Some of them were rightly declared war criminals. Others escaped punishment. Still others did not live to see the end of the war.

Von Bock Theodor (1880–1945)

German Field Marshal.

Even before the outbreak of World War II, von Bock led the troops that carried out the Anschluss of Austria and invaded the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. With the outbreak of war, he commanded Army Group North during the war with Poland. In 1940, von Bock led the capture of Belgium and the Netherlands and the defeat of the French troops at Dunkirk. It was he who took the parade of German troops in occupied Paris.

Von Bock objected to an attack on the USSR, but when the decision was made, he led the Army Group Center, which carried out an attack in the main direction. After the failure of the attack on Moscow, he was considered one of the main responsible for this failure of the German army. In 1942, he led the Army Group "South" and for a long time successfully held back the offensive of Soviet troops on Kharkov.

Von Bock was distinguished by an extremely independent character, repeatedly clashed with Hitler and defiantly kept aloof from politics. After in the summer of 1942, von Bock opposed the Fuhrer's decision to divide Army Group South into 2 directions, Caucasian and Stalingrad, during the planned offensive, he was removed from command and sent to the reserve. A few days before the end of the war, von Bock died during an air raid.

Von Rundstedt Karl Rudolf Gerd (1875–1953)

German Field Marshal.

By the beginning of the Second World War, von Rundstedt, who had held important command positions back in the First World War, had already managed to retire. But in 1939, Hitler returned him to the army. Von Rundstedt became the main planner of the attack on Poland, codenamed "Weiss", and during its implementation he commanded Army Group South. He then led Army Group A, which played a key role in the capture of France, and also developed the failed Sea Lion plan to attack England.

Von Rundstedt objected to the Barbarossa plan, but after the decision was made to attack the USSR, he led Army Group South, which captured Kyiv and other major cities in the south of the country. After von Rundstedt, in order to avoid encirclement, violated the Fuhrer's order and withdrew troops from Rostov-on-Don, he was dismissed.

However, the very next year he was again drafted into the army to become commander-in-chief of the German armed forces in the West. His main task was to counter a possible Allied landing. After reviewing the situation, von Rundstedt warned Hitler that a long-term defense with the available forces would be impossible. At the decisive moment of the landings in Normandy, June 6, 1944, Hitler canceled von Rundstedt's order to transfer troops, thereby wasting time and giving the enemy an opportunity to develop the offensive. Already at the end of the war, von Rundstedt successfully resisted the Allied landing in Holland.

After the war, von Rundstedt, thanks to the intercession of the British, managed to avoid the Nuremberg Tribunal, and participated in it only as a witness.

Von Manstein Erich (1887–1973)

German Field Marshal.

Manstein was considered one of the strongest strategists of the Wehrmacht. In 1939, as Chief of Staff of Army Group A, he played a key role in developing a successful plan for the invasion of France.

In 1941, Manstein was part of Army Group North, which captured the Baltic states, and was preparing to attack Leningrad, but was soon transferred to the south. In 1941-42, the 11th Army under his command captured the Crimean Peninsula, and for the capture of Sevastopol, Manstein received the rank of Field Marshal.

Then Manstein commanded the Don Army Group and unsuccessfully tried to rescue the Paulus army from the Stalingrad cauldron. Since 1943, he led the Army Group "South" and inflicted a sensitive defeat on the Soviet troops near Kharkov, and then tried to prevent the crossing of the Dnieper. During the retreat, Manstein's troops used the tactics of "scorched earth".

Having suffered a defeat in the Battle of Korsun-Shevchensk, Manstein retreated, violating Hitler's order. Thus, he saved part of the army from encirclement, but after that he was forced to retire.

After the war, he was convicted by a British tribunal for war crimes for 18 years, but already in 1953 he was released, worked as a military adviser to the government of Germany and wrote his memoirs Lost Victories.

Guderian Heinz Wilhelm (1888–1954)

German colonel general, commander of the armored forces.

Guderian is one of the main theorists and practitioners of "blitzkrieg" - lightning war. He assigned a key role in it to tank units, which were supposed to break through behind enemy lines and disable command posts and communications. Such tactics were considered effective, but risky, creating the danger of being cut off from the main forces.

In 1939-40, in military campaigns against Poland and France, the blitzkrieg tactics fully justified itself. Guderian was at the pinnacle of fame: he received the rank of colonel general and high awards. However, in 1941, in the war against the Soviet Union, this tactic failed. The reason for this was both the vast Russian expanses and the cold climate in which equipment often refused to work, and the readiness of the Red Army units to resist this method of warfare. Guderian's tank troops suffered heavy losses near Moscow and were forced to retreat. After that, he was sent to the reserve, and later held the post of inspector general of tank troops.

After the war, Guderian, who was not charged with war crimes, was quickly released and lived out his life writing his memoirs.

Rommel Erwin Johann Eugen (1891–1944)

German Field Marshal, nicknamed "Desert Fox". He was distinguished by great independence and a penchant for risky attacking actions, even without the sanction of the command.

