Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. Home Army helps "their Jews"

70 years ago, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" was organized. On April 19, 1943, by a secret Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" (short for "Death to Spies!") was established with its transfer to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov became his boss. SMERSH reported directly to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Joseph Stalin. Simultaneously with the creation of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, the Counterintelligence Department "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy was established - the head was Lieutenant General P.A. Gladkov, the department was subordinate to the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. P. Yukhimovich, reported to People's Commissar L.P. Beria.

During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military intelligence officers managed to virtually completely neutralize or destroy enemy agents. Their work was so effective that the Nazis failed to organize major uprisings or acts of sabotage in the rear of the USSR, as well as to establish large-scale subversive, sabotage and partisan activities in European countries and on the territory of Germany itself, when the Soviet army began to liberate European countries. The intelligence services of the Third Reich had to admit defeat, capitulate or flee to the countries of the Western world, where their experience was in demand to fight the Soviet Union. For many years after the end of World War II and the disbandment of SMERSH (1946), this word terrified the opponents of the Red Empire.

Military counterintelligence officers risked their lives no less than those who were on the front lines of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army. Together with them, they entered the battle with the German troops on June 22, 1941. In the event of the death of the unit commander, they replaced them, while continuing to fulfill their tasks - they fought against desertion, alarmism, saboteurs and enemy agents. The functions of military counterintelligence were defined in Directive No. 35523 of June 27, 1941 "On the work of the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of NPOs in wartime." Military counterintelligence conducted operational intelligence work in parts of the Red Army, rear, among the civilian population; fought against desertion (employees of special departments were part of the detachments of the Red Army); worked on the territory occupied by the enemy, in contact with the Intelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

Military counterintelligence officers were both at the headquarters, providing a regime of secrecy, and at the forefront in command posts. Then they received the right to conduct investigative actions against the Red Army soldiers and civilians associated with them, who were suspected of anti-Soviet activities. At the same time, the counterintelligence officers were to receive the sanction for the arrest of the middle command staff from the Military Councils of the armies or fronts, and the senior and senior command staff from the people's commissar of defense. The counterintelligence departments of the districts, fronts and armies had the task of fighting spies, nationalist and anti-Soviet elements and organizations. Military counterintelligence took control of military communications, the delivery of military property, weapons, and ammunition.

On July 13, 1941, the "Regulations on Military Censorship of Military Postal Correspondence" was introduced. The document defined the structure, rights and obligations of military censorship units, talked about the method of processing letters, and also gave a list of information that was the basis for the confiscation of items. Departments of military censorship were created at military postal sorting points, military postal bases, offices and stations. Similar departments were formed in the system of the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. In August 1941, military censorship was transferred to the jurisdiction of the 2nd special department of the NKVD, and the operational management continued to be carried out by the army, front and district special departments.

On July 15, 1941, the 3rd departments were formed at the Headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Northern, North-Western and South-Western directions. On July 17, 1941, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the bodies of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO were transformed into the Directorate of Special Departments (UOO) and became part of the NKVD. The main task of the Special Departments was the fight against spies and traitors in the units and formations of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the front line. On July 19, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Viktor Abakumov was appointed head of the UOO. His first deputy was the former head of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD and the 3rd (secret-political) Directorate of the NKGB, Commissar 3rd rank Solomon Milshtein. The following were appointed as heads of the Special Departments: Pavel Kuprin - Northern Front, Viktor Bochkov - North-Western Front, Western Front - Lavrenty Tsanava, South-Western Front - Anatoly Mikheev, Southern Front - Nikolai Sazykin, Reserve Front - Alexander Belyanov.

The People's Commissar of the NKVD, Lavrenty Beria, ordered the formation of separate rifle battalions under the Special Departments of the Fronts, separate rifle companies under the Special Departments of the Armies, and rifle platoons under the Special Departments of divisions and corps to combat spies, saboteurs and deserters. On August 15, 1941, the structure of the central office of the UOO was approved. The structure looked like this: a chief and three deputies; Secretariat; Operations department; 1st department - the central bodies of the Red Army (General Staff, Intelligence Directorate and military prosecutor's office); 2nd department - Air Force, 3rd department - artillery, tank units; 4th department - the main types of troops; 5th department - sanitary service and quartermasters; 6th department - NKVD troops; 7th department - operational search, statistical accounting, etc .; 8th department - encryption service. In the future, the structure of the UOO continued to change and become more complex.

SMERSH

Military counterintelligence, by a secret decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy. Regarding its name - "SMERSH", it is known that Joseph Stalin, having familiarized himself with the original version of "Smernesh" (Death to German spies), noted: "Are other intelligence agencies not working against us?" As a result, the famous name "SMERSH" was born. On April 21, this name was officially fixed.

The list of tasks solved by military counterintelligence included: 1) the fight against espionage, terrorist, sabotage and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in the Red Army; 2) the fight against anti-Soviet elements in the Red Army; 3) undercover, operational and other measures to make the front impenetrable to enemy elements; 4) the fight against betrayal and treason in the Red Army; 5) the fight against deserters and self-mutilation at the front; 6) verification of military personnel and other persons who were in captivity and encirclement; 7) performance of special tasks.

