The defeat of the French army near Krasnoe could become a prologue to the complete defeat of the enemy. To do this, it was necessary to implement the plan conceived by Mikhail Kutuzov to encircle enemy forces in Mesopotamia. Kutuzov carried out a similar operation in the war with Turkey, when, with weaker forces than the enemy, he stopped the advance of the Turkish army at Slobodzeya, then pressed it to the Danube, surrounded it and forced it to surrender. Now it was necessary to destroy a much more professional army than the Turks.
After the battle near Red () Kutuzov gave the troops one day of rest - November 7 (19). The troops needed to be put in order, to clear the rear from the remnants of the defeated French troops. The pursuit of the enemy was continued by Miloradovich's vanguard, Platov's Cossacks, Ozharovsky's detachment and other commanders of individual formations. For a further offensive, it was very important to establish contact with the armies of Wittgenstein and Chichagov in order to deliver coordinated strikes against the enemy. The Russian command believed that the enemy troops could leave for Lithuania, or move to Volhynia, to join the Austrian-Saxon troops. A French move north to link up with Victor and Saint-Cyr was considered unlikely. Wittgenstein was ordered to increase pressure on the right flank of the retreating enemy army, and he was promised the reinforcements of the forces of Platov and Adjutant General Kutuzov. The commander-in-chief also ordered Chichagov to speed up the exit to the Berezina in order to forestall Napoleon and occupy Borisov before him. Kutuzov, believed that Chichagov had already connected with the troops of Leaders and Ertel, so his army should have increased to 60 thousand soldiers. With such forces, Admiral Chichagov could well resist Napoleon's troops, who were almost without cavalry and artillery.
The information received on November 8-10 from Platov, Yermolov and Seslavin made the picture clearer. It was obvious that the enemy was continuing to move from Orsha along the high road to Borisov. Thus, Chichagov's army had to take the blow. The idea of the Russian command was to take Wittgenstein's forces from the north and Chichagov's army from the south to take a defensive position on the line of the Ulla and Berezina rivers with the front to the east and cut off the escape routes to the west for Napoleon's troops. The main army under the command of Kutuzov was supposed to strike at the French from the east.
One of the problems of the Main Army was the issue of supply. As it moved west, the army received less and less food. In order to somewhat improve the situation, it was decided to capture several French bases. One of the enemy's major food bases was located in Mogilev. The commander-in-chief gave the order to the detachments of Ozharovsky and Davydov to capture it. Ozharovsky perfectly fulfilled this order. On the way, Ozharovsky defeated an enemy detachment near the town of Gorki. In the battle, about 1.5 thousand enemy soldiers were destroyed, about 600 were captured and took 4 guns. In addition, Ozharovsky destroyed the enemy detachment in Shklov and saved the city from destruction. 10 thousand Cossacks of the Ukrainian militia joined the detachment of Ozharovsky. On November 12 (24), his detachment captured the city and proceeded to clear the south of Belarus from the enemy.
In addition, the command took measures to create food bases in Smolensk, Kyiv, to increase stocks in Bobruisk stores. No less difficult was the situation with winter uniforms. The bulk of the soldiers were still in summer uniforms. As a result, a significant number of sick soldiers left the army every day, with whom the mobile hospitals that were moving behind and established in the rear were clogged. Such losses exceeded combat and amounted to 30 thousand people. After the battle of Krasnoye, Kutuzov's army had no more than 50 thousand soldiers.
While the Main Army was moving south of the Moscow road, Chichagov, with the help of Lambert's vanguard, captured Minsk with a quick strike on November 4 (16), where there were significant enemy food supplies (about 2 million rations). More than 4 thousand enemy soldiers were captured in the city and its environs, mostly the wounded and sick. On November 9 (21), Lambert's vanguard, after a fierce battle, defeated the superior enemy forces and captured the crossing from Borisov (). The remaining enemy forces under the command of Dombrovsky were forced to retreat and moved towards Napoleon. Behind Lambert's vanguard, Chichagov's main forces approached Borisov and established themselves in this position. At the same time, detachments of Chaplits and Lukovkin arrived. Chaplits went out to Zembin, and Lukovkin to the Shabashevichs. Chichagov began to transport troops to the left bank of the Berezina. Moreover, instead of first transporting the cavalry and infantry, he began to transfer artillery and carts, although already on November 9 it was known that the French should be expected in 2-3 days.
In Borisov, Chichagov also received a message from Wittgenstein that his troops were pushing back units of Oudinot and Victor, who, in his opinion, were withdrawing south through Loshnitsy to the Lower Berezino. Chichagov sent 3 thousand vanguards under the command of Palen to Loshnitsy (Lambert was seriously wounded and was sent for treatment) in order to establish contact with Wittgenstein's troops. Palen's detachment, moving along the Smolensk road without proper security measures, at Loshnitsy ran into 10 thousand vanguard of Napoleon's army under the command of Oudinot. The road along which Palen walked passed through a dense forest, which excluded the possibility of deploying troops. Directly at Loshnitsy, the road left the forest and passed through a small copse. Oudinot, having received information about the movement of Russian troops, deployed his corps in this very copse. Across the road, he placed artillery with infantry, behind the cavalry. When the Russian column left the forest, it was met by the fire of the French cavalry. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russians and the fact that they could not deploy troops, pushing artillery, Oudinot went on the attack. The Russian infantry was driven into the forest, and the cavalry was overturned. The Russians, pursued by the French cavalry, retreated to Borisov. The French appeared at Borisov almost simultaneously with the retreating Russian troops.
The appearance of the French near the city was sudden for Chichagov. He assumed that these were the main forces of Napoleon and did not dare to start a fight. The admiral overestimated the power of Napoleon's army, believing that he had at least 90 thousand combat-ready soldiers. Instead of delaying the enemy with the available forces until the rest of the troops crossed to the right bank of the Berezina, he decided to clear Borisov. In the city, they had to abandon part of the carts already transported and blow up the bridge across the river. On November 12 (24), Admiral Chichagov, having overestimated the strength of the enemy, withdrew his troops (about 25 thousand soldiers) from Borisov and retreated to the right bank of the Berezina from Zembin to Usha. The capture of Borisov allowed Napoleon to be the master of the left bank and choose a place for the crossing. In addition, Chichagov was forced to disperse his forces in order to monitor the forces of the enemy.
Wittgenstein acted no better than Chichagov. At first, he assumed that Napoleon would go to connect with the corps of Victor and Oudinot, who occupied Cherei. However, news soon came that the French troops had left to join Napoleon. The actions of the French confirmed Wittgenstein's idea that the French would try to cross south of Borisov. He reported this in a letter to Chichagov. Wittgenstein did not know that Victor's troops retreated against the orders of Napoleon, who demanded to hold positions and create the appearance of the advance of the entire French army to the northwest. Having established the fact of the withdrawal of the French troops, Wittgenstein began to slowly move after them.
Actions of Napoleon
After the defeat at Krasny, Napoleon had to solve two main tasks. First, to make every effort to preserve the main cadres of the troops, who retreated to the west under the constant attacks of Russian regular units and partisan detachments. Secondly, he faced the most difficult task of saving troops from the simultaneous attack of three Russian armies, which together numbered about 100 thousand people.
While in Orsha, the French emperor reorganized Davout's 1st corps into three battalions, Ney's 3rd corps was also reduced to three battalions, Beauharnais's 4th corps and Junot's 8th corps were reduced to two battalions each. Napoleon even ordered the banners of all the corps to be collected and burned. The remaining artillery was also reorganized. 30 guns from the 9th Corps of Victor arrived in Orsha, in addition, there was already a fleet of 36 guns in the city itself. Of these, 6 batteries were formed and reinforced with them the corps of Ney, Davout and Beauharnais. The troops received the necessary ammunition and food from warehouses in Orsha and Dubrovna. From the remaining cavalry, a detachment of 500 officers was formed, Napoleon called it "his sacred squadron." These measures increased the combat capability of the army. With the arrival of the corps of Victor and Oudinot, the size of the army increased to about 75 thousand people, while the total number with the stragglers and sick soldiers who trailed behind the corps was about 85-90 thousand people. The combat-ready core of the army was approximately 40 thousand soldiers.
In Orsha, Napoleon received a message that Victor's corps was unable to complete the task - he had to push Wittgenstein's army beyond the Western Dvina. A message was also received about the capture of Minsk by Chichagov's troops. The emperor, worried, orders Oudinot to immediately go to Borisov in order to forestall the Russians. Corps Victor had to play the role of the flank vanguard, he had to convince Wittgenstein that Napoleon's army would retreat north of Borisov. After the withdrawal of the main forces from Orsha, Victor's corps began to play the role of a rearguard.
On November 9 (21), French troops left Orsha and destroyed all crossings across the Dnieper. On November 10 (22), the French arrived in Tolochin. Here a message was received about the capture of Borisov by Chichagov. This news aroused Napoleon's anxiety, and he convened a council of war. The question was raised about the further actions of the army. It was proposed to turn north, push Wittgenstein beyond the Dvina, and go through Glubokoe to Vilna. Jomini believed that it was possible to go to Borisov, force the Berezina and break through to Vilna. At this time, a report was received by Oudinot about the discovery of a ford near the village of Studenki. This finally determined Napoleon's decision to cross at Borisov.
