On December 16-30, 1942, the forces of the South-Western and left flank of the Voronezh Front carried out Operation Small Saturn (Middle Don Offensive). Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses and defeated the main forces of the 8th Italian army, the Hollidt task force and the 3rd Romanian army.

The Wehrmacht used up the forces intended for the attack on Stalingrad, and abandoned further attempts to unblock the Paulus group surrounded there, which sealed its fate and led to a radical change in the situation in the Stalingrad-Rostov direction (and on the entire Soviet-German front). The death of the Italian army on the Don caused literally a shock in Rome. Relations between Italy and Germany deteriorated sharply. Rome actually ceased to be an ally of Germany. The fascist regime of Duce Mussolini in Italy was shaken.

The plans of the Soviet command

Preparations for a new offensive operation, which received the code name Saturn, began at the end of November 1942. The troops of the Southwestern and left wing of the Voronezh fronts during this operation were to defeat the main forces of the 8th Italian army, which was defending on the Middle Don on the front of Novaya Kalitva, Veshenskaya, and enemy troops on the river. Chir and in the Tormosin area, and then advance in the general direction towards Millerovo, Rostov-on-Don. The Southwestern Front was reinforced with new formations. On December 8, 1942, by the directive of the Headquarters, the 1st Guards Army under the command of V.I. Kuznetsov (third formation) was formed from parts of the operational group of the Southwestern Front.

On November 25, the representative of the Stavka A. M. Vasilevsky, the commander of the artillery of the Red Army N. N. Voronov, the commander of the Air Force A. A. Novikov, together with the commander of the Voronezh Front F. I. Golikov, began reconnaissance work in the band of the 6th army of the VF. The next day, the same work was done jointly with the commander of the Southwestern Front N. F. Vatutin on the right wing of this front.

To defeat the 8th Italian Army and the German operational group Hollidt, it was planned to create two strike groups on the Southwestern Front: 1) on the right flank of the 1st Guards Army to strike from a bridgehead south of Upper Mamon on Millerovo; 2) in the zone of the 3rd Guards Army D. D. Lelyushenko east of Bokovskaya for a strike also on Millerovo, closing the encirclement. After that, the advancing troops were to move towards Rostov. The strike force of the Voronezh Front - the 6th Army under the command of F. M. Kharitonov was supposed to strike from the area southwest of Upper Mamon to Kantemirovka, Voloshino. The 5th Panzer Army of P.L. Romanenko was tasked with defeating the enemy at the junction of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, in the Morozovsk, Tormosin, Chernyshevsky area, and preventing him from breaking through to the encircled grouping. The actions of these troops were to be supported by the 17th Air Army.

The command of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts was to submit the final version of the operation in early December 1942. The 21st Army of the Southwestern Front, the 26th and 4th Tank Corps, operating on the inner front of the encirclement at Stalingrad, decided to transfer to the Donskoy front. So that all the attention of the command of the Southwestern Front is focused on the external line of struggle and the preparation of Operation Saturn. The 2nd Guards Army of R. Ya. Malinovsky was transferred to the Stalingrad region. The Soviet Headquarters initially planned to use the 2nd Guards Army as part of the troops of the Southwestern Front to develop an offensive from the Kalach region in the direction of Rostov-Taganrog. However, in connection with the beginning of the offensive of the German army group "Goth" in order to save the Stalingrad group of Paulus, Malinovsky's army was thrown into the fight against the breaking through German troops.

Soviet T-34 tanks with armored soldiers on the march in the snowy steppe during the Middle Don offensive

Germans

The High Command of the Wehrmacht attached great importance to keeping the defense at the borders of the Don and Chir rivers in its hands, continuing to concentrate forces here to release Paulus' troops. The Germans were waiting for the strike of the Soviet troops in this direction and were afraid for the defense of the 8th Italian army of General Italo Gariboldi. On the other hand, the attention of the German command was focused on Stalingrad and the troops of Manstein and Hoth, who were supposed to save the 6th Army of Paulus.

Hitler still hoped that the front line in the Stalingrad direction could be restored and the gains of the 1942 campaign could be preserved. During a meeting in the "Wolf's Lair" ("Wolfschanz") on December 12, 1942, he noted: "If we voluntarily give up Stalingrad, then this whole campaign will lose its meaning. To believe that I will be able to come back here again is madness. Now, in winter, we can build reliable cut-off positions with our available forces. The enemy currently has limited transportation capabilities on the rail line he has. The ice will melt, and such a transport artery as the Volga will be at its disposal. He knows what advantage it will give him. Then we won't make any more progress here, which is why we have no right to leave here. Too much blood has been shed to achieve this goal.”

Moreover, the Fuhrer still hoped to defeat the Red Army in the Stalingrad direction. Hitler noted that the German command, if they acted correctly, would be able to carry out bilateral coverage of the grouping of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad region, and then continue to carry out the previously assigned tasks. “I think,” Hitler said, “the right thing to do first is to strike from south to north and break through the ring. Only after that continue the strike to the east, but this, of course, is the music of the future. First you need to find and collect the forces for this. The decisive factor, of course, is how the day goes for the Italians.” That is, Hitler was aware of the danger in the Italian sector of the front. He feared that a catastrophe would happen here, and it really happened a few days after the meeting at the Wolf's Lair. But he still overestimated the capabilities of the Wehrmacht and underestimated the increased ability and power of the Red Army. He believed that the Stalingrad "bag" gives the German troops even greater opportunities than the Kharkov one.

Thus, Hitler was in no hurry to withdraw Army Group A from the Caucasus, believing that there was still time to draw new large forces to Stalingrad and turn the fight on the Russian front in the direction he needed, retaining the previous successes of the 1942 campaign of the year.

However, the grouping, which was in front of the South-West and the left wing of the Voronezh fronts, was strengthened before the offensive of the Soviet troops. Thus, the 385th Infantry and 27th German Panzer Divisions were additionally advanced to the Boguchar area. The command of the Wehrmacht continued to replenish the Army Group "Don".

A column of Romanian prisoners of war near Stalingrad

"Small Saturn"

Meanwhile, the command and troops of the Southwestern and left wing of the Voronezh fronts were preparing for an offensive in the region of the Middle Don. The concentration of troops and equipment due to the lack of transport and the congestion of communications was not completed by the appointed date. As a result, the start of the operation, scheduled for December 10, was postponed to the 16th. In addition, the idea of ​​the operation was significantly corrected by the Headquarters due to the delay in the liquidation of the encircled 6th Army of Paulus, which could not be crushed on the move and Manstein's deblocking strike (Operation "Winter Thunderstorm").

As a result, taking into account the current situation, it was decided to change the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops. According to the plan of Operation Saturn, it was planned from the Upper Mamon area directly to the south, through Millerovo to Rostov-on-Don, to the rear of the entire Army Group South. Now the troops were given the task of developing the offensive in a southeasterly direction, to the rear of the deblocking Manstein-Gotha grouping. That is, the scale of the operation was significantly reduced.

On December 13, the Headquarters, in a directive addressed to N. N. Voronov, N. F. Vatutin and F. I. Golikov, noted that Operation Saturn was conceived under a favorable military situation, which has now changed. The main blow was directed not to the south, but to the southeast, in order to “take the Bokovo-Morozov group of the enemy in pincers, walk along its rear and liquidate it.” The 1st and 3rd Guards Armies of the Southwestern Front were to encircle and destroy the troops of the 8th Italian Army and the Hollidt task force, and then advance on Morozovsk. At the same time, the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front was tasked with attacking from the area west of Upper Mamon in the general direction of Kantemirovka to ensure the offensive of the shock group of the Southwestern Front. The 5th Panzer Army was instructed, in cooperation with the 5th Shock Army of the Stalingrad Front, to defeat the enemy in the areas of Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin in order to reliably isolate the encircled Stalingrad Wehrmacht group. The revised plan of the operation was named "Little Saturn".

Side forces

The 6th Army of the Voronezh Front and part of the Southwestern Front - the 1st and 3rd Guards Armies, the 5th Tank Army, the 2nd and 17th Air Armies were involved in the operation. The Red Army involved 36 divisions numbering more than 425 thousand people, more than 5 thousand guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars and anti-aircraft guns), over 1 thousand tanks, more than 400 aircraft.

Our troops in the area from Novaya Kalitva to Nizhne-Chirskaya (430 km) were opposed by the main forces of the 8th Italian Army, the Hollidt task force and the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army - a total of about 27 divisions, including four tank divisions. The enemy troops numbered 459 thousand people, more than 6 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and about 500 aircraft. The defense of the Germans, Italians and Romanians consisted of two lanes with a total depth of about 25 kilometers, very well equipped and prepared in engineering terms.

Thus, the Soviet troops, in comparison with the enemy, had somewhat fewer people, artillery, were inferior in aviation, but had a serious superiority in the number of tanks. However, in the directions of the main attacks of the Soviet troops, an overwhelming superiority over the enemy was created. In addition, the Italian and Romanian troops had less combat stability than the German ones. They were less motivated, armed and supplied.

German tanks on a railway platform and other property seized at the Kantemirovka station (on the Rossosh - Millerovo section) of the Voronezh region. Ahead Pz.Kpfw.38(t) (Czech tank LT vz.38), followed by damaged Pz.Kpfw. IV early modifications

Breakthrough of enemy defense

The offensive began on 16 December. At 8 o'clock, heavy artillery fire fell upon the enemy. However, the one and a half hour artillery preparation took place in dense fog, the shooting was carried out at the squares. And aviation could not immediately take part in the destruction of enemy defenses, aircraft could not take to the air until the middle of the day. As a result, the enemy fire system was not completely destroyed during the preparatory phase. At 9 o'clock. 30 minutes. our troops went on the attack.

