1796 General Maritime List. Part II. pp. 378–379. A decree to this effect was received on February 24, 1769: RGAVMF. F. 212. Op. 4. D. 2. L.

1797 Sokolov A.K. Decree. op. S. 22.

Bonaparte arrived in Nice, at the main headquarters of the Italian army, on March 27, 1796. General Scherer gave him command and brought him up to date. Although there were one hundred and six thousand men in the army, in reality only thirty-eight thousand were under arms; of these, eight thousand were the garrisons of Nice and the coastal zone; no more than 30,000 people could go on a campaign. The remaining seventy thousand were dead souls; they left - prisoners, deserters, dead, lay in hospitals, moved to other military units.

The army was hungry, undressed, barefoot. Salaries had not been paid for a long time, there was little artillery; there were only thirty guns. Horses were missing. The army included two cavalry divisions, but they numbered only two thousand five hundred sabers.

The enemy army in the Italian theater numbered eighty thousand people with two hundred guns, therefore, two and a half times superior to the French. She had almost seven times more artillery.

The Austro-Sardinian army was commanded by Field Marshal Beaulieu, a Belgian by birth, a participant in the Seven Years' War. The age of both commanders was determined by the same numbers, but in different combinations: Beaulieu was seventy-two years old, Bonaparte - twenty-seven years old.

The military history of the Italian campaign of 1796–1797 has been described and analyzed by such major authorities as Bonaparte, Clausewitz, Jomini, and elaborated in detail in a number of special military historical writings. There is no need, therefore, to describe in detail the course of military operations. Let us dwell only on those issues that were essential for the subsequent life of Bonaparte.

Heading to the Italian army, Bonaparte knew that according to the general plan of military operations of 1796, approved by the Directory, the main tasks were assigned to the so-called Sambre-Meuse army under the command of Jourdan and the Rhine army, led by General Moreau. Both of these armies were to inflict a decisive defeat on the Austrians in southern Germany and pave the way for Vienna. The Italian army, on the other hand, was assigned an auxiliary role: it was supposed to divert part of the enemy forces to itself. Napoleon Bonaparte saw his tasks differently. It is usually emphasized that for Bonaparte the Italian campaign of 1796 was the first large-scale military operation in his life, that in ten or eleven years of service in the army he did not even have to command a regiment.

These considerations are generally correct, but it is overlooked that Bonaparte had been preparing for a campaign in Italy for a long time. From 1794 he drew up several variants of elaborate plans for offensive operations in Italy. For two years, he perfectly studied the map of the future theater of operations; in the words of Clausewitz, he "knew the Apennines like his own pocket." Bonaparte's plan was basically simple. The French were opposed in Italy by two main forces: the Austrian army and the army of the Piedmontese king - "the gatekeeper of the Alps", as Bonaparte called him. The task was to disengage these forces, inflict decisive blows primarily on the Piedmontese army, force Piedmont to peace and then fall upon the Austrians with all their might.

The plan was simple, and therein lay its irresistible strength. The main difficulty was how to translate this idea into practice. The enemy was vastly outnumbered. It was possible to eliminate such an advantage only by achieving superiority in speed and maneuverability.

This tactical decision was not Bonaparte's discovery. It was a skilful application of the experience gained by the armies of republican France during the three and a half years of war against a coalition of European monarchies. These were new principles of warfare created by the revolution, new strategy and tactics, and Bonaparte, as a son of his time, mastered them admirably.

And, completing his long journey from Paris to Nice, Bonaparte flew on courier and drove, drove horses in order to quickly move from ideas to action.

A few days after arriving in Nice, General Bonaparte ordered the army to march.

It would, of course, be wrong to imagine that Bonaparte, having taken command of the Italian army, immediately followed the path of victories and glory, experiencing neither difficulties nor failures. In reality, it was not and could not be.

In the coverage of the Italian campaign - the first major campaign of Bonaparte, which brought him all-European glory - two opposite extremes were observed in the historical literature. Some authors, primarily Ferrero, in every possible way downplayed Bonaparte's merits in the 1796 campaign of the year - they reduced his role to a simple function of the executor of the Directory's orders (or Carnot's plans) or even accused him of appropriating the fruits of the successes and victories of his subordinates.

On the contrary, historians, inclined to apology for their hero, extolled his personal merits in every possible way and with a generous brush depicted obstacles that only the genius of Napoleon could overcome. Such authors, in particular, were especially willing to talk about the resistance, almost about the rebellion that the old combat generals raised when they met the young commander in chief. Modern researchers (to name at least Rene Valentin and others) paid attention to the fact that such resistance of the generals subordinate to Bonaparte was impossible, if only because parts of the Italian army were stationed at different points: Massena was in Savoy, Augereau was in Pietra, Laharpe - in Voltri and so on. Both of these opposing tendencies, precisely because they represented extremes, gave a one-sided and therefore incorrect picture. The truth was somewhere in the middle.

Arriving in the Italian army, Bonaparte faced numerous difficulties, including those of a personal nature. Who was Bonaparte in the eyes of experienced, combat commanders of the Italian army? Upstart, "General Vendemière." There was a clear sense of derision in this nickname. It wasn't about age. Gauche was appointed commander at twenty-five, but he had Dunkirk, victories over the British and Austrians behind him. Bonaparte earned the general's epaulettes not in battles with foreign armies, but by exploits against the rebellious French. His military biography did not give him the right to the title of commander in chief.

Bonaparte had many outward vestiges of his Corsican origin. Not only did his accent, unusual for French hearing, clearly prove that Italian was his native language. He made gross phonetic and semantic errors in French. He pronounced the word "infantry" (infanterie) so that it sounded "children" (enfanterie); he said "section" (section), referring to the session (session); he confused the meaning of the words "truce" and "amnesty" (armistice et amnistie) and made many other gross errors. He also wrote with spelling errors. Subordinates noticed everything in the commander-in-chief, they did not forgive him a single mistake, not a single mistake.

Even before the arrival of the commander in the army, he was given offensive nicknames. Who called him "Corsican intriguer", who "general of the alcove", who "military from the hallway." When they saw a short, thin, pale, casually dressed general, mocking gossip intensified. Someone started the word "zamukhryshka" - gringalet, and it took root. Bonaparte understood that he needed to break the ice of distrust, the prejudice of the highest and senior commanders of the army; he understood that it was impossible to carry out the tasks that he set for himself by force of command alone.

In the Italian army there were four generals equal to him in rank: Massena, Augereau, La Harpe, Serurier, just like him, had the rank of divisional generals, but, of course, surpassed him in combat experience.

The most authoritative among them was André Masséna. He was eleven years older than Napoleon and managed to learn a lot in life. He lost his father early, ran away from his relatives at the age of thirteen, joined a ship's cabin boy, sailed on it for four years, then entered the army in 1775 as a soldier. He served in the army for fourteen years, but his non-noble origin blocked the path to promotion; he left the army in 1789, having risen only to the rank of sergeant's stripes. After retiring, Massena got married, opened a shop, and was engaged in smuggling. After the revolution, he joined the National Guard, became a captain; during the war he was elected commander of a battalion of volunteers. After a year of service in the army of revolutionary France, in August 1793, he was promoted to brigadier general.

Then he successfully fought in the Maritime Alps, distinguished himself in the capture of Toulon. For Toulon he was promoted to general of division.

General Thiebaud, who first saw Massena in 1796, left a colorful portrait of him: “Massena did not receive any upbringing, or even an elementary education, but his whole appearance was stamped with energy and insight; he had an eagle eye, and in the very manner of holding his head up high and slightly turned to the left, one could feel impressive dignity and defiant courage. His imperious gestures, his ardor, his extremely compressed speech, which proved the clarity of thoughts ... everything revealed in him a person created to order and dispose ... "Marmont spoke of him in similar terms:" A fiery soul was hidden in his iron body ... no one ever was not braver than him."

Augereau, who was usually spoken of disparagingly, was also an extraordinary person in his own way. He was born in 1757 into a poor family of a lackey and a greengrocer in the Parisian suburb of Saint-Marceau; at the age of seventeen he went as a soldier into the army, deserted from it, then served in the Prussian, Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, Neapolitan troops, leaving them when he got tired of it. In the intervals, Augereau helped himself with dancing and fencing lessons, duels, abductions of other people's wives; an adventurer and breter, he wandered around the world in search of adventure until the revolution opened up the opportunity for him to return to his homeland. In 1790 he joined the National Guard and, as a man of experience and by no means a timid one, he quickly pushed forward. According to the general judgment of his contemporaries, Augereau was a brave soldier. However, in a peaceful environment, it was difficult for colleagues to make out where courage ends and arrogance begins.

General Serurier was senior in age and military experience; he served as an officer in the old army. He was treated with distrust, but reckoned with his experience and knowledge. This silent, restrained general, who had seen a lot in his lifetime, but due to the vicissitudes of fate, was prone to pessimism, enjoyed great authority among the troops. Bonaparte highly appreciated him: he was one of the first to receive a marshal's baton. But it is worth noting that the well-informed Russian ambassador in Turin, Count Stackelberg, in one of the reports to Emperor Paul I reported that Serurier "hates Bonaparte."

Divisional generals Laharpe, brother of the educator of Alexander I, and Alsatian Stengel, who commanded the cavalry, both died at the beginning of the 1796 campaign.

There is a story about how the first meeting of the new commander with the division commanders took place. Bonaparte summoned Massena, Augereau, Serurier and La Harpe to his headquarters. They all appeared at the same time - huge, broad-shouldered, one larger than the other, immediately filling the small office of the commander. They entered without taking off their hats adorned with tricolor feathers. Bonaparte was also wearing a hat. He greeted the generals politely, but dryly, formally, and invited them to sit down. When they sat down and the conversation began, Bonaparte took off his hat, and the generals followed suit.

After a while Bonaparte put on his hat. But at the same time he looked at his interlocutors so that not one of them dared to stretch out his hand to his hat. The generals continued to sit in front of the commander with their heads uncovered. When the commanders dispersed, Massena muttered: “Well, this fellow has caught up with me with fear.” Bonaparte understood that it was possible to win the trust of senior commanders, soldiers, and the army not with words, but with deeds, military successes, and victory.

The versions spread by anti-Napoleonic literature that the Italian army for the most part consisted of Savoyard robbers and galley convicts were, of course, deliberate lies. In terms of its political sentiments, it was considered one of the most republican armies. Here, some traditions of the Jacobin era were preserved, from which other armies had already departed: for example, officers addressed each other with “you”. But in general, both in the soldiers and in the officers, discontent was clearly felt, and it sometimes manifested itself very sharply. Bonaparte took into account these sentiments and reckoned with them: the success of the campaign was ultimately decided by the soldiers.

There were also some special problems.

Shortly before Bonaparte's arrival in Nice, the commissioners of the Directory of Salicetti and Garro arrived at the headquarters of the Italian army.

The quarrel between Bonaparte and Salichetti in 1794-1795 was left behind. Friendly relations were again established between the two Corsicans. Massena even believed that Salicetti's appointment was arranged by Bonaparte, but this is unlikely to be the case.

The very appearance of commissars in the army could not embarrass Bonaparte; he knew from his own experience how great their role was in the troops. The difficulty was elsewhere. Salichetti was inspired by the idea of ​​raising a broad revolutionary movement in Italy. He established close contacts with Italian revolutionary circles, and in particular with their foreign committee in Nice. Buonarroti served as a link between Salichetti and the Italian revolutionaries. A friend of Babeuf and one of the most prominent figures in the Conspiracy of Equals, he has long maintained business and friendly ties with Salichetti. In the spring of 1796, in connection with the expected development of revolutionary events in Italy, Buonarroti had to come to Nice: he received a corresponding order from the Directory. He was already on his way, but due to coincident reasons (opposition to his appointment and, apparently, Babeuf's unwillingness to leave on the eve of the performance of the "equals"), he remained in Paris.

Upon Bonaparte's arrival in Nice, representatives of the Italian Revolutionary Committee immediately sent him a memorandum. The army commander answered her vaguely. He declared that the government of the Republic highly values ​​the peoples who are ready “by noble efforts to contribute to the overthrow of the yoke of tyranny. The French people took up arms for the sake of freedom. But although Bonaparte confirmed his readiness to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Italian committee, the idea of ​​​​an Italian revolution at the initial stage of the campaign did not meet with his sympathy. He, of course, was not opposed to the revolution in Italy, on the contrary. But his campaign plan was based on the calculation of the separation of enemy forces; for this it was necessary to achieve a truce with the king of Piedmont as soon as possible. The revolution could make this task more difficult. It was necessary to return to the Italian revolution, but later, when tangible success was achieved in the course of the campaign.

