America? Your America is no more...

excerpt from a book
Alexey Valerievich Isaev Defeat 1945. Battle for Germany

"Solstice"

The start of the German offensive in Pomerania was eagerly awaited on both sides of the front. Zhukov expected the enemy to launch a counteroffensive from the first days of February. While the 2nd Belorussian Front was gnawing away at the defenses of the 2nd German Army, and the 1st Ukrainian Front was fighting with a front to the southwest, the 11th SS Panzer Army of Felix Steiner was concentrated on the northern flank of the 1st Belorussian Front. Arriving units could not always bring equipment with them and received it from factories. In Stettin, the Nordland division received 30 assault guns and 30 Panthers and gradually began to be drawn into battles in separate battle groups.

The strongest unit of the 11th Army was the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg. On February 1, 1945, it consisted of 20,104 people (432 officers, 3,470 non-commissioned officers and 16,202 soldiers) - a high number of personnel in divisions, unlike the Red Army, was not uncommon in German formations in 1945. Commanded "Frundsberg" SS Major General Heinz Harmel is an experienced SS officer who went through the school of the largest battles of the Eastern Front. In the battles near Kharkov in February-March 1943, he commanded a motorized infantry regiment of the Das Reich division. In January 1945, Frundsberg took part in the German counter-offensive in the West in Upper Alsace (Operation Nordwind), and only on February 5 did the division embark on echelons. The formation's journey from west to east took place under Allied air attacks. On February 10, the first units of the division arrived in the area of ​​Stettin and Aldamma.

Solstice also involved the recently deployed “Führer Grenadiers” and “Führer Escorts” from the brigades in the division. The first numbered 9,775 people on February 15 (272 officers, 39 officials, 2,014 non-commissioned officers and 7,450 privates, including 327 “hiwis”). In fact, the Fuhrer Grenadiers remained a brigade - it included one tank-grenadier regiment of three battalions (including one battalion with armored personnel carriers). The division's tank fleet consisted of 28 Pz.IV and 28 Pz.V "Panther". The “Führer Grenadiers” were tactically subordinate to the 911th Assault Gun Brigade (32 StuG III). The Fuehrer-Begleit-Division (Fuehrer-Begleit-Division) numbered 9,506 people on February 15 (280 officers, 49 officials, 1,972 non-commissioned officers, 7,205 privates, including 339 Hiwis). Just like the Fuhrer Grenadiers, the division did not yet reach the division level - there was one tank-grenadier regiment of three battalions (one of them on an armored personnel carrier). In both divisions there was no reconnaissance battalion - it was replaced by a reconnaissance company. Of the two divisions, only the Führer Grenadiers could boast self-propelled artillery.

The scale of the planned Operation Solstice was gradually reduced in accordance with the forces allocated for it. As Guderian writes: “All that remained from the planned offensive plan was the idea of ​​​​a strike from the Arnswalde area with the aim of defeating the Russians north of the river. Wart, strengthen in Pomerania and maintain contact with West Prussia." Throughout the first half of February, in the areas of Arnswald and Stargard, the parties' forces accumulated and exchanged blows. The main participant in the battles with the concentrated units of Steiner’s army was the 61st Army of P.A. Belova, who was part of the 1st Belorussian Front. Already late in the evening of February 2, Belov wrote in an order to the corps subordinate to him: “The 61st army is regrouping with the front to the north.” The 89th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army on the perimeter of the encirclement of Schneidemuhl, starting from February 3, was replaced by units of the 47th Army. The 61st Army moved north, shifting the line from which a German counterattack could begin. At the same time, potential participants in the counterattack were eliminated; in particular, the garrison of the city of Nantik was destroyed.

It is interesting to note a fairly high percentage of heavy tanks in the armored units of Belov’s army. During the period described, there were 8 T-34 tanks only in the 85th Tank Regiment. There were 30 ISs in the 88th Heavy Tank Regiment and the 11th Guards. heavy tank brigade. The most numerous were the SU-76 - there were 43 of them in three self-propelled artillery and two tank regiments.

