BATTLE UNDER KONOTOPO 1659

The battle of Konotop in 1659 and its role in the confrontation between Hetman I. Vyhovsky and the Muscovite state.

The battle near Konotop on June 27-29, 1659 was the culmination of an armed confrontation between the Muscovite state and supporters of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, who was a champion of Ukraine's withdrawal from subordination to the Muscovite tsar, which unfolded in 1658-1659. In the foreign (primarily Ukrainian) history of historiography, there is a widespread opinion that "near Konotop the tsarist army suffered one of the biggest defeats in history." However, it would be more correct to say that we are talking about one of the most actively used defeats for political and propaganda purposes. However, the fact that "the color of the Moscow cavalry ... fold in one day" is generally confirmed by sources. This indicates that we are dealing with a more serious problem than the creation of a historical myth.
Let us briefly dwell on the situation that developed in Ukraine by the summer of 1659 and led to an armed clash between opponents and defenders of the power of the Russian tsar in the country. The characterization of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky almost as an agent of influence of the Polish magnates, which is widespread in Soviet historiography, seems too primitive.

Ivan Evstafievich Vygodsky

This experienced and cunning politician, who combined the features of a pragmatist and an adventurer, undoubtedly advocated the idea of ​​preserving the rights and liberties won by Ukraine under the leadership of Bogdan Khmelnytsky, which he interpreted as class privileges of the Cossacks and, first of all, of the elders. This is evidenced by the articles of the notorious Gadyach Treaty, signed on September 16, 1658 by I. Vyhovsky with the Polish government.

The paradox was that it was easier for I. Vyhovsky and his supporters to maintain the broad autonomy of Ukraine as part of the Commonwealth with its traditional weakness of the central government than under the power of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich approaching absolutism.

Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov

Thus, Hetman Vyhovsky joined the bloc of opponents of Moscow, headed by Warsaw and the Crimean Khanate that joined it. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to interpret the hostilities launched by him in August 1658 with the aim of extending his influence to the left bank, and especially to Kyiv, as a full-scale war with the Muscovite state. According to the Hadiach Articles, the hetman was a subject of the Commonwealth, and the latter was in a state of truce with Moscow since 1656 (Vilna Treaty). Formally, I. Vyhovsky acted at his own peril and risk, albeit with the secret blessing of Warsaw. Even the detachment (according to Polish terminology - “division”) of the crown convoy Andrzej Potocki, sent in support of the hetman in December 1658, consisted primarily of Wallachian, Moldavian, Hungarian, German and Serbian hired banners (units roughly corresponding to a Western European company) , which indicates the reluctance of Poland to demonstrate its own troops in the conflict.

Andrzej Potocki

At the same time, I. Vygovsky himself continued to play a risky diplomatic game with the Russian tsar, already after the start of clashes between his troops and the Russian garrisons, assuring Alexei Mikhailovich: “... We still remain irreplaceable subjects of your royal majesty.” During the subsequent conflict, he entered into negotiations with representatives of the Moscow administration in Ukraine, and even sent his representatives to the tsar, justifying the start of the conflict by the fact that "everything was caused by a quarrel and from letters of traitors on both sides." The position of the Moscow government was also similar, until the last moment it sought to maintain control over Ukraine through negotiations.

So, the Kyiv voivode V. B. Sheremetyev, whose subordinate troops were already drawn into the battles, receives an instruction from the tsar "to see the hetman in Kyiv and talk over, no matter what measures to calm the civil strife."

Vasily Borisovich Sheremetiev

Prince N. S. Trubetskoy, who in February-March 1659 marched on Ukraine with an army, which some Ukrainian authors regard as a “Moscow intervention”, received an order “to persuade the Cherkasy (this is how the Ukrainian Cossacks were called in Moscow - ed.), so that in their guilt they finish off the sovereign with their foreheads, and the sovereign will grant them as before ”and accept practically any conditions of I. Vyhovsky.

Thus, in 1658-59. it may be more about intense political maneuvering on both sides, accompanied by sporadic outbreaks of hostilities.

At the same time, before the Konotop battle, the military situation was clearly not in favor of the hetman's supporters. On August 16-24, 1658, an attempt by a detachment of Cossacks and Tatars, whose number was estimated at 21.5 thousand people, under the command of the brother of the hetman Danila Vyhovsky, to besiege Kyiv was easily repulsed by the Russian garrison; during the battle, apparently not particularly fierce (losses of the garrison are shown by Sheremetyev as only 21 people), Vygovsky's supporters were scattered and threw 12 cannons and 48 banners. On October 29, near Kyiv, Vygovsky himself suffered a failure, after which he held negotiations with the voivode Sheremetyev, an embassy was sent to Moscow, and there was a lull in the hostilities. I. Vygovsky resumed offensive operations only in February 1659, sending a 30,000-strong army near Lokhvitsa, incl. Tatar and Polish detachments.

The offensive was again repulsed by the Moscow governors, the princes Romodanovsky and Kurakin, with the support of the Cossacks of the “executive” (temporary) hetman Bespaly, who remained loyal to the tsar. The only victory that Hetman Vyhovsky won by the time of the Battle of Konotop was the capture of Mirgorod on February 4-7, 1659, and this was due to the transfer of local residents to his side and the condition of the free exit of the Moscow dragoons stationed in the city. Without calling into question more than once demonstrated in the wars of the 17th century. the excellent fighting qualities of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the military talents of their leaders, the unsuccessful actions of Vyhovsky's troops can be explained by the fact that their fighting spirit was still in 1658-59. obviously not up to the mark. The armed struggle against the Muscovite tsar, whose authority in the eyes of all Ukrainians, regardless of their beliefs, was quite high in those years, was not popular.
In January 1659, the tsar sent Prince A.N. Trubetskoy to Ukraine with a strong army. Officially, the purpose of the parish was to calm civil strife among the tsar's subjects in Little Russia, and the tsar's charter informed the Ukrainians about this. In a secret order, the prince was instructed to negotiate with I. Vygovsky, trying to conclude an agreement with him on accepting him again into Russian citizenship, and the tsarist government was ready to make big concessions. Thus, the hostilities were considered by Moscow as a last resort to bring Ukraine into obedience, and Trubetskoy's expedition was in the nature of a military-political demonstration. It is from this point of view that the Russian troops, who soon met in the battle near Konotop with the forces of I. Vyhovsky and his allies, should be assessed.
Aleksey Mikhailovich relied on the intimidating effect of his military presence in Ukraine as the main argument in the negotiations; therefore, the army of Prince Trubetskoy, who was considered one of the best Moscow commanders of that time, must indeed have been impressive. Reliable sources do not give an unambiguous number of Russian troops near Konotop. The "Chronicle of the Seer" defines it as "more than a hundred thousand"; S. M. Solovyov believes that there were about 150 thousand people in the army of Prince Trubetskoy. Some modern authors, however, believe that the number of Moscow troops is greatly overestimated; however, we note that in 1659, the same units that fought in the Russian-Polish war of 1654-67 went under Konotop in 1659, and historians estimate them at 122 thousand people during the culmination of hostilities. Taking into account the fact that the forces of the princes Romodanovsky and Lvov, as well as the Cossacks of Bespaly loyal to Moscow, joined the army of Trubetskoy near Konotop, the statement about the size of the Russian army of about 100 thousand people. looks quite realistic.
Moscow troops near Konotop were represented by units of the Belgorod and Sevsk ranks (military administrative districts), which traditionally bore the brunt of military conflicts on the southwestern borders of the Moscow state, as well as elite regiments of the Moscow (otherwise: Big or Tsar) rank, which testified about the importance of the campaign of Prince Trubetskoy for the tsarist government. According to the report of Prince Trubetskoy, the army consisted of "Moscow nobles and residents, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reitar system of the initial people and reiters, dragoons, soldiers and archers" . Consequently, it included both service and local components traditional for the Moscow state - noble cavalry, archers and Cossacks, and organized in the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich in the Western European "regiments of the new order" - cavalry (reitar and dragoon) and infantry (soldiers).

Despite the well-known fact that the fighting qualities of the Russian troops in the second half of the 17th century. left much to be desired, in 1659, under the command of Trubetskoy, units that had combat experience of the company against the Poles in 1654-1656 prevailed, which to some extent increased their combat effectiveness. Particularly noteworthy are the "Moscow nobles and residents", who on June 29, 1659 were to become the main participants and victims of the Battle of Konotop from the Russian side. Representing the color of the noble militia, this local cavalry, which included many representatives of noble families, nevertheless, was an irregular formation archaic for its time. Possessing good, albeit varied, weapons and a good horse composition, the Moscow noble hundreds were weak in another way: called up for service from their estates in wartime and did not conduct regular exercises, they did not have sufficient skills to act as well-coordinated military units and were extremely heterogeneous by composition. Undoubtedly, in their ranks there were also good fighters; however, the proportion of people was great, whose attitude to their military duties was determined by the sacramental phrase: “God grant that you serve the great sovereign, and do not take your swords out of their scabbards.”

The main opponents of the Moscow noble cavalry in the Battle of Konotop - Ukrainian Cossacks and Crimean Tatars, for whom war was actually a way of life - significantly surpassed it both in individual combat training and in first-class ability to act as a single whole as part of their units (hundreds) and units (regiments and Chambulov). As for the Moscow reytars and dragoons, more or less trained to fight in the ranks with firearms and edged weapons, according to the rules adopted in the 17th century. European tactical principles, then one by one these poorly trained cavalrymen (with the exception of some officers) fought even worse than the noble cavalry. In a word, the strength of the troops of Prince Trubetskoy near Konotop consisted primarily in large numbers and military experience, which, with successful leadership, could be turned into a guarantee of victory.

In March 1659, Prince Trubetskoy arrived with an army in Putivl, which for the time of the entire company became his main rear base. In a letter to the tsar, he reported on the performance in mid-January of Vyhovsky with the Tatars, Poles and "Cherkasy" against the detachment of Prince Romodanovsky and the continuation of clashes, including near Kyiv, which was under threat of attack. The message ended with the words: "... Cherkasy, sovereign, cannot be trusted, no matter what they say, they lie in everything." Vygovsky, in turn, did not agree to Trubetskoy's proposal for negotiations and continued to distribute a circular declaring war on Moscow and revealing its "treason" towards Ukraine. Thus, a decisive armed clash between the parties became inevitable.
Russian troops entered Ukrainian territory in March 1659. The first clash took place near the town of Sribne (Srebnoe), where the Moscow vanguard under the command of the bold and energetic cavalry commander Prince Semyon Pozharsky, according to the chronicle of Samuil Velichko, "without great labor, the city ... got the inhabitants of the local He cut down some of them, and took the others to the full ..., and smashed the Cossacks of the former Prilutsky regiment there ... so that their colonel Doroshenko himself, like a hare driven through the swamps there, ... escaped ... ". In itself, a secondary, this combat episode is important for understanding the course of the Battle of Konotop because S. Pozharsky, who led the Moscow troops directly involved in it, near Sribny won an easy victory over the supporters of Hetman Vyhovsky, and this subsequently caused him to underestimate the enemy.

On April 19, Trubetskoy's army laid siege to the city of Konotop, in which Nezhinsky and Chernigov regiments loyal to Vygovsky, led by Colonel G. Gulyanitsky, stubbornly defended themselves with the support of local residents. The siege lasted more than two months and was conducted by the Moscow governors according to all the rules of the military art of that time: with artillery bombardment, siege engineering work and repeated attacks, "in which ... the boyar Prince Trubetskoy spent a lot of people" . However, the situation of the besieged in Konotop in June became critical. Gulyanitsky, in his letter dated June 14, begs Hetman Vyhovsky to rush to his aid, warning that otherwise he will be forced to surrender the city in a week.
Probably, the delay of Trubetskoy near Konotop was due to political considerations - to demonstrate force to Ukraine, avoiding a general battle, but Hetman Vyhovsky used it exclusively for military purposes. During this time, he mobilized troops loyal to him and, most importantly, united with his main ally, the Crimean Khan Mohammed Giray IV.

Sources report that under the command of Vyhovsky there were 10 Cossack regiments; historians again disagree in determining their number, estimating it from 16 to 30 thousand people. Taking into account the fact that the Ukrainian Cossack regiment of that time averaged about 3 thousand fighters, the second figure looks more realistic. The Crimean Khan had about 30 thousand excellent cavalry troops, and to this should be added a significant part of the Polish mercenaries from the “division” of Andrzej Potocki, who also marched with the Cossacks and Tatars near Konotop. In a word, given the significant qualitative superiority of the Ukrainian-Tatar army (consisting of born warriors) over the Russian troops, Trubetskoy's numerical advantage (moreover, reduced by assaults and the inevitable infectious diseases and desertion in military camps of the 17th century, no longer looks so impressive.