SMERSH had the rights to: 1) conduct undercover, information work; 2) to carry out, in accordance with the procedure established by Soviet law, searches, seizures and arrests of Red Army servicemen and civilians associated with them who were suspected of criminal, anti-Soviet activities; 3) to conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested, then the cases were transferred, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the judiciary or the Special Conference under the NKVD; 4) apply various special measures aimed at revealing the criminal activities of enemy agents and anti-Soviet elements; 5) to call without prior agreement with the command in cases of operational necessity and for interrogations the private and command staff of the Red Army.

The structure of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO "SMERSH" was as follows: assistant chiefs (according to the number of fronts) with task forces attached to them; eleven main departments. The first department was responsible for intelligence and operational work in the central army agencies. The second worked among prisoners of war and was engaged in checking, "filtering" the Red Army soldiers who were in captivity or surrounded. The third department was responsible for fighting enemy agents who were thrown into the Soviet rear. The fourth conducted counterintelligence activities, revealed the channels of penetration of enemy agents. The fifth supervised the work of the military counterintelligence departments in the districts. The sixth department was investigative; seventh - statistics, control, accounting; the eighth is technical. The ninth department was responsible for direct operational work - surveillance, searches, detentions, etc. The tenth department was special (“C”), the eleventh was encrypted communications. The structure of "Smersh" was also present: Personnel Department; department of financial and material and economic services of the Office; Secretariat. Frontal counterintelligence departments, counterintelligence departments of districts, armies, corps, divisions, brigades, reserve regiments, garrisons, fortified areas and institutions of the Red Army were organized on the ground. From the units of the Red Army, a battalion was allocated to the Smersh Front Department, a company to the Army Department, a platoon to the Corps Department, division, brigade.

The bodies of military counterintelligence were recruited from the operational staff of the former UOO NKVD of the USSR and a special selection of the command and political staff of the Red Army. In fact, this was a reorientation of the personnel policy of the leadership towards the army. Employees of "Smersh" were assigned military ranks established in the Red Army, they wore uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia established for the corresponding branches of the Red Army. On April 29, 1943, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense Stalin, officers who had the ranks from lieutenant to colonel of state security received similar combined arms ranks. On May 26, 1943, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the rank of lieutenant general was given to the deputies of the Main Directorate Nikolai Selivanovsky, Isai Babich, Pavel Meshik. The ranks of major generals were given to the heads of departments and counterintelligence departments of the fronts, military districts and armies.

The number of the central office of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" (GUKR "SMERSH") was 646 people. The management of the front, which consisted of more than 5 armies, was supposed to have 130 employees, no more than 4 armies - 112, army departments - 57, departments of military districts - from 102 to 193. The counterintelligence department of the Moscow Military District was the most numerous. The departments and departments were given army formations, which were supposed to protect the locations of the military counterintelligence agencies, filtration points, and carried out escort. For these purposes, the front management had a battalion, the army department - a company, departments of corps, divisions, brigades - platoons.

At the forefront

The pro-Western and liberal public loves to criticize various pages of the Great Patriotic War. Military counterintelligence also came under attack. So they point to the weak legal and operational training of counterintelligence officers, which allegedly led to a huge increase in the number of "innocent victims" of the Stalinist regime. However, such authors forget or deliberately turn a blind eye to the fact that most of the personnel counterintelligence officers who had extensive experience and graduated from specialized educational institutions before the start of the war simply simply died in battles in the first months of the Great Patriotic War. As a result, a large hole appeared in the frames. On the other hand, new military units were hastily formed, there was an increase in the number of armed forces. Experienced personnel were lacking. Mobilized into the active army, employees of the state security agencies were not enough to fill all the vacancies. Therefore, those who did not serve in law enforcement agencies and did not have a legal education began to be recruited into the military counterintelligence. Sometimes the training course for newly minted Chekists was only two weeks. Then a short internship at the forefront under the supervision of experienced employees and independent work. It was only in 1943 that the situation in the personnel question was more or less stabilized.

During the period from June 22, 1941 to March 1, 1943, military counterintelligence officers lost 10,337 people (3,725 killed, 3,092 missing and 3,520 wounded). Among the dead was the former head of the 3rd Directorate, Anatoly Mikheev. On July 17, he was appointed head of the Special Department of the Southwestern Front. On September 21, while leaving the encirclement, Mikheev, with a group of counterintelligence officers and border guards, entered into battle with the Nazis and died a heroic death.

The solution to the personnel issue

On July 26, 1941, at the Higher School of the NKVD, training courses for operational workers for the Special Departments were created. They planned to recruit 650 people and teach them for a month. The head of the Higher School, Nikanor Davydov, was appointed head of the courses. During training, the cadets participated in the construction of defensive structures and the search for German paratroopers near Moscow. On August 11, these courses were transferred to a 3-month training program. In September, 300 graduates were sent to the front. At the end of October, 238 graduates were sent to the Moscow Military District. In December, the NKVD handed over another issue. Then the school was disbanded, then recreated. In March 1942, a branch of the Higher School of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was created in the capital. They planned to train 400 people over a 4-month period. In total, during the war, these courses were completed by 2,417 people (according to other sources, about 2 thousand), who were sent to the Red Army and the Navy.