At the beginning of World War II, Rommel participated in the Polish and French campaigns, but his main successes were associated with military operations in North Africa. Rommel led the Afrika Korps, which was originally attached to help the Italian troops, who were defeated by the British. Instead of strengthening the defenses, as ordered by the order, Rommel went on the offensive with small forces and won important victories. He acted in the same way in the future. Like Manstein, Rommel assigned the main role to rapid breakthroughs and maneuvering of tank forces. And only by the end of 1942, when the British and Americans in North Africa had a great advantage in manpower and equipment, Rommel's troops began to suffer defeat. Subsequently, he fought in Italy and tried, together with von Rundstedt, with whom he had serious disagreements that affected the combat capability of the troops, to stop the Allied landings in Normandy.

In 1944, Rommel took part in a conspiracy of senior officers against Hitler, or at least knew about him. A few days before the planned assassination attempt on the Fuhrer, he was seriously wounded. After the failure of the assassination attempt and the disclosure of the network of conspirators, Rommel, popular among the troops, unlike other participants in the conspiracy, was given the opportunity to commit suicide. It was officially reported that the Field Marshal died from his wounds, and the day of his funeral was declared a day of national mourning in Germany.

Field Marshal Keitel, who served with Hitler throughout the war, clearly wrote that he could not understand Hitler's plans and asked to go to the front three times, suggesting that Hitler replace himself, as Keitel believed, with the more intelligent Field Marshal Manstein. 116

After the war, all German generals of those who did not fall under the reprisal of the Nuremberg Tribunal began to blame all their mistakes and defeats on Hitler, the "smartest" Field Marshal of Germany Manstein was no exception in this. Nevertheless, he, too, is compelled to acknowledge Hitler's outstanding abilities for analysis. "But, in addition to this, Hitler had great knowledge and an amazing memory, as well as creative imagination in the field of technology and all weapons problems"- wrote E. Manstein. 117

Keitel, who knew that after the Nuremberg Tribunals he would be executed, and who, for this reason, had nothing to lose, wrote more frankly, including about what exactly Hitler had and what his generals did not have:

"I mention this only to show how the Fuhrer, with his incomparable gift of foresight, delved into all the details of the practical implementation of his own ideas and always looked to the root when he undertook something. I had to state this again and again in all areas of my official sphere.Thus, both the higher commanders and we, in the OKW, 28 forced to use this thorough method of work. The Fuhrer tirelessly asked questions, made comments and gave instructions, trying to capture the essence, as long as his indescribable fantasy still saw some gaps. From all this one can imagine why we often spent hours reporting to him and discussing various matters. This was a consequence of his method of work, which was so different from our traditional military skills, which taught us to transfer the decision to carry out orders given to our lower organs and headquarters. Whether I wanted it or not, I had to adapt to his system." 116

That is, thanks to his exceptional abilities for fantasy and imagination, Hitler could imagine a battle or a military operation in his mind, scroll through thousands of options for their development, choose the best one, moreover, such that his generals fell into hysterics, so Hitler’s ideas seemed to them stupid, unusual, unexpected, paradoxical.

Here, for example, Hitler's conflicts with his generals in the field of armaments.

When the German designers created the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, only Hitler appreciated its capabilities in the fight against the enemy's fortifications. He imagined: the fortifications, the terrain and the tremendous speed of the projectile in contact with the fortification, and realized that this gun was exactly what was needed to fight reinforced concrete forts and pillboxes. The generals considered his fantasies to be nonsense: this gun has a very light projectile and, according to the experience of the First World War, it, falling from above, will not break through concrete, and this gun is not suitable for firing at embrasures, since it was impossible to pull it up to the pillbox due to its gravity at 300-400 m. And when Hitler removed Ferster from his post at the beginning of 1938 because he built fortifications on the border with Poland so that they could be shot from the Polish side with similar weapons, then Keitel began to consider Hitler is a tyrant. But the Germans occupied the Czech Sudetes.

“The Czech border fortifications aroused the greatest interest not only among the military, but, of course, among Hitler himself. They were built on the model of the French Maginot Line under the guidance of French fortification engineers. We were simply amazed by the power of large barrage forts and artillery fortified positions. In the presence of the Fuhrer, experimental shelling from our guns was carried out.We were shocked by the penetration ability of our 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, the shells of which, by direct fire, completely pierced ordinary dugouts from a distance of up to 2000 m. when he gave the order to use them".

Then it became clear to everyone why Hitler removed Förster from the post of general of sapper troops: "Later, the war against France confirmed Hitler's rightness here too, because the French coastal structures on the opposite bank were destroyed by our 88-mm guns when firing direct fire from the first hit".

