSSIAN FLEET AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR

After the defeat, the Russian fleet, which consisted mainly of sailing ships, began to be massively replenished with first-generation steam warships: battleships, monitors and floating batteries. These ships were equipped with heavy artillery and thick armor, but they were unreliable on the high seas, slow and could not make long sea voyages.

Already in the early 1860s, the first Russian armored floating battery "Pervenets" was ordered in Great Britain, on the basis of which the armored batteries "Don't Touch Me" and "Kremlin" were built in Russia in the mid-1860s.

Battleship "Don't Touch Me"

In 1861, the first warship with steel armor was launched - the gunboat "Experience". In 1869, the first battleship designed for sailing on the high seas, the Peter the Great, was laid down.

The specialists of the Naval Ministry studied the experience of building in the USA the monitors of the system of the Swedish engineer Erickson with a rotating tower. In this regard, in March 1863, the so-called "Monitor Shipbuilding Program" was developed, which provided for the construction of 11 monitors to protect the coast of the Gulf of Finland and operate in skerries.
During the American Civil War, Russia sent two cruiser squadrons to the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the northerners. This expedition became an illustrative example of how relatively small forces can achieve major political successes. The result of the presence of only eleven small warships in areas of busy merchant shipping was that the major European powers (England, France and Austria) abandoned the confrontation with Russia, defeated by them only 7 years ago.

Russia achieved the lifting of the ban on keeping the navy in the Black Sea under the London Convention of 1871.

Thus began the revival of the Black Sea Fleet, which was able to take part in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. (On May 26, 1877, the mine boats of lieutenants Shestakov and Dubasov sank the Turkish monitor Khivzi Rahman on the Danube), and by the beginning of the 20th century it consisted of 7 squadron battleships, 1 cruiser, 3 mine cruisers, 6 gunboats, 22 destroyers, etc. courts.

The construction of warships for the Caspian and Okhotsk flotillas continued.

By the end of the 19th century, the Baltic Fleet had over 250 modern ships of all classes.

The descent of the battleship "Chesma" in Sevastopol

Also in the 1860s-1870s, a reform of the naval forces was carried out, which consisted both in the complete technical re-equipment of the fleet and in changing the conditions of service for officers and lower ranks.

In addition, in Russia at the end of the 19th century, tests of submarines began.

As a result, we can say that during the second half of the XIX century. Russia created a modern for that time armored fleet, which again found itself in 3rd place in the world in terms of military power.

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This article is from the History of the Russian Fleet project. |

origin of name

Battleship - short for "battleship". So in Russia in 1907 they named a new type of ships in memory of the old wooden sailing battleships. Initially, it was assumed that the new ships would revive linear tactics, but this was soon abandoned.

The advent of battleships

The mass production of heavy artillery guns was very difficult for a long time, therefore, until the 19th century, the largest of those installed on ships remained 32 ... 42-pounders. But working with them during loading and aiming was very complicated due to the lack of servos, which required a huge calculation for their maintenance: such guns weighed several tons each. Therefore, for centuries, ships tried to arm as many relatively small guns as possible, which were located along the side. At the same time, for reasons of strength, the length of a warship with a wooden hull is limited to about 70-80 meters, which also limited the length of the onboard battery. More than two or three dozen guns could only be placed in a few rows.

This is how warships arose with several gun decks (decks), carrying up to one and a half hundred guns of various calibers. It should be immediately noted what is called a deck and are taken into account when determining the rank of the ship only closed gun decks, above which there is another deck. For example, a two-decker ship (in the Russian fleet - two-way) usually had two closed gun decks and one open (upper) one.

The term "battleship" arose in the days of the sailing fleet, when in battle multi-deck ships began to line up - so that during their volley they were turned to the enemy by the side, because the simultaneous volley of all onboard guns caused the greatest damage to the target. This tactic was called linear. Building in a line during a naval battle was first used by the fleets of England and Spain at the beginning of the 17th century.

The first battleships appeared in the fleets of European countries at the beginning of the 17th century. They were lighter and shorter than the “ship-towers” ​​that existed at that time - galleons, which made it possible to quickly line up sideways to the enemy, and the bow of the next ship looked at the stern of the previous one.

The resulting multi-deck sailing ships of the line were the main means of warfare at sea for more than 250 years and allowed countries such as Holland, Great Britain and Spain to create huge trading empires.

The ship of the line "Saint Pavel" 90 (84?) - the cannon ship of the line "St. Pavel" was laid down at the Nikolaev shipyard on November 20, 1791 and launched on August 9, 1794. This ship went down in the history of naval art, a brilliant operation of Russian sailors and naval commanders to capture a fortress on the island of Corfu in 1799 is associated with its name.

But the real revolution in shipbuilding, which marked a truly new class of ships, was made by the construction of the Dreadnought, completed in 1906.

The authorship of a new leap in the development of large artillery ships is attributed to the English Admiral Fisher. Back in 1899, commanding the Mediterranean squadron, he noted that firing with the main caliber can be carried out at a much greater distance if guided by splashes from falling shells. However, at the same time, it was necessary to unify all artillery in order to avoid confusion in determining the bursts of shells of the main caliber and medium-caliber artillery. Thus was born the concept of all-big-guns (only big guns), which formed the basis of a new type of ship. The effective firing range increased from 10-15 to 90-120 cables.

