The Great Patriotic War is the most important period in modern history, demonstrating the feat and resilience of the Russian people.

After the attack of the fascist army on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the country was in a deplorable state. The military forces of the USSR were much inferior to the power of the Nazi army, and Stalin himself could not believe for several days that the war had begun.

The first battles were lost in disgrace, which convinced the Germans to the effectiveness of the Barbarossa plan. However, the events of the winter of 1941 and subsequent battles showed that it would not be so easy to capture the Soviet Union. Now historians often call the early stage of the war the most tragic and bloody.

Important dates and events	Description of ongoing military events
Early stage of hostilities (summer 1941-winter 1942).	The German attack was sudden and unpredictable, especially in the light of the peace treaties between the USSR and Germany. The Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus were the first to be attacked. Since the Germans operated on several fronts, it was difficult to conduct a logical defense, the army was not mobilized. Due to the surprise of the attack, the Soviet troops could not carry out a competent defense for a long time and invariably retreated.
	Almost immediately after the Nazi attack on the USSR, the defense of Hanko began. Despite the stubborn struggle of the Soviet soldiers and parts of the Finnish army, the base was taken, and all the locals were evacuated.
	One of the first battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On the morning of June 22, the Brest Fortress was attacked, and local military units heroically defended it for nine days. Despite the heroism of the locals and the military, the fortress was taken.
	The Baltic military operation became one of the bloodiest in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Despite the efforts of the soldiers, the Soviet army was forced out of the Baltic by the Germans.
	After fierce fighting, Minsk was taken.
	Defense of the Arctic, which ended with the victory of the USSR. The Soviet troops, at the cost of incredible losses, managed to push the Germans back.
	Due to the unpreparedness of the Soviet troops for the war, Kyiv was eventually taken by the Germans, and at the cost of huge losses on both sides. The city was destroyed almost to the ground, and the Southwestern Front of the USSR suffered a crushing defeat.
	It was on July 10 that the stoic defense of Leningrad began, which continued with a 3-year blockade. The Soviet troops were defeated, and the Germans managed to quickly capture the main strategic positions. Since the city was attacked from the air, Leningrad suffered the first losses in terms of its architectural appearance. At the end of the war, some parts of the city will be razed to the ground.
	The most important event in the early period of the Great Patriotic War. Despite the final defeat of the Soviet troops and thousands of losses, the USSR managed to thwart the blitzkrieg plan. The quick capture of Smolensk did not work out, despite the well-thought-out German tactics. It was this battle that showed the Germans that it would not be as easy to capture the USSR as the countries of Europe.
	Soviet troops were defeated, the Kherson and Nikolaev regions of the Ukrainian SSR were captured.
	The heroic defense of Odessa ended in the defeat of the USSR. Local residents were evacuated as planned, but the Soviet units still had huge losses. Odessa was captured and destroyed.
	The Germans won another victory, and the Soviet troops were driven far back. However, the long defense of Tallinn once again disrupted the blitzkrieg, the war became protracted.
	The war was becoming protracted, and the German plan to quickly capture the Soviet Union turned out to be irrelevant. Gradually, the USSR begins to win important strategic victories, for example, in the Yelnin operation. And even though the preponderance of forces is still on the side of the Germans, the Soviet Union manages to provide worthy resistance.
	The Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat, the losses near Roslavl and Vyazma were horrendous, and the preponderance of forces continued to remain on the side of the Germans.
	After fierce defensive battles, the Germans still managed to encircle Leningrad, organizing the longest and most tragic blockade of the city in the entire history of Russia. During the blockade of Leningrad, thousands of local residents died, and most often people died not from live shells, but from elementary hunger. The city itself was constantly bombed, many architectural monuments were destroyed. Only thanks to the functioning of the "road of life" and rare transmissions from outside the blockade, Leningrad managed to survive. This period is very important for the analysis of the history of the Great Patriotic War, because the long-term blockade demonstrated the strength of the Russian people.
	The defense of Moscow consisted of several stages, and until December 5, 1941, the Soviet troops only defended themselves, but it was on that day that they went on the offensive. Defensive actions near the capital of the USSR are often called the turning point of the Great Patriotic War. Despite the fact that Germany was militarily and strategically stronger, the USSR managed to win an unconditional victory. The Barbarossa plan collapsed, and the Germans had to urgently come up with new ideas for an attack on the Soviet Union.
	The Red Army suffered a crushing defeat, and the Germans managed to advance even further inland.
	The Germans were able to win a fairly quick and confident victory.
	Despite the fact that the forces of the USSR and Germany were equal, the Soviet Union managed to win a strategic victory. The Soviet troops once again showed their endurance, but the positions of the USSR were still weak and shaky.
	The Soviet troops managed to push the Germans a little further, but the operation itself had a dual meaning. Because of the defense of Tikhvin, it was not possible to organize a blockade of Leningrad. The constant resistance of the Soviet troops led to the fact that German communications were greatly stretched. In the future, this will affect the deterioration of Germany's military maneuverability.
	The failure of the Soviet troops in the Crimea led to an early defense of Sevastopol and further defeats on the Southern and Western fronts. Ukraine was literally on fire because of the German attacks, but the stoic defense of some areas continued.
	Sevastopol has always been considered an important strategic point, because it was here that sea communications were provided, and important military units were located here. After the failure of the Crimean defensive operation, the Soviet troops had to move to Sevastopol. The defense of the city became one of the bloodiest periods in the history of the war. Despite the stubbornness of the Soviet soldiers, Sevastopol was nevertheless captured and plundered. Thousands of local residents did not have time to evacuate, and the Germans, angry with such a long defense of the city, began to repair robbery, killing both children and adults. The defeat at Sevastopol is still considered one of the most tragic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War.
	This battle is considered one of the most important strategic victories of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the German troops were better equipped, and even outnumbered by the Russian units, the USSR managed to win a landslide victory. This victory was important from a moral point of view, because it strengthened the morale and convinced the Soviet soldiers that the Germans could be defeated.
	During this operation, the Soviet troops managed to prevent an attack on Moscow from the north and, in principle, curtail German offensive operations on the capital. In addition, this victory created the conditions for the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops.
	The most important strategic victory of the USSR helped push the Nazis back, free Yelets and Efremov.
	The German units retreated 130 kilometers, and the Soviet troops finally eliminated the possibility of an attack on the capital.
	The Soviet troops were defeated, but still managed to help the Leningrad occupiers a little, diverting the attention of the German units. The losses were huge, but at the same time, the Soviet troops failed to recapture even a small part of the occupied territories.
	Exhausting battles lasting more than a year brought victory to the USSR. The Red Army managed to defeat large parts of the German army, which were stationed precisely near Rzhev.
	The Soviet troops managed to temporarily delay the advance of the Germans on the North-Western Front. However, the German army managed to win a strategic victory, breaking through the encirclement of the Red Army.
	Despite all efforts, the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses on the Bryansk and Western fronts. At the cost of huge losses, only an advance of 5-20 kilometers forward was achieved.