Personnel for military counterintelligence were trained not only in the capital, but also in the regions. In the very first weeks of the war, the departments of the military districts, on the basis of inter-krai schools of the NKGB, created short-term courses for training operational personnel. In particular, on July 1, 1941, on the basis of the Novosibirsk Interregional School, Short Courses were created under the Special Department of the NKVD of the Siberian Military District. They recruited 306 people, commanders and political workers of the Red Army. Already at the end of the month, graduation took place, and a new group (500 people) was recruited. The second group was dominated by young people - 18-20 years old. This time the training period was extended to two months. After graduation, everyone was sent to the front. In September - October 1941, the third set was made (478 people). In the third group, most of the cadets were senior party workers (employees of district committees and regional committees) and political workers of the Red Army. From March 1942, the course of study grew to three months. The courses were attended by 350 to 500 people. During this period, most of the students were junior commanders of the Red Army, sent from the front by the Departments of military counterintelligence.

Veterans became another source for replenishing the ranks of military counterintelligence. In September 1941, the NKVD issued a directive on the procedure for restoring former workers and sending them to serve in the army. In October 1941, the NKVD issued a directive on the organization of registration of employees of special departments who were being treated and their further use. The “special officers” who were cured and successfully passed the medical examination were sent to the front.

On June 15, 1943, an order was issued by the State Defense Committee signed by Stalin on the organization of schools and courses of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence. It was planned to form four schools with a 6-9 month course of study, with a total number of students - more than 1300 people. Courses were also opened with a 4-month training period in Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk (200 students each). In November 1943, the Novosibirsk courses were transformed into the school of the Main Directorate with a 6-month and then a year course of study (for 400 people). Sverdlovsk courses in June 1944 were also transformed into a school with a training period of 6-9 months and 350 cadets.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, military counterintelligence officers neutralized more than 30 thousand enemy spies, about 3.5 thousand saboteurs and more than 6 thousand terrorists. "Smersh" adequately fulfilled all the tasks assigned to it by the Motherland.

, executive editor of the "Red Star" in 1941-1943.

At that time, newspapermen had such an unwritten rule, or rather, an immutable law: on the eve of holidays, say, the anniversary of the Red Army, the October Revolution, or May 1, not to talk about the tasks of the troops. It was supposed to wait for Stalin's speech or order, and after that to popularize, to explain the "leader's" attitudes. This time we broke with tradition and published an editorial "!", in which we gave out the "secrets" of the Headquarters. There were lines in the article:

“The decisive time has come, on which the future of mankind depends.

We have won the winter campaign of the Patriotic War... We must remember that the expulsion of the enemy from our Motherland has only just begun... The enemy has not yet been defeated, he is still strong, still capable of striking. The spring lull on the fronts does not mislead us. This is the calm before the storm, before the big battles that will not be long in coming.

The Germans will no doubt try to use the summer to straighten things out. They did not give up the idea of launching an offensive in order to get out of the impasse into which the adventuristic strategy of the Hitlerite command had led them.

Of course, the power of the German military machine has been largely undermined by the defeats inflicted on it by the Red Army. However, the Germans will undoubtedly undertake new adventures. They continue to draw up the remnants of their reserves to the Soviet-German front, to accumulate military equipment.

Our task is to meet fully armed any attempts of the enemy, to prepare for decisive battles with the German fascist enslavers. We must not only frustrate the adventurist plans of the Nazis, but inflict such powerful blows on the enemy that would decide the outcome of the war ... "

Everything is correct, except that about the "remains of reserves" and the "outcome of the war" we took what we wished for reality. It was too early to assert that the Germans were drawing up the remnants of their reserves. We ran ahead, talking about the outcome of the war. No matter how powerful a blow we inflict on the enemy, he will not yet decide the "outcome of the war." Before its outcome, as you know, it was still far away - two whole years! But it was important, we thought, to declare publicly that the Headquarters for some reason kept a secret - about the summer offensive being prepared by the Germans.

The newspaper also has many articles on military-tactical topics.

First of all, the article “Soviet motorized infantry” by Colonel A. Poshkus attracts attention. At the beginning of the war, our motorized infantry was not yet one of the main branches of the army, like, say, the cavalry during the years of the civil war. Perhaps that is why some military leaders still lived by the old ideas, overestimating the role of the cavalry in this war. Life has shown that the cavalry corps and divisions that fought in the Patriotic War acted confidently, valiantly, but did not decide the fate of major operations. A curious fact of the overestimation of the capabilities of the cavalry: the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev, an old horseman, turned to Stalin with a proposal to form a cavalry army. As General F.E. Bokov told me, the Supreme Commander seized on this idea, considered it seductive. However, the General Staff resolutely rejected it, and Stalin was forced to agree with this.

Motorized infantry is another matter. Poshkus tells about her strength and power, based on the experience of her 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps:

“While still studying at the academy, I had a good idea of the role of motorized infantry in modern warfare. But here, looking at the motorized units unfolded in all their formidable beauty, organized and equipped in a modern way, perhaps for the first time I felt this huge force on the tracks in the wheels. In the mighty movement of tanks and motorized infantry, I almost physically felt the pulse of modern warfare.

Motorized infantry, the author emphasizes, creates opportunities for wide and bold maneuver. The formations of the corps more than once made marches of 120-150 kilometers during the night and suddenly appeared where the enemy least expected them. The author gives such an example. After a big push, it was in the dark that parts of the corps broke into the village, which housed the headquarters of the enemy division. Our fighters saw a picture common to the rear: German soldiers carried buckets of water from a well, officers were doing morning exercises in the yards. The division headquarters was destroyed and captured.

