LECTURE 20

RATIONALITY(from lat. ratio - mind) - reasonableness, a characteristic of knowledge in terms of its compliance with the most general principles of thinking, reason.

The concept of rationality has a long history, but only from the second half of the 19th century it began to acquire a stable content and became the subject of heated debate. This was largely due to the consideration of theoretical knowledge in its development, the understanding of the complexity and ambiguity of the justification procedure.

Any human activity has an expedient character, and this implies a clear understanding of the goal, its setting and the choice of ways to achieve it. In everyday and practical life, such a choice is made on the basis of everyday experience, in which a choice based on common sense and intuition will be considered rational or reasonable. However, common sense and intuition are sufficient only for solving relatively simple problems. In more complex cases of solving scientific problems and complex tasks, one has to turn to the construction of rational choice models. When building such a model, the scheme of activity includes: 1) the exact formulation and justification of the goal, or, as they say, the target function; 2) a complete listing of all possible alternatives or ways to achieve the goal; 3) an assessment of each alternative in terms of its value or utility, as well as the likelihood of its implementation in reality. Ultimately, from all available alternatives, the one that best suits the goal, both in terms of its usefulness and the likelihood of implementation, is selected.

Such a choice should not be arbitrary, but justified, reasonable or rational. The validity of such a choice is connected, first of all, with its purpose, and reasonableness or rationality depends on the methods and means used to achieve the ultimate goal. Therefore, the contradictions that arise in the selection process are primarily related to the identification of rational and irrational approaches, both to the selection process itself and to the assessment of possible alternatives for its implementation.

The solution to the problem of the relationship between individual calculation and adherence to norms is offered by an alternative theory of social exchange - rational choice theory . This theory is a scientific approach that is based on the consideration of social interaction as a process of coordinating the actions of people striving to achieve individual goals. The rationality of the choice is determined by the optimality of the behavior strategy. The individual chooses from alternatives - a fixed set of possible options for action - the option that will give the best result. However, the desire of all to maximize individual benefit can lead to a social dilemma - a situation in which there is a conflict between individual rationality and social rationality.

Despite the influence of rational choice theory on the development of exchange theory, it has remained aloof from the mainstream of sociological theory. Thanks in large part to the efforts of one man, James S. Coleman, this theory has become one of the "topical" in modern sociology. First, Coleman founded the journal Rationality and Society in 1989 to promote rational choice theory. Secondly, Coleman published the extremely influential book The Foundations of Social Theory. Finally, in 1992, he became president of the American Sociological Association. Taking advantage of the opportunity to promote the theory of rational choice, he spoke at the meeting of the association with the appeal "The rational reorganization of society."

Thus, the journal "Rationality and Society" is closed to many sociological studies. At the same time, macro-level approaches and their relationship with rational action remain in the area of ​​interest of the publication. In addition to these academic considerations, Coleman insists that rational choice research should be connected in a practical way to our changing world.

The problem of optimizing the strategy of behavior in a situation where individually rational actions lead to socially irrational consequences is revealed on models of mathematical game theory. The most famous of these is called the Prisoner's Dilemma.

For each of the two arrested (for participation in the same crime), there are two options: confess or deny. The matrix of possible outcomes for the first participant (see Fig. 4) includes four cases, depending on the actions of the second participant:

1) both confess and, sharing responsibility, receive the same punishment;

2) the first confesses while the second is unlocked, and the blame is shifted to the second;

3) the first is unlocked, the second confesses, and the blame is shifted to the first;

4) both are unlocked and receive the same minimum penalty.

Rice. 4 Prisoner's Dilemma

The application of models like the prisoner's dilemma to the analysis of a wide variety of social phenomena forms the basis of the research strategy of rational choice theorists. They have traditionally been modeled by the work of economists who have long developed this approach, and in recent years also by the work of the American sociologist James Coleman (1926–1995) The Foundations of Social Theory (1990).

Coleman analyzed from the point of view of rational choice the interactions traditionally associated with the manifestation of feelings rather than with calculation. In particular, he showed that in the process of courtship and marriage, an individual seeks a partner as attractive as possible in terms of physical beauty, intelligence, kindness, job prestige, income level, or other qualities. Therefore, marriage behavior, according to Coleman, is reduced to a rational choice from a fixed set of alternatives. But the desire of each participant in the "marriage market" to optimize the choice leads to a social dilemma that can be described using the "prisoner's dilemma" model. If both partners marry for love, then each "acquires" attention and care from the other and at the same time "spends" energy and time on attention to the partner and care for him, that is, there is a situation of general gain (4). If one of the partners enters into a marriage of convenience, and the other for love, then one "wins" because it "acquires" without "spending", that is, there is a situation of either one-sided gain (2) or one-sided loss (3). The strategy of marriage of convenience is individually rational, but if both partners choose such a strategy, then neither of them “acquires” what he expects (1). The strategy of marriage of convenience is socially irrational.

Social norms limit the choice, reducing alternatives to socially approved actions, and orient the participants in the interaction to maintain their reputation, that is, to maintain confidence in them on the part of the interaction partners. Thus, the rational choice can be considered not in favor of individual interest, but in favor of the positive opinion of other people. However, rational choice theory underestimates the problem of opinion formation, that is, the perception, interpretation and evaluation of the actions of individuals by other participants in the interaction.