Napoleon's army marched to Borisov for three days. Oudinot was the first to enter the city, followed by the guards. Here Napoleon stood for two days in indecision. Oudinot took the Russian units passing along the right bank, knocked out of Borisov and crossing the Berezina at Veselov, for Wittgenstein's vanguard. When the French headquarters became convinced that this assumption was erroneous, energetic preparations for the crossing began. To divert Chichagov's attention, they began to prepare a false crossing near the Lower Berezino, where several thousand soldiers were supposed to carry out demonstrative actions. A real crossing was prepared near the village of Studenka, 15 km from Borisov upstream of the Berezina.
The deception succeeded, Chichagov, just as Wittgenstein was misled. The admiral suggested that Napoleon wanted to break through towards Minsk in order to join the Austro-Saxon troops. Chichagov, contrary to the advice of the chief of staff Sabaneev and the corps commanders, ordered the troops to be concentrated near the Lower Berezino. At Borisov, the Lanzheron corps was left, and at the village of Bryli, the Chaplit detachment. In addition, Langeron considered that the enemy was trying to restore the crossing in Borisov and ordered Chaplits to leave only an observation detachment at Zembin, and the rest of the forces to go to him. As a result, the place where the French decided to cross was covered by a detachment of General Kornilov consisting of one battalion of rangers and two regiments of Cossacks with four guns.
Napoleon, having established the fact of the movement of the main forces of the Russian army south of Borisov, ordered an immediate crossing across the Berezina near Studenka. Work began on November 14 (26) under the command of engineering generals J. Eble and F. Chasselu. One bridge was intended for infantry, the other for cavalry, artillery and baggage. The sappers had to direct the crossing in icy water. According to eyewitnesses, almost all of them later died from the cold. On the same day, the corps commanders received an order to pull the troops to the crossings.
General Kornilov, having discovered the accumulation of French troops near Studenka, opened fire on them from his guns. At the same time, he sent Chaplits the news about the preparation of the crossing. However, Lanzheron detained Chaplits in Borisov. They both assumed that Napoleon, having crossed the Berezina, would go not to Vilna, but to Minsk. Kornilov could not interfere with the construction of the crossing. The Russian battery was soon suppressed by the fire of 40 guns, which were installed on the high bank of the Berezina. Under the protection of artillery, the Corbino cavalry brigade crossed, followed by a rifle battalion from Dombrovsky's division on rafts. These forces were enough to push back the Kornilov detachment. When the bridges were ready, Dombrovsky's cavalry, Dumerk's cavalry division, Oudinot's 2nd Corps, crossed the river. These forces covered the approaches to the crossing and took possession of the Zembinsky defile, where the bridges over the swamps remained intact. If Chaplits and Lnzheron had destroyed these bridges, the French would have lost time. When Chaplits approached the crossing point, he met superior enemy forces, who pushed him back beyond the village of Stakhovo. He sent an urgent report to Langeron. The latter sent only two regiments to help, as he was afraid to leave Borisov, where there were still many French troops.
At this time, on the left bank, Wittgenstein still believed that Napoleon's troops were advancing south of Borisov. Only on the evening of November 14 (26) did Wittgenstein decide to move forward and establish contact with Chichagov. It was obvious that if Wittgenstein had taken measures for deeper reconnaissance, he would have discovered the enemy's crossing and could take Studenki to prevent the enemy from retreating. However, he also overestimated the strength of the enemy and did not want to take a hit on his army. The forces of Wittgenstein's army (35-40 thousand people) were quite enough to withstand the onslaught of the enemy for two days, thereby enabling Chichagov to reach the threatened area and approach Kutuzov's army.
At this time, Chichagov received news that the crossing at the Lower Berezino was false, and the real one was located at Studenka. Soon Langeron also received a message about the actions of the enemy. The admiral realized that he had been cruelly deceived by the enemy and immediately set out. On November 15 (27), having covered more than 30 versts in a day, Chichagov's army again reached Borisov. The troops were exhausted by the march, and they had to rest, only part of the cavalry was sent to Studenka. As a result, on November 15 (27), the French crossed quite calmly. On this day, the guards, the 1st and 4th corps of Davout and Beauharnais crossed the river. As a result, Napoleon already had 14-15 thousand combat-ready soldiers on the right bank of the river. Oudinot's 2nd Corps defended the crossing site, while Victor's 9th Corps held Borisov. By the night of November 27, on November 27, stragglers began to arrive, crowds of abandoned, sick and wounded soldiers, civilians with convoys. Napoleon Bonaparte ordered only combat-ready, "walking in the ranks" groups to pass through, carts were not allowed to pass.
Wittgenstein only at the end of the day on November 15 decided to put forward the vanguard to Old Borisov, and with the main forces to go to the new Borisov. The vanguard under the command of Major General Vlastov, having reached the edge of the forest, through which the road from Stary Borisov to Studenka ran, discovered the French and began the battle. It was the division of General Partuno, which had the task of holding Borisov until the crossing was completed. But Partuno left the city earlier due to the appearance of the forces of Platov and Yermolov. There were about 7 thousand people under the command of the French general. Partuno attacked the Russian troops at dusk, but was repulsed with heavy losses. Seeing that he was surrounded, Partuno sent an officer to Wittgenstein to negotiate surrender, and he himself, with part of the division, tried to make his way through the forest to the crossing, but was unsuccessful and was captured. On the morning of November 16, the rest of the French laid down their arms. It was only after this that Wittgenstein realized his mistake and decided to attack the French army.
The main army at this time was preparing for battle. Ordering Chichagov and Wittgenstein to block the escape routes to the west and north, Kutuzov wanted to force the enemy to move south, where the main forces of the Russian army were waiting for her. November 15 (27) The main army was stopped to rest, preparing for the decisive battle.
On the morning of November 16, Napoleon still held both banks of the Berezina behind him. He wanted to transfer the wagon train and Victor's corps. He did not yet know about the surrender of the Partuno division and believed that Victor had two divisions. About 20 thousand people crossed to the right bank, about the same number remained on the other bank.
At about 10 o'clock in the morning, Wittgenstein, with the forces of Vlastov, attacked and brought down artillery fire on the masses of people who had accumulated at the crossing. Victor went on a counterattack, but his blow was not successful. Following Vlastov's vanguard, Berg's infantry division and Fok's reserve entered the battle. The stubborn battle continued until nightfall. Artillery shelling caused panic in the retreating crowd, a stampede began, people rushed to the crossings. One of the bridges collapsed.
Chichagov's troops that day also went to the crossing and, having heard artillery fire at Studenka, also went on the offensive. The blow was taken by Oudinot's body. The troops of the Sabaneev Corps during the second attack almost completely killed the Vistula Legion. Other parts of the French corps also suffered heavy losses. Napoleon sent the troops of Ney's corps, the Old and New Guards to help Oudinot. Oudinot himself was wounded and replaced by Ney. The terrain was marshy, which made it difficult for the cavalry, so the Russian troops could only push the French. Soon Sabaneev was forced to stop the attacks and move on to artillery shelling. The fierceness of the battle on this day is evidenced by the number of wounded and killed French generals in three corps - 17 people.
Platov's corps, having occupied Borisov on the evening of November 15 (27), on the morning of November 16, crossed to the right bank of the river and moved around to the Zembinsky defile.
On November 17, Napoleon realized that artillery and carts could not be saved, and ordered Victor to leave the left bank. The troops of this corps cleared their way, throwing people off the bridge and began to cross to the other side. After part of the troops crossed over to the other side, the emperor ordered General Ebla to burn the crossing. Napoleon feared that the Russian infantry would also break through behind Victor's corps. Several thousand still combat-ready soldiers and huge crowds of lagging behind incompetent French soldiers were thrown. They were thrown to save those who managed to cross. Most of the abandoned drowned, trying to cross, or were taken prisoner, some were hacked to death by the Cossacks.
Napoleon led only 9 thousand combat-ready soldiers to the Zembinsky defile (almost half of them were guardsmen), they were followed by crowds that had lost their combat effectiveness. The French crossed the swamps and destroyed the bridges behind them. Russian troops crossed the swamp a little later, when the intensified frosts bound them with ice.
P. Hess. Crossing the Berezina. 1840s
Results
The total losses of the French army for November 14-17 (26-29) reached 50 thousand soldiers (according to other sources, 35 thousand people). Moreover, approximately 20 thousand were lost from among the combat-ready part of the army, during the battles with the forces of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. Only the Russians captured 5 generals, 427 headquarters and chief officers, about 23.5 thousand soldiers as prisoners. The actual "Great Army" of Napoleon ceased to exist. The crossing of the Berezina and the accompanying battles were a disaster for the French army. The Russian army lost 6-8 thousand people during this time.