The article emphasizes that the power of motorized infantry is fully used only with competent, well-practiced interaction with tanks:

“The success of the battle of motorized infantry is always determined primarily by its complete and constant, not artificial, but organic interaction with tanks. In our connection, such interaction has been achieved. Suffice it to say that during the entire period of hostilities we did not have cases when motorized infantry fell behind tanks, there were no those fatal gaps between combat vehicles and people that lead to failure. An inextricable connection with tanks is the basis of the combat operations of motorized infantry. Tanks usually act more decisively, feeling the mechanized infantry behind them. They break the resistance of the enemy in the way of its movement and act mainly against enemy infantry. Motorized rifle units suppress anti-tank artillery, destroy submachine gunners. Infantry sees more than tanks ... "

And then mature reasoning, also based on the experience, in particular, of the Battle of Stalingrad: “When you think about what the motorized infantry gave the tanks, first of all you come to the thought: the motorized infantry increased the survivability of the tanks. The life of the tank, which is organically part of the mechanized forces, has become more durable. The motorized infantry perfectly knows the price of a tank. Tanks are her armor. If she does not protect them with all available means, she will lose this shell. No matter how strong the armor of a tank is, it can still turn out to be an eggshell if it is not covered in a timely manner by an artillery fire shield. When tanks come under fire from anti-tank artillery, motorized infantry units must raise this fire shield in time and shield the tanks with it. This means that artillery must never fall behind tanks on the battlefield. We have practiced hitching 45-mm guns to tanks more than once, and this experience has fully justified itself. Mutual cover for each other - this is the law of motorized infantry and tanks on the battlefield and on the march.

I must say that this is the first article in the newspaper that so widely reveals the role, significance and place of motorized infantry in modern combat.

Of great interest is the journalistic article of the commander of the motorized mechanized brigade, Colonel P. Boyarinov, “The Maturity of the Commander”. The author refers to the words of Suvorov, who instructed his godson Alexander Karachay, taught him: "The incessant refinement of the eye will make you a great commander." On many combat examples, the author shows how important it is to have an accurate eye. He emphasizes that modern combat is deep combat. You can skillfully organize a breakthrough of the front edge. But success will depend on more than just that. It is determined primarily by the strength of strikes against reserves, by the depth of the enemy's defenses. Under present-day conditions, an eye is needed that allows one to give a correct assessment of enemy forces throughout their entire depth.

The point of view of the brigade commander on the disputes that sometimes arise is also curious - what the academy teaches and what the battle teaches. What's more important?

“I myself studied at the Frunze Academy and at the Academy of Motorized Mechanization. However, when faced with the conditions of modern warfare, it seemed to me that I had lost my knowledge. Why did this happen? The war demanded greater mobility, tireless activity, eye and speed. When, thanks to experience, these qualities appeared, everything that we were taught was quickly remembered ... Practice has taught us to replace obsolete provisions with new ones.

I must note that such speeches aroused interest in the newspaper of commanders and military leaders, a desire to hold discussions on topical issues of military affairs.

SMERSH is an abbreviation for "Death to Spies", which was the name of a number of counterintelligence agencies of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. SMERSH was created on April 19, 1943 and lasted only 3 years, until 1946. However, even this historically insignificant period was enough for a part of the liberal-minded public to register SMERSH in the repressive and punitive bodies of the Stalinist regime.

Top secret

It is difficult to say for sure, perhaps because Red Army soldiers returning from captivity passed through it, through the sieve of filtration camps, or the fact that the most famous dissident of the Soviet era A. I. Solzhenitsyn was arrested by SMERSH played a role. The service of the operational staff of the SMERSH GUKR was extremely dangerous - on average, the operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. Only during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing.

The activities of this organization now, in the last two or three years, have aroused increased interest, even the cinema has burst into a couple of series on this topic, in fairness, it is worth saying that in terms of quality this film production is inferior to the adaptation of Bogomolov's Moment of Truth. In general, it is worth considering the work of SMERSH closely and there is nothing more objective than the documents of SMERSH itself, which at one time were not intended for a wide range of readers.

The tasks assigned to SMERSH were as follows:

“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;

c) taking the necessary agent-operational and other [through the command] measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

d) the fight against betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army [going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];

e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;

f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the people's commissar of defense.

Smersh bodies are exempted from carrying out any other work that is not directly related to the tasks listed in this section "(from the GKO Decree on the approval of the regulation on the Smersh GKR NPO of the USSR)

Why did the need to create such a counterintelligence service as SMERSH arose precisely in 1943?

