The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 16, 1997 “On Priority Measures for Reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Improving Their Structure” substantiates the need for military reform and determines the stages, content and timing of military reforms. The military reform is carried out in two stages.

At the first stage(until 2000) there was a noticeable reduction in the number of armed forces. By the end of 1998, it amounted to 1.2 million servicemen. At the same time, the process of optimizing the structure of the combat strength of the Armed Forces was going on. In the second half of 1997, the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), the Military Space Forces (VKS) and the Rocket and Space Defense Forces (RKO) were united. Created qualitatively new Strategic Rocket Forces. Further, in 1998, the Air Force (VVS) and the Air Defense Forces (Air Defense) were merged. Created qualitatively new Air Force. During the reform there were significant changes in Navy, although its overall structure is preserved. Major changes have taken place in ground forces.On the basis of formations and units of the reduced composition and personnel, storage bases for weapons and military equipment (BKhVT) were created. What is important from a mobilization point of view. The military-industrial complex is being reformed. Conditions are being created for the military-technical re-equipment of the army and navy. Through the merger of educational institutions and their transformation, a fundamental reorganization of the military education system.

However, after the completion of the first stage of the military reform, the improvement of the country's military organization slowed down markedly.

The year 2000 was a turning point in terms of reform. Twice - in August and November - the Security Council considered issues of military development. The system of functioning of the Armed Forces was recognized not only as unbalanced, but inefficient. Solid, serious work has been done, taking into account the forecasts for the development of the Armed Forces and the country's economy. The amounts of funding up to 2010 were determined, broken down by years and items of expenditure. Aircraft construction plan until 2005 ., which is a complex of more than 30 interrelated documents, signed by the President of the Russian Federation.

In the next three to four years, the size of the army and navy will decrease by 365,000 servicemen and 120,000 civilian specialists. However, the reduction of the army and navy will in no way affect the quality of the permanent readiness units. The main task of the transformations is the ability to localize the armed conflict in strategic directions. Since we now have six such directions, and seven military districts, the PriVO and UrVO are planned to be merged into one military district.

The largest structural change will be the transition of the Armed Forces to a three-service basis: the Ground Forces, the Air Force and the Navy - according to the principle of "three elements". And on the basis of the Strategic Missile Forces, two branches of the Armed Forces will be created: the Strategic Missile Forces and the one formed by merging the Military Space Forces with the Missile and Space Defense Forces.

A decision was also made to reduce the so-called military formations of other ministries and departments (including the reduction of military departments at state educational institutions of higher professional education).

It is clear that the reform process will not be limited to these measures. Much will still have to be changed - be it the social sphere, military education or science. However, the first decisive step in the right direction has been taken.

Reference: if in the 1990s the Russian Armed Forces did not emerge from a protracted crisis, then the national armies of the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty and the Union of Independent States (CIS) found themselves in a much more difficult situation. Almost everywhere there is a sharp decline in combat training and the level of combat readiness of troops. Despite the presence of often a significant amount of weapons, only a very small proportion of it is suitable for combat use (with the exception of the Armed Forces of Belarus).

A significant part of the equipment is in storage, and in dismantled form. So, from helicopters of army aviation only a few are able to rise into the air. In parts of the Air Force, serviceable aircraft are less than 30%. Many types of weapons (90%) are obsolete, there are practically no modern types of military equipment in the national armies. The entire fleet of combat vehicles and vehicles does not have batteries. Combat training has become conditional, since at best 5-15% of fuels and lubricants are allocated for the exit of military equipment from the park.

One of the main reasons for this state of affairs is considered to be the weakness and incompetence of the national military elite, the top commanding personnel of the strategic and operational-tactical levels.

Many officers and generals of titular nationalities, hastily promoted to the highest leadership positions in their armies, do not have the necessary service experience and military education, even at the operational-tactical level.

Finally, the new states simply do not have enough funds. If, for example, the entire annual Ukrainian military budget as a whole is enough to maintain only one combat-ready division according to NATO standards, then in the rest of the republics of the former USSR the situation is even worse.

findings:

The heirs of centuries-old military glory - the Russian Armed Forces have a well-founded structure - consist of branches, branches of the armed forces, each of which performs tasks according to its intended purpose. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are equipped with modern, efficient weapons, for the most part superior to analogues of foreign armies.

Changes in the military-political situation, tasks and conditions of the country's military security dictate the need for a comprehensive military reform.

III. FINAL PART ………….. 5 min. 1. Recall the topic, what issues were considered, the objectives of the lesson, how they were achieved. 2.Answer students' questions 3.Announce the final grades for students who were surveyed during the lesson, mark those who excelled, indicate general shortcomings. 4. Announce the topic of the next lesson, the venue. 5. Announcement of the task for self-studying, indicating the literature: a) To study according to the abstract: - the purpose, composition and tasks of the main types of the Armed Forces and the branches of the Ground Forces; - the concept of association, connection, part, subdivision; - the content of the stages of the military reform of the Armed Forces. b) Write in a workbook: - from a slide projector and know by heart the scheme of the composition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; - from the Combat Charter of the SV, part 2 and know by heart the abbreviation of the abbreviations of motorized rifle, tank and artillery units.

If the trainees have no questions, ask 1-2 questions on the topic covered. Pay attention to the fact that the assignment will be checked by a control flight at the next lesson.

Description of the presentation on individual slides:

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The reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF of Russia) 2008-2020 is a set of measures to change the structure, composition and strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, announced on October 14, 2008 at a closed meeting of the military collegium of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Defense of Russia). The reform is divided into 3 stages.

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Stage I This stage includes organizational and staff measures: optimization of the number, optimization of management, reform of military education. Number optimization An essential part of the reform was the reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, which in 2008 was about 1.2 million people. Most of the reductions fell on the officer corps: from more than 300 thousand to 150 thousand people. As a result, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev set the task of returning about 70,000 officers to the Armed Forces. In 2014, the strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 845 thousand: ground forces - 250 thousand, airborne forces - 35 thousand, navy - 130 thousand, air force - 150 thousand, strategic nuclear forces - 80 thousand, command and service - 200 thousand.