On June 27, 1659, the combined forces of Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan approached Konotop. On their part, the battle that took place over the next three days really looks like a cunning operational-tactical combination worked out in advance. By successive blows and withdrawals of the Cossack cavalry, the Moscow troops were lured right to the place where they had organized a fatal ambush, and on the Sosnovka River, the Cossacks had previously built a dam and dug ditches to cut off the enemy's retreat with a water barrier. However, one should not indiscriminately blame Prince Trubetskoy for the fact that the enemy’s approach came as a complete surprise to him. The annals of Samovidets and Samuil Velichko contain information that on June 24, at the crossing to Konotop near Shapovalovka, the first skirmishes took place in which the Cossacks of Vyhovsky "took the language, but the Moscow people did not get the language." In addition, Vygovsky himself, in a report about the battle, admits that, having launched a demonstrative attack on June 27 on the Russian camp, when crossing the Lipka River, “I found fifteen thousand Moscow there, harrowing the crossing.” Consequently, Trubetskoy expected an attack, undertook a search with reconnaissance detachments in the direction of the alleged approach of the enemy, and put up a strong barrier there. However, the Moscow governor could not unravel the enemy’s plan, and throughout the entire battle he was deluded about his strength, first underestimating it, and then overestimating it.
On June 27, the entire army of the Crimean Khan, half of the Cossack troops (probably the infantry, which at that time made up about 50% of the Ukrainian units and the Polish banners, hid in an ambush in the forests outside the village of Sosnovka; in front of them lay a lowland, on which it was planned to lure the enemy and flood Hetman Vyhovsky fully exploited the element of surprise, with the cavalry half of the Cossacks, attacked the Moscow detachment of Prince Romodanovsky at the crossing, inflicted serious losses on him, stole the horses grazing in the fields and retreated across the Sosnovka River. Trubetskoy's reaction is well known: he sent "to hijack" the impudent Cossacks a flying detachment led by the most experienced cavalry commander, Prince Pozharsky, who was best suited for this task, as well as Prince Semyon Lvov and the voivode Lev Lyapunov.Probably the latter two were deputies of the first.Sources attribute the performance of the Pozharsky detachment as early as June 28, i.e. there is this connection was not assembled hastily.In addition, found in a number of modern According to Russian authors, the estimate of its composition at 5,000 noble cavalry and 2,000 Cossacks of the “mandatory” hetman Bespaly also seems to be underestimated. Based on source data, the forces of Prince Pozharsky look completely different. According to Samuil Velichko, the Moscow cavalry, chasing Vyhovsky's Cossacks, amounted to "more than ten ("kilkanadtsyat") thousand reytars and other good cavalry troops" . Contemporaries testify that, in addition to nobles and Cossacks, Pozharsky's cavalry included at least two regiments of the "new system" - Colonels William Johnson and Anz Georg Fanstrobel (who died in this battle). The presence of infantry in the Pozharsky detachment is not directly confirmed by sources; although the fact that the site of the main battle near Sosnovka is a little more than 10 km away from Konotop suggests that some foot contingents of the Moscow army could have reached the battle site by June 29.
There is some confusion in the dating of the decisive events of the Battle of Konotop by sources, primarily the annals of Samovidets and Velichko. Based on the relation of I. Vyhovsky, we can distribute them as follows. Having moved out of the camp of the Russian army, Pozharsky's cavalry during the day on June 28 had several skirmishes with the Ukrainian Cossacks who were luring them, and then crossed the Sosnovka River along the bridge - i.e. exactly where Vygovsky and Mohammed Giray expected. It was at this stage that the Moscow governors made a fatal mistake. The presence of the main forces of the Crimean Tatar army nearby was undoubtedly assumed by them, and now it has received confirmation from the interrogations of the captured Cossacks. However, Prince Pozharsky, who was in a state of victorious euphoria, excusable for a young cavalryman, but not for a unit commander, clearly overestimated his strength. Contemporaries cite his arrogant and self-confident words: “Come on, honey! Let's kalga and Nuradin (sultans, sons of the khan - ed.)! ... We cut them all down and capture them! At the same time, as far as is known, he completely neglected reconnaissance and had no idea either about the real location of the enemy, or even about his engineering work on the Sosnovka River, which threatened the Moscow detachment with a real “konotop” (Ukrainian researchers deduce the name of the city precisely from the presence of vast swamps in its In turn, Prince Trubetskoy left the pursuit of Vygovsky entirely to Prince Pozharsky and did not bother to send infantry and artillery to reinforce his detachment, which would have made counter-offensive actions, if not Cossacks, then at least mounted Tatar Chambuls (regiments - approx. He considered Pozharsky's forces quite adequate to the task assigned to them, possibly under the influence of the reports of the latter. And this at a time when the Russian military leaders could not help but know that luring the enemy by feigned retreat under attack (the so-called "Tatar dance ”or“ hertz ”is a common combat technique of Ukrainian Cossacks.

On June 29, the flying detachment of Prince Pozharsky, which the Cossacks of Vyhovsky lured into the lowland between the village of Sosnovka and the river of the same name by a feigned retreat, came under attack from many times superior ambush Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian forces and was defeated. At the same time, Cossack "sappers" under the command of S. Gulyanitsky (brother of the colonel besieged in Konotop) destroyed the bridge and the dam in the rear of the Moscow cavalry; the spilled Sosnovka turned the path of the “military people” Pozharsky to retreat into a huge swamp. It is logical that the decisive role in the defeat of the Pozharsky detachment was played by the rifle and cannon fire of the ambush Cossack infantry and the rain of arrows that the Crimean Tatars showered on the Russian cavalry, following their favorite trick. Only when the enemy was completely upset did the troops of Vygovsky and Mohammed-Giray deal a decisive blow in cavalry formation with cold weapons; It was not difficult for the Cossacks and Tatars to cope with the demoralized and poorly trained Moscow riders for hand-to-hand combat. At this stage, probably, all three Moscow governors were captured - the princes Pozharsky and Lvov and Lyapunov, easily recognizable by their luxurious equipment and weapons. Obviously, against the flexible fighting style demonstrated by the Ukrainian-Tatar forces, the Russian governors and their subordinates were completely powerless; however, primarily not because of the archaism of Moscow's tactics, but because of the notorious "human factor" in the command and the low training of the troops.

The "Chronicle of the Seer" claims that the defeat of Pozharsky took place in just one hour, and this seems to be true. However, her statement that the losses of the Russian troops at the same time amounted to "twenty or thirty thousand people of his royal majesty" does not seem so plausible. The losses of the Russian cavalry, no doubt, were very heavy. However, sources from the Moscow side give a much more modest figure: “Total in Konotop in the big battle and on the withdrawal: the regiment of the boyar and voivode Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy with comrades of the Moscow rank, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized Murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reiter ranks of the initial people and reiters, dragoons, soldiers and archers were beaten and 4769 people were caught in full. Of these, the losses of the Moscow category (of which the Pozharsky cavalry was mainly formed) amounted to 2873 people,
- Sevsky category - 774 people, Belgorod category - 829 people. These figures may be inaccurate or significantly underestimated, especially since the dead Bespaly Cossacks are not taken into account (only “Rylsky, Odoevsky, Don and Yaik Cossacks” are mentioned in the list of losses), and military leaders of all times and peoples hid their losses. But the difference with the tens of thousands offered by the Seer is still too great. Confirmation that part of the Pozharsky detachment still managed to escape from the trap near Sosnovka can be the ratio of losses and survivors known on the basis of modern documents among the “capital officials of the sovereign regiment”. Of these, 2 okolnichy (princes Pozharsky and Lvov), 1 steward, 3 solicitors, 79 Moscow nobles, 163 tenants died, and 717 people survived (including those subsequently redeemed from Tatar captivity). A rather high percentage of survivors among the "capital ranks" is explained by the fact that the nobles, who had the best horses, had more chances to escape during the retreat than, for example, the "thin" reytars and dragoons. As for the Ukrainian-Tatar losses during the defeat of Pozharsky, then, given the course of the battle, they could not be particularly great. The figures given by some Ukrainian authors of 4,000 Cossacks and 6,000 Tatars cannot be confirmed in the sources.
Undoubtedly, among the Moscow “military people” who survived at Sosnovka, there were both cowards who fled at the first sign of failure, and brave men who made their way through the enemy’s orders; but it is easy to imagine in what catastrophic tone both of them reported to Prince Trubetskoy about the defeat of the Pozharsky detachment. Although numerous fresh infantry and all artillery remained at the disposal of the Moscow governor, the Lipka River represented a convenient natural line of defense, on which it was quite possible to stop Vygovsky and the Tatars, and the exhausted defenders of Konotop (who remained in the ranks no more than one and a half thousand would hardly have decided in such conditions for a deep sortie, Trubetskoy prematurely considered the battle lost.

He hurriedly broke camp and began to retreat with the army in the direction of Putivl, which, according to the Polish participant in the battle R. Peglasevich, "amazed everyone." The persecution, organized by the Ukrainian-Tatar troops, was not successful: the Moscow governor, who did not show himself in the best way near Konotop, conducted the retreat very successfully. Its units moved, hiding behind a “walk-city” made up of wagons, dug in at halts and repelled all attacks of the enemy cavalry with dense artillery fire. According to Samuil Velichko, on July 10 they "entered Putivl without great damage." This mobile fighting retreat is a much more complex way of fighting than defending in prepared positions. If the Moscow army had remained near Konotop, it would most likely have fought off the enemy with even greater ease. It will not be a mistake to say that Trubetskoy is to blame for the fact that the Battle of Konotop turned out to be a defeat for the Moscow troops, to an even greater extent than Pozharsky, although he acted more adequately.

The last tragic chord of the battle was the well-known execution of the captive Prince Pozharsky, whom the Crimean Khan ordered to be hacked to death for impudent speeches and spitting in the eyes. It can be assumed that, realizing his responsibility for the defeat, the Russian governor deliberately provoked Mohammed Giray - spectacular death to some extent atoned for his guilt in the eyes of his contemporaries. But the assertion that all the prisoners were killed along with Pozharsky Crimeans is probably far from the truth. Recall that the second prince - Semyon Lvov - died later in captivity from an illness (possibly due to wounds received in battle), and among the "capital officials" who received the honorary name "Konotop Regiment" in Moscow, a few years later there were those redeemed from Crimean captivity . The Tatars who fought for the sake of booty had no reason to destroy prisoners for whom it was possible to get a ransom. However, the fate of the simple “military people” captured by them at Sosnovka could well turn out to be the most tragic: not being able to drive them to the Crimea at the height of the campaign, the Tatars, most likely, really massacred them.
The psychological effect of the defeat at Konotop for the Muscovite state was undoubtedly extremely negative. “In a sad dress, Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people, and horror attacked Moscow,” writes S. M. Solovyov. The main reason for this seems to be really very heavy losses suffered in the battle by the well-born Moscow nobility. After studying the most famous genealogical books of noble families, modern Russian researchers managed to compile a general list of representatives of noble noble families who died in the battle of Konotop. Among them are the princes Volkonsky, Ukhtomsky and Vyazemsky, Neledinsky, Velyaminov-Zernov; moreover, in many cases, the father and son, or several brothers, died. It can be admitted that after Konotop such a strong noble militia "the Tsar of Moscow was no longer able to lead into the field"; although the combat value of the local cavalry should not be exaggerated. However, it is hardly logical to link the work begun in August 1659 to strengthen the fortifications of Moscow with a real fear of an invasion by Vygovsky and the Tatars.
From a military point of view, the Battle of Kontop was an impressive victory for Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan over the Moscow governors. Through the use of feigned retreat, ambush and engineering on the ground, they demonstrated complete tactical superiority over the enemy, who actually played by their rules throughout the battle. The Ukrainian and Tatar cavalry skillfully used their advantage over the poorly trained and heterogeneous cavalry units of Pozharsky. The combat mission of lifting the siege of Konotop and forcing the Russian troops to retreat was completed in full. However, the defeat of Trubetskoy cannot be considered complete. The main body of his army remained intact; moreover, having made a successful retreat with battles to Putivl, they showed that they had not lost their combat capability. The battle confirmed the ability of the Moscow “military people”, repeatedly mentioned by contemporaries, to re-engage in battle after a defeat, “without losing heart”. The losses of the Russian troops near Konotop were undoubtedly very sensitive, but by no means huge. Recalling the experience of the Ukrainian uprising against the Commonwealth in 1648-56, we can say that, compared with the brilliant victories of the Cossack army near Zhovti Vody, Pilyavtsy and Batogh, the Battle of Konotop looks like a rather ordinary success, half of which, moreover, belongs to the allies - Tatars.
The influence of this battle on the course of further struggle in Ukraine should not be overestimated either. The Moscow garrisons in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities (with the exception of Romny resisted. Vyhovsky’s attempt to undertake a joint campaign with the khan “to the land of Moscow for prey and to waste” was neutralized by a raid of the Cossacks led by Yuri Khmelnitsky on the Crimea, after which the khan and a half burdened with trophies troops turned back. However, it is unlikely that, having the main enemy forces in the rear, Vygovsky and Mohammed-Girey, in any case, would have decided on a deep invasion on the southwestern borders of the Muscovite state. Trubetskoy, in turn, soon resumed active combat and It is significant that Vyhovsky's victory at Konotop did not inspire confidence in his supporters, and in August-September 1659 the hetman faced such a large-scale transition of the Cossacks from his camp to the pro-Moscow one that a little more than two months after the battle he resigned hetman powers (Bila Tserkva Rada).All this allows us to characterize the battle near Konotop not as one of the greatest, but as one of the most fruitless victories in the history of Ukraine.

On October 17, 1659, the Cossack Rada in Bila Tserkva finally approved Yury Khmelnytsky as the new hetman of the Cossacks. Vyhovsky was forced to abdicate and officially transfer the hetman's kleinods to Khmelnytsky.

At the Rada, the entire Zaporizhzhya Army "became under its Great Sovereign by the autocratic hand in eternal allegiance as before." Vygovsky fled to Poland, where he was later executed on charges of treason - a natural end for a traitor.

E.G. Fedoseev

Battle of Konotop: myths of the new century

July 2009 marks the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko instructed the government to develop an action plan to celebrate the victory of the "Ukrainian army" near Konotop. In honor of this anniversary, it is proposed, in particular, to hold scientific conferences and the all-Ukrainian festival "Cossack Rodoslav", as well as to make a documentary film about the Battle of Konotop. In addition, the president instructed the government and administration of the Sumy region to resolve the issue of building a memorial complex on the battlefield. The purpose of all these events, as noted in the presidential decree, is "the restoration of historical truth and national memory, as well as the dissemination of complete and objective information about the events of the mid-17th century in Ukraine."

But what is the “historical truth” about which the Ukrainian president advocates restoring? How objective is the information that Kyiv, for the sake of the ideologists of extreme nationalism, imposes on the entire Ukrainian people? An analysis of the works of representatives of the current Ukrainian historical science Y. Mytsyk, V. Stepankov, S. Gorobets, A. Bulvinsky and others shows that this “truth” rests on four myths about the battle of Konotop...

Myth one: about the "Ukrainian-Russian war of 1658-1659."