Coleman's commitment to the concept of rational choice is reflected in his central idea that "people strive to achieve their goal, and the goal (and therefore actions) is shaped by values ​​or preferences." But at the same time, Coleman clarifies that, theoretically, he needs a conceptually more definite idea of ​​a rationally acting subject, which can actually be borrowed from political economy. According to this concept, actors choose those actions that contribute to the extraction of maximum benefit, satisfy needs and desires.

Key concepts in Coleman's theory are actors and resources. Resources- this is what is controlled by the actors and what they are interested in one way or another. Given these two elements, Coleman describes how their interaction is brought to the system level:

The minimum basis of a social system of action is two actors, each of which controls the resources in which the other is interested. It is the interest in resources controlled by the other that makes the subjects be purposeful and participate in actions that include both sides in the system of actions. It is this structure, along with the purposefulness of actors striving to realize their interests to the maximum, that determines the interdependence of their actions, giving them a systemic character.

Based on rational choice theory, Coleman is far from thinking that this approach will provide answers to all emerging questions. However, he is convinced of its ability to develop in this direction, since he argues that "the success of a social theory based on rationality lies in the consistent reduction of that area of ​​social activity that cannot be explained by this theory."

Coleman's focus on the rational action of an individual suggests that his approach involves the linking of micro and macro phenomena, or an explanation of how a combination of individual actions affects the behavior of a system. Attaching the greatest importance to this issue, Coleman is interested in the transition from the macro to the micro level, or in how the system limits the attitudes of actors. Finally, he focuses on relationships within the micro level - the impact of individual actions on other individual actions.

Still, Coleman's approach fails to avoid several shortcomings, three of which are major. First, he pays predominant attention to the issue of the transition from the micro to the macro level, without concentrating on consideration of relations of a different kind. Second, he neglects relationships within the macro level. Finally, he establishes causal relationships in a purely unidirectional way; in other words, it does not take into account the dialectical relations connecting micro and macro phenomena.

Sociology of rational choice is based on the theory of social exchange and economic theories of rational choice. The concept of rational action of individuals is transferred to the behavior of the whole system, consisting of the same individuals. The idea to transfer the principles of methodological individualism to the level of corporate actors was born in response to the inability of economists to explain such economic phenomena as stock market panics or trust relationships in mutual lending societies.

The sociology of rational choice revives the ideas of utilitarianism in sociology, which views a person as a utility utilizer.

New models of rationality. The prerequisites for the theory of rational choice arose as early as the middle of the 18th and early 19th centuries. in the doctrines of morality of the Scottish school of morality, whose representatives were the first to propose an individualistic concept of rational behavior of people and drew attention to its fruitfulness for explaining other social phenomena.

None other than the future founder of classical political economy, Adam Smith, who belonged to this school, applied this concept to explain market relations. Another source of its origin is the ideas of the supporters of the school of utilitarianism, who refused to consider the behavior of people on the basis of various a priori ideas and preconceived opinions. In contrast, they began to explain their actions and behavior solely by the results to which they lead. Therefore, they stopped considering people's actions in advance as good or bad until their results are known. The founder of the school of utilitarianism, I. Bentham, put forward the basic principle that ethics should be focused on achieving happiness for the greatest number of people. In his opinion, this happiness can even be mathematically calculated as a balance of pleasures and pains in a certain behavior.

Representatives of the later neoclassical theory in economics replaced the principle of evaluating behavior through a balance of pleasure and pain with the principle of the mutual exchange of goods, if this exchange takes place honestly. In this way, the ideas of individualism, rational or intelligent choice in decision-making were used to analyze economic activity and, above all, to study market relations. Therefore, in the future, the theory of rational choice (TRV) began to be developed mainly in economic research and began to be considered as a purely economic theory.

In recent decades, this theory under the name of public choice theory (TOT) has been applied and developed in political science, sociology, history and other social sciences. At present, there is even a tendency to consider RCT as a universal theory or even a research paradigm for all social sciences and humanities. Without denying the significance and important advantages of this theory, primarily in economic research, as evidenced by the award of Nobel Prizes for the last year in this field, we will nevertheless try to show that this theory has certain limits of application.

Therefore, without a meaningful analysis of the principles and methods of a particular social science, it cannot be automatically applied to all social sciences and the humanities without exception.

Questions for self-control:

1. Explain the essence of rational choice theory;

2. Who is the most significant developer of rational choice theory;

3. What is the sociology of rational choice based on.

The basic tenets of rational choice theory are rooted in neoclassical economics (and also in utilitarian ideas and game theory; Levi et al., 1990). Based on various models, Friedman and Hechter (1988) developed a model of rational choice theory, which they called "wireframe".

The subject of study in rational choice theory is acting subjects. The latter are seen as purposeful or intentional. That is, actors have goals towards which their actions are directed. In addition, it is believed that actors have their own preferences (or "values", "utilities"). Rational choice theory does not consider what these preferences are or their sources. It is important that the action is taken to achieve the goals corresponding to the hierarchy of preferences of the acting subject.

Although rational choice theory assumes consideration of the goals or intentions of actors, it does not ignore the possibility of limiting actions, distinguishing two main varieties of them. The first is the lack of resources. The available resources vary among actors. In addition, their access to other reserves is not the same. Those with a large amount of resources can achieve goals relatively easily. But for those who have a small supply of them or do not have it at all, it is difficult or impossible to achieve the goal.