The alignment of forces was clearly in favor of fascist Germany, because the USSR was inferior to the opponent both in terms of the number of soldiers and the number of military equipment. However, the true heroism of the Soviet people helped to hold back the enemy for months, preventing the Germans from advancing even a kilometer.

The mercilessly cold winter also had its effect. Thousands of Germans froze in the Russian forests, and by the winter of 1942, the Nazi command was finally convinced that the Barbarossa plan had not justified itself. Ahead, both sides expected bloody battles that finally changed the international alignment of military forces.

(1 ratings, average: 5,00 out of 5)

1. Alla

   The biggest problem and question of this period can be considered why the leadership of the USSR, knowing about the impending danger, allowed such a rout at the first stage of hostilities. Of the two points of view, I cannot lean towards either: 1) The leadership of the USSR was too self-confident, knew about the attack, but overestimated its strength. 2) They simply did not know about a possible attack.

2. Amirlan

   Of all the stages of the war, it is the first stage that is the most disastrous - they gave away Ukraine, Belarus, Leningrad fell into a blockade, almost lost Moscow + entire divisions that were surrounded near Rzhev and Vyazma. Undoubtedly, the most difficult and disastrous stage of the war.

3. Grunge66

   The first stage is universally considered a failure, on the Soviet side. But if you look at the heavy losses of the Germans, it becomes clear that Blitzkrieg is not so Blitzkrieg. The failed game of the Abwehr and total partisanship showed from the first days of the war that the German side would sooner or later give up its positions. Of course, the Nazis had winning moments, but if you think about who the “attacker” is, then the “soviets” were more likely to have a head start. The first stage was the least disastrous for the Germans, in relation to the rest of the "stages".

4. Viktor Sh

   The author of the article written above is nothing more than an eccentric with the letter “M” after the written phrase: “The first battles were lost in disgrace, which convinced the Germans of the effectiveness of the Barbarossa plan ... If the author of the article came to this conclusion, then he simply did not read the German memoirs generals. And it's not about ideology. Yes, the battles of the summer of 41 were lost. But they were lost with great bloodshed not only for the Red Army, but also for the Wehrmacht.
   Behind the mediocrity of the Soviet generals, there was a massive feat of ordinary Red Army soldiers and junior commanders. Just after the first days and weeks of fighting, the Germans came to the conclusion that "Barbarossa" was different from walking around Europe. Where the Western European countries were just shamefully surrendered.
   My grandfather fought from July 1941, in August of the same year he was seriously wounded, and then from the spring of 42 to the spring of 45 he fought in one of the tank brigades. It was a shame that individual fighters and commanders went over to the side of the Nazis under one pretext or another. Everything else is considered a shame - it is really a shame for those descendants who did not even bother to study historical documents in more detail.

5. Ivan

   Gentlemen, how can you argue with a person who believes that the USSR fought against the Nazis ...

