Balkan Crisis 1908. Balkan Crisis

Germany and its ally in the military bloc of Austria-Hungary sought to turn the Balkans and Turkey into a sphere of their economic, political and military influence, which affected the interests of the Entente countries in this region and deepened their contradictions with the Austro-German bloc. The events that unfolded in 1908-1909 assumed an explosive character. in the Balkans and dubbed the "Bosnian crisis".

Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Serbs and Croats, was occupied for an indefinite period by the troops of Austria-Hungary by decision of the Berlin Congress of 1878, but continued to be considered Turkish possessions. Austria-Hungary considered these provinces, which were of great strategic importance, as a springboard for strengthening its influence in the Balkans and had long hatched plans for their final annexation.

In 1908 a revolution began in Turkey. The absolutist regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid was overthrown, the military came to power, belonging to the bourgeois-nationalist organization "Unity and Progress" (called "Young Turks" in Europe), who introduced a constitution in the country. The revolution in Turkey caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Balkans, but the Young Turk government brutally suppressed the movement that had begun.

The Young Turk Revolution was seen by Austria-Hungary as a convenient pretext to implement for the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In connection with this intention of Austria-Hungary, Russian Foreign Minister A.P. Izvolsky believed it possible to negotiate with the Vienna Cabinet on compensation for Russia in return for its recognition of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. He knew that the question of the occupation of these territories had already been finally decided by the Vienna Cabinet, and under these circumstances, one would have to either limit himself to a fruitless protest of the Russian side, or resort to threats, which was fraught with the outbreak of a military conflict.

On September 2-3 (16-17), 1908, in the Austrian castle of Buchlau, Izvolsky met with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count A. Erenthal. An oral ("gentlemen's") agreement was concluded between them. Izvolsky agreed to Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in exchange for Erenthal's promise to support Russia's demand to open the Black Sea straits for the passage of Russian military ships and the provision of territorial compensation to Serbia. It also provided for the withdrawal of Austrian troops from the Turkish province - the Novo-Bazar Sanjak - and the refusal of the Austrian side from claims to it. Izvolsky assumed full responsibility for the negotiations.

These issues were to be resolved at an international conference of European powers, participants in the Berlin Congress of 1878 - Russia, England, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy. To prepare this conference and clarify the position of the powers, Izvolsky went on a tour of European capitals.

Germany and Italy gave their consent in a general, non-binding form, but at the same time demanded certain compensations for themselves. France and England, despite their allied relations with Russia, were not interested in changing the regime of the straits and in fact refused to support her in this matter. France conditioned its position on the opinion of the British Cabinet. In London, they referred to the need to obtain Turkey's consent to change the regime of the straits.

On September 29 (October 10), 1908, when Izvolsky was touring European capitals, Austria-Hungary officially announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this time, in order to attract Bulgaria to his side, Erenthal secretly agreed with the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand to grant her complete independence. Under the terms of the Berlin Congress of 1878, although Bulgaria was an autonomous principality, it paid tribute to Turkey, and the elected Bulgarian prince was approved by the Turkish sultan. Relying on the support of Austria-Hungary, Ferdinand declared himself king, and Bulgaria an independent kingdom.

Russia, Serbia and Turkey protested against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Serbia even mobilized its army. England and France, under various pretexts, evaded taking any measures against the actions of Austria-Hungary. England put forward a project to neutralize the straits and even sent its squadron to the Dardanelles, and advised the Turkish government to be more vigilant and strengthen the Bosphorus. Turkey, for a British subsidy of 2.5 million pounds, in February 1909 renounced its rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Izvolsky was opposed by Stolypin, who reasonably pointed out that an agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary on these terms would cause strong discontent both among the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula and public opinion in Russia itself. He believed that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary would inevitably evoke strong opposition from the Balkan peoples and thus contribute to their unity under the auspices of Russia.

Austria-Hungary, in an ultimatum form, demanded that Serbia recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly threatening it with war, defiantly began military preparations and concentrated its troops on the Serbian border. Germany took the side of Austria-Hungary. On March 8 (21), 1909, she presented Russia with an ultimatum - to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, to abandon the demand to convene an international conference on the Bosnian question and to influence Serbia to accept the conditions of the Vienna Cabinet. Germany unequivocally declared the likelihood of military action by Austria-Hungary against Serbia if the ultimatum was not accepted. Germany frankly went to extreme measures. In Berlin, they said that "the best moment has come to pay off the Russians."

On the day the German ultimatum was received by the tsarist government, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Nicholas II. Russia's unpreparedness for war was recognized, as well as internal circumstances of a social nature. Stolypin took a firm position to avoid war by any means, pointing out that "unleashing a war means unleashing the forces of the revolution." On March 12 (25), 1909, Nicholas II sent a telegram to Wilhelm II about the consent of the Russian government to accept Germany's demands. A few days later, Serbia also announced the acceptance of the requirements of Austria-Hungary. The failure of Russian diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis was caustically dubbed "diplomatic Tsushima" in Russia itself.

The failure of Russian diplomacy temporarily weakened the position of the Germanophile group in Russia. At the same time, a noisy campaign was launched in right-wing newspapers against England and France, which did not support Russia in the most acute moments of the crisis.

Germany regarded the outcome of the Bosnian crisis as a favorable factor in the weakening of Russia's influence in the Balkans and the split of the Entente. Germany itself sought to strengthen its influence in the Balkans and oust Russia, France and England from the countries of the Middle East, but it was precisely this desire of Germany that rallied the Entente bloc even more, and the result of the Bosnian crisis was an intensification of the arms race. In Russia, it was criminalized to develop a program for the reorganization of the army and navy, equipping them with new types of weapons. In order to centralize all military affairs, the Council of State Defense was abolished in August 1909, and all institutions of the military department, including the General Staff and the general inspectors of individual branches of the military, were subordinated to the Minister of War. After the Bosnian crisis, the Russian General Staff was even more convinced that war was imminent, as well as that Austria-Hungary and Germany would be Russia's most likely opponents in this war. In 1910, a new deployment of the army was approved with the aim of a more even distribution of troops throughout the country. The areas of concentration of troops and equipment were moved away from the borders so as not to put them under attack by the enemy in the very first days of the war. The officer corps was expanded, in which the proportion of representatives of non-noble estates increased.

The Bosnian crisis contributed to the rapprochement between Russia and Italy. In October 1909, a secret treaty between Russia and Italy was signed in the Italian town of Rakkondzhi. It provided for Italian support in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans and assistance in opening the Black Sea straits to Russian warships in exchange for Russia's benevolent neutrality in the event that Italy seized Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (in North Africa), which were under Turkish rule. The treaty also provided for the joint diplomatic pressure of Italy and Russia on Austria-Hungary in case it violated the status quo in the Balkans. The Russo-Italian Treaty of 1909 marked an important step in Italy's emerging withdrawal from the Triple Alliance.

In September 1911, the Italo-Turkish war began. Russia decided to take advantage of Turkey's failures in this war to create a favorable regime for the Black Sea straits. He was sent to Turkey by the ambassador N.V. Charykov, who was tasked with obtaining from the Turkish government consent to the opening of the Black Sea straits for Russian military ships in exchange for Russian assistance in protecting the straits and adjacent territories. Charykov also faced another task - to achieve the unification of Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkan Union under the auspices of Russia in order to counter the aggressive policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. It was supposed to join this union also Greece and Romania.