Related to the problem of scarcity of resources is the concept opportunity costs(Friedman & Hechter, 1988, p. 202). In pursuit of a given goal, actors must estimate the costs they will incur by abandoning the next most attractive action. An actor may refuse to achieve the most valuable landmark for himself if the resources available to him are insignificant, and also if, for this reason, the chances of achieving the desired are small, and if, in pursuing this goal, he risks not reaching the next highest value. Actors are viewed here as actors seeking to maximize their own benefit 1 , and, accordingly, goal setting involves an assessment of how the chances of achieving the most important target are related to the impact of this result on achieving the second most important goal.

Another source that limits individual action is social institutions. According to Friedman and Hechter,

[an individual's] actions from birth to death are constrained by family and school rules; laws and regulations, rigid installations; churches, synagogues and mosques; hospitals and funeral homes. By limiting the range of courses of action available to individuals, the imposed rules of the game—including norms, laws, programs, and voting rules—systematically affect social outcomes (Friedman & Hechter, 1988, p. 202)

These restrictions associated with social institutions provide positive and negative sanctions that encourage certain actions of subjects and discourage others.

Friedman and Hechter name two other aspects that they consider fundamental to rational choice theory. The first is the linkage mechanism, or process by which "separate individual actions come together to produce a social outcome" (Friedman & Hechter, 1988, p. 203). The second is the important role of information in rational choice. It used to be thought that actors had the necessary information (to the full or sufficient extent) to make a purposeful choice from the alternative possibilities available to them. However, there is now a growing consensus that the quantity or quality of available information is highly variable, and that this variation has a profound effect on the choice of actors (Heckathorn, 1997).

At least the first steps in the theory of exchange were influenced by the elementary theory of rationality. Further, considering the theory of rational choice, we will focus on more complex aspects associated with this concept.

"Social Psychology of Groups"

The bulk of The Social Psychology of Groups (Thibaut & Kelly, 1959) is devoted to the relationship between two subjects. Thibault and Kelly were especially interested in the process of interaction between these two people and the consequences that it has for the members of the "dyad". Like the work of behaviorism (although its influence on the study of these scientists is insignificant) and in line with the theory of exchange, the main subject of analysis for Thiebaud and Kelly is the problem of rewards and costs:

1 However, modern rational choice theorists acknowledge that this desire and ability to maximize benefits is limited (Heckathorn, 1997).

The ratio of rewards and costs for each of the two subjects will be the better, the (1) the greater the reward for him will be the possible behavior of another person and (2) the lower the possible costs of such behavior. If each is able to provide the other with the maximum reward at their own minimum cost, then the relationship not only allows both to achieve an excellent combination of rewards and costs, but also provides the additional advantage that both people achieve the optimal ratio of rewards and costs at the same time ( Thibaut & Kelly, 1959, p.31)

Molm and Cook (1995) argue that three points from the concept of Thiebaud and Kelly played a special role in the development of the theory of exchange. The first is the attention to the issues of power and subordination, which became central to Richard Emerson and his followers (see more on this later). Thibault and Kelly believe that the source of power in the interaction of two subjects is the ability of one of them to influence the essence of the results achieved by the other subject. They distinguish two types of power. First - "Force of Destiny" This happens when actor A influences the results of actor B, “Not thinking about what he is doing. B"(Thibaut & Kelly, 1959, p. 102). Second - "behavioral control"“If, by varying his behavior, A causes B to also change his own, the first controls the behavior of the second” (Thibaunt & Kelly, 1959, p. 103). In a dyad, both subjects are dependent on relationships between themselves. Therefore, each of them in one way or another has power over the other. This interdependence limits the amount of power one can exert over another.

The second provision from the theory of Thiebaud and Kelly, which influenced the development of the theory of exchange, is connected with the concepts comparison level(US) and level of comparison of alternatives(US alt). Both of these levels are standards for evaluating relationship outcomes: SR is a standard that allows an actor to determine whether a particular relationship might be attractive or well satisfying to its expectations. This standard is usually based on an assessment of what, as an actor, he thinks he deserves in the case of this relationship. That relationship, which is above the SA, is considered to satisfy the request; below - unsatisfactory. Establishing the level of comparison is based on cash or symbolic experience, which involves taking into account the totality of the consequences of behavior known to the acting subject. The USalt standard is involved by the actor when deciding whether to terminate the relationship or continue it. When the consequences are rated below the alt DC, the subject will refuse such a relationship. Establishing the level of comparison of alternatives is based on taking into account the best - that is, those that provide the greatest reward and minimum costs - from the alternatives available to the acting subject. Molme and Cook argue that this type of thinking provided the basis for some of Emerson's ideas about social networks: "While Thiebaud and Kelly primarily considered the relationship between two people, without creating from the concept of alternatives the concepts of social networks that provide actors with an alternative in choosing partners, the concept of USalt foundation for Emerson to do it later” (Molm & Cook, 1995, p. 213).

Thibault and Kelly's third contribution to exchange theory was the concept of a "results matrix". It is a way of visualizing "all the possible events that can occur in the interaction between A and B" (Tibaut & Kelley, 1959, p. 13). The two axes of the matrix are the elements of the behavioral "repertoires" of subjects A and B. Each cell contains "results that appear to be a reward for the subject and costs incurred by him in each particular episode of interaction" (Tibaut & Kelley, 1959, p. 13). This matrix was applied in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, in the study of transactions and cooperation issues to consider patterns of interdependence, and these studies, in turn, “stimulated further more complex studies of social exchange” (Molm & Cook, 1995, p. 214).