Now it is unconditionally considered that G. Guderian was the main theorist of the massive use of ground forces. But what could this commander of an automobile regiment do without Hitler's support against the reinforced concrete wall of "professional" generals? After all, even Hitler was not easy to break through them. For example, Germany was not really ready for a war against Czechoslovakia, and the only idea that could promise success was the idea of ​​breaking through the Czech fortifications and quickly bringing large tank formations into the rear of the Czechs. This idea of ​​Hitler was opposed by the commander of the ground forces Brauchitsch and his chief of staff Halder. They believed that since Germany still had little artillery, then all the tanks should be evenly distributed among the infantry divisions. For 4 hours in a row, Hitler tried to explain to Brauchitsch and Halder the essence of the matter, and, as Keitel writes, he was forced to give up on them: "Hitler lost patience and, in the end, ordered them, in accordance with his demand, to withdraw all tank formations and massively use them to break through the Pilsen. Coldly and irritably, he said goodbye to both gentlemen".

By the time of the French campaign, the German generals had again begun to sabotage the mechanization of the army, believing that it was already excessively motorized, and this greatly hampered Hitler. Keitel writes:

"However, only during the winter, primarily as a result of new interventions by Hitler, from the initially too weak tank forces a corps under the command of Guderian was formed, and then a real tank army, led by General von Kleist and Chief of Staff Zeitler. This should be attributed to exceptional perseverance and the unbending will of the Fuhrer".

By the way, historians almost unanimously assert that the victorious plan for the war with France and its allies - the plan to break through the Ardennes to Abbeville - belongs to Manstein. But what is this assertion based on, apart from Manstein's own agreement with it? In fact, as Keitel writes, this idea was Hitler's plan from the very beginning. Back in October 1939, when the very first version of the war plan in France, developed by the German General Staff, was being considered, the following happened. "A few days later - it was probably in mid-October - General Halder was summoned to the Führer to report on the West operational plan. Jodl and I were present. Although Hitler interrupted the speaker with various remarks, he concluded by saying: from expressing his position, he will refrain until Halder hands him a map with a plan of operation. When Halder left, Hitler told us something like this: this is the old Schlieffen plan with a strong right wing on the Atlantic coast; such operations do not go unpunished twice! a different view and in the coming days I will tell you (Yodl and me) about it, and then I will talk to the OKH myself. 29

Due to lack of time, I do not want to consider here the operational issues arising from this, but I will limit myself to stating: it was Hitler personally who demanded a breakthrough of tank groups through the Sedan to the Atlantic coast near Abbeville in order to envelop from the rear and cut off the Franco -English Motorized Army.

The German General Staff reared up against this plan, but even then, in October 1939, Hitler said: "We will win this war, even if it is a hundred times contrary to the doctrine of the General Staff". And the meeting between Manstein and Hitler, at which Manstein expressed his ideas on the plan to him, took place only in February 1940. 117 And since Manstein’s friend was a friend of Hitler’s adjutant, then go and guess today: either Manstein himself thought of breaking through the Ardennes, or his friend suggested what Hitler needed to say in order to please him.

In almost all operations of the Second World War, Hitler's military genius prevails even over the extraordinary abilities of his generals. He gave this and insisted on the order "Not a step back" in the winter of 1941/1942 near Moscow. Ruthlessly dismissed those generals who tried to retreat. 30 Keitel writes:

“But it would be contrary to the truth if I did not state here with all conviction: the catastrophe was avoided only thanks to Hitler’s willpower, perseverance and merciless firmness. and the blindness dictated by the adversity, the hard pressed and suffering from terrible cold (this cause of apathy) Army Group Center, was not crossed out by the inexorable, uncompromising opposition and iron energy of the Fuhrer, the German army in 1941 would inevitably suffer the fate of the Napoleonic army of 1812. This I, as a witness and participant in the events of those terrible weeks, must say quite definitely! All heavy weapons, all tanks and all motorized means would remain on the battlefield. Conscious of their own defenselessness thus created, the troops would also lose their hand weapons and, having behind their backs ruthless pursuer, would run".

And even in his last operation, in which Hitler's military genius surpassed the intellect of Stalin's gaining experience, Hitler had to overcome indecision and panic among his generals. In the early summer of 1942, Hitler, having received intelligence about the impending offensive of the Soviet troops from the Barvenkovsky ledge, developed his own counter-operation and "caught" Stalin. But Timoshenko's blow near Kharkov was so strong and the threat of encirclement of the Germans themselves was so real that the German generals who commanded the troops panicked. Keitel writes:

"The spring operation (1942) in the Poltava region began at the last moment, when the Russians deeply wedged into the front line, which threatened to break through the weak, still stretched defensive lines. Field Marshal Bock wanted to bring into battle the counterstrike provided at his disposal and partly more forces thrown up where there was a danger of an enemy breakthrough in a westerly direction.The Führer, as commander-in-chief of the ground forces, believed that a counteroffensive should be launched on the basis of the wedging arc, in a chordal direction, in order to cut off the enemy, who was in a bag.However, von Bock was afraid that "He won't make it in time with this maneuver. Then Hitler intervened himself and ordered to act in accordance with his plan. He turned out to be right: at the stage of the greatest crisis, the battle turned into a decisive defeat for the Russians with an unexpectedly large number of prisoners of war."