The rebellion of the hetman of the troops of Zaporozhye Ivan Vyhovsky, which today in Ukraine is called nothing less than the "Ukrainian-Russian war", was just an episode of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667. After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1657), Ivan Vyhovsky was elected the new Ukrainian hetman. Bishop of Chernigov L. Baranovich, consecrating the election of Vygovsky and solemnly handing him a mace, a saber and a bunchuk, said: “You must serve faithfully and faithfully to the great sovereign, as you have served until now: manage and strengthen the Zaporozhye Host, so that it is relentless under the high hand his royal majesty."
Vygovsky soon committed treason, that is, an act of betrayal in relation to the Russian Tsar as his subject, violating the oath and concluding a military-political alliance with the Crimean Khanate hostile to Russia. Guided by the motive of strengthening personal power, already in October 1657, Vyhovsky sent a letter to the Crimean Khan Mohammed Giray, in which he expressed his desire to "renew the former fraternal alliance of the Cossacks with the Tatars." At the same time, which is very significant in relation to the personality of Vygodsky himself, he signed: "Your Khan's grace, our gracious sir, a desirable servant in everything." Khan willingly responded to this pleasurable call of the hetman and sent his horde to “feed” on the Ukrainian lands.
The appearance of the Tatars led to the growth of opposition to the hetman in the lands of the Left-bank Ukraine. The power of the hetman was not recognized by the Zaporizhzhya Sich, headed by the ataman Y. Barabash. The Cossacks with weapons in their hands opposed Vyhovsky. Then the Poltava regiment led by Colonel M. Pushkar rebelled. Ordinary Cossacks fled in droves from the hetman's army and went over to the side of the rebels.
In June 1658, having called on the helpers of the Horde, Vygovsky staged a bloody massacre in Poltava, giving the city to the Tatars for plunder. Lubny and Gadyach were taken and destroyed by storm. Without receiving an appropriate order from Moscow, the Russian army under the command of Prince G. Romodanovsky, stationed in Belgorod, was unable to come to the aid of the rebels. Nevertheless, Sloboda Ukraine - Kharkov, Sumy, Akhtyrsky and Ostrogozhsky Cossack regiments remained faithful to the tsar and subsequently actively participated in hostilities against the hetman-traitor. The defeat of Poltava was only the beginning of the civil war in Ukraine. Soon after Vyhovsky's main forces left the Dnieper, the Poltava, Mirgorod and Lubensky regiments again rebelled against the hetman, driving out the colonels he had appointed.
Having concluded the Treaty of Gadyach with Poland (September 1658), the hetman committed a new betrayal, since this agreement provided for the return of Ukraine to the Commonwealth. Vygovsky began an armed struggle against Russia, which came to the defense of the forces opposed to him. To call these events the "Ukrainian-Russian war of 1658-
1659" more than contrived. After all, even Vygodsky himself, after the Gadyach agreement, which returned Ukraine under the rule of Poland, continued to sign his letters as “the hetman with the Army of His Royal Majesty Zaporozhye.” Truly a "servant of two masters" - the treacherous and deceitful hetman sought to extract the maximum personal benefit from the two monarchs, not thinking about the interests and aspirations of his people.
Vyhovsky's actions largely contributed to the start of the civil war in Ukraine, which later received the name "Ruins". It was not Ukrainians and Russians who fought in this “war” against each other, but primarily Vyhovsky’s opponents (“Cossacks on this side of the Dnieper”) and his supporters (“Zadneprovsky”), as contemporaries noted.
The actions of Ivan Vygovsky created a serious threat to the external security of the Muscovite state, they destroyed the defense of the southern steppe borders. Already in the autumn of 1658, the raids of the Tatar-Cossack detachments began on the Russian border towns and villages. In March 1659, the tsar sent an army to Ukraine under the command of Prince A. Trubetskoy. It was not a punitive action at all, as Ukrainian historians are trying to present today. If the purpose of the campaign was to walk across Ukraine "with fire and sword", the voivode would not be embarrassed about the means, especially since he had them. Instead, strictly following instructions from Moscow, he began lengthy negotiations with Vyhovsky's representatives on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Punishers don't behave like that. Ukrainian historians, trying to find historical examples of the atrocities of the Moscow "occupiers", resort to only one dubious fact - the extermination of the inhabitants of the town of Srebnoye by the Russians, reflected in the annals of Samuil Velichko. This "eyewitness", who lived at the end of the seventeenth century, has long been known to historians for conjectures and fantasies. To refer to it is at least frivolous.

Myth two: about the huge "occupation" army of Russians[

On April 20, 1659, Russian troops besieged Konotop, in which an active supporter of Ivan Vygovsky, the “executive” hetman G. Gulyanitsky, with 4 thousand Cossacks from Nezhinsky, as well as partially Chernigov and Prilutsky regiments, strengthened. With skillful lies, and sometimes with violence, he managed to convince the Cossacks that the tsarist army came in order to “beat the hetman and the Cossack foreman, break their rights and liberties, create the Cossacks as eternal peasants.” None of the Ukrainian historians gives documentary evidence of the allegedly 100,000-strong Russian army near Konotop. One by one, they unfoundedly assert that there were 100, 120, 150, 200, 360 thousand Russians, without even trying to investigate this issue. According to the “Estimate of the Military Forces of the Muscovite State in 1663”, the total strength of the entire active Russian army at the climax of the Russian-Polish war was about 122,000 people. According to Ukrainian scientists, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich threw all his available armed forces to the siege of such a small city as Konotop, removing horse and foot regiments from the Polish, Swedish and Tatar borders.
Konotop was a well-fortified fortress. Trubetskoy, having settled down as a wagon train in the village of Podlipnoe (south of Konotop), suggested that Gulyanitsky stop resistance and surrender the city. Having been refused, the prince ordered his archers and dragoons to begin preparations for the assault. The next day, Prince F. Kurakin arrived near Konotop "with comrades and with the sovereign's military people." Trubetskoy ordered them "to stand near Konotop on the other side of the city." To the west of the fortress were the regiments of Prince G. Romodanovsky from the Belgorod category (military administrative district). Thus, on three sides, Konotop was tightly surrounded by three siege camps, and on the fourth, the marshy and difficult to cross the river Ezuch flowed.
According to a study by the Soviet historian A. Novoselsky, who found in the archive bit records about the losses of Trubetskoy's troops in the Battle of Konotop, the number of the Russian army that blockaded Konotop was approximately 30 thousand people. Under Konotop, there were also Ukrainian regiments of the hetman loyal to the tsar
I. Bespaly (about 7 thousand people). A significant part of its fighters were Cossacks-Cossacks. The Poltava, Mirgorod and Lubensky regiments, as well as the regiments of Sloboda Ukraine, were left to defend their cities and towns in the event of an invasion of the Vygov traitors, Crimean Tatars and Nogais.
On April 29, Russian troops launched an unsuccessful assault on Konotop, which resulted in significant losses. After that, Trubetskoy began a leisurely siege, which dragged on for almost two months. The prince, following the royal decrees from Moscow, hoped to pacify Vygovsky without a decisive military clash and much bloodshed. Trubetskoy at that moment was unable to adequately assess the enemy’s treachery and succumbed to deception: he did not organize reconnaissance and, as a result, had no idea about the number of enemy troops and the features of the terrain on which the battle subsequently unfolded.

Myth three: About the “great victory” of Ukrainians

Vygovsky managed to deceive Trubetskoy. Declaring readiness for peace negotiations, he pulled together significant forces to Konotop. Early in the morning of June 28 (July 8, according to a new style) near Sosnovka, 5 versts south-west of Konotop, the Crimean Tatars and Vyhovsky's Cossacks attacked the guard hundreds of Russians. And after a short battle at the crossing over the Kukolka River, they retreated. Trubetskoy decided that small and scattered detachments of Cossacks and Tatars were acting against him. Meanwhile, the main forces of Vygovsky and the Khan were approaching Sosnovka. The Russians were opposed by 10 Cossack hetman regiments (Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Kanevsky, Uman, Cherkassky, Kalnitsky, Pavolotsky, Belotserkovsky, Podnestriansky and Prilutsky - about 16 thousand people in total), part of the Polish detachment of A. Pototsky - 18 banners (about 1.400 people) and Crimean -Tatar horde led by Khan Mohammed Giray himself (about 30 thousand people).
Believing that there were small enemy forces in front of him, Trubetskoy sent his cavalry across the Kukolka River. The command of this cavalry detachment was entrusted to the energetic and brave Prince S. Pozharsky and his comrade Prince S. Lvov. The shock group included about two thousand Moscow and city noblemen, two Reiter regiments under the command of foreign colonels A. Fanstrobel and V. Johnston with dragoon companies attached to them (a total of about 4 thousand people). Faithful to the royal oath, Hetman Bespaly sent with the governors
2 thousand Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of colonels G. Ivanov and M. Kozlovsky. The most combat-ready part of the Russian cavalry were the Reiters, armed and trained no worse than the European regular cavalry of that time. Detachment Pozharsky-
Lvov was consolidated, as it included combat units from different "voivodship regiments".
The princes crossed the crossing, attacking the Tatars and mercenaries of Vyhovsky discovered in the steppe. A participant in the battle on the Russian side, Yesaul Semyon Cherkes, described the beginning of the battle as follows: “We moved away from the wagon train for 7 versts and, having crossed the crossing, boldly hit the Tatars and the Germans without fear, because here people showed up not very big, but they didn’t start big, and they wanted to demolish those people.” But even on the eve of the battle, before reaching Sosnovka, the Crimean Khan Mohammed Giray, having separated from Vygovsky, secretly came to the tract Empty Torgovitsa, located near the Torgovitsky swamp. Stopping in a shelter, the Crimeans waited until the detachment of Pozharsky and Lvov, pursuing the fleeing mercenaries and Tatars, approached the tract. Having chosen a convenient moment, the entire Crimean Tatar horde suddenly fell upon the Russian cavalry - from the rear and from the flank. The first strike of the Khan's army was taken by the Reiter regiment of Fanstrobel, who "managed to turn the front and fire a volley of carbines right at point-blank range at the attacking Tatar cavalry. However, this could not stop the Horde, and after a short battle, the regiment was exterminated. As a result, the cavalry detachment of Prince Pozharsky was ambushed, surrounded by the entire Crimean Tatar horde. Pozharsky and his warriors courageously fought against the enemies to the last opportunity.
Documents testify to the fact that it was the Crimean Tatars, and not the Cossacks of Vyhovsky, who played the main role in the defeat of the Pozharsky and Lvov detachment. All the "initial people" who were wounded were captured by the Tatars. After the battle, the hetman humbly asked the khan for Russian prisoners, for he had nothing to boast about. According to an eyewitness, “and whom the de governor was caught by the Tatars in battle, and the hetman de begged for those governors from the Tatars, and the Tatars didn’t give him away.” Vygovsky himself confirmed the fact that "all colonels, captains, captains either died on the battlefield or went into Tatar captivity."
Having been captured, Prince Semyon Romanovich Pozharsky showed his contempt for the leader of the Horde. He spat in the Khan's eyes, and called Vygovsky a traitor. The offended Khan immediately ordered the execution of Pozharsky. The feat of the brave prince is not forgotten among the people, the old “Song about the death of Semyon Pozharsky” has survived to this day. It is quite understandable why there is not a word about the Cossacks-Circassians in the song, and the Crimean Tatars and other eastern peoples act as opponents of the Russians.
The battle did not end with the defeat of the Pozharsky detachment. Romodanovsky's cavalry regiments stood at the Sosnovskaya crossing and blocked the road to Konotop. Soon, the main forces of Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan approached Sosnovka. Romodanovsky had only cavalry, since all of his infantry was in trenches near Konotop, that is, far from the crossing. Reiter and Romodanovsky's dragoons were supported by the Cossacks-Cossacks of Bespaly. Dismounting his cavalry and fortifying himself on the bank of the Kukolka, Romodanovsky took upon himself the blow of the enemy's vastly superior forces. The fierce battle continued until the very evening, until the Tatars and Vygovtsy bypassed his position near the village of Popovka. At the same time, the Polish dragoons of Lonchinsky (from the detachment of A. Potocki) managed to capture the crossing near Sosnovka. Even Vygovsky himself admitted in his report that “the dragoons drove (Russians. - I.B.) from the crossing, and then the cavalry crossed and detained them with skirmishes.” But not the dragoons then predetermined the outcome of the battle. In most of the testimonies of the participants in the events, the main role of the Tatars in that battle is noted. The Pole T. Korchevsky reported that “[the khan went around at another crossing to the rear of this (Russian. - I.B.). As soon as the Khan passed to their rear, then immediately embarrassment began between them. “Tatars de at that time, having entered from both sides, the sovereign’s military people were hit and the regiments and hundreds of sovereign’s military people were mixed,” the Don Cossacks who were captured by Vygovsky said after the battle. As an unnamed Polish participant in the battle noted, “a horde crossed on the right wing and on the left and captured the rear of this crossing from the Muscovites who defended it.”
One conclusion suggests itself: the victory over the Russians near Konotop was ensured by the Crimean Tatar horde. Nevertheless, in the report, Vygovsky extolled his merits in every possible way, downplaying the decisive importance of the Tatars in the battle.