February 2, 1942. Monday. 226th day of the war

“By the evening of February 2, the situation was somewhat relieved directly on the outskirts of Vyazma. The 5th Army Corps (4th Panzer Army) managed to actively tie down the advanced units of General Efremov southeast of the city. The 5th Panzer Division (5th Army Corps) counterattacked and stopped the Soviet units near the village of Dashkovka. However, the fighting did not stop here. General Efremov was determined to complete the work he had begun and take Vyazma.(p.150)

February 6, 1942. Friday. 230th day of the war

February 12, 1942. Thursday. 236th day of the war

February 20, 1942. Friday. 244th day of the war

But in general, the damage inflicted by German aircraft was small. Much more serious losses - over 2000 people - the paratroopers suffered as a result of an inaccurate drop due to the fault of their own transport aircraft. As before, there were numerous cases of throwing people and cargo over a large area, from a height of 1000-2000 m, instead of the prescribed 600 m, into the location of the 33rd Army, Belov’s corps, into the enemy’s battle formations and further beyond the Dnieper. The loss of cargo significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the landing force, the loss of skis deprived many units of mobility. Until February 23, simultaneously with the continued landing, parts of the corps concentrated in the assembly areas, searched for dropped property and conducted reconnaissance.

The Germans, in turn, from the very first night of the appearance of paratroopers in their rear, began to strengthen the garrisons and defensive structures. Many buildings in settlements were adapted for firing points, ice trenches and various barriers were built. The garrisons were reinforced with tanks and artillery.

After taking command of the corps, Colonel Kazankin contacted his brigades and the command of the 50th Army. By this time, the troops of General Boldin, approaching the Warsaw highway at the turn of Sapovo, Savinki, met stubborn resistance from the enemy, which they were unable to overcome.(p.107)

Halder Franz “The expected offensive of the enemy in honor of the Red Army Day did not happen. The situation is without significant changes. The main offensive efforts of the enemy are concentrated in Ukraine (Izyum), in the area south-west of Yukhnov, on the left flank of the 23rd Army Corps and on the front of Army Group North ... "

February 24, 1942. Tuesday. 248th day of the war

Western Front (Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich). 4th Airborne Corps. “On the night of February 24, the 9th Airborne Brigade of Colonel I. I. Kuryshev, destroying small garrisons along the way, reached the settlements of Prechistoye and Kurakino, where it was stopped by the Germans. The 212th brigade of Lieutenant Colonel N. E. Kolobovnikov tried to capture strongholds in Ivantsevo, Kostinki, Zherdovka on the move, but was unsuccessful. During the night from 24 to 25 February, parts of the corps conducted reconnaissance searches, improved their positions and prepared for repeated attacks on strongholds. The only means of suppression that the paratroopers had was fire from small arms and mortars. However, he could not be particularly intense due to the limited amount of ammunition. Therefore, the corps operated mainly at night, with surprise attacks.(p. 108) Russian attacks from the north repulsed. The envelopment maneuver of the enemy from the west and southwest has been stopped. There are no changes on the front of Army Group North. Only on

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by a directive dated February 25, united the control of the troops participating in the liquidation of the group surrounded in the Demyansk region, in the hands of the commander of the North-Western Front. Operationally, the right-flank formations of the 3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin Front were also subordinate to him. The liquidation of the encircled group was assigned to the troops of the 34th Army, the 1st Guards Rifle Corps and the right-flank divisions of the 3rd Shock Army.(p. 337)

Western Front (Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich). 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Belov, Pavel Alekseevich). “The enemy, pulling up tanks, aircraft and 3 armored trains, first threw Sokolov’s corps off the highway, and on February 25 launched a series of counterattacks on Belov’s group, surrounding the 41st cavalry division, Onufriev’s brigade, Major Soldatov’s 250th regiment and the 329th rifle division. Belov had to abandon the attack on Vyazma in order to save his troops. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division went to help the encircled. After 3 days of fighting, the cavalry and paratroopers managed to break through the enemy ring and join the main forces. But the losses were great. So, in the 75th Cavalry Division, there were only 59 active bayonets.(p.104)

Army Group Center. " On February 25, 1942, General Model reported to the command of the GA "Center" that the participation of his army in a new operation before the start of the thaw was already becoming unlikely, but "it is possible to deliver a sudden blow to the north before or after the period of thaw ..." In other words, Model is not lost hope of carrying out a strike to the north in the future, although he saw that the chances of its success under present conditions were not great. Now he focused his attention on the actions of the 39th Soviet army, which continued to threaten German communications.(p.161)

Halder Franz (Head of the General Staff of the Dry Troops of Germany): “Across the front, a remarkably calm day. Apparently, the enemy is regrouping forces and pulling up human and material reserves. Preparations are being made for the continuation of the offensive.

February 26, 1942. Thursday. 250th day of the war

Army Group Center. “The operational report of the headquarters of the GA Center dated February 26, 1942 spoke about the continuation of the attacks of the 263rd Infantry Division (4th Army) in the Yukhnov area in order to eliminate the breakthrough on its front, as well as the resumption of attacks by Soviet units on the sector 267th Infantry Division (4th Tank Army) northwest of the Shan Plant, the reflection of which cost the division's outposts heavy losses due to "heavy enemy artillery fire."(p.163)

Halder Franz (Head of the General Staff of the Dry Troops of Germany): “All in all, a very relaxing day! The enemy again stepped up pressure against the motorway in the sector defended by the troops of the 4th Army. Attacks are carried out with the participation of tanks. Otherwise, there are no significant changes ... "