Back in October 1904, Germany, taking advantage of Russia's failures in the war with Japan, made an attempt to tear it away from the alliance with France, but the negotiations, which lasted until December of that year, did not produce results. The second attempt on the part of Germany was made at the final stage of the Russo-Japanese War. In July 1905, the German emperor Wilhelm II paid a visit to Nicholas II, who was resting on about. Björke in Finnish skerries (near Vyborg). Here he managed to persuade Nicholas II to sign an agreement on mutual military assistance in the event of an attack on Russia or Germany by another European power. At the same time, Wilhelm II hinted that England was meant here, and not France, which might join this treaty. However, in its meaning, the treaty was directed against France, which deprived Russia of its main ally and creditor. In its form, the treaty was defensive and came into force at the end of the Russo-Japanese War.

This agreement was in the nature of a personal agreement between the two monarchs without the knowledge of their foreign ministers. S.V. Witte, who arrived from Portsmouth after the signing of peace with Japan, and Foreign Minister V.N. Lamsdorf, after much persuasion from the tsar, convinced him to disavow the treaty: without formally renouncing it, to introduce a number of such amendments and conditions into it that would nullify it. In November 1905, Wilhelm II was informed that Russia's obligations towards Germany did not apply in the event of a war between Germany and France. This was a diplomatic refusal, and the treaty did not come into force, which strengthened Russia's relations with France. At the beginning of April 1906, France granted Russia a new loan in the amount of 2,250 million francs (850 million rubles).

At the same time, Russia did not want to aggravate relations with Germany either. In July 1907 Wilhelm II had a meeting with Nicholas II in Swinemünde. An agreement was concluded between them on maintaining the status quo in the Baltic Sea. Sweden and Denmark joined this treaty.

Germany and Italy gave their consent in a general, non-binding form, but at the same time demanded certain compensations for themselves. France and England, despite their allied relations with Russia, were not interested in changing the regime of the straits and in fact refused to support her in this matter. France conditioned its position on the opinion of the British cabinet. In London, they referred to the need to obtain Turkey's consent to change the regime of the straits.

On September 29 (October 10), 1908, when Izvolsky was touring European capitals, Austria-Hungary officially announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At this time, in order to win Bulgaria over to his side, Erenthal secretly agreed with the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand to grant her complete independence. Under the terms of the Berlin Congress of 1878, although Bulgaria was an autonomous principality, it paid tribute to Turkey, and the elected Bulgarian prince was approved by the Turkish sultan. Relying on the support of Austria-Hungary, Ferdinand declared himself king, and Bulgaria an independent kingdom.

Russia, Serbia and Turkey protested against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Serbia even mobilized its army. England and France, under various pretexts, evaded taking any measures against the actions of Austria-Hungary. England put forward a project to neutralize the straits and even sent its squadron to the Dardanelles, and advised the Turkish government to be more vigilant and strengthen the Bosphorus. Turkey, for a subsidy from England of 2.5 million pounds sterling, in February 1909 renounced its rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Izvolsky was opposed by Stolypin, who reasonably pointed out that an agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary on these terms would cause strong discontent both among the Slavic peoples of the Balkan Peninsula and public opinion in Russia itself. He believed that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary would inevitably provoke strong opposition from the Balkan peoples and thus contribute to their unity under the auspices of Russia.

Austria-Hungary, in an ultimatum form, demanded that Serbia recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly threatening it with war, defiantly began military preparations and concentrated its troops on the Serbian border. Germany took the side of Austria-Hungary. On March 8 (21), 1909, she presented Russia with an ultimatum - to recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, to abandon the demand to convene an international conference on the Bosnian question and to influence Serbia to accept the conditions of the Vienna Cabinet. Germany was unequivocal about the likelihood of military action by Austria-Hungary against Serbia if the ultimatum was not accepted. Germany frankly went to extreme measures. In Berlin, they said that "the best moment has come to pay off the Russians."

On the day the tsarist government received the German ultimatum, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Nicholas II. Russia's unpreparedness for war was recognized, as well as internal circumstances of a social nature. Stolypin took a firm position to avoid war by any means, pointing out that "to unleash a war means to untie the forces of the revolution." On March 12 (25), 1909, Nicholas II sent a telegram to Wilhelm II about the consent of the Russian government to accept Germany's demands. A few days later, Serbia also announced the acceptance of the requirements of Austria-Hungary. The failure of Russian diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis was caustically dubbed "diplomatic Tsushima" in Russia itself.

The Bosnian crisis contributed to the rapprochement between Russia and Italy. In October 1909, a secret treaty between Russia and Italy was signed in the Italian town of Rakkondzhi. It provided for Italian support in maintaining the status quo in the Balkans and assistance in opening the Black Sea straits for Russian warships in exchange for Russia's benevolent neutrality in the event that Italy seized Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (in North Africa), which were under Turkish rule. The treaty also provided for the joint diplomatic pressure of Italy and Russia on Austria-Hungary in case it violated the status quo in the Balkans. The Russo-Italian Treaty of 1909 marked an important step in Italy's emerging withdrawal from the Triple Alliance.

Bosporus and Dardanelles. Secret provocations on the eve of the First World War (1907–1914) Luneva Yulia Viktorovna

Chapter II The Question of the Black Sea Straits during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 On the way to the Italo-Turkish war

The Question of the Black Sea Straits during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909 On the way to the Italo-Turkish war

In late 1907 and early 1908, tensions arose between Russia and Turkey. Back in September, immediately after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement, Russian Foreign Minister A.P. Izvolsky, during a visit to Vienna, in a conversation with A. Erenthal, said that it was in Russia's interests to maintain the status quo in the Balkans. Germany and Austria-Hungary, not objecting to the actions of Russia, continued to develop expansion in the Middle East. Germany negotiated political and military agreements with the Ottoman Empire and secured a continuation of the contract for the construction of the Baghdad Railway. Austria-Hungary signed with Istanbul a secret military convention and a protocol on concessions in Thessaloniki and Kosovo vilayets.

England continued to develop relations with Russia. On May 27–28 (O.S.), 1908, on the roadstead of the Revel (now Tallinn) port, a meeting between Edward VII and Nicholas II took place. The English king spoke in favor of further strengthening the unity between the two governments and expressed satisfaction with the development of events in Russia as a result of the activities of P. A. Stolypin.

Despite the rapprochement with England, Izvolsky believed that relations with Austria-Hungary should also be improved. The Danubian monarchy sought to establish its control in the Balkan Peninsula and firmly establish itself on the Adriatic coast. To do this, she needed to annex the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, these South Slavic lands were under the control of Austria-Hungary, but formally remained part of the Ottoman Empire.

To implement this plan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary A. Ehrental did extensive preparatory work.

In November 1907, Izvolsky, during his trip to Europe, met with him and discussed issues of Balkan politics. Izvolsky told Erenthal that it would be desirable to find out in advance "whether it is possible for Russia and Austria to continue to act in complete unity and harmony, even in the event of such circumstances that, in addition to the will of these two powers, would violate the status quo within the Turkish empire" . Izvolsky openly told Erenthal that Russia neither now nor in the future wants any territorial gain either at the expense of Turkey or at the expense of any of the Balkan countries. But if, contrary to this peace-loving and conservative policy, significant changes took place on the Balkan Peninsula, the Russian government, of necessity, “would have to attend to ensuring its most important interest, arising from the history and geographical position of Russia. This interest, in my deep conviction, is entirely concentrated in the question of a free exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, in other words, in the question of the Turkish straits. Such a formulation of the matter, it seems to me, should greatly facilitate the establishment of complete agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary regarding further joint activities in the Eastern question; for the resolution in our favor of the question of the Straits would not violate any Austrian interest ... ".