On April 5, 1796, the army set out on a campaign. The French regiments stretched along the narrow road marched quickly towards the enemy. Bonaparte chose the shortest, albeit the most dangerous path. The army marched along the coastal edge of the Maritime Alps (along the so-called cornice) - the entire road was shot through from the sea. But on the other hand, this made it possible to bypass the mountain range and greatly accelerated the movement. Ahead of the rapidly moving ranks, on foot, in a gray marching uniform, without gloves, was the commander of the army. Next to him, also in inconspicuous civilian clothes, contrasting with the bright, multi-colored uniforms of officers, walked the commissar of the Salicetti Directory.

Bonaparte's calculation turned out to be correct. The command of the Austro-Sardinian troops would not allow the French to risk such audacity. Four days later, the most dangerous part of the journey was left behind - on April 9, the French regiments entered Italy.

The army of Bonaparte had no choice, she could only go forward. Hunger drove the soldiers; shod and undressed, with heavy guns at the ready, outwardly resembling a horde of ragamuffins rather than a regular army, they could only hope for victory, anything else meant death for them.

On April 12, the French met with the Austrians near Montenotte - "Night Mountain". Bonaparte led the battle. The center of the Austrian army under the command of General Argento was defeated by the divisions of Massena and La Harpe. The French took four banners, five cannons and two thousand prisoners. It was the first victory of the Italian campaign. “Our pedigree comes from Montenotte,” Bonaparte later said with pride.

In Vienna, they were puzzled, but considered the incident an accident. "The troops of Gen. Argento suffered some setback in the case at Montenotte ... but this does not matter, ”wrote the tsarist ambassador Count Razumovsky from Vienna on April 12 (23), 1796.

Two days later, on April 14, in the battle of Millesimo, a blow was dealt to the Piedmontese army. The spoils of the French were fifteen banners, thirty guns and six thousand prisoners. The first tactical task was achieved - the Austrian and Piedmontese armies were separated; the roads to Turin and Milan were opened before the French.

Now it was necessary to intensify the blows against the Piedmontese army. The battle of Mondovi on April 22 ended in a heavy defeat for the Italians. Again the trophies were banners, guns, prisoners. Pursuing the enemy, the French entered Cherasco, ten leagues from Turin. Here, on April 28, an armistice was signed with Piedmont on very favorable terms for the French side. The agreement at Cherasco not only brought Piedmont out of the war. The tsarist diplomat Simolin, with due reason, reported to St. Petersburg that, thanks to the agreement of April 28, the French "became masters of the entire Piedmont and the entire territory of Genoa."

In an order to the army on April 26, Bonaparte wrote: “Soldiers, within fifteen days you won six victories, took 21 banners, 55 cannons, many fortresses and conquered the richest part of Piedmont, you captured 15 thousand prisoners, you put out of action killed and wounded 10 thousand people. You have been deprived of everything - you have received everything. You have won battles without cannons, crossed rivers without bridges, made difficult passages without shoes, rested without wine and often without bread. Only the phalanxes of the Republicans, the soldiers of Liberty, are capable of such feats!

What ensured the success of the Italian army? First of all, its ultimate speed and maneuverability. The enemy could not expect such a pace of offensive operations. Marmont wrote to his father that he did not get off his horse for twenty-eight hours, then rested for three hours, and after that he remained in the saddle again for fifteen hours. And he added that he would not exchange this frantic pace "for all the pleasures of Paris." The lightning speed of the operations of Bonaparte's army allowed him to keep the initiative in his hands and impose his will on the enemy.

Other factors also mattered. Although Bonaparte and the Directory were wary of the idea of ​​"revolutionizing" Piedmont, as the French troops advanced, anti-feudal, anti-absolutist sentiments grew in the country. When French troops entered the small towns of Alba and Cuneo, one of the Piedmontese patriots, Ranza, established revolutionary committees here. Cities were illuminated, Liberty trees were planted in squares, and revolutionary religious songs were sung in churches. This gave Salichetti a reason to express a severe condemnation of the Italian revolutionaries: “Instead of illuminating the churches, it would be much more useful to light (with fire) the castles of the feudal lords.” Salichetti, not content with the teachings of the Italian patriots, imposed an indemnity of one hundred and twenty-three thousand lire on the rich of the city.

But, despite the relatively modest beginning of the revolutionary movement, the Turin court was frightened to the extreme. Massena turned out to be right in explaining the hasty search by the Piedmontese king for a separate agreement with France, not so much by military defeats, but by fear of a popular uprising in Turin and throughout the kingdom.

After the signing of the armistice, Junot, and then Murat, took enemy banners and other trophies to the Directory to Paris; On May 15, peace was signed in Paris with Piedmont. However, some confusion reigned in the French army after the armistice at Cherasco. Why didn't they enter Turin? Why hastened to a truce?

Bonaparte so persistently sought an early truce with Piedmont, primarily because the small and poorly armed French armies were not able to fight against two strong opponents for a long time.

Having secured the rear from the Piedmontese army, having disabled one of the opponents, Bonaparte continued the offensive. Now he had only one enemy left, but a powerful one - the Austrian army. Its superiority over the French army in numbers, artillery, material supplies was undeniable. Bonaparte had to continue to act in accordance with his basic principle: "Weakness in numbers to compensate for the speed of movement." On May 7, the French army crossed the Po River. Three days later, in the famous battle of Lodi, Bonaparte, having captured the seemingly impregnable bridge over the Addu River, defeated the rearguard of the Austrian army. Bonaparte won the hearts of the soldiers in this battle, showing great personal courage. But that was not the meaning of Lodi. Clausewitz wrote: "... the storming of the bridge at Lodi represents an enterprise that, on the one hand, deviates so much from conventional methods, and on the other hand, is so unmotivated that the question involuntarily arises whether it is possible to find an excuse for it or whether it is impossible" . Indeed, the bridge, three hundred paces long, was defended by seven thousand soldiers and fourteen guns. Was there hope for success?

Bonaparte proved by victory the justification of his actions. Let us again give the floor to Clausewitz: “The enterprise of the brave Bonaparte was crowned with complete success ... Undoubtedly, no military feat has caused such amazement throughout Europe as this crossing of the Addu ... So, when they say that the assault at Lodi is not strategically motivated, since Bonaparte could get this bridge the next morning for nothing, then only the spatial relations of the strategy are meant. But don't the moral results we have pointed to belong to strategy? Clausewitz was right. On May 11, Bonaparte wrote to Carnot: “The Battle of Lodi, my dear Director, gave the Republic all of Lombardy ... In your calculations, you can proceed as if I were in Milan.”

It wasn't bragging. On May 26, the French army triumphantly entered Milan. In the capital of Lombardy, a solemn meeting was arranged for her. Flowers, flowers, garlands of flowers, smiling women, children, huge crowds of people who took to the streets, enthusiastically greeted the soldiers of the Republic; the Milanese saw them as warriors of the revolution, liberators of the Italian people. Tired, exhausted and happy, with faces blackened by powder soot, regiment after regiment passed soldiers of the Republican army among the jubilant population of Milan. On the eve of the capital of Lombardy, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand fled with his retinue and gendarmes. The French liberated Lombardy from the hated Austrian oppression.

Who does not remember the famous lines from Stendhal's "Parma Monastery"? “Together with the ragged poor French, such a mighty wave of happiness and joy poured into Lombardy that only the priests and some of the nobles noticed the severity of the six million indemnity, followed by other monetary penalties. After all, these French soldiers laughed and sang from morning to evening, they were all under 25 years old, and their commander-in-chief had recently turned 27, and he was considered the oldest person in the army.

This army of twenty-year-olds carried hopes for tomorrow. In the order for the army, the commander wrote: “Soldiers, from the heights of the Apennines you fell like a stream, crushing and overturning everything that tried to resist you. Let those who raised the daggers of civil war over France tremble; the hour of vengeance has come. But let the nations be calm. We are friends of all peoples, and especially the descendants of Brutus and the Scipios ... The free French people, respected by the whole world, will bring worthy peace to Europe ... "

In Lombardy, Bonaparte, in full agreement with Salichetti, supported the Italian revolutionary forces in every possible way. Their awakening was entirely in line with French interests. The Italian Revolution became an ally in the war against the feudal Habsburg Empire. In Milan, the Friends of Freedom and Equality club was created, a new municipal council was elected, the newspaper Giornale dei patrioti d "ltalia" edited by Matteo Galdi began to appear. Its main slogan was the unification of Italy. Lombardy was experiencing its 89th year. In the revolutionary two directions were identified in the movement: the Jacobins (giacobini) led by Porro, Salvador, Serbellonni and the moderates - Melzi, Verri, Resta. Common to both parties was the desire for independence and freedom of Lombardy. Bonaparte urgently requested instructions from the Directory: if the people demanded the organization of a republic , should it be granted? "Here is the question that you must decide and communicate your intentions. This country is much more patriotic than Piedmont, and it is more ripe for freedom."

But the army of the Republic brought Italy not only liberation from the hated Austrian oppression. From the time the armies of the French Republic took the war to foreign territory, they firmly adhered to the rule of passing on to the vanquished the expenses of maintaining the victorious army. Godchaux, in an excellent study on the commissioners of the Directory, showed that from the autumn of 1794 the representatives of the Thermidorian Convention in the army began to make extensive use of indemnities imposed on the population of the conquered lands. Even the leftist Bourbott, being the representative of the Convention in the Sambre-Meuse army, in August 1794 imposed an indemnity of three million francs on the occupied Treves region, in November of the same year - four million on Koblenz. In June 1795, the representatives of the Convention in the army that occupied the territory of Mastricht-Bonn imposed an indemnity of twenty-five million on the occupied region, which was later reduced to eight million. At the direction of the Directory in the Bonn-Koblenz region, Joubert established a forced loan from large merchants, bankers and other wealthy people. The commissioners of the Convention, and then the Directory, widely resorted to massive requisitions of grain, cattle, vegetables, horses for the needs of the cavalry.

Bonaparte acted in full accordance with the practice of the Directory. The army supplied itself with everything necessary from the conquered lands.

Acting in accordance with the instructions of the government, Salichetti and Bonaparte embarked on the path of the most extensive requisitions and indemnities. The Duke of Tuscany was to contribute two million lire in specie, one thousand eight hundred horses, two thousand bulls, ten thousand quintals of grain, five thousand quintals of oats, etc.

This was just the beginning. In January 1797, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, under an additional agreement providing for the evacuation of French troops from Livorno, undertook to pay another million crowns. “This last blow will complete the destruction of the finances of Tuscany,” Count Mozenigo expressed his opinion. However, the losses of the vanquished were not limited to fixed payments. When leaving Livorno, the French took out twenty-six cannons, gunpowder, shells and "most of the silverware from the palace." The government of Tuscany prudently turned a blind eye to this. The Duchy of Parma was to lend, in the form of a loan (a loan that was never repaid), two million livres in gold. Even in Milan, in jubilant Lombardy, which covered the roads along which the soldiers of the Republic marched with flowers, Bonaparte and Salichetti were not afraid in the very first days to demand a huge contribution of twenty million lire.

However, the commander and the commissar, acting unanimously at that time, tried to make the burden of taxation fall primarily on the shoulders of the propertied and reactionary circles of Lombardy. Their actions in Lombardy had a well-defined political content. In the war against feudal Austria, they sought to use the fighting slogan: "War of the peoples against tyrants."

The “Appeal to the people of Lombardy”, signed by Bonaparte and Salichetti on 30 Floreal IV (May 19, 1796), said: “The French Republic swore an oath of hatred for tyrants and brotherhood with peoples ... The Republican army, forced to wage war to the death against monarchs, is friendly to the peoples liberated from tyranny by its victories. Respect for property, respect for the individual, respect for the religion of the people - such are the feelings of the government of the French Republic and the victorious army in Italy. And further, explaining that means were needed to defeat the Austrian tyranny, and that the twenty million lire indemnification imposed on Lombardy served this purpose, the appeal emphasized that the burden of payments should be laid on rich people and the highest circles of the church: the interests of the poor classes should be reserved. This did not exclude the possibility that when, as, for example, in Pavia, an anti-French uprising began, in which the peasants participated, Bonaparte brutally suppressed it.

The 1796 campaign was different from subsequent wars, even from the 1797 campaign. The victories of Napoleon's army in 1796, which amazed the world, cannot be correctly understood if the social policy of Bonaparte-Salicetti is not taken into account in due measure.