Napoleon managed to avoid encirclement and complete defeat on the Berezina River, which could lead to the surrender of the remnants of the army along with the emperor. Napoleon was able to break through to Vilna. The color of the generals, most of the officer corps and the imperial guard were preserved. As a result, Napoleon retained the backbone of the army, which he could build up by using the troops stationed in Europe, conducting a new mobilization in France.
Napoleon managed to break through more because of the mistakes of Chichagov and Wittgenstein, and not because of his skill. A combination of circumstances and a series of mistakes by Russian generals saved the French emperor. More active and decisive actions of the armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein could lead to a more brilliant victory. On the other hand, there is an opinion that this was the best outcome for this fight. By forcing Napoleon to give a decisive and possibly last battle, the Russian armies would have suffered huge losses. And as a result of the battle at the Berezina, Napoleon's "big army" actually ceased to exist anyway. Kutuzov saved the soldiers, having solved the strategic task of eliminating the enemy army, with minimal losses.
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Description of the Patriotic War in 1812 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky Alexander Ivanovich
Napoleon crossing the Berezina
Napoleon's arrival at Studyanka and building bridges there. - Kornilov's actions. “The enemy is crossing on ferries and attacking the Russians. - Chichagov ascertains the real place of the crossing of the enemies. - The movement of Russian armies and corps on November 14. - The location of the warring troops on November 15. – Inactivity near Bril. — Napoleon's Crossing. “The Partuno affair. - Borisov's occupation. - Arrival of Chichagov to Borisov. - Preparations for a general attack on both banks of the Berezina. - Battle of Brill. - The battle at Studyanka. - Crossing of the French rearguard. - Destruction of bridges on the Berezina. - Disasters of the enemy. - Further retreat of the enemy. - Notes on the crossing of the Berezina.
Before dawn on November 14, Napoleon arrived at Studyanka, where all the enemy troops from Loshnitsa and Borisov were going at night, with the exception of Viktor: he was the rearguard and was at Loshnitsa. On that day, Napoleon had everything under arms, including the corps of Victor and Oudinot, the Dombrovsky detachment and the teams that joined the army between the Dnieper and the Berezina, from 60 to 70,000 people. This calculation is based on the testimony of prisoners. French writers claim there were fewer under arms; Napoleon's secretary puts his army at 40,000, and his adjutant at 45,000. The unarmed, trailing behind the army, and the multitude of non-combatants, no one kept count; they think that their number was equal to the number of combatants, but that is just guesswork. On the way from Stary Borisov to Studyanka, the glow of our fires on the right bank of the Berezina glowed before Napoleon's eyes. At dawn, he saw Cossacks and rangers there, and therefore, not doubting the proximity of the Danube army, he began to prepare for battle and ordered a 40-gun battery to be placed near Studyanka, which was supposed to cover the construction of two bridges, one at Studyanka, the other higher. He did not have pontoons: half of them were burned by Mortier, leaving Moscow, the rest were put on fire after the battle of Vyazemsky; the pontoons of two companies, marching from Vilna towards the army, were burned in Orsha. It remained to build a bridge on the goats, for which Oudinot ordered the day before to cut down the forest, break down the huts of the nearby village and bring logs, brushwood and straw to the river, which continued all night from the 13th to the 14th. The personal presence of Napoleon revived the soldiers used in the bridge work. His surprise and joy increased as the day approached he made sure that the number of Russians did not increase and that preparations for the crossing were not visible on our side. The French began to put goats in the water.
The work could not be carried out secretly and in silence: it was visible and audible in Kornilov's detachment. Already the day before, Kornilov reported on the accumulation of enemies and their every minute increase in their number. “The French,” he wrote, “are chopping wood and, no doubt, have the intention of crossing at Studyanka.” On the morning of the 14th, he again sent a confirmation report, adding that the enemy had started building a bridge. Through the telescope they saw ours and the forty-gun battery of the French. The location on our side was low-lying, separated from the river by a swamp, half a verst long. No more than 4 guns could be placed on the site located here, but the cannonballs, due to the swamp separating us from the Berezina, could reach no further than the middle of the river. When the construction of the bridge by the French began, captain Arnoldi, who commanded the battery at Kornilov, wanted to test whether the cannonballs would reach the other shore, and if they didn’t, then where exactly would they fall, in order to know for sure when to start firing with significant harm to the enemy? He opened fire. After the first shot, a 40-gun battery greeted us from the mountain: it covered everyone with cannonballs and earth; people and horses fell down, and we were left with the conviction that it was impossible to use artillery. Our shots fell only in the middle of the river, while the enemy, from large-caliber cannons, thrown from a height, could hit us one by one, to choose from, like from a gun.
When building bridges, Napoleon sent the cavalry by swimming; each rider carried an infantry soldier behind him on horseback; along with them ferries with infantry sailed. Rolling to the right bank of the Berezina, the French announced it with a joyful cry and rifle shots. Kornilov sent troops to hold the enemy; the artillery, instead of futile action across the river, turned to the left, intending to meet the French. At the same time, a Cossack officer from Zembin rode up with a report that the French cavalry had crossed at Veselov, against Zembin, as a result of which the Cossacks who were there were retreating to the detachment. From that moment, around noon, Napoleon's crossing should have been considered established, for the small number of Kornilov's detachment did not allow it to be prevented. The French infantry, transported by cavalry and on ferries, which went incessantly up and down the river, scattered in multitudes through the forest and attacked ours; one enemy column was advancing along a road so narrow that it was difficult for us to place two guns on it. Work near the bridges, accelerated personally by Napoleon, went quickly forward. The first bridge was finished shortly after noon and swayed under the weight of the French columns led by Marshal Oudinot. Oudinot's first action was to send a detachment to take possession of the Zembinsky fashion shows, along which the road to Vilna runs. The detachment found bridges and dams in the marshes and lowlands of Gaina unscathed, which provided Napoleon with a retreat route to Lithuania. Seeing the success of his plans, Napoleon said to those around him, pointing to the sky: “My star has risen again!” Like all conquerors, he believed in destiny.
Kornilov was heavily attacked from the front and smashed from the flank with shots from 40 guns. Unable to respond to such deadly fire, he retreated, with a contrite heart, step by step, about 2 miles, holding the enemy as much as his strength allowed. Having reached the first platform located in the dense forest, he ordered to place, as often as possible, all his 12 cannons and shoot in all directions with the greatest speed, which lasted three hours. Only with such efforts of artillery and the extraordinary courage of the infantry, dismounted Cossacks and parts of the regular cavalry kept the enemy, who was desperately trying to push our people to Stakhov and further, and thereby clear the crossing and the road for retreat. Hearing about the crossing of the enemy, Chaplits hastily returned from under Borisov, and with his help Kornilov defended the place to which he retreated until night. But there were moments when our infantry moved back into the forest behind the artillery, and the French riflemen came out in heaps from the sides to the edge, firing heavy fire from all sides. It got dark. Only the flashes on the rifle shelves indicated the places where the grape shots were to be sent, which made it possible for the infantry to push back the French again. Once they poured out in large numbers and rushed to the battery, having an order to take it by all means, but they were driven back by battle fire. The night stopped the bloodshed. While Oudinot was fighting Kornilov, Chaplits, and the troops approaching them from Borisov, the enemy finished building another bridge; both broke down several times, which briefly stopped the crossing. By evening, Ney arrived with his consolidated corps, and took command of all the troops on the right bank of the Berezina. He had orders to hold to the last extreme the position occupied by Oudinot, and thereby give the army time to cross. Although Napoleon during the day made sure that Chichagov was moving down the Berezina, he had no doubt that he would not be slow to return when he learned about the French crossing at Studyanka, and for this purpose he accelerated the crossing by all means.
In vain did Napoleon fear the imminent appearance of the Danube army. All day, on the 14th, when the enemy was crossing at Studyanka, Chichagov stood at Shabashevichi, where in the afternoon reports from Kornilov and Chaplits came to him. Meanwhile, he was also informed that the French had collected materials for bridges even below Borisov, and the sound of their work was heard. He sent several battalions to Chaplits and, for a final decision on what to do in such difficult circumstances, he was waiting for a report from Count Orurk, who was detached to the town of Berezin. Arriving early in the morning, on the 14th, at the place assigned to him, Count Orurk did not see a single enemy on the opposite bank, but for greater confirmation of this he ordered Captain Malinovsky to cross the Berezina with the Cossacks. The Cossacks went through Pogost to Tidy. Residents everywhere unanimously showed that there were no French in the vicinity and that they were concentrating near Borisov. On the way back, Malinovsky was informed by the inhabitants of the village of Pogosta about the arrival of a squadron of Polish lancers from the vicinity of Bobruisk, who scattered around the village and fed the horses. The Cossacks rushed to the careless Poles, captured 40 people and found a command from the squadron commander Sulyakovsky: "to go to Borisov and higher along the Berezina, where there is a crossing." This command and the news reported from Count Orurk that the enemy was not visible on the lower Berezina were immediately forwarded to Chichagov; they reached him late in the evening of the 14th. Comparing them with the reports of Kornilov and Chaplits, the Admiral was convinced of the present state of affairs and on November 15 in the morning he set out from Shabashevichy to Borisov. Count Orurk, without waiting for orders, went to connect with the army, dispatching Major Khrapovitsky to open a message with our main army and report to Prince Kutuzov about the crossing of the French above Borisov. Khrapovitsky soon met Count Ozharovsky, who sent Rotmister Palitsyn to Field Marshal with news brought from the Danube army.