The city of Arnswalde mentioned by Guderian was surrounded on February 6, and about 3 thousand garrison men under the command of Major General Voght and 11 thousand refugees were blocked in it. The backbone of the garrison consisted of spare parts for rocket mortars and units of Steiner's army arriving in Eastern Pomerania. Thus, the Arnswald garrison included seven “Royal Tigers” from the 503rd battalion of SS heavy tanks, which only unloaded in the Wedella area, not far from Arnswald, on January 28th. The Royal Tigers were used to defend Arnswald in a very unique way: several vehicles were loaded onto railway platforms and became an improvised armored train. He moved along the railway that bypassed Arnswalde, and tanks fired at the attacking Soviet troops. The remaining tanks were used to maneuver through the city streets in the direction of Soviet attacks. The Arnswald garrison had no artillery: Soviet troops noted the presence of only two batteries of 81-mm mortars. The defense system was based on machine gun fire. At night, Yu-52 transport workers dropped cargo to the besieged garrison. In general, the defense of Arnswald developed according to a typical scenario for the “festungs” of the second half of the war: stubborn defense in complete encirclement, meager air supplies and illusory hopes for relief. However, Arnswalde was not in a worse position. On February 12, the garrison was asked to capitulate; General Voght rejected this offer: he already knew about the impending offensive.

On February 13, Zhukov, by operational directive No. 00813/op, ordered Belov to surrender sections of the front on the right flank of the army to units of the 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army and the 7th Guards. cavalry corps. After the surrender of their combat sectors, the corps of the 61st Army were transferred further to the west and replaced the 2nd Guards. tank army and 8th Guards. Tank Corps 1st Guards. tank army. Accordingly, the 47th Army reached the Oder line and took up positions on the left flank of the 61st Army. It was this directive from the front commander that determined the position of the Soviet troops at the beginning of the Solstice. The 80th Rifle Corps remained to storm Arnswalde, while the 9th Guards and 89th Rifle Corps moved into new areas and took up positions south of Stargard. Thus, the infantry of two rifle corps of the 61st Army advanced under the attack of the most powerful XXXIX Tank Corps. To strengthen the defense of the 9th Guards. Rifle Corps Zhukov sent the fresh 1818th self-propelled artillery regiment of the RGK, armed with the SU-85 (21 self-propelled guns).

The general offensive of Steiner's army began on February 16, 1945. On the right flank, the XXXIX Panzer Corps advanced, consisting of the Schlesien Panzer Division, the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, the 4th SS Grenadier Division Polizei and the 28th SS Division "Wallonia". Initially, Frundsberg and Schlesien attacked the left flank of the 12th Guards. tank corps. In the direction of the German offensive, units of the 34th Guards took up defensive positions. motorized rifle and 48th Guards. tank brigade. The newcomers were lucky: by 16.00 “Schlesien” and “Wallonia” occupied the city of Verben on the shores of Lake Madusee, and by 20.00 - Schöningen, thereby intercepting the Reichsstrasse No. 158 highway running from Piritz to Stargard. During the offensive, units of the “Politsai” captured a bridgehead on the river. Faule Ina south of Bloomberg.

The SS division "Frundsberg" went into battle literally "from the wheels." On the morning of February 16, one battalion of the tank regiment and the 22nd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment were still on the road. The tanks unloaded at the railway station south of Stargard and drove straight into battle. As a result, the Frundsberg offensive was less successful - Varnitz was held by units of the 66th Guards. tank brigade. It is significant that the brigades that found themselves under the blow of the German offensive were already pretty battered: in the 48th Guards. As of February 15, the tank brigade had only 20 T-34 tanks, and in the 66th Guards. tank brigade - 15 T-34 tanks. Since the 12th Guards. The tank corps turned out to be a tough nut to crack; Frundsberg’s actions on February 17, at Wenck’s insistence, were transferred to the direction of the Polizei’s advance. The 22nd Panzergrenadier Regiment "Frundsberg", arriving by rail, was already unloaded in Blumberg. A new blow came at the junction of the 75th and 12th Guards. rifle divisions of the 61st Army. The “Polizei” captured Delitz on February 17, and because of its right flank, “Frundsberg” developed an attack on Musherin, on the flank and rear of the 12th Guards. tank corps and the 75th rifle division. A counterattack was immediately launched on Musherin with the support of the 6th Guards. heavy tank regiment. Meanwhile, Frundsberg turned further west and captured Zallentin on February 17, further enveloping the right flank of the 12th Guards. tank corps. After the capture of Zallentin, Musherin was occupied. The situation was unstable - the German units that had captured Musherin were under continuous mortar fire. Tankers even preferred not to leave their tanks, hiding from the hail of shrapnel under their armor. Frundsberg's right neighbor, the 28th SS Volunteer Division, captured the Lindenbeg Hills on February 17.