The main peak of the crisis of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and other main methodological trends occurred in the 60-70s. These years were full of attempts to find a new methodological basis for further research. Scientists have tried to do this in different ways:

1. update the "classical" methodological approaches (the emergence of post-behavioral methodological trends, neo-institutionalism, etc.);

2. create a system of "middle level" theories and try to use these theories as a methodological basis;

3. try to create an equivalent of a general theory by referring to classical political theories;

4. turn to Marxism and create on the basis of this various kinds of technocratic theories.

These years are characterized by the emergence of a number of methodological theories that claim to be the "grand theory". One of such theories, one of such methodological directions was the theory of rational choice.

Rational choice theory was designed to overcome the shortcomings of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and institutionalism, creating a theory of political behavior in which a person would act as an independent, active political actor, a theory that would allow looking at a person’s behavior “from the inside”, taking into account the nature of his attitudes, choice of optimal behavior, etc.

The theory of rational choice came to political science from economic science. The “founding fathers” of the theory of rational choice are considered to be E. Downes (he formulated the main provisions of the theory in his work “The Economic Theory of Democracy”), D. Black (introduced the concept of preferences into political science, described the mechanism for their translation into performance results), G. Simon (substantiated the concept of bounded rationality and demonstrated the possibilities of applying the rational choice paradigm), as well as L. Chapley, M. Shubik, V. Riker, M. Olson, J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch (developed "game theory"). It took about ten years before rational choice theory became widespread in political science.

Proponents of rational choice theory proceed from the following methodological assumptions:

First, methodological individualism, that is, the recognition that social and political structures, politics, and society as a whole are secondary to the individual. It is the individual who produces institutions and relationships through his activity. Therefore, the interests of the individual are determined by him, as well as the order of preferences.

Secondly, the selfishness of the individual, that is, his desire to maximize his own benefit. This does not mean that a person will necessarily behave like an egoist, but even if he behaves like an altruist, then this method is most likely more beneficial for him than others. This applies not only to the behavior of an individual, but also to his behavior in a group when he is not bound by special personal attachments.

Proponents of the theory of rational choice believe that the voter decides whether to come to the polls or not, depending on how he evaluates the benefits of his vote, and also votes based on rational considerations of utility. He can manipulate his political settings if he sees that he may not get a win. Political parties in elections also try to maximize their benefits by enlisting the support of as many voters as possible. Deputies form committees, guided by the need to pass this or that bill, their people to the government, and so on. The bureaucracy in its activities is guided by the desire to increase its organization and its budget, and so on.

Thirdly, the rationality of individuals, that is, their ability to arrange their preferences in accordance with their maximum benefit. As E. Downes wrote, "every time we talk about rational behavior, we mean rational behavior, initially directed towards selfish goals." In this case, the individual correlates the expected results and costs and, trying to maximize the result, tries to minimize costs at the same time. Since the rationalization of behavior and the assessment of the ratio of benefits and costs require the possession of significant information, and its receipt is associated with an increase in overall costs, then one speaks of "bounded rationality" of the individual. This bounded rationality has more to do with the decision-making procedure itself than with the essence of the decision itself.

Fourth, the exchange of activities. Individuals in society do not act alone, there is an interdependence of people's choices. The behavior of each individual is carried out in certain institutional conditions, that is, under the influence of institutions. These institutional conditions themselves are created by people, but the initial one is people's consent to the exchange of activities. In the process of activity, individuals rather do not adapt to institutions, but try to change them in accordance with their interests. Institutions, in turn, can change the order of preferences, but this only means that the changed order turned out to be beneficial for political actors under given conditions.

Most often, the political process within the framework of the rational choice paradigm is described in the form of public choice theory, or in the form of game theory.

Proponents of the theory of public choice proceed from the fact that in the group the individual behaves selfishly and rationally. He will not voluntarily make special efforts to achieve common goals, but will try to use public goods for free (the “hare” phenomenon in public transport). This is because the nature of a collective good includes such characteristics as non-excludability (that is, no one can be excluded from the use of a public good) and non-rivalry (the consumption of this good by a large number of people does not lead to a decrease in its utility).

Proponents of game theory proceed from the fact that the political struggle for gain, as well as the assumptions of rational choice theory about the universality of such qualities of political actors as selfishness and rationality, make the political process similar to a game with a zero or non-zero sum. As is known from the course of general political science, game theory describes the interaction of actors through a certain set of game scenarios. The purpose of such an analysis is to search for such game conditions under which participants choose certain behavior strategies, for example, that are beneficial to all participants at once.

This methodological approach is not free from some shortcomings. One of these shortcomings is the insufficient consideration of social and cultural-historical factors influencing the individual's behavior. The authors of this manual are far from agreeing with researchers who believe that the political behavior of an individual is largely a function of the social structure or with those who argue that the political behavior of actors is in principle incomparable, because it occurs within the framework of unique national conditions and etc. However, it is obvious that the rational choice model does not take into account the influence of the sociocultural environment on the preferences, motivation and behavioral strategy of political actors, and does not take into account the influence of the specifics of political discourse.

Another shortcoming has to do with the assumption of rational choice theorists about the rationality of behavior. The point is not only that individuals can behave like altruists, and not only that they can have limited information, imperfect qualities. These nuances, as shown above, are explained by the rational choice theory itself. First of all, we are talking about the fact that often people act irrationally under the influence of short-term factors, under the influence of affect, guided, for example, by momentary impulses.