When Chichagov was standing in Shabashevichi, on November 14, Count Wittgenstein moved forward 13 versts from Baran to Kostritsa, where the party sent the day before to Veselov returned to him and reported on Napoleon's crossing at Studyanka; another patrol informed that Viktor's corps was at Borisov. Count Wittgenstein's first thought was to go straight to Studyanka, hit Napoleon in the rear and separate Victor from him. Unfortunately, the road from Kostritsa to Studyanka turned out to be impassable for the artillery. Therefore, Count Wittgenstein decided to go to Old Borisov, intending to cut off Viktor, who was at Borisov, and if he had already left this city, then turn after him and, having overtaken him, attack him. Wanting to make an attack more successfully, Count Wittgenstein suggested that Count Platov approach Borisov and attack the city along the high road. Count Platov was at that time between Nacha and Loshnitsa, held up by the enemy rearguard, who lit bridges behind them and retreated as slowly as they could, so that Victor needed to cover the march of other corps to Studyanka, give Napoleon time to build bridges and draw to scattered teams rushing to Borisov from the lower Berezina. Yermolov, following Count Platov, with Miloradovich's vanguard, was near Nacha. On that day, on the 14th, Prince Kutuzov crossed the Dnieper at Kopys and arrived at Staroselye. In Kopys, he left several horse guard regiments and 12 companies of artillery, ordering the people and horses of these companies to equip the artillery that was with the army. According to the intention previously adopted, Prince Kutuzov wanted to continue the march to the Berezina from Staroselya to Krugloye the next day, on the left side of the road from Orsha to Borisov, in order to have reliable food and stop Napoleon's path if he turned to the south. The army was preceded by a newly composed vanguard, under the command of Adjutant General Vasilchikov, for Miloradovich, facing the high road, had already moved away from the army at such a distance that he could no longer serve as a vanguard for it.
Such were the movements of the fighting armies during November 14th. In the morning, the 15th army was in the vicinity of the Berezina in the following position: Chichagov on the march from Shabashevichi to Borisov, Count Wittgenstein from Kostritsa to Old Borisov, Count Platov, followed by Yermolov, from Loshnitsa to Borisov; Napoleon at Studyanka, managing the crossing all night; Victor, with two divisions, on the march to Studyanka from Borisov, where he left the 5th division of his corps, Partuno, ordering him to stay in the city until evening, for the following reasons: crossings; 2) not to allow our troops stationed on the opposite bank to build a bridge near Borisov; 3) as far as possible, to prevent the connection in Borisov of Count Wittgenstein, Count Platov and Chichagov, and 4) to expel by force from Borisov heaps of backward people who, having found warm apartments in the city and some supplies, did not want to go further. As for our troops, on the eve of fighting with Oudinot and Ney on the right bank of the Berezina, near Bril, the morning of November 15 found Russian and French riflemen in the forest, mutually mixed. Some of our rangers were behind the enemy line, and the same was with the enemy skirmishers. Everyone stood in the position in which they had been overtaken the day before by the darkness of a cold and rainy night. At dawn, our and French officers bred the shooters, as on a training field, without any hostile actions. Then on both sides they stood quietly; the day passed without a shot. No one was willing to start business. Ours, due to the small number, did not attack, waiting for the arrival of the army from near Borisov, and the French had no reason to start business, rejoicing at the inaction of the Russians, which allowed them to complete the crossing. At one o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon crossed to the right side of the Berezina with the guards and occupied the Zanivki farm. On the left bank, he left Victor, who built his two divisions in battle order, in such a way that they covered the bridges along which the enemy crossed, which that day was not disturbed from behind by Count Wittgenstein.
It is said above that on the morning of the 15th, Count Wittgenstein from Kostrica and Count Platov from Loshnitsa set out, both with the intention of cutting off Victor, who, in their opinion, should have been in Borisov. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, Vlastov with Count Wittgenstein's vanguard approached Stary Borisov from Zhitskov and learned there that Victor had already passed this place, with most of his corps, and was at Studyanka. Vlastov overtook only one of his rear columns, overturned it and took the cannon. The prisoners showed that Partuno's division was in Borisov. Knowing that, Count Wittgenstein appointed his entire corps to meet Partuno and placed the troops facing Old Borisov, and with the right wing to the Berezina. Soon, General Partuno, left for sacrifice, appeared. Seeing the path to Studyanka blocked, he went ahead, but was repulsed. Count Wittgenstein sent a negotiator to him, to announce to him that he was surrounded from everywhere, and to demand surrender. Partuno restrained the negotiator and set out to leave, hoping for success due to the onset of darkness and believing that, having begun negotiations, our guards had weakened. He describes his situation as follows: “We were surrounded, constrained by carts and 8,000 backward, mostly unarmed, in tatters, who were the perfect likeness of the wandering dead. To the right was a mountain occupied by the Russians; to the left the Berezina and the Russians; Russians stood in front and behind; their cores pierced through our columns. To complete the disaster, I was informed that the bridges at Studyanka were on fire, where we needed to join the army. After this news turned out to be unfair, and we learned that the flames of the burning village were mistaken for the fire of bridges. I sent to look for some way to escape, hoping to sneak past the Russians in the dark, and forbade shooting.
Having passed a small space, I found myself eye to eye with the enemy, but continued the march, in the greatest silence, through swamps, lakes and forests, pursued and pressed by the Cossacks, for I was recognized by them. Surrounded on all sides by enemy fires, exhausted from hunger, fatigue and cold, almost drowning in the lake, which had just frozen and was hidden from us by darkness and snow, we laid down our weapons. Two brigade commanders of Partuno's division, one of whom was shot in the knee and the other was wounded by a cannonball in the hand, lagged behind her, returned to Borisov and found the city already in the power of Count Platov. Seeing no escape, the French generals sent a negotiator to Count Wittgenstein, and the next morning, at 7 o'clock, they surrendered. In total, 5 generals were taken, more than 8000 people with weapons and unarmed, 800 serviceable German cavalry and 3 cannons.
While Count Wittgenstein was handling Partuno's division, Count Platov and Seslavin approached Borisov, where Seslavin was the first to break in; moreover, many prisoners were taken and 2 guns were captured in front of the city. At that time, Chichagov, with his army, tired of two difficult transitions, arrived from Shabashevichi to the bridge fortification of Borisov and then stopped for the night, not continuing the march to join Chaplits. He ordered a pontoon bridge to be built on the Berezina, through which a communication was established between the Danube army and Count Wittgenstein and with the troops detached from the main army, that is, Count Platov and Yermolov, who were 18 miles from Borisov. Count Wittgenstein went to Borisov and personally agreed with Chichagov: on the next day, on the 16th, a general attack on both banks of the Berezina, as follows: enemy troops that have already crossed; 2) Count Platov and Yermolov go to the right side of the Berezina and support the Danube army and 3) Count Wittgenstein attack Victor's corps and all French troops located on the left side of the river and covering the crossing, which has not yet been completely completed. So, on November 16, a battle was to flare up on both banks of the Berezina.
The troops gathered on the 14th and 15th between Stakhov and Bril, that is, Chaplits, Kornilov and the regiments, who had come to them from near Borisov in these two days, stood in the forest in the places where the affair ended on the 14th. They were ordered, on signal shot from Arnoldi's company, to attack with the entire enemy line, not waiting, to gain time, for the army, which was supposed to come from under Borisov, where it had spent the night. The dawn had just begun to break, as with the flight of our two cannonballs, rifle shots rang out. Standing in the French vanguard, on a narrow road, two guns silently went back to their reserves; Arnoldi's company, also 2 guns abreast, followed them, then turned sharply to the right along the road and barely appeared against the square where the Berezina crossing was, when they were suddenly met by shots from the French battery. Our infantry, moving at the same time as the artillery, pushed back the enemies. Realizing the importance that could come from if the Russians had time to establish themselves close to the crossing, Ney moved his infantry forward, trying to push us deeper into the forest; then he formed a column of cavalry, from all who had horses, from the general to the soldier, and ordered them to charge. And reinforcements were approaching our troops at that moment. After spending the night near Borisov, Chichagov arrived at 9 o'clock in the morning to Stakhov and detached Sabaneev, the Chief of the Main Staff, with the 9th and 18th infantry divisions. Having a special prejudice against the benefits of loose formation, Sabaneyev, before reaching the battlefield, scattered more than half the number of both divisions into arrows. But Ney had already managed to make a cavalry attack. Having made his way through the skirmishers, he rushed to their reserves and to the long, stretched chain of Sabaneyev's approaching shooters. The personal fearlessness of our generals kept Ney, especially the brilliant attack of the Pavlograd hussars, under the personal command of Chaplits, who overturned the enemy cavalry. Then, for a whole day, the mutual armies fought in the forest with arrows. The French rushed forward with fierceness, thinking not about the glory of the battle won and the acquisition of trophies, but having in mind to block the retreat of the army to Zembin and ensure the lot of several tens of thousands of unarmed people who were still on the left bank of the Berezina with the troops, then attacked by Count Wittgenstein at Studyanka. When the chains of skirmishers thinned, others went to reinforce them. Both ours and the enemies lost a lot of people, moved either back or forward. The location was such that on our side, which was not an example in a general battle, only two guns were active at a time, on a narrow road, at the exit from the forest. At first, Arnoldi's company was here, firing in 6 shifts, that is, alternately with two guns, but they were not able to hold out for more than half an hour: it ended in the extermination of people and horses. Then two new guns were replaced. Three hours later, due to the great losses suffered by this company, it was sent back. Its place was gradually replaced by three companies (Pashchenko, de Bobrysh and Prebsting), which acted uniformly in two guns, exactly as in Arnoldi's company and with the same losses, but maintaining their position for 12 hours, under the deadly fire of artillery and bullets . Behind Ney stood Napoleon with the guards in reserve, and meanwhile the carts, artillery, unarmed and non-combatant, were reaching for Zembin as they crossed the bridges. Until 11 o'clock in the evening, a bloody battle continued in the forest between Bril and Stakhov; only half of the Danube army, scattered into arrows, participated in it. There were no maneuvers, no detours, no movements in columns. The rest of the army and all the cavalry, except for the Pavlograd Hussar Regiment, as well as the detachments of Count Platov and Yermolov, who crossed the Berezina near Borisov, were not brought into the fire and stood in reserve near Stakhov.