The troops of the 6th Army of Kharitonov and the 1st Guards Army of Kuznetsov crossed the Don on ice and induced crossings, and also advanced from the Osetrovsky bridgehead. The Red Army reached the enemy positions on a wide front. During a three-hour fierce battle, the arrows of the 6th Army broke into Novaya Kalitva and Derezovka, wedged to a depth of 2-3 km into the enemy defenses. Rifle formations of the 1st Guards Army by the middle of the day advanced on its flanks by 1.5-2 km. Without waiting for the infantry to create a gap in the enemy's defensive formations for mobile formations to enter the operational space, and in order to speed up the breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone, the front commanders brought three tank corps into battle: 25th, 18th and 17th. However, this was done without preliminary engineering reconnaissance, and the tanks immediately ran into minefields, suffered losses and were forced to suspend attacks until passages were made in minefields.

In the afternoon, the fog cleared, and Soviet aviation began to strike at enemy battle formations and airfields. German aviation actively resisted. Numerous battles arose in the air between Soviet and enemy aircraft. The enemy command tried to disrupt the Soviet offensive, trying to push the Soviet divisions back to their original position, throwing operational reserves into counterattacks. As a result, by the end of the first day, the successes were small, the Soviet troops advanced 4-5 km in the offensive zone of the 6th Army, and only 2-3 km in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Guards Army. The 3rd Guards Army did not achieve success at all that day.

The pilot of the Italian fighter Macchi MC.202 "Folgore" from the 356th Squadron (356 Squadriglia) in the steppe on the Eastern Front. Winter 1942

On December 17, the rifle troops of the 6th and 1st Guards armies continued to attack the enemy. The enemy sought to disrupt the advance of our troops with artillery fire, counterattacks, bombing and assault strikes by aircraft. However, the rifle divisions now established good cooperation with aircraft and tanks, which ensured the continuation of the initial success. By the end of the day, the troops of the 6th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Novaya Kalitva and Derezovka sectors and, destroying the remaining pockets of enemy resistance, launched a further offensive. Introduced into the gap, the 17th Panzer Corps fought its way towards Kantemirovka.

Troops of the 1st Guards Army, advancing from the region of Lower Mamon, Upper Mamon, Lower Gnilusha, during the battles of December 16 - 18, broke through the defenses of the 3rd Italian Infantry Division and the 298th Infantry Division of the Germans, deploying an offensive in the southern and southeastern directions. In the offensive zone of this army, the 18th, 24th and 25th tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough. The troops of the 3rd Guards Army of General Lelyushenko, advancing from the line east of Kruzhilin - Bokovskaya, also broke through the enemy defenses. On December 18, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the 14th Rifle Corps of this army, captured the settlements of Astakhov, Konkov, Bokovskaya and Stary Zemtsov. On the left wing of the Southwestern Front, General Romanenko's 5th Tank Army crossed the river with the forces of the 321st Rifle Division and the 5th Mechanized Corps. Chir and captured a bridgehead with a length of 15 km along the front and up to 5 km in depth.

Thus, in the course of three days of stubborn fighting, the troops of the South-Western and left wing of the Voronezh Fronts broke through the enemy’s strong defenses in several directions, with battles they crossed the Don and Bogucharka rivers. The main blow was delivered in the offensive zone of the 1st Guards and 6th armies. Here, the breakthrough of the enemy defense was expanded by 60 km along the front, and the advancing troops advanced up to 40 km in depth, reaching the southern bank of the river. Bogucharka. The 3rd Guards Army broke through the enemy defenses 20 km along the front and advanced up to 15 km in depth. The actions of the ground troops of the fronts were actively supported by our aviation - the 2nd and 17th air armies of generals K. N. Smirnov and S. A. Krasovsky.

Soviet troops defeated the 3rd and 9th Italian, 294th and 298th German infantry divisions, inflicted significant damage on the 52nd Italian infantry division. The defense of the 8th Italian army collapsed, all reserves were used on the very first day, command and control was lost and a non-stop retreat began.

A dog sits in the snow against the backdrop of a column of Italian troops retreating from Stalingrad

The frozen bodies of Italian soldiers near the broken column of FIAT SPA TL37 artillery tractors on the road near Stalingrad. In the background (far right) is an Italian truck Fiat 666 NM

To be continued...

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And then the beloved commander will say:

- Friend! Aiming at a fascist, remember Tanya.

Let your bullet fly without a miss and avenge it.

Going on the attack, remember Tanya and don't look back...

Petr Lidov.

"Tanya" (the first essay about Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya).

ChapterVI. Strike from the "Osetrovsky bridgehead". Operation "Little Saturn"

Operation "Small Saturn" is an offensive operation of the troops of the South-Western and left wing of the Voronezh Front, carried out on December 16-30 during the development of the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad. As a result of the Middle Don operation, Soviet troops, breaking through the enemy front up to 340 km wide, defeated 5 Italian, 5 Romanian and 1 Nazi divisions, 3 Italian brigades, defeated 4 infantry and 2 tank Nazi divisions, captured about 60 thousand prisoners , over 1900 guns, 176 tanks, about 370 aircraft advanced 150-200 km and went to the rear of the Don army group. The enemy was forced to abandon further attempts to unblock the group surrounded by Stalingrad.

The offensive of the Soviet troops in the region of the Middle Don was the second stage in the encirclement and defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad. At the same time, the successful offensive of the Soviet troops on the Middle Don was the first stage in the liberation of the right-bank (its southeastern regions) part of the Voronezh region from the Nazi invaders. Boguchar, Kantemirovka, Novaya Kalitva and other settlements were liberated from the enemy.

The book “Crusade against Russia” tells: “In the first decade of December 1942, the Italian army occupied positions between the 2nd Hungarian and 3rd Romanian armies, placing their divisions in one line along the Don. The left flank, adjacent to the Hungarian army, was the Alpine corps (divisions "Tridentina", "Julia", "Kuneenze"), which remained outside the zone of the December offensive of the Red Army.

Further, downstream of the Don, there were two divisions of the 2nd Army Corps "Cosseria" and "Ravenna", between which the 318th German Infantry Regiment occupied positions. Then followed the 35th Army Corps (its positions began at the mouth of the Boguchar River), which consisted of the 298th German division and the Italian Pasubio division. On the right flank of the Italian army was the 29th Corps, which had a German headquarters, but included three Italian divisions: "Torino", "Cheler" and "Sforzescu", the sector of which ended at the village of Veshenskaya.

On the morning of December 16, 1942, a thick fog hung over the Don. General N.F. Vatutin at 8 o'clock in the morning gave the order to start artillery preparation. Shooting was carried out on the square. As a result, the enemy's firepower turned out to be unsuppressed. In each of the seven rifle divisions in the breakthrough sectors, their own combat situation, their own battle conditions and the success of the defense breakthrough were created.

In the first two days, the 563rd regiment of the 153rd Guards Rifle Division (commanded by Colonel-General A.P. Karnov) crossed the Don River and occupied the village of Abrosimovo. Further developing the offensive on the village of Medovo, without entering the village of Monastyrshchina, he turned south and occupied the Sukhoi Log farm, and then moved to Meshkovo, where other regiments of the 153rd division were supposed to advance from the villages of Kazanskaya and Baska. As retired Major General F.T. Bolotov, the former assistant chief of the operational headquarters of this division, on the night of December 16, the scouts infiltrated behind enemy lines, cut the communication wires to the headquarters and set up ambushes, thereby ensuring success. The division was also given the task of ensuring the crossing of the Don River by the 15th Panzer Corps in this sector. Sapper units on the ice of the Don River were washing up a crossing for this corps. However, the corps did not begin to cross here, but went to the village of Podkolodnovka. Then, through the liberated territory, to the Novaya Markovka area at the disposal of the Voronezh Front for the subsequent support of the offensive of our troops in the Rossosh-Ostrogozhsk operation on January 19.

On October 11, 1942, the 38th Guards Rifle Division (commander A.A. Onufriev), after fierce fighting near Stalingrad, was withdrawn to the Saratov region for replenishment and until November 22 conducted tactical exercises close to combat. On the night of November 22, after being staffed and armed, the division was given the task of redeploying to the area of ​​the village of Zamostye, Petropavlovsk district, Voronezh region. On December 7, the regiments of the division became part of the 1st Guards Army in the area from the village of Podkolodnovka to the Novy Liman farm.

Having reached their starting positions, the division command prepared a unit of submachine gunners and on the night of December 11 made an attempt to infiltrate the Italians' trenches. On a gentle slope in the area of ​​​​Ryzhkina beam, they managed to catch the enemy by surprise. With a sudden blow, the Italians were knocked out of the trench. Taking advantage of the success, the battalion advanced inland, pursuing the retreating enemy. Other units also entered this breakthrough and with a fight occupied the height where the second line of trenches was located. The road from the village of Krasnogorovka to the farm Ogolev also passed here. Leaving some of the soldiers on high, the battalion decided to capture the Ogolev farm, bypassing it from the rear. The maneuver was a success, the Italians abandoned the trenches and fled. 33 soldiers were captured. Thus, on the right bank of the Don, a bridgehead was captured, to which other divisions of the division moved. Until the beginning of the general offensive, the bridgehead was held, despite the attempts of the Italians to return the farm. From this bridgehead, the 113th and 115th regiments of the division moved forward, and the 110th guards regiment of this division took up a position on the other side of the river against the village of Krasnogorovka.

The village was located on the high bank of the river. It was very difficult to take him. Therefore, from the beginning of the offensive on December 16, the fighters suffered losses and could not take the settlement. At the same time, the battalions located higher along the bank in the floodplain of the river found a way out. On a gently sloping section of the coast, with a friendly attack, the fighters knocked the enemy out of the trenches and, pursuing the Italians, went to the village from the flank. The enemy was forced to leave the village, but lingered on the high-rises. On December 16 and 17, the guards stubbornly attacked the enemy and put him to flight. On December 18, the village was completely liberated.