The activity of the Abwehr was high from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In 1942, the German special services began to sharply increase the scale of operations against the USSR; in 1942, up to 1,500 people were trained at the same time in special schools and training centers of the Abwehr and SD. The training lasted from one and a half (for the so-called ordinary spies) to three (for radio spies and saboteurs) months. Taken together, all intelligence schools, points and courses produced approximately 10 thousand spies and saboteurs per year. The task was to study the changes in the infrastructure to a much greater depth, they started talking about the need to obtain data on everything related to the mobilization and strategic deployment of the reserves of the Armed Forces of the USSR, their morale, level of discipline and training. They demanded not only to assess the state of defense and the concentration of technical means in the direction of the main attack, but also to find out the ability of the Soviet economy to cope with the urgent needs of the troops in conditions when the massive movement of industrial enterprises and research institutes to the eastern regions of the country continues. In cooperation with the SD, the Abwehr had to launch active sabotage activities in industry and transport in order to destroy communications, transport hubs, disable mines, power plants, defense plants, fuel and lubricants storage facilities, and food warehouses. The Abwehr moved on to more aggressive and offensive activities. The mass recruitment of agents, the unprecedented size of their deployment, were considered at that time proof of the ability of the leaders of Hitler's intelligence to analyze, learn about changing conditions and adapt to them.

In 1943, the activity of the Abwehr reached its peak. The head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, made a trip to the Eastern Front in June 1943. At a meeting in Riga, attended by the leaders of the Abverstelle and field intelligence agencies, the heads of reconnaissance and sabotage schools, Canaris positively assessed the activities of the Abwehr III department - he was impressed by the message of the head of the Abwehrkommando-104, Major Gezenregen, about the mass arrests and executions of Russians who did not accept the "new order." Canaris said so: "Our counterintelligence service is helping the Fuhrer to strengthen the new order." As for the first and second departments of the Abwehr in the Nord army group, he assessed their actions as unsatisfactory. “Our undercover intelligence department and sabotage service,” he said, “have lost their offensive spirit, which I have always insisted on. We do not have agents in the Soviet headquarters, but they should be there. I resolutely demand a massive dispatch of agents. I have created as many schools for you as you need ... “In 1943, the scale of the deployment of agents to the Soviet rear increased by almost one and a half times compared to 1942 ...

I must say that the Abwehr did not care much about the quality of agents, the quality of training was sacrificed for the sake of quantity. Perhaps the Abwehr professed a philosophical law about the inevitable transition of quantity into quality. But, in any case, such "Stakhanov methods" of throwing spies and saboteurs into the rear of the Red Army inevitably led to the tension of all counterintelligence services of the Red Army and the NKVD, created favorable conditions for the work of the most valuable and experienced agents. It is interesting that the leadership of the Abwehr sometimes suffered from clearly adventurous plans, putting before their agents, frankly, tasks of a cosmic scale. So in August 1943, a group was abandoned in the Kazakh SSR, which, relying on the help of local nationalist elements, was supposed to launch agitation among the population for the separation of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union and for the formation, no more, no less, of an independent state under the protectorate of Germany. Another example, on May 23, 1944, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Utta, Astrakhan Region, the landing of an enemy super-powerful aircraft was recorded, from which a detachment of saboteurs in the amount of 24 people was landed, led by an official German intelligence officer, Captain Ebergard von Scheller. This group was sent by the German intelligence agency Wally I ”To prepare a base on the territory of Kalmykia for the transfer of 36 (!) Squadrons of the so-called “Kalmyk Corps of Doctor Doll” to organize an uprising among the Kalmyks. The Battle of Kursk became the debut of SMERSH and a test of strength. SMERSH made titanic efforts to ensure the secrecy of this strategic operation. One source of information for German intelligence was defectors.

From the memorandum of the UKR "Smersh" of the Bryansk Front, Deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR B.C. Abakumov on the results of operational-Chekist measures under the code name "Treason to the Motherland" on June 19, 1943.

Top secret

In May s. The 415th and 356th Rifle Divisions of the 61st Army and the 5th Rifle Division of the 63rd Army were the most affected by the betrayal of the Motherland, of which 23 servicemen went over to the enemy.

One of the most effective measures to combat traitors to the Motherland, among others, was to stage operations under the guise of group surrenders of military personnel to the enemy,

which were carried out on the initiative of the Directorate] of counterintelligence "Smersh" of the front under the guidance of experienced operatives of the counterintelligence departments of the army. The operations took place on June 2 and 3. g. in sections 415 and 356 with the task of: under the guise of surrendering our military personnel, get close to the Germans, throw grenades at them, so that the enemy in the future every transition to his side of a group or single traitors

met with fire and destroyed. Three groups of servicemen of the 415th and 356th divisions were selected and carefully checked for operations. Each group included 4 people.

In the 415th Rifle Division, one group consisted of division scouts, the second - from penalized. In the 356th Rifle Division, one group of scouts from the division was created.

Interesting stuff. It should not be surprising that there were defectors in June 1943; this also happened in 1945. Both the Germans and ours scattered throughout the war millions of leaflets-passes for prisoners. Here is what Helmut Klaussmann, 111th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, recalled: “In general, there were defectors from both sides, and throughout the war. Russian soldiers also ran across to us after Kursk. And our soldiers ran across to the Russians. I remember that near Taganrog two soldiers stood guard and went to the Russians, and a few days later, we heard their appeal on the radio with a call to surrender. I think the defectors were usually soldiers who just wanted to stay alive. They usually ran before big battles, when the risk of dying in the attack overcame the feeling of fear of the enemy. Few people ran across their convictions both to us and from us. It was such an attempt to survive in this huge carnage. They hoped that after interrogations and checks you would be sent somewhere to the rear, away from the front. And there life is somehow formed. ”

The tasks assigned to SMERSH were as follows:

“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;

d) the fight against betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army [going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];

e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;

f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the people's commissar of defense.