Let's turn to Count Wittgenstein. After spending the night from 15 to 16 November in Old Borisov, he ordered Vlastov to go with the vanguard to Studyanka, on the 16th, at 5 o'clock in the morning; Vlastov was to be followed by Berg's corps, in two columns and a reserve from Zhitskov. Count Steingel remained with the corps at Stary Borisov to complete negotiations with the brigadier generals of the Partuno division, who finally surrendered, as mentioned above, not earlier than the morning of the 16th. Vlastov met the French patrols at Bych and, crowding them, approached the position occupied by Viktor in front of the Studyanka, on the heights lined with artillery. In front of the front of the position a stream flowed through the bushes; on the left wing stood a brigade of cavalry. Vlastov sent riflemen to occupy Victor from the front; he ordered the Cossacks, reinforced by regular cavalry, to attack the cavalry of the left wing; against the right flank of Victor brought 12 guns and opened fire from them on the bridge on the Berezina. While the Cossacks, with varying success, fought with the cavalry brigade and the rangers exchanged fire in the bushes, our cores fell on the bridge, in the middle of the crowded carts, hitting people and horses. From the broken and overturned wagons and carriages, from the accumulation of the dead and wounded, a terrible confusion occurred on the bridge, a complete stop: it was impossible to move either back or forward. Fearing the wreckage of the bridge, the crowds moved from it back to the shore, while others rushed from the shore to the bridge. No human power could restore order. To facilitate the crossing, Victor had to gain time and move the Russian battery, which was destroying the bridge, by all means. He attacked the center of Vlastov, with which Berg's corps, which was on the march, had not yet had time to connect. Victor's offensive movement was supported by a battery placed on the opposite bank of the Berezina by Napoleon, who personally directed the guns. Vlastov retreated. Soon Berg arrived in time with the first column and a reserve arrived from Zhitskov. Ours moved forward, the riflemen ran across the stream, but Victor did not allow them to establish themselves, brought the reserve into action, drove the riflemen, crossed the stream and tore apart our center. However, his attack was soon put to an end. Ours brought up a battery company, and under its shots the cavalry and infantry came out of the reserve; they were joined by the shelves of the center that were pushed back a moment. The French did not resist the pressure. Then our right wing leaned forward. Victor drew back the troops, placed them in a semicircle, having bridges in his rear, and fired back from batteries; on both sides the matter was limited to cannonade. If at that time all the troops of Count Wittgenstein acted collectively, Victor's death was inevitable; but our corps were fragmented: Count Steingel stood all day in Old Borisov, disarming Partuno's division, and came to the battlefield at night, and of Berg's two columns, only one took part in the battle; the other remained behind for a long time, due to a misunderstanding, which often happens in war, and came to Studyanka at the end of the case. The darkness of the evening ended the battle. In addition to those killed, the enemy lost many people on the bridges, on which our batteries resumed operations, when, after two offensive movements, Victor was pushed back. Unarmed and non-combatants rushed to the bridges in large heaps. Distinction in ranks and rank has disappeared; no one heeded the voice of the chiefs; each in a hurry to get to the opposite bank, knocking others into the water and, as best he could, opened his way through the piles of bodies. Healthy, wounded and sick were crushed by wheels and horse hooves; charging boxes blown up by grenades flew into the air; horses, with the limbers of guns and wagons overturned, neighed, reared up and, finding no passage anywhere, spiraled; others, pushed off the bridge, fell with people into the river. The screams were drowned out by the buzzing of Russian cannonballs, the crackling of bursting bombs and the rolling of gunfire that thundered on both sides of the Berezina.
After the end of the battle at Studyanka, confusion on the bridges did not stop. Suddenly, at 10 o'clock on a stormy cold evening, Victor's troops appeared there. Leaving the rear guard at Studyanka, Victor began to descend to the crossing from the elevated bank, where he stayed all day. His columns cleared their way with butts and bayonets, made a kind of trenches from dead bodies and horse corpses heaped along the edges of bridges. Victor's crossing ended at midnight. The bridges are empty. Crowds of backward people who had not had time to cross the river before, exhausted by futile efforts to reach the shore and then dispersed by Victor's corps, rushed to the snowy ground, took refuge in broken and overturned wagons. Those who could, made fire. In the exhaustion of bodily and mental strength, they decided to indulge in sleep, or, rather, oblivion and wait for the dawn. At night, the French generals sent orders to the crowds to hastily cross to the opposite shore, announcing the imminent lighting of the bridges. The exhaustion of the unarmed was so great that few obeyed; most preferred momentary calm to captivity, almost inevitable. Trying to bring the unfortunates out of sleep and force them to cross, Napoleon ordered, at 5 o'clock in the morning, to burn their wagons. This measure produced some effect, especially since Victor's rearguard, which had stood overnight on the left bank, soon set off for the bridges. Then the unarmed crowds, reinforced by a short sleep and convinced that there were no more troops left behind them and no protection from the Russians, rushed to the river, but not everyone had time to cross.
It began to get light. The general, who was instructed to destroy the bridges, delayed execution to the last opportunity, wanting to give his comrades-in-arms time to cross. Every moment was precious, but the delay could not last more than an hour. At half-past 9, a terrible thunderstorm of the French - the Don Peaks - appeared on a hill near Studyanka, and an order was immediately given to set fire to the bridges, covered with flammable substances at night. People, horses, carts sank into the water. Many of the bridges that remained on the surviving part of the bridge attempted to cross the ice floes that had packed near the goats, but were squeezed, covered with ice, carried away by the river, fought in vain with its course and screamed for help: no one helped. Others tried to swim to safety, but drowned or froze. Others rushed through the flames that devoured the bridge, and instead of deliverance, they found a painful death. Women, children, infants, with their arms wrapped around their mothers' necks, lay on the ice with shattered limbs. Desperate, frantic screams filled the air, torn apart by the piercing howl of the north wind, which had risen with a blizzard since early morning, covered the eyes of multi-tribal victims with hoarfrost and snow, and ossified their arms and legs. The Berezina was filled with corpses to such an extent that it was possible to cross them on foot from one bank to another.
Before the bridges were ignited, Napoleon, on November 17, at 6 o’clock in the morning, left Zanivki through Zembin to Kamen, where his army stretched and fled all night and all morning, supposed to go to Vilna through Molodechno, Smorgony and Oshmyany. The rear guard was commanded by Ney, who was stopped for several hours when turning from the Brilevsky forest to Zembin, where a congestion of people and heavy loads blocked the road. Upon learning of the enemy’s retreat, Chichagov moved towards Bril, found on the way 7 abandoned cannons, trucks, charging boxes and many backward ones, the number of which, together with those taken the day before, in the battle near Stakhov, prisoners, extended to 3300 people. The Danube army did not go further than Bril that day. Only the vanguard was sent for the enemy, under the command of Chaplits, consisting of regiments: one infantry, 7 jaegers, 4 light cavalry, 8 Cossack and 3 companies of horse artillery. Chaplits pursued the French to the tavern of Kabinskaya Rudnya, but could not go quickly. The road in the forest led to a path; The French filled it with trees and set fire to the bridges there. Arranging his way, Chaplits caught up with Ney not earlier than evening. To the left was Lanskoy, near Pleschenitsy, where he was sent the day before, during the battle of Stakhovsky, with orders to get ahead of the heads of enemy columns. He made an unintentional attack on Pleschenitsy and took one general and the furiers who were preparing the premises for Napoleon's main apartment.