Pursuing the enemy, the division fought and liberated the villages: Dubrava, Malevannoye, Medovo, Karazeevo and the Khlebny farm. Then, through Verkhnyaki, Zhuravka, they reached Arbuzovka, where, together with other divisions, they surrounded and destroyed the 18,000th group of Italians. On December 17, the rifle divisions of the 6th and 1st Guards armies continued to launch the offensive. The troops of the 1st Guards Army, operating from the area of ​​Lower Mamon, Upper Mamon, Lower Gnilusha, during the battles of December 16-18, broke through the defenses of the 3rd Italian Infantry Division and the 298th Infantry Division of the Germans, deploying an offensive in the southern and southeastern directions.

In the offensive zone of this armyin the middle of the day to accelerate the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemywere introducedinto battle18th, 17th, 24th and 25th tank corps. However, this was done without preliminary engineering reconnaissance, and the tanks immediately ran into minefields, suffered losses and were forced to suspend attacks until passages were made in minefields.

The 58th Guards Rifle Division (commanded by Major General A.I. Semenov), which occupied the left bank of the Don River from Nizhny Mamon to Podkolodnovka, was located along steep slopes in dugouts and trenches, mainly opposite the lands of the Quiet Don, the Olkhov farm and the village of Grushovoe . The most advantageous position for the concentration of troops was the floodplain of the Don River, where the river left the farm Quiet Don to the village of Zhuravka, forming a meadow.

Early in the morning, December 16, under the cover of artillery preparation, the fighters of the division crossed the river. In the meadow, almost right up, we approached the steep bank of the floodplain and rushed to the attack. But the trenches could not be taken. The units lay down, suffered losses, but the attacks did not stop. Where crawling, where throwing, using the folds of the terrain, the fighters stubbornly moved forward and forced the Italians to leave their positions. By nightfall, the farm was completely liberated. On the morning of December 17, the offensive resumed. During the day, without stopping attacks, the fighters forced the Italians to retreat, and by evening, the units entered the village of Filonovo with a fight. Reinforcements arrived during the night. The fighters, having rested a little, again moved into battle. In an extract from the act of the atrocities of the Italian fascists in the village of Bely Kolodets, Bogucharsky district, Voronezh region, it was reported: “After the battle on December 15, a group of wounded Red Army soldiers in the amount of 12 people was captured. They were thrown behind a barbed wire fence in the open air directly onto the snow. The Italians took off the boots from the soldiers and left them completely without shoes in severe frost, did not give the prisoners any food, beat them, and in order to further abuse the wounded soldiers, occasionally they threw them to gnaw bones.

On December 17, in the afternoon, the Italians led the prisoners out from behind the fence and began to beat them severely with sticks and rifle butts. The Nazis beat unarmed wounded Red Army soldiers with rifle butts and sticks on their bloodied body, legs, arms and face. Then the tortured, severely beaten Red Army soldiers were taken to be shot.

The Italians, sensing the approach of the Red Army units to the village, were in a hurry to deal with the captured Red Army soldiers as quickly as possible. At 6 pm on December 17, "the Red Army soldiers were shot at point-blank range from a machine gun and rifles, and those who still showed signs of life were finished off by the Nazis with rifle butts."

Ivan Kitaev, a soldier of the 408th regiment, recalled: “With great difficulty, we occupied the village of Filonovo, where houses were burned, men and women climbed out of the cellars, wept with joy and thanked us from the bottom of their hearts for liberation. After an hour of rest, we went through deep snow in severe frost to free Boguchar. Our 408th regiment advanced in battle formation. You look to the right and to the left - the Germans are retreating through deep snow, and our Red Army soldiers are advancing. This went on until 11 am. Suddenly, gun shells flew from Boguchar, the Germans stopped. But the firing of our guns was not successful. Only by two o'clock in the morning eight "Katyushas" were brought. A young, cheerful lieutenant chose a platform with his flashlight, placed them exactly with a gap between them of 50 meters ... After 30 minutes there was such a blow that the Red Army soldier Astashin and a couple of our horses all sat on their stomachs ... our regiment entered the city in the morning, where there were many killed Germans. There were many broken houses and shops in the city.

“The resistance of the enemy was broken on December 17th. On this day, the Ravenna division began to rapidly roll back, opening the flanks and rear of the neighboring 298th German division. Rifle units of the 1st Guards Army moved forward, surrounding and bypassing the retreating Italian and German units. They met serious resistance from the 298th German division in the city of Boguchar. However, on the night of December 19, this division also began to withdraw. As a result of three days of fighting, the enemy defenses were broken through in the entire Bogucharsky direction. Rifle units advanced up to 35 km in the first three days of the offensive.

The active participation of the 2nd Corps of the Italian Army in operations on the Soviet-German front was over.

On the morning of December 18, and during the day, with short skirmishes, the fighters moved forward. And in the evening we came close to the village of Pereshchepnoye. Neither heavy fire nor the loss of soldiers could stop the attackers. Moving from house to house, the fighters forced the Italians to flee from the village towards Boguchar with fire, bayonet and butt.

At dawn, across the virgin lands, along the ravines, along the road, the fighters rushed to the city on a wide front. Even from a distance, clouds of smoke were visible above the city. Italian resistance intensified. When the church became visible, a machine gun began to shoot from the bell tower. On December 19, at two in the afternoon, the attackers had already penetrated the city. And along the streets, from house to house, they moved towards the center. Grigory Ivanovich Makarenko, together with the calculation of the machine gun "Maxim", turned around near the building of the boarding school. During this period, German armored vehicles and infantry appeared on Dzerzhinsky Street. After a short time, another machine gun crew approached the gymnasium. The soldiers opened fire with two machine guns along the street, the Germans could not stand it and scattered towards Lysogorka. Throughout the city bursts of machine guns and shots from rifles were heard.

While the battle was going on, a group of fighters made their way to the building of the fire station and tied a red flag to the lightning rod of the tower. By evening, the battle in the city died down, and only from the direction of Poltavka, Popovka and Vervekovka shots were heard. At night, other units pulled into the city. On the morning of December 20, units of the division moved to the village of Dyachenkovo. Heavy machine-gun fire was fired from the village. The attackers suffered heavy losses. Attack after attack - and the enemy could not stand it, he fled. The division's path lay further through Zholobok, Medovo and Melovaya to Millerovo.

The 44th Guards Division (commander Major General Kupriyanov D.A.) on the night of November 15, 1942, after stubborn fighting, was withdrawn for replenishment. Immersed in a train train at the Pogorelovo Gorodishche station, it was transported to the city of Kirsanov, Tambov Region, and by the beginning of November it was ready to carry out combat missions. On November 21, having plunged into the echelon, the division moved to the front, and on November 24 arrived at the Uryupinsk station. After unloading, on foot, the division, through the city of Kalach and Nizhny Mamon, arrived at the front and settled on the "Sturgeon bridgehead". On December 3, the division was enrolled in the 1st Guards Army of the Southwestern Front. The division headquarters is located in the village of Osetrovka on the banks of the Don River.

On December 16, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the division went on the offensive from the village of Filonovo to the city of Boguchar. Overcoming enemy resistance, on December 16 and 17, the 133rd and 128th regiments liberate the village of Gadyuchye and reach the outskirts of the village of Filonovo. At this time, units of the 58th division came close to the village of Filonovo, advancing from the Quiet Don farm, but lingered, as they met stubborn resistance from the Italians. The guardsmen of the 133rd regiment continued their offensive and at two o'clock in the afternoon, on December 18, they captured the village of Vervekovka, which is located on the Bogucharka River, a kilometer from the village of Lysogorka, adjacent to the city of Boguchar. The 130th and 128th regiments arrived in time from the village of Filonovo, covering the flank of the 58th division, and began to move along the village of Lysogorka to the city of Boguchar. Other units continued to advance south. On December 18, the villages were liberated: Popovka, Lofitskoye, Kupyanka, Poltavka. Soon our troops of the 44th Guards Division approached the outskirts of the villages of Dyadin and Radchenskoye.

The German command, trying to stop the advance of our troops, with the support of tanks, made their way to the city of Boguchar, and attacked units of the 44th division. After a fierce battle, the enemy was defeated. Using the success of the 18th Panzer Corps, which broke through in this direction, the division pursued the retreating enemy and moved to Alekseev-Lozovka and Millerovo. On December 22, together with other divisions, she participated in the encirclement and destruction of the 18,000th enemy grouping in the Arbuzovka-Zhuravka area. The Italian officer D. Tolli, a participant in the events of 1942, wrote in the book “With the Italian Army in Russia”: “On December 16, Soviet troops overturned the front of the Italian army, on December 17, the entire front collapsed, and on December 18, south of Boguchar, the ring of forces operating from the west and east closed. ... Artillery and vehicles were abandoned. Many officers tore off their insignia, the soldiers threw machine guns, rifles, equipment.

The 41st Guards Rifle Division (commander Colonel Ivanov N.P.) advanced from the Osetrovsky bridgehead in cooperation with units of the 44th division at the same time. With the support of the 25th Panzer Corps, it fought through the villages of Tverdokhlebovo, Raskovka, Barsuki, Shurinovka, Lebedinka and through the Shiroky farmstead reached Chertkovo station. Its units also participated in the encirclement and destruction of a group of Italians in the village of Arbuzovka.

From September 16 to November 14, 1942, the 350th Guards Rifle Division (commander Major General A.P. Gritsenko) was under reinforcement in the Tambov region. Here she was replenished with personnel, received the missing weapons and military equipment. On November 14, 1942, an echelon with parts of the division was transferred to the Voronezh Front and took up defensive positions on the left bank of the Don River, in the Upper Mamon area. During the five months of occupation, on the steep bank of the Don, from the stone quarry to the village of Derezovka, the enemy created a heavily fortified defense. In some places, the slopes were watered and iced over.