The front command and its headquarters were unable to prepare the offensive for that day. The operation began only on 27 February. The front had sufficient forces to carry out the task, but due to the poor organization of the offensive, the troops could not achieve the desired results. They failed to break through the enemy defenses and open their way from the Kerch Peninsula to the Crimea. Attempts to continue the offensive in March and April were unsuccessful.(p. 344)

“By the beginning of the offensive, the Crimean Front had twelve rifle divisions, one cavalry division, several separate tank battalions with heavy KV and medium T-34s and artillery units of the RGK. Of the total number of troops, 9 divisions were part of the first echelon of the front. Manstein was able to oppose them with 3 German infantry divisions and the 18th Romanian, which was thrown to him by Marshal Antonescu. She was placed on the northern flank with the expectation that, resting against the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov, the Romanian soldiers would be able to hold their position, "especially since the swampy terrain in front of her front made it unlikely that the enemy would use large forces." Another Romanian division covered Evpatoria. General Petrov, in the Sevastopol defensive region, had seven rifle divisions and three brigades against four German infantry divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade. Thus, the Soviet troops in the Crimea had sufficient superiority in forces to successfully solve the assigned task.

The offensive of the Crimean Front began on February 27 and developed very slowly: continuous rains charged, the ground was soaked so that even tanks got stuck in the mud. At the same time, the Primorsky Army from Sevastopol launched strikes in the Northern and Eastern directions, trying to break through the encirclement. The Germans managed to repulse all enemy attacks. Only the 18th Romanian division could not resist, in the northern sector of the isthmus the Russians were able to break through to Kiet, the left flank of the defense arched menacingly to the west. Manstein had to throw into battle his only reserve - the 213th Infantry Regiment and headquarters units.(p.169)

Halder Franz (Head of the General Staff of the Dry Troops of Germany): “The enemy offensive has begun in the Crimea. In the Kerch direction, the enemy, striking at our northern flank (Romanians), achieved success. A counterattack is being prepared. Otherwise, there were no significant changes in the situation ... "

Erich Manstein (11th Army): “After several outwardly calm, but in reality extremely tense weeks, on February 27, the enemy finally launched the major offensive we had expected. On the Sevastopol front, he tried to break out to the north and east through the loose encirclement of 54 ak. He could already oppose four German divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade in the fortress area with 7 rifle divisions, 3 brigades and 1 cavalry division without horses. The artillery of these divisions was supplemented by fortress artillery, partly located in armored towers. Enemy attacks, undertaken mainly in the zones of the Lower Saxon 22nd and Saxon 24th Infantry Divisions, were repulsed in stubborn battles thanks to the excellent actions of our troops and effective artillery fire.

On the Parpach sector, the enemy launched an offensive against 30 ak (170 and 132 pd) and 42 ak (46 pd and 18 Romanian pd) stationed there with the forces of 7 rifle divisions, 2 brigades and several tank battalions. Another 6 or 7 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades and 1 cavalry division were in the second echelon and had to be brought into battle to use the achieved breakthrough.

The German divisions managed to repulse the enemy attacks, but the 18th Romanian infantry division could not resist. At the same time, we also lost 2 German artillery battalions operating in its zone. We had no choice but to throw into battle our reserve, 213 infantry regiments, and remove the headquarters of 170 Infantry Division and 105 Infantry Infantry Division from the southern flank of this front in order to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough in the north. However, these units, with their heavy weapons, advanced so slowly due to deep mud that the enemy managed to break through to the west to Kieta, which practically secured the opportunity for him to go north through the Parpach Isthmus. The Romanian division was withdrawn from the battle." 54th Army from the north in the direction of Lyuban towards the shock group of the Volkhov Front. To assist the fronts in the fulfillment of this task, it was proposed to organize massive air strikes of the fronts and the Reserve of the High Command against the enemy’s battle formations and defensive structures. (p. 335)

Kalinin Front (Konev, Ivan Stepanovich). 29th Army (Shvetsov, Vasily Ivanovich). “In connection with the deteriorating position of the troops of the 29th Army, the army commander, with the permission of the command of the Kalinin Front, ordered the army to leave the encirclement in a southerly direction and join with the 39th Army. By the time they left the encirclement, only about 6 thousand people remained in the 29th Army. For the last three days, the encircled units no longer had food and ammunition. The output began on the night of February 18 and was completed by February 28. 5200 people left the encirclement and joined the 39th Army, of which up to 800 were wounded. After the withdrawal of units of the 29th Army to the south, the distance separating the troops of the 39th Army from the main forces of the front increased significantly, and the conditions in which she now had to fight became more difficult.(p. 323)

“On February 28, the remnants of the 29th Army in the amount of 6,000 people broke out of the ring to their own. According to German data, 4888 fighters and commanders were captured, another 26647 people died on the battlefield. Thus, the Germans cut off the first half of those ticks that were supposed to compress the main forces of Army Group Center in February.(p.103)