When on the morning of the 17th Chichagov was walking from Stakhov to Bril, Count Wittgenstein, who could not cross the Berezina because of the destruction of bridges on it, moved the vanguard to the very shore, in front of Studyanka. They put up cannons and fired from them at the enemy troops, who were then on the right side of the Berezina.
The French did not respond to our fire, trying only to leave. The space near Studyanka and the bridges, more than a square verst, was lined with carriages, carriages, droshkys, wagons, with the remnants of booty looted in Russia, of which the enemies transported very little beyond the Berezina. There were also 12 cannons abandoned by Victor. On both days, 13,000 prisoners were taken by Count Wittgenstein, including Partuno's division. Horses and a pack of hounds led by the enemy from Moscow roamed along the shore, intent on having fun hunting on the way back from Russia. Count Wittgenstein appointed 3 squads to clear roads and build bridges. The wagon train was given to the troops as booty. Enemies, big and small, officers and soldiers, men and women, in rags, covered with rags, horse blankets, with frostbitten members, trembling from the cold, rushed into our ranks and asked for a piece of bread in the name of humanity. Soldiers and warriors, as much as they could, gave them crackers; enemies kissed the hands of generous warriors. Some of the enemy officers, who, when taken prisoner, did not have time to completely rob, gave watches, pistols, rings, and money for a handful of crackers. The initially aroused feeling of compassion soon turned into disgust when signs of desecration of the shrine were noticed.
There were French women sitting on horses covered, instead of saddles, with scraps of priestly robes; found chests knocked together from images, and other sacred objects shamelessly used by enemies. The soldiers presented to the authorities all the church things stolen by the blasphemers. Meanwhile, Napoleon, wrapped in a sable coat, continued on his way to the Stone. His last words on the banks of the Berezina were addressed to the artillery general Eble, who set fire to the bridges. Napoleon told him: “Clean up the dead bodies and throw them into the water; The Russians must not see our loss." But Eble was not up to the funeral; he considered himself lucky that he managed to get out himself, leaving not only the dead, but all the wounded and sick, without bandaging, food and help. Cursing Napoleon, they died in the desert forests from frost, which reached 20 degrees the next day; others, even before death, were pecked by birds of prey, devoured by wolves.
Thus ended Napoleon's crossing of the Berezina, which cost him up to 20,000 prisoners, many thousands killed and drowned in the river, 25 cannons left on both banks, many guns thrown into the water, and a huge convoy. However, despite the great harm suffered by the enemy, the expectations of Emperor Alexander were not realized, because the enemies were not blocked from the way back, “they were not exterminated to the last man,” as the Emperor ordered, and Napoleon himself was not captured. The capture of Attila of modern times would be a mere act of chance; one or more people can drive almost always and everywhere. And with the complete death of his troops on the Berezina, Napoleon could escape, all the more convenient because he was in the region, then betrayed by his seductions. But his army should have suffered a final defeat if we had acted more skillfully and more decisively on our side. The Danubian army stood at Brest for so long that no matter how much it accelerated after the march from the Bug to Borisov, it still could not reach the Berezina in time, which is why it was impossible for it to enter into direct contact with Count Wittgenstein and agree with him about their mutual actions. After the capture of Borisov, no information about the enemy was collected for two days. Then followed the defeat of the vanguard and the retreat of the army from Borisov, which deprived us of communications with the left bank of the Berezina and Count Wittgenstein. After, according to the news of the enemy’s preparations for the crossing at Ukholod and Studyanka, the central point on the Berezina was left and a movement was made to Shabashevichi, without first surveying the banks of the Berezina and verifying where the enemy would be more advantageous to cross. Then they would see how much the elevation of the left bank of the Berezina near Studyanka, which some Generals pointed out, advising not to move away from Borisov, favored the French for building bridges. When they moved from under Borisov to Shabashevichi, they exposed the Zembinskaya road and did not even destroy the gates and bridges on it. Having received a report in Shabashevichi about the real crossing of Napoleon, the Danube army did not immediately, but the next morning, returned back, which was why the whole night was lost, and, having traveled 20 versts, it camped for the night at Borisov, although we had no more than 13 versts before the enemy’s crossing . The next day we set off forward; there was a battle of Stakhovsky, but it was not conducted in accordance with the rules adopted in the war.
In the Danube army was under arms:
Of all the Russian armies, the Danubian was the most combative. She fought continuously for six years with the Turks, almost without discharging her guns. Coming from Moldavia, everyone, from the General to the soldier, burned with the desire to fight Napoleon, pay the debt to the dear Fatherland, die for the adored Monarch, were sure that they would not only equal, but surpass their comrades, who labored in the main army and in the corps of Count Wittgenstein. With such troops, nothing was impossible: you could safely go, hit the heads of enemy columns at the crossing and then move wherever the need would require. Instead of Ertel's corps, which did not arrive at the army, they came to reinforce it on the day of the Stakhovsky battle: Yermolov, with 14 battalions of Miloradovich's vanguard, and the entire corps of Count Platov, but they, like half of the Danube army, did not participate in the case. Consequently, there were enough troops and it was possible, if not to stop Napoleon, then to make it difficult to cross him and hold him until Count Wittgenstein and Miloradovich, who came to Borisov the next day, struck from the rear.
It is unfair to think that Prince Kutuzov ordered Chichagov to pay exclusively attention to the lower Berezina, as if he probably believed that Napoleon's breakthrough would follow there. The field marshal wrote to the Admiral on November 10: “ not redundant observe if the enemy turns from Tolochin or Beaver to Pogost and Igumen. The second and last command was of November 13th. Describing the orders made for the main army and Count Wittgenstein, Prince Kutuzov, as if guessing Napoleon's move to Vilna after the Berezina crossing, says: Zembin, Pleschenitsy and Vileyka. To prevent this necessary so that you occupy a defile at Zembin with a detachment, in which it is convenient to keep a much more excellent enemy. Our main army from Kopys will go through Staroselye and Tsetserzhin to the town of Berezina, firstly, in order to find the best food for ourselves, and secondly, to preempt the enemy if he went from Beaver through Berezino to Igumen, to which many news give rise to conclusions. Below Borisov, 8 versts, at Ukholod, there are very convenient fords for the passage of cavalry. From these orders it is clear that Prince Kutuzov did not reject the possibility of Napoleon crossing below Borisov, but positively prescribed one thing: the need to occupy Zembin. If they had fulfilled his command, having destroyed bridges and gati in the Zembinsky defile, stretching for 2 versts, then after crossing the Berezina, Napoleon would have had no other means of retreat, as soon as he turned left, to Minsk, through Aptopol. Here he would enter swamps and dense forests, and Chichagov could take an extremely strong position not far from Stakhov, behind the Brodnya river, in front of which there was a swamp 100 fathoms wide. Consequently, after the cruel losses that the enemy had to suffer at the crossing of the Berezina, if he had managed to cross it, it would have been necessary to make another breakthrough and knock the Russians out of position at Brodnya. It took time to attack, but meanwhile Count Wittgenstein and the corps detached from the main army arrived in time. Wherever Napoleon turned between the positions of Zembinskaya and Stakhovskaya, everywhere he bogged down in bottomless, not quite frozen swamps; deprived of food and without cover, with exhausted troops, in blizzards and cold, he had to fall under our shots, surrender or die of hunger and cold. To what extent the foresight of Prince Kutuzov about Zembin was thorough, and how important it was to destroy bridges and gateways there, which, however, was easy to fulfill, is proved by the following circumstances. Engineer General Ferster, after Napoleon’s breakthrough, was sent by the Sovereign to Borisov to collect various information about the actions taking place on the Berezina, reported: “In the Zembinsky defiles, narrow passages and thin bridges surrounded by a swamp could contribute to the almost complete destruction of the enemy, if this defile were examined properly and the bridges were destroyed." The French themselves write: “If the Russians burned the Zembinsky bridges, then we would have no choice but to turn to Minsk, to the left, where Chichagov’s army was, because impassable swamps and marshy forests were several leagues to the right: Napoleon would have no means of to salvation." Another writer says: “If only some Cossack took fire from his pipe and set fire to the bridges, then all our efforts and crossing the Berezina would be in vain. Taken in a narrow space between swamps and rivers, without food or shelter, exposed to unbearable snowstorms, the main army and its Emperor would be forced to surrender without a fight. An eyewitness to the Berezina crossing, General Jomini, puts it this way: "The swamps are not completely frozen yet, and if the Russians had time to burn the Zemba bridges, then everything would be lost." One of the most experienced generals of the Napoleonic army, Dumas, says: “While passing along the Zembinsky bridges, the only road through a swamp stretching for a mile, we were convinced of the terrible danger that we avoided: nothing was easier for the enemy than to break or burn these bridges.”