Myth four: about the "complete defeat of the Russian troops"

None of the modern Ukrainian historians writing on the topic of the Konotop battle even tried to find out what the real losses of the Russian troops were in this battle. So, Yu. Mytsyk continues to assert that “as a result of the Konotop catastrophe, 40 thousand tsarist troops were killed on the battlefield, and 15 thousand, including 50 governors, were taken prisoner. Meanwhile, the paintings of losses preserved in the archives of ancient acts say otherwise. “In total, in Konotop, in a big battle and on a withdrawal ... beaten and caught in full” 4,769 people. The bitterness in Moscow and the mourning announced on this occasion were caused not by the number of dead, but by the fact that many noble youth from aristocratic families fell in the battle (princes Volkonsky, Vyazemsky, Meshchersky, Bolkhovsky, Ukhtomsky, Shcherbatov and others), in total - 246 "Moscow officials." It was this fact that gave rise to rumors of a grandiose massacre and hitherto unprecedented defeat, which in reality did not happen.
Already two months after the battle, the Ukrainian Cossacks rebelled against Ivan Vyhovsky. One by one, the Cossack regiments began to go over to the side of Moscow. At the same time, the Nezhinsky regiment was the first to take the oath to the tsar, the same one that stubbornly defended Konotop from Trubetskoy's army. Vyhovsky threw away the hetman's mace and fled to Poland, where he was later shot by the Poles on suspicion of treason. Ukraine has made its choice, it preferred Moscow to Warsaw.
Militant nationalism, the rejection of historical ties between Kyiv and Moscow, the distortion of facts and their interpretation for the sake of the present time literally overwhelm the research of Ukrainian historians today. The exaltation of those who betrayed their friends and supporters, betrayed their oath, went against Moscow, giving her an oath of allegiance before that, trampling into the mud the true heroes of the Ukrainian people who fought against the invaders, traitors and traitors, these are the priorities of Ukrainian historiography. And public policy too.

XIII

In early November, Romodanovsky entered Little Russia with an army and dismissed a lengthy station wagon among the people, it calculated the crimes of Vyhovsky, as in the previous letter given to the Poltava regiment, refuted the slanders dissolved by him and his supporters, as if the tsar wants to destroy the Cossacks, the interests and people: it was pointed out that, according to the articles of Hetman Khmelnitsky, from the income collected in Little Russia, it was necessary to give a salary to the Cossacks, and Vyhovsky did not give it and appropriated the income, paid from them to a foreign army, which he kept in this way at the expense of the Little Russian people, for his own weights. The Little Russian people were invited to assist the Great Russian army and deliver food to it. According to the meaning of these articles, it was as if the whole people were being judged by the misunderstanding that arose between the Moscow government and the hetman.

For his part, Vygovsky also dissolved the wagon among the people in the Poltava regiment, urged the Cossacks to remain obedient to him and stand against the enemy, that is, the Great Russian troops: God, with the entire Zaporizhzhya Army, declare your malice to the whole world.

The advent of Romodanovsky was a signal for Pushkaren's party. She came to life. By order of Romodanovsky, a dispersed golota, who sensed a robbery, began to gather for his army; the regiment of Deineks was again formed. Colonels Ivan Donets and Stepan Dovgal commanded the Little Russians; they were given Moscow military men. They took Goltva. The Cossacks and the townspeople swore allegiance to the tsar. Then Dovgal defeated the Mirgorodites near Sorochintsy. Then, on October 23, the Deineks broke into Mirgorod and robbed it so that the inhabitants, according to the chronicler, were left completely naked. The next day Romodanovsky entered Mirgorod. Stepan Dovgal became a colonel again. From there, the militia moved to Lubny. The Shvets was not able to defend himself, - he gathered the Cossacks and left in advance; wealthy people with their belongings fled in all directions.

Deineks, running ahead to Lubny, ravaged and burned them. In vain did Romodanovsky, wanting to save the city, send military men from Moscow to drive them out. The Deineks were terribly angry against the Lubents. They, - said the Deineks, - the Lubensky Cossacks ruined us more than anyone else, burned our houses, gave our wives and children to the Tatars; last year, three thousand Zaporozhye Cossacks were killed. They robbed the Mgarsky monastery, where they found money immured in the wall - according to the custom of that time: Prince Romodanovsky barely kept the crowd from the final ruin of the monastery. From Luben, the militia moved on, ruined Chornukhi, Goroshin, Piryatin; near Varva had an insignificant skirmish with Gulyanitsky. The tenant Khmetevsky and the Kolontaevsky centurion Kotlyarenko were sent to Pereyaslavl to persuade the Cossacks and the mob to lag behind Vygovsky. Then the prince settled down with the army near Lokhvitsa for winter quarters. Deineks roamed the left-bank Ukraine, robbed the wealthy, burned their houses...

The Lokhvitsky camp of Prince Romodanovsky was filled with both Great Russian military men and Cossacks. Prince Kurakin, Prince Semyon Pozharsky and Lvov arrived. The more the news of the treaty with Poland spread among the people, the more willingly the simpletons, turning away from the thought of fraternizing with the Poles, fled to the Great Russian army. Romodanovsky was visited by Judge General Bespaly, recently appointed to this position. The prince gathered a handful of Cossacks loyal to the tsar and proposed to elect a hetman; they chose Fingerless. The new hetman approved his stay in Romny. Together with him, Voronok was appointed general captain. Probably, new colonels were elected at the same time, instead of Vyhovsky's adherents who had fallen away from the tsar: instead of Shvets, Tereshchenko was elected; Poltava had Kirik Pushkarenko as a colonel. In Ukraine, two administrations and two hetmans were formed. But he did not want to lay down his dignity and the third - Iskra, a bunchuk comrade of the Poltava regiment. He wrote to Moscow, referring to the fact that he was pointed out the hetman's dignity back in Moscow, assured that the people stood for him. The government did not find anything better than to instruct Romodanovsky himself to approve, at his own discretion, one of the two. Iskra appeared in Gadyach, called himself a hetman, gathered an embassy around him and prepared to overthrow both Vyhovsky and Bespaly. At the call of Romodanovsky on December 1, he went to Lokhvitsa, and “so,” says the chronicler, “he was intoxicated with the thought of the upcoming hetmanship, that he was not afraid to go accompanied by an insignificant detachment, although throughout the left-bank Ukraine, detachments of Vyhovsky’s party fought with deineks. Seven miles from Lokhvitsa, Iskra was attacked by the Chigirinsky Cossacks under the command of Skorobogatenok. Iskra asked the prince for help in vain through messengers. Romodanovsky made excuses at night and sent a detachment when this detachment could see only corpses. “The spark has gone out, ready to flash!” Ukrainians said. Romodanovsky got rid of the need to choose one of the two. But at the end of January, as it seems, Romodanovsky was no longer in Lokhvitsa: Prince Fyodor Kurakin is the chief commander there.

Such skirmishes were limited to military operations. Vyhovsky did not move for a long time. He did not trust his Cossacks, saw widespread hesitation and hoped for help from the Crimea and Poland, but meanwhile he was a mercenary squad of Serbs, Volokhi, Germans and Poles: the last three thousand came to him under the command of Yuri Pototsky and Yablonovsky, and two dragoon regiments under the command of Lonchinsky. On the one hand, he waited to see how the articles he and Benevsky would adopt in Warsaw would be accepted, on the other hand, he curried favor with the khan, but at the same time showed a desire to remain loyal to the tsar and sent the Belaya Tserkov colonel Kravchenko to Moscow as an ambassador.

Kravchenko was received very kindly in Moscow, when suddenly at the end of December the news came that Skorobogatko had destroyed the Iskra, and the Pereyaslav colonel Timofei Tsytsura was attacking the Great Russian military men. This was considered treachery, since Vyhovsky had previously announced to the governors that he was sending an embassy to the tsar, and on this basis, considering the war suspended, the governors released Gulyanitsky from the siege in Varva. Kravchenko's situation in Moscow was difficult: they began to consider him a spy, but Kravchenko begged to be allowed to send messengers with letters to the hetman and the colonels. Together with two Little Russians, the centurion and ataman of the Belotserkovsky regiment, Major Grigory Vasilyevich Bulgakov was sent to Little Russia by envoy from the tsar with clerk Firs Baibakov. He was instructed to find out the true state of affairs in Little Russia, whether the Cossacks wanted Vyhovsky to remain hetman or want to change him, like him, whether he sincerely wants to bring guilt or thinks to get along with Poles, Crimeans and other foreigners, how great his forces are, etc. Bulgakov had to hand him the letter only in the presence of the foremen, and in no case should he give it in private. Baibakov should have been released in advance with news.

The tsar, reprimanding Vygovsky for violating the truce, appointed a council in Pereyaslavl during the winter. For this purpose, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy will be sent. Together with him, Romodanovsky and Sheremetev should be present at this council. This council will have to find and punish the perpetrators of unrest and establish order. It goes without saying that neither the hetman nor his accomplices could have been to the taste of this gladness: it would have been gathered under the influence and oppression of the boyars and would not have been favorable to those who showed a desire to stand up for their liberties more than to please Moscow, with In the same way, Vygovsky and the foremen had many enemies: they would then speak loudly and with success. It is clear that Bulgakov did not expect a very kind reception.

Already on the road to Konotop, he experienced trouble. He sent a centurion to Gulyanitsky to inform him that he himself would go to the hetman, and Baibakov would go back, and therefore, both for himself and for Baibakov, he asked for an escort. Gulyanitsky rudely received the centurion and announced that he would not give Baibakov an escort. "If they are both sent to the hetman, then let them both go, I have no order to let one go to the hetman, and the other back." He also did not want to give Bulgakov escorts to Kyiv, as Bulgakov wanted.

Bulgakov and Baibakov went on their own to Gulyanitsky. Confirming the same thing that he said to the centurion, the Nezhin colonel said: your sovereign sends to us, as if he wants peace, but at the same time he constantly sends troops and intimidates the self-willed ones. Turks and Jews are better than you; a Turk would have been better for us than a Muscovite.

The messengers began to make excuses. Gulyanitsky cursed them with obscene abuse and, by the way, threatened the Muscovite with the Swedes! “Nowhere did it happen,” said Bulgakov, “to scold ambassadors and envoys innocently.”

They left and on January 8 arrived in Pereyaslavl: in the courtyard where they landed, dragoons in German dress immediately appeared and stood guard at the doors and windows. They were told that they would not be allowed to see the hetman, but that they would wait for him here, that the first person in the city was Nemirich and asked them to dine with him.

Nemirich, a European man, received them politely and drank with them to the sovereign's health, which pleased the Moscow messengers very much. They were even more pleased when they saw captured countrymen who were governors at the table, and learned that Nemirich often caresses and treats them, and in general sends good food to other prisoners. They could not resist not to thank him and not to reassure him with royal favor, which Nemirich had never sought. But politeness did not prevent Nemirich from demanding from them the letters that Kravchenko sent, and when they excused themselves that they should give them to those to whom they were written, Nemirich sent an asaul to them and ordered that these letters be taken from them by force.

On January 10, the hetman arrived, greeted by Nemirich with great honor, with cannon fire. On the 18th, royal messengers came to him; they passed in the middle of the armed ranks of musketeers dressed in German, and found Vygovsky in the room, along with the convoy, judges and captains, and there they handed him a letter from the tsar, saying the usual formalities.

When the letter was read aloud, Vygovsky said: “It is written in the royal letter to be glad to be in Pereyaslavl with the near boyar Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy, with Vasily Borisovich Sheremetev, and with Grigory Grigoryevich Romodanovsky and comrades. No, it's hard for me to move in with the boyars. I know what their intent is: they want to catch the hetman and cut off his head or cut out his tongue, as they did to the Kyiv elders. It is better to be not only in citizenship, but even in full possession of a Turk, than in citizenship of the Muscovites. Perhaps we will meet at Tsibulnik or Solonitsa. Why were my envoys scolded and wanted to be shot in Moscow? What are the messengers to blame. Here I will do the same to you... I will order you to be shot. Here it is also written in the charter - to punish those who are the cause of all evil: and even without joy you can know that Sheremetev and Romodanovsky are the cause of everything. Why does Vasily Borisovich from Kyiv not go away with military men, and why does Grigory Grigoryevich leave the Cherkassy cities abroad? Moreover, until recently, Prince Fyodor Fyodorovich Kurakin came and ruined many places, and came to Lokhvitsa to help, and with him there were self-willed people who should all have been executed. They call me an perjurer: no, I am not an perjurer; I didn’t do anything like that: I swore to the sovereign that I should be a subject, and not that I should be in our cities to the Moscow governors and that the Muscovites should rule over us. This will never happen. Now I'm going to war, but not against the sovereign's military people, but against the Self-willed, and whoever will stand for them, I will fight with those. These letters that Kravchenko wrote were written involuntarily; fearing death, he wrote as he was ordered to write; and you will do the same when I make you. I served the sovereign faithfully, even when I was a clerk - I persuaded the hetman Khmelnitsky and brought all of Little Russia under the high hand of his royal majesty; but now they call me a traitor and a perjurer, and they constantly give printed and written letters to self-willed people, and order them to start riots. Here is what the boyar Vasily Vasilyevich Sheremetev writes. Bring and read the sheet that he wrote to all the mob and to the entire Zaporozhye Host.

We read Sheremetev's letter. It said that Vyhovsky had forgotten the fear of God, was giving Little Russia to the Poles, that the Poles wanted to kill Little Russians, ruin them, enslave them into captivity, still own Ukraine, and eradicate the Orthodox faith. The diploma ended with the words: and you, mindful of your oaths, should not pester the Poles and not let them live in Cherkassy cities and do the same to you against the Poles, just as you did to the Poles in advance, referring to us, and we, following your exile, help you and ready to stand for you.

Bulgakov said to all this that the sovereign indicated to be glad to pacify civil strife and bloodshed, and not in order to catch the hetman; that no one thought to shoot Kravchenko, and that there was no insult to him in Moscow, that the boyar Sheremetev arrived in Kyiv by royal decree, at the petition of the Cossack envoys, and if it annoyed them, they should have asked the sovereign to change him, and not go to him war, and that if Kurakin arrived near Lokhvitsa, it was because the Cherkasy could not resist the truth, and that as if the self-willed people were given printed and written letters with hung seals, they do not know about it.

But all speeches and arguments were in vain. The foreman who was there spoke in the same spirit as the hetman, and the envoys realized that, as they put it, there would be no appeal from them.

Upon returning to their court, the messengers had a secret conversation with one of the sentry dragoons. Hetman had all these dragoons, he explained, not Germans, but Poles and Polished Cossacks. When the dragoon was given a gift, he told the envoys that Vyhovsky was going with the Poles and the Germans to expel Romodanovsky and take Kyiv from Sheremetev, that he now had three thousand Poles, and soon there would be thirty thousand; but as soon as a large royal army appears, all the dragoons, except for the Poles, will retreat from it; and he has such an idea that, taking with him the treasures of Khmelnitsky, in case of danger, flee to Poland, and Yuras Khmelnitsky knows about his intention.