As D. Easton rightly points out, the broad interpretation of rationality proposed by the supporters of the theory under consideration leads to the blurring of this concept. More fruitful for solving the problems posed by the representatives of rational choice theory would be to single out types of political behavior depending on its motivation. In particular, “social-oriented” behavior in the interests of “social solidarity” differs significantly from rational and selfish behavior.

In addition, rational choice theory is often criticized for some technical inconsistencies arising from the main provisions, as well as for the limited explanatory possibilities (for example, the applicability of the model of party competition proposed by its supporters only to countries with a two-party system). However, a significant part of such criticism either stems from a misinterpretation of the work of representatives of this theory, or is refuted by the representatives of rational choice theory themselves (for example, with the help of the concept of "bounded" rationality).

Despite these shortcomings, rational choice theory has a number of virtues which are the reason for its great popularity. The first undoubted advantage is that standard methods of scientific research are used here. The analyst formulates hypotheses or theorems based on a general theory. The method of analysis used by supporters of rational choice theory proposes the construction of theorems that include alternative hypotheses about the intentions of political actors. The researcher then subjects these hypotheses or theorems to empirical testing. If reality does not disprove theorems, that theorem or hypothesis is considered relevant. If the test results are unsuccessful, the researcher draws the appropriate conclusions and repeats the procedure again. The use of this technique allows the researcher to draw a conclusion about what actions of people, institutional structures and the results of the exchange of activities will be most likely under certain conditions. Thus, rational choice theory solves the problem of verifying theoretical propositions by testing scientists' assumptions about the intentions of political subjects.

As the well-known political scientist K. von Boime rightly notes, the success of rational choice theory in political science can be generally explained by the following reasons:

1. “neopositivist requirements for the use of deductive methods in political science are most easily satisfied with the help of formal models, on which this methodological approach is based

2. The rational choice approach can be applied to the analysis of any type of behavior - from the actions of the most selfish rationalist to the infinitely altruistic activity of Mother Teresa, who maximized the strategy of helping the disadvantaged

3. directions of political science, which are on the middle level between micro- and macrotheories, are forced to recognize the possibility of an approach based on the analysis of activity ( political subjects– E.M., O.T.) actors. The actor in the concept of rational choice is a construction that allows you to avoid the question of the real unity of the individual

4. rational choice theory promotes the use of qualitative and cumulative ( mixed - E.M., O.T.) approaches in political science

5. The rational choice approach acted as a kind of counterbalance to the dominance of behavioral research in previous decades. It is easy to combine it with multi-level analysis (especially when studying the realities of the countries of the European Union) and with ... neo-institutionalism, which became widespread in the 80s.

Rational choice theory has a fairly wide scope. It is used to analyze the behavior of voters, parliamentary activity and coalition formation, international relations, etc., and is widely used in modeling political processes.

Ruzavin G.I. Contradictions of rational choice // Contradiction and discourse - M.: IF RAS, 2005

G.I. Ruzavin

We choose, we are chosen. How often it does not match! The economy is not only an arena for the struggle of opposing interests, an endless chain of ups and downs, stabilization and stagnation, but also a fertile field of study for a philosopher-methodologist. Can choice in the force fields of the economy be rational? To what extent are the concepts of rational choice in economics applicable to other areas of social research? These topical issues for the multipolar world are in the focus of attention of Professor G.I. Ruzavin.

Rational Choice Contradictions

The concept of rational choice, developed within the framework of modern economic theory, is currently put forward as a universal research paradigm for all social sciences and humanities. So, for example, R. Shveri states that economic science has developed “a special approach that can be applied to the analysis of both the market and non-market sectors of public life. This is, in fact, the main mission of rational choice theory. However, this theory is entirely focused on the rational behavior of the subject in a market economy and does not take into account irrational and even irrational actions and motivations. In practical terms, such a choice focuses primarily on individualism and therefore opposes itself to collectivism, completely ignoring the contradictions that arise between individual and public interests.

Without denying the need for a rational choice of an individual and his active position in the development of society, in the proposed article we tried to draw attention to the contradictions that arise between individual and public interests with an excessive exaggeration of the role of the individual in such a choice.

What is a rational choice?

Any human activity has an expedient character, and this implies a clear understanding of the goal, its setting and the choice of ways to achieve it. In everyday and practical life, such a choice is made on the basis of everyday experience, in which a choice based on common sense and intuition will be considered rational or reasonable. However, common sense and intuition are sufficient only for solving relatively simple problems. In more complex cases of solving scientific problems and complex tasks arising in industrial and socio-economic activities, one has to turn to the construction of rational choice models. When building such a model, the scheme of activity includes, firstly, the exact formulation and justification of the goal, or, as they say, the target function; secondly, a complete enumeration of all possible alternatives or ways to achieve the goal; thirdly, an assessment of each alternative in terms of its value or utility, as well as the likelihood of its implementation in reality. Ultimately, from all available alternatives, the one that best suits the goal in terms of its usefulness and probability of implementation is selected. In mathematical terms, a rational choice is one that corresponds to the maximum or minimum value of the objective function. For example, in a market economy, the maximum value of such a function will correspond to obtaining the greatest profit, and the minimum - to the lowest production costs.

Already when constructing a model of rational choice, we are faced with a discrepancy between the model of reality or a contradiction in the mental image of a particular reality. Therefore, building a model is a process of resolving such a contradiction, bringing the model in line with the real state of affairs, bringing it closer to reality. But we encounter such contradictions in any process of cognition, and especially in

theoretical modeling. In the case under consideration, we are faced not just with the knowledge and modeling of certain objects, but with choice of the many possible alternatives to action, behavior, or problem solving.