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Optimization of management One of the main directions of the reform is the transition from the four-level command and control system "military district" - "army" - "division" - "regiment" to the three-level "military district" - "operational command" - "brigade". After the military-administrative reform, all troops in the territory of the military district are subordinate to one commander, who is personally responsible for security in the region. The unification of the combined arms armies, fleets, air force and air defense commands under the unified leadership of the commander of the military district has made it possible to qualitatively increase the combat capabilities of the new military districts by reducing the reaction time in crisis situations and increasing their combined strike power. Self-sufficient inter-service groupings of troops (forces) have been created in strategic directions, united under a single command, the basis of which is formations and military units of constant readiness, capable of bringing themselves to the highest degree of combat readiness in the shortest possible time and performing tasks as intended.

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Stage II This stage includes the solution of social issues: Increasing monetary allowance, Providing housing, Professional retraining and advanced training of military personnel. Increasing the monetary allowance Since January 1, 2012, the monetary allowance of military personnel has been increased by 2.5-3 times, and military pensions have increased. On November 7, 2011, President Dmitry Medvedev signed the Law "On the monetary allowance of military personnel and the provision of certain payments to them." In accordance with the law, the system of accrual of monetary allowance was changed, the additional payments and allowances that existed before were canceled and new ones were introduced. The monetary allowance of a conscripted military serviceman consists of a salary for a military position and additional payments.

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Professional retraining and advanced training of servicemen Starting from January 2012, all contract servicemen are required to undergo intensive combined arms training courses in specially created training centers, the so-called "survival courses". In the first six months of 2012, more than 5,500 military personnel were trained in the Southern Military District alone, of which about a thousand military personnel did not pass the test. Since 2013, all those who entered the military service under the contract from among the citizens who are in the reserve must undergo four weeks of training under the intensive combined arms training program. Retraining of officers takes place in specialized centers upon appointment.

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Stage III On November 19, 2008, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, told reporters that in the next 3-5 years, weapons and equipment in the Russian army will be updated by a third, and by 2020 this will be done 100% President of Russia Vladimir Putin demanded that by the end of 2015 the armed forces be equipped with modern weapons by at least 30%, and by the end of the year - 47%. By the end of 2020, this figure should be at least 70%. This means that in the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF), which are a priority in development, there will already be 100%, as in the Aerospace Forces and the Navy. A little less in the Ground Forces and the Airborne Forces, but they will also have high rates.

1. Necessity, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The main task of the lesson is to consider: in-depth study of available documents and materials in order to provide moral and psychological support by personnel (especially officers) to the idea and plan of the reform of the Armed Forces, the formation of an interested attitude towards its results, a sense of ownership and personal responsibility for its progress and outcome.

The Russian Federation is going through a difficult and responsible period of its development. The tasks of deep economic and democratic transformations are being solved.

Historical experience shows that in the turning points in the life of our country, the Armed Forces have always been subjected to profound reforms. Their number, structure, recruitment methods, military-technical equipment were brought into line with the realities of the time.

At present, large-scale and active work has begun in our country to reform the army and navy, to give them a modern look, mobility, high combat capability and combat readiness.

On July 16, 1997, the President of Russia signed the Decree "On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure." It substantiates the objective need for military reform, defines its stages, content, economic justification and timing of its implementation. The decree establishes proper control and responsibility for the implementation of the planned measures of military organizational development. This document is a detailed and reasoned program for the reform of the Armed Forces.

1. Necessity, prerequisites and purpose of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Since the creation of the Russian Armed Forces (May 7, 1992) there has been a lot of talk about reforming them. In practice, the matter essentially did not move forward. Today in the country, in the military leadership, a clear and precise understanding of the objective necessity, goals, ways of reforming the army and navy has been formed.

What exactly are the regularities that determine the need for the ongoing reform? What is their essence and how do they influence military construction?

One of the determining factors , affecting the military construction of the state, is geostrategic position of the country, the nature and characteristics of the military-political situation in the world. The point is to correctly, soberly and balancedly determine whether there is a military threat to the country, its sources, scale and nature, to give a correct assessment of the real military-political situation and the prospects for its development. The nature and direction of the state's military development directly and directly depend on the answer to them.

After the end of the Cold War, the military-political situation in the world has changed significantly. It has seen many positive changes. The former sharp and dangerous military and ideological confrontation between the two systems is gone. For our country at present and in the near future there is no threat of a large-scale war. It must be emphasized that a large-scale armed clash with the NATO bloc is also unlikely, despite its expansion to the East. In other words, at present and in the near future, there is no serious external threat to the country. Russia, in turn, does not consider any state, any people as its potential enemy.

But these changes do not mean the complete disappearance of the military danger. It now proceeds from the possibility of local wars and armed conflicts. That is why it is important to decide what kind of army Russia should have, based on the nature of modern regional wars and conflicts in which it can participate to one degree or another.

Today, the country's Armed Forces, not counting numerous other troops, are 1.7 million people. Their number is clearly inadequate to the existing military danger. There is a direct expediency of their reduction and reorganization. This is the starting point of the country's leadership, putting forward a well-founded and long overdue task of immediate reform of the Armed Forces.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also dictated by considerations of an economic nature. The country has been implementing economic reform for the 6th year already. It is carried out in conditions of the most severe crisis. The decline in production has not yet been overcome. Russia is seriously lagging behind the main centers of power in the modern world in a number of key indicators. It accounts for only 2% of world economic production, but 4% of military spending. This means that the country's spending on the military sphere is twice the world average. And one more indicator: in terms of gross domestic product per capita, we are in 46th place in the world.