Western Front (Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich). 4th Airborne Corps. The Vyazemskaya airborne operation ended. “... paratroopers in certain directions advanced 20-22 km towards the troops of the front, captured a number of settlements. As a result of the fighting on February 23-28, parts of the corps reached the line indicated by the command of the Western Front, where a meeting with the troops of the 50th Army was to take place. Several reconnaissance groups of the 9th Airborne Brigade even managed to get through the Warsaw highway and establish contact with the units of General Boldin.(p. 108) Bakhmutka, weaker attacks - in the sector of the 11th Army Corps. Enemy activation is noted in the Mtsensk area and near Sukhinichi. In the area of ​​​​the highway leading to Yukhnov, and in the eastern sector of Army Group Center, the usual offensive actions of the enemy ... On the front of Army Group North, a strong enemy attack on Kholm from the north and south is still noted. The position of the 2nd Army Corps is still difficult. The supply of supplies by air is clearly insufficient. To the north of Lake Ilmen, the enemy is concentrating forces in order to intensify the blow from the breakthrough area west of Volkhov in the direction of Lyuban. In this regard, the pressure of the enemy on the front of the 38th Army Corps was significantly weakened.

Bibliography

Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War 1941: June July August September October November December 1942: January ... Wikipedia

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The Red Army retreated 850-1200 km, but the enemy was stopped in the main directions near Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov and went on the defensive. The winter campaign of 1941-42 began with a counteroffensive of the Soviet troops in the western strategic direction.
In the course of it, a counteroffensive was carried out near Moscow, the Luban, Rzhev-Vyazemskaya, Barvenkovsko-Lozovskaya and Kerch-Feodosiya landing operations. Soviet troops removed the threat to Moscow and the North. Caucasus, facilitated the situation of Leningrad, completely or partially liberated the territory of 10 regions, as well as St. 60 cities. The Blitzkrieg strategy collapsed. It was destroyed ca. fifty
enemy divisions.
In the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, Soviet troops had an unrealistic task: to completely defeat the enemy and liberate the entire territory of the country. The main military events unfolded in the southwestern direction: the defeat of the Crimean Front, the military catastrophe of the Soviet troops in the Kharkov operation, the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad, Donbass, Stalingrad defensive
operations, battle in the North. Caucasus. In the northwestern direction, the Red Army conducted the Demyansk and Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operations. The enemy advanced 500-650 km, went to the Volga, captured part of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range.
The territory was occupied, where before the war 42% of the population lived, 1/3 of the gross output was produced, and more than 45% of the sown area was located. The economy was transferred to the war footing. A large number of enterprises were relocated to the eastern regions of the country, and 2.3 million heads of livestock were exported. In the first half of 1942, 10,000 aircraft, 11,000 tanks, approx. 54 thousand guns. In the 2nd half of the year, their output increased by more than 1.5 times.
In the winter campaign of 1942-43, the main military events were the Stalingrad and North Caucasian offensive operations, the breaking of the blockade of Leningrad. The Red Army advanced 600-700 km to the west, freeing the territory of St. 480 km2, defeated 100 divisions (40% of the enemy forces on the Soviet-German front).

Valentin Pikul about the Crimean Front in the book "Square of Fallen Fighters":
“Failures in wars are always inevitable, but they cannot be justified if they arose from the carelessness of the people who are entrusted with the conduct of the war. This obvious disregard for the enemy served as a tragic prelude to the fatal turns in May 1942.
Beginning in January 1942, the Kerch Peninsula and the city of Feodosia were occupied by our troops, who fettered the German armies of Erich von Manstein, who stormed Sevastopol, acting with an eye to the back: one should constantly expect a blow from Kerch -
and then, perhaps, we will have to abandon the assault on the city and generally get out of the Crimea. Little of! Hitler could not launch an offensive in the Caucasus in the summer, because this powerful Russian army could threaten the rear of the Wehrmacht.
Perhaps nowhere were so many people and military equipment gathered as on this narrow Kerch isthmus. The weak-willed General Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov commanded this entire mob, and Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis was with him a representative of the Headquarters.
An absolute layman in military affairs, Lev Zakharovich forbade the fighters to tear off even trenches and trenches. - You should only sit out in the ground, cowards! he insulted people. - Digging undermines the offensive spirit of the red fighter, and the Bolshevik must boldly face death!
Of course, Moscow did not gather large forces for that, so that they would stagnate in one place there. The Headquarters more than once pushed the Crimean army on the offensive, to rush into the depths of Crimea, to rescue the wounded Sevastopol, to take Perekop and slam the lid of the cauldron in which Manstein’s army would have died ... Only in April, Mekhlis and Kozlov began to advance, but so stupidly that all attacks were useless.
Manstein very easily conquered the city and port of Feodosia from Mekhlis, which made the troops of the Crimean army even more embarrassed in a small patch. - “Hunting for bustards,” Manstein announced, “that's what we will call this operation ... From this mess that Stalin's strategists brewed, we will make a bloody mess!
At dawn on May 8, the German-Romanian troops began to "hunt for bustards", and by the evening our front had collapsed. Sailors in vests stood up to their full height, shouting “polundrrra-a!”, tried to shoot from rifles into narrow triplexes of tanks' viewing slots ... All of them died under the tracks! Manstein recalled: “All roads were clogged with abandoned vehicles, tanks and guns of the enemy. At every step we came across long columns of prisoners. In front of us in the rays of the shining sun lay the sea, the Kerch Strait and the opposite coast (already Caucasian). The goal that we had dreamed of for so long was achieved.
Mekhlis fled, leaving 176,000 prisoners to the enemies, all planes, all tanks and two and a half thousand guns, which Manstein immediately sent near Sevastopol, to destroy his defenders. But before running away, Lev Zakharovich sent a denunciation of General D.T. Kozlov as a "traitor".
The Crimean army, abandoned by the command, escaped by swimming through the Kerch Strait - by swimming, because there were not enough boats,
people clung to every boat. And part of our troops, unable to break through to the sea, buried themselves alive in the Adzhimushkay quarries (and there, deep underground, they held the front for almost half a year, until the Germans suffocated them with gases).
Sevastopol was now doomed!"