Such a choice should not be arbitrary, but justified, reasonable or rational. The validity of such a choice is primarily related to its purpose, and reasonableness or rationality depends on the methods and means used to achieve the ultimate goal. Therefore, the contradictions that arise in the selection process are primarily related to the identification of rational and irrational approaches, both to the selection process itself and to the assessment of possible alternatives for its implementation.

Focusing on the individual rational choice of the subject, the existing economic concept of choice does not take into account the irrational and even irrational decisions and actions of the economic entity, which can lead not only to undesirable, but clearly negative consequences. Indeed, the achievement of maximum benefit or utility by an individual often conflicts with the interests of society. Therefore, the study of rational and irrational actions of individuals and separate groups, which are always observed in society, constitute an important problem of socio-economic research.

Other controversies arise in assessing the usefulness and likelihood of various choice alternatives. They essentially determine the extent to which the choice as a whole is rational. To get a more concrete idea of ​​this, let us turn first to the emergence of the idea of ​​rational choice itself, and then to economics, where it has found essentially the greatest application.

The concept of rational choice in economics

The ideas of rational choice first arose in the 18th century, but not in economics, but in the teachings of the Scottish school of morality, on the one hand, and the principles of the utilitarian school, on the other. Both of these schools rejected the traditional requirement to set moral standards according to religious beliefs and preconceived a priori principles. The behavior of people and their actions, they argued, must be judged by the results to which they lead. Therefore, they cannot be assessed in advance as good and bad until these results are known. But for this, people must have freedom of choice in their actions and be responsible for them.

The founder of the school of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, was guided by the principle that ethics should be based on achieving happiness for the greatest number of people. He even believed that this happiness could be mathematically calculated as a balance of pleasure and pain. Therefore, each person is given the opportunity to make a reasonable choice of their behavior. This fundamentally individualistic conception of morality was subsequently used by Adam Smith, who belonged to the Scottish school, in the creation of classical political economy.

“Each individual person,” he wrote, “... has in mind only his own interest, pursues only his own benefit, and in this case he invisible hand heading towards a goal that was not his intention. In pursuing his own interests, he often serves the interests of society more effectively than when he consciously seeks to serve them ”(emphasis mine. - G.R.) .

The metaphor of the invisible hand that controls the behavior of people in the market is designed to show that a rational choice based on taking into account people's own interests, under all conditions, turns out to be the most effective means of rational management. However, Smith himself does not disclose the mechanism for achieving such a goal. Therefore, some modern authors believe that long before the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, he discovered the principle of negative feedback. It is this principle, as is known, that ensures the stability of dynamic systems, in particular, order in a competitive market. But most likely, Smith revealed the influence of the free choice of market participants on the mechanism of price formation on it. Indeed, if the demand for goods increases, then prices rise, and vice versa, if demand decreases, then prices fall.

Undoubtedly, the idea of ​​rational choice plays an important role in the analysis of not only economic, but also any form of human activity. Such activity always has an expedient character, and this implies a clear awareness and setting of the goal, and most importantly, the possibility of choosing a specific solution or alternative to achieve the goal. But the practical realization of such a goal is carried out in society not without struggle and contradictions. However, supporters of the concept of rational choice in economics do not want to notice this, starting from A. Smith himself and ending with F. Hayek. Note that in the above quote, Smith argues that the pursuit of self-interest more effectively promotes the public interest,

than conscious service to society. True, in the era of free competition, the real contradictions of the economy were not so clearly expressed as to draw attention to them. Therefore, ideas about the self-sufficiency of market regulation dominated classical political economy until the Great Depression of the 1930s. last century. The depression and the crisis showed with their own eyes that market regulation is not self-sufficient and therefore cannot remove the contradictions between the interests of different sections of society. Meanwhile, advocates of rational choice continued to insist that individual choice always leads to an increase in social wealth and is therefore rational.

At present, representatives of the modern economic elite are beginning to speak about the illusory nature of such ideas. “Life would be much easier,” declares the famous financier George Soros, “if Friedrich Hayek were right and the general interest would be obtained as an unintended result of people acting in their own interests. However, the summation of narrow self-interests through the market mechanism entails unintended negative consequences.

The contradictions that arise in the theory of economic choice are connected with the very interpretation of the concept of rationality. Since economic theory is based on the principle of methodological individualism, the concept of rationality acquires a subjective character in it. If the subject aims to achieve the maximum benefit and considers its implementation rational, then such a goal may come into conflict with the interests of other subjects and society as a whole. Is it possible to consider his choice rational in this case? For example, if an entrepreneur, hoping to take advantage of the existing infrastructure, decides to build a chemical plant near a settlement, then from his individual point of view he will consider his choice to be quite rational. But from the point of view of the inhabitants, such rationality is subjective and therefore comes into conflict with broader public interests. Almost every subject is forced to reckon with the interests of other subjects and interact with them in one way or another. Therefore, the contradictions that arise between them can be resolved by creating appropriate rules of conduct for market participants, not to mention compliance with the general requirements of state regulation and antimonopoly legislation. It follows that the very concept of rational choice in economics needs further development.

refinement and development. As is known, this concept is based on a more fundamental principle of rationality, which causes a lot of controversy and criticism.