At present, up to 40% of the revenues of the country's annual budget are spent on the maintenance of the Armed Forces, other troops and law enforcement agencies. This holds back economic transformations and does not allow for an increase in investment in the development of industrial and agricultural production. Our economy, which is also in a crisis situation, is simply not able to withstand such a load. Related to this is the underfunding of the army, especially for combat training and equipping with new weapons, delays in the payment of monetary allowances and an increase in the number of homeless servicemen. These circumstances have an extremely negative impact on the combat capability and combat readiness of the army and navy. Life requires bringing the Armed Forces in line with the level of the existing military danger and the economic capabilities of the state.

The need to reform the Armed Forces is also associated with a number of demographic restrictions. . The decline in the population is a matter of serious concern for the Russian leadership. In 1996, the population of the country decreased by 475 thousand people. The trends in 1997 are similar.

In recent years, despite the seeming sufficiency of human resources, only a quarter of the conscripts come to military service. The rest enjoy benefits, deferrals, etc. As a result, there is a large shortage of privates and sergeants, which reduces the level of combat readiness.

Today, every third young man cannot serve for health reasons (in 1995 - only every twentieth). 15% of conscripts have a body deficit; 2 times more prone to alcoholism (12%); 8% of young people recruited into the army are drug addicts.

The situation with staffing is aggravated by the presence of military formations in another 15 federal structures, which also claim to be a conscription contingent. Let's say the Ministry of Internal Affairs has about 540 thousand people, plus 260 thousand as part of the internal troops; Railway troops - 80 thousand; Border troops - 230 thousand; Ministry of Emergency Situations - 70 thousand; building structures - about 100 thousand people, etc. And from this point of view, the restructuring of the military organization is extremely necessary.

It would be expedient to drastically reduce the number of federal departments that have military formations, and more resolutely switch to a mixed, and then to a contract system of manning units. With the reduction of the Armed Forces, this prospect becomes quite real, making it possible to move on to a professional army.

What is the goal of the proposed reform? First of all, it is called upon to increase the country's defense capacity, to bring the troops in line with the requirements of the times.

“Modern Armed Forces,” notes the Address of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to the soldiers of Russia - must be compact, mobile and equipped with modern weapons. “At the same time, the reform,” said the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, “will radically improve the social position and material well-being of a person in uniform.” ("Red Star", July 30, 1997).

As the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev, noted, these should be “highly equipped, with sufficient deterrence potential, a modern level of professional and moral and psychological training, combat-ready, compact and mobile Armed Forces of a rational composition, structure, and strength.” (“Red Star”, June 27, 1997)

2. Main stages and content of the reform.

Military reform is a nationwide, nationwide task. Being extremely complex, it is designed for a long period. In its course, there are two stages.

First (before 2000) optimization of the structure, combat composition and strength of the Armed Forces is being carried out.

During this period, a new military doctrine is being developed and approved, research and development work (R&D) is being actively carried out on new generation weapons, combat control and communications equipment, and dual-use technologies.

On the second (2000-2005) the qualitative improvement of the reduced Armed Forces is ensured,

increasing their combat capability, switching to the contract principle of recruitment, the development of weapons of the next generations continues. In short, over the next 8 years, the Russian Armed Forces will be completely reformed. And in the future, a large-scale rearmament of the army, navy and other troops will begin with models of equipment that will serve in the 21st century.

What are the specific priorities of military construction at the first stage of the reform of the Armed Forces? They are outlined in the reform plan approved by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces and approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the army, despite insufficient budget allocations, began. We can say with satisfaction that it is gaining momentum. Reasonable and rational directions for its implementation have been chosen.

In order to bring the military organization of the state in line with the needs of defense and security, as well as the economic capabilities of the country, the number of military personnel is being reduced.

In total in 1997 - 2005. Almost 600,000 officers, ensigns and midshipmen will be fired from the Armed Forces. Including in 1998 more than 175 thousand regular military personnel, in 1999 - almost 120 thousand. The number of civilian personnel will decrease from 600 thousand people to 300 thousand people within a year and a half.

As of January 1, 1999, the number of servicemen in the army and navy was set at 1.2 million. Such a strength of the Armed Forces is quite optimal and will undoubtedly provide reliable defense of the Russian state.

However, the reduction of the army and navy is not the main thing in their reform. The main thing is to optimize the structure and combat strength, improve the controllability and equipment of the troops.

Therefore, it is necessary major organizational restructuring of the Armed Forces. Before January 1 next year, the Strategic Missile Forces, the Military Space Forces and the Air Defense Missile and Space Defense Forces will be united. It will be a qualitatively new branch of the Armed Forces. It will retain the name "Strategic Missile Forces". This merger will make it possible to abandon unnecessary parallel links, as well as to pool resources and get rid of excess financial costs. The main thing is that related defensive functions are concentrated in the same hands, the cause of the country's security wins. As a result of this reorganization, the effectiveness of the possible use of the Strategic Missile Forces will increase by about 20%, and the economic effect will exceed 1 trillion rubles.

In the same year, carried out measures to radically optimize the management bodies, including - central apparatus. Their number will be reduced by about 1/3. In particular, the Main Command of the Ground Forces is not only significantly reduced, but also transformed into the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. It is reassigned to one of the Deputy Ministers of Defense and will focus mainly on issues of combat training of troops. The purpose of the transformation of the management bodies is to improve the quality and efficiency of management, professionalism, and staff culture. In 1998, the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces are merged.. On the basis of their association, a type of the Armed Forces is created - the Air Force. But the process of this unification will be far from simple, given the different methods and ways of managing these branches of the Armed Forces, and most importantly, they have different tasks. In the course of the unification, the combat composition of the Air Force and Air Defense will also be optimized, and the problem of managing them under the conditions of the new structure will be solved.

In connection with these transformations, the transition from the five-service to the four-service structure of the Armed Forces is being completed. Then a three-species structure is envisaged (according to the spheres of application of troops: land, air, space and sea). And ultimately we must come to two components: the Strategic Deterrence Force (SSF) and the General Purpose Force (SDF).