The division was given the task of seizing a bridgehead on the right bank. On the night of December 12, scouts and sappers checked the thickness of the ice, and then on the morning of December 12, one of the battalions of this division crossed the Don River on ice and tried to capture high-rise trenches along chalk steeps. However, further advance was hindered by a machine gun that fired from a bunker. As the participant of this battle, I.M. Syrova, who lives in Raskovka, he and V.N. Prokatov climbed the mountain together and tried to destroy the firing point with machine guns and grenades. But all to no avail. V.N. Prokatov approached very close to the bunker, but since the grenades ran out, he sacrificed himself and rushed at the machine gun, closing the embrasure of the bunker with his body. The soldiers rushed forward, knocked the Italians out of the trenches and captured a small bridgehead. The Soviet government highly appreciated the courage and heroism of Vasily Nikolaevich Prokatov, awarding him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. A bust of the hero was installed at the site of the feat near the steep bank of the Don River.

During December 16 and 17, the division's infantry crossed to the right bank and, developing the offensive, through the outskirts of Derezovka, the Bely farm, Pisarevka, reached the outskirts of Kantemirovka and Zhuravka.

The 195th Guards Rifle Division (commanded by Colonel Karuna A.P.) liberated Derezovka and, overcoming the resistance of the Italians, defeated the stronghold in the village of Dubovikovo with the support of the 17th Tank Corps. Then, through Ivanovka, Dantsevka, Titarevka, she went to the Gartmashevka station, where she cut the railway, surrounded a large enemy group, and captured the station.

The 267th Guards Rifle Division (commander Colonel Gerasimov V.A.) captured Novaya Kalitva and, advancing successfully, on December 20 approached the Kantemirovka station, which was captured on December 19 by the 17th Tank Corps.

To accelerate the breakthrough of the tactical defense of the 8th Italian army, the 17th, 18th, 24th and 25th tank corps of the 5th tank army, which were redeployed from the Bryansk Front, were introduced into the battle. The 17th Panzer Corps was located in the Upper Gnilusha area. The 25th moved to the "Osetrovsky bridgehead", the 18th - to the Lower Mamon area, and the 24th was located not far from the "Osetrovsky bridgehead" on the left bank.

After three months of fighting near Voronezh, the 17th Tank Corps (commander Major General P.P. Poluboyarov) was withdrawn on October 6, 1942 for replenishment and rearmament in the area of ​​​​the Tatishchevo station in the Saratov region, where it was until December 15. As a result of a month and a half of combat training, the corps was well prepared and capable of solving complex combat missions. On November 18, an order was received to regroup the corps to the front line.

From November 19, for five days, the corps was transported by rail to the Talovaya station in the Voronezh region, and from there moved under its own power to the village of Verkhnyaya Gnilusha. To ensure the timely advance of the corps to the line, army engineering units built two pontoon bridges with a carrying capacity of 60 tons each on the Don River. On December 16, at night, the 67th and 174th tank brigades crossed these bridges to the Osetrovsky bridgehead. With the commander of the 267th Infantry Division, Colonel V.A. Gerasimov agreed on the procedure for the passage of tank columns and further interactions in the performance of the task of capturing the Kantemirovka station.

On the morning of December 16, the offensive of the 15th Rifle Corps began. Within three hours of the battle, units of the 6th and 1st armies broke through the enemy defenses and deepened one and a half to two kilometers. Following the rifle units, tank corps also moved. But without preliminary engineering reconnaissance, the tanks stumbled upon minefields, suffered losses and were forced to stop.

On December 17, rifle troops continued to develop the offensive. Army sappers discovered minefields, made passages and the tanks went forward. Bypassing the liberated Derezovka, the 67th and 174th tank brigades of the corps, together with the soldiers of the 195th Guards Rifle Division, met stubborn resistance from the Italians near the village of Dubovikovo. However, by attacking from the flanks and the front, the soldiers, with the active support of the tankers, broke into the village and destroyed three tanks, six anti-tank guns, and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. By the end of December 18, the corps completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone of the enemy and moved forward in two columns to the Kantemirovka station. The 67th tank and 31st motorized rifle brigades advanced through the village of Tali, and the 174th and 67th tank brigades through Pisarevka.

After fierce skirmishes with the enemy, on December 19, tankers broke into the Kantemirovka station and captured it. Due to the fact that the infantry lagged behind, the command of the corps was forced to organize all-round defense and repel enemy attacks until the approach of the 267th and 350th rifle divisions. Having handed over the station to the 267th Rifle Division, the corps left through Ukraine to the city of Millerovo, where a large group of Germans and Italians was surrounded.

The 18th tank corps (commander Major General Bakharov B.S.), after breaking through the enemy defenses from the Osetrovsky bridgehead, supporting the offensive of the 44th rifle division, passed through Gadyuchye and Vervekovka. Having defeated the enemy in the Vervekovka area, he crossed the river. Bogucharka. Further, the corps moved to Popovka and Dyadin, where it helped the division to repel the counterattack of the Germans, who were trying to break through to Boguchar, and went through the steppe through Medovo, Karazeevo, which had already been liberated by battalions of the 38th Guards Rifle Division. The population joyfully greeted the column of tanks. The driver of one of the tanks threw out a triangle of letters through the hatch to his parents, who lived in this village, where he was born and lived before the war himself. In a letter, he said briefly that he was alive and went to beat the Germans. It was Ivan Yakovlevich Toloknov. From the village of Karazeevo, the path of the tankers lay to the village of Meshkovskaya.

On December 19, the corps occupied Art. Meshkovskaya, you rushing 35-40 km ahead of the advancing rifle formations of the 1st Guards Army. As a result of these bold actions, the corps, having entered the Meshkovskaya area, cut off the escape route from the Don of the main forces of the 8th Italian Army. With the approach of rifle divisions on December 21, the 18th Panzer Corps continued to develop the offensive and the next day captured Ilyichevka, Verkhne-Chirsky, and then turned south-west and began to move towards the Millerovo area to finish off the encircled grouping of Germans and Italians.

On December 17, the 25th Tank Corps (commander Major General Pavlov P.P.) left Nizhny Mamon for the Osetrovsky bridgehead and, together with units of the 41st Guards Rifle Division, moved through Tverdokhlebovka, Raskovka, Barsuki, Shurinovka, Lebedinka , farm Shirokiy to Kashara and Morozovsk, through the rear of the enemy.

A special task was assigned to the 24th Tank Corps (commander Lieutenant-General V.M. Badanov), which was to fight from the "Osetrovsky bridgehead" through the rear of all the groupings of German troops involved in the large bend of the Don, to capture the Tatsinskaya station, where he was an airfield that supplied the group of German troops surrounded in Stalingrad with weapons, ammunition and food.

Parts of the 24th Panzer Corps began to cross the Don at 11:30 on 17 December. Coming across the bridges to the "Osetrovsky bridgehead", the corps moved south following the 18th and 25th tank corps that had gone forward. Approaching s. Vervekovka, the tankers stopped to think about where it would be better to cross the river Bogucharka. According to eyewitnesses of that time, after the advance of the 18th tank corps, on December 18 in the morning, a column of tanks approached the village from the side of the Gadyuchye farm. A young tanker, apparently the commander of the column, climbed out of the front tank, sat on the armor, unfolded the map and, turning to the residents, said: “Well, where can I get to Tatsinskaya?” They explained to him that Tatsinskaya was still 300 km away and that the river could only be crossed in the village of Dantsevka, where it was shallower. And the tankers moved through the village of Tverdokhlebovo, where other tank brigades were concentrated. On the morning of December 19, tank engines were started up again, and the population escorted the tankers on their way.

Having crossed the river, the tankers moved through the village. Shurinovka, s. Lebedinka, Khutor Shirokiy on Alekseevo - Lozovka and further south to Tatsinskaya. On the way, the tankers supported the advancing troops, successfully captured the station, destroyed about 300 aircraft at the airfield, but then found themselves surrounded. Gathering their strength, the tankers broke through the ring and left the encirclement.

In his book "Recollection and Reflections" G.K. Zhukov wrote: “Having entered the gap northwest of Boguchar on December 17 at 18:30, the 24th Panzer Corps fought about 300 kilometers, destroying 6,700 enemy soldiers and officers on the way to the Tatsinskaya station and capturing a huge amount of military property.” The battle for the city of Boguchar was hot. In a letter from the front, Ivan Tolochko, a front-line friend of Corporal Efim Yakubovich, who died in battle in December 1942, described: “Hello, dear relatives ... A letter to you from a front-line friend of your son and brother Tolochko Ivan Pavlovich. I would like to describe some of the details of my friend's death, express my condolences and console you... Your son died a heroic death in the battles for our native land at the end of 1942. In that heavy battle for the city of Boguchar, we were together at the same mortar. We went forward, the Nazis fiercely resisted. The enemy bullet hit a comrade in the chest. I dragged him from half a kilometer on my shoulders to the ravine, where enemy bullets did not fly ... Bandaged him, Efim was silent, said only once: “Leave me, you will die, after all ...” Feeling the imminent death, he asked me to write to his relatives .. And he died in my arms.”

Along with the advancing troops, there were also war correspondents, among them were: Alexei Surkov, correspondent of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, author of the song “In the dugout”, familiar to all Russians, and Petr Lidov, correspondent of the Pravda newspaper, author of the essay “Tanya” about Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. In his diary, P. Lidov wrote “ December 25th. Sunny day. Frost up to 30 degrees. Together with Alexei Surkov, he left for Boguchar. Correspondence about the battles for Millerovo on nine pages was transmitted with difficulty due to the load of the telegraph. Moscow received her only at midnight ... ". A. Surkov wrote in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on December 27, 1942: “How pitiful is the appearance of these arrogant pretenders to dominance over the whole world! Where did their self-confident arrogance, their upturned nose go? They trudge along like naughty mangy dogs, shivering chillily, burying their heads in their shoulders. They are pathetic, but not compassion, but only disgusting contempt, these degenerates, who make the last march to the east under escort, evoke in us. Look into the face of that collective farm woman who is frozen in a daze over the dying firebrands of her hut. Burning hatred seeps from her eyes. Probably, the same martyr ripped open the belly of a fascist officer in Pereshchepnoye with a pitchfork: And now he is lying on the street with a pitchfork in his stomach, his pewter eyes goggling.