Kharkov operation in 1942.
The offensive of the Soviet troops began as an attempt at a strategic offensive, but ended with the encirclement and almost complete destruction of the advancing Red Army forces.
The leadership from the Soviet side was carried out by: Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction, General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Chief of Staff, and N. S. Khrushchev, representative of the Headquarters. The Southern Front was commanded by General R. Ya. Malinovsky.

But there have been undoubted successes. And, above all, the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht army near Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43.
By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. The shock and fire power of the Red Army became much higher than in 1941-1942 and in the first half of 1943. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in manpower and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people 1.1 times, in artillery - 1.7 times, in tanks - 1.4 times and in combat
airplanes - 2 times.
The scope, intensity of the struggle and the results achieved make the Battle of Kursk one of the largest battles of the entire Second World War. For 50 days, two most powerful groupings of the armed forces of the opposing sides waged a fierce struggle in a relatively small area. The victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a high cost to us. In the course of it, the Soviet troops lost in total
complexity of over 863 thousand people, over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 1.6 thousand aircraft. The enemy in the Battle of Kursk lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft.
During the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army not only withstood the enemy's enormous blow, but also, having launched a counteroffensive, utterly defeated him, throwing him back in the southern and south-western directions for 140-150 km.
The Battle of Kursk was the decisive event that marked a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet Union.

Sergei Varshavchik, RIA Novosti columnist.

May 1942, the 33rd month of World War II. During these 30 days of spring, the German troops inflicted a number of heavy defeats on the Red Army and seized the strategic initiative. This allowed the Wehrmacht in 1942 to move as far as possible to the east, to the foothills of the Caucasus and to Stalingrad. In the Pacific, the Allies fought fierce naval battles with the Japanese.

Manstein vs. Kozlov and Mehlis

The main events of the month unfolded in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front - in the Crimea and in the Kharkov region. On the Kerch Peninsula, on May 8, the offensive of the 11th field army under the command of General Manstein began against the Crimean Front. Weakened by the previous unsuccessful offensives that were carried out from January to April 1942, the Soviet troops were taken by surprise by the start of Operation Bustard Hunting (this was the name of the German offensive operation).

Manstein needed to clear the Crimean peninsula of enemy soldiers, in order to then come to grips with the assault on Sevastopol, a tough "nut", which was not given to him in November 1941.

The tasks of the Crimean Front under the command of General Kozlov were directly opposite - located in the east of Crimea, at least to pull the Wehrmacht forces from Sevastopol towards themselves, and at the maximum, to clear the peninsula of German units.

Manstein understood that a frontal attack on the positions of the Crimean Front, which had been fortified over several months, would not bring him success. In addition, Kozlov had a numerical superiority. However, Erich von Mantein was one of the best military leaders in Germany (it was he who proposed to attack in the difficult Ardennes, which led to the defeat of France in 1940), while Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov was just one of many Red Army generals.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that Manstein was the absolute master of the troops subordinate to him, while the Crimean Front was corroded by the actual dual power - the leaders of the front headquarters did not know whose orders to carry out, Kozlov or the representative of the headquarters of the supreme commander, army commissar of the 1st rank (which corresponded to the rank army general), Lev Mekhlis. He was a man with an imperious and voluntaristic character, who ignored not only the orders of Kozlov, but also his immediate superior, the commander of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal Budyonny, claiming that he was directly subordinate to Stalin.

Beat where they are not expected

As a result, Manstein struck where he was least expected to attack, in the southern sector. He reinforced the actions with an amphibious assault and thoroughly bombed the headquarters of the Soviet formations, which had been reconnoitered in advance, which did not change their location for a long time (the commander of the 51st Army, General Lvov, was killed in the bombing).

Having broken through the Soviet defenses in a weak spot and disrupted command and control, the German units turned to the north, cutting off the escape routes of the 47th and 51st armies. The confusion was completed by the German airborne assault, landed in the rear of the 44th Army.

On May 13, the Crimean Front collapsed. On the night of May 14, an order was given to evacuate Soviet troops from the Kerch Peninsula. In a short time, units of Kozlov lost more than 160 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, while about 140 thousand soldiers and commanders were transported to the Taman Peninsula. The declared losses of the Germans amounted to about 10 thousand soldiers and officers.

The Kerch catastrophe not only allowed the Germans to soon begin the assault on Sevastopol, which was taken a short time later, but also opened up a shorter route for the invasion of the North Caucasus - through the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula.