Other innovations that formed the basis of the new type of ships were centralized fire control from a single general ship post and the spread of electric drives, which accelerated the aiming of heavy guns. The guns themselves have also changed significantly, due to the transition to smokeless powder and new high-strength steels. Now only the lead ship could carry out sighting, and those following it in the wake were guided by bursts of its shells. Thus, building in wake columns again allowed in Russia in 1907 to return the term battleship. In the USA, England and France, the term "battleship" was not revived, and new ships continued to be called "battleship" or "cuirassé". In Russia, the "battleship" remained the official term, but in practice the abbreviation was established battleship.

The Russo-Japanese War finally established superiority in speed and long-range artillery as the main advantages in naval combat. There were talks about a new type of ships in all countries, in Italy Vittorio Cuniberti came up with the idea of ​​a new battleship, and in the USA the construction of ships of the Michigan type was planned, but the British managed to get ahead of everyone due to industrial superiority.

The first such ship was the English Dreadnought, whose name has become a household name for all ships of this class. The ship was built in record time, going on sea trials on September 2, 1906, a year and one day after the laying. A battleship with a displacement of 22,500 tons, thanks to the new type of power plant used for the first time on such a large ship, with a steam turbine, could reach speeds of up to 22 knots. On the Dreadnought, 10 305 mm caliber guns were installed (due to the haste, the two-gun turrets of the completed squadron battleships of 1904 were taken due to the haste), the second caliber was anti-mine - 24 76 mm caliber guns; medium-caliber artillery was absent. The reason for this was that the medium caliber was less long-range than the main one and often did not participate in battle, and guns with a caliber of 70-120 mm could be used against destroyers.

The appearance of the Dreadnought made all other large armored ships obsolete.

For Russia, which lost almost all of its Baltic and Pacific battleships in the Russo-Japanese War, the “dreadnought fever” that had begun turned out to be very useful: to the revival of the fleet could begin without taking into account the outdated armored armadas of potential opponents. And already in 1906, having interviewed the majority of naval officers - participants in the war with Japan, the Main Naval Staff developed a task for designing a new battleship for the Baltic Sea. And at the end of next year, after the approval of the so-called "small shipbuilding program" by Nicholas II, a worldwide competition was announced for the best design of a battleship for the Russian fleet.

The competition was attended by 6 Russian factories and 21 foreign firms, among which were such well-known companies as the English "Armstrong", "John Brown", "Vickers", the German "Volkan", "Schihau", "Blom und Voss", the American "Krump", and others. Individuals also offered their projects - for example, engineers V. Cuniberti and L. Coromaldi. The best, according to the authoritative jury, was the development of the company "Blom und Voss", but for various reasons - primarily political - they decided to refuse the services of a potential adversary. As a result, the project of the Baltic Plant was in the first place, although evil tongues claimed that the presence of a powerful lobby in A.N. Krylov - both the chairman of the jury and the co-author of the winning project.

The main feature of the new battleship is the composition and placement of artillery. Since the 12-inch gun with a barrel length of 40 calibers, which was the main weapon of all Russian battleships, starting with the "Three Saints" and "Sisoy the Great", was already hopelessly outdated, it was decided to urgently develop a new 52-caliber gun. The Obukhov Plant successfully coped with the task, and the Petersburg Metal Plant in parallel designed a three-gun turret installation, which, compared to a two-gun mount, gave a 15 percent savings in weight per barrel.

Thus, Russian dreadnoughts received unusually powerful weapons - 12 305-mm guns in a side salvo, which made it possible to fire up to 24,471-kg shells per minute with an initial speed of 762 m / s. Obukhov guns for their caliber were rightfully considered the best in the world, surpassing both English and Austrian guns in ballistic characteristics, and even the famous Krupp guns, which were considered the pride of the German fleet.

However, excellent armament was, alas, the only advantage of the first Russian dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" type. In general, these ships should be recognized, to put it mildly, as unsuccessful. The desire to combine conflicting requirements in one project - powerful weapons, impressive protection, high speed and a solid range ", swimming - turned into an impossible task for the designers. I had to sacrifice something - and primarily armor. By the way, the mentioned survey of naval officers did a poor job here. Of course, those, having been under the destructive fire of the Japanese squadron, would like to go back to battle on fast ships with powerful artillery.As for protection, they paid more attention to the area of ​​​​armor than its thickness, without taking into account the progress in the development of shells and cannons. The experience of the Russo-Japanese War was not seriously weighed, and emotions prevailed over impartial analysis.

As a result, "Sevastopol" turned out to be very close (even outwardly!) To the representatives of the Italian shipbuilding school - fast, heavily armed, but too vulnerable to enemy artillery. "Project scared" - such an epithet was given to the first Baltic dreadnoughts by the naval historian M.M. Dementiev.