During April-June 1908, an exchange of notes took place between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian ministries of foreign affairs, in which Russia's support for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was confirmed in exchange for Austria-Hungary's support for changing the regime of the Straits in the direction of interest to Russia.

On May 1 (14), 1908, the Government of Austria-Hungary sent a memorandum to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which Erenthal proposed to take a fresh look at the problem of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina belonging to Turkey, on July 2 (15) Izvolsky sent a memorandum to Erenthal, which contained a proposal to agree in the event of decisive changes in the Balkans on the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Novopazar Sanjak in exchange for changing the convention on the Straits in favor of Russia. At the same time, Izvolsky mentioned that the revision of the Berlin Treaty was possible only with the consent of the powers that signed it, and for this it would be necessary to hold an international conference.

In terms of time, Izvolsky's statement almost coincided with the coup d'état in Turkey, which began in Thessaloniki, that is, in Macedonia. The government of the Young Turks came to power, which made a bet on Germany. This increased Russia's concern about the fate of the Black Sea straits. The leaders of the Young Turk revolution were going to hold elections in the Ottoman Empire, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. This circumstance prompted the Habsburg Monarchy to formally annex both of the provinces it occupied. A modern historian writes: “Thus the Danube Monarchy caused the second great international crisis of the 20th century, the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909. Essentially, it was a consequence of the long impact of the Eastern Question and the events of the Young Turk revolution, but only the German intervention raised the regional crisis to a world level.

On July 21 (August 3), 1908, a special meeting was held in St. Petersburg with the participation of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Council of State Defense, military and naval ministers, representatives of the General Staffs of the naval and land forces, the Minister of Finance, as well as Russian ambassadors in Paris and Constantinople. At the meeting, the issue of defending the interests of Russia in Turkey was discussed, but it was recognized that now “we are not ready for any independent action, that the armed seizure of the Bosphorus has to be temporarily postponed and for the time being to develop a detailed plan of action for the peaceful occupation of the Bosphorus without declaring war Turkey".

When it came to the possibility of conducting an operation in the Straits, the Minister of Marine said that it would be possible to send two battleships and two cruisers from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean to occupy the Upper Bosphorus and other actions only in the future.

The meeting was in favor of speeding up the relevant preparations. Izvolsky believed that the general political situation was beneficial for Russia, and believed that England, which hindered Russia's undertakings in the East, would not have opposed it at that moment. The consciousness of their own impotence and friendly relations with England dictated to the Russian ruling circles the need to accept the Turkish revolution, come to terms with it and try to extract possible benefits from it.

The meeting decided "to develop a detailed plan of action in the peaceful occupation of the Bosporus without declaring war on Turkey, subject to all precautions so that the Turks do not learn prematurely about our intentions."

Three days later, the head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, F.F. Palitsyn, sent a confidential letter to the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District, stating that "the current political situation may force us to occupy part of the territory of Turkey with troops, in the foreground the Upper Bosphorus." This task was assigned to the Odessa district.

Palitsyn noted: "... it is true that the military-political situation in which we will now have to carry out the expedition will differ significantly from the one that was envisaged earlier (meaning before the Russo-Japanese War)." He was sure that Russia would not have to wait for the appearance and breakthrough of the English fleet into the Black Sea. “The main concern of the expedition,” Palitsyn summed up, “will be the capture of advantageous positions on both sides of the Strait, dominating Constantinople, and keeping them in their hands in order to achieve the political goal set, according to the circumstances.” On July 29 (August 11), 1908, F. F. Palitsyn informed I. M. Dikov, Minister of the Sea: “Operational considerations require that in the event of a collision with Turkey, we should be ready to transfer one corps of troops, reinforced by a cavalry brigade and provided with a monthly reserve. In round numbers, this will amount to about 1,100 officer and class ranks, 42,000 lower ranks, 110,000 horses, 3,000 guns and wagons with 300,000 pounds of food supplies. Where the landing will have to be sent - whether to the Bosphorus, or to another point on the coast of Asia Minor - can only be indicated by the situation in which it will be necessary to start a war. Further, Palitsyn referred to the conclusion of the Special Meeting on July 21 (August 3), that for political reasons the government could not enter into an agreement with Bulgaria on joint actions and that the political situation could force part of Turkish territory to be occupied by troops and, in the foreground, the Upper Bosphorus. “Under the current political situation, the task of the expedition,” Palitsyn informed Dikov, “is reduced to capturing positions on both banks of the Bosporus that dominate Constantinople; and to hold these positions until the concentration of forces necessary for the military task, in accordance with the specified policy. The interests of the first echelon of the ground forces require that the fleet, by providing and facilitating the landing, would contribute to the fall of the Bosphorus batteries and render all possible assistance to the troops in holding the captured positions.

On August 20 (September 1), 2008, Foreign Minister Erenthal informed the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, V.P. meet Izvolsky. Erenthal did not fail to ask whether Izvolsky had already probed the opinion of the British government on this matter. “Having received a negative answer, he agreed in the future to accept the text proposed by Izvolsky. He did not risk anything, being sure that the British would not make concessions in this matter.

The Russian minister intended to use the current situation to secure Russia's right to navigate warships through the Straits. Izvolsky believed that if he managed to conclude a deal with Austria-Hungary, then Germany would not oppose the implementation of his plan. France, as an ally, should not have objected to the Straits either. Great Britain, on the other hand, will have to fulfill its promise given at the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement.

On August 6 (19), the government of Austria-Hungary decided to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. The annexation plan was supported by the Austrian military party, led by Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Chief of the General Staff Konrad von Götzendorf. By agreement with the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand of Coburg, this event was to coincide with the declaration of independence of Bulgaria. As a result, it turned out that Austria-Hungary was not the only state that violated the Berlin Treaty.

Already on August 20 (September 2), Izvolsky wrote from Carlsbad to his assistant N.V. Izvolsky found it extremely important that the Vienna Cabinet did not refuse to include the issue of the Straits in the discussion. Further, Izvolsky reasoned as follows: “It remains to find a formulation that really provided us with the necessary compensation. The fact is that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a material fact; compensation, namely, the consent of Austria-Hungary to one or another resolution of the question of the Straits, in any case, will be of an abstract and secret nature. On August 28, it was clear to Izvolsky that the decision to announce annexation in the near future had already been taken by the Vienna Cabinet.

On September 2–3 (15–16) Izvolsky met with Erenthal in Buchlau. The Russian minister wrote to his assistant that the Austro-Hungarian government had finally decided on annexation and was counting on its recognition by Russia.

As a result of difficult negotiations, Erenthal agreed, without waiting for the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire in the distant future, to accept the Russian formula regarding the Straits, when all ships of Russia and other coastal states of the Black Sea could enter and exit through the Straits while maintaining the principle of closing them to warships of other nations. The subjects of the transaction were unequal. The annexation after thirty years of Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a logical step, while Russia did not possess the Straits and could not independently resolve the issue settled at the international level. Erenthal only wanted to introduce some reservation into this formula, which would deprive it of its aggressive character towards Turkey, which seemed quite possible to Izvolsky. Erenthal expressed his readiness to support Russia's demand to Germany.