“Aviation support for the Little Saturn operation was entrusted to the 17th and 2nd VA. They were opposed by the VIII, the best air corps of the Luftwaffe Air Force 8 - the Italian army. The 2nd VA supported the breakthrough and the offensive of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front on Kantemirovka. FROM December 21, 1942 to January 15, 1943 villages kupyanka in 3 km from Boguchar on the airfield, where the Italian air corps aircraft were previously based, housed 814 fighter aviation regiment, which the participated in Operation Little Saturn. In December 1943, directly above the field airfield in the village of Kupyanka, where all 3 regiments of the division were stationed, Senior Lieutenant E.P. Savelyev shot down a Messer in front of everyone.

Hero of the Soviet Union Yevgeny Petrovich Savelyev recalled: “At this airfield (the airfield near the village of Kupyanka), we first experienced the joy of the first victories and the bitterness of the loss of our comrades-in-arms (Dmitry Gotalsky) in fierce battles with a fierce enemy.”

On the afternoon of December 28, 1942, thirteen Yak-1s of the 814th Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) (207th Fighter Aviation Division (IAD), 17th VA) took off to cover the Millerovo area.

In the area of ​​​​the village of Malchevskaya, Millerovsky district, they fought an air battle with a large group of German fighters and bombers. Junior Lieutenant Nikolai Putko, together with senior sergeant Ivan Guz, shot down one Ju-88 bomber, and senior sergeant Alexei Penyaz shot down a Bf-109 fighter. In the area of ​​​​the village of Malchevskaya, in a protracted battle, the flight commander, Lieutenant Dmitry Gotalsky, attacked three Bf-109s. The pilot did not lose his head, boldly accepted the battle and literally in a matter of minutes, one after the other, destroyed two enemy fighters. When attacking the third Messerschmitt, a pair of German Bf-109s attacked him from above, which knocked him out. Bleeding, Dmitry managed to land the plane in the field, but the Germans finished him off already on the ground. The front retreated from Boguchar, the troops advanced towards Stalingrad.

The Soviet Information Bureau of December 19, 1942 reported: “... more than 200 settlements were occupied by our troops, including the cities of Novaya Kalitva, Kantemirovka, Boguchar ... During the offensive, our troops defeated nine German divisions and one infantry brigade of the enemy. The breakthrough was made by the forces of the Southwestern Front, commanded by Vatutin N.V. and the Voronezh Front, commanded by Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov.

During Operation Small Saturn, the 8th Italian Army, the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army and two Nazi infantry divisions were defeated. Our troops advanced 100-150 kilometers.

The famous poet, publicist A. Surkov wrote in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper of December 27, 1942: “The Bogucharians patiently waited and hoped. And now their hopes have come true. From the pogrom of the approaching cannonade, from the bustle of the hasty evacuation, they guessed that captivity was coming to an end. By the evening of December 18, shells whistled very close by. From the outskirts of Pereshchepnoye, on the heels of the fleeing Germans, the Red Army soldiers burst into the city. In the morning Boguchar woke up again with a Soviet city.

Many local boys and girls aged 17-18 voluntarily became fighters of the 1st Infantry Division. We will name only some girls and boys: Galina Bondareva, sisters Polina and Ekaterina Kravtsov, Raisa Petrenko, Matrena Often, Anna Veprikova, Lyubov Voronina, Claudia Golubkova, Maria Zelenanina, Anna Goncharova, Evdokia Zhilyakova, Maria Lapturova, Alexandra Bondareva, Mikhail Shepetkin, Ivan Babarin, Maxim Kudelin, Stepan Bakhalov, Andrey Khristichenko and many others. In the village of Starotolucheevo, 14 Komsomol and Komsomol members became volunteers.

Boguchar came to life and began to recover, on December 23, 1942, “the commissar of the partisan detachment Alexei Dubrovsky had already begun to fulfill his direct duties as chairman of the district council of workers' deputies. They come to him for instructions, they report to him about the traitors caught, about the warehouses found, about all sorts of things. Advice and help are expected from him. Dubrovsky listens attentively to everyone, gives advice, instructions, from time to time he enters something into his notebook. Point by point, the program of the Council's future priority work is growing. Take into account the inventory and property left in the collective farms after the departure of the occupiers. To develop a plan for food, housing and any other assistance to those who suffered from the German invasion ... Technicians are returning from the ruins of the city power plant blown up by the Germans. They report that although the building has collapsed, the engine and the most valuable parts of the fittings are not badly damaged, and after a small repair, the station can give current. Alexei Grigorievich rubs his hands merrily. So Boguchar will soon be with the light. Okay, let's be patient. Now, even without electricity, the soul is light.

Subsequently, one and German colonels L. Steidle recalled: “I throw letters into the fire, but at the bottom of the suitcase I grope for two books, among them Hitler’s Mein Kampf and a small icon that I bought for two rubles in Boguchar. I already wanted to throw Mein Kampf into the fire, but what would that get me? Let the Russians see what is not in the suitcase of the German colonel.

Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Military-historical essays. - M .: Science, 1998. - Book two. Fracture. - 502 p.; Stalingrad battle. Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002. - Book. 2. - 573 p.; Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia / Ch. ed. MM. Kozlov. Editorial Board: Yu.Ya. Barabash, P.A. Zhilin (deputy chief editor), V.I. Kanatov (responsible secretary) and others - M .: Sov. Encyclopedia, 1985. - 832 p.

From Don to Prague. - M., 1977. - S. 12.

Ten years in combat. - Kirov, 1995. - S. 165.

Mass heroism. - Voronezh, 1996.

Prokatov Vasily Nikolaevich(1923-14.12.1942) - Hero of the Soviet Union. Born in 1923 in the village of Kuzovlevo, Kharovsky district, Vologda region, in a peasant family. Graduated from 9 classes. He worked on a collective farm. In the Soviet Army since July 1941. Since that time at the front. During the operation "Small Saturn" on the Middle Don, the commander of the department of the 1180th Infantry Regiment (350th Infantry Division. 6th Army Voronezh Front), Komsomol Sergeant Prokatov, at the head of a group of soldiers on December 14, 1942, crossed the river. Don in the area with. Derezovka (at that time Rossoshsky district). The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded on March 31, 1943 posthumously. Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Red Star. Poho

Big Saturn and Little Saturn

In addition to Operation Uranus, the Soviet General Staff developed another offensive operation, larger in scope and objectives. It was called "Saturn". CM. Shtemenko wrote: “According to the plan of the new front [Southwestern], it was necessary to advance from the bridgehead on the right bank of the Don in the Serafimovich region and break out to Tatsinskaya, which would allow intercepting the enemy’s railway and other routes from near Stalingrad to the west. Then the front was to advance through Kamensk to the Rostov region, where the withdrawal routes of the German fascist troops would cross not only from Stalingrad, but also from the Caucasus ... When finalizing the general plan of the counteroffensive of our troops, the idea of ​​​​attacking Rostov through Kamensk found expression in the plan of Headquarters, known under the code name "Saturn". The shock groupings of troops surrounding the enemy were reinforced by tank and mechanized corps.

The situation for the operation "Saturn" was very favorable. The concentration of the main forces of Army Group "B" near Stalingrad led to the fact that the Germans lost the opportunity to create a continuous line of defense against the Soviet troops. Moreover, the Soviet command became aware that as a result of the successful implementation of the Stalingrad offensive operation, a huge gap had formed in the Likhaya-Rostov sector, not filled by any German units. The enemy's lack of reserves in the immediate operational rear created additional advantages for the Soviet troops.

On November 23, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave A.M. Vasilevsky was ordered to begin preparations for Operation Saturn. It was to be carried out by the troops of the left wing of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts by striking in the direction of Millerovo - Rostov. It was assumed that the success of this operation could create conditions for the complete defeat of the entire southern enemy grouping on the Soviet-German front. At the same time, not only the Paulus army, but also the 1st and 4th tank, 11th German armies, 3rd and 4th Romanian, 2nd Hungarian and 8th Italian armies turned out to be in the boiler. In fact, it was about achieving a decisive victory over the armed forces of Germany and a radical change in the course of World War II. It was already planned to inflict a catastrophic defeat on Hitler during the winter campaign of 1942-1943.

To accomplish this most important task, the Headquarters concentrated significant forces on the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts. In addition to the 1st Guards, 5th Tank, 6th and 21st Armies, 4th and 26th Tank Corps already there, the South-Western Front additionally received 5 rifle divisions from the Stavka reserve, 18th, 24 th and 25th tank and 1st guards mechanized corps, 6 separate tank and 16 artillery and mortar regiments. The Voronezh Front was given 3 rifle divisions, one rifle brigade, the 17th tank corps, 7 artillery and mortar regiments. But that was not all. By decision of the Stavka on November 26, the 3rd Guards Army was created for the Southwestern Front under the command of Lieutenant General D.D. Lelyushenko. By December 9, it was planned to form and deploy between the 5th Tank Army and the 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front another, the 5th Shock Army, consisting of 5 rifle divisions, the 7th Tank and 4th Mechanized Corps. Lieutenant General M.M. was appointed to command the new army. Popov. In addition, the 2nd Guards Army was moving into the battle area from the Headquarters reserve. True, because of the latter, a dispute arose between the commanders of the fronts. This army was also desired by the commander of the Stalingrad Front, A.I. Eremenko, and the commander of the Don Front K.K. Rokossovsky.

However, the available forces were more than enough. The troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts were opposed only by the German task force "Gollidt", whose armored power was exhausted by the 7th and 11th tank divisions, as well as the 8th Italian army. As a combat-ready formation, it could not be taken into account at all. Further, up to Millerov, the enemy troops were absent. Yes, and the Fretter-Pico task force located in Millerovo had more than modest forces - the 30th Army Corps, the 3rd Mountain Rifle and the 304th Infantry Divisions. It did not represent a serious obstacle for the Soviet tank avalanche. The Germans could not put up anything to defend Rostov, except for scattered parts of the garrison. Thus, as Manstein accurately noted in his memoirs, the German High Command did everything to ensure that the Russian plan to eliminate the largest strike force of the German army succeeded.