The advance of French troops in Italy, despite indemnities, requisitions and robberies, contributed to the awakening and development of the revolutionary movement throughout the Apennine Peninsula. In January 1797, Mozenigo, one of the best-informed tsarist diplomats in Italy, was confident that if "the English withdraw from the Mediterranean, all of Italy will be in revolution within a year." Indeed, even in those Italian states that retained independence and independence, as, for example, in Piedmont, no government repressions and concessions could stop the growth of the revolutionary wave. In the summer of 1797, the whole of Piedmont was in revolutionary ferment. To keep the throne, the royal court was forced to make major concessions. The edicts issued in early August meant, according to the definition of the tsarist ambassador, "the last blow to the feudal system in the country."

It would be unhistorical to downplay the merits of Bonaparte, his generals and soldiers in the victories of 1996, as Ferrero did, to deny his undeniable talent as a commander. But it would be just as ahistorical to underestimate the social content of the war in Italy. Despite all the requisitions, indemnities, violence, it was basically an anti-feudal war, a war of the historically advanced bourgeois system at that time against the feudal-absolutist order, which was becoming obsolete. And the victory of French weapons over the Austrian ones was made easier by the fact that the sympathy of the progressive social forces of Italy, the Italians of tomorrow, "Young Italy", was on the side of the "soldiers of Liberty" - the army of the French Republic, which brought liberation from the alien Austrian and feudal oppression.

In the long and difficult life of Napoleon Bonaparte, the spring of 1796 has forever remained the most remarkable page. Neither the thundering glory of Austerlitz, nor the velvet of the empire embroidered with gold, nor the might of the all-powerful emperor, who commanded the destinies of Western Europe bowing before him - nothing could compare with the troubled, dangerous days of the sunny spring of 1796.

Glory came to Bonaparte not in the days of Toulon and even less than 13 Vendemière. She came when, commanding a small army of naked and hungry soldiers, he miraculously won one victory after another - Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, San Michele, Mondovi, Lodi, Milan - brilliant victories that made all of Europe repeat the previously unknown name of the general Bonaparte. Then the military generals believed in him, then the soldiers began to call him "our little corporal"; for the first time that spring, Bonaparte believed in himself. He later admitted that this new feeling - a sense of great opportunities - came to him for the first time after the victory at Lodi.

His youth and youth - it was an ominous chain of failures, miscalculations, defeats. For ten years, fate was merciless to him. Hopes, dreams, expectations - everything was dispelled, everything turned into defeat. He was in danger of feeling like a failure. But as he himself said, he had a presentiment, a subconscious feeling of success, good luck ahead. How many times has it deceived him! And finally, the hopes came true. The Schönbrunn court sent its best, most experienced commanders against Bonaparte. Arzhanto, Beaulieu, Alvintsi, Davidovich, Provera, Wurmser, Archduke Karl - these were really honored military generals of the Habsburg empire. The largest military authorities paid tribute to them. And yet this army of half-dressed, hungry boys, inferior to the Austrian in numbers, in artillery, inflicted defeat after defeat on her.

Starting the war in April 1796, Bonaparte acted according to a carefully thought out and worked out plan. He calculated, as in a finely conceived game of chess, all variations, all possible moves - his own and his opponent's - up to about the twentieth move. But now the time has come when the twentieth move was made, when the previously thought out options for the plan were exhausted. The war has entered a new stage - into the sphere of the unforeseen; the time of improvisations has come, the time of instant, not allowing for delay decisions. And here Bonaparte for the first time discovered for himself that it was this sphere that was his true element, in which he had no equal, it brought the greatest success.

“We must get involved in the battle, and then we will see!” - this famous principle of Napoleonic tactics was born for the first time in 1796-1797. It was the principle of free, daring thought triumphing over routine, over dogma, over the rigidity of centuries-old rules. We must dare, we must look for new solutions, not be afraid of the unknown, take risks! Search and find the simplest and best ways to win! This twenty-seven-year-old army commander overturned all the rules of war that had been established for centuries. He ordered the Milanese fortress to be besieged at the same time, General Serrurier to encircle and block the fortress of Mantua, which was considered impregnable, and, continuing the siege of Mantua, move the main forces to the east - to the Venetian Republic and to the south - against Rome and Naples. Everything was connected: both the stubborn, methodical siege of Mantua, and the maneuver war brought to the limit by the speed of movement and the swiftness of the blows.

After the triumphant entry into Milan in May 1796, the war continued for a long time - a whole year. It was marked by battles that went down in the history of military art - Castiglione, Arcole Bridge, Rivoli. These battles, which have long since become classics, went on with varying success: the French army came in these battles as close to the brink of defeat as it was to victory. Of course, Bonaparte took the greatest risk in these battles. In the legendary battle on the Arkol bridge, he was not afraid to put both the fate of the army and his own life at stake. Throwing himself under a hail of bullets with a banner forward on the Arcole bridge, he survived only due to the fact that Muiron covered him with his body: he took upon himself the mortal blows intended for Bonaparte. The three-day battle of Rivoli might have seemed completely lost by its end. But at the last moment (and there was a pattern in this accident!) the French command surpassed the Austrian - the battle was won!

In the campaign of 1796-1797, Bonaparte showed himself to be a brilliant master of maneuver warfare. In principle, he continued only what was new that had been created before him by the armies of revolutionary France. It was a new tactic of columns, combined with a loose formation and the ability to provide extraordinary speed of movement in a limited area of ​​​​a quantitative superiority over the enemy, the ability to concentrate forces into a shock fist that breaks through the enemy’s resistance in his weak spot. This new tactic has already been used by Jourdan, Gauche, Marceau; it had already been analyzed and generalized by the synthetic mind of Lazar Carnot, but Bonaparte was able to breathe new strength into it, to reveal the possibilities hidden in it.

The military talent of Bonaparte could be revealed with such fullness in the campaign of 1796-1797 also because he relied in his actions on generals of first-class talent. Andre Masséna - "the beloved child of victory", a talent-nugget - himself had the right to the glory of a great commander, if fate had not made him Napoleon's ally. The Italian campaign revealed the initiative, courage, military gift of Joubert, relatively little known until then; his merits in the victorious outcome of the battle of Rivoli and in the Tyrol were very great. Stendhal was right in praising Joubert. From the time of Toulon, Bonaparte began to group young people around him with some special features inherent in them that made him distinguish them from the rest. He managed to instill in them faith in his star: they were all people who were completely devoted to him. At first there were only three of them - Junot, Marmont, Muiron. Then Duroc and Murat joined them. This small circle of officers, who enjoyed the complete confidence of the commander, then included Lannes, Berthier, Sulkovsky, Lavalette.

Jean Lannes, the same age as Bonaparte, the son of a groom, began his military service as a soldier; in 1796 he was already a colonel. His initiative, ingenuity, personal courage drew the attention of the commander. Lannes was promoted to brigadier general and showed remarkable ability in directing operations on his own. Lannes was known as a staunch Republican, and his leftist views were also known in foreign embassies. He sincerely became attached to Bonaparte, seeing in him the embodiment of republican virtues. In the campaign of 1796–1797, he twice saved Napoleon's life. Lannes was one of the most prominent military leaders of the brilliant Napoleonic galaxy. Courageous, direct, sharp, he earned the honorary nickname Roland of the French army.

Starting the Italian campaign, Bonaparte invited the chief of staff of the army, General Berthier. Alexandre Berthier had a lot of experience - he served in the old army, fought in the war for American independence, but by his calling he was a staff worker. It was not easy to understand his views and predilections. During the revolution, he got along with Lafayette and Custine, but also with Ronsin and Rossignol. What was he striving for? Nobody knew this. He had an amazing capacity for work, an almost improbable professional staff memory, and a special talent for translating general directives from a commander into precise paragraphs of an order. He was not suitable for the first or independent roles, but no one could replace him with equal success as chief of staff. Bonaparte immediately appreciated the special talent of Berthier and did not part with him until the collapse of the empire in 1814.

Then, in 1796, Bonaparte noticed and approached the young Polish officer Joseph Sulkowski. Sulkowski was born in 1770. An aristocrat who received an excellent education, was fluent in all European languages, an admirer of Rousseau and French educational philosophy, he fought in his youth for the independence of Poland, and then, as a true "lover of Liberty", as they said in the 18th century, gave his sword to the defense of the French Republic.

Since the Italian campaign, Antoine-Marie Lavalette has also become close to Bonaparte. Formally, he was only one of the commander-in-chief's adjutants, but his real significance was great: Lavalette enjoyed the confidence of Bonaparte and, moreover, may have had some influence on him.

The name of Lavalette is usually associated with the story of his unfulfilled execution in 1815, which made a sensation throughout Europe. For going over to Napoleon's side during the Hundred Days, Count Lavalette was sentenced to death. All the efforts of his wife Emilie Beauharnais, niece Josephine, and friends to save his life were in vain. In the last hours before the execution, his wife was allowed to visit him. She did not stay long on death row; she left him with her head bowed low, covering her face, bending under the weight of inconsolable grief, staggering past the sentries ...

When the guards came in the morning to take the sentenced man to the place of execution, Lavalette was not in the cell. His wife was there. The day before, having exchanged clothes with his wife, Lavalette left prison in her dress.

This unusual story so struck contemporaries in its time that Lavalette remained in the memory of generations only as a successful hero of a dramatic incident in the style of the novels of Eugene Sue or Alexandre Dumas. They began to forget that he was one of the capable figures of the Napoleonic era. He never came to the fore, but, remaining in the background, Lavalette was in fact an influential participant in the complex political struggle of those years.

Such was the "cohort of Bonaparte" - eight or nine people grouped around him during the Italian campaign. It was a peculiar combination of different human qualities - courage, talent, intelligence, firmness, initiative, they made the small "cohort of Bonaparte" an irresistible force. These different people were united by a feeling of friendship, camaraderie; they were born of the revolution and linked their future with the Republic; they believed in their commander. Bonaparte was to them first among equals, and the Republic and France could not have been better served than by fighting under his command against the armies of tyrants. Finally, they were all united and carried on their waves by irresistible youth. They alternated the dangers and emotional stress of fierce battles, always with an unknown outcome, with the excitement born of "circling the heart." And in this, the commander-in-chief was the first to set an example. He completed the entire Italian campaign without parting mentally from Josephine. He wrote her several letters a day; they were all about the same thing - how he loves her immensely; he kept in his pockets the rarely received letters from her; he read them over several times, he knew them by heart, and it seemed to him, perhaps not without reason, that she did not love him enough. He was so obsessed with his all-consuming passion that he could not remain silent about it; he talked about her to his friends in the army, even in letters to Carnot, to the distant, dry, hard Carnot, he could not help confessing: "I love her to the point of madness."

Following the commander in chief, his first deputy suffered the same fate. General Berthier, who presented himself to young people from Bonaparte's entourage as a man of the prehistoric past - he was sixteen or seventeen years older than them! - Berthier, who seemed to see nothing but geographical maps and reports of the personnel of the regiments, was also defeated by the same powerful feeling. Stendhal wrote about this in elegant and precise words: “The beautiful Princess Visconti at first tried - so they said - to turn the head of the commander in chief himself; but, having convinced herself in time that this was not an easy task, she was content with the next person after him in the army, and, it must be confessed, her success was undivided. This attachment completely filled the whole life of General Berthier until his death, which followed nineteen years later, in 1815.

What to say about the young? About Junot - the “storm”, as he was called, famous for his daring and often risky romantic adventures, about the frantic Murat, about Muiron tenderly devoted to his wife? All of them lived a full-blooded life, today, filled to the brim with everything - exhausting transitions through the mountains, the excitement of the art of getting ahead of the enemy, the thunder of bloody battles, devotion to the motherland, military glory, love. Death was behind them; she lay in wait for each of them; she pulled out of their ranks first one, then another: the first was Muiron, followed by Sulkovsky. The rest bowed their heads and banners, saying goodbye to their departed comrades forever. But they were young, and death could not frighten them. Every day they staked their lives against her - and won. And they went forward without looking back.

Bonaparte during the years of the Italian campaign was still a republican. The orders of the commander-in-chief, his appeals to the Italians, his correspondence, official and private, and finally, his practical activities in Italy - all confirm this. Otherwise, however, it could not be. Yesterday's follower of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Jacobin, the author of "Supper at Beaucaire" could not immediately become completely different.

Of course, over the past years, Bonaparte, like all other republicans, has changed in no small measure. The Republic itself had changed: in 1796 it was already in many ways different than in 1793-1794. The evolution of the bourgeois republic, which became especially noticeable during the years of the Directory, could not pass without leaving a trace. But in the army, especially in the Italian one, long cut off from the capital, they did not go into the subtleties of the evolution of the Republic. The general meaning of politics was determined in the army by the old slogans: “The Republic is waging a just war! She's defending herself against the monarchy! Death to tyrants! Freedom to the peoples!”