The envoys were told that the hetman was going to war near Lokhvitsa and ordered them to be taken with him, and let them go from the camp. They had to submit, and on the 16th they were taken from Pereyaslavl on carts.

When they reached the village of Belousovka, thirty miles from Lokhvitsa, the bailiff announced to them that the hetman would let them go, and that they would receive his letter to the sovereign on the way to the camp where they would have to spend the night for the first time.

“We,” said Bulgakov, “gave the letter of the great sovereign to the hetman himself, it was so convenient for the hetman to give us the sheet himself; nowhere is it found that the plates were sent to the camp; true, we are sent to Chigirin, and not to the great sovereign.

The bailiff swore that they would go back to Moscow. “You,” he said, “cannot be with the hetman, because now the murzas are coming to him, talking to him about all sorts of things, and the Lyash ambassador Benyovsky is now with him; so you don't feel good there."

They received a letter and, under an armed detachment, returned again through Pereyaslavl. In Pereyaslavl, they had the opportunity to hear how certain spiritual people treat Moscow; the archpriest of Kyiv, having come to them, reprimanded them that the sovereign was sending ambassadors, as if for peace, and the boyar Sheremetev was acting in an hostile manner. Ambassadors like you,” he said, “should be cut down.

But on the other hand, in Nizhyn, both on their way to Vyhovsky and returning from Vyhovsky, the envoys saw Maxim Filimonov, who assured them of his devotion to the tsar, said that nothing could be expected from Vyhovsky, and asked to keep his son in Moscow, but meanwhile he in Ukraine, a rumor is already spreading that he has gone missing.

The letter sent to the king from the hetman was written with a sharp statement of termination. Vyhovsky reproached the tsar for the fact that he, the hetman, many times tearfully asked for the pacification of the free-willed, but, not getting what he wanted, he was forced to pacify them himself, that when everything had calmed down, Romodanovsky entered Ukraine and stirred up the free-willed people again to ruin and torment people, that the hetman many times, wanting to avoid bloodshed, wrote to the tsar, but did not receive a gracious royal word, and meanwhile the Poles began to attack the Cossacks, invite the Turks and dissuade the Tatars from an alliance with the Cossacks. “Seeing such disgrace,” this letter read at the end, “we decided to return to our former sovereign, the Polish king, protecting the freedom of the Orthodox faith and the Eastern churches, but with the agreement that reconciliation would follow with Your Majesty. Do not please, your royal majesty, lay wrath on us for this, but, as a Christian king, prevent the shedding of Christian blood; and if, your royal majesty, you send your armies against us, then blood will be shed and the enemy of the Christian faith will take joy. Grigory Bulgakov will speak about this at greater length, and we wish your Tsar Majesty many years of reign.”

Vyhovsky decided to go to war, but not against the Great Russians, but against the Cossacks: the Zaporozhian Sich declared itself resolutely against the hetman's intentions. The Zaporozhians, according to a contemporary, hated Vyhovsky even more after he fraternized with the Tatars and, therefore, could not approve of the usual Zaporozhian raids on the Tatar fields and the Black Sea.

The Cossacks sent a strong detachment under the command of Silky to help the royal army. Silka came to Zinkov and began to incite eastern Ukraine against the hetman. Vyhovsky went against this detachment, trying to prevent both him and the detachments that were formed in nearby towns from joining the Lokhvitsky army. So that Romodanovsky would not hit him in the rear, the hetman sent Nemirich to disturb him.

On January 29, Nemirich approached Lokhvitsa. The Moscow army came out against him, but the chiefs of the Moscow cavalry were people - according to the chronicler - inexperienced and could not resist Nemirich. The Muscovites locked themselves in Lokhvitsa, and Nemirich harassed and held them until Vyhovsky dealt with their allies.

On February 4, Vygovsky laid siege to Mirgorod and sent an urge to the city to lag behind Moscow and stand together for the fatherland, promising not to take revenge on anyone. The archpriest of Mirgorod, named Philip, began to speak for Vygovsky and had such an effect with his speeches that he not only convinced the Mirgorod Cossacks, but Stepan Dovgal himself bowed. The self-will and robberies that the Great Russian military people allowed themselves in the city irritated the people of Mirgorod; they opened the gates and recognized the hetman's authority. His sworn enemy, whom he so stubbornly sought to take, along with other horsemen of the opposing party, appeared to Vygovsky, was received by him friendly and led his Cossacks along with them further. The Great Russian military people who were in Mirgorod were released to their own. Vygovsky began to address meekly wherever they listened to his convictions; towns and villages, one after another, surrendered to him and went over to his side. The Great Russian governors were afraid for Bespaly himself, so that he would not renounce his hetmanship and be transferred to Vyhovsky. Kurakin from Lokhvitsa hurried to send a detachment of soldiers on foot to Romen to protect this point of the new Cossack administration. In fact, having become under Zinkov, Vygovsky sent exhortations to Bespaloy - to lag behind Moscow and unite for a common cause. There was nothing solid and reliable in the popular belief: having easily surrendered to the persuasion of Vygovsky, the Little Russians later said to the Great Russian military people: “Let only a strong tsarist army come; we will help you against Vyhovsky,” Zinkov persisted against the hetman; the Cossacks settled there with their ataman Silka and for four weeks repulsed Vyhovsky. Vyhovsky stood under Zinkov.

Although Vyhovsky's letter to the tsar, sent with Bulgakov, showed already the final termination, but in Moscow they wanted to make peace with the hetman, at least for the time being. The main authorities were entrusted to the boyar, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy. The assembly place was appointed in Sevsk, where the boyar arrived on January 30th.

On February 13, a secret order was delivered to Trubetskoy, where he was instructed to arrange with. Vyhovsky world peace, and after that he received eighteen copies of the royal letter, inciting the Little Russians against the traitor and perjurer Vygovsky, and by royal order on February 18 sent Bespalom shells and military people to help. In a secret order, dated February 13, Trubetskoy was ordered to meet with Vygovsky and appoint a council in Pereyaslavl, so that all the colonels and the rabble were on this council, and this council was supposed to resolve disputes. Before the meeting of the Rada, the boyar was authorized to make broad concessions to Vygovsky, if necessary. Boyarin was supposed to communicate with Vyhovsky, and, first of all, by mutual agreement with him, Trubetskoy should have separated his military people, and Vyhovsky should have released the Tatars from him. To warn Vygovsky of distrust on both sides, it was necessary to make faith. The boyar, having come together with Vyhovsky, will announce to him the oblivion of all the past in the name of the tsar, and the hetman will show him the articles adopted with the Poles. The boyar will agree to grant the hetman and the entire Cossack army the same rights and privileges that the Poles promised the Cossacks. It must be assumed that the content of the Gadyach treaty was not yet fully known in Moscow, because the order makes a reservation that it is possible to agree to such an agreement "with the tsar only when this agreement does not contain high and intricate articles, which not to honor the sovereign's name. The Moscow government, however, knew well what benefits Vygovsky extorted from the Poles, under the Gadyach agreement, personally for himself and for the foreman; it understood that the main reasons for inclining towards Poland lay in the personal appearance of the foremen, and therefore generously lavished its gifts. Hetman promised to give an increase in the mace; agreed to make him a Kyiv governor; it was decided to give his relatives, friends, and in general the colonels and the entire foreman the castellanism and eldership, they promised to remove Sheremetev and not to bring military people into Ukraine, and the hetman would have to remain in citizenship and break the alliance with the Tatars. All such promises, of course, could only be valid when the people recognized Vyhovsky as hetman at the council that Trubetskoy would convene in Pereyaslavl; but if it happened otherwise, then Trubetskoy had to hand over the mace to the person whom the Chigirinsky starostvo chose, just as the belonging of the hetman's order should have been given to the new hetman.

On February 20, the clerk Starkov arrived from Moscow in Sevsk, with proposals to Vygovsky, and was immediately sent to the Zinkovsky camp. Following him, Trubetskoy moved closer to the borders of Ukraine with an army and on March 1 arrived in Putivl. Since then, negotiations have been going on for three weeks, the details of which, unfortunately, are unknown to us. Trubetskoy wrote friendly letters to Vyhovsky and persuaded how to settle the world, but sent appeals to the people - to stand strong against the traitor Ivashki and not bow to his lovely letters.

On March 24, Starkov arrived from Vygovsky with the news that Vygovsky asked Trubetskoy to come with him for negotiations ten miles from Romno, but nothing was written in the letter to Trubetskoy about such a meeting.

Having released Starkov to Moscow, Trubetskoy served a prayer service on March 26 formidable and terrible Spas and moved with the whole army to Ukraine. He wrote to Lokhvitsa to Kurakin, and to Romain to Bespalom, so that they would come to him. On March 30, Bespaly appeared with his colonels and captains. Trubetskoy announced to the Cossacks that he had come not for war, but to pacify civil strife and bloodshed; he encouraged them with royal mercy, and ordered them to write to cities and towns that succumbed to Vygovsky's exhortations, so that the inhabitants would repent and still turn under the autocratic royal hand. “Make, hetman, a strong law, under the death penalty, to your colonels and captains and all Cossacks,” said Trubetskoy to Bespaly, “so that they don’t do anything bad in the sovereign Cherkassy cities: don’t beat people, don’t take them in full, don’t rob and they didn’t offend them in any way, and they wouldn’t do any violence and ruin to them, and the sovereign’s military men “were ordered the same from me under the death penalty.” Fingerless promised, and was released to Romen again.

April has come. There was no news from Vyhovsky. The tongues brought to the Great Russian camp announced that the hetman had retreated from Zinkov and left for Chigirin; meanwhile, Gulyanitsky, with Cossacks and Tatars, arrived in Konotop and from there sent out parties that attacked the Great Russian villages near Putivl, Rylsk and Sevsk, ravaged them, killed and took people prisoner.

Came from Moscow Kravchenko. Trubetskoy, calling him to him, explained to him Vygovsky's behavior, and said:

“Tell the hetman and all the Cossacks to leave behind their lies and remain under the hand of the great sovereign, as before, without any doubt; and if they do not come to their senses and do not begin to beat the brow of the sovereign about their faults, then I will go with military people, and what will be done to them, it will not be from me, but from themselves.

Kravchenko swore that he would persuade the hetman and the colonels.

“We,” he said, “we have been sent to you, sovereign, from all the mob with pleasure, and we will glorify the great mercy and salary of the great sovereign in all cities and towns.”

At the end of March, Vygovsky returned to Chigirin. Easter has come. According to the custom of that time, colonels and other officials came to the hetman with congratulations on the Easter holiday. Vygovsky, taking advantage of this opportunity, called them to the Rada.

Vygovsky did not trust the Moscow proposals: they were supposed to be a condition - to gather a council. Vyhovsky was afraid that many ill-wishers would gather at this Rada - they would choose another hetman, and the boyar, who would be the decider of the case, would break all the promises made to him. Moreover, the Moscow government obviously did not trust him, and, offering peace, acted against him and united with his enemies. He presented the colonels with the misfortune that threatened them all; he assured that the Muscovites were deceiving them, and, according to the general verdict, he sent a station wagon around Ukraine. The hetman informed the Ukrainian people in it about the reasons that prompted him to call the people to arms against the Moscow troops; he argued that the tsarist commissioners at the Vilna commission of 1656 decided to give Ukraine under Polish rule as soon as the tsar received the Polish crown; therefore, the hetman and the foremen reasoned that it was much better to unite with Poland as a free nation than to be given into captivity. “Another reason,” wrote Vyhovsky, “prompting us to secede from the Russian power, is that we undoubtedly inquired that his royal majesty sent his high letter to Prince Grigory Grigorievich Romodanovsky, commanding to exterminate the hetman with all the elders, to destroy the weight of our rights and liberties , leave only ten thousand Cossacks, and the rest of the Ukrainian people: make eternal peasants and slaves.

This wagon at first frightened the Ukrainians on the right side of the Dnieper; on the left, only Pereyaslavsky, Prilutsky, Nezhinsky and Chernigov regiments held on to Vygovsky.

Meanwhile, on April 10, Trubetskoy served a prayer service to the “terrible and terrible Savior” in the Konstantinovsky Cathedral and moved to Konotop; at the same time he wrote to Bespalom in Romen and in Lokhvitsa to Kurakin, so that from both sides they would converge to him for connection. On April 13, on the road, Bespaly stuck to him with his Cossacks; On the 16th, they reached Konotop, drove off the detachment that was watching the path; On the 21st, Prince Fyodor Kurakin appeared to him with Pozharsky and Lvov and with the entire army stationed in Lokhvitsa. The Little Russian chronicler writes that the Prilutsk colonel Doroshenko wanted to block the way for the Muscovites, but Romodanovsky's comrade, the brave prince Semyon Ivanovich Pozharsky, struck him near Sribny. “Doroshenko,” says the chronicler, “like a hare ran through the swamps, fleeing death, and Prince Pozharsky ordered to cut all the inhabitants of the town of Sribnoe.”

There were two colonels in the Konotop castle - Nizhyn and Chernigov, with their regiments, up to four thousand people in total. Before the attack, Trubetskoy wrote a letter to Gulyanitsky, informing him that he had been sent to calm civil strife and to stop the bloodshed; urged to remember the single Orthodox faith and royal mercy, to lag behind falsehoods, to beat with one's forehead in one's guilt and send good and noble people for negotiations.

Instead of an answer, shots from cannons and rifles were heard from the city.

“We sat down to death! - the Cossacks shouted: - we will not surrender the city!

Then Trubetskoy ordered to shoot at the city and into the city.