However, at this crucial moment, the Soviet command began to make one mistake after another. First of all, according to A.M. Vasilevsky, the General Staff seriously miscalculated in assessing the number of German troops surrounded in Stalingrad. Prior to the offensive operation, it was believed that 85-90 thousand enemy soldiers and officers would be surrounded. But suddenly it turned out that the true figure is almost 350 thousand people. The “ghost of Demyansk” immediately appeared in the Headquarters, heavily pressing on the consciousness of both the Supreme Commander and his marshals. This pressure was intensified by the presence of the German army groups "Don" and "Gollidt" at a slight distance from the boiler. Moreover, the latter was only 40 kilometers from the encircled group.

On November 26, in a conversation with A.M. Vasilevsky, by direct wire, Stalin stated that "at the present time, the most important and main task is the quickest liquidation of the encircled group of Germans." This, they say, will free our troops occupied in it to carry out other tasks for the final defeat of the enemy on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. That is, on that day, for the first time at such a high level, an opinion was expressed about the need to postpone Operation Saturn indefinitely.

On November 29, the representative of the Headquarters on the Stalingrad front, G.K. Zhukov sent a telegram to Stalin. It contained proposals on the course of further military operations: “The German command, apparently, will try ... to assemble a strike group in the Nizhne-Chirskaya - Kotelnikovo region as soon as possible to break through the front of our troops in the general direction of Karpovka ... In order to prevent the connection of the Nizhne-Chirskaya - Kotelnikovo and Kotelnikovskaya enemy groupings from Stalingrad and the formation of a corridor, it is necessary:

As quickly as possible, push back the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Kotelnikovskaya groupings and create a dense battle formation along the Oblivskaya - Tormosin - Kotelnikovo line. In the Nizhne-Chirskaya - Kotelnikovo area, keep two groups of tanks as a reserve;

Break the encircled enemy group near Stalingrad into two parts. For what ... inflict a cleaving blow in the direction of Bol. Rossoshka. To meet him, strike in the direction of Dubininsky, height 135. In all other sectors, go on the defensive ... After splitting the encircled enemy group into two parts, you need to ... first of all, destroy the weaker group, and then hit the group in the Stalingrad area with all your might.

No. 02. 29.11.42 Zhukov.

Further G.K. Zhukov writes that A.M. agreed with his considerations. Vasilevsky and therefore decided to "temporarily abandon" the operation "Saturn". Instead of an attack on Rostov, the South-Western Front was redirected to strike at the flank of the enemy's Tormosino grouping. From that day on, the previous plan of the operation was divided in two: the operation "Big Saturn", which provided for the encirclement of the entire southern wing of the German troops, was postponed, it was replaced by the operation "Small Saturn", which turned the main forces of the Southwestern Front south, in the direction Morozovsk. Stalin, following his favorite principle "not to indulge in dizziness from success", approved the proposals of comrades Zhukov and Vasilevsky.

It is interesting that at the same time, for some reason, the Headquarters remained confident in the threat from the Lower Chir grouping of the enemy. Meanwhile, General Gollidt, only in a complete eclipse of reason, could decide to go on the offensive with his frail forces and thereby expose himself to the crushing blow of the many times superior troops of the Southwestern Front. He did nothing of the sort. On the contrary, in pursuance of the proposals of G.K. Zhukov, the 5th Panzer Army went on the offensive on Nizhne-Chirskaya. Since there was a well-prepared German defense here, then, as noted by A.M. Vasilevsky: “On the left flank of the Southwestern Front of the 5th Panzer Army, despite all efforts, it was not possible to dislodge the enemy from the bridgehead on the left bank of the Don, near Nizhne-Chirskaya, and also to eliminate his bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Chir. It kept bothering us." And this concern was not in vain, since the attacks of the Soviet troops did not prevent General Gollidt from preparing his 7th and 11th tank divisions to help Manstein.

Manstein himself considered the idea of ​​releasing the 6th Army a complete hopelessness. Indeed, according to Hitler's instructions, the meaning of this operation was to hold Stalingrad. Manstein, on the other hand, proposed a different plan: “Leaving the territory occupied during the summer campaign [which could not be held anyway], it would be possible to use a severe crisis for victory! To do this, it was necessary to withdraw the troops of Army Groups A and Don in an organized manner from the arc of the front protruding far to the east beyond the lower Dnieper.

At the same time, it would be necessary to concentrate in the Kharkov region all the forces at the disposal of the command, released as a result of the reduction of the front line. This grouping would receive the task of hitting the flank of enemy forces striving for crossings across the Dnieper. Thus, a transition would have been made from a retreat to a bypass operation, in which the German troops would have pursued the goal of pressing the enemy to the sea and destroying him there. "But," Manstein added, "it was not in Hitler's nature to accept a decision that required the abandonment of the gains of the summer campaign."

As for the idea of ​​dissecting the Paulus group, it had one significant flaw. As you know, powerful defensive belts were created around Stalingrad and in the city itself in the summer of 1942. The Germans broke off all their teeth, breaking through them for four months. Now Paulus used these fortifications to organize a solid defense inside the ring. And the Soviet troops attacked them. What came of this can be found in the memoirs of A.M. Vasilevsky: “Meeting the stubborn resistance of the encircled enemy, the Soviet troops were forced to suspend the advance ... Fulfilling the instructions of the Headquarters, in the first days of December we again tried to dismember and destroy the encircled group. However, this time too, no significant results were achieved. The enemy, relying on a network of well-prepared engineering defensive structures, fiercely resisted, responding with fierce counterattacks to our every attempt to advance.

In addition, in the best traditions of the Demyansk boiler, the Soviet command did not interfere with the Germans to establish an "air bridge". A.M. Vasilevsky recalled that "we underestimated the seriousness of this task, and its implementation was random, scattered."

The debate over Operation Saturn continued for another two weeks. By that time, the troops of the Stalingrad and Don fronts were finally bogged down in battles with the Paulus group. On December 12, Manstein launched an offensive from the Kotelnikovo area, causing a surge of gloomy mood in the Headquarters. Therefore, on December 14, the final decision was made: to change the direction of the main attack of the South-Western and left wing of the Voronezh fronts. Instead of Rostov, in the rear of the entire enemy grouping on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, now the task was to defeat only the 8th Italian Army and reach the rear of Manstein's troops. This was the "Little Saturn".

However, the task assigned to the Soviet troops according to the plan of operation "Little Saturn" failed to be completed. Having been defeated in an attempt to release the 6th Army, Manstein noticed a threat from the troops of the Southwestern Front and withdrew his grouping from a flank attack. Interestingly, A.M. Vasilevsky considered this a major victory for us: “As a result of the offensive of the Stalingrad Front, from December 24 to December 31, the 4th Romanian army was finally defeated, and the enemy’s 57th tank corps was thrown back 150 kilometers with heavy losses.” As for the strike of the Southwestern Front, its troops got stuck on the Tatsinskaya-Morozovsk line and did not reach Manstein. Two and a half months later, the 57th Tank Corps, along with other parts of Manstein, took an active part in the devastating battle for Kharkov for the Red Army. These were all the fruits of the "Little Saturn".

Why did the Soviet command refuse to conduct Operation Saturn and shelve the final defeat of Nazi Germany? A.M. Vasilevsky answers this question as follows: “The delay in the liquidation of Paulus’ troops was the main reason that changed the operational situation in the Stalingrad and Middle Don areas and influenced the further development of Operation Saturn. But such a delay was inevitable. In addition, Paulus was not going to leave anywhere. And the Soviet command knew about it. For example, G.K. Zhukov, in the telegram mentioned above to Stalin, reported: “The surrounded German troops now, under the current situation, without an auxiliary strike from the Nizhne-Chirskaya-Kotelnikovo region, will not risk a breakthrough and exit from the encirclement.” Gollidt did not plan any auxiliary strike. And with regard to Manstein, there was a reliable counterbalance - Operation Saturn. Here is the opinion of A.M. Vasilevsky: “Had the operation begun on December 10, it is quite possible to assume that the success achieved by the troops of the South-Western and left wing of the Voronezh fronts on December 16 would have excluded Manstein’s troops from going on the offensive on December 12 in the Kotelnikovsky direction.”

It must be said that Operation Saturn was so good that it could begin before December 10 and after December 16. Manstein is absolutely clear on this score: the main danger was not the loss of the 6th Army, but the fact that Army Group A could not quickly leave the Caucasus. A positional war was going on on the Transcaucasian front. This means that the Germans could not do without a stationary installation of weapons, that they had to accumulate ammunition and food, create various amenities for the troops, all the more necessary in the absence of reserves and the ability to change troops in positions. All of the above led to a loss of mobility and maneuverability, to a significant expenditure of time to prepare for withdrawal to new positions. Manstein recalled his conversation with the chief of staff of Army Group A, in which he called the start date for a possible retreat on January 2 and its completion only after 25 days. In addition, Hitler stubbornly rejected all proposals with the word "retreat", thereby playing into the hands of his opponent.

The rejection of Operation Saturn was the biggest mistake of the Soviet command in the entire war. Let's say more: an unforgivable mistake. How could this operation be carried out?

The ideal option was to simultaneously conduct operations "Uranus" and "Saturn". At the same time, the main thing was that absolute surprise was achieved. There were enough forces. The blow of the Stalingrad and Don fronts had the functions of an auxiliary, and the Voronezh and South-Western fronts - the main one. Actually, this was what the Headquarters and the General Staff assumed before they found out the real size of the Paulus group.