In the eyes of the soldiers and officers of the Italian army, the 1796 campaign of the year was as just a war in defense of the Republic as the campaign of 1793-1794. The only difference was that the Republic became stronger and now fought against the same Austrians and Englishmen not on their own soil. , but on someone else's.

General Victor, sent by the command of the Italian army to Rome, first of all laid wreaths at the foot of the statue of Brutus. Lannes, in his proclamations, called for the total eradication of royalists, emigrants, and rebellious priests. The Italian army advertised its republicanism.

The victories of 1796 would not have been possible if the republican army had not morally surpassed the Austrian army, if it had not been surrounded by an atmosphere of sympathy and support from the Italian population, freed from the Austrian oppression thanks to the French.

But in his position as commander of the army, in direct contact with the government, Bonaparte, of course, was much better informed than others about the political situation of the Republic and well versed in the significance of the changes taking place in the country.

His relationship with the Directory grew more difficult by the day. Outwardly, both sides tried to maintain the established formal norms: the Directory prescribed, the general reported; all hierarchical distances were observed. But in essence, after the very first victories, after Montenotte, Millesimo, Lodi, after Bonaparte was convinced that the campaign was developing successfully, he began to pursue his own line, despite all the assurances of his readiness to carry out the orders of the Directory.

On May 20, 1796, the commander of the Italian army announced to his subordinates that they would receive half of their salary in specie. None of the armies of the Republic paid like that. He decided it alone, without asking anyone's permission. In Paris, this excessive independence caused dissatisfaction, but in the Italian army, of course, the decision of the commander was met with approval.

Even earlier, on May 13, Bonaparte received from the Directory an order prepared by Carnot, announcing that the army operating in Italy would be divided into two independent armies. One, operating in the north, will be led by General Kellermann, the second, under the command of General Bonaparte, numbering twenty-five thousand soldiers, should go to Rome and Naples.

This order Bonaparte received when the thunders of victory at Lodi had just died down. In the midst of the general rejoicing that reigned in the army after the brilliant victory, this order was stunning. Bonaparte immediately wrote back. He declared that it was against the interests of the Republic to separate the army operating in Italy. Bonaparte substantiated his objections with the precisely and clearly formulated argument "Better one bad general than two good ones." And in his usual style, he went to aggravate the situation: “The position of the army of the Republic in Italy is such that you need to have a commander who enjoys your full confidence; if it is not me, you will not hear complaints from me ... Everyone is waging war as best he can. General Kellerman is more experienced than I am: he will lead her better; together we will lead her badly. The threat of resignation sent from Lodi - that was a strong move!

Could the Directory accept Bonaparte's resignation? The armies of Jourdan and Moreau, to whom the government entrusted the main tasks in defeating Austria, were failing. The only army that marched forward and sent couriers to the capital every three days with news of new victories was this shabby Italian army, yesterday still considered almost hopeless, but now riveting the attention of all Europe with its victorious march. The name of Bonaparte, until recently little known, was now on everyone's lips. Bonaparte's victories strengthened the position of the Directory, supported its prestige, which had been significantly undermined by many failures. The Government of the Directory could not accept the resignation of General Bonaparte.

There was another significant reason that gave Bonaparte such confidence. The army he led was the only one that sent to the Directory not only victorious reports and enemy banners, but also money in the precious metal - gold. With the financial crisis of the Republic, which turned into a congestive disease, with the wolf greed of the members of the Directory and the government apparatus, through whose hands gold passed, sticking to their fingers, this circumstance was of the utmost importance. It was not customary to talk about him aloud; in official speeches about such "details", it goes without saying that Bonaparte knew better than anyone how much they meant. A few days after entering Milan, Salichetti reported to the Directory that the conquered regions, not counting Modena and Parma, had already paid thirty-five and a half million.

Could the Directory refuse such an important source of replenishment of the always empty treasury, and at the same time, perhaps, their own pockets? Will another general ensure this continuous flow of gold from Italy? It was doubtful. Jourdan and Moreau not only did not send gold - their armies demanded large expenses.

Bonaparte correctly calculated the moves: the Directory had to agree to the conditions set for it. The order for the division of the army in Italy was consigned to oblivion. Bonaparte won, the Directory retreated. But the disagreements between the general and the Directory continued. They now touched on an essential question - about the future of the conquered regions of Italy, about tomorrow.

The instructions of the Directory boiled down to two main requirements: to pump out more gold and any other valuables from Italy - from works of art to bread - and not to promise the Italians any benefits and freedoms. According to the Directory, the Italian lands were to remain occupied territories, which later, during peace negotiations with Austria, should be used as a bargaining chip, for example, you can give them to Austria in exchange for Belgium or territory along the Rhine, etc., or to Piedmont as a payment for an alliance with France.

In this cynical position of the Directory, the evolution of the foreign policy of the French Republic was clearly revealed. After Thermidor came a new streak. The Directory represented a large, predominantly new, speculative bourgeoisie and was guided in foreign policy by the same thing as in domestic policy: it sought to enrich itself either in the form of territorial seizures, or in the form of indemnities or outright robbery. In the foreign policy of the Directory, predatory goals became more and more clearly in the first place. The war changed its content. V. I. Lenin wrote: “A national war can turn into an imperialist one and vice versa.” In 1796, this process had already begun.

The Italian army was inherent in the extent to which it was one of the instruments of foreign policy of the Directory, and the features inherent in this policy as a whole. However, the disagreements between the commander and the government of the Directory were primarily on such fundamental issues. Bonaparte did not agree with the policy imposed on him by the Directory. In 1796, of course, he had already freed himself from the egalitarian-democratic illusions inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and Reynal, who possessed him ten years earlier. He was now not essentially embarrassed by the need to impose an indemnity on the defeated country; he already considered it possible, where it was profitable or expedient, to preserve for some time the monarchy (as was the case in Piedmont or Tuscany), while earlier he believed that all monarchies should be destroyed. For all that, his policy in Italy to a large extent contradicted the directives received from Paris.

Speaking for the first time in Milan on May 15 and addressing the people, Bonaparte declared: “The French Republic will make every effort to make you happy and remove all obstacles to this. Only merits will distinguish people united by a single spirit of fraternal equality and freedom. In the mentioned appeal “To the people of Lombardy” dated 30 Floreal, the commander again promised freedom to the people, which could practically mean the constitution of a Lombard statehood in the future, the formation of a Lombard republic under one name or another.

Bonaparte's efforts were directed towards this. In obvious contradiction with the instructions of the Directory, which he practically sabotaged, hiding behind various excuses, he led the matter towards the speedy creation of several Italian republics. Later, he came to the idea of ​​the need to create a system of friendly France and republics dependent on it. As Dumouriez wrote to Paul I, in 1797, Bonaparte, speaking in Geneva, in the Senate, said: “It would be desirable that France be surrounded by a belt of small republics, such as yours; if it doesn't exist, it must be created.

In an appeal to the Italians on 5 Vendemière (September 26, 1796), the commander of the French army called on the Italian people to awaken Italy “The time has come when Italy will stand with honor among the powerful nations ... Lombardy, Bologna, Modena, Reggio, Ferrara and, perhaps, Romagna, if he shows himself worthy of it, one day they will cause the astonishment of Europe, and we will see the most beautiful days of Italy! Hurry to arms! Free Italy is populous and rich. Make your enemies and your freedom tremble!”

Was this the fulfillment of the requirements of the Directory? That was the bold program of the bourgeois-democratic

revolution, to which Bonaparte persistently called on the Italians in many appeals and appeals.

And if the call for a free Italy was not carried out, the reason for this lies mainly in the particularism of the Italian small states, in the immaturity of the movement of national unity at that time, in the inability to overcome the aspirations for local and religious isolation.

Bonaparte was able to realistically assess the originality of the country in which he acted. We must do what is practically possible today. In October 1796, the creation of the Transpadan Republic was officially proclaimed in Milan, and the congress of deputies of Ferrara, Bologna, Reggio and Modena, held in Bologna that same month, announced the creation of the Cispadan Republic. The commander-in-chief of the French army in Italy welcomed the formation of republics in Italy with a special message.

In Paris, in the circles of the Directory, they were enraged by the disobedience and willfulness of the general. The instructions given to him were to "keep the peoples in direct dependence" on France. Bonaparte acted as if - if these directives did not exist, he contributed to the creation of independent Italian republics, connected with France by a common interest.

The conflicts between Bonaparte and the government of the Directory are often depicted as clashes of competing ambitions, they are seen as the beginning of the general's subsequent struggle for power. Such an interpretation does not exhaust the issue. Bonaparte in 1796 pursued a historically more progressive policy. He strove to use to the end the revolutionary-democratic potential of the French Republic, which had not yet been exhausted. In contrast to the Directory, blinded by greed, who did not think about tomorrow, Bonaparte set other tasks. In the war against powerful Austria, he considered it necessary to raise anti-feudal forces against her and to acquire an ally for France in the person of the Italian national liberation movement.

To avoid ambiguities, let us say once again that, of course, Bonaparte in 1796, while carrying out a historically progressive cause in Italy, was very far from the Ebertist concepts of revolutionary war. In an appeal on October 19, 1796 to the people of Bologna, he declared: "I am an enemy of tyrants, but above all an enemy of villains, robbers, anarchists." He constantly emphasized his respect for property and the right of everyone to enjoy all the benefits. He remained a champion of bourgeois property, bourgeois democracy. And in the war against the feudal Austrian monarchy, Bonaparte's bourgeois-revolutionary program was undoubtedly a powerful weapon, shaking the pillars of the old world and attracting allies in the person of the peoples oppressed by the despotism of the Habsburgs.

On November 29, 1796, General Clark arrived in Milan at the headquarters of the Italian army. He left the capital on the 25th and, sparing no horses, covered the vast distance from Paris to Milan in four days. Clark was in a hurry, but where? To Vienna. Bonaparte Clark briefly, without going into details, informed that he was vested with the authority to negotiate with the Austrian government for an armistice, and maybe peace.

It was not difficult for the commander of the Italian army to understand that the Directory was in a hurry to appropriate the fruits of his victories, through Clark to conclude a victorious peace, which the whole country would applaud, and leave him, Bonaparte, at the door. The Moor has done his job, the Moor can go.

The correspondence of Bonaparte in December 1796 does not contain direct evidence of his moods of that time. One can only guess about them. He was aware that in the current situation, the outcome of his struggle with the Directory could not be decided with ink. Here we need other, more effective means. It was also obvious to him that, by sending Clark to Vienna, the Directory sought not only to steal his laurels, but also to take control of Italian affairs and, by agreement with Austria, to cross out everything created with such difficulty in Italy.

The determination of the Directory to remove the victorious general was due to the fact that by the autumn of 1796 Barras, Carnot, Larevelier-Lepo - the leaders of the Directory - considered their position strengthened. This calculation, as subsequent events showed, was erroneous, nevertheless, they proceeded from it. In May - June 1796, the regime of the Directory experienced another crisis. The "Conspiracy in the name of equality" was uncovered, and its main leaders - Gracchus Babeuf, Darte, Buonarroti - were arrested. But the matter did not end there. In fructidor, the revolutionary-democratic movement in the Grenelle camp, which was closely connected with the Babouvists, was crushed; numerous more arrests followed. The blow expanded: it was directed not only against the Babouvists, but also against the left, pro-Jacobin circles in general.

By the autumn of 1796, the leaders of the Directory could consider the crisis largely overcome. The swing policy continued. After a blow to the right in October 1795, in May - July 1796, a blow was struck to the left. The balance has been restored; the directors considered their position newly consolidated; the time had come, the directors thought, to take care of the masterful general in Italy.

The operation with the mission of Clark (its authorship is usually attributed to Carnot) quite fit into the general policy of the Directory of that time - a blow to the left. Clark was entrusted not only with diplomatic tasks, but also with more special tasks - monitoring Bonaparte. He had direct instructions from Carnot and Larevelier on this score. Of course, Bonaparte, the former commander of the internal army, who at one time closed the Pantheon club, could not be accused of having links with the Babouvists. He could not be blamed for his connection with Salichetti, who was close to Buonarroti, if only because Salichetti was under Bonaparte as a commissar of the Directory and the Directory was supposed to protect him. But they wanted to ask Bonaparte for unauthorized actions, and ask strictly. By transferring negotiations with Austria into the hands of General Clark, the Directory thus deprived Bonaparte of the opportunity to influence the course of events in Italy. But getting around Bonaparte was not easy. He once again soberly considered the situation, weighed all the chances. An analysis of the situation showed that it was not hopeless.