The Crimean Front was disbanded, and its leaders were demoted in positions and ranks by the decision of the Headquarters (read, Stalin). In particular, Mekhlis was removed from the post of deputy defense commissar and head of the main political department of the Red Army and demoted to corps commissars. Kozlov, on the other hand, was demoted to major general, left the post of commander and never held a similar position again.
Broken springboard

The situation was even worse in the Kharkov direction, where on May 12 the Red Army launched an offensive with the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts in order to press Army Group South to the Sea of ​​Azov and destroy it. The main "springboard" for this was the Barvenkovsky ledge - a bridgehead, which was created as a result of a winter offensive on the western bank of the Northern Donets River, which opened up the possibility of an attack on Kharkov by Soviet units.

At first, the attackers were successful - the German defense was broken through in some places, and this made it possible to introduce several Soviet armies into the breakthrough.

At some point, there was even a panic at the headquarters of Army Group South. In particular, the commander of the group, Field Marshal von Bock, seriously doubted the ability of General von Kleist's 1st Panzer Army to repel the Soviet offensive near Kharkov. However, the Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, General Halder, convinced Bock of the advisability of such a strike. And, as subsequent events showed, he was right.

The strike of Kleist's tanks on May 17, inflicted on the rear of the advancing units of the Red Army, broke through the defenses of the Southern Front, and then cut off the retreat path for the Soviet troops. The Acting Chief of the General Staff, General Vasilevsky, the very next day, on May 18, proposed to the Headquarters to withdraw troops from the Barvensky salient, but Stalin refused to do so. As a result, by May 25, a significant number of Soviet troops were locked in the Barvenkovo ​​"cauldron", from where they then made unsuccessful attempts to break through to their own until the end of the month.

"Boilers" in the south and in the north

As a result of heavy three-week fighting, the Red Army lost 270 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. A number of generals died or went missing in the encirclement - for example, the deputy commander of the Southwestern Front Kostenko, the commander of the 6th Army Gorodnyansky, the commander of the 57th Army Podlas.

The rapid breakthrough of enemy positions was a success for the Germans, largely due to the fact that the Soviet units were stretched out in one echelon, and had no reserves in depth. The depth of tactical defense did not exceed 3-4 kilometers and, moreover, was poorly equipped in the engineering sense.

According to Marshal Baghramyan, who at that time served as chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, a considerable part of the blame lies with the leadership of the Southern Front, in particular, with the commander, General Malinovsky, who, according to Baghramyan, allowed a significant part of his forces to be diverted to a private operation. (which did not bring success), and was not ready for the German counteroffensive.

As a result of the heavy defeat of our troops near Kharkov, the Wehrmacht got the opportunity for a strategic offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, which it did not fail to take advantage of in the summer of 1942.

Disappointingly, the struggle also developed in the north, on the Leningrad front, where during May the German vise around the encircled 2nd shock army tightened. After the banner of the army was sent by plane to the rear, in fact, the agony of the formation began. The army began to retreat to the "corridor" at Myasny Bor, where fierce battles unfolded. On May 30, units of the Wehrmacht, with the support of bomber and assault aircraft, went on the offensive and the next day they tightly blocked the "corridor", thereby slamming the lid of the "cauldron", in which more than 40 thousand people turned out.

Battle of the sea giants

While gigantic land battles were unfolding in Europe, other theaters of World War II were dominated by naval battles. This was due to the need to disable, first of all, Japan's strike force - its navy. On May 4-8, the largest battle between the Japanese and the American-British fleets took place in the Coral Sea, during which for the first time groups of the largest surface ships, aircraft carriers, met in battle on both sides. As a result, the parties lost one aircraft carrier and one destroyer, as well as several dozen aircraft. The Allied death toll was over 600 and the Japanese over 900.

Despite the virtual draw, the battle turned out to be a loss for the Japanese, forcing them to abandon their plans to capture the capital of New Guinea.

On land, the Japanese did much better. On May 1, they captured the second largest city in Burma, Mandalay, and on May 5 they captured the sea fortress of Kore in the Philippines.

On May 5, Operation Battleship began - the capture of Madagascar (belonging to Germany's ally, Vichy France), by the armed forces of Great Britain, Australia and the Union of South Africa. The main goal was to prevent the possible establishment of a Japanese naval base on the island. Uninvited guests were met with fierce resistance, which was broken after a few months. In the battles that lasted until November 6, 1942, both sides lost just over 250 people killed. By the standards of the Eastern Front, these were battles of local importance.

In North Africa, the next offensive of the tank army "Africa" ​​under the command of General Rommel began. From May 26 to May 27, the famous "Desert Fox" attacked the British positions west of Tobruk and broke through them. However, his cherished goal - the city of Tobruk, fell only after almost a month.

How a peasant bought a fighter jet...