In classical economic theory, rationality was seen as objective a characteristic of the processes under study, in which it was assumed that the decision-maker was considered as an ideal "economic person" (Homo economicus), who has complete information about the state of affairs in the market, is not subject to errors and always makes the right decisions to maximize his benefits. Such a person in any situation chooses the optimal, best course of action. Noticing the abstract and unrealistic nature of this approach, the supporters of neoclassical theory in economics began to interpret it in terms of subjective terms. Even M. Weber considered such an interpretation necessary to reveal the subjective motives of economic entities, although he did not deny the possibility of an objective interpretation of rationality. On the contrary, one of the founders of mathematical economics, V. Pareto, considered rationality as an objective criterion of economic knowledge and action. In his opinion, the achievement of the goal depends not only on the information that an individual subject has, but also on those who have much more information.

Although the opposition of the objective interpretation of rationality to the subjective one as a whole is unjustified, it points to the need for their difference, which plays a significant role in the characterization of expedient objective human activity. M. Weber turns to subjective interpretation precisely for analysis, as he puts it, goal-oriented activities, i.e. clarification of motives, intentions and intentions of acting subjects. V. Pareto, on the contrary, emphasizes that such activity must also be based on objectively existing knowledge and information in order to become successful.

In modern philosophical discussions on rationality, it is usually associated only with the processes of acquiring and substantiating scientific knowledge. The criteria of rationality in these cases are the requirements for the correspondence of knowledge to the laws of logic and the style of thinking established in science. Simply put, knowledge is considered reasonable if it satisfies the requirements of the laws and standards of thinking. However, at present, the concept of rationality is also used to analyze the expedient actions of people in various fields of activity. This application of the concept

rationality even more corresponds to the nature of practical than theoretical activity. Let us not forget, however, that in all such cases we are talking about rational choice, which differs from arbitrary and deliberate choice in its practical and theoretical validity.

The efficiency of economic, as well as any form of social activity, depends, firstly, on the subjective rationality of the choice of individuals, and secondly, on an objective rational assessment of the objective function, which consists of a cumulative assessment of the utility and probability of possible alternatives for achieving the set goal. The cumulative weighted assessment of the utility and likelihood of each alternative makes it possible to choose, if not optimal, then a more satisfactory solution to the problem. In this regard, the position of the Nobel laureate Herbert Simon deserves attention, who believes that rational choice should not always be associated with obtaining the maximum benefit or utility. “The entrepreneur,” he writes, “may not care at all about maximization, he may simply want to receive the income that he considers sufficient for himself.” This conclusion he confirms not only by concrete economic evidence, but also by considerations relating to psychology. "Man," he says, satisfied a living being that solves a problem by searching... and not maximizing a being who, in solving a problem, tries to find the best (based on a certain criterion) alternative. Such restrictions on the maximization of rational choice have to be reckoned with especially in social administration and politics.

Rational choice in social management

The notion of an optimally acting “economic man” who always makes the right decisions turned out to be clearly not suitable for social management, since it does not take into account the fact that in the behavior and actions of people, along with undoubtedly rational components, there are irrational and even irrational components. That is why G. Simon, instead of the ideal model of "economic man", put forward the model of "administrative man" for social management, in which, based on all available information and a probabilistic assessment of random and unforeseen circumstances,

the goal is to find a satisfactory solution to the assigned management problem. The restrictions that are imposed here on rational choice are due to many circumstances that arise in real life:

Unforeseen events of a random nature that can only be estimated with varying degrees of probability;

Cognitive capabilities and intellectual abilities of the administrator himself and his assistants;

Political and organizational conditions for making managerial decisions, which in a democratic society are determined by the interaction of various groups, collectives and associations pursuing different goals and protecting different interests;

Finally, the ability to make the right decisions comes with time and depends on experience and improves with practice.

As far as sociology is concerned, many scholars are aware that individual choices can lead to undesirable and even obviously negative consequences. Supporters of the concept of rational action, although they emphasize the need for a normative and rational approach in sociological analysis, nevertheless object to their interpretation in terms of benefits and disadvantages, as is done in economics. The most important condition for such an analysis is the disclosure of contradictions in the interaction of rational and irrational aspects in the development of social processes, the identification and evaluation of the role of traditions and innovations in them.

The study of such contradictions should not be limited, however, to a simple statement of the interaction between the rational and the irrational in social processes: it is necessary to analyze the moments of transition and transformation of the rational into the irrational in order to prevent an undesirable development of events. The study of such transformations, according to A.G. Zdravomyslov, consists, firstly, in the study of the motivation of the subject’s behavior, the identification of rational and irrational moments in it; secondly, in establishing a rational measure of emerging social institutions; thirdly, in revealing the degree of rationality of the current practical policy.

Rational choice in politics

Although individual choice in politics is made at the micro level, in particular during election campaigns, referendums, polls, etc., the rules of choice themselves are established at the macro level. The contradiction that arises here, according to the Nobel laureate James Buchanan, can be resolved by creating in civil society a “constitution of politics”, which is a kind of cast from the social contract of the ideologists of the Enlightenment of the 18th century. But unlike the latter, this constitution is based not on the ideas of goodness and justice, but on the principles of market exchange. Buchanan explicitly states that applying the idea of ​​market exchange to politics undermines the common misconception that people participate in politics because they seek justice and goodness in society.

“Politics,” he argues, “is a complex system of exchange between individuals in which the latter collectively strive to achieve their private goals, since they cannot realize them through ordinary market exchange. In the market, people exchange apples for oranges, and in politics, they agree to pay taxes in exchange for benefits that everyone needs: from the local fire department to the court.