The Directory chose the wrong time to negotiate with Austria. In Vienna in November - December 1796, the campaign was by no means considered a lost one. On the contrary, it was then that the hopes of achieving a decisive turning point in the course of the war revived again. The armies of Jourdan and Moreau were thrown back by Archduke Charles across the Rhine; they had to go on the defensive. Against the army of Bonaparte, new reserves were prepared, with them the army of Alvintzi reached about eighty thousand people. The old Hungarian field marshal was determined to take revenge for Arcole. Alvintzi went to the release of Wurmser's army, locked in the besieged Mantua. Eighty thousand Alvintzi plus twenty or thirty thousand Wurmser - that was an impressive force. With such an overwhelming superiority, could there be any doubt that the forty thousand tired soldiers of Bonaparte would not be crushed?

Clarke drove the horses in vain. Alvintzi refused to let him into Vienna. What was the point of Austria entering into negotiations at a time when she was preparing to deal a crushing blow to the French army? Bonaparte, who initially received Clark very coldly, now became infinitely amiable with the diplomat general. Clarke, a general from the nobility, also of Irish origin and therefore injured in 1793, who managed to experience a lot in his short life, smart and quick-witted, every day more and more succumbed to the charm of the commander of the Italian army so friendly to him.

But Bonaparte understood that the outcome of the struggle with the Directory was not decided by the fact that Clark would be “conquered”, that is, he would turn from an adversary into an ally. In this Bonaparte quickly succeeded: with his gift of seduction, it was not difficult for him to win over Clark to his side. But Clark's "conquest" did not solve anything yet. Everything depended on the outcome of the fight with Alvintzi.

Bonaparte in December 1796-early 1797 was ill: he was shaking with a fever. He was yellow, even thinner, dried up; a rumor spread in royalist circles that his days were numbered, that in a week, or at most two, he could be "written off" from among the opponents. But two weeks passed, and this "living dead" showed once again what he is capable of. In the famous battle of Rivoli on January 14-15, 1797, a battle that remains one of the most brilliant achievements of military art, Bonaparte defeated his opponent utterly. Alvintzi's army fled the battlefield, leaving more than twenty thousand prisoners in the hands of the French. In an effort to consolidate success and finish off the enemy, Bonaparte, having received information that part of the Austrian army under the command of General Provera was moving towards Mantua, ordered Massena to block his path. Despite the extreme fatigue of the soldiers, Masséna on January 16 overtook a group of Provera troops at Favorit and defeated it.

The triumph of Rivoli, doubled by the victory at Favorite, raised the prestige of Bonaparte to an unattainable height. Count Mozenigo reported from Florence to Petersburg: “The French army in a fierce battle almost completely crushed the Austrians ... and as a result, Buonaparte, who almost destroyed the imperial troops in Italy within four days, entered Verona in triumph, surrounded by all the attributes of victory.”

Now all attention was riveted on the battle for Mantua, which Simolin called "the key to all Lombardy." Mocenigo predicted that Mantua would not last long and that "all of Italy would feel its fall at once!" . Indeed, two weeks after Rivoli, Wurmser's army in Mantua, having lost all hope of liberation, capitulated. Henceforth, all of Italy lay at the feet of the victors.

Beginning on the morning of January 14, the decisive battle at Rivoli, Bonaparte was aware that the upcoming battle would determine not only the outcome of the entire Italian campaign, but his long dispute with the Directory would also be resolved. Bonaparte's calculations were confirmed by the victories of French arms. He defeated not only Alvintzi and Wurmser. The Directory was also defeated. In flattering terms, she congratulated the victorious general. And although the successes of Bonaparte caused increasing anxiety among the members of the Directory, she could now only modestly express her wishes to the victorious general. Previous intentions to "teach a lesson" or even remove the willful commander turned out to be at least inappropriate.

Bonaparte had to realize the fruits of his victories.

Rivoli and Mantua caused the greatest panic in all the palaces of large and small Italian states. In a report from Florence to St. Petersburg in mid-February 1797, it was reported that "anxiety and fear that gripped Rome reached its highest limit." The French troops were moving towards the capital of the Papal States without encountering any resistance, and in Rome they were primarily concerned with where the "holy father" could hide. Naples was seized with the same anxiety; the main efforts of the Neapolitan court were aimed at achieving peace with Bonaparte. The Grand Duke of Tuscany hurried to deposit a million crowns into the treasury of the victorious army and, as Mozenigo wrote, not noticing the hidden humor of his message, “should have felt very happy to be able to pay off at such a price at a time when the fall of Mantua gave the French all of Italy” .

On February 19, in Tolentino, Bonaparte dictated the terms of peace to the representative of the pope, Cardinal Mattei, and his colleagues. They differed sharply from the program, which was determined in a number of documents by the Directory. By the agreement in Tolentino, Bonaparte wanted to show the members of the Directory that from now on he would decide Italian affairs himself: he understood them better than high-ranking gentlemen in Paris.

However, he knew with whom he was dealing and what could make the greatest impression in Paris. In a letter to the Directory on February 19, 1797, reporting on peace conditions providing for an indemnity of thirty million livres, Bonaparte casually remarked: “Thirty million are worth ten times more than Rome, from which we could not draw even five million.” The directory had to accept the terms of peace with the pope, worked out contrary to its directives. In Paris, apparently, they were glad that the general kept sending gold - many tens of millions. What if he comes up with something else?

Bonaparte vigilantly followed what was happening in his native Corsica. The power of the British was not strong. The victories of French arms in Italy created favorable conditions for the resumption of the struggle. In 1796, he sent his emissary Bonelli to the island, who managed to raise a strong partisan movement in the western regions of Corsica. After that, General Zhentili was transferred there at the head of a detachment of two to three hundred people. The British, who found themselves in complete isolation on the island, had to leave it in October 1796.

Salicetti, and then Mio de Melito and Joseph Bonaparte, who replaced him, restored French power in Corsica relatively quickly. But it was not easy to appease the passions. Modern scholars acknowledge that the supporters of Paoli or the monarchy provided covert resistance to the French republican regime.

Neither the participants in the struggle of those years, nor the researchers of the history of Corsica knew, and could not know, that in the fall of 1797, the Corsican separatists, led by Colonna de Cesari, decided on a new major action. According to archival documents of the Russian Collegium of Foreign Affairs, and in particular the reports to Emperor Paul I from Florence, in mid-December 1797, Colonna de Cesari, who had arrived from Corsica, came to Mozenigo's reception. In a confidential conversation, he stated that "the island of Corsica is just as dissatisfied with the French as with the British ..." and that, in the opinion of all "the most visible and active forces of the country", the fate of the island can only be properly decided by establishing the supreme power of the Russian emperor over it. . Column de Cesari argued that the conquest of the island, important for Russia as a stronghold in the Mediterranean, would not present great difficulties: the Corsicans had guns.

Mocenigo promised to report what he had heard to St. Petersburg. Without accepting any obligations, he did not close the doors for the continuation of negotiations. Secret meetings and negotiations continued throughout the year. In November 1798, Mozenigo took part in a "secret meeting" of the Corsicans, during which they presented him with "a lengthy report and a plan on the convenience and benefits of an enterprise in Corsica and on the means of attack, demanding 6,000 guns, 2,000 sabers, 100 kegs of gunpowder and 3 thousand regular troops ". Motsenigo, perhaps in order to evade a definite answer, pointed out that “if the gene does not stick to it. Paoli or will not be committed with the consent of the English court ... ", then the enterprise will run into great difficulties. Negotiations dragged on...

Did Bonaparte know about them? Apparently not. Nothing confirms his concern about the course of affairs in Corsica in 1798. His attention was focused on other important issues - Bonaparte was in a hurry to make peace with the Austrian monarchy.

A year of victories crushed the Austrian army. Simolin wrote in April 1797 from Frankfurt that public opinion was already talking about "the crisis of the Austrian house" and that the army considered the conclusion of peace with republican France to be inevitable. But the army of Bonaparte was extremely tired. It was necessary to hastily, while the wings of victory were spreading behind them, to end the war. Bonaparte was also in a hurry because he was afraid that Gauche, who had replaced Jourdan as commander of the army, would launch an offensive with fresh forces and get ahead of the Italian army in Vienna. But the initiative for peace negotiations should not have come from Bonaparte. He was sure that the Austrians would be the first to ask to start peace negotiations. And in order to hurry them (Bonaparte himself could not wait long), he moved his army, exhausted from fatigue, to the north. The troops of Joubert, Massena, Serurier and a fresh division of Bernadotte invaded Austria.

After the defeat of Alvinci, Archduke Charles was appointed commander of the Austrian army against Bonaparte. He had a reputation as the best commander of the Austrian army: he dealt heavy blows to Jourdan, forced Moreau to retreat. Beaulieu, Argento, Alvintzi, Davidovich, Kvazdanovich, Wurmser, Provera - the best generals of the Austrian army - lost their glory in battles with this young Corsican, who was already surrounded by an aura of invincibility. Should you tempt fate? Archduke Charles tried to stop the French advance. But the battles of Tagliamento and Gradisca, although not pitched battles, again showed with indisputable superiority of French arms. Should not have waited for the worst. The vanguard of the French troops was one hundred and fifty kilometers from Vienna. Panic broke out in the capital of the Habsburgs.

On April 7, in Leoben, representatives of the Austrian side came to Bonaparte - they were generals Bellegarde and Merveldt. They declared that they were authorized by the emperor to negotiate preliminary peace terms. Bonaparte's dreams came true! The Emperor himself, head of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation", sent his representatives to negotiate peace. Everything favored Bonaparte in that amazing spring of 1797. He did not allow the Directory to snatch the fruits of his victories from him, he himself bypassed the gentlemen of the directors who took it into their head to control him as a puppet. Clark is completely disabled. Gauche and Moreau did not have time to come to Vienna. Bonaparte, now alone, without mentors and advisers, will negotiate with the emperor's representatives and conclude peace on the terms that he finds most expedient.

Negotiations, which began on April 7, were successfully completed ten days later. On April 18, at Eggenwald Castle, near Leoben, preliminary peace conditions were signed by General Bonaparte on behalf of the Republic and Count Merveldt and Marquis Gallo on behalf of the Austrian Emperor. Bonaparte was accommodating during the negotiations. He first asked for more, saw what the other side was most interested in, and quickly found a way to an agreement with her. Austria abandoned Belgium, reconciled with the loss of possessions in Northern Italy, but Bonaparte did not insist on the rejection of the Rhine lands. In a secret agreement, Austria was promised part of the Venetian region as compensation.

The Leoben agreements were concluded in contradiction with the requirements of the Directory, which insisted on annexing the Rhineland to France and compensating Austria with the return of Lombardy to it. Bonaparte foresaw that the agreement would be met with displeasure by the directors. In a letter to the Directory on April 19, Bonaparte, reviewing all his actions since the beginning of the campaign, proved their correctness and insisted on the approval of the preliminaries. He reinforced his desire with a threat: in case of disagreement with his actions, he asked to accept his resignation as a commander and give him the opportunity to engage in civilian activities.

The calculation was accurate. Members of the Directory could not, at the moment of the highest popularity of a general who had won an honorable and profitable peace, dismiss him. As Simolin reported, in Paris, the news of the signing of the peace agreement by Bonaparte "were greeted with enthusiasm by the people." Still less did the members of the Directory wish to see this restless and willful man in Paris as their work colleague. Barras already well understood that all sorts of surprises could be expected from this "simpleton", as he had recently and so erroneously, so short-sightedly called Bonaparte. Reluctantly, the Directory had to approve the Leoben agreements. Bonaparte had achieved his goal: he had won the war, he was on the way to winning the world, the most important step had been taken. His hands were untied - he took up Italian affairs.

In May, using as a pretext the murder of several French soldiers in Venetian territory, the French army entered the territory of the Venetian Republic and occupied it. The government of the Doge Republic was overthrown. A provisional government was set up in Venice, but Bonaparte did nothing to strengthen it. He did not forget about the secret articles of the Leoben agreements.

In June, French troops entered the territory of the Republic of Genoa; There was also a suggestion for this. But there was no talk of Genoa in Leoben conversations; here nothing prevented the proper state forms from being immediately found. On June 6, the formation of the Ligurian Republic was proclaimed in Genoa. The model for it was the constitution of the third year of the French Republic. The Ligurian Republic was created along the same lines, with two Councils and a Directory.