The weakness of armor protection was, unfortunately, not the only drawback of the Sevastopol-class battleships. In order to ensure the greatest cruising range, the project provided for a combined power plant with steam turbines for full speed and diesel engines for economic power. Alas, the use of diesel engines caused a number of technical problems, and from they were abandoned already at the stage of drawing development, only the original 4-shaft installation with 10 (!) Parsons turbines remained, and the actual cruising range with a normal fuel supply (816 tons of coal and 200 tons of oil) was only 1625 miles with a 13-knot course. one and a half, two, or even three times less than any of the Russian battleships, starting with Peter the Great. The so-called "reinforced" fuel supply (2500 tons of coal and 1100 tons of oil) hardly "reached" the cruising range to acceptable standards, but catastrophically worsened the rest of the parameters of the already overloaded ship. Seaworthiness was also useless, which was clearly confirmed by the only ocean voyage of a battleship of this type - we are talking about the transition of the Paris Commune (formerly Sevastopol) to the Black Sea in 1929. Well, there is nothing to say about habitability conditions: comfort for the crew was sacrificed in the first place. Perhaps worse than our sailors, only the Japanese, accustomed to the harsh environment, lived on board their battleships. Against the background of the above, the assertion of some domestic sources that battleships of the Sevastopol type were almost the best in the world looks somewhat exaggerated.

All four of the first Russian dreadnoughts were laid down at St. Petersburg factories in 1909, and in the summer and autumn of 1911 they were launched. But the completion of the battleships afloat was delayed - many innovations in the design of ships, for which the domestic industry was not yet ready, had an effect. German contractors also contributed to the failure to meet deadlines, supplying various mechanisms and not at all interested in the rapid strengthening of the Baltic Fleet. In the end, ships of the Sevastopol type entered service only in November-December 1914, when the fire of the world war was already raging with might and main.

Battleship "Sevastopol" (from March 31, 1921 to May 31, 1943 - "Paris Commune") 1909 - 1956

Laid down on June 3, 1909 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. On May 16, 1911, he was included in the lists of ships of the Baltic Fleet. Launched June 16, 1911. Entered service November 4, 1914. In August 1915, together with the battleship Gangut, she covered minelaying in the Irben Strait. It underwent a major overhaul in 1922-1923, 1924-1925 and 1928-1929 (modernization). November 22, 1929 left Kronstadt for the Black Sea. On January 18, 1930, he arrived in Sevastopol and became part of the Black Sea Naval Forces. From January 11, 1935, he was part of the Black Sea Fleet.

It underwent a major overhaul and modernization in 1933-1938. In 1941, anti-aircraft weapons were strengthened. Participated in the Great Patriotic War (defense of Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula in 1941-1942). On July 8, 1945 he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On July 24, 1954 it was reclassified into a training battleship, and on February 17, 1956 it was excluded from the lists of the Navy ships in connection with the transfer to the stock property department for dismantling and sale, on July 7, 1956 it was disbanded and in 1956 - 1957 it was divided on the basis of "Glavvtorchermet" in Sevastopol for metal

Displacement standard 23288 full 26900 tons

Dimensions 181.2x26.9x8.5 m in 1943 - 25500/30395 tons 184.8x32.5x9.65 m

Armament 12 - 305/52, 16 - 120/50, 2 - 75 mm AA, 1 - 47 mm AA, 4 PTA 457 mm
in 1943 12 - 305/52, 16 - 120/50, 6 - 76/55 76K, 16 - 37 mm 70K, 2x4 12.7 mm Vickers machine guns and 12 - 12.7 mm DShK

Reservations - Krupp armor belt 75 - 225 mm, mine artillery casemates - 127 mm,
towers of the main caliber from 76 to 203 mm, conning tower 254 mm, decks - 12-76 mm, bevels 50 mm
in 1943 - board - upper belt 125 + 37.5 mm, lower belt 225 + 50 mm, decks 37.5-75-25 mm,
traverses 50-125 mm, cabin 250/120 mm floor 70 mm, towers 305/203/152 mm

Gears 4 Parsons turbines up to 52,000 hp (in 1943 - 61,000 hp) 25 Yarrow boilers (in 1943 - 12 systems of the English Admiralty).

4 screws. Speed ​​23 knots Cruising range 1625 miles at 13 knots. Crew 31 officer 28 conductors and 1065 lower ranks. In 1943, speed 21.5 knots Cruising range 2160 miles at 14 knots.