During the reform of the Navy there will also be changes, although its structure as a whole will remain. 4 fleets will remain - the Baltic, Northern, Pacific and Black Sea, as well as the Caspian flotilla. But they will be more compact than the current groupings of forces and assets in strategically important oceanic and maritime sectors. The Navy should retain ships of high combat effectiveness, strategic submarines, and support forces. The reduction in the number of ships will increase the importance of shore-based naval aviation. The fleet will perform more limited combat missions than at present.

Ground troops - the basis of the Armed Forces. And yet the number of divisions in them will decrease. It is supposed to keep 25 divisions. Some of them will be fully manned and combat-ready in every strategic direction. They will be able to effectively solve the relevant tasks. On the basis of the remaining divisions, bases for the storage of weapons and military equipment will be created. The combat potential of the retained divisions will increase. They will be equipped with new weapons and control systems. Thanks to this, the effectiveness of the striking actions of the division will almost double. Serious changes will also affect the military districts.

Military districts are given the status of operational-strategic (operational-territorial) commands Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the relevant areas. Within the boundaries of their responsibility, the military districts are entrusted with the functions of operational leadership of all military formations, regardless of their inclusion in various federal departments. This means that the border, internal troops, civil defense units and other military formations are operationally subordinate to the operational-strategic command.

In connection with the planned transformations, the military system on a national scale will undergo major changes. It will acquire harmony and completeness, the ability to more effectively solve the pressing issues of strengthening the country's defense.

As already mentioned, the reform of the Armed Forces is being carried out under conditions of severe financial constraints, when the defense budget not only does not increase, but is even cut. Therefore, it is important to persistently seek out internal reserves and skillfully use them.

This thesis is rejected by a number of opponents and is heavily criticized by some media. Meanwhile, there are internal reserves. They are serious enough.

Already at the first stage of the reform, it is necessary to get rid of unjustified and unproductive expenditures that do not meet the interests of strengthening the country's defense capability. The Armed Forces must get rid of enterprises and organizations, objects and structures, without which their vital activity will practically not suffer and they are quite capable of existing.

Already at present the process of withdrawing the so-called support structures from the Armed Forces began. Some of them are substantially reorganized and corporatized. This will reduce the number of military and civilian personnel. At the same time, considerable funds will be received to replenish the defense budget and ensure social protection.

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There is a major reorganization of the military construction complex. It is carried out on the basis of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation signed on July 8, 1997 "On the reform of state unitary enterprises that are part of the construction and quartering bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." Over 100 organizations of the military-construction complex being withdrawn from the Armed Forces will be transformed into joint-stock companies. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced by 50,000 people, while the controlling stake will remain in federal ownership. On this basis, considerable funds will be received. As part of the Armed Forces, 19 state-owned enterprises are temporarily retained, which will be engaged in construction and industrial activities, as well as ensuring the life of remote garrisons.

On July 17, 1997, the President of the Russian Federation signed the Decree on the formation of the Federal Service for Special Construction of Russia . The reorganized Rosspetsstroy will provide the most important special construction works. At the same time, the number of military personnel will be reduced from 76,000 to 10,000 people. Also on July 17, 1997, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation the Federal Road Construction Administration was reorganized. It operated under the Ministry of Defense, and is now transferred to the Federal Road Service of the country. At the same time, the number of servicemen of this department is reduced from 57 to 15 thousand people.

Thus, only according to the three decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, due to structural changes, it will be possible to reduce about 150 thousand military personnel. In general, as a result of the reform, the number of military builders will be reduced by 71%, and civilian personnel in military construction by 42%. Military construction is planned to be conducted on a competitive basis. All this will significantly reduce the burden on the defense budget. Moreover, it will be significantly replenished due to the withdrawal of numerous enterprises from the Armed Forces.

At the first stage of the reform, such problems will also have to be solved. There are about 100 agricultural enterprises in the system of the Ministry of Defense. Many of them are profitable. They were created during a period of shortage of products. At present, their preservation in their former form is not everywhere justified. Therefore, their corporatization is envisaged. However, in a number of regions (Kola Peninsula, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Tiki, etc., they still significantly fill the need for essential food products.

The number of military representations at enterprises in which officers are involved, numbering 38 thousand people, is being reduced. Moreover, representatives of various branches of the Armed Forces sometimes perform duplicating functions. There is a need to have a unified system of state representations at enterprises. It is also expedient to liquidate numerous hunting farms, recreation centers, etc., for the maintenance of which subsidies and compensations from the Ministry of Defense are constantly increasing.

In the course of the reform of the Armed Forces, transfer of social infrastructure facilities to local authorities(parts of housing and communal services, kindergartens and nurseries, schools, household enterprises, etc.), which are on the balance sheet of the Ministry of Defense. These are tens of thousands of buildings and structures. The cost of maintaining social infrastructure sometimes reaches 30% of the cost of maintaining troops. Their transfer to local budgets will begin this year and end in 1999. This measure will save 2-3 trillion rubles annually. They will also go to provide social guarantees for servicemen.

Currently started a radical reorganization of military trade, which employs about 62 thousand people. The administrative apparatus is being restructured and reduced. Unprofitable enterprises are liquidated. There is a sale of the largest objects of military trade in Moscow and large centers, where they have lost their functional purpose. All this will make it possible to almost halve the number of military trade personnel, including military personnel by 75%. More than a trillion rubles will be received from corporatization of trade enterprises. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense retains a controlling stake. It is possible to manage these enterprises and earn income.

It should be especially noted that military personnel and their families will not suffer in the slightest from the reorganization of the military trade system. Indeed, up to 70% of enterprises serve closed and remote garrisons.

In the course of the reform, many military camps are freed up. A large number of various weapons become redundant. Military property is released.