How Hitler's generals settled in Germany. August 24th, 2017

When in the summer of 1950 a short, gray-haired man in the uniform of a former Wehrmacht general appeared before a Soviet military tribunal and began to give confused testimony about his past, the chairman of the court could hardly have guessed what the fate of this man would be.
Then it was an ordinary defendant who tried in every possible way to justify himself, shifting the blame on others, hiding some facts and forgetting others.
But the charges were heavy, and the court in its verdict stated that the defendant "participated in the issuance of criminal orders for the forcible evacuation of peaceful Soviet citizens from settlements near the cities of Pskov and Ostrov in 1944;
on the conduct of punitive expeditions against the civilian Soviet population in connection with military operations against Soviet patriotic partisans; about the introduction of a particularly cruel regime in the camps for prisoners of war of the Soviet Army;

About the forced use of peaceful Soviet citizens and prisoners of war to work on defensive structures for German troops;
about the destruction during the retreat from the regions of the Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov regions of railway tracks and buildings.
In addition, he allowed the destruction of the cities of Pskov, Novgorod, Leningrad, the destruction of historical monuments of art in the cities of Gatchina, Peterhof, Pavlovsk and Pushkin, and also allowed robberies and atrocities on the part of soldiers and officers of military units subordinate to him against the peaceful Soviet population of the aforementioned regions and prisoners of war of Soviet citizens.

On June 29, 1950, the defendant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. And on April 1, 1961, this man replaced General Heusinger as Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. His name is Friedrich Furch.
Ferch's appointment to this high post presents a rather difficult problem for a researcher of the military policy of the FRG. Not because it followed unexpectedly. On the contrary, it was hard to expect otherwise.
However, the appearance of Friedrich Ferch in such a position indicated that the military policy of the Federal Republic had crossed some invisible border, passing which it is already very difficult to return from madness to reason, from impotent anger to a realistic assessment of the situation, from the thirst for revenge to a sober course.

Friedrich Ferch in the Bundeswehr (right). And his predecessor in office was also Wehrmacht General Adolf Heusinger.

When the court spoke about the actions of the 18th Army, which turned the Novgorod, Leningrad and Pskov regions into a "scorched earth zone", Ferch argued that his troops performed only actions that were "militarily necessary", and even cared about the fate of the civilian population . Let's face it here, too.
For more than two years, the divisions of the 18th Army and its rear were stationed on the territory of the Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov regions. Here are some figures from the acts of the Extraordinary State Commission for Establishing and Investigating the Atrocities of the Nazi Invaders.
On the territory of the present Novgorod region, 6513 civilians were shot, 430 were hanged, 4851 died as a result of torture, 166,167 people were driven into captivity. The Nazi invaders destroyed 1087 schools, 921 club buildings, theaters, museums, libraries, 172 hospitals and clinics, 180 nurseries and orphanages.
During the investigation and during the trial, Ferch pleaded responsible for the fact that it was on the orders of the army headquarters in the autumn of 1943 that the civilian population was forcibly evacuated from the Novgorod region, and in March 1944 from the Pskov region - Ostrov.

The world knows about the barbarous destruction of the French city of Oradour-sur-Glane and the Czechoslovak village of Lidice. In the same Novgorod region, from October 15 to November 15, 1943, 30 villages were burned - 500 peasant households. Thousands of peaceful Soviet citizens were brutally killed. In the grave pits found near the villages of the Batetsk region Zhestyanaya Gorka and Chernoye, 3,700 corpses were found.
On December 28, 1945, in Leningrad, at an evening court session in the case of a group of German war criminals, an officer of the 21st Army of the airfield division, Captain Shtrüfing, was interrogated.
- Did you receive orders to burn down all settlements and exterminate Soviet people?
“Yes, I did,” he replied.
- Who did they come from?
- The division received an order from the army. It was signed by the commander and General Furch...

Foreign tourists who now come to Novgorod are amazed that in this ancient city, whose name was known long before the discovery of America, there are almost no old houses.
The reason is very simple: in 1943-1944. units of the 18th German army, retreating, destroyed 2306 houses out of 2346 here. All hospitals, schools, museums, libraries, industrial enterprises, water supply, power plants were completely destroyed.
The city theater was used as a stable. The printing house, post office, telegraph, radio center were destroyed. Nothing has survived from the city's book fund, which numbered about 200 thousand volumes. Centuries-old trees were cut down near the ancient Novgorod Kremlin and the boulevard on the banks of the Volkhov.
The small town of Ostrov also had to drink its cup of suffering. In March 1944, its population was almost completely evicted by the Germans, and in the summer of 1944 the city was burned to the ground. So Furch ordered. On this score, we have the testimony of General Beck-Bereps, commander of the 32nd German Infantry Division. On January 24, 1950, he testified during the investigation: "The city of Ostrov was destroyed, as I later learned, according to the previously developed plan for the retreat of the 18th Army."
Such is the truth. Before the trial, Furch either lied, or deep down believed that the extermination of civilians and the destruction of cities was a "military necessity."