Crew 72 officers 255 foremen and 1219 sailors

Battleship "Gangut" (since June 27, 1925 - "October Revolution") 1909 - 1956

Battleship "Poltava" (since November 7, 1926 - "Frunze") 1909 - 1949

The battleship "Petropavlovsk" (from March 31, 1921 to May 31, 1943 - "Marat")

(from November 28, 1950 - "Volkhov") 1909 - 1953

The information received that Turkey is also going to replenish its fleet with dreadnoughts demanded that Russia take adequate measures in the southern direction as well. In May 1911, the tsar approved a program for the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet, which provided for the construction of three battleships of the Empress Maria type. The Sevastopol was chosen as a prototype, but taking into account the characteristics of the theater of operations, the project was thoroughly revised: the proportions of the hull were made more complete, speed and power mechanisms were reduced, but the armor was significantly strengthened, the weight of which now reaches 7045 tons (31% of the design displacement versus 26% on the "Sevastopol"). Moreover, the size of the armor plates was adjusted to the spacing of the frames - so that they serve as an additional support that prevents the plate from being pressed The normal supply of fuel also increased slightly - 1200 tons of coal and 500 tons of oil, which provided a more or less decent cruising range (about 3000 miles of economic progress). But the Black Sea dreadnoughts suffered more from overload than their Baltic counterparts. The matter was aggravated by the that due to an error in the calculations, "Empress Maria" received a noticeable trim on the bow, which further worsened the already unimportant seaworthiness; In order to somehow rectify the situation, the ammunition of the two main caliber bow turrets had to be reduced to 70 rounds per barrel instead of 100 according to the state. And on the third battleship "Emperor Alexander III" for the same purpose, two bow 130-mm guns were removed. In fact, ships of the "Empress Maria" type were more balanced battleships than their predecessors, which, having a longer range and better seaworthiness , could be considered more like battlecruisers. However, when designing the third series of dreadnoughts, cruising tendencies again prevailed - apparently, our admirals were haunted by the ease with which the faster Japanese squadron covered the head of the Russian wake column ...

Battleship "Empress Maria" 1911 - 1916

at the Russud plant in Nikolaev, launched on October 19, 1913, entered service on June 23, 1915.
He died on October 7, 1916 in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol from the explosion of cellars of 130-mm shells.
By May 31, 1919, it was raised and put into the Northern Dock of Sevastopol, and in June 1925 it was sold to the Sevmorzavod for dismantling and cutting into metal, and on November 21, 1925 it was excluded from the lists of ships of the RKKF. Dismantled for metal in 1927.

Battleship "Empress Catherine the Great" (until June 14, 1915 - "Catherine II") (after April 16, 1917 - "Free Russia") 1911 - 1918

On October 11, 1911, it was included in the lists of the Black Sea Fleet ships and on October 17, 1911, it was laid down at the Naval plant (ONZiV) in Nikolaev, launched on May 24, 1914, and entered service on October 5, 1915.
On April 30, 1918, he left Sevastopol for Novorossiysk, where on June 18, 1918, by decision of the Soviet government, in order to avoid capture by the German invaders, he was sunk by torpedoes fired from the destroyer Kerch.
In the early 1930s, EPRON carried out work to raise the ship. All the artillery of the Civil Code and the UK was raised, but then there was an explosion of the ammunition of the Civil Code, as a result of which the hull broke under water into several parts.

Battleship "Emperor Alexander III" (since April 29, 1917 - "Will") (after October 1919 - "General Alekseev") 1911 - 1936

October 11, 1911 was included in the lists of ships of the Black Sea Fleet and October 17, 1911 was laid
at the Russud plant in Nikolaev, launched on April 2, 1914, entered service on June 15, 1917.
December 16, 1917 became part of the Red Black Sea Fleet.
On April 30, 1918, he left Sevastopol for Novorossiysk, but on June 19, 1918 he returned to Sevastopol again, where he was captured by German troops and on October 1, 1918 included in their Navy on the Black Sea.
On November 24, 1918, it was captured from the Germans by the Anglo-French invaders and soon taken to the port of Izmir on the Sea of ​​Marmara. From October 1919 he was part of the White Guard naval forces of the South of Russia, on November 14, 1920 he was taken away by the Wrangel troops during the evacuation from Sevastopol to Istanbul and on December 29, 1920 he was interned by the French authorities in Bizerte (Tunisia).
On October 29, 1924, it was recognized by the French government as the property of the USSR, but due to the difficult international situation, it was not returned. In the late 1920s, it was sold by Rudmetalltorg to a French private company for scrapping, and in 1936 it was cut into pieces in Brest (France) for metal.

The next four ships for the Baltic, according to the "Program of Reinforced Shipbuilding" adopted in 1911, were originally created as battlecruisers, the lead of which was named "Izmail".

Battlecruiser "Izmail" on the slipway of the Baltic Shipyard a week before launch, 1915

The new ships were the largest ever built in Russia. According to the original project, their displacement was to be 32.5 thousand tons, but during construction it increased even more. Huge speed was achieved by increasing the power of steam turbines to 66 thousand hp. (and when boosted - up to 70 thousand hp). Booking was significantly increased, and in terms of the power of weapons, Izmail surpassed all foreign counterparts: new 356-mm guns were supposed to have a barrel length of 52 calibers, while abroad this figure did not exceed 48 calibers. The weight of the projectile of new guns was 748 kg , initial speed - 855 m / s Later, when, due to the protracted construction, it was necessary to further increase the firepower of the dreadnoughts, a project was developed to re-equip Izmail with 8 and even 10 406-mm guns,

In December 1912, all 4 Izmails were officially laid down on stocks that were freed up after the launch of the Sevastopol-class battleships. The construction was already in full swing when the results of full-scale tests on the execution of the former Chesma were received, and these results plunged the shipbuilders into a state of shock. cable, and at long firing distances it deforms the shirt located behind the armor, violating the tightness of the hull. Both armored decks turned out to be too thin - the shells not only pierced them, but also crushed them into small fragments, causing even greater destruction ... It became obvious that the meeting of the "Sevastopol" at sea with any of the German dreadnoughts does not bode well for our sailors: one an accidental hit in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe ammunition cellars will inevitably lead to disaster. The Russian command realized this back in 1913, and that is why it did not release the Baltic dreadnoughts into the sea, preferring to keep them in Helsingfors as a reserve behind the mine-artillery position that blocked the Gulf of Finland ...