The Bosporus mirage clearly arose before the eyes of Izvolsky, who wrote to Charykov that it was necessary to report everything to the tsar and develop before him the idea that we would not achieve anything by protests against annexation and threats, and the path he proposed of compensation and guarantees might even turn out to be profitable. “With a happy and skillful conduct of business, there are chances today, that is, without waiting for the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, to change the decision on the Straits in our favor. In any case, we get formal consent to such a change from Austria, and maybe Germany, ”wrote Izvolsky.

The results of the meeting between Izvolsky and Erenthal were not officially recorded, which left the freedom to interpret the chances of "a happy and skillful conduct of business." Neither the timing of the annexation, nor Russia's proposal to revise the status of the Straits, nor the procedure for formalizing changes in the Berlin Treaty were specified. The interlocutors then interpreted its meaning differently: Izvolsky claimed that a formal conspiracy had taken place: Erental received Bosnia and Herzegovina, Izvolsky - a revision of the question of the Dardanelles at a European conference that he wanted to organize. Erenthal said that there was no collusion.

On September 10 (23), Izvolsky reminded Erenthal that he “conditioned his consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by recognizing the pan-European nature of this issue and the need for compensation.” On September 11, the Russian minister wrote to his assistant that "it is necessary to prepare and at the decisive moment direct our press and public opinion, which can very easily go astray." Izvolsky considered it very important to establish mutual understanding with a number of leading publications, not limited to the friendly New Time, but "enlist the support of A.I. Guchkov (Voice of Moscow) and P.N. Milyukov (Rech)". The main role in contacts with the press was assigned to A. A. Girs, who headed the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and assistant minister Charykov.

The ambassador in Istanbul, I. A. Zinoviev, correctly assessed the situation when he wrote that "the present Turkish government is not particularly disposed to resolving the issue of the straits in the sense that is desirable for Russia."

On October 5 (18), 1908, the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District sent a letter to Palitsyn. "The political events taking place recently in the Balkan Peninsula confirm the need to keep our armed forces and assets on the Black Sea in constant readiness and to accept certain interventions in the fate of the Balkan peoples." He concluded that the question “of the readiness to transfer our armed forces at any moment to one or another point of the Turkish theater is very important and “requiring full and tireless attention and care” is the question of “readiness to transfer our armed forces at any moment to one or another point of the Turkish theater - in other words, constant readiness for an undertaking landing operation in one or another other sizes and purposes.

The question of the implementation of the landing expedition was divided into a number of component questions about the readiness of the Black Sea Fleet (public and private), military units and various kinds of reserves. “At the present time,” A. V. Kaulbars reported to Palitsyn, “due to the transfer to the reserve, about 40% of the lower ranks are missing on all ships of the Black Sea Fleet. In view of this, for the immediate exit of the combat squadron, it is necessary to remove from all military transports and ships of the reserve fleet most of the crews on them and transfer them to the ships of the combat fleet. To staff up to the regular composition of the teams of military transports and ships of the reserve fleet, it will be necessary to call on spare sailors.

All the difficulties listed by the commander of the Odessa District were the reason that “the ships of the Black Sea Fleet could only be ready to go to sea on the 8th day after the announcement of the expedition. In addition, there was an acute shortage of coal reserves: there were about 20,000 tons; meanwhile, for the purposes of the expedition, a reserve of about 700,000 tons was recognized as necessary. As a result, it turned out that with such unprepared means, there can be no question of speed and, if possible, suddenness of our appearance off the coast of the Bosporus.

It was encouraging that in peacetime the shores of the Bosphorus were poorly guarded. The possibility of a sudden seizure of the shores of the Strait in peacetime was also due to certain mutual relations of the European powers, or, as the commander formulated it: "So to speak, the general political situation of the moment." The commander of the troops of the Odessa military district understood that "the Bosphorus expedition, the results of which, if the outcome is favorable, will be of paramount national importance," could lead to significant political difficulties. Therefore, he believed that the adoption of this decision should be preceded by a thorough discussion. “The results expected from the expedition, as well as the results caused by it, in view of the existing conditions, sacrifices and difficulties, will be put on the scales. Both those and others will make a relative assessment, which will serve as the basis for the subsequent decision.

“Until now, the issue of organizing the management of an amphibious expedition, which is a matter of paramount importance, has not been sufficiently developed,” Kaulbars admitted, “and the issue of delimiting the power and responsibility of the military and naval departments in organizing amphibious operations has not been resolved. It would seem that for the correct use of all the means prepared for the amphibious expedition, for improving and maintaining them in constant readiness, it is necessary, even in peacetime, to designate the person who will become the head of the expedition. Izvolsky, meanwhile, continued his diplomatic tour of Europe. On September 12–13 (25–26) in Berchtesgaden, he met with the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs W. Schön, and on September 16–17 (29–30) in Desio with Italian Foreign Minister T. Tittoni, followed by Paris and London. From a conversation with Schoen, Izvolsky fully understood that Germany would not object to changes in the regime of the Straits, but would demand compensation for itself in this region.

Tittoni was generally sympathetic, but immediately put forward Italy's claims to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, to which the Russian minister did not object.

On September 19 (October 2), a draft memorandum to the Austro-Hungarian government, which requested compensation to Russia and the Balkan states in the event of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was approved by the tsar. Paragraph 2 of the memorandum dealt with the question of the Straits and stipulated “the right for Russia and for other Black Sea countries to navigate their warships freely in both directions through the Straits that link the Black and Mediterranean Seas, since the principle of closing these Straits is established by states that are not coastal to this sea." At the end of the memorandum, the Russian government invited Vienna to conduct a friendly exchange of views on the future of Constantinople and its adjacent territories and to establish mutual understanding between Russia and the Danubian Monarchy in the event of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

On the same day, Charykov informed the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the military and naval ministers and the finance minister, as well as the acting chief of the General Staff, about the results of Russian-Austrian negotiations. Stolypin and Kokovtsov expressed their indignation at the fact that the Council of Ministers learned so late "about a case of such enormous historical significance, affecting the interests of the internal state of the empire." The ministers urgently gathered for a meeting at which Stolypin and Kokovtsov, "with the sympathetic support of others," sharply criticized Izvolsky's actions. They believed that, although Russia could not prevent the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should act as a defender of the interests of the affected states, "and by no means an accomplice or harborer of Austria." At the meeting, it was decided to tell the king that the government refuses to take responsibility for the consequences of actions taken without his knowledge.

Reporting to Izvolsky about what had happened, Charykov asked him to return to Petersburg. Having received a telegram compiled by Kokovtsov and setting out the opinion of the Council of Ministers, Izvolsky became seriously worried. The minister, through the Russian ambassador to France, A. I. Nelidov, explained to Charykov that he (Izvolsky) had warned Austria about the international consequences of the annexation and was proposing a peaceful and favorable outcome for Russia. He also believed that his return to St. Petersburg, as desired by the meeting, might not be desirable, since the upcoming talks in London, Paris and Berlin promised promising results in the current situation. Despite disagreement on the part of the Council of Ministers, Nicholas II allowed the Minister of Foreign Affairs to continue the journey.

On September 25 (October 8), Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is possible that the thought flashed through the Austrian minister that the unexpected annexation would help to frustrate Izvolsky's plans for the Straits. Two days before this event, on September 23 (October 6), the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Zinoviev, met with the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. From their answers, the ambassador concluded that they recognized it necessary to protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria to the powers that signed the Treaty of Berlin, but "understand the impossibility of changing the course of events and treat the facts in cold blood."