When the court began to examine the punitive acts of Ferch's troops, the former Wehrmacht general took the following position: he was ready to admit that the instructions on fighting the partisans were inhuman, but he allegedly "did not put these instructions into practice, since in the area where I acted with his troops, the actions of the partisans were not felt. How were things here?
In fact, the headquarters of the 18th army performed many functions that went beyond the direct leadership of the new troops.
So, he was also in charge of punitive operations against Soviet partisans. The chief of staff of the 18th Army, Friedrich Ferch, became the direct leader of punitive operations against the partisans of the Leningrad, Novgorod and Pskov regions.
During the investigation, Ferch said: "I confirm that I gave orders to clear the Luga-Novgorod region of partisans." A regime of terror and robbery reigned in the areas occupied by the 18th Army.
So, this time too, Ferch lied before the court, hiding the facts of the brutal destruction of partisans and civilians, or considered this the norm. One of the two - and each speaks of a man Friedrich Ferch; rather, its inhumanity.
It is in the light of these facts that the appointment of General Fertsch to the highest military post in the Federal Republic of Germany should be considered.

In order to complete the portrait of Furch, we will add only a few strokes. In the Soviet prisoner of war camp, he was emphatically defiant.
When Field Marshal Franz Scherner arrived at the camp, the same "bloody Franz" who, according to Hitler's last will, was to become the new commander-in-chief of the ground forces, he became Ferch's closest friend.
Both of them developed a plan for the formation of new troops and a plan for a new organization of the high command. However, Scherner believed that he would have to remain in the background - he assigned Ferch an active role.
So, before us is the line: Hitler appointed Scherner as his successor as commander of the ground forces, Scherner chose Furch as his successor. And in 1961 this appointment was confirmed by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Having come to control the Bundeswehr, Ferch began to form its top in his own image and likeness.
http://militera.lib.ru/research/bezymensky1/index.html

It was not at all out of sympathy for the USSR that they sought to destroy the Fuhrer

July 20, 1944 at headquarters Adolf Hitler"Wolf's Lair" thundered a powerful explosion. The shock wave tore apart the meeting room and killed several senior officers. The leader of the Third Reich himself escaped with burns and burst eardrums.

The failed assassination attempt signed the death warrant for the German Resistance. The investigation showed that there was a conspiracy of the generals; over the following months, the Gestapo arrested more than seven thousand people, 200 of whom were shot.

Generals against the war

The explosion at the Wolf's Lair was far from the first attempt on Hitler's life. The top military leadership of Germany was preparing to eliminate him back in 1938. The generals feared a war with England and France, which could start due to the occupation of the Sudetenland. The German generals believed that the country was not ready to fight with the two strongest states of the continent.

The conspirators, which included the chief of staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Ludwig Beck, head of the Abwehr (military intelligence) admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris, generals Erich Hoepner And Erwin von Witzleben, intended to remove Hitler as soon as he ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia, establish a provisional government and announce new elections for the head of state.

The coup d'état was thwarted ... by the British. Prime Minister Nevvil Chamberlain initiated the signing of the Munich Treaty, according to which France and England recognized the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. The threat of war was removed, and with it the motive to overthrow Hitler was gone.

The occupation of Poland in 1939, the capture of the Scandinavian countries and the rapid defeat of France in 1940 raised Hitler's authority and popularity to unprecedented heights. Even the principled opponents of the Fuhrer in those years could not but admit that the “corporal” managed to achieve what neither the Kaiser could do WilliamII, nor the iron chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Attempts to prepare the removal of Hitler before each of these operations ended in failure - none of the field marshals who were approached by the conspirators agreed to lead the Reich.

The conditions for a new conspiracy arose only in 1941, after the attack on the USSR. Another miracle did not happen: the Reich could not destroy the Soviet colossus with a swift blow and was drawn into a protracted conflict on two fronts. Professional military men, many of whom commanded units back in the First World War, perfectly understood what this would lead their country to.

Aristocratic conspirators

The leader of the conspirators was the representative of the General Staff at the headquarters of Army Group Center Henning von Tresckow, Field Marshal's nephew Fedora von Bock. An aristocrat by birth and a staunch anti-Nazi, von Tresckow told his friends even before the war that only the assassination of Hitler could save Germany.

On March 13, 1943, a bomb was planted on Hitler's plane, which was visiting the headquarters of the Center group. The explosive device was disguised as a parcel. Germany was not lucky: the fuse failed due to the low temperature in the luggage compartment.