The worst thing about this situation was that nothing could be fixed. There was nothing to think about making any fundamental changes to the 4 Baltic and 3 Black Sea battleships under construction. On the Izmails, they limited themselves to improving the systems for attaching armor plates, strengthening the set behind the armor, introducing a 3-inch wooden lining under the belt and changing the weight of horizontal armor on the upper and middle decks. The only ship on which the experience of shooting the Chesma was taken into account in full , became "Emperor Nicholas I" - the fourth battleship for the Black Sea.

The decision to build this ship came just before the start of the war. It is curious that it was officially laid down twice: first in June 1914, and then in April of the next, in the presence of the tsar. The new battleship was an improved version of the "Empress Maria", but with identical armament, it had large dimensions and significantly enhanced armor protection. The weight of the armor, even without taking into account the towers, now reached 9417 tons, that is, 34.5% of the design displacement. But it was not only quantity, but also in quality: in addition to strengthening the support jacket, all armor plates were connected by vertical dowels of the "double dovetail" type, which turned the main belt into a monolithic 262nd

Battleship "Emperor Nicholas I" (since April 16, 1917 - "Democracy")

1914 - 1927

It was laid down on June 9, 1914 (officially on April 15, 1915) at the Naval plant in Nikolaev and on July 2, 1915 was included in the lists of ships of the Black Sea Fleet, launched on October 5, 1916, but on October 11, 1917 due to a low degree of readiness weapons, mechanisms and equipment removed from construction and laid up. In June 1918, it was captured by German troops and October 1, 1918 included in their fleet on the Black Sea. The Germans planned to use the ship as a base for seaplanes, but due to a lack of personnel, these plans were abandoned.
After the liberation of Nikolaev by parts of the Red Army, the battleship was laid up. On April 11, 1927, it was sold to Sevmorzavod for scrapping and on June 28, 1927, it was sent in tow from Nikolaev to Sevastopol for cutting into metal.

Battle cruiser "Borodino" 1912 - 1923

Laid down on December 6, 1912 at the New Admiralty in St. Petersburg. Launched on July 19, 1915.

Battle cruiser "Navarin" 1912 - 1923

Laid down on December 6, 1912 at the New Admiralty in St. Petersburg.
Launched November 9, 1916
On August 21, 1923, it was sold to a German shipbreaking company and on October 16 it was prepared for towing to Hamburg, where the ship was soon cut into metal.

Battlecruiser "Kinburn" 1912 - 1923

Laid down on December 6, 1912 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg.
Launched October 30, 1915
On August 21, 1923, she was sold to a German shipbreaking company and on October 16 she was prepared for towing to Kiel, where the ship was soon cut into metal.

The fate of most Russian dreadnoughts turned out to be rather sad. Battleships of the "Sevastopol" type stood on raids throughout the First World War, which did not at all contribute to raising the morale of the crews. On the contrary, it was the battleships that became the center of revolutionary ferment in the fleet - anarchists and socialist-revolutionaries enjoyed the greatest authority here. During the civil war, battleships were twice in battle : in June 1919, "Petropavlovsk" shelled the rebellious fort "Krasnaya Gorka" for several days in a row, having used up 568 shells of the main caliber, and in March 1921, "Petropavlovsk" and "Sevastopol" found themselves in the center of the anti-Bolshevik Kronstadt revolt, fought a duel with coastal batteries, having received with a number of hits.Nevertheless, they were restored and, together with the Gangut, served in the Red Fleet for a long time. But the fourth ship - "Poltava" - was not lucky. Two fires - the first in 1919, and the second in 1923 - made the battleship completely incapacitated, although the burned-out hull stood at the Naval training ground for another two decades, exciting Soviet designers to all kinds of semi-fantastic projects its restoration - up to turning into an aircraft carrier.

The Black Sea dreadnoughts, unlike the Baltic ones, were used much more actively, although only one of them, Empress Catherine the Great, met the German-Turkish Goeben in December 1915 in a real battle. The latter, however, used his advantage in speed and went to the Bosphorus, although he was already covered by volleys of the Russian battleship.

The most famous and at the same time mysterious tragedy occurred on the morning of October 7, 1916 on the inner roadstead of Sevastopol, a fire in the forward ammunition cellar, and then a series of powerful explosions turned the Empress Maria into a pile of twisted iron. The victims of the disaster were 228 crew members.