The annexation in Berlin was treated with caution, although the advance of Austria-Hungary to the southeast was in line with the interests of the Central Powers. The German government, feeling dissatisfied with the independent step of Austria-Hungary, nevertheless unconditionally supported its ally. Reich Chancellor B. Bülow convinced the Kaiser that "only England can benefit from speaking out against Erenthal."

Britain, in turn, sought to prevent the strengthening of Germany's positions either in the Balkans or in Morocco. Gray's harmonious plans were violated by Izvolsky's confused diplomatic game with Austria-Hungary.

Britain took a sharply negative stance on the act of annexation. The British Foreign Minister E. Gray told the Austro-Hungarian government that “violation or modification of the terms of the Berlin Treaty without prior consent from other powers, of which Turkey is most affected in this case, can never be approved or recognized by His Majesty's government ".

Meanwhile, it was precisely because of the Buhlau deal that the problem of the Straits turned out to be most closely connected with Balkan affairs. In Paris, Izvolsky received no definite assurances. By its non-intervention in the Bosnian crisis, France hoped to get a concession from Germany on the Moroccan issue, which at that time was more important for it than the problems of Russia and Turkey. Izvolsky's idea of an international conference and compensation in favor of the countries disadvantaged by the annexation was not supported by French Foreign Minister S. Pichon. The French ministers were dissatisfied not only with the unfortunate moment and the form that Izvolsky had chosen to solve the problem of the Straits, but also with the fact that the Russian minister was negotiating with Erenthal behind their backs. On September 24 (October 7), Russian Ambassador Nelidov telegraphed from Paris that French Foreign Minister S. Pichon asked to inform Russia that "according to the London Cabinet, until a preliminary agreement on the conference program is reached, it is advisable not to make a proposal convocation. In particular, some time is needed for the preparation of public opinion on the question of the Straits. It is also advisable to agree on compensation in advance. As a result of all this, Gray asked the Paris Cabinet to encourage Russia not to rush with concrete proposals to convene a conference. It also seemed more desirable to Pichon to make a simultaneous declaration in Constantinople and Sofia to the effect that the Berlin Treaty could not be subjected to any change or violation without the consent of the signatory powers.

In the issue of the Straits, France advocated respect for the sovereignty of Turkey and strongly advised that the issue be agreed with Britain in advance. The situation became even more aggravated due to the fact that just during Izvolsky's stay in Paris, he received a message that Stolypin's point of view had triumphed in St. Petersburg and that the tsarist government had decided to protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This tied Izvolsky's hands. In this extremely complex and confusing situation, affecting the interests of almost all the great powers, a lot depended on the position of Britain.

Russian political circles immediately responded to the annexation. Golos Moskvy considered the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a statement of the final liquidation of the Berlin Treaty and supported “the demands made to the government not to miss the moment and take care of Russia's interests. This meant the revision of the regime of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

The press also drew conclusions about Izvolsky's unsuccessful attempts. The "Speech" of October 7, 1908 ridiculed the minister who wanted to pursue a policy of "disinterestedness" in the Turkish question and dreamed of coming to the proposed international conference with clean hands. “In no country, it seems, does diplomacy consider it a merit to be especially disinterested. On the contrary, everywhere, it goes without saying that everything undertaken in international politics should be undertaken exclusively in the interests of a given state. In October 1908, Novoe Vremya responded to the failure that had befallen Izvolsky: “We are surprised that A.P. Izvolsky did not come to Buchlau with the simple idea of doing the same thing with the Dardanelles that Baron Erenthal did with Bosnia.”

British newspapers devoted entire pages of their publications to the crisis in the Middle East. Even before Izvolsky's arrival in London, "The Times" (The Times) stated: "We can immediately say that the demand for new compensation at the expense of Turkey is simply unacceptable."

On September 25 (October 8), the day before Izvolsky's arrival in London, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg A. Nicholson informed Gray that Russia could be considered an ally in the issue of supporting Turkey. True, Russia did not agree with the agenda proposed by England for the conference, which was limited to questions of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the independence of Bulgaria. Russia demanded compensation for itself - access to the Straits.

During a week-long stay in the British capital on September 26 - October 3 (October 9-16), Izvolsky held tense negotiations not only with E. Gray and his assistant C. Harding, but also with some other British ministers. These negotiations in England were given such serious importance that they were repeatedly discussed by the cabinet, and their content was systematically reported to Edward VII.

Izvolsky's project provided for the opening of the Straits for military vessels of the Black Sea coastal states. His main proposal was that “the principle of closing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus remains; an exception is made for military vessels of the coastal states of the Black Sea. At a time when the Port is not in a state of war, the coastal powers of the Black Sea will have the right to freely pass through the straits, in both directions, warships of all sizes and names. “However, in no case can more than three warships of the same coastal power make the transition from the Black to the Aegean Seas at the same time. The Ottoman authorities must be warned at least 24 hours before the passage of every warship." At the same time, Izvolsky assured Gray that “Russia has absolutely no plans of conquest in relation to Constantinople and the zone of the Straits.”

On September 30 (October 13), 1908, Izvolsky's proposal was discussed by the British Cabinet. Outlining in detail the course of the negotiations, Gray informed those present that, according to the Russian minister, a negative solution to the issue would lead to very serious consequences: “Izvolsky said that the present moment is the most critical - it can strengthen and strengthen good relations between England and Russia or break them absolutely. His own position is at stake, since he is wholly bound up with the policy of establishing a good agreement with England, which he defends against all adversaries. After a long and very heated discussion of the problem of the Straits, the cabinet was unable to reach a unanimous decision. In Gray's opinion, regardless of the essence of Russian claims, the moment in connection with the events in Turkey was extremely unsuitable for raising the question of the Straits. As a result, Izvolsky's proposal was rejected by a majority of votes. The authority and position of Izvolsky directly depended on London, so the Russian minister was extremely persistent. He managed to ensure that on October 12 Gray received him for the third time. The meeting took place at Gray's house, and the Russian ambassador to London, A. K. Benckendorff, was present during the conversation. Izvolsky somewhat retreated from his original position, proposing the option of passage through the Straits in peacetime of warships of all Black Sea states and ensuring that Turkey, in case of war, had equal rights in the use of the Straits by all powers. Gray, not wanting to put Izvolsky in a stalemate, saw in this proposal an element of reciprocity and promised to discuss it at a cabinet meeting.

On October 14, 1908, Gray handed Izvolsky a secret memorandum setting out the British Cabinet's final opinion on the matter. “The British Government agrees to the opening of the Straits, provided that the Straits are open to all equally and without exception. The Russian proposal (to open them "for Russia and the coastal states") runs counter to British public opinion, which would be extremely disappointed if Russia, which was protesting against Austria's actions, took the opportunity to secure an advantage for itself to the detriment of Turkey or in violation of the status quo to the disadvantage of others. A purely unilateral agreement that would give the Black Sea states an advantage in wartime to use the entire Black Sea, as an inaccessible harbor, as a refuge for their cruisers and fighters in case of any pursuit by the belligerents, cannot be accepted by the public opinion of England ... The agreement should be, therefore, such that, giving Russia and the coastal states at any time an exit, subject to the restrictions indicated by Mr. Izvolsky, and protecting them from the threat or assertion of foreign naval power in the Black Sea, and in peacetime, it would contain an element of reciprocity and in in the event of a war, it would put the belligerents in the same conditions. Moreover, with regard to the passage of the Straits, His Majesty's Government takes the liberty of remarking that the consent of Turkey must be a necessary preliminary condition for any project.