In June, the Transpadan and Cispadan Republics were transformed into a single Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte saw in her the basis of the future united Italy. Italy was to become the faithful support of France. A number of socio-political measures of an anti-feudal, bourgeois nature were carried out in the republic: feudal duties and requisitions were abolished, secularization of church lands was carried out, new legislation was introduced establishing the equality of all citizens before the law with all the ensuing consequences. The political system of the republic was close to the French model: Directory, two legislative Councils, a similar system of local self-government. The Cisalpine Republic had close relations with France. Otherwise, however, it could not be. Would a newly born, weak republic, surrounded on all sides by hostile monarchies, be able to resist them without the support of republican France?

The tsarist diplomats expressed fears (it must be admitted, quite justified) that the new republics would become an instrument in the hands of France and would contribute to the revolutionization of the country. So it was.

It seemed to many Italian contemporaries of those events that Bonaparte acts primarily as an Italian patriot, for whom his native country is the most precious thing. The well-known mathematician of that time, Mascheroni, presenting his book “Geometry” to the army commander, recalled in the inscription of the significant day when “you crossed the Alps ... to liberate your dear Italy.” This appeal testified that in the eyes of the Italian scientist, the victorious general remained a faithful son of Italy - he was Napolione di Buonaparte for him. But was it really so?

“The French Republic considers the Mediterranean Sea as its own sea and intends to dominate it,” Bonaparte firmly declared to the bewildered Count Cobenzl, the representative of Austria at the negotiations that ended with the Peace of Campoformia. But after all, the Italians also declared that the Mediterranean Sea is mare nostra - “our sea”. Therefore, Bonaparte put the interests of France above the Italian interests? There can be no doubt about that.

The Italian policy of Bonaparte was determined by the interests of France - this is indisputable. But after all, the interests of France can be understood in different ways. Differences between Bonaparte and the Directory in matters of Italian politics just serve as a clear example of this different understanding of interests. When the Directory objected to the formation of independent Italian republics and demanded only gold and more gold from Bonaparte, referring to the "interests of France", this only proved how narrowly she understood them. It was a frankly predatory policy that fully corresponded to the wolf greed of the new, speculative bourgeoisie, striving to snatch more booty. Bonaparte understood the interests of France wider and deeper. He went through the school of the revolution and saw what tremendous advantages France gains by opposing the progressive, bourgeois system of relations to the reactionary, feudal system, attracting to its side numerous forces of the oppressed and dissatisfied. His policy in Italy was in the mainstream of historical progress, and this was the source of its strength.

Contemporaries felt and understood this, although they expressed their opinion differently. Stendhal called 1796 the heroic time of Napoleon, a poetic and noble period of his life: "I remember very well the delight that his youthful glory aroused in all noble hearts." Gro, Berne, David captured the image of a young, very thin warrior striving forward, with an inspired pale face, long hair fluttering in the wind, with a tricolor banner in his hands, rushing ahead of the soldiers towards the enemy. Beethoven later, shocked by the thunder of great victories and unparalleled feats, created his immortal "Heroic Symphony".

All this is so. And yet, even in that initial, best time of Bonaparte's activity on the big stage of European politics, some features sometimes appeared, some separate touches in his image, his actions, which confused even his most ardent admirers from among the republicans.

Huge indemnities imposed on the defeated Italian states ...

Bonaparte's adherents, even among the Italian patriots, justified him by saying that such were the "laws of war" as they were understood in the 18th century, that the commander carried out only the requirements of the Directory, that indemnities were collected by other republican armies, and that Bonaparte made the monarchs pay, the church , rich.

All in all, this was true. But others, although not quite confidently, still objected: do the "laws of war" apply to the republic? Did General Bonaparte always fulfill the requirements of the Directory? Finally, still others were quite timidly perplexed: had indemnities ever been collected in such huge amounts?

It was impossible not to notice that in the behavior itself, in the way of life of the republican general, something had changed. While the army fought forward, Bonaparte, along with the soldiers, walked mostly on foot and, appearing at the time of the battle in the most dangerous places, shared all the hardships of the campaign. But then the shots stopped, an armistice was signed, peace was expected, and Bonaparte returned to Milan.

He settled in the magnificent castle of Monbello, near Milan, where he created a kind of small courtyard, which amazed visitors with the splendor of decoration. Here, at large receptions, at dinner parties, at evening parties, Josephine reigned. It seems that for the first time she began to appreciate her husband - she seemed to recognize him again. Was this quick-witted, self-confident, admirable commander of the army the same angular, passion-ridden Corsican that she and that stupid Charles secretly laughed at? She reproached herself: how could she not immediately see “her Bonaparte”? Every day her affection for him grew stronger. In addition, he finally gave her the opportunity to satisfy the innate passion that had remained unquenched for so many years to overspend. However, this talent of the general's wife was disputed by his sisters, and above all by the beautiful Paoletta, who finally became Polina, but still turned the heads of all the young officers of the army. It was a cheerful, brilliant courtyard, sparkling with youth, laughter, jokes, wine in crystal glasses, smiles of women - the courtyard of the general of the victorious army.

But who paid for these carefree noisy evenings in the magnificent halls of the ancient palace of Monbello, where wine flowed like water and money flowed without count? Count Melzi and other Italian ministers raised their glasses to the health of the commander and officers of the army of liberators. Perhaps they were quite sincere. But after all, it was gold created by the people of Italy.

In the castle of Monbello, it became a little quieter after Pauline Bonaparte, who attracted so many admirers to herself, finally opted for General Leclerc. Her elder brother duly celebrated her wedding and gave her forty thousand livres as a dowry. Admirers of the general and admirers of Polina said: isn’t a woman who overshadows all the beauties of Italy with her beauty worthy of it? Who would dare to object? But people who knew the Bonaparte family closer remembered to themselves that three years ago, barefoot Paoletta was rinsing clothes in the icy water of the river. When Bonaparte left Italy in 1797, the Directory of the Cisalpine Republic offered him the Monbello Palace, which he loved, as a sign of gratitude; she paid the former owner a million livres for it.

Napoleon in Saint Helena found it necessary to return - for future generations - to the question of his expenses in Italy. He told how the Duke of Modena had offered him, through Salicetti, four millions in gold and how he had turned it down. There is no doubt that what he said is true. He also indicated that the total amount received by him in Italy did not exceed 300,000 francs. Fr. Massoy, who devoted his whole life to researching the details of the biography of a famous person, modestly remarked on this occasion that, most likely, the emperor missed one zero. It is difficult to say with certainty whether Bonaparte already had a millionth fortune by the time of the happy evenings at Monbello; perhaps not. He was more greedy for fame than money. But in the smiling, witty Italian guests, the brilliant owner of the castle of Monbello, it was no longer easy to recognize the gloomy, wolf-like officer from the topographical bureau, who hid in the shade to hide his worn uniform and worn boots.

Of course, the Bonaparte of 1797, who had behind him the glory of Montenotte, Lodi, Rivoli, was already different than two years ago.

During this time in his life everything has changed dramatically, everything has become different. It is also important to understand the psychological change that took place in him during the months of the war in Italy.

All the first years of Bonaparte's conscious life, moreover, for a whole decade - from 1786 to 1796 - he suffered one setback after another, he went from defeat to defeat. With his Corsican penchant for superstition, he was ready to admit that he was "not lucky." Maybe he was born a failure? Maybe all his life he will be pursued by evil rock? And now, after ten years of failures since 1796, everything has changed in his fate. The wind blew into his sails. He went from victory to victory, from success to success.

Bonaparte was one of the educated people of his time. In Montbello, he invited famous scientists - the mathematician Monge, the chemist Berthollet, and they were surprised at his knowledge in special branches of science. Italian musicians and artists were amazed at how subtly he understands music. But he combined all this with some kind of atavistic, cavernous Corsican superstition. In moments of excitement, he was often and quickly baptized; he believed in omens, in forebodings. During the days of the Italian campaign, he finally believed in his star. He got rid of the oppressive, perhaps even subconscious, fear: what if he's not lucky again? He came to life, perked up, he believed that from now on happiness and good luck accompany him. He was seen smiling, joyful, happy, primarily because all these fourteen months of the war in Italy a lucky star shone on him and he felt how much he could do.

Some of Napoleon's biographers, inclined almost since 1796 to see in his actions and thoughts plans to seize the throne, in my opinion, shift his evolution. A significant role here was played by the testimonies of Mio de Melito, introduced into historical science at one time by the brilliant pen of Albert Sorel, orienting readers in this spirit. Sorel confided in them, and his literary talent gave the lack of credibility to such statements. Meanwhile, a careful study of the memoirs of Mio de Melito, published by the Württemberg general Fleischmann, shows that they are not trustworthy as a source. However, regardless of Mio's apocryphal memoirs, it is quite obvious that the path traversed by Bonaparte from a Jacobin to an all-powerful emperor could not be so straightforward.

The real power of Bonaparte in Italy in 1797 became enormous. Count Stackelberg, the tsar's envoy in Turin, wrote in August 1797: "There is no doubt that in all Italy all French agents, without any exception, are completely dependent on the commander in chief." It was right. Of course, Bonaparte, and most of the people of his time, went through a series of disappointments generated by the tragic course of the bourgeois revolution. But he, like most of his associates with a similar political biography, that is, in the past of the Jacobins, remained a republican. There is no reason to doubt his republicanism of that time. When the Austrian representatives during the Leoben negotiations offered to officially recognize the republic as a concession, for which you have to pay something, Bonaparte contemptuously rejected this. The republic did not need anyone's recognition ... “The Republic is like the sun! So much the worse for those who do not see her,” he answered arrogantly.

And yet, Stendhal, with his amazing gift of historical insight, did not accidentally point to the spring of 1797, to the entry of the French into Venice, as the brink that completed the heroic period of Bonaparte's life.

The entry of the French into Venice was predetermined by the Leoben agreements. On both sides, they were a compromise, and the very idea of ​​a compromise was not objectionable to anyone. But in the Leoben agreements, for the first time, a direct deviation from the principles of republican foreign policy was allowed. The secret agreement on the transfer of Austria to the Republic of Venice meant the violation of all the principles proclaimed by the republic. Bonaparte tried to justify his actions by saying that the cession of Venice to Austria was only a temporary measure, forced by circumstances, that in 1805 he corrected this. These arguments, of course, could not change the fundamental significance of the Leoben deal. In essence, the transfer of Venice to Austria was no better than the return of Austria to Lombardy, which the Directory insisted on and Bonaparte objected to.

Significantly new elements have been introduced into Bonaparte's Italian policy since the time of the Leoben Accords. It would be wrong to assume that after April-May 1797, after Leoben and the occupation of Venice, Bonaparte's entire policy changes dramatically, from progressive to aggressive, conquering. But it would also be wrong not to notice those changes in the policy pursued by Bonaparte, which have been quite clearly revealed since the spring of 1797 - a manifestation of conquest tendencies.

The Directory, although almost everything that Bonaparte did in Italy (except for the millions that arrived) caused her discontent, had to put up with the willfulness of the general in view of the precariousness of her own positions. Having barely managed to defeat the danger on the left - the movement of the Babouvists, she found herself in front of an even more formidable danger - this time on the right. Elections in the Germinal of Year V (May 1797) gave a majority in both Councils to the opponents of the Directory - royalist and pro-royalist elements, the so-called Clichy party. The election of Pichegru as chairman of the Council of Five Hundred and Barbe-Marbois as chairman of the Council of Elders was an open challenge to the Directory - both were its enemies. The right-wing majority in the Legislative Councils immediately found the most vulnerable spot: it demanded that the Directory account for its expenses. Where did the gold that came from Italy go? Why is the treasury always empty? These were questions that the Directory, even with all the diabolical ingenuity of Barras, could not answer. But that was only the beginning. The legislatures made no secret of their intention to kick Barras and the other "regicides" out of government. What will happen next? It was not yet quite clear, apparently, some kind of transitional form to the monarchy. Opinions differed. The "salon opposition" grouped around Madame de Stael also criticized the government from the right. It was not easy to define Madame de Stael's political program. According to the witty remark of Thibodeau, "Madame de Stael received the Jacobins in the morning, the royalists in the evening, and the rest of the world at dinner." But what everyone agreed on was a critical attitude towards the "triumvirs". All were united by a common conviction: it is necessary to drive the "triumvirs" who clung to the director's chairs.

For Barras, in essence, this was all that mattered; everything that followed did not interest him. The director's post was power, honor, magnificent apartments in the Luxembourg Palace, receptions, revels, nightly orgies and money, money, money without an account, floating into his hands from all sides. Could he part with all this? A man who went through all the circles of hell, emerged from the bottom, gliding along the edge of a knife, cunning and daring, Barras was frantically looking for a way to outplay his enemies. During the years of the revolution, when the danger from the right was outlined, the people entered the political scene and their active actions swept away all enemies. But after Germinal and Prairial, after the defeat of the Babouvists, there was nothing to think about the people. The army remained. Bayonets are stronger than any constitutional laws. They can do everything. It is only important that they do not turn against Barras himself ...