The reform of the Armed Forces is designed to adjust the structure of the defense budget . Recently, an extremely unfavorable structure for financing the Armed Forces has taken shape. Up to 70% of the allocated funds are spent on salaries for officers and salaries for civilian personnel. Moreover, in 1996 more than 7 trillion rubles were spent for these purposes in excess of budgetary funds. And combat training and the purchase of new equipment are not actually funded. At a meeting of the Federation Council on July 4 this year. Defense Minister General of the Army I.D. Sergeev declared: "In the Armed Forces, with the exception of the Rocket Forces and several formations of the Ground Forces, there is practically no combat training" (Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5, 1997). The troops almost do not receive new military equipment and weapons. As a result, the level of combat and mobilization readiness of troops and their technical equipment are decreasing. The reduction of the army and navy, their organizational changes will allow about half of the defense budget to be used for combat training and the acquisition of new weapons.

The most important problem determining the success of the reform is financing. This is the "question of questions" today. As is already clear from the previous explanations, it is envisaged to have three sources of funding: 1) budget money for improving the combat training of troops, the daily maintenance of the entire structure of combat readiness (Today this figure is 1%, but in 1998 it will rise to 10%); 2) the sale of surpluses of released military property, trade enterprises; 3) an item in the budget for social guarantees for retired servicemen.

It will be decided in a completely new way question of military training. The task of reforming the military education system is to raise the level of personnel training and, at the same time, optimize training costs. Currently, the Ministry of Defense has 100 universities, incl. 18 military academies. Their number clearly exceeds the needs for personnel in the army and navy under the new conditions. It will be reduced, including through mergers. For example, at present, aviation specialists for the Air Force, Air Defense and Ground Forces are training 17 military educational institutions, incl. two academies (VVA VVS and VA PVO). After their reorganization, 8 aviation schools will remain. The two academies will be merged into the Air Force and Air Defense Military Academy, which will train command personnel. A military technical aviation university. NOT. Zhukovsky will focus on training engineering personnel for all branches of the Armed Forces.

In the course of the military reform, such a complex task will also have to be solved. It, of course, goes beyond the Ministry of Defense, but its experience in reorganizing the system of training military personnel will have to be used in every possible way. Now each power ministry and department has its own system of training military personnel. In addition to the Ministry of Defense, military universities operate in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (more than 30), in the Federal Border Service (7), etc. Unfortunately, the activities of numerous universities are not coordinated by anyone. There is a need to create a unified (federal) system for training military personnel for all power ministries and departments. At the same time, the quality of personnel training will certainly increase. This will be facilitated by the increase in the professionalism of the teaching staff of universities. In particular, the replacement of a number of posts by trained civilian specialists, the extension of the service life of officer scientists and highly qualified specialists, etc.

Further - in the current state of affairs, primarily because of the low prestige of military service, many cadets of military schools after completing their second year of study break their contracts. At the same time, they are credited with a two-year term of military service and they continue their education in related civilian educational institutions from the 3rd year. As a result, the Ministry of Defense incurs huge costs and does not receive the required number of trained officers. This problem requires an optimal solution.

Practice shows that up to 40% of graduates leave the Armed Forces upon graduation. The reasons are well known. All this leads to a shortage of young officer cadres. Here we have to find the right and optimal solutions.

The logistic organs of the Armed Forces will have to be substantially reformed. They are being brought into line with the new branch structure of the army and navy. Their optimization, adaptation to market conditions of management is envisaged. The rear of the Armed Forces is called upon to be more economical and use budget funds rationally. All this should contribute to improving the nutrition of soldiers, their clothing allowances, and, in general, the material and technical support of the troops.

Thus, the reform of the Armed Forces is a truly large-scale and responsible undertaking, requiring great efforts and significant material costs. The reform affects the fundamental interests of the country's national security. Its success depends on a number of conditions. First of all, from the nationwide support of the ongoing activities (material and moral support), from the level of state and military leadership of the transformations in the military sphere. No wonder the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin took the course of the reform of the Armed Forces under his personal control.

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3. The tasks of military personnel to ensure combat readiness, strengthen military discipline and law and order, and successfully implement the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The reform of the Armed Forces and their radical transformation have a decisive influence on changes in the scale and nature of the tasks they are solving.

It should be emphasized that under the new conditions, as follows from the essence of the reform, the function of the Armed Forces has been and remains the same. This is to ensure the security of Russia from external threats to its territorial integrity, sovereignty, economic and political interests.

Despite the low probability of large-scale aggression against our country in modern conditions, the task of ensuring external security is still relevant. The main sources of military danger are local wars and regional conflicts in which Russia may be involved.

Under these conditions, there is a need for a certain adjustment of both general tasks and their individual types. And this will inevitably determine the content and direction of the entire process of combat training and military service. The Armed Forces are called upon to reliably deter any possible aggression, and at the same time to have the ability and skill to prevent or fend off local wars and regional conflicts.

The main task of deterring aggression is still entrusted to the Strategic Missile Forces. In connection with the reform, they acquire new fighting qualities. While playing a decisive role in deterring aggression, they are also less expensive than other branches of the Armed Forces. Nuclear deterrence remains at the core of Russia's national defense system. This is a reliable guarantee of the country's security for a period of deep economic and political transformations, including the reform of the Armed Forces.

In terms of conventional Armed Forces and armaments, Russia will have sufficient capabilities to successfully solve combat missions in local wars and regional conflicts. The ground forces will be small in number, compact and mobile. They will have means of transfer for operations in various strategic directions. In local wars and regional conflicts, the Air Force will play an increasing role. The combat power of conventional Armed Forces during the years of reform will increase significantly as a result of equipping them with high-precision weapon systems.

The navy, while maintaining a largely modern structure, will have the ability to solve problems in important oceanic and sea strategic areas, ensuring the state interests of the country. But the volume of these tasks may be limited due to positive changes in the military-political situation in the world.

The likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts will necessitate more active participation in international peacekeeping operations. They are organized by the UN, OSCE, CIS. For the Russian Armed Forces, this is a fundamentally new task. To solve it, special military contingents may be required, as is happening, for example, now in Tajikistan.

As you can see, the reform of the Armed Forces, their deep transformation does not in the least remove the task of ensuring the country's security from the army and navy. But the content of the tasks is specified and adjusted in connection with changes in the nature and scale of military dangers for the country.

The success of the reform of the Armed Forces and the fulfillment by them of the tasks of ensuring the security of our state directly depends on the activity and efficiency of the military labor of the personnel of the army and navy. The challenges of reform are complex. But any reforms are carried out by people - specific military personnel. And active participation in the implementation of reforms in practice is our common patriotic duty.

The leader of the classes must emphasize that the main efforts of the personnel in the context of the reform should be aimed at maintaining high combat readiness, which is unthinkable without high proficiency of military personnel, strong military discipline and law and order.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense considers the prevention of crimes and incidents, primarily related to the death and injury of people, the manifestation of hazing, the loss and theft of weapons, ammunition and military property, to be a task of paramount importance at the stage of reforms. Such facts reduce the effectiveness of the course of reforms and divert much effort from solving the main tasks related to reforming the army and navy.

The level of organization of the personnel is very important, it is necessary that the reorganization, mass dismissal of military personnel, the withdrawal of support structures from the Armed Forces, etc. are carried out according to plan, without any failures. The main thing is not to weaken attention to the tasks of increasing vigilance and combat readiness, because the modern world is not safe.

Under these conditions, the demands on officers who organize the training and education of subordinates, and the conductors of state policy in the army and navy, are immeasurably increasing. The quality of combat training, the level of military skill of soldiers and sergeants primarily depend on their professionalism, sense of responsibility, and initiative.

They are the bearers of high morale and discipline. Only their personal example in service, in observance of Russian laws and military regulations, serves as an effective means of establishing law and order and strong military discipline in the troops.

This is what he spoke about at a reception in honor of graduates of military academies on June 30, 1997, the Minister of Defense, General of the Army I.D. Sergeev: "We must not forget that the state of the army and navy is determined primarily by the state of the officers. It is the officers, true professionals, patriots devoted to their Fatherland, who with dignity carry their high title of defender of the Russian land" ("Red Star", July 1, 1997 .).

During the reform period, attention to the issues of social protection of soldiers should not be weakened.

The guarantee of success lies in maintaining a healthy moral and psychological state in military collectives in today's difficult times.

It is necessary to see in each of your subordinates not a robot, not a blind tool, but a person, a person. However, humanity is not connivance, not lisping, but care combined with exactingness. The main thing is not to forget about the dignity of your subordinates, to always feel personal responsibility for their training and education, for their lives.

One of the most important tasks of the officer corps is to strengthen the patriotic, moral and military education of their subordinates.

It is important to make every soldier, every subordinate of the state significance of the reform of the Armed Forces that has begun, personal responsibility for maintaining high vigilance and combat readiness. Military personnel must deeply understand that the reduction of the army and navy should not weaken their combat power. It must be replenished by the growth of the combat skill of each soldier, the skillful possession of military equipment and weapons, the strengthening of military discipline, organization and military law and order.

During the period of reform, when individual units and subdivisions will be reduced, it is more important than ever to treat a variety of material resources with care and economy.

And one more problem. Today, when there is a spiritual and political confrontation in society, various forces are trying to influence the army. The involvement of servicemen in political processes would lead to destabilization in military collectives and would be not only illegal, but in the full sense, disastrous for the cause of reforming the army and society. Skepticism, discrediting the ideas of military reform, the reform of the Armed Forces, is capable of causing serious damage to the cause of ensuring the country's national security. But there is no turning back. Behind is only the degradation and destruction of the army and navy. Ahead, on the path of reform, are the powerful Russian Armed Forces of the 21st century. Great Russia needs a strong, reformed army. Everyone should realize this.

In conclusion, let us emphasize once again that the reform of the Russian Armed Forces is a major, historic event in the life of the people and their armed defenders, a matter of great national importance. It is objectively conditioned and natural. The reform will bring the Armed Forces into full conformity with the nature and characteristics of the current military-political situation and the economic potential of the country. The army and navy, having decreased in number, will increase their combat capability and combat readiness due to qualitative parameters.

One of the strategic objectives of the reform, as emphasized by the President of the Russian Federation, is to qualitatively improve the life of servicemen, “... to restore the former prestige and respect of the Russians to the military profession.” (Red Star, July 30, 1997).

The implementation of the reform will contribute to the economic and political stabilization of the country. The tasks of the reform cannot be accomplished without raising the level of combat readiness, without strengthening military discipline and law and order, without the interest of every serviceman in its successful implementation.

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Sample questions for the seminar (conversation):

- What caused the need for such a radical reform - the Armed Forces of the country?

- In what recent speeches of the leadership of the country and the army, and how are the goals and priorities of the reform formulated?

- Tell us about the main stages of the reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

- Personnel policy in the course of reform.

- Restructuring of military education.

- Tell us how the defense budget will be adjusted.

- What should be done to increase the prestige of military service?

- What sources of funding are envisaged to ensure the reform?

- What measures are planned to be taken to ensure social protection of servicemen and members of their families?

- Tell us about the tasks of the Armed Forces in modern conditions.

- How do you imagine the tasks of your unit, subdivision and your personal ones in the course of the reform?

A radical transformation of the system of international relations, the adoption of a new military doctrine, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, a focus on qualitative parameters in defense construction - these and many other factors dictate the need for military reform in Russia. Therefore, military reform became an imperative of social and political practice in Russia after the end of "cold war". The need for military reform in the Russian Federation is due to geopolitical changes. It is geopolitical features that predetermine the significant scale of transformations that must be carried out in the context of large-scale socio-economic reforms.