From the text of the memorandum, we can conclude that London does not object in principle to the opening of the Straits, but not only for Russia and the coastal states, but on conditions of complete equality for all countries without exception, and that His Majesty's Government does not consider the time suitable for concluding an agreement, which would give Russia exclusive rights. The proposal of the Russian government to grant this right only to the Black Sea states could cause the British to suspect that Russian diplomacy is trying to use the tense situation caused by Austria's actions in its own interests and to the detriment of Turkey.

The memorandum further proposed to divide the problem of changing the regime of the Straits into two parts - for the period of peacetime and for the period of war. The British government, not objecting to granting the Black Sea states the right to withdraw ships from the Straits at any time (with the restrictions mentioned in the Izvolsky memorandum) and agreeing in fact to maintain the principle of closing the Straits for warships of non-Black Sea states in peacetime, insisted on introducing the principle of reciprocity in the use of the Straits by warships of all countries in wartime, especially in the case of participation in hostilities by Great Britain and Russia.

When translating the text of the English memorandum published in A. I. Nelidov's Note on the Straits, a serious error crept in, significantly distorting its content. The word egress has been translated as advantage. Meanwhile, it meant the right of passage. This changed the essence of the British memorandum, which contained the agreement of the British side to grant the Black Sea powers the right of passage through the Straits in peacetime.

The most significant change in the new memorandum was the division of the problem into two parts: the period of peace and war. But after all, Izvolsky and the Russian side, seeking to grant the Russian fleet the right to pass through the Straits, had in mind only peacetime.

Obviously, no treatises and treaties could remain in force in wartime, especially if England and Russia were enemies. Suffice it to recall the statement of R. Salisbury in 1878 that the British government reserves the right to send its fleet to the Black Sea in case of war, regardless of any treatises.

The Gray Memorandum also introduced two new provisions that had not previously figured in the Anglo-Russian negotiations over the Straits. The first has already been mentioned: the British side insisted that the change in the regime of the Straits should not be associated with an international conference that Izvolsky proposed to convene in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second position was much more significant.

The Foreign Office document emphasized that the British Government believed that "Turkey's consent must be a necessary prerequisite for any proposal to change the regime of the Straits." For the first time in the course of diplomatic negotiations on this issue, the British side not only remembered the existence of the Turkish government, but even demanded that its consent to any changes in the regime of the Straits be secured.

This condition really changed the whole situation in a significant way and made it almost impossible for the Russian government to achieve a change in the regime of the Straits. In Constantinople, Germany's positions were again strengthened. “Turkey was offended by the scornful attitude of Austria and Bulgaria towards her ... - Gray wrote. “We cannot agree to add more embarrassment to this by imposing on Turkey the embarrassing issue of the Straits.”

Simultaneously with a negative answer to Izvolsky, “the British government warned the Porte about the information it allegedly had about Russia’s aggressive projects in relation to the Straits and demanded, on this basis, to strengthen the defensive structures on the Bosphorus, and then, recognizing the measures taken by the Porte as insufficient, sent (despite the protests of the Ports) the British squadron to Turkish waters, to the Straits, to reinforce their views on this issue.

Gray knew from the very beginning that Russia would not agree to the opening of the Straits to the warships of all powers. “The simple opening of the Straits for the warships of all peoples,” he wrote, “would provide an opportunity for foreign fleets to concentrate on the Black Sea at any time. This is unfavorable for Russia and will naturally be unacceptable for her.”

In addition, British diplomacy did not intend to change the regime of the Straits in favor of Russia for nothing, because such a change, in the opinion of the British government, would give Petersburg during the war the opportunity to turn the Black Sea into a harbor from which Russian ships could prevent communications to the Mediterranean Sea and in which they could hide from the persecution of the enemy.

As for the statement about the rejection of the Russian proposal until a favorable change in public opinion for Russia, which was included in the memorandum of the British government, it was dictated only by tactical considerations.

“Cautious and prudent was the behavior of the English Foreign Minister Edward Grey,” wrote B. Bulow in his memoirs, “he was filled with a desire not to bring things to a break.” British diplomacy achieved its goal of preventing Russia from free passage of its warships through the Straits, skillfully using the fact that Izvolsky could not openly admit to his deal with Erenthal at the expense of the Slavic peoples.

In a conversation with Gray on October 1 (14), 1908, Izvolsky stated: “When the question of the Straits is raised, England constantly impedes its solution, and, despite good relations with England, as a result of no real improvement, these good relations did not entail. This may prove disastrous for a good understanding with England." Gray insisted, however, that the moment for resolving the matter raised was unfortunate, and promised at another, more convenient time to use the influence of England in Istanbul to secure the consent of the Turkish government. “Izvolsky only achieved Gray’s assurance,” as A. Taylor correctly noted, “that he would be glad to perform a miracle:“ I positively wish to reach such an agreement that will open the Straits on terms acceptable to Russia ... and at the same time not put in disadvantageous position for Turkey or other powers.”

In fact, as V. M. Khvostov pointed out in The History of Diplomacy, “the change in the position of the British government was explained by the fact that if earlier the influence of Germany prevailed in Turkey, now the Young Turk revolution contributed to the strengthening of the influence of England. It was one thing to support Russia's claims for the free passage of its ships through the Straits in defiance of the hostile Turkey, as well as Germany standing behind her, and it was quite another to support the same claims when there is a chance to become the mistress of the Straits.

In the materials of the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, which quoted Izvolsky's interview with Reuters, it was stated that “Izvolsky and Grey have reached agreement on a conference on Balkan affairs, but only a narrow range of issues will be touched upon in it. It is not intended to put the question of the Dardanelles for discussion at the conference, since this question will concern mainly Russia and Turkey. Russia does not want this issue to be resolved in a sense unfavorable for Turkey or to be turned into a question of compensation, since Russia will come to the congress only as a disinterested power.

The Times also confirmed Russia's disinterestedness towards Turkey, but did not go into details of Izvolsky's negotiations with Gray, referring to the fact that they took place behind closed doors. "The Standard" (Standard) credited Great Britain with speaking out in defense of the Port, the issue of opening the Straits was attributed to the two most interested powers - Russia and Turkey, there was concern about Germany and Austria-Hungary's consent to compensation. The issue of the Straits was removed from the agenda. Gray urged Izvolsky to "show such an expression of goodwill towards Turkey that, at the time of the present crisis, while protecting Turkish interests, one would not receive direct benefits for Russia itself - this would make a good impression on the public opinion of England."

Paris and London showed Russian diplomacy "that the road to a peaceful resolution of the issue of the Straits goes from St. Petersburg not through Berlin and Vienna, but through London and Paris, and showed this in the most decisive form, leaving no room for any doubts and hesitation" .

The fact that Gray was not going to help Izvolsky was evidenced by the following remark by Nicholson: “His (Izvolsky. - Auth.) the appeal to the issue of the Straits was so unintelligible from the very beginning - through a fog of inaccuracies (a secret deal with Erenthal in Buchlau. - Auth.). Unfortunately for him, his first steps in this darkness and on a slippery slope brought him face to face with an enemy who presented his own goals with the utmost clarity.