The united Great Russian army began to besiege Gulyanitsky. From April 21 to June 29 this siege lasted; a large Great Russian army under the command of Trubetskoy besieged four thousand Nizhyn and Chernigov residents - and did not take them. The castle was surrounded by a deep moat and a high rampart. For several days cannons rattled incessantly, grenades flew into the city, military men dug tunnels; On the 28th of April, before dawn, having finished the prayer service, the whole army climbed into the attack. Everything was in vain: the lock from grenades did not light up, the tunnels were interrupted; Moscow people managed to climb the walls, but, beaten off with damage, returned from the attack; and the besieged from the high ramparts responded to the besiegers with cannonballs and buckshot so accurately that they inflicted much more harm on them than they themselves suffered. The Muscovite archers and gunners spent nothing but "the sovereign's potion," as they called gunpowder. Trubetskoy conceived a different kind of war: he wanted to fill up the ditch that surrounded the castle, but the Cossacks interrupted work with frequent shots, made bold sorties, descended into the ditch and carried away the earth thrown there by the Great Russians onto their shaft: in this way the ditch remained as deep as before, and the shaft was made higher, and the Cossack nuclei hit the besiegers even more successfully. Several weeks have passed. Bored with the siege, Trubetskoy sent Romodanovsky and Skuratov to Borzna. On May 12, Moscow people attacked Borzna. The commander of the Borzen Cossacks, Vasily Zolotarenko, brother-in-law of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, was defeated; Borzna was taken and burned; many inhabitants were exterminated - the wives and children of the Cossacks were brought prisoners near Konotop and sent to Great Russia. On May 21, according to a secret letter from the invariable benefactor of the Moscow side, Archpriest Filimonov, Romodanovsky, Kurakin and the Cossacks, under the command of Bespaly, moved to Nezhin. The Nizhyns made a sortie; the Great Russians drove them into the city, but on the other side stood a large army, consisting of Serbs, Poles, Tatars; the Great Russians went to them, a battle took place, the Tatars retreated; the Cossack leader Skorobogatenko, the appointed hetman, was captured. However, the prince was afraid to pursue the Tatars, assuming that they were deliberately luring him into pursuit in order to lead him on a large army, and returned to Trubetskoy to conduct a siege.

Not knowing where Vyhovsky was and what was being done to him, on June 4 Trubetskoy decided once again to try to stop the bloodshed by peaceful means. He sent the Don Cossacks with a letter to look for him: as before, the boyar offered peace to the rebellious hetman and asked to send now noble people for a conversation. Until June 27 there was no rumor or spirit of Vyhovsky.

Vygovsky did not help Gulyanitsky, because he was waiting for the khan; there were only sixteen thousand Cossacks who adhered to his party. Mahmet Giray appeared no earlier than June 24, with thirty thousand Horde. His first meeting with the hetman was at Krupych-pole. The allies affirmed their friendship with a mutual solemn oath: the hetman and the foremen swore on behalf of the whole of Ukraine, the colonels swore for their regiments, the centurions for their hundreds; then the khan, sultans and murzas swore, according to their own law, not to retreat from the Cossacks and help against the Muscovites until the Moscow troops were driven out of Ukraine. Vygovsky, moreover, had several thousand mercenary troops - Serbs, Volokhi, but mostly Poles.

The united Cossack and Tatar army marched to Konotop. Near Shapovalovka, a Moscow detachment, sent to take the languages, met with them. There was a battle; the Great Russians were utterly defeated, and this first success encouraged the Cossacks.

Among the prisoners was Silka, the brave defender of Zinkov, whom Vyhovsky ordered to be chained to a cannon.

The captives expressed the position of the troops near Konotop and added that the generals did not wait for the arrival of the enemy. In fact, the governors had no information that the enemy was so close to them.

The allies were fifteen miles from Konotop; here it was necessary to cross the swampy river Sosnovka. Vygovsky examined the area: it seemed to him such that the battle given on it could end in the complete defeat of one of the hostile troops. The Cossacks could hope for victory because they had time to arrange their army in a favorable way; it was only necessary to lure the Muscovites.

Vyhovsky stationed his Cossack army on a wide meadow, in a closed place, and gave command of the army to Stefan Gulyanitsky, brother of the besieged in Konotop, and he himself, having selected a small detachment for himself, invited Sultan Nureddin with him and crossed over to the other side of the Sosnovka River, with the intention of attacking to the rear of the besiegers, then run, lure the Muscovites behind him and lead them to the remaining Cossack army; Khan with the Horde went to the right to the Torgovitsa tract, about ten versts away, with the goal of hitting the rear of the enemy another time, when Vygovsky manages to bring him out.

Battle of Konotop, beginning

On June 27, Tuesday, Vygovsky crossed the river and suddenly hit the rear of the besiegers of the Konotop castle. The unexpected appearance of the enemy confused the Great Russians: they ran in alarm, and the Cossacks captured many horses and cavalry, which in a hurry did not have time to jump on them in time. But in a few hours, the Moscow people recovered - the governors noticed that the Vygovsky army was at least ten times smaller than theirs. Pozharsky hit on the Cossacks - they turned back and fled for Sosnovka.

The night has come. Several Cossacks were taken prisoner, others voluntarily came to serve the king.

“Does Vygovsky really have as many troops for everything as there were here?” Pozharsky asked them.

“No,” answered the Cossacks, “don’t chase after him, prince: he deliberately lures you into an ambush. There are many Cossacks with him, and the Khan himself with the Horde, and with the Khan are glorious warriors: Sultans Nureddin and Kalga, Murzas Dzaman-Saidak and Shuri-Bey.

"Come on honey! - shouted Pozharsky: - come on Nureddina, come on Kalga, come on Dzyaman-Saidaka! We will cut down and spit out all their butted mothers!”

In vain did Trubetskoy stop Pozharsky. The brave prince did not listen. “He,” says the chronicler, “believed too much in his invincibility after his success near Sribnoy.” On June 28, early Pozharsky with thirty thousand crossed over Sosnovka. The other half of the army, under the command of Trubetskoy, remained near Konotop; Bespaly was with her with the Cossacks.

Having crossed the Sosnovka, the Moscow people set up batteries and arranged themselves in battle order. Vyhovsky did not interfere with them. But at a time when the Great Russians attributed this inaction of the Cossacks to cowardice, five thousand Ukrainians, under the command of Stepan Gulyanitsky, were digging a ditch in the direction of a wide bridge, along which the Muscovite army passed. As soon as they took their work close to the Moscow army and could be seen by them, Vygovsky made an attack, but after the first return shots he fled. Pozharsky, confident that the Cossacks were afraid of his prowess, rushed after them. Vygovsky retreated even further ... The entire Moscow army withdrew from its position, pursued the Cossacks with fervor and retired a considerable distance from the bridge.

In the meantime, the Cossacks, who were quickly digging a ditch, found themselves in the rear of the Moscow army, rushed to the bridge, cut it down and blocked the shallow river with its remnants: the water began to spill over the viscous meadow. This unexpected phenomenon gave Gulyanitsky the idea not only to block the way back through Sosnovka for the people of Moscow, but to make it difficult for them to move across the meadow. On his orders, the Cossacks scattered across the swamp: some mowed grass and reeds, others chopped willow and vine and threw them into the water. In a few minutes the river was dammed up, and the water spilled in all directions.

Seeing the Cossacks behind them, the Great Russians stopped chasing Vygovsky and turned back; then, in their turn, the fleeing Cossacks chased after them, and suddenly the Muscovite people were deafened by a terrible cry and whistle: the Horde with the Khan and militant Murzas flew impetuously right on the left wing of the Muscovite army. The Moscow people wanted to keep the pressure, but Vygovsky with the Cossacks and the mercenary troops hit them from the right side. Muscovite people, constrained from the sides, leaned back ...

But they had no way back; water, spilling over the meadow, turned it into a swamp; the Moscow guns did not move; Muscovite horses sank to their belly; Moscow people started to run on foot, but it was also impossible to walk. “How could he have run away,” says the chronicler, “who had winged horses.”

Battle of Konotop, end

In vain Pozharsky rushed with all his might, in vain he wanted to get out to a dry place: thirty thousand Russians loyal to the Tsar died on that terrible day. The Tatars did not spare them, because it was impossible to hope for payback from the simple; and the Cossacks were bitter against this army, which, according to Vygovsky and the elders, allegedly came in order to destroy their rights and turn them into slaves.

Pozharsky was captured and brought to Vygovsky. The prince abruptly began to speak to him for betraying the tsar, and Vyhovsky sent him to the khan.

The Commander of the Faithful said to him through the interpreter:

“You are too reckless, prince, and frivolous; you dared not be afraid of our great forces, and now you are worthy, punished, because so many brave and innocent Moscow troops died through your frivolity!

“Prince Pozharsky,” says the chronicler, did not look that he was in captivity, but in response to the khan’s remark, he treated the khan’s mother with an epithet, uncommon in the printed word, and spat in the khan’s eyes. The enraged khan ordered to cut off his head in front of his own eyes. “The response to him,” says the Ukrainian chronicler, “is the extermination of the innocent inhabitants of Sribnoe.” Together with him, the khan, in a rage, ordered the other noble captives to be chopped up; among them was the son of the famous Procopius Lyapunov, Lev, two Buturlins and several colonels. Pozharsky showed himself to be a real great Russian folk fellow. The people's memory appreciated this and passed on his feat to posterity in a song.

Behind the river, crossing, behind the village of Sosnovka,
Under Konotop under the city, under the white stone wall,
In meadows, green meadows,
Here are the royal regiments,
All wolves are sovereigns,
Yes, and the companies were noble.
And from afar, from a pure field,
Whether from that wide expanse,
If only black crows were herds of herds, -
Kalmyks and Bashkirs gathered, gathered,
The Tatars were thrown into the regiments of the sovereign;
They ask the Tatars
From the regiments of the sovereign to his opponent.
And from the regiment of the sovereign's opponent
They did not choose either from the archers or from the soldiers of the good fellows.
Pozharsky Prince went out vtapory, -
Prince Semyon Romanovich,
He is a boyar big word, Pozharsky prince, -
He went out for a ride
Conquering the Tartar and the villainous rider:
And the Tartar held a sharp spear in his hands,
And the glorious Pozharsky prince
One sharp saber in the right hand.
Like two bright falcons flew in an open field,
And they gathered in an open field
Pozharsky boyar with a Tatar.
God help Prince Semyon Romanovich Pozharsky -
With his sharp saber he drew back the sharp Tatar spear,
And he cut off his head, like a Tatar rider,
And the evil filthy Tatars howled:
He killed their rider, which is not a glorious Tatar.
And the Crimean Tatars are evil, they are evil, but crafty,
They shot a good horse at Semyon Pozharsky,
His good horse falls.
The Prince of Pozharsky will shout to the regiments of the sovereign:
“And you are newly recruited soldiers, you are sovereign archers.
Bring me a good horse, take Pozharsky away;
Take away to the regiments of the sovereign.
Crimean Tatars are evil, they are evil and crafty,
And they rushed about in a heap, captured Prince Pozharsky,
They took him to their Crimean steppes
To his Crimean Khan - a village Shishimore.
He began to interrogate him:
“And goy thou, Pozharsky prince,
Prince Semyon Romanovich!
Serve me by faith, yes you are by faith-truth,
Absently unchanged;
Even as you served the king, yes to your white king,
And so you serve me, the Crimean Khan himself, -
I'll favor you with gold and silver
Yes, and lovely wives, and souls of red girls.
The Pozharsky prince answers the Crimean Khan himself:
“And goy be a Crimean khan - a village shishimora!
I would be glad to serve you, the Crimean Khan himself,
If my frisky legs were not shackled,
Yes, hands were not tied in silk chemburs,
If only I had a sharp saber!
Would serve you with faith on your wild head,
I'd cut off your wild head!"
The Crimean Khan will scream here - the village shishimora:
“And you, filthy Tatars!
Take Pozharsky to the high mountains, cut off his head,
Chop his white body in pieces into small pieces,
Scatter Pozharsky across the far open field.
If black crows screamed, zagaikali -
The Tatars captured Semyon Pozharsky.
The Tatars took him to a high mountain,
They told the Tatar prince Semyon Pozharsky,
Chopped off a wild head,
They cut out the white body in parts into small ones,
They scattered Pozharsky across the far open field;
They themselves went to the Crimean Khan himself.
They will be gone for a day, another, no one will visit.
And from the regiment there were two sovereign Cossacks,
These two Cossacks are great,
They went up the mountain
And they climbed that high mountain,
And those fellows saw: - after all, the body of Pozharsky:
His head lies on his own, arms, legs are scattered,
And his body is white in parts chopped
And scattered over a wide expanse,
These Cossacks, well done, collected his body
Yes, they put them in one place;
They took off their linden bast,
And yes, they put it there.
They tied the linden bast tightly,
They carried him, Pozharsky, to Konotop to the city.
In the city of Konotop, the bishop came in handy there.
He, the bishop, collected priests and deacons
And church clerks,
And those Cossacks, daring fellows,
He ordered to wash the body of Pozharsky.
And they laid his body white in an oak house,
And they covered it with that white-oak lid;
And here people marveled
That his body was fused into place.
Having performed a proper burial,
His white body was buried in the damp earth,
And sang the eternal song
To that Prince Pozharsky.

(Ancient verse. coll. Kirshe Danilov.)

On June 29, Gulyanitsky with his Nizhyn and Chernigov residents came out of a twelve-week imprisonment. Only 2,500 men remained in his detachment.

On July 2, Prince Trubetskoy began to retreat, crossed the river with great inconvenience; many drowned during the crossing.

The victors chased after him, but Trubetskoy dug in and repelled the pressure of the enemy; Vygovsky himself was in danger: a fragment of the cannonball wounded his horse and touched his caftan. Trubetskoy reached the river Semi, ten versts from Putivl; but he could no longer defend himself, and went to Putivl. Vygovsky refused to pursue the Moscow army on Moscow soil. In vain did the Poles, who served with Vyhovsky on a salary, out of revenge for Gonsevsky, just before, in peacetime, captured by Khovansky in Vilna, begged him; In vain the khan tried to convince the hetman: Vyhovsky pretended to have raised his arms only in order to expel the Muscovite army from Ukraine, causing disaster to the people and ruining the land, and did not at all intend to wage war with the tsar and the Great Russian people. “Probably,” the Polish historian notes, “he was afraid that the Cossacks would not fall away from him if he left Ukraine.”