The main blow fell on the 8th Italian army, which, as you know, immediately ran. Then it only remained to develop the breakthrough with mobile tank-mechanized and cavalry groups specially created for this purpose. It was possible to secure the flank from a possible counterattack from the Gollidt group by rapidly reaching its flank and even the rear through the positions of the Italian troops. By the way, this is what happened on December 16th. Manstein recalled: “Due to the collapse of the Italian army and the flight of almost all the Romanian troops on the left flank of the Gollidt group, the enemy could advance in the direction of the Donets crossings at Belaya Kalitva, Kamensk and Voroshilovgrad, encountering almost no resistance. Only in the Millerovo area, like a lone island in the red surf, did the Fretter-Pico group, newly created on the right flank of Army Group B, offer resistance. But still, the enemy had the opportunity, at his own discretion, to turn east to strike at the rear of the Gollidt group or the Mita group, or continue to advance south, towards Rostov.

So, all the concerns expressed by G.K. Zhukov in a telegram dated November 29, Operation Saturn filmed. The breakthrough would have been so swift that Gollidt and Manstein did not even have time to think about the concentration of their forces, since they would already have Soviet troops in the rear. We add that in November there was no Fretter-Pico group and the path to Rostov remained free. The Germans, as they say, would not have had time to gasp, as Lelyushenko's tanks would already be in Rostov and slammed a trap unprecedented in military history.

Of course, the enemy would have made an attempt to break out of the ring. But what were his opportunities in this regard? First of all, all the fears of the Soviet command regarding the army of Paulus were groundless. General Paulus, firstly, did not have a corresponding order from Hitler. And secondly, the cessation of the supply of fuel turned the equipment of the 6th Army into a pile of dead metal. Paulus reported to the Fuhrer's Headquarters that for his tanks, of which about 100 more were ready for battle, there was fuel for no more than 30 kilometers. In order to ensure a breakthrough, it was necessary to transfer 4,000 tons of gasoline over the "air bridge". Of course, it was impossible. It was precisely this argument that Hitler invariably used in disputes with Manstein, who insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the 6th Army from Stalingrad: “What do you really want, because Paulus has only enough fuel for 20 or at best 30 kilometers; after all, he himself reports that at the present time he cannot make a breakthrough at all. Thus, the opinion of the command of Army Group "B", on the one hand, was opposed by the opinion of the High Command, which, as a prerequisite for a breakthrough, put forward the retention by the 6th Army of the remaining sectors of the front near Stalingrad, and, on the other hand, the opinion of the army command, which considered breakthrough impossible due to lack of fuel.

Communications passed through Rostov not only of the 6th Army, but also of the 4th Romanian and 4th Panzer Armies, of the entire Army Group A. Accordingly, not only Paulus was left without fuel. Meanwhile, the distance from the positions of Army Group A in the Caucasus to Rostov was at least 600 kilometers. The 4th Panzer Army, stationed south of Stalingrad, was separated from Rostov by 400 kilometers. The power reserve of the main German tank T-IV did not exceed 110 kilometers. So even without taking into account the opposition of the Soviet troops, all these German armies still would not have reached Rostov. They simply did not have sufficient fuel supplies to successfully break through. And no "air bridge" could save such a mass of troops.

But if there was a risk that the Germans would somehow reach Rostov, then it could have been prevented. Since there were almost no German troops at such a distance from the main theater of operations, the Red Army could move forward and seize the crossings across the Dnieper, which supplied the southern wing of the Wehrmacht. In this case, the breakthrough distance for the 4th Panzer Army was significantly lengthened and reached 700 kilometers, and for Army Group A - almost 900 kilometers. Obviously, the German troops were in a hopeless situation.

A.M. Vasilevsky claims that the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts in November 1942 were not ready for Operation Saturn. Then it should have begun, as he himself assumed, on December 10th. Or December 16, when it really began in the form of "Little Saturn". With such a course of action of the Red Army, the troops of Gollidt and Manstein would not have had time to slip out of the trap. The fact is that the distance from the positions of the 8th Italian army to Rostov was only 300 kilometers. Therefore, Soviet troops would advance with a lead of 100 kilometers. Thus, not only the capture of Rostov was achieved. In March 1943, the Germans would actually have nothing to carry out an offensive operation in the Kharkov region. Never in the history of our army would the shameful stain of another Kharkov defeat appear.

Finally, it is interesting to consider the potential for the collapse of the entire southern wing of the German Eastern Front. First of all, the loss of such a mass of troops could not be compensated for by anything. The Germans did not have such reserves. A gap almost 400 kilometers wide appeared in the front line. Again, there was nothing to close it. The Red Army, unlike the Wehrmacht, possessing significant reserves, could solve two problems: the defeat of Army Group Center by striking the flank and rear and the development of a deep breakthrough in Ukraine, the liberation of Kyiv, Donbass, Crimea without any special losses, access to the state border. In fact, it was about the complete defeat of Nazi Germany back in 1943. And the storming of Berlin would have taken place in the spring of forty-four.

Soviet history defines the Battle of Stalingrad as a turning point in the course of the war. In fact, it should be recognized that more than six months remained before the radical change. The loss of the troops of the Stalingrad group, of course, was a disaster, but not so severe as to really turn the tide of hostilities in favor of the Red Army and finally break the Wehrmacht both psychologically and militarily. After all, a little more than a month has passed since the surrender of Paulus, when the Soviet troops suffered a severe defeat in the battle for Kharkov and retreated under the onslaught of the enemy 150-200 kilometers to the east. All this, alas, does not speak in favor of the assertion of a radical change.

The real turning point came after the Battle of Kursk. Then the German army really suffered a final defeat and completely lost the initiative. But it could have happened much earlier. Manstein's words can serve as confirmation of this: "No matter how great the victory of the Soviet troops, they still failed to achieve a decisive victory - the destruction of the entire southern flank, which we could not compensate for in any way."

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In October 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began preparations for a decisive counterattack near Stalingrad. The planned offensive operation received a code name "Uranus". Preparations for the future offensive took place in the strictest secrecy.

By mid-November 1942, a significant weakening of the flanks of the elite units of Army Group B, drawn into street fighting, created a favorable situation for the start of our offensive. By that time, Soviet troops in the Stalingrad area numbered over 1.1 million people, about 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 15,000 guns and mortars, and 1,350 aircraft. While the enemy grouping of the German, Italian and Romanian armies had about a million soldiers and officers, 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,200 aircraft provided air support.

November 19, 1942 at 9:00 in the morning, after an hour and a half artillery attack, the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the offensive. Operation Uranus has begun. On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive.