Barras hesitated: to whom to turn - to Gauche, Moreau, Bonaparte? More than others, he feared Bonaparte. Therefore, he initially turned to Gosh, but, having failed or did not have time to prepare everything, he only compromised him.

And time passed, it was impossible to delay. As an experienced player, Barras coolly stated that if the case did not work out, he would have to hang on the crossbar.

In the middle of Thermidor (still the same fateful month Thermidor!) The "triumvirs" came to the conclusion that only Bonaparte could get them out of trouble. As Barras wrote, he and his colleagues “would be happy to see again in their midst the general who acted so beautifully on 13th Vendemière.”

By this time, Barras had thought through the question to the end: Bonaparte was the best, he was a man of action, and dispersal with bayonets, consecrated by the constitution of the Legislative Councils, would by no means serve the popularity of the winner at Rivoli. A win for Barras would be a loss for Bonaparte. Although Barras had long ceased to regard Bonaparte as a "simpleton", he again underestimated him. The hidden thoughts of Barras were unraveled by Napoleon. It is necessary to fight against the monarchical danger - Bonaparte had no doubts about this. He appealed to the army in support of the Republic, sharply condemning the royalist intrigues, and agreed to provide armed assistance to the Directory. But Bonaparte least of all intended to act in accordance with the plans of Barras, to compromise himself, to compromise the glory of Rivoli and Leobin, with operations in the spirit of Vendemière. For such things there are others. And he sent Augereau to Paris with a detachment of soldiers. Augereau, breter, stalker, martinet, a man ready for anything, but unable to benefit for himself - he thought too tightly, he was best suited for such a role.

Augereau arrived in Paris when the position of the directors, in their own judgment, became critical. From mouth to mouth they passed the phrase said by Pichegru in a conversation with Carnot, who complained about the “triumvirs”: “Your Luxembourg Palace is not the Bastille; I will mount a horse, and in a quarter of an hour everything will be over.

Barras, Rebel, Larevelier-Lepeaux waited in horror for the last "quarter of an hour."

Augereau, arriving in Paris, reported to the "triumvirs" in cold blood: "I have come to kill the royalists." Carnot, who could not overcome his disgust for Augereau, said: "What a notorious robber!"

But Bonaparte gave the Directory not only a penetrating force in the person of the ferocious Augereau, he also armed it politically. Even earlier, in Verona, the portfolio of the royalist agent Count d "Antrega was seized, which, among other papers, contained irrefutable evidence of Pichegru's betrayal, his secret ties with the emissaries of the pretender to the throne. Bonaparte handed over these documents to the members of the Directory.

From the moment Barras and his accomplices found themselves in the hands of these deadly documents for Pichegru, which unexpectedly gave the whole violent operation an almost noble shade of saving measures in defense of the Republic, they decided to act

On the 18th fructidor (September 4, 1797), ten thousand soldiers under the command of Augereau surrounded the Tuileries Palace, where both Councils met, and, without meeting any resistance, except for timid cries about the "right of the law", made a "cleansing" of their composition. It was then that one of Augereau's officers, whose name has not been preserved in history, uttered the famous phrase: “The law? It's a saber!"

Most of the objectionable deputies, led by Pichegru, were arrested. Carnot, warned that he would be arrested, managed to escape. In forty-nine departments, the elections held at the Germinal of Year V were annulled and new ones appointed, providing for all necessary measures to ensure that suitable candidates get through. Senior officials, officials, judges were removed, newspapers were closed - in a word, everything that at that moment posed a direct or potential threat to the power of the “triumvirs” was removed from the path ...

The coup d'état of the 18th fructidor had considerable consequences for the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic. Without going into consideration of them, we note nevertheless the most important: the events of the 18th fructidor greatly contributed to the further discrediting of the regime of the Directory. If the legal basis of this power had previously seemed extremely shaky, then after 18 fructidor it became obvious to everyone - both enemies and supporters of the regime - that it could be held only by relying on the army. The formula “Law? It's a saber!" was confirmed and shown in practical action on the stage of the highest national forum.

Bonaparte, who closely followed the course of events in distant Paris, drew practical conclusions from them: the Directory will no longer be able to prevent him from making peace with Austria. In general, this calculation turned out to be correct, but Bonaparte was mistaken in particulars.

Barras was one of those greedy playboys who live for today. A man not timid, he was aware that the recent operation did not add to his friends. But during his turbulent life, he had accumulated so many enemies from among the people who were betrayed, sold or robbed by him, that he had long lost count. He didn't count them - you can't count them all! After the fructidor, he again felt like a master in the Luxembourg Palace, and with an impudence that made even experienced people give in, he was now ready to “put in their place” those before whom he fawned yesterday in fear.

Barras was rescued by Augereau's soldiers sent by Bonaparte. But it was Bonaparte and Augereau, the day after the fructidor, that irritated him the most.

On September 17, Minister of War Scherer wrote to Lazar Hoche: “The Directorate wants both Rhine armies to be united under one command and to march at the latest on the 20th Vendemière. The Directory has chosen you, General, to lead our victorious phalanxes to the gates of Vienna. Bonaparte, on the other hand, was asked to break off negotiations with the Vienna cabinet and prepare the army for the start of a new campaign.

Barras decided to pay off completely with the unauthorized general. In addition, Bonaparte rendered too great services both to the Republic and to him personally, Barras. Feeling powerful again, the director sought above all to get rid of those to whom he owed money. It is necessary to put Gauche over Bonaparte, to push two illustrious commanders against their foreheads - let them bicker and squabble, and then he, Barras, will intervene as an arbiter and show Bonaparte his place.

Bonaparte was furious. He did not fall into the trap set for him - he did not argue either with Gosh or about Gosh. In a letter dated September 23, he again insisted on his resignation. “If they don’t trust me, I have nothing to do ... I ask to be relieved of my post.” The resignation directory did not accept him, however, on the issue of peace, it remained in its former positions.

But the coup of the 18th fructidor had political consequences outside France as well. In Austria, after Leoben, hesitation on the question of concluding peace began to be clearly revealed. Bonaparte, by many signs, could be convinced that in Vienna they were in no hurry to sign a peace treaty. The solution to the source of these oscillations was not difficult. After the elections in Germinal and the formation of a pro-royalist majority in the French legislature in Vienna, they hoped for the fall of the Directory and drastic political changes in France. Why hurry with the world?

Bonaparte, for his part, tried to influence the Habsburg government. In August 1797, he demanded that the Piedmontese king transfer ten thousand soldiers to the command of the Italian army, referring to the "probability of resuming hostilities against Austria." As he expected, this demand caused a stir in Turin and it immediately became known in all the embassies, and then in all the capitals of Europe.

In Vienna, this demarche was duly appreciated. The revolution of the 18th fructidor dispelled the last illusions. Two weeks after the coup, on September 20, Emperor Franz sent a letter directly to Bonaparte, offering to start negotiations without delay. Without waiting for the sanction of the Directory, Bonaparte agreed. Negotiations began in Udine (in Italy) on 27 September and continued until 17 October. The Vienna Cabinet sent the best diplomat of the empire, the highly experienced Count Ludwig Cobenzl, to negotiate with Bonaparte. For the last eight years he was the ambassador in St. Petersburg, he managed to gain the confidence of Empress Catherine II. Unusually full, ugly, "Northern polar bear", as Napoleon called him, Cobenzl, for all his massiveness, showed exceptional liveliness and dexterity in diplomatic negotiations. He was persistent, assertive, spoke with aplomb. By sending Cobenzl to Italy, the Austrian government showed the importance it attaches to the upcoming negotiations.

The agreements at Cherasco, Tolentino, and Leobene showed that the young general was not only an outstanding commander, but also a diplomat of first-class talent. Campoformio fully confirmed this.

Bonaparte forced the Austrian diplomat to travel a long distance and come to him in Italy. Although Bonaparte was a stone's throw from Milan to Udine, he was a day late, forcing the emperor's representative to wait patiently for his arrival. He came to the first meeting accompanied by a huge retinue of generals and officers, rattling sabers. He wanted from the very first meeting to make it clear to his interlocutor that in the negotiations of two equal parties there are losers and winners.

The negotiations were difficult. For Bonaparte, they turned out to be especially difficult because he received directives from Paris ordering him to set obviously unacceptable conditions for Austria, and Cobenzl, for his part, evaded direct obligations, trying to make the agreement between France and Austria dependent on its subsequent approval by the congress of representatives of the German Empire. . Bonaparte found himself, as it were, between two fires. And he was in a hurry: he wanted to make peace with Austria as soon as possible, the only way he could end his campaign.

Cobenzl was intractable. Bonaparte tried to intimidate the Austrian with the threat of breaking off negotiations. Cobenzl coolly objected: "The Emperor wants peace, but is not afraid of war, and I will find satisfaction in having met a man as famous as interesting." Bonaparte had to look for other ways.

Historical literature usually points out that the key to the agreement with Austria at Udine and Passariano was the problem of Prussia. The AVPR documents introduce some amendment to this generally correct statement. This key was not found by Bonaparte in Udine and Passariano, but earlier, during the Leoben period. On April 27 (May 8), 1797, Motsenigo’s decoded report to St. Petersburg reported: “Brother Bonaparte, who is a minister in Parma, writes that this agreement (preliminaries in Leoben. - A.M.) is based on an alliance between France and emperor in order to jointly counteract the aspirations for the exaltation of the Prussian king.

Already during the Leoben negotiations, Bonaparte found the most sensitive place in the positions of the Austrian side. He decided to touch it again in a conversation with Cobenzl. He spoke to him about the Peace of Basel, about the ties maintained with the Prussian king ... After all, it could have been otherwise?

Cobenzl was a man of understanding. He didn't have to repeat what he heard twice. He inquired cautiously: was France prepared by a secret agreement to support Austria against the excessive claims of the Prussian king? “Why not,” Bonaparte replied imperturbably, “I see no obstacles to this, if we come to an agreement with you on everything else.” The conversation took on a purely businesslike character. Both interlocutors understood each other well, and yet the negotiations progressed slowly, since in specific issues each of the parties sought to negotiate the most advantageous solution for it.

Bonaparte received new government directives from Paris - the "ultimatum of September 29", offering to break off negotiations and resolve issues by force of arms - to go on the offensive against Vienna. Responding to the Directory with repeated requests for resignation, he decided to conduct business "in his own way." And Cobenzl continued to bargain on every point, the negotiations did not move forward. Bonaparte could not remain longer in such an uncertain position. He decided on a bold move: he showed Cobenzl the directives received from Paris. He explained that he could interrupt the negotiations at any second and his government would only be satisfied.

Cobenzl was mortally frightened. He agreed to all the demands of Bonaparte. That was a frank division of booty. The Venetian Republic, like Poland recently, was divided between Austria, France and the Cisalpine Republic, Mainz and the entire left bank of the Rhine went to France. Austria recognized the independence of the northern Italian republics. In return, according to secret articles, she was to receive Bavaria and Salzburg.

By October 9, all controversial issues were settled and the text of the agreement was drafted. But on the 11th, when Bonaparte and Cobenzl met to sign it, new difficulties suddenly arose.

Bonaparte did not like the wording of the paragraph on Mainz and the border along the Rhine, he proposed to correct it. Cobenzl objected, Bonaparte insisted. Cobenzl argued that the boundaries of the Rhine were within the competence of the empire. An enraged Bonaparte interrupted him: “Your empire is an old servant, accustomed to being raped by everyone ... You are bargaining here with me, but you forget that you are surrounded by my grenadiers!” He yelled at the bewildered Cobenzl, threw on the floor a magnificent service, a gift from Catherine II, which shattered to smithereens. "I will crush your entire empire like this!" he shouted in rage. Cobenzl was shocked. When Bonaparte, continuing to shout something indistinct and abusive, left the room with a noise, the Austrian diplomat immediately made all the corrections that Bonaparte demanded to the documents. “He went crazy, he was drunk,” Cobenzl later justified. He later began to tell that during the negotiations the general drank punch, glass after glass, and this, apparently, had an effect on him.

This is hardly the case. The Austrian diplomat wanted to justify himself, to explain how he allowed such a scene. Bonaparte did not go crazy and was not drunk. He hardly got drunk at all. In his furious outburst, one must most likely see the amazing art of so completely getting used to the role, when it is impossible to distinguish whether this is a game or genuine feelings.