The second attempt was prepared by Comrade von Treskov, Baron Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff. On March 23, the head of the Reich was going to visit an exhibition of captured Soviet armored vehicles. The tour guide was Colonel von Gersdorff. In preparation for the elimination of Hitler, he hid two small mines in his clothes, setting the clockwork to a 20-minute delay.

This time, Hitler was saved by his hyperactive nature: having briefly examined the Soviet tanks, he left the exposition after 15 minutes. The Baron barely had time to clear himself.

Six months later, in November 1943, another aristocratic officer Axel von dem Boucher prepared to blow up Hitler with a grenade during a demonstration of the new German uniform. However, the head of the Reich never came to the demonstration of military fashion.

July bad luck

To put an end to the protracted game of cat and mouse was the attempt that the count was preparing Claus Schenck von Stauffenberg. The former cavalryman managed to fight in Poland and North Africa. Covering the retreat of the famous "desert fox" Erwin Rommel, Stauffenberg fell under an English bomb, which deprived him of his eye, left hand and two fingers of his right.

On July 1, 1944, he was promoted to the rank of colonel, and on the same day he was appointed chief of staff of the reserve army, commanded by Colonel General Friedrich Fromm, sympathetic to the conspiracy. In this capacity, Stauffenberg received access to events involving Hitler.

The conspirators approached the preparation of the July assassination attempt very carefully. The plan was worked out under the leadership of an infantry general Friedrich Olbricht and was called Operation Valkyrie.

The idea was not limited to the murder of the country's top Nazi. Immediately after the elimination of Hitler, the military planned to use the reserve army to attack and kill the SS troops, seize key infrastructure, arrest, and, if necessary, execute key leaders of the Nazi regime. It was also decided that if Fromm showed indecision or began to waver, he would be immediately removed, and a retired general would take his place. Erich Hoepner.

In the future, it was planned to start separate negotiations with Great Britain and the USA, while continuing the war against the USSR.

Despite careful study, the operation did not work out. The conspirators missed the opportunity to blow up Hitler on the 6th, 11th and 15th of July. The bomb, handed over to Stauffenberg by the leadership of the Abwehr, was registered in the colonel's briefcase, who over and over again wore it to events. However, the constant delays, early departures and changes in the plans of the choleric Fuhrer did not allow the pedantic officers to realize their plans.

The July 20 meeting was the fourth attempt in a month to put an end to the leader. Exhausted by constant nervous tension, Stauffenberg went at him with the firm intention of blowing up the Fuhrer at all costs.

However, the conspirators were again out of luck. The meeting was originally planned to be held in a concrete bunker. The explosion of two kilograms of English exogen in a confined space left no chance of survival for any of the participants. However, due to renovations, the meeting was moved to a wooden barracks. There, the blast wave demolished the roof, knocked out the windows, broke through the walls ... and left alive most of the participants in the meeting.

The Third Reich and the war unleashed in Europe are still perhaps the most important event and phenomenon in the history of the twentieth century. And contrary to popular interest in the very specific personality of Adolf Hitler, the infamous and at the same time one of the greatest empires was not created by the hands of one person. The military conquests that redrawn the map of Europe became possible largely thanks to the bright talented personalities of the officer corps. The color of the Prussian generals, as they were called and simply skilled careerists. And although the Nuremberg Trials did not recognize the governing bodies of the army as criminal organizations, accusations of war crimes and waging an aggressive war still cause heated debate. And the attitude towards the "loyal officers of the Reich", in the works of historians - from contempt and desire for just retribution, to a certain degree of admiration. In this cycle Guido Knopp did not aim to tell about all the commanders of the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe (or at least all the field marshals). In his characteristic manner of parsing vivid images (remember the book Behind Hitler's Back), he turns to the stories of six very different people whom history has put on a par.

Fuhrer's Footman - Keitel

This name is known to most people who are somehow familiar with the theme of the Second World War. It was the signature of the field marshal, formal in nature, that was put under the second, already legendary, Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945. The man who ended his life on the scaffold of the Nuremberg prison is known as a faithful and consistent performer, a real "subordinate" of Hitler. One of the few war criminals who eventually admitted his guilt, but only for inaction. For blindly doing his job as a model military officer. Most historians and publicists, like Lawrence Rees, William Shearer, Lidell Hart, Kurt von Tippelskirch, Richard Evans, unanimously agree that the field marshal actually idolized his boss and patron. He became one of the clearest examples of ambition and the struggle for favor, which, in the conditions of the bloodiest conflict, cost the lives of millions of people. To paraphrase a famous expression, the path to the Fuhrer's heart lay through diligence and fanatical devotion to the common cause and personally to his orders.".

The first episode takes the nickname of the eminent officer in detail and talks about the formation of such a correspondence. From a young officer of stately Prussian appearance and character, to one of the key architects of the German rearmament program in 1934-1939. A whole selection of shots with the field marshal is presented, mostly surrounded by Hitler. The material is valuable for its great attention to the lively comments of older people who are familiar with the person in question firsthand. Former officers of the High Command, the Berghof headquarters, even Frau Keitel, who was supposed to be about 100 years old at the time of filming. Not only his personality and character are actively discussed, but also the consequences of his activities in his post. The continuity of the policy of destroying the enemy from the plans of the Fuhrer to the hand of Keitel, who signed the key directives.