“Ekaterina” outlived her sister by less than two years. Renamed “Free Russia”, she eventually ended up in Novorossiysk, where, in accordance with Lenin’s order, she was sunk on June 18, 1918 by four torpedoes from the destroyer “Kerch” .. .

Emperor Alexander III” entered service in the summer of 1917 already under the name “Will” and soon “went from hand to hand”: the Andreevsky flag on the hafel of his mast was replaced by Ukrainian, then German, English and again Andreevsky, when Sevastopol was again in the hands of the Volunteer Army . Renamed again - this time to "General Alekseev", - the battleship remained the flagship of the White Fleet on the Black Sea until the end of 1920, and then went into exile to Bizerte, where in the mid-30s it was dismantled for metal. It is curious that the beautiful The French retained the 12-inch cannons of the Russian dreadnought, and presented them to Finland, which fought against the USSR, in 1939. The first 8 guns reached their destination, but the last 4, which were on board the Nina steamer, arrived in Bergen almost simultaneously with the start of the Nazi invasion to Norway. So the guns from the former Volya ended up in the hands of the Germans, and they used them to create their Atlantic Wall, equipping the Mirus battery on the island of Guernsey with them. In the summer of 1944, the guns first opened fire on the Allied ships, and in September they even achieved a direct hit on an American cruiser. And the remaining 8 guns of "General Alekseev" fell into the hands of the Red Army in 1944 and were "repatriated" after a long journey around Europe. One of these guns was preserved as a museum exhibit of Krasnaya Gorka.

But our most advanced battleships - "Izmail" and "Nicholas I" - never had a chance to enter service. The revolution, civil war and subsequent devastation made the completion of ships unrealistic. In 1923, the Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin hulls were sold for scrapping to Germany, where they were taken in tow. Nicholas I, renamed Democracy, was dismantled for metal in Sevastopol in 1927-1928. The Izmail corps lived the longest, which again they wanted to turn into an aircraft carrier, but in the early 30s it shared the fate of its brothers. On the other hand, the guns of the battleships (including 6 "Izmail" 14-inch guns) served for a long time on railway and stationary installations of Soviet coastal batteries.

By the beginning of World War I, the navy of tsarist Russia was a very formidable force, but it could not be noted for more or less significant victories or even defeats. Most of the ships did not participate in combat operations or even stood at the wall waiting for orders. And after Russia left the war, the former power of the imperial fleet was generally forgotten, especially against the backdrop of the adventures of crowds of revolutionary sailors who went ashore. Although initially everything was more than optimistic for the Russian Navy: by the beginning of World War I, the fleet, which suffered huge losses during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, was largely restored and continued to be modernized.

Sea versus land

Immediately after the Russo-Japanese War and the accompanying first Russian revolution of 1905, the tsarist government was deprived of the opportunity to take up the restoration of the Baltic and Pacific fleets, which were practically destroyed. But by 1909, when the financial position of Russia was stabilized, the government of Nicholas II began to allocate significant sums for the rearmament of the fleet. As a result, in terms of total financial investments, the naval component of the Russian Empire took third place in the world after Great Britain and Germany.

At the same time, the effective rearmament of the fleet was largely hampered by the traditional for the Russian Empire disunity of interests and actions of the army and navy. During 1906-1914. the government of Nicholas II did not actually have a single program for the development of the armed forces agreed between the army and naval departments. To bridge the gap between the interests of the departments of the army and the navy, the Council of State Defense (SGO), created on May 5, 1905, by a special rescript of Nicholas II, was supposed to help. The SGO was headed by the Inspector General of the Cavalry, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. However, despite the presence of a supreme conciliatory body, the geopolitical tasks that the Russian Empire was going to solve were not adequately coordinated with specific plans for the development of land and sea forces.

The difference in views on the strategy of rearmament of the land and naval departments was clearly manifested at a meeting of the Council of State Defense on April 9, 1907, where a heated argument broke out. Chief of the General Staff of Russia F.F. Palitsyn and Minister of War A.F. Rediger insisted on limiting the tasks of the navy, and they were consistently objected to by the head of the Naval Ministry, Admiral I.M. Dikov. The proposals of the “landers” came down to limiting the tasks of the fleet to the Baltic region, which naturally caused a decrease in funding for shipbuilding programs in favor of strengthening the power of the army.

Admiral I.M. Dikov, on the other hand, saw the main tasks of the fleet not so much in helping the army in a local conflict in the European theater, but in geopolitical opposition to the leading powers of the world. "A strong fleet of Russia is necessary as a great power," the admiral said at the meeting, "and she must have it and be able to send it wherever her state interests require." The head of the Naval Ministry was categorically supported by the influential Minister of Foreign Affairs A.P. Izvolsky: "The fleet should be free, not bound by the private task of defending this or that sea or gulf, it should be where politics dictates."

Taking into account the experience of the First World War, it is now obvious that the "ground troops" at the meeting on April 9, 1907 were absolutely right. Huge investments in the oceanic component of the Russian fleet, primarily in the construction of battleships, which devastated the military budget of Russia, gave an ephemeral, almost zero result. The fleet seemed to have been built, but for almost the entire war it stood at the wall, and the many thousands of military sailors overwhelmed by idleness in the Baltic became one of the main forces of the new revolution, which crushed the monarchy, and after it, national Russia.