The armed forces inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR were created as a means of confrontation in "cold war" and in many ways do not meet the requirements for modern armed forces. The Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for local and ethnic conflicts, the weak technical equipment of the Russian army, the insufficient professionalism of soldiers and officers are affecting. One of the main problems of the Russian army was insufficient funding "human resource", as well as ineffective mechanisms for the social protection of military personnel. All these problems and many others cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army - in order to solve the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces, it is necessary to implement military reform as a comprehensive series of measures aimed at radically transforming the RF Armed Forces.

The military reform should not be identified with the reform of the Armed Forces, since the reform of the Armed Forces is considered as an integral part of the reform of the entire military construction in the country. In this context, we should also note some other problems that accompany the implementation of the process of military reform in modern Russia, which, one way or another, require close study.

The crisis of the Russian army worsened in the late 1980s. By the end of the 80s. spending on the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of a multimillion-strong army exacerbated the economic crisis. The underestimation of the factor of the unpreparedness of the Russian army to repel threats to global, regional and national security has led to miscalculations in the ongoing military reform in Russia. It should also be noted that all these factors create the prerequisites for the implementation of military reform in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Russian army.

As the main negative factors that predetermined the decrease in the combat readiness of the Soviet, and then the Russian army, K. Cirulis and V. Bazhanov indicate:
1. The irreconcilable contradiction of the corrupt caste with the rest of the officer mass;
2. Alienation between the generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers;
3. "Hazing", which created a tendency to criminalize the army and a system of ugly informal relationships;
4. Intensive development of equipment and weapons, which exacerbated the contradiction between the need to increase the professionalism of personnel and outdated methods of combat training and its organization;
5. The decline in the prestige of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation due to the involvement of servicemen of combat specialties in household work, which led to a decrease in combat readiness.

Unsatisfactory combat readiness is associated with the transition from the form of organization of the army inherent in the command-administrative system of the Soviet type to the form of organization of the army of a democratic state. However, the events of the early 1990s prevented the rapid implementation of military reforms. In the 1990s military reform was not carried out. The state policy of reducing military spending without reforming the Armed Forces led to the collapse of the army. The lack of funding for the Armed Forces has led to the use of emergency reserves.

The military reform programs being developed had political significance, and military reform in practice meant a theoretical, methodological, organizational and legal basis. However, the successful implementation of the military reform in the late 1990s. were hampered by insufficient funding, a lack of funds and a lack of political will to implement the planned measures. During the period of the military reform from 1992 to 2001, which can be called, in the words of L. Peven "a decade of missed opportunities", its main tasks were not fulfilled:
- high combat readiness of troops is not ensured;
- effective measures for the social security of servicemen have not been developed.

The aspect of the gradual transition of the Russian army to a contract basis for staffing positions deserves special attention. In the context of military reform in Russia, this process can be seen as affecting not only the organization of the Russian army, but also affecting Russian society. This leads to the effective use of the latest technology by contractors and the improvement of the professionalism of military personnel and the Russian army as a whole. However, the initial cost of maintaining contract soldiers is much higher than the cost of conscript soldiers. The first experiments on the formation of military units from contract soldiers were carried out in the early 1990s. The first unsuccessful experiment in transferring the army to a contract system for recruiting privates and sergeants in Russia began in 1992. The peak of the unsuccessful experiment came in the summer - autumn of 1993 - the experiment failed due to insufficient funding and the absence of a social package of benefits for contract soldiers.

However, even now material rewards and social benefits for contractors are minimal. It can be assumed that, provided that favorable socio-economic conditions are provided for a significant part of the conscripts, this type of service in the Armed Forces can become an attractive and prestigious type of public service. An important role in the growth of motivation to serve under the contract can be played by positive advertising in the media. Support for the transition to a professional army is significantly higher among groups with higher social resources and the potential to implement them.

The introduction of alternative civil service (ACS) has become an important event in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation. Perhaps in the future, the ACS Institute will be replenished with a large number of potential participants, the number of which can be measured in tens and hundreds of thousands. Jobs for those mobilized as part of the alternative civil service can be found in orphanages and homes, nursing homes, and disabled people. These jobs, as a rule, are characterized by relatively difficult working conditions and are not prestigious and unattractive for most of the traditional workers, but the social demand for the volume of such work is increasing. Military reforms are met with support in Russian society, especially among those categories of conscripts and other social groups who receive social benefits or advantages as a result of the introduction of the recruitment of the alternative civilian service. The problem of assessing the socio-economic consequences of recruiting the composition of the alternative civilian service is difficult to predict in the long term. It should be assumed that many social groups will benefit from these innovations. However, in its current form, these transformations cannot solve the main problem of the Russian army - the plight of soldiers (called for military service) and officers.

Social aspects of the military reform of the Russian Armed Forces

In post-reform Russia, complex, contradictory and often unpredictable social processes have a significant impact not only on certain social groups in Russian society, but also on servicemen and their families. Indeed, one of the main problems of the Russian army was insufficient funding. "human resource", ineffective mechanisms of social protection of soldiers and officers. All these and many other problems cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army. Therefore, in order to solve the numerous social problems of the Russian army, it is necessary to implement comprehensive measures, the purpose of which is to take targeted actions aimed at radically transforming the system of social protection of Russian military personnel.

The low wages of the military and insufficient funding for the maintenance of the army have become one of the important problems that need to be addressed immediately. In this regard, economic measures of the Government were adopted or are planned to be adopted, the purpose of which is to replace the benefits of military personnel with monetary compensation. Calculated for 2002-2010. The program "State housing certificates" partly contributed to the solution of this problem. The functioning of the mortgage system for officers will solve the housing problem for many servicemen.