Why did the need to create such a counterintelligence service as SMERSH arose precisely in 1943?

Top secret

One of the most effective measures to combat traitors to the Motherland, among others, was to stage operations under the guise of group surrenders of military personnel to the enemy,

met with fire and destroyed. Three groups of servicemen of the 415th and 356th divisions were selected and carefully checked for operations. Each group included 4 people.

In the 415th Rifle Division, one group consisted of division scouts, the second - from penalized. In the 356th Rifle Division, one group of scouts from the division was created.

Here is what Helmut Klaussmann, 111th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, recalled: “In general, there were defectors from both sides, and throughout the war. Russian soldiers also ran across to us after Kursk. And our soldiers ran across to the Russians. I remember that near Taganrog two soldiers stood guard and went to the Russians, and a few days later, we heard their appeal on the radio with a call to surrender. I think the defectors were usually soldiers who just wanted to stay alive. They usually ran before big battles, when the risk of dying in the attack overcame the feeling of fear of the enemy. Few people ran across their convictions both to us and from us. It was such an attempt to survive in this huge carnage. They hoped that after interrogations and checks you would be sent somewhere to the rear, away from the front. And there life is somehow formed. ”

Chapter 27

SS soldiers in the Warsaw ghetto during the uprising

Most Germans did not seem particularly concerned about Hitler's repression of the Jews. They were indifferent to the fate of people forced to wear the Star of David on their backs: Nazi propaganda tirelessly convinced the population of the Reich that "racial cleansing" would have a beneficial effect on the future of Germany and all of Europe.

Few people knew about the death camps set up in Poland. They were surrounded by forbidden strips several kilometers wide with warning inscriptions. Those who violated the ban were shot on the spot. To ensure secrecy, the entire process from deportation to the killing of the "enemies of the Reich" was carried out under a veil of conventional designations: the mass murder was called "special operation", the centers of extermination of people - "Vostok", "labor", "concentration" and "transit" camps, gas chambers and crematoriums - "baths" and "morgues".

Rumors of atrocities were cynically denied. When a high-ranking party official, Hans Lammers, presented Himmler with a note that Jews were being subjected to mass executions, the Reichsfuehrer strongly denied this. He explained that the order for the "final solution of the Jewish question", received from the Fuhrer through Heydrich, provides only for the evacuation of Jews outside the Reich. During their transportation, unfortunately, there are deaths due to illness and air raids by enemy aircraft. The Reichsführer SS also admitted that among the Jews there were those who were killed during the riots as a warning to others, but assured Lammers that the majority were "accommodated" in camps in the East, and even brought photo albums showing how Jews worked as shoemakers, tailors, etc. “This is the order of the Fuhrer,” Himmler emphasized. “If you think that specific measures need to be taken, tell him about it, and give me the names of the people from whom you received this information.”

Lammers refused to extradite these people and turned to Hitler himself for clarification. He repeated almost the same thing that Lammers had heard from Himmler.

“Everyone felt something was wrong in this system, even if they did not know all the details,” Hans Frank, the former Hitlerite governor in occupied Poland, admitted at the Nuremberg trials. We just didn't want to know! It was nice to live in such a system, to support families like royalty and think that everything is fine. And this was a man who told his subordinates that they were all accomplices in the liquidation of the Jews and, no matter how unpleasant it was, it was "necessary in the interests of Europe." The Governor-General of Poland, Frank, knew that the order for the "final solution of the Jewish question" came directly from the Führer. However, the average German was convinced that Hitler had nothing to do with these atrocities.

Members of Hitler's "family circle" could not imagine that their Fuhrer himself ordered the killing of Jews. After all, Schmundt and Engel managed to convince him not to deprive the ranks of some Wehrmacht officers - "partial" Jews. Bormann and Himmler seemed to be villains, committing arbitrariness behind the Fuhrer's back. But they were only obedient executors of the "Final Solution" plan, and Hitler believed that he could get away with it if he presented the world with a fait accompli. Of course, there will be protests, threats, but human memory is short. Who today sharply condemns the Turks for the extermination of a million Armenians during the First World War? Even members of the "family circle" could be convinced that Hitler was the inspirer and organizer of the massacres, when in June 1943, in a conversation with Bormann, he proudly announced that he had cleansed the German world of the "Jewish poison": "For us, this was an important process disinfection, which we have carried to the end and without which we ourselves would have been strangled and destroyed. I warned them that if they unleashed another warrior, I would destroy this vermin throughout Europe, this time for good. To this warning they responded by declaring war. We opened the Jewish abscess, and the whole world in the future will be grateful to us for this.”

Of the 380,000 Jews who were driven into the Warsaw ghetto at the beginning of the war, only 70,000 survived three years later. Those who remained understood that deportation meant death. The Jewish underground groups in the ghetto decided to put aside their differences and banded together to oppose further evacuation. To Himmler's amazement, they refused to leave Warsaw, and the Reichsführer-SS ordered the ghetto liquidated.