In other words, politics is based on making collective decisions that benefit many. Thus, the contradiction between the state and the individuals that make up society is resolved by concluding a social contract between them, primarily related to taxation. However, the success of political choice is achieved by its maximization. The voter will vote for the party that promises to cut taxes. The maximization of benefits in the politics of the party is achieved by obtaining the largest number of votes in parliament, parties unite in coalitions to get the maximum number of votes for the adoption of the desired bill, etc. Since the parties act as defenders of the interests of certain social groups, strata and classes of society, it is impossible to achieve any social harmony and justice in society. D. Buchanan understands this very well, and therefore his “constitution of politics” is aimed at protecting society from extreme forms of arbitrariness on the part of the state. To do this, he considers it necessary to adopt the relevant constitutional laws by universal suffrage.

The principles of rational choice can, to a certain extent, explain certain features of political activity, such as the results of voting in elections, the formation of coalitions in parliaments, the division of power between the parties that won elections, and so on. All this constitutes only the external, superficial side of the complex domestic political life in modern society; they do not reveal its internal mechanisms and driving forces. Therefore, they greatly simplify political life and the events and processes taking place in it, and therefore, they cannot explain, much less predict the trends in the political development of society.

Can rational choice theory become universal?

a paradigm for the social sciences and humanities?

Having discussed the attempts to apply the economic theory of rational choice in sociology and political science, as the disciplines closest to economics, we can unequivocally state that it cannot claim the role of a universal research paradigm in the social sciences. It is true, of course, that this theory was able to satisfactorily explain how, out of the disordered actions of individuals in society, an ordered order eventually arises, for example, a spontaneous order in a competitive market, consisting in an equilibrium between supply and demand. And this makes it possible to regulate the exchange of goods. But already in such a market, contradictions constantly arise at the present time, when monopolies penetrate into it, violating this order. Therefore, the idea of ​​rational choice does not work here.

The situation of choice has to be met not only in the economy, but also in various spheres of social activity and even in everyday life. However, the difference between the spheres of such activity imposes its own specifics on the nature of the choice in them. Therefore, one cannot agree with the opinion of R. Schwery that the economic theory of choice was able to "celebrate the success of its crusade aimed at conquering all other sciences." He believes that this theory "formalizes the logic that guides people who make choices in various situations of everyday life" .

were developed in the famous work of J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern "Game Theory and Economic Behavior". True, the mathematical models created by specialists in these disciplines were first used by economists. This is understandable, since economics turned out to be the most suitable science for applying these models. But this does not give economists the right to arrange "crusades to conquer all other sciences," as R. Schweri states.

First, experts in other sciences, when faced with situations of choice, use the principles and models of the general theory of decision making, and not the private models of economists.

Secondly, Schwery himself admits that rational choice theory "cannot operate with various social variables that are difficult to define in economic terms" .

Thirdly, the possibility of applying some ideas and even models of economic science does not turn specific social sciences and humanities into a part or section of the economy. Each of these sciences has its own special subject and specific research methods that are not covered by rational choice theory. Therefore, attempts to conquer them by the economy with the help of the rational choice paradigm would mean striving, if not for the elimination of the social sciences and the humanities, then at least for their reduction, or reduction to economics.

Notes

Shwery R. Rational choice theory: universal remedy or economic imperialism // Vopr. economy. 1976. No. 7. S. 35.

Smith A. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. M., 1992. S. 332.

Utility maximization rule

Critics of the theory of marginal utility have formulated the paradox of water and diamonds. They believed that water should have maximum usefulness, since it is vital, and diamonds should be minimal, since one can live without them. Therefore, the price of water must be higher than that of diamonds.

This contradiction was resolved in the following way. In nature, water reserves are not limited, and diamonds are rare. Therefore, the total utility of water is large, but the marginal utility is small, while for diamonds, on the contrary, the total utility is small, and the marginal utility is large. The price is determined not by the total, but by the marginal utility. The relationship between marginal utility and price can be illustrated by the following formula:

where MU x , MU y , MU z– marginal utilities of goods; P x , R y , R z is the price of these goods.

This ratio shows utility maximization rule: the income of the consumer should be distributed in such a way that the last ruble spent on the acquisition of each type of goods would bring the same marginal utility. For example, a consumer wants to buy three goods BUT, AT, With to meet your needs. Assume that the marginal utility of a good BUT is 100 utils, good B– 80 utils, boons With- 45 utils. At the same time, the price of a good BUT equal to 100 rubles, good B- 40 rubles, benefits With- 30 rubles. Let's present these data in tab. 4.2.

Table 4.2

Marginal Utility and the Price of Goods

As can be seen from the table, the distribution of the consumer's money does not bring him maximum utility, since the rule of utility maximization is not observed in this case. Because good AT brings the maximum weighted utility (i.e., marginal utility per 1 ruble of costs), then the funds must be distributed in such a way as to increase the amount of consumption of good B and reduce the consumption of good BUT. In this case, the utility maximization rule must be satisfied.

The consumer should discard the last copy of the good BUT, and purchase with the saved 100 rubles. 2.5 parts of the good AT. As a result, we obtain the following relation (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3

Consumer equilibrium in cardinal theory

Having thus distributed the monetary income among the goods BUT, AT and With, the consumer will be able to extract the maximum satisfaction of their needs.