Vyhovsky retreated to Gadyach and sent the large banner, drums and cannons taken from the Muscovites to John Casimir; Little Russian prisoners, according to the tsar's decree, were ordered to leave the governors with those military Great Russian people who would take them prisoner. Only those who were captured in Borzna by 30 people. with their families, they gave out sixty-six Moscow military men for exchange, at the suggestion of the centurion Peter Zabela, whose wife was among the captured Borznians. Vyhovsky for three weeks could not take Gadyach, who was defended by the brave Colonel Pavel Okhramenko. Khan with a horde retired to the Crimea, but several Tatar corrals scattered over Moscow land. The eager Cossacks set off at once with them. Since the population in the border lands of Moscow was Little Russian, the governors were afraid that it would not rebel at the call of their compatriots; Although the settlers found shelter on the free Ukrainian steppes of the Muscovite state, they did not like Muscovites. In these forms, Prince Trubetskoy sent messengers to Vygovsky with a letter in which he proposed to arrange a world peace and, for this purpose, having stopped the war, send people for negotiations. Trubetskoy announced that the Moscow army came to Konotop not at all for military operations, but for conversation and pacification of house bloodshed. The hetman replied that he was glad to reconcile and offered to send commissioners of three or four people from both sides to Baturyn.

“And what do you write that you didn’t bring a war to Konotop,” wrote Vyhovsky, “but for conversation and pacification of house civil strife, then what is your truth? Who saw that with such great forces and with such a great people, who dared to come into conversation? It is better for God, who knows the hearts of people, to bring guilt and find out that you have come to eradicate ours with great hosts. But since God does not help the untruthful, it is better not to have such intentions any more!” - Saying goodbye to the messengers, whom, although he invited to dine, he kept in custody, Vygovsky said: "Khan went with the horde to Moscow cities and will reach Moscow."

Vyhovsky retreated from Gadyach to Chigirin and planned to expel Sheremetev from Kyiv, but meanwhile continued to communicate with Trubetskoy. The latter, having received his letter from under Gadyach, sent to him and offered to send an embassy to the king. Vygovsky, apparently not refusing to reconcile, tried by all means to arm the people against the Muscovites. His ally Khan sent a letter to the Little Russians exhorting them to retreat from the Muscovites, promised his help, patronage and intercession before Vygovsky, whom he called his brother; Khan's vizier Shefergazi also wrote and advised to obey the Crimean ruler. Such writings, addressed to the Poltava regiment, were intercepted and delivered to Moscow by Bespaly, along with an appeal from the military foreman, written to Kirik Pushkarenok and all the Cossacks of his regiment. It must be, however, that such exhortations reached Kirik and had their effect. At least after that, Kirik was deprived of his colonel's rank and put into custody by the Cossacks, and Fyodor Zhuchenko was chosen instead as colonel. On the one hand, the successes of Vygovsky gave hope for the triumph of his party, on the other hand, the self-will of the Moscow military people aroused irritation among the people against the Muscovites. But the decisive and cruel Sheremetev brought fear to the outskirts of Kyiv. On his orders, his comrades, Prince Yuri Baryatinsky and Chaadaev, burned and destroyed the towns of Gogolev, Voronkov, Tripoli, Staiki, Makarov, Ermine-field and many other towns, villages and farms; all inhabitants without distinction were put to death; the Little Russians saw that the Muscovite was strong and fearsome, and began to lean towards obedience.

Today is the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. Here is an article from Wikipedia about this event.

Battle of Konotop- armed clash in 1659, one of the episodes of the Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667. It happened not far from the city of Konotop, near the village of Sosnovka, between the Russian army of Prince Trubetskoy and the Cossacks of the Ukrainian hetman Vyhovsky, who acted in alliance with the Crimean Tatars and Poles, as well as with foreign mercenaries. In the battle, the Russian cavalry was defeated, after which the main forces of Trubetskoy had to lift the siege of Konotop. The consequence of the events near Konotop was the strengthening of opposition to Vyhovsky and the defeat of the latter in the political struggle.

background

The Battle of Konotop took place during the period, which in Ukrainian historiography is usually called "Ruin" (Ukrainian "Ruina"). This period, which began almost immediately after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, is characterized by a civil war in most of the territory of present-day Ukraine, during which the warring parties turned to the neighbors of the Hetmanate for help, which led to intervention by Russia, the Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate.

The prerequisites for an armed civil conflict in the Hetmanate were laid back under Bohdan Khmelnitsky, who, after the peace between Alexei Mikhailovich and Jan II Casimir in 1656, concluded an alliance agreement with the King of Sweden, Charles X, and Prince Yuriy Rakochi of Semigrad. According to this agreement, Khmelnitsky sent 12 thousand Cossacks to help the allies against Poland.

After the death of Khmelnitsky, in the beginning of the turmoil, Yuri Khmelnitsky became the hetman, with the support of the Russian state. A little later, in an atmosphere of sharp contradictions, Ivan Vyhovsky (Korsun Rada October 21, 1657) was finally elected hetman of the Hetmanate, who concluded the Gadyach Treaty with the Commonwealth in 1658, openly taking the side of Poland and Lithuania in the Russian-Polish war. To attract Mehmed IV Giray to his side, he had to swear allegiance to the Crimean Khan.

Chronicle of the Seer:
“... for all the elders, and the colonels and centurions for all the rabble swore allegiance to the krimsky khan on that, if he didn’t retreat, the khan with the sultans and usimi murzas swore an oath as a cossack, if they didn’t retreat in that war, like they would hit with wax Moscow."

The course of the battle

The battle was preceded by the siege of the Konotop fortress by the royal army. On June 29, 1659, the Cossack hetman Ivan Vygovsky (25 thousand troops), together with the Tatars of Mehmed IV Girey (30 thousand) and the Poles of Andrey Pototsky (3.8 thousand), defeated the cavalry of Semyon Pozharsky and Semyon Lvov (from 20 to 30 thousand) and the suburban Cossacks of the Hetman Ivan Bespaly (2 thousand). After the feigned retreat of the Cossacks of Vygovsky, who lured the detachment of Pozharsky and Lvov to a swampy place, the Tatars unexpectedly struck from an ambush and defeated the Russian cavalry. Both governors were taken prisoner, where Lvov died of his wounds, and Pozharsky was executed for spitting in the face of the Crimean Khan. Mehmed-Girey and Vygovsky staged a mass execution of all the prisoners.

An attempt by the Tatars to develop success and attack Trubetskoy's army, which was besieging Konotop, was thwarted by the actions of Russian artillery. At the same time, with the appearance of a strong Polish-Tatar grouping in the rear of Trubetskoy, the strategic situation in the Konotop region changed. Further besieging Konotop, having a numerous enemy in the rear, became meaningless. Trubetskoy decided to make a breakthrough. According to the reconstruction of events done by the military historian V. Kargalov, voivode Aleksey Trubetskoy applied the tactics of a walk-city: he ordered the troops to move in a ring of carts, which, having closed, formed a kind of mobile fortress. Under the cover of a convoy, foot soldiers with rifle and cannon fire repulsed the assaults of the Tatar cavalry, and detachments of the noble cavalry counterattacked from the openings between the carts of the Tatars. As a result, regiments of soldiers, reiters and noble cavalry crossed in perfect order to the right side of the Seim and took refuge in the Putivl fortress.

Losses

According to the Cossack "Chronicle of the Self-Watcher" of the 17th century, Trubetskoy's losses in the Konotop clash and during the retreat amounted to 20 to 30 thousand people. According to Russian archival data, “In total, in Konotop, in a big battle and on a withdrawal: the regiment of the boyar and governor, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy, with comrades of the Moscow rank, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized Murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reitarsky ranks of the initial people and reytar, dragoons, soldiers and archers were beaten and 4761 people were caught in full. According to S.M. Solovyov, only more than 5 thousand prisoners were captured.
“The flower of the Moscow cavalry, who served the happy campaigns of 1654 and 1655, died in one day, and never after that the Tsar of Moscow could lead such a brilliant army into the field. In mourning clothes, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people and horror seized Moscow ... "

Two roundabouts died or were executed after the battle: S.R. Pozharsky, S.P. Lvov, steward E.A. Buturlin, 3 attorneys: M.G. Sonin, I.V. Izmailov, Ya.G. Krekshin, 79 Moscow nobles and 164 residents. There are 249 "Moscow officials" in total. Semyon Pozharsky, on the orders of the Khan, was executed at his headquarters. As S. Velichko writes about this, Pozharsky, “inflamed with anger, scolded the khan according to the Moscow custom and spat between his eyes. For this, the khan became furious and ordered to immediately cut off the head of the prince in front of him.

Meaning and consequences of the battle

The immediate consequence of the clash at Konotop was the fall of the political authority of the rebellious hetman Vyhovsky, the legitimacy of whose election to the post of hetman after the death of Bogdan Khmelnitsky was initially in doubt. Actually, the battle near Konotop was an attempt by military measures to strengthen the political and personal power of Vyhovsky, which the population of the Left-Bank Ukraine refused to recognize. The result was just the opposite. Immediately after Trubetskoy's retreat to Putivl, peasant and urban uprisings broke out in Ukraine. Popular anger was fueled by the actions of the Crimean Tatars, allied with Vyhovsky, who shamelessly plundered Ukrainian settlements, took women and children into slavery. Almost simultaneously with the development of events around Konotop, the Zaporizhzhya ataman Ivan Serko attacked the Nogai uluses. And at the beginning of the year, the Don Cossacks organized an ambush on the Samara River, which begins on the territory of modern Donbass, and cut off the road to a three thousandth detachment of Tatars led by Kayabey, who was in a hurry to join Vygovsky. All these events forced the Crimean Khan to leave Vygovsky and leave with the main forces for the Crimea. Soon, Poltava, pacified by Vyhovsky in the previous year, joined the cities of Romny, Gadyach, and Lokhvitsa that had rebelled against Vyhovsky. Some clerics opposed Vyhovsky: Maxim Filimonovich, an archpriest from Nizhyn, and Semyon Adamovich, an archpriest from Ichny. By September 1659, the oath to the "white tsar" was taken by: Colonel Ivan Yekimovich of Kyiv, Timofey Tsetsyura of Pereyaslavl, Anikey Silin of Chernigov.

Very soon, the Cossacks of the Kyiv, Pereyaslov and Chernihiv regiments, as well as the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks under the command of Ivan Sirko, nominated a new hetman - Yuri Khmelnitsky. At the Cossack Rada in the town of Garmanovtsy near Kyiv, a new hetman was elected. In Garmanovtsy, the ambassadors of Vyhovsky, Sulima and Vereshchak were hacked to death, who had signed the Gadyach Treaty a little earlier (an agreement between Vyhovsky and the Poles that provoked the military campaign of 1659). Vyhovsky fled with gladness in Garmanovtsy. In October 1659, the Cossack Rada in Bila Tserkva finally approved Yuri Khmelnytsky as the new hetman of Ukraine. Vyhovsky was forced to abdicate and officially transfer the hetman's kleinods to Khmelnytsky. Soon Vyhovsky fled to Poland, where he was subsequently executed.

After the next election of Yuri Khmelnitsky, in 1659 he signed a new treaty with the Russian kingdom, which, due to the betrayal of Vyhovsky, significantly limited the power of the hetmans.

The Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667, an episode of which was the Battle of Konotop, eventually ended with the Andrusovo truce, which led to the division of the Hetmanate along the Dnieper into the Right-Bank and Left-Bank. This was a consequence of the split and the legal consolidation of realities in the Hetmanate itself, since the main part of the Cossacks on the Left Bank wanted to join the Russian state, while on the Right Bank, pro-Polish aspirations prevailed.

The controversy between the Foreign Ministry of Russia and Ukraine

On June 10, 2008, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed "perplexity and regret" at Ukraine's desire to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. The Russian Foreign Ministry considers this event just "a bloody battle due to another betrayal of another hetman."

The head of the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Vasily Kyrylych, said that the celebration of historical dates, including the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop, is an exclusively internal issue of Ukraine.

Memorial complex in memory of the Battle of Konotop

February 22, 2008 in the village of Shapovalovka, Konotop district, Sumy region, a cross and a chapel were installed on the site of the Konotop battle. On the same day, a museum exposition "The History of the Battle of Konotop in 1659" was opened there.

As part of the preparations for the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop, the Ukrainian authorities announced an open competition for the best design proposal for the creation of a historical and memorial complex of Cossack honor and valor in the city of Konotop and in the village of Shapovalivka.

March 11, 2008 President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree on the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop.

In the same decree, Viktor Yushchenko instructed the Council of Ministers of Crimea and the Sevastopol city administration to study the issue of renaming streets, avenues, squares and military units in honor of the heroes of the battle of Konotop. In a long list of holiday events

“The flower of the Moscow cavalry, who served the happy campaigns of 1654 and 1655, died in one day, and never after that the Tsar of Moscow could lead such a brilliant army into the field. In mourning clothes, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people and horror seized Moscow ... "

The lines quoted above from the historical work of the famous Russian scientist Sergei Solovyov could have been sent to a meeting of the club “What? Where? When?", Being absolutely sure that it is unlikely that erudite people will be able to answer the question: "Who was that terrible force that in the late 1650s destroyed the color of the Russian army in one day?" And even a hint like: “Did the Ukrainian army do this by chance?” - would hardly reduce your chances of winning in a game against club members.

Confidence in this was at least inspired by the fact that this battle, which took place only five years after the “memorable act of reunification of the Ukrainian people with the fraternal Russian people”, was not mentioned in textbooks, and they tried not to talk about it in scientific literature. It is noteworthy that even in the Russian folk song “Under the city near Konotop”, which mourns the death of the Russian prince-bogatyr Semyon Pozharsky, to whom they “sang the eternal song” precisely after this battle, not a single word is mentioned about the “merits” of the Orthodox Zaporizhian Army in inglorious death of the royal warriors. All the blame is transferred to the Tatars, Kalmyks, Bashkirs, who "if black crows" pressed on the Orthodox.