At three o'clock in the morning on April 19, 1943, over two thousand SS men with tanks, flamethrowers and dynamite burst into the ghetto in anticipation of an easy victory and unexpectedly ran into fierce resistance. Over 1,500 fighters secretly prepared weapons in advance - several machine guns, grenades, a hundred rifles and carbines, several hundred pistols and Molotov cocktails - and set it all in motion. By evening, they forced the Germans to retreat. Day after day, this unequal battle continued, which stunned the commander of the SS group, General Jurgen Stroop, who could not understand why "these subhumans" were fighting for a hopeless cause. He reported that although his men initially captured "a significant number of Jews who are cowards by nature," it became increasingly difficult to do so: "Again and again, fighting groups of 20 to 30 Jewish men created new pockets of resistance."

On the fifth day, a desperate Himmler ordered a "cruel and merciless" combing of the ghetto. Stroop decided to set fire block by block. According to his report, compiled after the liquidation of the ghetto, the Jews remained in the burning houses until the very last moment, and then jumped from the upper floors. “With broken bones, they were still trying to crawl across the street into the surviving buildings. Despite the threat of burning alive, the Jews preferred to return to the thick of the flames, but not to surrender to us.

The defenders of the ghetto fought with desperate heroism for four weeks and, when the situation became hopeless, they descended into the underground sewer passages. Finally, on May 15, the shooting in the last remaining pockets of resistance subsided, and the next day, in honor of the victory, General Stroop blew up the miraculously surviving synagogue in the “Aryan” part of Warsaw. For a whole month, a few rebels repelled the army of punishers. Of the 56,065 Jews captured, 7,000 were killed on the spot, 22,000 were sent to camps. According to official, obviously underestimated figures, the Germans lost 16 people killed and 85 wounded.

Bicycle Day - April 19, 1943 - the date on which Dr. Albert Hofmann was the first person to deliberately take LSD.

Since then, April 19 has been celebrated as Bicycle Day! And what about Hoffman? LSD? And a bike? Let's get back to history...

History of Bicycle Day (from Wikipedia)

Three days earlier, he accidentally, not yet knowing about the action of diethylamide, absorbed a certain amount of the substance with the pads of his fingers.
That day, he intentionally took 250 micrograms of LSD. After some time, symptoms began to appear that he had already felt before - dizziness and anxiety.
Soon the effect became so strong that Albert could no longer form coherent sentences and, observed by his assistant, informed of the experiment, he rode his bicycle home. During the trip, he experienced the effects of LSD, thus making that day the date of the world's first psychedelic experience with LSD.
The effect of LSD was manifested in the fact that Hoffmann's subjective sensations - a very slow ride - did not correspond to the objective ones - a very high speed of movement.
The familiar boulevard on the way to the house turned for Hofmann into a painting by Salvador Dali. It seemed to him that the buildings were covered with small ripples.
On April 22, he wrote about his experiment and experience, and later included this note in his book LSD - My Problem Child (Eng. LSD: My Problem Child).
After Hofmann got home, he asked an assistant to call a doctor and ask a neighbor for milk, which he chose as a common antidote for poisoning.
The arriving doctor could not find any abnormalities in the patient, except for dilated pupils.
However, for several hours Hofmann was in a state of delirium: it seemed to him that he had become possessed by demons, that his neighbor was a witch, that the furniture in his house threatened him.
After that, the feeling of anxiety receded, it was replaced by multi-colored images in the form of circles and spirals, which did not disappear even with closed eyes.
Hofmann also said that the sound of a passing car was perceived by him in the form of an optical image.
As a result, Albert fell asleep, and in the morning he felt a little tired, and all day, according to him, sensory sensitivity was increased.

From Hoffmann's diary (material from pda.velorama.ru)

19.04.1943, 16:20: Taken orally 0.5 cc 1/2 ppm diethylamide tartrate solution = 0.25 mg tartrate. Diluted with approximately 10 cc of water. No taste.

17:00: There is dizziness, anxiety, visual distortions, symptoms of paralysis, a desire to laugh.

Addendum from 21.04: Went home on a bike. 18:00 - approx. 20:00 the most severe crisis. (See special report).

This is where the notes in my lab journal break off. I could only write the last words with great effort. It was now clear to me that LSD had been the cause of the astonishing incident on the previous Friday, for the changes in perception were the same as before, only stronger. I had to strain to speak coherently. I asked my laboratory assistant, who was informed about the experiment, to walk me home. We went by bike as there was no car due to wartime restrictions. On the way home, my condition began to take on threatening forms. Everything in my field of vision trembled and distorted, as if in a distorted mirror. I also had the feeling that we couldn't move. However, my assistant told me later that we were going very fast. Finally, we arrived home safe and sound, and I could hardly ask my companion to call our family doctor and ask for milk from the neighbors.

Despite my delusional, unintelligible state, I had short periods of clear and effective thinking - I chose milk as a common antidote for poisoning.

The dizziness and the feeling that I was losing consciousness had by this time become so severe that I could no longer stand, and I had to lie down on the sofa. The world around me is now even more terrifyingly transformed. Everything in the room was spinning, and familiar things and pieces of furniture took on a grotesque menacing shape. They were all in constant motion, as if possessed by inner restlessness. A woman at the door, whom I hardly recognized, brought me milk - during the evening I drank two liters. It was no longer Frau R., but rather an evil, treacherous witch in a painted mask.