Two days later, the text was finally agreed upon in the wording proposed by Bonaparte. The Austrian diplomat sent the draft treaty to Vienna for approval, received approval, and now all that remained was to sign the treaty.

It was agreed that the exchange of signatures would take place in the small village of Campoformio, halfway between the residences of both sides. But when the document was completely ready on October 17, Count Cobenzl, so frightened by Bonaparte, afraid of some other surprise on his part, without waiting for Bonaparte's arrival in Campoformio, went to his residence in Passariano. The general had his own reasons for not delaying the completion of the case. Here, in Passariano, on the night of October 17-18, the treaty was signed.

And although neither Bonaparte nor Cobenzl were ever in Campoformio, the treaty that ended the five-year war between Austria and the French Republic went down in history under the name of the Peace of Campoformia.

First Italian campaign

Against France, the coalition continued the war, which included Austria, England, Russia, the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and several German states (Württemberg, Bavaria, Baden). The Directory believed that Germany should be the main theater of operations. Therefore, the main forces and money were sent here, the experienced General Moreau commanded the army here. Actions in Italy, according to the authorities, could only divert some of the forces of Austria. At best, the German and Italian armies of France could unite in Tyrol during an attack on Vienna. No one suspected then that it was in Italy that Napoleon would decide the fate of the entire war.

Arriving in the Italian army, based in the vicinity of Nice, Napoleon could see one of the reasons for this skepticism. Formally, 106 thousand people were under his command. But only formally. In fact, there were no more than 38 thousand soldiers in the ranks. Of these, eight thousand were the garrisons of Nice and the coastal zone - they could not go on a campaign. Seventy thousand were "dead souls" - prisoners, deserters, dead. But the condition of those who really were in the army was deplorable. Under the command of Napoleon was a crowd of ragamuffins who had not received supplies and uniforms for a long time, with loose discipline, flourishing plunder on the part of most officials. This army had to fight with superior enemy forces - about eighty thousand people.

Under Napoleon there were three divisional generals - Augereau, Massena and Serrurier, who did not immediately treat the "young upstart", the protege of the Directory, with due respect. Bonaparte could not ensure an immediate change in the supply situation, but he actively set about strengthening discipline and combating theft. “We have to shoot a lot,” he wrote to Paris. He quickly won the respect of the generals. Massena recalled that when Napoleon put on his general's hat, he seemed to stand two feet taller. Bonaparte literally hypnotized people with his gaze. He gave orders in a tone that allowed no objections. The officers of the Italian army were quickly able to verify the competence of the general.

Napoleon did not want to delay the offensive for a long time. He was of the opinion that "the war should feed itself" - this, on the one hand, made it possible to lighten the soldier's bags, on the other, to get rid of too long convoys. In this case, this meant not only the possibility, but also the need for a quick march. The soldiers themselves had to get their own food and clothing. In his famous speech to the Italian army, Napoleon declared: “Soldiers, you are not dressed, you are poorly fed ... I will lead you to the most fertile countries in the world!”

The campaign in Italy began on April 5, 1796. Having passed along the coast along a dangerous "cornice", the French found themselves on the Apennine Peninsula, which, in the words of Clausewitz, Napoleon knew in advance, "like his own pocket." In Italy, Austrian and Piedmontese troops acted against Bonaparte, scattered in three groups on the routes to Piedmont and Genoa. The first battle with the Austrians took place in the center of this disposition at Monte Notto. Having gathered, as usual, all his forces into a fist, Napoleon broke through the Austrian center. After giving the soldiers a short rest, he moved on. In the battle at Millesimo, the Piedmontese troops were completely defeated, and Bonaparte immediately continued to move. The roads to Turin and Milan were open to the French.

Napoleon's actions in Italy at this time in history are sometimes referred to as "Six Victories in Six Days". This does not quite correspond to chronology, but on the whole it correctly reflects the swiftness of the young French general that struck his contemporaries. Napoleon's opponents could not resist his pressure and speed of movement. He avoided complex maneuvers, gathered forces into a fist in the main direction, hit the enemy in parts. The French army, led by genius and reformed by the revolution, had a striking superiority over the feudally organized Austrian army and the even less important Piedmontese army, led by the inert and aged Hofkriegsrat. The Battle of Mondovi ended the second of these. On May 15, 1796, peace was concluded between Piedmont and France. Piedmont refused to allow any troops other than French to pass through its territory, pledged not to enter into alliances with anyone, and ceded the county of Nice and all of Savoy to France. In addition, he had to feed the French army in Italy.

Now Napoleon was left alone with Austria. After new victories, he managed to push the enemy back to the Po River, and then to the east beyond the Po, where he continued the pursuit. On May 10, 1796, Bonaparte's army, after a fierce battle at Lodi, crossed the Adda River, and on May 15, triumphantly entered Milan. Murat took Livorno, and Augereau took Bologna. Lombardy threw off the shackles of Austrian oppression. Many Italians received foreigners with enthusiasm - after all, they really brought liberation with them, the destruction of the hated feudal order. “Let the peoples be calm,” Napoleon wrote in one of his orders to the army. “We are friends of all peoples, and in particular of the descendants of Brutus and the Scipios ... The free French people, respected by the whole world, will bring worthy peace to Europe ... ” Bonaparte’s colleague Salichetti publicly declared that illuminations in churches would prefer fires in feudal castles.

However, one should not assume that Napoleon unselfishly carried the freedom of Italy. In parallel with the expulsion of the Austrians, other processes took place. And then, and subsequently, the French general behaved in Italy as if no states and rulers existed here anymore. Bonaparte was far from the idea of ​​respect for sovereignty and tradition, he respected only strength. “Big battalions are always right,” the commander said more than once. He declared that France brought new revolutionary values ​​to the peoples of Italy, deliverance from feudal slavery, and immediately imposed huge indemnities even on neutral states (like Parma), his soldiers carried out unceremonious requisitions of provisions, fodder, money, paintings and statues (they were sent to France Napoleon sent so many that the Italians still have every reason to make claims against French museums). With cities where, say, they found a murdered French soldier, General Bonaparte cracked down mercilessly.

Victory reports from Italy increasingly strengthened the authority of the commander. The Directory could no longer ignore this. An indicative episode occurred when Napoleon fought at Lodi. From Paris came a decree on the division of the Italian army. But Bonaparte felt so confident that he sent a defiant reply to France. He wrote that one bad general is better than two good ones, in connection with which he refused to command one of the two armies. And the directors were forced to cancel their instructions! No wonder - after all, one victory in Italy followed another, a secondary theater of military operations turned into a triumphal one, money flowed from the south to France in a continuous stream ...

Modena capitulated to the French, after which Bonaparte's army began to lay siege to the center of Austrian rule in Northern Italy - Mantua. From Tyrol, a 30,000-strong army under the command of General Wurmser followed to the aid of this fortress. Having thrown back the divisions of Masséna and Augereau in turn, the Austrians entered the city. But they soon had to leave as Napoleon defeated another column of Austrians and continued to threaten Mantua. On August 5, at the Battle of Castiglion, Bonaparte defeated Wurmser, after a series of new battles, the Austrians again locked themselves in Mantua. Now the Austrian army of Alvintzi hurried to the rescue. On November 15–17, fierce battles took place between the French and these troops for the Arkol bridge. Three times Napoleon's soldiers took it and were knocked out three times. Finally, the French commander, with a banner in his hands, himself led his people into another attack. Napoleon's biography could have been much shorter as a result of this feat, but, fortunately (or unfortunately for all of Europe), the general survived, the bridge was taken.

It was for such personal courage that the soldiers and officers loved Bonaparte. Although, of course, not only for this. Napoleon knew how to talk with ordinary soldiers, shared with them all the hardships of campaigns. He knew many soldiers by sight, remembered the details of their marital status, wives and children. For them, Napoleon always, even being the all-powerful emperor, remained the first soldier, the "little corporal."

It should be noted that during the Italian campaign, Napoleon's inner circle was replenished with a number of brilliant commanders. First of all, these are Lannes and Berthier. The groom's son Jean Lannes earned the fame of the bravest of the Napoleonic galaxy of military leaders. Direct and sharp, he did not stop before criticizing his immediate patron. And yet he always enjoyed his trust. Berthier was a different type of person. Being a decade and a half older than the commander, he was not a field commander and made his career under Bonaparte in a staff setting. Berthier had no less capacity for work than Napoleon himself, he was prudent and consistent. The great commander could always rely on him. In Italy, Berthier was actually the second person in the French army.

Fans of alternative history can once again practice the art of modeling events by reading the pages of Napoleon's biography, dedicated to the end of 1796 - the beginning of 1797. At this time, hitherto invulnerable to enemy bullets, the commander was stricken with a fever and was probably on the verge of death. However, even in this situation, the general continued to issue orders that turned out to be victories. On January 14–15, 1797, at the Battle of Rivoli, the troops of the Austrian commander Alvinzi suffered a final defeat. Masséna prevented the Austrians from reaching Mantua, and two weeks later that city also surrendered to the French. Bonaparte also undertook an expedition against the papal possessions, acquiring for France, according to the peace in Tolentino, concluded on February 19, the richest part of the papal lands, a large contribution, a mass of works of art.

After that, Napoleon moved north, threatening the Habsburg possessions and Vienna directly. In the spring of 1797, he pushed back another Austrian army commanded by Archduke Charles. Austria sued for peace. The truce was concluded in Leoben in May by Napoleon himself, while the final peace was signed on October 17, 1797 at Campo Formio, and it basically repeated all the points of the preliminary truce. Austria gave France the banks of the Rhine and all her Italian possessions. In return, Venice was handed over to her, with which Napoleon put an end specifically in order to have something to offer Austria. Bonaparte did not have the slightest real pretext for starting a war with this city, but Venice was taken. So Napoleon somewhat casually and as if in passing put an end to the ancient republic forever. In June 1797, his troops occupied the center of another old merchant power - Genoa. Here the Ligurian Republic was proclaimed, the model for which was the Constitution of the III year of the French Republic.

In negotiations with the Austrian ambassador in Leoben, the French general had already shown his manner of conducting diplomatic negotiations. At some point, he was already so annoyed by the tricks and breakings of an interlocutor experienced in diplomacy that he broke the service and simply yelled at the Austrian. “You forget,” Napoleon shouted, “that you are surrounded by my grenadiers!” This “diplomatic trick”, I must say, turned out to be very effective. Subsequently, Napoleon resorted to him more than once, his outbursts of rage, when he banged his fists, reprimanded high-ranking guests, threw and trampled on his hat, were probably sometimes feigned. The emperor even took lessons from one of the Parisian actors. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Bonaparte really did not always cope with outbursts of anger. He liked to directly indicate to his counterparts what they are worth and where their place in life is.

The political map of Italy has been redrawn. Back in June 1797, the Cisalpine Republic was formed, which included, first of all, Lombardy and retained only the appearance of independence from France; another part of Italy became part of France, the third (for example, Rome) was temporarily left in the hands of the previous rulers, of course, intimidated and dependent on Paris in everything. Napoleon ruled in Italy as a full owner. Among his decrees were the order to deprive the church and monasteries of the rights to certain types of fundraising, the destruction of feudal rights, a number of legal provisions close to French, and, of course, the continuation of mass requisitions - Napoleon and his officers returned from Italy as wealthy people.

Napoleon spent the second half of 1797 in the castle of Mombello near Milan, where, in many ways, through the efforts of the brilliant Josephine Beauharnais, who fell into her element, a kind of court of Bonaparte was created. Receptions, feasts and balls followed one after another. The victorious French generals were greeted as heroes and liberators, as if forgetting that all the expenses for the maintenance of this "fun castle" were borne by the inhabitants of Milan. Outstanding scientists from Paris also came here, for example, Monge and Berthollet. Napoleon amazed them with his knowledge of the sciences, which was deep enough for an amateur. No less surprising was the awareness of Bonaparte among Italian singers and artists. However, this surprise could be ostentatious, because Napoleon at that time was actually the undivided master of Lombardy.

But the general did not go to break with the Directory. Moreover, when Barras and his co-rulers faced a real threat of overthrow, it was Napoleon's soldiers who again helped them avoid a sad fate. The Italian triumphant himself did not appear in Paris, but Augereau, sent by him on the 18th fructidor (September 5), 1797, dispersed both legislative Councils, thereby carrying out almost a coup d'état in favor of Barras. "The law is a saber!" - allegedly answered the breter and dashing grunt Augereau to the reproaches of one of his acquaintances. In the future, the commander did exactly the same with the parliament.