And besides, it was the troops of the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, with the help of his ally, the Crimean Khan Mehmed IV Giray, who in the summer of 1659 won a convincing victory near Konotop over the tsarist troops led by governors princes N. Trubetskoy, S. Pozharsky, S. Lvov. But did Ukraine need this victory? Was the not at all militant Ukrainian hetman striving for it? After all, as you know, even a bad peace is better than a good war...

ORIGINAL SIN OF UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: "TREASON" OF HETMAN IVAN VYHOVSKY?

Obviously, even people who are far from professional studies in history were fed up with the topic of “treason” by Hetman Ivan Mazepa. It is less known that Mazepa's opponent, Peter I, justifying the expediency of eliminating the hetman's office in Ukraine, called all Ukrainian rulers known to him traitors, making an exception only for Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Ivan Skoropadsky. It is clear that Bogdan's successor, Ivan Ostapovich Vygovsky, should open this "honorary" list. After all, it was he, of course, along with Mazepa, who was branded by Russian historiography as a "traitor", "lyakh", "Jesuit", "hidden Catholic" and the like.

It often follows from historical works that even during the lifetime of his predecessor, Vyhovsky hatched secret intentions to tear Ukraine away from the union with Moscow, restore the Polish-gentry order and the power of the Polish king on Ukrainian soil, and even ruin the Orthodox Church. The absurdity of the last accusation is obvious if only because it was the Vyhovsky family, occupying high positions in the Commonwealth, that never broke with Orthodoxy, but, on the contrary, took care of its interests in every possible way, initiated the founding of Orthodox brotherhoods, and was engaged in church affairs. It is just as hard to believe in the intentions of the hetman, who felt the fullness of power in his hands, to renounce it in favor of the king of the Commonwealth and the Polish magnates. The problem of his attitude towards Moscow looks somewhat more complicated.

Ukrainian jingoistically minded historians argue that from the very beginning Vyhovsky, unlike Khmelnitsky, was aware of the insecurity of a close alliance with the tsar and tried to get rid of him. In fact, the insight to the hetman came later. Having joined the struggle for the hetman's mace, Ivan Ostapovich seriously counted on the support of the tsarist government. After all, his relationship with the Polish authorities can hardly be called idyllic - the Poles considered the former general clerk in the Khmelnitsky government to be an even more consistent opponent of the Polish king than the hetman himself was.

From the diplomatic correspondence of the ambassador of the Hungarian prince, one can learn that between Vyhovsky and Moscow there were even some secret agreements on the support of the tsar for the candidacy of the latter in the future hetman elections. But already from Vyhovsky’s diplomatic correspondence with the tsarist government, it unequivocally follows that this assistance, as well as recognition of the competence of the hetman in general, was associated by the Russian side with his concessions in the matter of limiting the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state in favor of the tsar.

The behavior of the tsarist ambassadors in Ukraine testified to the fact that Moscow needed such a hetman at the head of the Zaporizhian Army, who, according to the apt expression of Ivan Ostapovich himself, could, “taking by the crest, lead him.” Taking into account the too great political appetites of the Muscovites and feeling the serious support of the foreman behind him, the applicant refused any concessions, declaring his intention to continue the policy of his predecessor. It was from then, from the end of the summer - the beginning of the autumn of 1657, between Vygovsky and Moscow that "a black cat ran".

Not wanting to be a puppet in the hands of the boyars and the governor of the tsar, in October 1657 Ivan Ostapovich convenes the General Council in Korsun. Having described the plans of the Russian government, the hetman renounces his powers and places a mace in front of the participants of the council. Now it is difficult to establish how sincere Vygovsky was in his renunciation of power. Most likely it was a skillful political move. His correctness was confirmed by the subsequent development of events. The Cossacks not only returned the hetman's kleinods to him, but also expressed full confidence in his political course and vowed to support his actions against the claims of the tsarist governors.

In order to win over as many of the influential Cossack elite as possible, Vyhovsky at the Rada declares his readiness to revise the fundamental foundations for the functioning of the Hetmanate's political power system, voluntarily ceding a number of his powers to the Cossack elders and thereby establishing a full-fledged republican power model, significantly violated by authoritarian methods of government. Khmelnitsky.

Vyhovsky's unexpected political moves ensured the strengthening of his authority. Having received a message about the unanimous support of Ivan Ostapovich by the participants of the Korsun Rada, the tsarist government for the first time officially recognizes the hetman's powers of Vyhovsky and declares no intention to revise the nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

But the political victory won in the autumn of 1657 in Korsun for Vygovsky in the end turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. The hetman's flirtation with the foreman against the background of the latter's rapid enrichment and the same incessant impoverishment of the ordinary Cossacks, the attempts of the Cossack elite to secure the free peasantry in subordination provoke the growth of anti-senior and anti-hetman sentiments in Ukraine. At the head of these speeches - no matter how sad it is to realize - is the Zaporizhzhya Sich. And here it should be noted that the role of the latter in the processes of Ukrainian state building in the domestic historical literature is often overly idealized, which does not fully correspond to historical reality. After all, it is the leaders of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, in search of support in the fight against the Hetman's government, who turn to Moscow for help, simultaneously calling on its leadership to significantly limit the prerogatives of the Hetman's leadership, leaving behind the hetmans only those powers that they possessed, being subjects of the Polish king.

Internal instability in Ukraine and the appearance of an unexpected ally in the person of the Zaporizhzhya Sich allows the Russian ruling elite, ignoring the warnings of the ancient Greek philosopher, to try to enter the same river for the second time...

UKRAINIAN-CRIMEAN "REUNION" OF 1658. ITS BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES

The moral support provided by Moscow to the anti-Hetman opposition significantly increased its strength. By the spring of 1658, armed anti-Hetman demonstrations engulfed the Zaporozhian Sich, the Poltava regiment, and most of Mirgorod. Vygovsky's appeals to the tsar for help to quell the riots did not bring success. Taking into account the specifics of the political situation prevailing at that time in Central and Eastern Europe, Ivan Ostapovich could receive real military assistance in taming the rebellion only from the Crimean Khanate.

It is clear that a logical question arises here: was it worth drawing external forces into resolving an internal conflict? But we must not forget that the existing internal crisis was provoked to a large extent also by external interference. Therefore, everything is not as simple as it might seem at first glance.

Geographically, the then Ukrainian state was separated from the Crimean Khanate only by a strip of neutral Wild Fields. In the political dimension, the shortest route from the hetman's residence in Chigirin to the Khan's palace in Bakhchisarai ran through ... Warsaw. After all, the Ukrainian-Russian treaty of 1654 upset the Cossack brotherhood with Crimea, but at the same time made possible the emergence of a military-political union of Crimea and Poland, which lasted for the next twelve years. And now, in order to receive military assistance from the Crimean Khan, Vyhovsky needed to establish political relations with the Polish king.

After the Ukrainian-Polish consultations began in March 1658, in April the Crimean horde, allied to Vyhovsky, entered Ukraine. With her support, at the beginning of the summer of 1658, the hetman near Poltava managed to win a decisive victory over the Ukrainian armed opposition.

Reporting the results of the Battle of Poltava to Moscow, Vyhovsky in no way hints at the desire to break off relations with the tsar and tries in every possible way to convince him of the absence of anti-Moscow sentiments in the newly concluded alliance with the Crimea. Nevertheless, in August 1658, the tsarist troops led by the Belgorod voivode G. Romodanovsky were introduced to the Left Bank, in the convoy of which the leaders of the anti-Hetman opposition who survived the Poltava rout find refuge. Romodanovsky, known for his arbitrariness, from among them, in contrast to Vyhovsky, proclaims Ivan Bespaly as hetman, who was most suitable for the role of hetman, whom the Russian governor could, “taking by the crest, lead him.” From that moment on, Vyhovsky had no choice but to speed up the conclusion of an agreement with the Polish king, since the authority of the Crimean Khan was too little to keep Moscow from intervening in Ukraine.

SHORT LIFE OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIA-UKRAINIAN (-RUSSIAN) UNION

The Gadyach agreement of 1658 proclaimed the appearance on the map of Europe of a new federal state - the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian Commonwealth (that is, the republic). These political peoples were united as "free with free" and "equal with equals." Each of the parts of the state had its own administration, finances, army.

It is significant that in the text of the agreement, Ukraine retained the right to exempt its armed forces from the participation of the federation in the war with Moscow, if it comes to that. Moreover, hetman Vyhovsky, not giving up hope of avoiding an armed conflict with Moscow, offered the Russian side to join the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian union. Moreover, given the desire of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to be at the same time the Tsar of Moscow, and the King of Poland, and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Chernigov, Kyiv, Little Russia, Volyn, Podolsk "and others, and others", the proposal of the Ukrainian hetman looked quite realistic. In any case, since the autumn of 1656, the Russian leadership had been completely sincerely discussing with the Poles the possibility of the tsar's accession to the Polish throne and the proclamation of a personal union of the two states.

Hetman's proposals took on even more realistic outlines from the end of 1658, when troops loyal to Vygovsky, together with Crimean Tatars and Polish units, drove Romodanovsky's troops from the Left Bank. The participants in the secret meeting, which took place in February 1659 in the tsar's chambers, also agreed that an agreement could be concluded with Vyhovsky on the basis of the provisions tested in Gadyach. However, according to the opinion of the tsar's advisers, it should have been bilateral, without the participation of Poles and Lithuanians.

At the same time, obviously, in order to be more convincing in negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership, the boyar A.M. Trubetskoy, sent to Ukraine, was given at the disposal of ... almost a hundred thousandth tsarist army.

It is difficult to predict what the “negotiations” with such a representative “embassy” could lead to, which in Ukraine was joined by the troops of Prince Romodanovsky, already familiar to us, and the detachments of I. Bespaly. Obviously, Vyhovsky himself was not confident in their positive results either. That is why he did not agree to Trubetskoy's proposal to meet at the negotiating table, sarcastically complaining that it was very dangerous to meet with the boyars - one could lose one's head during such meetings.

The tsar’s voivode himself did not really hope for them, who, as soon as he crossed the Ukrainian border, immediately began to “agitate” the Cossacks for the tsar by force of arms. Almost the most active in this agitation was Prince Pozharsky, already familiar to us from the mentioned Russian folk song, who, as S. Velichko testifies, “having captured the city of Serebryany, cut down some of the inhabitants there, and captured others with all their property.”

“FROM THAT DEFEAT COULD ESCAPE... IS THE ONE WHO HAD A WINGED HORSE”

This is how the Ukrainian chronicler Samiylo Velichko commented on the prospects for saving the royal warriors in the battle of Konotop. And the battle itself was preceded by a heroic defense by five thousand Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Nizhyn colonel Grigory Gulyanitsky of the Konotop fortress, which was besieged and stormed, I repeat, by a hundred thousand (!) Imperial army. Only referring to God's help, God's providence, one can explain how the Cossacks of Gulyanitsky managed to keep the city in their hands, repelling the constant attacks of such a superior enemy, from the end of April to the end of June 1659.

The unprecedented resilience of the defenders of Konotop allowed Vyhovsky literally to collect faithful Cossack regiments bit by bit, call on the Crimean horde for help, mobilize regiments of volunteers from Poland, Moldova, Wallachia, Transylvania.

A test of strength took place on June 24 near the village of Shapovalivka, where the Ukrainian hetman defeated the enemy's forward patrol. And on June 29, 1659, on the day of Saints Peter and Paul, Vygovsky, at the head of his international forces, approached the Sosnovskaya ferry near Konotop. Not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, the hetman attacked the 15,000-strong Russian detachment defending the crossing from the march. Vygovsky's dragoons pushed the enemy back across the river, and the cavalry rushed after him. The Crimean Tatar army was left in ambush.

Having inflicted considerable losses on the enemy, the Ukrainian troops entered into battle with the regiments of Prince Pozharsky, who came to the aid of the retreating. After that, Vygovsky gave the order to withdraw his forces to their previous positions, pretending to be running. Prince Pozharsky and other Russian governors at the head of the main forces rushed after them and fell into a pre-arranged ambush. Only the vast majority of the tsarist warriors crossed to the second bank of the river, when the Tatars hit them from an ambush. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Cossacks managed to destroy the crossing and dam the river below it. The water overflowed and made it impossible for the Russian cavalry to return to their original positions. The heavy royal cavalry got stuck in the swampy places of the river, “real konotops,” as one of the contemporaries of the events wrote about it. Noticing from the walls of Konotop the development of the battle at the crossing and near it, the regiments of Gulyanitsky, exhausted by the siege, also went on the offensive.

The result of the Battle of Konotop was one of the most sensitive and shameful defeats of the tsarist troops of the second half of the 17th century, already mentioned at the beginning. According to various sources, from 30 to 60 thousand royal warriors were killed on the Konotop field. The tsarist governors were captured: Prince Pozharsky, Prince Lvov, the Buturlin brothers, Prince Lyapunov and others. Most of them went into captivity in the Crimea. And the already mentioned hero of the Russian folk song, Prince Semyon Pozharsky, on the orders of the Khan, was executed at his headquarters. But the reason for this was not the knightly prowess shown by the governor on the battlefield, but, most likely, the dirty abuse that he “honored” Mehmed IV. As Velichko writes about this, Pozharsky, “inflamed with anger, scolded the khan according to the Moscow custom and spat between his eyes. For this, the khan became furious and ordered to immediately cut off the head of the prince in front of him.

Having received news from Governor Trubetskoy about the Konotop defeat, Muscovites immediately remembered the campaign against Moscow by another Ukrainian hetman, Petro Sahaidachny. As the same Solovyov wrote on this occasion, “tsarist Moscow trembled for its own safety; by order of the tsar, people of all classes hurried to earthworks to strengthen Moscow. The tsar himself with the boyars came over and over again to look at these works. Residents of the surrounding area with their families and property filled Moscow, there was a rumor that the tsar was leaving for the Volga, to Yaroslavl ... "