On December 18, 1942, the Saratov collective farmer Ferapont Petrovich Golovaty (1890 - 1951), one of the initiators of the nationwide movement to raise funds for the Defense Fund, contributed his savings (100 thousand rubles) to the construction of a fighter.
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Back in 1910, Ferapont Holovaty got into the service of a regiment that guarded the royal family. For high growth, for beauty, remarkable strength, he was sent to the Life Guards. He was among those who carried the guard in Tsarskoe Selo and at the Winter Palace. In 1914, Ferapont went to the front. There is evidence of what kind of soldier he was. In East Prussia, Golovaty was awarded three St. George's Crosses. So his courage was noted, shown both in battle, and in rescuing the wounded, and when leaving the encirclement. During the Civil War, he joined the Budyonny Cavalry Army. Served as a squadron commander.
In December 1942, Golovaty took cans of honey to Saratov for 200 kilometers. A separate tent was built for him in the market. For several days he stood behind the counter. Since honey was expensive, they took it little by little. So a whole bag of small money gathered. With him, he came to buy a plane.
By that time, Ferapont Petrovich's two sons and three sons-in-law were at the front. 9 grandchildren remained in the Golovaty's house. The oldest of them was nine years old. So Ferapont Petrovich did not give his money to buy an aircraft from a large income.
The Yak-1B fighter plane was presented to pilot Boris Eremin, a native of the Saratov region, who fought near Stalingrad. On board the aircraft was a gift inscription “To the Pilot of the Stalingrad Front, Guards Major Eremin from the Collective Farmer of the Stakhanovets Collective Farm Comrade. Golovaty". On this plane, Eremin reached from Stalingrad to the Crimea, won a single victory, was never shot down. After the liberation of Sevastopol, the aircraft, as having exhausted its service life, was sent to Saratov, where it was installed for viewing on one of the city squares.
In June 1944, F.P. Golovaty, at a rally in Saratov, handed over the second aircraft, purchased at his own expense, to the Guards, Lieutenant Colonel Yeremin. This time, the Yak-3 fighter, with the inscription on the board "Second aircraft for the final defeat of the enemy." Eremin fought on this plane until the Victory, the last plane was shot down in the sky of Berlin.
Ferapont Golovaty continued to work on the collective farm. In 1944 he joined the CPSU(b)/CPSU. In 1946 he was elected chairman of the Stakhanovets collective farm. He made a lot of efforts to restore the economy in the post-war period. In 1947, during the harvesting work on the collective farm, a high yield of wheat was harvested - 31.3 centners per hectare on an area of ​​40 hectares.
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 26, 1948 "in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 29, 1947, for obtaining high yields of wheat when the collective farm fulfills mandatory deliveries and payments in kind for the work of the MTS in 1947 and the provision of seeds of grain crops for sowing 1948 Golovaty Ferapont Petrovich was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor with the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and Sickle gold medal.
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The Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation prepared a certificate on the material donations of citizens to the front during the war years. To be honest, we ourselves were surprised to learn what scale of charity the example of Ferapont Golovaty aroused among the masses. Already by April 1943, 274 rural patriots transferred 36.5 million (!) Rubles to the state for the purchase of weapons. All funds were mainly used for the production of aircraft and tanks. Thus, the compatriot Golovaty collective farmer Selivanova donated 300 thousand rubles to the front, the Georgians Basharuli - 150 thousand, the Uzbek Shakhnazarov - 270 thousand, the Azerbaijani Suleymanov - 250 thousand, the Kazakhs Baimagometov, Bukebaev and Kabdulaev - a total of almost 800 thousand rubles.
Soon a wave of donations reached the creative and technical intelligentsia. Mikhail Sholokhov handed over to the front the Stalin Prize awarded to him for "Quiet Don", Korney Chukovsky and Alexei Tolstoy contributed 100 thousand rubles each for the purchase of aircraft, Alexander Tvardovsky and Lebedev-Kumach - 50 thousand each. The Kukryniksy, together with the poets Mikhalkov and Marshak, built the Merciless tank at their own expense, which, by the way, safely reached Berlin. Designer Yakovlev, inspired by the example of Golovaty, contributed 150 thousand rubles for the purchase of an aircraft designed by him.
Even children did not remain aloof from the nationwide initiative. In May 1943, the editorial office of one of the Omsk newspapers received a letter from the 6-year-old daughter of a front-line tanker Ada Zanegina, who asked her to publish her proposal to young townspeople to raise funds for the construction of a tank and call it "Baby". Little by little money began to flow into the editorial office. As a result, 160,886 rubles were accumulated, for which the “baby” T-60 was built.
By the way, not only money was handed over to the front. For example, the Voronezh post office received a package with gold coins - “for the defenders of the motherland”. In the package received by the Saratov branch of the State Bank, a silver device with gold monograms was found. In Dnepropetrovsk, a resident handed over a diamond necklace worth 10,000 rubles to the branch of the State Bank. In Turkmenistan, the women of the republic collected and handed over to the front 7360 silver and gold jewelry.
In total, the defense fund and the fund of the main command of the Red Army during the war years received from the population over 17 billion rubles in cash (for comparison: the salary of a worker then ranged from 500 to 1000 rubles), 13 kg of platinum, 131 kg of gold, 9519 kg of silver , 4.5 billion rubles in government bonds. That is, more than 118 billion rubles in total. By the way, this amount was equal to the average annual expenses for the needs of the entire Red Army. With this money, 2.5 thousand aircraft, over 30 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, submarines, armored trains and many other military equipment were built.