How insignificant the request of Russia was for the British government can be seen from Gray's letter to Lowther: “From a strategic point of view, there are no advantages for our ships to enter the Black Sea in wartime. It is an already established principle of our maritime strategy that under no circumstances should warships enter the Black Sea as long as Turkey is not our ally. The terms of reciprocity are therefore nothing more than a shop window.”

Britain decided to postpone the issue of the Black Sea Straits indefinitely. “It is quite possible that it will never be raised,” Zinoviev wrote in his report to the Foreign Ministry. "England will not agree to any proposal before it has been previously accepted by Turkey."

Izvolsky, knowing the cunning of British diplomacy, could have foreseen such an outcome. Even before leaving Paris for London, Izvolsky, not knowing about the new conditions that would be put forward there, had a long conversation with the Turkish ambassador in France, during which he proposed to conclude an alliance treaty between both parties, which included granting Russian warships the right of free passage through the Straits. .

While Izvolsky was touring Europe, Charykov and Stolypin prepared their draft Russian-Turkish agreement, which provided for the support of the Russian government at a future international conference for Turkey's position on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, at the same time, Turkey's consent to a change in the regime of the Straits.

On September 23 (October 6), Charykov presented a draft treaty with Turkey, which consisted of four points, for a report to the tsar. He proposed that the two powers at the forthcoming conference on the revision of the Berlin Treaty act jointly in defense of mutual interests. Petersburg was ready to support a number of wishes of the Ottoman Empire, including the abolition of capitulations and the remnants of the indemnity due to Russia. The Turkish government, for its part, had to take an obligation: not to object to the transformation of Bulgaria into an independent kingdom; if the powers agree not to reject the opening of the Straits for military vessels of Russia and other Black Sea countries, while maintaining the absolute security of Turkish territory and installations in the vicinity of the Straits. Nicholas II approved Charykov's plan.

On September 26 (October 9), the Turkish government decided not to oppose the Russian proposal and asked St. Petersburg to get support for this agreement from England and France at a conference. “Turkey has no objection to our formula about the straits,” Charykov reported to Stolypin. In fact, the Port also did not want to support the Russian proposal, especially with regard to the Straits, therefore, it immediately informed England and Germany about it, counting on their assistance. The ambassador in Istanbul, I. A. Zinoviev, correctly assessed the situation when he wrote: “The present Turkish government is not particularly disposed to resolving the issue of the Straits in the sense that is desirable for Russia.”

Berlin followed the developments closely. On October 19 (November 1), the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, A. Pourtales, visited Izvolsky, and they discussed the upcoming conference. The ambassador explained to Izvolsky the motives of German policy, recalling the Russo-Japanese War, when Germany, according to him, one of all European states, exposing itself to the danger of complications with Japan, supported Russia.

Instead of gratitude, the Russian government joined the ambivalent agreement between France and England, more and more clearly taking the side of a group of powers hostile to Germany. The culminating point of this policy was the Algeciras Conference, where Russia openly spoke out against Germany.

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Bosnian Crisis 1908-1909, its reason was the annexationist policy of Austria-Hungary, which sought to strengthen its position in the Balkan Peninsula. One of the most important strategic tasks is to provide access to the Aegean Sea through the Macedonian port of Thessaloniki.

After the coup d'état of 1903, which brought the Karageorgievich dynasty to power, the new Serbian government set a course for cooperation with Russia and liberation from Austro-Hungarian financial and economic domination. The victory of Serbia ended the customs war with Austria-Hungary, which began in 1906. October 5, 1908 The rescript of Emperor Franz Joseph on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was published. The Serbian kingdom considered these territories as part of the future South Slavic state and therefore opposed their annexation. Serbia turned to Russia for help, which, in turn, offered to consider this issue at a conference of countries participating in the Berlin Congress. February-March 1909 Austria-Hungary concentrated large army units on the border with Serbia. In support of the ally, German Chancellor Bülow sends two messages to St. Petersburg demanding that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina be sanctioned. Russia, and then other countries that signed the Berlin Treaty, accepted the German proposal.

March-October 1912. formed Balkan Union as part of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro. The most important goal of the union was liberation from the Ottoman oppression, at the same time the Balkan Union was also directed against A-B. Bulgaria wanted to gain access to the Aegean Sea by annexing Thessaloniki and western Thrace, and also, together with Serbia, to seize most of Macedonia. Greece claimed territorial acquisitions in South Macedonia and western Thrace, as well as the island of Crete and other island territories in the Aegean Sea. Serbia sought, together with Greece, to carry out the division of Albania and secure access to the Adriatic Sea.

First Balkan War 1912-1913 The reason for the war was the refusal of the Turkish government from its promise to grant autonomy to Macedonia and Thrace. Hostilities began in October 1912. The allied troops launched a decisive offensive: the Bulgarian troops rushed to Constantinople, the Greeks cleared Epirus of the enemy and, together with the Bulgarians, occupied Thessaloniki. Serbian troops liberated most of Macedonia, northern Albania and reached the Adriatic coast. Turkey has requested a truce. On December 16, a conference of representatives of the warring countries opened in London. But in January 1913 hostilities resumed. But the Ottoman Empire was again defeated. In May 1913 in London, Turkey signed a peace treaty, according to which it ceded significant territories to the Balkan states west of the Midia-Enos line.

Second Balkan War 1913 The royal government of Serbia was the first to express its dissatisfaction with the results of the war. Having not received Northern Albania and access to the Adriatic Sea, it demanded the transfer of Vardar Macedonia. Greece laid claim to Thessaloniki and the Aegean coast. Romania counted on the annexation of Southern Dobruja and the Silistria fortress. But Bulgaria refused them all. As a result, Serbia, Greece, Romania and Turkey entered into an anti-Bulgarian alliance. Hostilities lasted from June to August 10, 1913 and ended with the signing of the Bucharest peace and the signing of a separate peace treaty between Bulgaria and Turkey - the Constantinople peace treaty on September 29. Bulgaria lost all acquisitions in Macedonia. Serbia received Vardar Macedonia, Greece-Aegean Macedonia with Thessaloniki, Epirus and the islands of the Aegean Sea. Romania acquired Southern Dobruja and Silistria. Turkey regained most of Eastern Thrace with Adrianople.

Preparing for war, both blocks were engaged in strengthening their positions in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Plans of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans:

1. Germany hatched plans to subjugate Turkey to its influence, especially after it managed to get a concession for the construction of the Baghdad railway.

2. Austria-Hungary wanted to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina; sought to subjugate Serbia and Bulgaria to its influence and oust Russia from there; go to the shores of the Aegean Sea.

England could not reconcile with these plans, which has always considered the countries of the Middle East as a bridge from Europe to India. Russia could not allow this either, the subordination of Turkey and the Balkans to the influence of Germany and Austria would mean a threat to the security of the entire Russian south from the Black Sea coast to the Transcaucasian border.

In 1908-1909. the Bosnian crisis erupted. Austria-Hungary, relying on the support of Germany, using the weakening of the Ottoman Empire caused by the Turkish revolution and the rising liberation movement in the Balkans, in 1908 annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The failure of the attempt of Russian diplomacy to achieve a revision of the status of the Black Sea straits for agreeing to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the conclusion Russian agreements With Italy on maintaining the status quo in the Balkans and on joint action against any violation of the status quo. It was signed in Racconigi(near Turin) October 24, 1909 This actually meant union of Russia and Italy directed against Turkey and Austria. The agreement hastened the start Italian-Turkish War 1911–1912 gg. for Libya and, oddly enough, the beginning of the Balkan wars. After all, watching the defeat of Turkey in the Italo-Turkish war, the Balkan countries hastened to formalize Balkan Union and start a war against the Porte.