Having considered the main aspects of the military reform and the impact of its social aspects on Russian society, we can come to the following conclusions:
1. Russia, as a great power on which international security depends, must have a combat-ready army that meets the most modern requirements. The need to counter terrorist threats and repel the threats of potential aggressors obliges military personnel to constantly improve the military-technical equipment of the army.
2. A very negative social climate has developed in the modern Russian army, cases of "hazing relationship". To increase public confidence in the army, it is necessary to curb bullying. Frequent cases of violation of fundamental human rights in the army determine the negative attitude of many conscripts to military service. Numerous illegal ways of evading military conscription are widespread.
3. The military reform carried out in Russia for more than a century and a half has become one of the key events in Russian social and political life. It has a great influence on Russian society and affects the interests of many social groups and lobbies.
4. The most urgent problem of military reform has a rational solution feasible for the Russian economy and society. Since 2001, it has entered the accelerated implementation process. The successful implementation of the military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will make it possible to move to a new system of troop recruitment without prejudice to the combat capabilities of military units, ensure the necessary number of trained reserves, eliminate many aspects of social tension in society, which is characteristic of the current conscription system, and ensure Russian society's support for reforms.

Work with personnel

Referring to the authoritative studies of domestic experts in the field of military construction and military management, B.L. Belyakov singles out the problems of educating the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and also focuses his research interest on the substantive characteristics of their influence. He points out that the problems of modern military education cause such a factor as the disintegration of the relatively effective system of educational work that previously functioned in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and has developed over decades, including the strengthening of military discipline, with servicemen of various ethnic groups and nations, along with introducing a confessional factor into the military environment.

Slow and protracted phased creation of a new system of indoctrination work that does not meet the main goals and objectives of the concept of transition to a unitary system of indoctrination work in military collectives of various branches of the Armed Forces. This slow process of transition to a unitary system of education, in his opinion, also hinders more efficient and well-coordinated work of the command and commanders of military units, as well as the system of bureaucratic departments of educational work to unite and conduct educational work in multinational or multi-ethnic military collectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the absence in the Armed Forces of a scientifically and conceptually substantiated system and training program for specialists in the humanities (philologists, ethnologists and historians) who are specially trained to conduct socially oriented work (information, educational, etc.) with military personnel of various ethnic groups and nationalities inhabiting the Russian Federation.

In the 70s of the last century, there were no serious interethnic or interethnic conflicts in the Soviet army, and the grandfather structure prevailed in the system of social relations in army collectives. Later, when solidarity in army collectives on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or compatriotism acquired a large-scale character, the compatriot-status system of social relations in many cases prevailed in army collectives over the traditional "grandfather" and even destroy the latter. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased national homogeneity of the Russian army, the criminal system came to the fore.

In the modern Russian army, many commanders and their educational assistants need to work and act mainly in extraordinary conditions and with some elements of innovation and even, under certain conditions, the risk of solving urgent problems and tasks of increased pedagogical complexity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account that some commanders have lost their former ideological and moral and value orientations of the traditional system of educational work that has developed in the Russian and Soviet army, and new spiritual values ​​in educational activities have not been formed. Unsuccessful experiments with the search for a national idea, an ostentatious appeal to national and ethno-confessional sources, a drop in the standard of living of a significant number of the country's population led to social and legal vulnerability and uncertainty about the future for a significant number of the military. All these factors have a negative effect on the pedagogical activity of officers in the army in strengthening military discipline in military collectives. It should also be noted that the solution of many of the above problems and challenges is possible by referring to the theoretical, conceptual and practical methods of sociological science and involving professional sociologists in eliminating the consequences of these dysfunctional phenomena in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Along with this they read:
Politics and military reform
Army reform
MTC with France

stages and main content of the reform
All reforms in the Russian Army took place as a result of the country's major military defeats in the struggle for freedom and independence. Military reforms of Ivan the Terrible at the end of the 17th - beginning of the 18th centuries. were caused by the need to strengthen the Russian army in connection with the creation of a single state and protection from the raids of neighbors. Peter the Great creates a regular army and navy on the basis of recruitment. After powerful defeats from the northern neighbors, after the defeat of Russia from the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. the country is in need of another military reform. After the military defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. the government of Nicholas II made an attempt to carry out another military reform (1905–1912), etc.

The main goal of the latest military reforms is the creation of a highly equipped armed forces with the necessary military deterrence potential.

When planning the reform, the country's leadership took into account the difficult socio-economic situation in Russia, the limited possibilities for financing reform measures.

The entire reform was planned to be implemented in a time period of 8-10 years, which is divided into 2 stages.

At the first stage (1997–2000), it was planned to move from five branches of the Armed Forces to four branches.

The implementation of this stage of reforms took place under the powerful approval of the Western states, which saw their interests in this, the NATO member countries, which allocated money for the disposal (destruction) of Soviet defense and attack systems. In the period 1997-1998, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces were merged. The ground forces were reformed, and the structures of the Navy were streamlined. All this boiled down to the creation of a limited number of combat-ready formations and units, the expansion of the functions and sphere of influence of the remaining, staffed with people and equipped with modern technology.

The first stage of the military reform was completed with the optimization of the entire structure of the Russian Armed Forces.

The second stage of the reform should bring the following results:

- transition to a three-service structure of the Armed Forces;

- creation of multifunctional new types of weapons for strategic, operational and tactical purposes;

- creation of a scientific, technical and technological basis for the rearmament of the Russian Army;

- the transformation of the Military Space Forces into an independent branch of the military.

As a result of the reform, the capabilities of the Armed Forces should increase in fulfilling the tasks of strategic deterrence, preventing and repulsing aggression against Russia and its allies, localizing and neutralizing local conflicts and wars, as well as implementing Russia's international obligations.

To solve these tasks, the Russian Armed Forces must include:

- nuclear deterrence forces (SNF) - to keep nuclear powers from the possible deployment of a nuclear war, as well as other states with powerful conventional weapons from non-nuclear wars;

- forces of non-nuclear deterrence to keep potential aggressor states from unleashing non-nuclear wars;

- mobile forces - for the speedy resolution of military conflicts;

- information forces - to counter a potential adversary in an information war.

These tasks should be solved by the already reformed branches of the Russian Armed Forces.