Stalingrad offensive

You. Grossman

There is ice on the Volga. Ice floes rustle, collide, crumble, climb on top of each other. This dry whisper, reminiscent of the rustling of sand, is heard many fathoms from the shore. The river is almost completely covered with ice, only occasionally in a wide white ribbon floating among the dark snowless banks, spots of water are visible. White Volga ice carries tree trunks and logs. Here, on an icy hill, a large black raven sits, frowning. Yesterday a dead Red Navy sailor in a striped vest sailed here. The sailors from the cargo steamer removed it. The dead one froze to the ice… They pulled it off with difficulty. It was as if he did not want to leave the Volga, where he fought and died.
The Volga ships and barges look strange among the ice. The wind picks up the black smoke from the steamship pipes, spreads it over the river and tears it to shreds on the ice floes rising on end. The blunt, wide prows of the barges slowly crush the light ribbon under them; the dark water behind the stern is again covered with ice coming from Stalingrad. Never before had the Volga steamers operated at such a late hour. “This is our first polar navigation,” says the captain of the tugboat. It is not easy to work in the ice, the towing ropes often break, the sailors cut heavy ropes with hammers, balancing, they run across the unsteady oscillating ice floes. The captain with a long gray mustache, with a face dark red from the wind, shouts in a hoarse voice into a bullhorn. The steamer, groaning with tension, approaches the ice-covered barge. But this crossing works day and night - barges carry ammunition, tanks, bread, horses, and if the formidable crossing, the fire crossing, up there, near the city, provides the Stalingrad defense, then this lower crossing ensures the Stalingrad offensive.
For ninety days the Germans stormed the houses and streets, factories and gardens of Stalingrad. For ninety days our divisions repelled the unexpected onslaught of thousands of German guns, tanks, and aircraft. Hundreds of brutal attacks withstood the fighters of Rodimtsev, Gorokhov, Gurtiev, Saraev. With their will, their iron hearts, their great bloodshed, Stalingrad fought off the onslaught of the enemy. The ring around our defense was shrinking ever closer, the connection with the meadow shore became more and more difficult, the blows became more and more stubborn. August was a difficult month in the defense of the city. It was harder in September, the pressure of the Germans became even more furious in the days of October. It seemed that there were not enough human strength to withstand the fire that raged over the city. But the Red Army survived - maybe superhuman strength was needed for this. But in a terrible hour, these superhuman forces were found in our people. The line of the Volga defense was not passed by the enemy. Let our offensive be worthy of the defense of Stalingrad, let it be a living, formidable, fiery monument to those who fell defending the Volga, Stalingrad. When we were crossing the Volga, barges full of prisoners were towing past us. They stood in thin green overcoats, in high white caps, stamping their feet and rubbing their frozen hands. "So they saw the Volga." the sailors said. The prisoners looked sullenly at the water, at the rustling ice, and it was clear from their faces that their thoughts were gloomy, like black winter water. All roads to the Volga are full of prisoners - they can be seen from afar on the flat expanse of the dark, snowless steppe. There are columns of 200-300 people, there are small parties of 20-50 prisoners. Slowly, reflecting with its movement all the bends of the steppe country road, a column is moving, stretching for several kilometers. It has over 3,000 prisoners. This huge cart is escorted by several dozen fighters. A detachment of 200 people usually goes under the protection of two or three fighters. The prisoners march diligently, some detachments even keep their alignment, keep pace. Some prisoners speak Russian quite well. They shout: "There is no need for war, we need to go home, the end of Hitler." And the guards, grinning, say: “As soon as our tanks came out to their rear and cut all the roads, they immediately shouted - there is no need for war, but earlier, I suppose, they didn’t shout, they shot and flogged old people in the villages.” And the prisoners keep moving, moving, marching in crowds, rattling bowlers, pieces of wire, throwing colorful blankets over their shoulders.
N connection launched an offensive on a foggy morning. There was a slight frost. The silence, which seems especially perfect in the fog, at the appointed moment was replaced by the roar of cannons, the drawn-out and menacing rumble of the Guards mortar batteries. And as soon as the cannonade stopped, our tanks appeared out of the fog. Heavy vehicles rapidly climbed the steep slopes of the hills, the infantrymen sat on the tanks, ran after them. The fog hid the movement of cars and people, from the observation post only muddy flashes of gunfire were visible. The battalion of Lieutenant Babayev stormed the central height. The first to burst onto the crest of the height were Babaev's deputy lieutenant Matusovsky, lieutenant Makarov and Elkin, fighters Vlasov, Fomin and Dodokhin. Senior Sergeant Kondrashov burst into the enemy pillbox and began to beat the machine gunners with the butt of his rifle. The Germans raised their hands.
When the fog cleared, from the command post it was clear that the central height from the bottom to the very crest was swaying with the movement of gray Russian overcoats. One after another, heavy enemy guns fell silent, standing in the hollows and on the reverse slopes of the hills. And when the field telephones buzzed, when the messengers came running with reports from company and battalion commanders that our infantry had stormed the three dominant heights, tank and motorized regiments moved into the gap. We are following in the footsteps of advancing tanks. The corpses of dead enemies lie along the roads, abandoned guns, disguised by dry steppe grass, look to the east. Horses roam in the beams, dragging chopped-off buildings behind them, cars smashed by shells smoke with blue haze, helmets, grenades, and cartridges are lying on the roads.
The brown steppe land turned brick red with blood. The flow of prisoners does not dry out. They are searched before being sent to the rear. Funny and pitiful look piles of village women's things that are found in the bags and pockets of these thieves. There are old women's scarves, and earrings, and underwear, and skirts, and baby diapers, and colorful girl's sweaters. One soldier was found to have 22 pairs of woolen stockings, while another had four pairs of completely different women's galoshes. The further we go, the more abandoned cars, guns. Increasingly, there are trophy cars going to the rear. There are trucks, and elegant small cars, and armored transporters, and staff vehicles. We are entering Abganerovo. An old peasant woman tells us about the three-month stay of the invaders:
We've become empty. The hen won't crow, the rooster won't crow. Not a single cow left. No one to drive out in the morning, no one to meet in the evening. These robbers picked everything up clean. We have unlearned how to speak loudly, all in a whisper, and if you say anything with your voice, now they are driving their huts, and even hit them on the neck. All the old people, go, we have been flogged - he didn’t go to work, he didn’t hand over the grain. In Plodovitaya, where the headman was flogged four times, my crippled son was stolen, with him a girl and a boy. This is the fourth day of crying. There are none and no.
Abganerovo station is full of captured trophies. There are dozens of heavy cannons and hundreds of field guns. Their trunks turned to the torn sides, as if looking around in confusion, captured cars with division emblems stand in long lines. The station tracks are clogged with echelons captured by us. On prefabricated freight trains you can read the names of many cities and countries captured by the Nazis. There are French, Belgian, and Polish cars, but no matter what language the inscription is made in, each car is boldly imprinted with a black imperial eagle - a symbol of slavery and violence. There are trains loaded with flour, corn, mines, shells, wagons with ersatz boots, with technical equipment, with searchlights. Pity and poverty look sanitary teplovushki with hastily knocked together bunks covered with dirty rags. The fighters, groaning, take out paper bags of flour from the cars, put them on trucks.
In the evening we continue our journey. Troops march, black anti-tank rifles sway, cannons rush past, towed by small powerful cars. Tanks march with a heavy roar, cavalry regiments pass at a trot. A cold wind, carrying dust and dry snow groats, rushes over the steppe with a howl, hits in the face. The faces of the Red Army soldiers turned bronze-red from a bit of a cruel wind. It is not easy to fight in this weather, to spend long winter nights in the steppe under this icy all-penetrating wind, but people walk briskly, raising their heads, walking with a song.
This is the Stalingrad offensive.
The mood of the army is exceptionally good. Everyone - from generals to ordinary soldiers - lives with a sense of great responsibility, the great significance of what is happening. The spirit of severe, sober efficiency lies on all actions and deeds of commanders. The headquarters do not know rest, the concept of day and night has disappeared. Top commanders and chiefs of staff are working clearly, seriously and intensely. Low voices can be heard giving short orders. At the headquarters there is a taut efficiency. Success is great, success is undoubted, but everyone lives with one thought - the enemy is surrounded, he cannot be allowed to leave, he must be destroyed. All life, every breath of the people of the Stalingrad Front is devoted to this responsible and difficult task. There should not be a shadow of frivolity, premature reassurance. We believe that the Stalingrad offensive will be worthy of the great Stalingrad defense.
ABGANEROVO.
November 30th. (by telegraph)

February 2 - 66th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad. Day of military glory of Russia. Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht by the Red Army in Stalingradskaya battle .

The Battle of Stalingrad is a battle between the troops of the USSR, on the one hand, and the troops of Nazi Germany, Romania, Italy, Hungary during the Great Patriotic War. The battle was one of the most important events of World War II and, along with the Battle of Kursk, was a turning point in the course of hostilities, after which the German troops lost their strategic initiative.

The battle included an attempt by the Wehrmacht to capture the left bank of the Volga near Stalingrad (modern Volgograd) and the city itself, a confrontation in the city, and a counteroffensive by the Red Army (Operation Uranus), which resulted in the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht and other German allied forces inside and around the city were surrounded and partly destroyed, partly captured. According to rough estimates, the total losses of both sides in this battle exceed two million people. The Axis powers lost large numbers of men and weapons and subsequently failed to fully recover from the defeat.

The offensive of the German troops

The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad raised the international prestige of the Soviet Union to a high level. Turkey and Japan were waiting for the moment to attack, and after the defeat of the Nazis, they refused to oppose the USSR. For the Soviet Union, which also suffered heavy losses during the battle, the victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of the liberation of the country, as well as the occupied territories of Europe, leading to the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

The victory of the Soviet troops over the Nazi troops near Stalingrad is one of the most glorious pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War. For 200 days and nights - from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943 - the Battle of Stalingrad continued with the continuously increasing tension of the forces of both sides. During the first four months, stubborn defensive battles went on, first in the big bend of the Don, and then on the outskirts of Stalingrad and in the city itself. During this period, Soviet troops exhausted the German fascist grouping that was rushing to the Volga and forced it to go on the defensive. In the next two and a half months, the Red Army, going on the counteroffensive, defeated the enemy troops northwest and south of Stalingrad, surrounded and liquidated the 300,000-strong group of Nazi troops.

The Battle of Stalingrad is the decisive battle of the entire Second World War, in which the Soviet troops won the biggest victory. This battle marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II in general. The victorious offensive of the Nazi troops ended and their expulsion from the territory of the Soviet Union began.

The battle of Stalingrad in terms of the duration and fierceness of the fighting, in terms of the number of people and military equipment participating, surpassed at that time all the battles of world history. It unfolded over a vast territory of 100,000 square kilometers. At certain stages, more than 2 million people, up to 2 thousand tanks, more than 2 thousand aircraft, up to 26 thousand guns participated in it on both sides. According to the results, this battle also surpassed all previous ones. Near Stalingrad, Soviet troops defeated five armies: two German, two Romanian and one Italian. The fascist German troops lost more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers, as well as a large number of military equipment, weapons and equipment, killed, wounded, captured.

The battle for Stalingrad is usually divided into two inextricably linked periods: defensive (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and offensive (from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943). At the same time, due to the fact that the Battle of Stalingrad is a whole complex of defensive and offensive operations, its periods, in turn, must be considered in stages, each of which is either one completed or even several interrelated operations.

For courage and heroism shown in the Battle of Stalingrad, 32 formations and units were given the honorary titles "Stalingrad", 5 - "Don". 55 formations and units were awarded orders. 183 units, formations and associations were transformed into guards. More than one hundred and twenty soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, about 760 thousand participants in the battle were awarded the medal "For the Defense of Stalingrad." On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, the hero city of Volgograd was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

There is a non-bell ringing in Russia,

That memory bells beat in it,

Yes, the one that we call folk,

Called about the Battle of Stalingrad!

We will celebrate in February: the anniversary

Already sixty-five years have passed,

We celebrate victory with her now,

There's not much light left...

The last time we retreated in the summer,

And Kharkov was behind Khrushchev,

As it was in the forty-first, we handed over

Steppe spans of scorched earth.

An order has already come from the Commander-in-Chief,

And let there be cruelty in it,

What from a soldier, and to the headquarters of the top:

Not a step back; here's the thing.

And with the Volga we stood at Stalingrad,

We stood up tightly, they can't get through,

And the storms are all fire and a hail bullet,

They did not find their way beyond the Volga.

And the last reserves are thrown,

Dismantled on rails even BAM,

The Nazis did not think everything, probably

That the Russians gave them the main battle here.

And the forces were enough, and the environment

Fascist troops, and the ring is closed,

And provided the country with weapons,

And the genius of strategists is evident!

Not only everyone in Europe is shocked,

The whole world is amazed by this victory,

And former enemies, and philanthropists,

Everyone understood - the Union is not defeated!

There will be flame and resistance,

Deliveries will also go more fun,

And the second front that were unintentional

We'll have to open it, now they'll understand.

It's a shame only for me for the Stalingraders,

And for the Soviet martyr people,

That the first live like Volgograd residents,

And for the second ... then everyone here will understand.

We had this name as a reward,

And Stalingrad is our symbol and honor,

And only the street of Paris Stalingrad

Lives unnamed!

Sergey Momdzhi