But then the SGO meeting ended with the victory of the sailors. After a short pause, on the initiative of Nicholas II, another meeting was convened, which not only did not reduce, but, on the contrary, increased the financing of the Navy. It was decided to build not one, but two full squadrons: separately for the Baltic and Black Seas. In the final approved version, the "Small Program" of shipbuilding provided for the construction of four battleships (of the Sevastopol type), three submarines and a floating base for naval aviation for the Baltic Fleet. In addition, it was planned to build 14 destroyers and three submarines on the Black Sea. It was planned to spend no more than 126.7 million rubles on the implementation of the "Small Program", however, due to the need for a radical technological reconstruction of shipyards, the total costs approached increased to 870 million rubles.

Empire breaks into the sea

Appetite, as they say, comes with eating. And after the ocean battleships Gangut and Poltava were laid down at the Admiralty Shipyard on June 30, 1909, and Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol at the Baltic Shipyard, the Naval Ministry submitted a report to the emperor justifying the expansion of the shipbuilding program.

It was proposed to build eight more battleships, four battleships (heavily armored) cruisers, 9 light cruisers, 20 submarines, 36 destroyers, 36 skerry (small) destroyers for the Baltic Fleet. It was proposed to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet with three battlecruisers, three light cruisers, 18 destroyers, and 6 submarines. The Pacific Fleet, according to this program, was to receive three cruisers, 18 squadron and 9 skerry destroyers, 12 submarines, 6 minelayers, 4 gunboats. To carry out such an ambitious plan, including the expansion of ports, the modernization of shipyards and the replenishment of the ammunition bases of the fleets, 1,125.4 million rubles were requested.

This program, if implemented, would immediately bring the Russian navy to the level of the British fleet. However, the plan of the Naval Ministry was incompatible not only with the military, but with the entire state budget of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, Tsar Nicholas II ordered that a Special Meeting be convened to discuss it.

As a result of long discussions and sobering criticism from army circles, the expansion of shipbuilding was at least somehow reconciled with the real state of affairs in the Russian Empire. In the "Program of enhanced shipbuilding 1912-1916" approved by the Council of Ministers in 1912. In addition to the four battleships already under construction, it was planned to build four armored and four light cruisers, 36 destroyers and 12 submarines for the Baltic Fleet. In addition, it was planned to build two light cruisers for the Black Sea and 6 submarines for the Pacific Ocean. The proposed appropriations were limited to 421 million rubles.

Failed resettlement in Tunisia

In July 1912, Russia and France concluded a special maritime convention in order to strengthen their military-strategic partnership. It provided for the joint actions of the Russian and French fleets against potential opponents, which could only be the countries of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and Turkey. The convention was focused primarily on the coordination of the Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean basin.

Russia regarded Turkey's plans to strengthen its fleet in the Black and Mediterranean Seas with concern. Although the Turkish fleet, which in 1912 included four old battleships, two cruisers, 29 destroyers and 17 gunboats, did not seem to pose too much of a threat, nevertheless, the tendencies to strengthen Turkish naval power looked alarming. By this period, Turkey twice generally closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for the passage of Russian ships - in the fall of 1911 and in the spring of 1912. The closure of the straits by the Turks, in addition to certain economic damage, caused a significant negative resonance in Russian public opinion, since the ability of the Russian monarchy was questioned effectively defend the national interest.

All this brought to life the plans of the Naval Ministry to set up a special base for the Russian fleet in French Bizerte (Tunisia). This idea was actively defended by the new Minister of Marine I.K. Grigo Rovich, who proposed to relocate a significant part of the Baltic Fleet to Bizerte. Russian ships in the Mediterranean could then, in the opinion of the minister, solve tasks of a strategic nature with much greater efficiency.

The outbreak of the First World War immediately curtailed all work on the preparation of the relocation of the fleet. Since, in general, the potential of the Russian fleet could not even remotely be compared with the potential of the German High Seas fleet, with the very first shots fired at the border, another task became much more urgent: to physically save the existing ships, especially the Baltic Fleet, from sinking by the enemy.

Baltic Fleet

The Baltic Fleet reinforcement program was only partially completed by the beginning of the war, primarily in terms of building four battleships. The new battleships "Sevastopol", "Poltava", "Gangut", "Petropavlovsk" belonged to the type of dreadnoughts. Their engines included a turbine mechanism, which made it possible to reach a high speed for ships of this class - 23 knots. A technical innovation was the three-gun turrets of the main 305-mm caliber, used for the first time in the Russian fleet. The linear arrangement of the towers provided the possibility of a volley of all the artillery of the main caliber from one side. The two-layer armor system of the sides and the triple bottom of the ships guaranteed high survivability.

The classes of lighter warships of the Baltic Fleet consisted of four armored cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 57 mostly obsolete destroyers, and 10 submarines. During the war, an additional four battle (heavy) cruisers, 18 destroyers and 12 submarines entered service.