Not only the Danube army, but also Count Wittgenstein had to prevent the enemy crossing. For reasons of circumstances and the will of Prince Kutuzov, he had to remain on the banks of the Ula until he received the right news: where would Napoleon go, to Lepel or Borisov? When Victor retreated from Cherei, in order to block the road from Orsha to Borisov, Count Wittgenstein did not attack him with all his might, but limited himself to one onslaught on his rearguard, which did not have the slightest influence on the course of affairs, because during the avant-garde clashes Napoleon continued to move unhindered towards Borisov. The caution of Count Wittgenstein's actions from Ula to Baran was based on the following reasons: 1) he did not know and could not fully imagine the disorder of the main French army, whose flight along the Orsha road was blocked from him by Victor, with regiments, for the most part retaining a military structure. The news Count Wittgenstein received about this army varied. According to some, Napoleon led 60, according to others, 80 thousand people, and by observations, through ordinary surveys in the war, it was impossible to find out how many troops were under Napoleon who retained their weapons; 2) Count Wittgenstein was also deterred from attacking Victor with the whole corps by fear of the proximity of the main enemy army and diligence, in case of defeat, to betray the path to the power of the enemy, along which Napoleon could then turn right to the Dvina to connect with MacDonald, Wrede and the Lithuanian confederation. Such were the reasons for the slow and overly cautious movements of Count Wittgenstein, which allowed Napoleon to come to Borisov harmlessly. On that day, when Napoleon was stretching up the Berezina from Borisov to Studyanka, Count Wittgenstein came to Kostritsy and here he learned too late about Napoleon's movement towards Studyanka, which could not have escaped us if we had passing sidings on the right side; they would certainly have stumbled upon the French and reported where the enemy was going. Having been informed of the beginning of Napoleon's crossing of the Berezina and finding the road to Veselovo and Studyanka impassable for artillery, Count Wittgenstein turned to Stary Borisov and used the entire corps to cut off one division, Partuno, and meanwhile the whole day, on the 15th, Napoleon calmly continued the crossing. During the attack on Viktor on the 16th, at Studyanka, Count Steingel's corps remained too long at Old Borisov to disarm Partuno, and the second column, Berg, did not ripen at the right time, which is why Viktor had the opportunity to hold out all day, was not completely defeated and sunk in the Berezina or taken prisoner with all the crowds of unarmed people who were on its left bank.
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Crossing the Berezina.
The image is reprinted from the 1812 website.
BEREZINA, a river in Belarus, on which, near the city of Borisov, on November 14 (26) -17 (29), 1812, a battle took place between Napoleon's armies retreating from Russia and Russian troops trying to cut off her escape routes. The idea of the Russian command was that the corps of General P. X. Wittgenstein from the north and the 3rd Western Army of Admiral P. V. Chichagov from the south take a defensive position on the line of the Ulla and Berezina rivers with the front to the east and cut off Napoleon's escape route to the west . The main grouping of the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal M. I. Kutuzov pursued the French army from the east. On November 11 (23), the vanguard of the enemy, led by Marshal N. Oudinot, approached Borisov. On November 12 (24), Chichagov, overestimating the strength of the enemy, withdrew troops (about 30 thousand people) from Borisov and retreated to the right bank of the Berezina from Zembin to Usha.
Oudinot was ordered to hold Borisov and start building a crossing north of Borisov near the village of Studenka. Napoleon's army, having united with the troops of marshals Oudinot and K. Victor, on November 14 (26) approached the Berezina. Napoleon, with the forces of 85-90 thousand people (of which up to 40 thousand combat-ready) decided to cross the Berezina near the village of Studenka (15 km from Borisov upstream), and in order to divert the attention of the Russians from the place of the crossing, he took demonstrative actions downstream the river. Chichagov, misled by the actions of the French, withdrew his forces 25 km south of Borisov, leaving a small barrier at the ford opposite Studenka. On the morning of November 14 (26), the advanced units of Oudinot's corps crossed the Berezina ford and pushed back the barrier to Stakhovo. By evening, the main forces of Napoleon (about 19 thousand combat-ready) crossed over two bridges built near Studenka. On November 15 (27), on the left bank, Wittgenstein's troops (40 thousand people) and the forward detachments of Kutuzov's main grouping (25 thousand people) surrounded the division of General L. Partuno (about 4 thousand people) in the Borisov region and forced the surrender. On November 16 (28) a battle broke out on the Berezina: on the right bank, the crossing troops of Marshals M. Ney and Oudinot (about 12 thousand people) successfully repelled the offensive of Chichagov’s troops, and on the left bank (near Studenka) Victor’s troops (about 7 thousand people) held out until evening against Wittgenstein's troops, they crossed the river at night. In the morning
On November 17 (29), by order of Napoleon, the bridges near Studenka were burned. On the left bank there were carts and about 40 thousand lagging soldiers, most of whom drowned during the crossing or were captured. In total, the enemy lost about 50 thousand people, and the Russians - 8 thousand. Due to the mistakes of Chichagov and the indecisive actions of Wittgenstein, Napoleon managed to avoid complete defeat and retreat to Vilna, retaining the core of his army.
Used materials of the book: Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. M., 1986.
Berezina - battle on November 14-16, 1812 between the French army and Russian troops (Patriotic War, 1812).
The Berezina is a river in Belarus, on the banks of which, on November 14-16, 1812, a battle took place between the French army under the command of Emperor Napoleon (75 thousand people) and Russian troops under the command of the admiral P.V. Chichagov and general P.H. Wittgenstein (80 thousand people). After the Red Ring around the Napoleonic troops began to shrink. Wittgenstein's corps (50,000 men) approached from the north, while Chichagov's army (30,000 men), which had come from the Ukraine, was already in Minsk. At the Berezina, they were preparing to close in and cut off Napoleon's escape route from Russia.
On November 9, the avant-garde units of Chichagov approached the Berezina and took the city of Borisov. But soon they were knocked out of there by the corps of Marshal N. Oudinot. The Russians retreated to the right bank and blew up the bridge behind them. The Berezina had not yet frozen over, and when Napoleon's main forces approached Borisov on November 13, they ran into the surface of the river. South of Borisov was another crossing. Napoleon sent Oudinot's corps there. But it was only a deception. With such a demonstration, Napoleon created the appearance that he was trying to capture the crossing south of Borisov.
The admiral mistook this maneuver for Napoleon's attempt to break through to connect with Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg's corps operating in Western Belarus. As a result, Oudinot's corps took almost the entire Chichagov army, which did not have a large number, into nowhere. In fact, Chichagov on the Berezina had 20 thousand people under arms, with whom he tried to cover the almost 60-kilometer section of a possible breakthrough by the French troops, the total number of which significantly exceeded the Russian forces beyond the Berezina.
While Chichagov was moving south, down the river, the main events unfolded 15 km north of Borisov, near the village of Studenka (the width of the river there reached 50 m), where the Polish uhlans found a ford, and the French sappers built temporary bridges. According to them, on November 14, the French army began crossing to the right bank. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein, who feared a collision with the main forces of Napoleon, acted cautiously and hesitated to advance to the Berezina. He went to the river only on November 15, when the crossing had already begun. By that time, on the left bank, it was covered by the corps of Marshal K. Viktor.
For two days, the French, repelling the attacks of scattered Russian detachments, crossed to the western coast. On November 15, messengers broke into Borisov M.I. Kutuzov avant-garde units of the pursuit under the command of the chieftain M.I. Platova and general A.P. Yermolova . Kutuzov himself was in no hurry to the Berezina, hoping that even without him there would be enough forces to eliminate the French army. It is worth noting that the plan to encircle Napoleon on the Berezina did not provide for a single command. This predetermined the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian commanders, each of whom made decisions independently. When Chichagov, realizing his mistake, returned to Borisov, the Napoleonic troops had already entrenched themselves on the right bank of the river.
On November 16, a fierce battle began on both sides of the Berezina, which became the culmination of the battle on the Berezina. Chichagov tried to throw back the French units covering the student crossing on the right bank. Wittgenstein attacked the corps of Marshal K. Victor, who covered the crossing on the left bank. The wooded area prevented the actions of the cavalry, which accounted for almost half of the number of Chichagov troops. Until 11 o'clock in the morning there was a stubborn frontal shooting battle, which cost both sides heavy losses.
Due to the low capacity of the built bridges, the huge congestion of people and convoys, panic, and the increased onslaught of the Russians, only a third of Napoleon's troops (25 thousand people) managed to break through to the west. The rest (about 50 thousand people) died in battle, froze to death, drowned or were captured. Fearing the capture of the Russian crossing. On November 17, Napoleon ordered to destroy it, leaving his troops on the left bank. Contemporaries noted that in some places the river was littered to the top with the corpses of people and horses. The Russians lost 8 thousand people in this battle. After the Berezina, the main forces of the Napoleonic army in Russia ceased to exist (see Red II).
Used materials of the book: Nikolai Shefov. Russian battles. Military History Library. M., 2002.
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Bego. Crossing the Berezina
Lie. Crossing the Berezina, November 14-17 (26-29), 1812 (eyewitness account).