Strategist - Manstein

The name of this renowned military expert of the Wehrmacht has long been associated with the genius of combat strategy and planning of offensive operations. Important attention is paid here to the formation of the personality of the future field marshal, from a boy with a hereditary general in his blood, to an informal leader of the command during the Second World War. Was a purebred representative of the so-called now Prussian officers and nephew of President Hindenburg. Such a trained and ambitious man as Erich Manstein quickly rose through the ranks while still in the Reichswehr and was patronized by von Fritsch and Beck. And although he began the war with relative obscurity, it was Erich von Manstein who owns the legendary Blitzkrieg plan against France and Belgium in May-June 1940. Although, as it was not difficult to predict, Hitler appropriated all the merits of the military strategy, the outstanding subordinate received the opportunity and authority to prove himself in the future.

Great importance is given to the relationship between the commander-in-chief and his most talented field marshal. Two veterans of the First World War did not always find common ground at the table with military cards. It is on the example of Manstein that the topic of the discrepancy between the real situation at the front, especially on the East, and the illusions of conquering Lebensraum in the head of the leader of the Third Reich is actively raised here. It is unpopular to voice such things, but the former corporal should have listened to people who were guided by something more than a fanatical belief in a higher destiny. Still living officers and soldiers of the Wehrmacht comment on the relationship between the owner of the Reich Chancellery and an outstanding strategist. The latter despised the commander-in-chief, but he lacked the fortitude to act in his own way. A vivid example was the tragedy with the 6th army of Paulus, surrounded at Stalingrad. The immediate boss of another newly-made field marshal did not dare to go against the will of the Fuhrer, although tens of thousands of ordinary soldiers freezing in the snow hoped for him.

Traitor - Paulus

Another name of the German commander, known to a wide range of people, even remotely familiar with the history of the most famous conflict. Friedrich Paulus is associated with shots of frostbitten Wehrmacht soldiers among the ruins of Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943. As part of the project, the betrayal of one of the most respected generals is given decisive importance. As you know, Hitler had his own vision of the events of the Eastern Front and for a long time did not accept even tactical retreats, with the aim of further regrouping troops. The tactics of fighting to the last soldier, to the last cartridge, were tragically implemented for several months in the difficult fate of the 6th Army, which was previously called " conqueror of capitals"(Paris, Kyiv). The promised supply did not reach the resulting cauldron. The soldiers ended up in a real winter hell, being deprived of even proper winter uniforms. The superior forces of the Red Army only tightened the grip even more, while the German soldiers and officers demonstrated an unprecedented will to live.

To support large-scale Nazi propaganda, a strong leader and father of the army, who himself is ready to give his life for the fatherland, was important. Friedrich Paulus, after losing the chance to break out of the encirclement, watched his subordinates die daily. And although the news came from Berlin about the assignment of the rank of field marshal and an unambiguous hint from the Fuhrer not to surrender alive, the commander of the 6th Army requested surrender from his rivals. According to the former corporal, who was far from the winter hell of Stalingrad, 90,000 surviving soldiers had to lay their lives on the altar of future victories, so the surrender of Paulus was a blow to propaganda and military devotion to the still strongest army on the continent. Further evidence at the Nuremberg trials against their former leaders and a relatively quiet life - first in the USSR, as Stalin's personal trophy, and then in the GDR, under round-the-clock surveillance by the secret services.

Idol - Rommel

In the conditions of a destructive world war unleashed by a group of people, it is especially important for the regime and its leaders to set true, militantly contagious examples for the entire nation. While the panzer divisions are freezing on the approaches to the enemy's stronghold in the East, near Moscow, the glorious victories of the African Corps amuse the minds of millions of Germans on the radio and on the screens of cinemas. And although most modern people bypass this theater of operations as insignificant, the name of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and his status " Desert fox have become an integral part of history. Another conscientious and ambitious executor of the will of the Fuhrer, who had no interest in the political behind the scenes, but was a loyal National Socialist and wanted to win the war - any war in which his Vaterland would have to participate. One of the most determined and resourceful commanders of the Wehrmacht and the entire Second World War.

Rommel's personality here is a clear illustration of a more general theme - as he called his book. Euphoria from renewed dignity and political power to disillusionment and ruin in 1945. So the illustrious Field Marshal won one victory after another in the hot desert of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. His name descended from the lips of millions of enthusiastic Germans. After a disappointing turning point in the war, the loss of North Africa as a foothold, the unsuccessful defense of the Western Wall from an allied landing in June 1944, yesterday's idol passed into the camp of waste material. Great importance is attached to the tragic end of the general, which was initiated from the very top and turned into a farce for the entire German people. The leader of the nation could not and did not want to forgive the man who destroyed, among other things, the myth of the invincibility of the Reich army, and who knew about the assassination attempt on Hitler himself. Particularly interesting are the comments from the elderly son of the field marshal, who verbally conveys important moments in his father's career.