The Novik squadron destroyer, a ship of a unique engineering project, stood out with especially valuable combat and operational characteristics. According to its tactical and technical data, this ship approached the class of armorless cruisers, referred to in the Russian fleet as cruisers of the 2nd rank. On August 21, 1913, at a measured mile near Eringsdorf, the Novik reached a speed of 37.3 knots during tests, which became an absolute speed record for military ships of that time. The ship was armed with four triple torpedo tubes and 102-mm naval guns, which had a flat firing trajectory and a high rate of fire.

It is important to note that, despite the obvious successes in preparing for the war, the Naval Ministry took care of providing the advancing component of the Baltic Fleet too late. In addition, the main fleet base in Kronstadt was very inconvenient for the operational combat use of ships. They did not manage to create a new base in Reval (now Tallinn) by August 1914. In general, during the war years, the Russian Baltic Fleet was stronger than the German squadron in the Baltic, which consisted of only 9 cruisers and 4 submarines. However, in the event that the Germans transferred at least part of their newest battleships and heavy cruisers from the High Seas Fleet to the Baltic, the chances of Russian ships to resist the German armada became illusory.

Black Sea Fleet

For objective reasons, the Naval Ministry began to strengthen the Black Sea Fleet even more late. Only in 1911, due to the threat of strengthening the Turkish fleet with two newest battleships ordered in England, each of which, according to the Naval General Staff, would surpass “our entire Black Sea Fleet” in terms of artillery strength, it was decided to build three battleships on the Black Sea , 9 destroyers and 6 submarines with a completion date of construction in the period 1915-1917.

The Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912, the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and most importantly, the appointment of General Otto von Sanders as head of the German military mission in the Ottoman Empire heated the situation in the Balkans and the Black Sea straits to the limit. Under these conditions, on the proposal of the Foreign Ministry, an additional program for the development of the Black Sea Fleet was urgently adopted, which provided for the construction of another battleship and several light ships. Approved a month before the start of the First World War, it was to be completed in 1917-1918.

By the beginning of the war, the previously adopted programs for strengthening the Black Sea Fleet had not been implemented: the percentage of readiness of three battleships ranged from 33 to 65%, and two cruisers, which the fleet badly needed, were only 14%. However, the Black Sea Fleet was stronger than the Turkish fleet in its theater of operations. The fleet consisted of 6 squadron battleships, 2 cruisers, 20 destroyers and 4 submarines.

At the very beginning of the war, two modern German cruisers Goeben and Breslau entered the Black Sea, which greatly strengthened the naval component of the Ottoman Empire. However, even the combined forces of the German-Turkish squadron could not directly challenge the Black Sea Fleet, which included such powerful, albeit somewhat outdated battleships as Rostislav, Panteleimon, and Three Saints.

northern flotilla

With the outbreak of the First World War, a significant delay was revealed in the deployment of the Russian defense industry, which was aggravated by its technological backwardness. Russia was in dire need of components, some strategic materials, as well as small arms and artillery weapons. For the supply of such cargoes, it became necessary to ensure communication with the allies through the White and Barents Seas. Ship convoys could only protect and escort the special forces of the fleet.

Russia was deprived of any opportunity to transfer ships from the Baltic or Black Seas to the North. Therefore, it was decided to transfer some ships of the Pacific squadron from the Far East, as well as to purchase from Japan raised and repaired Russian ships that the Japanese got as trophies during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

As a result of negotiations and a generous price offered, it was possible to buy from Japan the squadron battleship Chesma (formerly Poltava), as well as the cruisers Varyag and Peresvet. In addition, two minesweepers were jointly ordered from England and the United States, a submarine from Italy, and icebreakers from Canada.

The order to form the Northern Flotilla was issued in July 1916, but the real result did not follow until the end of 1916. At the beginning of 1917, the Arctic Ocean flotilla included the Chesma battleship, the Varyag and Askold cruisers, 4 destroyers, 2 light destroyers, 4 submarines, a mine layer, 40 minesweepers and minesweepers, icebreakers, other auxiliary vessels. From these ships, a detachment of cruisers, a trawling division, detachments for the defense of the Kola Bay and protection of the Arkhangelsk port area, observation and communication groups were formed. The ships of the Northern Flotilla were based in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

The programs for the development of naval forces adopted in the Russian Empire were lagging behind the beginning of the First World War by about 3-4 years, and a significant part of them turned out to be unfulfilled. Some positions (for example, the construction of four battleships for the Baltic Fleet at once) look clearly redundant, while others that showed high combat effectiveness during the war years (destroyers, underwater minelayers and submarines) were chronically underfunded.

At the same time, it should be recognized that the Russian naval forces very carefully studied the sad experience of the Russo-Japanese War, and basically drew the right conclusions. The combat training of Russian sailors, in comparison with the period of 1901-1903, was improved by an order of magnitude. The Naval General Staff carried out a major reform of fleet management, dismissing a significant number of "cabinet" admirals to the reserve, abolished the qualification system for serving, approved new standards for artillery firing, and developed new charters. With the forces, means and combat experience that the Russian navy had at its disposal, it was possible with a certain degree of optimism to expect the final victory of the Russian Empire in the First World War.