On October 27, Napoleon's main forces reached Smolensk, where they plundered the remaining warehouses. Due to the threat of encirclement and the complete disorganization of his army, which was reduced to 60 thousand people, Napoleon decided to leave Smolensk on October 31. Leaving the city, the French army stretched for almost 60 km. Its vanguard was approaching Krasnoy, while the rearguard was just leaving Smolensk. Kutuzov took advantage of this. On November 3, he sent the vanguard of General Miloradovich (16 thousand people) to Krasnoy. He fired artillery fire at the French troops marching along the Smolensk road, then attacked them and, cutting off the rear columns, captured up to 2 thousand people. The next day, Miloradovich fought all day with the Beauharnais corps, capturing 1,500 prisoners from him. In this battle, Miloradovich, pointing out the suitable French to the grenadiers of the Pavlovsky regiment, uttered his famous phrase: "I give you these columns!" On November 5, the main forces of both armies entered the battle near Krasnoe. Kutuzov's plan was to gradually cut off French units on the road with strikes from the south and destroy them piecemeal. For this, two strike groups were allocated under the command of Generals Tormasov and Golitsyn. During a fierce battle, in which Miloradovich's detachment also took part, the Russians inflicted heavy losses on the Young Guard, the corps of Davout and Ney. Nevertheless, it was not possible to completely eliminate the French army. Part of it, led by Napoleon, managed to break through and continued to retreat to the Berezina. The French lost 32 thousand people in the battle of Krasnoe. (of which 26 thousand prisoners), as well as almost all of their artillery. Russian losses amounted to 2 thousand people. This battle was the biggest success of the Russian army since the beginning of the campaign. For Red Kutuzov received the title of Prince of Smolensk.
Battle of the Berezina (1812)
After the Red Ring around the Napoleonic troops began to shrink. Wittgenstein's corps (50,000 men) approached from the north, and Chichagov's army (60,000 men) approached from the south. At the Berezina, they were preparing to close in and cut off Napoleon's escape route from Russia. On November 9, Chichagov's units approached the Berezina and occupied the city of Borisov. But soon they were driven out of there by the French corps of Marshal Oudinot. The Russians retreated to the right bank of the river and blew up the bridge. Thus, the crossing on the main road, along which Napoleon's army retreated, was destroyed. The Berezina had not yet frozen over, and the French were trapped. On November 13, the main forces of Napoleon approached the Berezina, which, with the joined corps of Victor, Saint-Cyr and a number of other units, numbered up to 75 thousand people. In this critical situation, when every minute was precious, Napoleon acted quickly and decisively. South of Borisov was another crossing. Napoleon sent Oudinot's corps there. The French emperor sought to make the Russian commander believe that he would be crossing there to retreat to Minsk. Meanwhile, the main army of Kutuzov, marching towards Minsk, was moving to the area south of Borisov. A meeting with her could have ended in failure for Napoleon. He sought to withdraw to the north-west of Minsk, to Vilna. To do this, 15 km north of Borisov, near the village of Studenka, the Polish uhlans found a ford, where French sappers built temporary bridges. On them, Napoleon began crossing on November 14. The demonstration of Oudinot's body was a success. Chichagov, leaving part of the troops at Borisov, with the main forces went down the river. For two days, the French crossed, repelling the attacks of scattered detachments of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. On November 15, the vanguard units of the persecution sent by Kutuzov under the command of Ataman Platov and General Yermolov broke into Borisov. Kutuzov himself was in no hurry to the Berezina, hoping that even without him there were enough forces to eliminate the French army. When Chichagov finally returned to Borisov, the Napoleonic troops had already entrenched themselves on the right bank of the river. On November 16, a fierce battle broke out on both sides of the Berezina. Chichagov tried to push back the French units covering the Studenkov crossing on the right bank. Wittgenstein attacked the corps of Marshal Victor, who staunchly covered the crossing on the left bank. The wooded terrain hindered the maneuvering actions of the cavalry. All day long until 11 o'clock in the morning there was a stubborn frontal shooting battle, which cost heavy losses for both sides and became the culmination of the battle. Due to the low capacity of the built bridges, the huge concentration of people and convoys, panic and the intensification of the Russian onslaught, only one third of the troops (25 thousand people) managed to break through to the west, towards Vilna. The rest (about 50 thousand people) died in battle, froze to death, drowned or were captured. Fearing the capture of the Russian crossing, Napoleon ordered to destroy it, leaving a mass of his troops on the left bank. Contemporaries noted that in some places the river was littered to the top with the corpses of people and horses. The Russians lost 4 thousand people in this battle. After the Berezina, the main forces of the Napoleonic army in Russia ceased to exist.
During the campaign of 1812, the personnel color of the French army disappeared, which France could only dream of later. In 1813-1814, the veterans of the Moscow campaign who survived on the Berezina made up less than 5% of Napoleon's army (a considerable part of them ended up blocked in the Danzig fortress, which surrendered in December 1813). After 1812, Napoleon had a completely different army. With her, he could only delay his final downfall. Soon after the Berezina, Napoleon left the remnants of his army and went to France to collect new troops. At this time, severe frosts hit, accelerating the liquidation of the Napoleonic troops. In mid-December, Marshal Murat, left by the commander-in-chief, transferred only the miserable remnants of the Great Army across the frozen Neman. So ingloriously ended Napoleon's attempt to defeat Russia. History knows few examples of such military disasters. In his report, M.I. Kutuzov summed up the results of the campaign in this way. "Napoleon entered with 480 thousand, and withdrew about 20 thousand, leaving at least 150,000 prisoners and 850 guns." The death toll in the Russian troops amounted to 120 thousand people. Of these, killed and died from wounds - 46 thousand people. The rest died of disease mainly during the persecution of Napoleon.
In Russian history, the Patriotic War became the most intense in terms of the number of battles. On average, every month there were 5 battles. On December 25, on the day of the Nativity of Christ, the tsar issued a Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy and the victorious end of the Patriotic War of 1812. This day, like the date of the Battle of Poltava, also became an official religious holiday in memory of "the deliverance of the Church and the Russian State from the invasion of the Gauls and with them are twelve tongues."
November 25 reached the banks of the Berezina River. The water in it stood very high, and large ice floes rushed along its surface. On the opposite bank stood 30,000 Russians under Chichagov; a little further north stood Wittgenstein with an equally strong detachment, and Kutuzov, who had twice as large an army, pressed the French from the rear. It would be surprising if even a single person from the French army escaped during the brewing battle. Borisov had a strong bridge thrown across the Berezina. The Polish division of Dombrovsky, which was entrusted with the protection of this important point, was forced to retreat in front of a more numerous enemy. The French had to build bridges at other points; they almost did not have the necessary shells for such work, but they still managed to build two bridges near Studyanka.
Napoleon himself led the workers with indefatigable energy and was able to inspire courage in his soldiers again. French sappers stood for hours waist-deep in water that was as cold as ice. The remnants of the Napoleonic army began to cross these weak bridges with cries of "long live the emperor", which had not been heard in Napoleon's ears for a long time. During the first two days, the Russians did not interfere with the crossing, but from November 28, battles began again on both banks of the Berezina, and Marshals Ney, Victor and Oudinot even managed to inflict sensitive losses on the corps of Chichagov and Wittgenstein. Napoleon and his marshals never showed more remarkable strategic skill than during these unfortunate days.
Napoleon's army crossing the Berezina. Painting by P. von Hess, 1844
The most terrible scenes took place after those troops in which order was still observed crossed the river: then thousands of backward soldiers rushed to the bridges, and Russian artillery began to hit them with their cannonballs. Most of these unfortunates surrendered, and the Russians got huge booty after the battle on the Berezina. How many French soldiers drowned in the cold waves of the river or were crushed during a terrible crush, no one could count. Approximate losses are estimated at 30 thousand - half the damage suffered by the Napoleonic army in the terrible battle of Borodino. The disasters that befell the French while crossing the Berezina have become synonymous with the most terrible misfortunes that war can cause people. Even after ten years, traces of a terrible catastrophe were still visible. From the carts, people and horses falling into the water, an island was formed near Studyanka, dividing the river into two branches, and not far from these branches three elevations of human corpses were formed. “Human bones still stuck out from there, but they were wrapped in a thick layer of forget-me-nots: it was a terrifying combination of a delicate flower with a terrible memory,” a contemporary wrote.
Napoleon's army crossing the Berezina
After the battle of the Berezina, the French army numbered only 8,000 soldiers capable of combat, but even these soldiers carried the germs of death in themselves; stupidity and despair were expressed on their pale faces. According to official information, 243,600 enemy corpses were buried in Russia; and of the innumerable captives and soldiers left behind by sickness, only a few returned to their own country. Following the defeat on the Berezina, discipline in the Napoleonic army disappeared completely; all moral ties were severed, and along with the most noble feats of generosity and self-sacrifice, the most incredible atrocities were committed. All human feelings were dulled from terrible suffering. Only hunger defended its rights to such an extent that human meat was eaten to satisfy it. Only the shouts of “Hurrah” heard close by from the lips of Russian Cossacks were able to stir the petrified hearts with a feeling of fear. Half of Europe had to wear mourning. On December 3, Napoleon published the famous 29th bulletin, in which he announced to the Western peoples, who had not heard from him for several months, that the emperor was healthy, but “