Even worse than these demonic transformations of the outer world was the change in how I perceived myself, my inner being. Any effort of my will, any attempt to put an end to the disintegration of the outer world and the dissolution of my "I", seemed futile. Some kind of demon possessed me, took possession of my body, mind and soul. I jumped up and screamed, trying to free myself from him, but then sank down and lay helplessly on the sofa. The substance I wanted to experiment with won me over. It was a demon that contemptuously triumphed over my will. I was seized by a terrifying fear, to go crazy. I found myself in another world, in another place, in another time. It seemed that my body was left without feelings, lifeless and alien. Did I die? Was it a transition? At times it seemed to me that I was outside the body, and then I clearly realized, as an outside observer, the fullness of the tragedy of my situation. I didn't even say goodbye to my family (my wife, with our three children, went to visit her parents in Lucerne that day). Could they understand that I did not experiment recklessly, irresponsibly, but with the greatest care, and that such a result could in no way be foreseen? My fear and despair increased, not only because the young family had to lose their father, but because I was afraid to leave my work, my chemical research, which meant so much to me, unfinished in the middle of a fruitful, promising path. Another thought arose, an idea full of bitter irony: if I had to leave this world prematurely, it would be because of lysergic acid diethylamide, which I myself gave birth to in this world.

By the time the doctor arrived, the peak of my hopeless state had already passed. My lab assistant told him about my experiment, as I still couldn't make a coherent sentence myself. He shook his head in disbelief at my attempts to describe the mortal danger that threatened my body. He found no abnormal symptoms, except for severely dilated pupils. And the pulse, and pressure, and breathing - everything was normal. He saw no reason to prescribe any medication. Instead, he walked me to my bed and stayed to look after me. Gradually, I returned from the mysterious, unfamiliar world to the soothing everyday reality. Fear subsided and gave way to happiness and gratitude, normal perceptions and thoughts returned, and I became confident that the danger of insanity had finally passed.

Now, little by little, I began to enjoy the unprecedented colors and play of shapes that continued to exist before my closed eyes. A kaleidoscope of fantastic images washed over me; alternating, motley, they diverged and converged in circles and spirals, exploded in fountains of color, mixed and turned into each other in a continuous stream. I distinctly noticed how every auditory sensation, such as the sound of a doorknob or a passing car, was transformed into a visual one. Each sound gave rise to a rapidly changing image of a unique shape and color.

Late in the evening my wife returned from Lucerne. Someone told her on the phone that I had come down with a mysterious illness. She immediately returned home, leaving the children with her parents. By this time, I had moved far enough to tell her what had happened.

Exhausted, I fell asleep and woke up the next morning refreshed, with a clear head, although somewhat physically tired. I felt a sense of well-being and new life. When, later, I went out for a walk in the garden, where the sun shone after a spring rain, everything around shone and sparkled with a refreshing light. The world seemed to be re-created. All my senses vibrated in a state of supreme sensitivity that lasted all day.

This experiment showed that LSD-25 behaves like a psychoactive substance with extraordinary properties and power. In my memory, there was no other known substance that would cause such profound psychic effects in such ultra-low doses, which would give rise to such dramatic changes in human consciousness, in our perception of the inner and outer world.

Even more significant was that I could remember the events that took place under the influence of LSD in great detail. It only meant that the memory function of consciousness was not interrupted even at the height of the LSD experience, despite the complete disintegration of the usual vision of the world. Throughout the experiment, I was always aware of my participation in it, but despite understanding my situation, I could not, with all the efforts of my will, shake off the world of LSD. Everything was perceived as completely real, as a disturbing reality, disturbing because the picture of another world, the world of familiar everyday reality, was still fully preserved in memory, available for comparison.

Another unexpected aspect of LSD was its ability to produce such a deep, powerful state of intoxication without further hangover. On the contrary, the day after the LSD experiment, I was, as I have already described, in excellent physical and mental condition.

I realized that LSD, a new active substance with such properties, should find application in pharmacology, neurology, and especially psychiatry, and that it should attract the attention of the relevant specialists. But at that time, I did not even suspect that the new substance would also be used outside of medicine, as a drug. Since my self-experimentation had shown LSD in its terrifying, diabolical aspect, I least of all expected that this substance could ever find use as a kind of drug used for pleasure. Also, I failed to recognize a strong connection between LSD exposure and spontaneous visionary experiences until subsequent experiments with lower doses and in different settings.

The next day I wrote to Professor Stoll the above account of my extraordinary experience with LSD-25 and sent a copy to the Director of the Pharmacological Department, Professor Rothlin.

As I expected, the first reaction was skeptical surprise. Immediately there was a call from the management; Professor Stoll asked: “Are you sure that you didn’t make a mistake when weighing? Is the dose mentioned really correct?” Professor Rothlin called and asked the same question. I was sure about this because I did the weighing and dosing with my own hands. However, their doubts were somewhat justified, since until that moment no substance had been known that would have even the slightest psychic effect in smaller milligram doses. The existence of a substance with such a force of action seemed almost unbelievable.

Professor Rothlin himself and two of his colleagues were the first to repeat my experiment with only one-third of the dose that I used. But even at this level, the effects were still quite impressive and completely unrealistic. All doubts about the statements in my report were eliminated.

Bicycle video for a snack :)

Portal for the student. Self-training

History of Bicycle Day (from Wikipedia)

From Hoffmann's diary (material from pda.velorama.ru)

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