October 6, 1908 governments Serbia and Montenegro announced in their countries mobilization. Russia, under pressure from Germany, was forced to recognize this action of the Austrian government, as it was not ready to interfere with it by military means. Under the pressure of his ally, Serbia March 31, 1909 also was forced to recognize the annexation, April 9, 1909, the rest of the great powers agreed with this.

Consequences of the Balkan crisis of 1908–1909:

1. Relations between Russia and Serbia on the one hand and Austria-Hungary on the other deteriorated.

2. In contrast to the Entente, Germany became even closer to Austria-Hungary.

3. There has been a withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance.

4. Within the framework of the Entente, serious contradictions were revealed: the allies did not provide Russia with significant support in the Bosnian-Herzegovina issue (“they kept the gunpowder dry”) and were not ready to satisfy Russia’s claims in the Eastern Question, in general, leaving Russia alone with Germany and Austria-Hungary .

First Balkan War (1912–1913).August 6(19), 1911 a Russian-German treaty was signed, which concerned only the policy of both countries towards Persia and Turkey, as well as problems related to the construction of the Baghdad road.

Terms of the Russo-German Potsdam Agreement:

1. Russia pledged not to interfere with the construction of the railway Berlin – Baghdad, and also committed itself to obtaining a concession from Iran for the construction of a railway Tehran - Khanekin on the Iranian-Turkish border.

2. Germany recognized the presence of "special interests" of Russia in Northern Iran and pledged not to seek concessions there, and also gave an assurance that it would not build branches of the Baghdad railway north of Khanekin.

Despite all efforts, the German side failed to tear Russia away from the Entente. In the end September 1911, sending Turkey ultimatum, Italy started a war to conquer Tripoli and Cyrenaica. The situation in the Balkans, the aggressive actions of Austria-Hungary, the Italo-Turkish war pushed the Balkan states to an alliance against Turkey. Russia supported the unification of their forces, but against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The goals of the Balkan countries in the war with Turkey:

1. Serbia advocated the division of Macedonia, Albania, as Serbia sought to gain access to the Adriatic Sea.

2. Bulgaria demanded the annexation of the entire Macedonian territory, she sought to gain access to the Aegean Sea by annexing Thessaloniki and Western Thrace. First Bulgarian king Ferdinand I dreamed of creating Whole Bulgaria- an empire that was supposed to cover the entire eastern part of the Balkans.

3. Greece also claimed Thrace, Macedonia and Albania.

4. Montenegrins sought to occupy the major Turkish ports on the Adriatic and the Novopazar Sanjak.

Negotiations dragged on. The main difficulty in creating a Balkan Union was how to reach an agreement on the division of Macedonia between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, and Thrace between Greece and Bulgaria. Bulgarian-Serbian treaty on a defensive alliance was signed only March 13, 1912 May 12, 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia signed military convention in case of war against Turkey or Austria. May 29 joined the Union of Slavic States Greece, who did not want to be left without territorial gains at the expense of Turkey. Later alliance treaty signed Montenegro and Bulgaria.Petersburg wanted to keep the Balkan countries from attacking Turkey, but failed to do so.

September 26 (October 9), 1912 Montenegro, having opened hostilities, marked the beginning of the First Balkan War. On October 5 (18), 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria declared war on Turkey, and the next day, Greece. The Balkan countries quickly defeated the Turkish troops and occupied most of the territory that belonged to Turkey in Europe. On December 16, 1912, at a conference in London, negotiations began between representatives of the warring countries of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey on the development of peace conditions. . On May 30, 1913, a peace treaty between Turkey, where the Young Turks came to power, on the one hand, and Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro, on the other, was signed. Even at the very beginning of the work of the London Conference, the ambassadors of the six countries decided to create an autonomous Albania. The supreme power in the country was left to the Turkish sultan, however, under the control of six European powers, and in fact a protectorate of Austria-Hungary and Italy was established. This was done in order to deprive Serbia of access to the Adriatic. Russia could not prevent this. After the war, a dispute arose between the allies about the ownership of Macedonia, Thrace, northern Albania. Montenegro did not occupy Shkoder, Greece did not annex Thrace. Bulgaria was unhappy with the claims of the Serbs to Macedonia. None of the founding states of the Balkan Union was fully satisfied with the London Treaty and the outcome of the war.

Second Balkan War (June 29– July 29, 1913). First Balkan War despite the opposition of Austria-Hungary and Germany, strengthened the position of Serbia and influenced its position in the Balkan region, important in the event of a war in Europe. That's why Austrian diplomacy and Germany was intended to, if not eliminate Balkan block, then at least significantly weaken b. Influenced by German and Austrian diplomacy Greece and Serbia began to agree on a joint struggle against Bulgaria and June 1, 1913 signed the corresponding treaty.

In the hope that it will be supported by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria June 29, 1913 without declaring war, opened hostilities against the Serbs and Greeks. started Second Balkan War.

The goals of the powers in the Second Balkan War:

1. Serbs, not having received access to the Adriatic Sea as a result of the First Balkan War, they wanted to annex to their country Macedonia and Thessaloniki thus gaining access to the Aegean Sea.

2. Greeks it was necessary to expand the borders of their country as much as possible. Later, after the First World War, there was The great idea of Venizelos- recreation Byzantine Empire with its capital in Constantinople (Istanbul).

3. Romania, which was not part of the union, also had territorial claims to Bulgaria dreaming about Dobruja.

The Bulgarian command and Tsar Ferdinand, starting the war, did not take into account the fact that the situation in Europe had changed. Germany held back Austria-Hungary, since decisive measures were taken in Germany to strengthen the army, which should have been completed only by the beginning of 1914. In addition, Germany did not want Romania to go over to the Entente.

The Bulgarian troops were defeated, which prompted them to oppose it. July 12 Turkey, a the 14 th of July– Romania.July 30 in Bucharest opened conference, on which August 10, 1913 was signed peace treaty.

Terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty:

1. Greece received South Macedonia, Thessaloniki, part western Thrace, island Crete and islands in the Aegean.

2. Serbia got most of Macedonia previously owned by Bulgaria.

3. Romania found Southern Dobruja.

4. Turkey got back a part Thrace and Adrianople(currently city Edirne).

5. Bulgaria lost not only recent conquests, but also part of its old territory. Despite significant territorial losses, the central part of Thrace, conquered from the Ottoman Empire, remained part of Bulgaria.

Consequences of the Balkan Wars:

1. The Balkan wars led to the liberation of the Slavic peoples from the Turkish yoke.

2. The Balkan bloc ceased to exist, which was in the hands of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

3. Germany and Austria-Hungary lost Romania, which, together with Serbia and Greece, was now under the influence of the Entente.

4. Serbia has lost the support of Russia, but has grown significantly. Serbia, having again failed to gain access to the Adriatic Sea during the war, wanted to annex the north of Albania, which went against the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy. The Balkans became the "powder magazine" of Europe.

Portal for the student. Self-training

Chapter II The Question of the Black Sea Straits during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 On the way to the Italo-Turkish war

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