Conspirator - Canaris

It was the turn of a lesser-known general public, but not without importance, a personality. The name of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris almost always appears in association with the plot against Hitler on July 20, 1944. And although he did not take a direct part in the events of that day and those preceding them, he was an important link in the secret organization of the German resistance, as an officer of the high command. It is precisely that attempt at a coup d'état and the degree of participation of Canaris in it that is given here only nominal, final significance. It is much more interesting to understand the formation of silent opposition to the atrocities of the Nazi regime in a man who for a long time was the head of foreign intelligence. The activities of the Abwehr, of course, also led to the death of people, the civilian population. And people who knew the admiral doubt that if he had survived the war (he was executed 4 days before the concentration camp was liberated by American troops), he would have become a hero in the eyes of the allied countries.

Wilhelm Canaris was not a poultry farmer, an unsuccessful lawyer or a stormtrooper, as some prominent figures of the regime were. From his youth, he showed himself as an experienced sailor, faithful to his homeland and military duty. Even during the First World War, he began to actively work for German agents and, according to popular versions, was Mata Hari's lover and had a hand in the murder of Rosa Luxembourg and hiding her executioners. Under his leadership, intelligence was conducted on the eve of World War II, disinformation of potential opponents, sponsoring separate formations in the Middle East and England. The insightful Canaris foresaw the tragic outcome of the war of annihilation unleashed by Hitler, and, being aware of the atrocities against the peoples of Europe, he balanced between opposition and retention of office. Even more ambiguous today seem to be his strained friendly relations with Heydrich.

Pilot - Udet

Quite a prominent personality in the future fate of the Wehrmacht army of Nazi Germany, whose name is little known to a wide range of people, even fans of the theme of the Second World War. As a boy, Ernst Udet dreamed of becoming a conqueror of the sky, when airplanes, as a phenomenon, were just beginning to penetrate society. From an early age, his passion was the cockpit. With the beginning of the Great War, Udet, as a volunteer, tried to get into the Air Force of Kaiser's Germany, which he did not succeed on the first try. The second most successful pilot of his country in that war was a real national hero and treasure, a living embodiment of military aviation, even when it, as a phenomenon, was abolished in accordance with the post-war Versailles provisions. The pilot, who did not give up, designed devices in the premises of the poultry farm and performed throughout the country, as well as abroad, with demonstration shows. His tricks at height were considered something unattainable in their time, which witnesses of the era recognize half a century later.

How did a man doing what he loved, relaxing carelessly in restaurants, like the soul of companies, and detached from politics, became the architect of one of the first means of mass destruction of that war - dive bombers. Since the personality of Udet is not so well known, among other Nazi leaders, it is in this series of real shots that he is least of all. More time is devoted to artistic reconstructions, general aviation chronicles and commentaries (among which, Leni Riefenstahl). The senior officer, one of the founders of the Luftwaffe as it met the war, became at first a scapegoat for the pompous Goering. After his untimely death, which is typical of many state funerals, his death was turned into a real farce.

Some interesting thoughts from the series

— On May 8, 1945, Keitel arrived at the signing of the unconditional surrender of Germany with the proud posture of a military man, with a marshal's baton and a monocle. He acted more like a winner than a loser.

— Field Marshal Keitel, for his canine devotion and constant desire to please his Fuhrer, received from some officers the nickname lackey - he was even called Lakeitel.

— Erich Manstein's career came to a halt in 1938 after he voluntarily resigned following von Fritsch, who was forced out of office. And later in his office there were portraits of Beck and Fritsch, whom he admired, and not Hitler.

— Manstein allowed himself to speak disparagingly about his commander-in-chief behind his back, which was witnessed by some officers of the General Staff.

— Friedrich Paulus was one of the officers responsible for the training of German and Soviet tankers before the start of the war.

— The 6th Army enjoyed great honor in the army and was called the conqueror of the capitals, for participating in the operations of taking Paris and Kyiv under the leadership of Field Marshal Reinehow.

— Erwin Rommel has been a military school instructor since 1935. Soon he was appointed military adviser to the Hitler Youth organization, but due to the imminent conflict with Schirach, he returned to teach.

— Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, as head of the foreign intelligence service (Abwehr), attended many important events, but tried to get into the lens less often for obvious reasons.

— Canaris dreamed of a villa in Spain after his retirement. He admired the dictator Franco and the portrait of the latter, instead of Hitler, hung in the admiral's office.

— In the 1920s and 1930s, Udet performed unparalleled air shows in Germany and the United States, performing unprecedented dive stunts.

— Ernst Udet was a good friend of director Leni Riefenstahl. He starred in her and a number of other American and German films, in the form of a pilot.

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