From Musherin, the Frundsberg units began an attack south on the morning of February 18, to the area of ​​Lubtow and the Schönninger Canal. But this offensive no longer achieved its goals. By that time, the 397th Rifle Division of the 89th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army was advancing to the Lyubtov area. On February 17, 17 tanks of the 65th Guards were sent to Zallentin. tank brigade of the 9th Guards. tank corps with the task of knocking out the enemy from the master's yard on the southern outskirts of Zallentin. But instead of attacking at 19.00 on February 18, the tanks of the 65th Tank Brigade retreated northwest to Clemmen. As a result of the proceedings that soon followed, the commander of the 1st tank battalion of the brigade was removed from his post and put on trial by the Military Tribunal. He was reminded of Order No. 227 of 1942. The commander of the 65th Tank Brigade was reprimanded. The 66th Guards was sent to repel the growing threat. tank brigade that recaptured Zallentin by 18.00 on February 19. The next day, Musherin was recaptured by the 75th Infantry Division and the 6th Guards. heavy tank regiment.

In the center of the formation of the 11th SS Panzer Army in the direction of Arnswald, the III SS Panzer Corps, consisting of the tank-grenadier divisions Nordland and Nederland, was advancing. Behind them were the 281st Infantry Division and the 27th SS Division Langemarck. The SS Corps supported the 503rd SS heavy tank battalion (17 combat-ready Royal Tigers on February 15). On the left flank the divisions “Führer Escort” and “Führer Grenadiers” were advancing under the control of the headquarters of the X SS Army Corps. The German units moved forward with great difficulty. The offensive of "Nordland" in the zone defended by cavalrymen of the 7th Guards. The cavalry corps developed relatively successfully, but the tasks of the day were not completed. In particular, the Norge regiment was unable to capture Schlagentin. Attempts by the Nederland and Fuhrer Escort divisions to capture the Ritz road junction with an attack from two sides were unsuccessful, crashing against strong anti-tank defenses. The 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army defended here. It should be noted that the German command managed to support the offensive with some aircraft. If in the first ten days of February in the zone of the 61st Army, VNOS posts noted only 45 sorties, mainly of a reconnaissance nature, then in the second ten days there were already 208. German planes in groups of 5-14 vehicles attacked the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

Meanwhile, units of the 80th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army began an assault on Arnswald on the morning of February 16, regardless of its release by the enemy advancing from the north. A peculiar, but typical for the last period of the war, situation arose of mixing the formations occupying the front and storming the German “festungs”: the 7th Guards. The cavalry corps defended with a front to the north, and in its rear the 80th Rifle Corps stormed the encircled city. The main tank units of the P.A. army were sent to capture Arnswald. Belova: 11th Guards. heavy tank brigade, 85th tank regiment and 1899th self-propelled artillery regiment. In addition, the 80th Rifle Corps was temporarily transferred to the 415th Rifle Division and the 60th Guards. corps artillery regiment from the 9th Guards. rifle corps. A brigade of heavy ISs with the forces of the 91st (6 IS-2) and 92nd (5 IS-2) tank regiments supported the 356th Infantry Division, the 85th Tank Regiment also supported the 356th Infantry Division, and the 1899th Self-Propelled artillery regiment - 311th rifle division. However, due to the small number of infantry, it was not possible to break into the city. In the report on the results of the operation, the leadership of the 80th Rifle Corps indicated as one of the reasons for the delay in the assault on Arnswalde: “insufficient number of infantry: 600 active bayonets in two divisions (356 infantry division - 260 people, 212 infantry division - 300 people); late approach of infantry reinforcement (311 and 415 infantry divisions). Late because by this time the enemy had introduced new tank motor units and launched decisive attacks from the north.” Also, the lack of heavy artillery was pointed out as the reason for the failure of the first days of the assault - for a long time the assaulters did not have guns with a caliber of over 122 mm.

On the morning of February 17, the assault on Arnswald continued; 14 IS-2s of the 90th Tank Regiment joined the attackers. The 356th Infantry Division with an IS brigade occupied a gas plant on the outskirts of Arnswald and became involved in street fighting in the city. But the increase in the number of tanks did not turn the situation in favor of the attackers: the few infantry were cut off by fire from the upper floors of the buildings, and the ISs were hit by the Royal Tigers cruising the streets. During the day of the battle, 4 IS-2 tanks were burned and 3 were knocked out.

At 16.00 on February 17, the advanced units of “Nordland” reached Arnswalde and relieved the encircled garrison of the city. The artillery of the 80th Rifle Corps came under attack from the relief force. “It should be noted that the existing divisional artillery could not fight the enemy’s heavy tanks due to the lack of special shells, and the infantry did not have a sufficient number of means of combat, due to which the tanks almost unhinderedly reached the artillery outposts and inflicted significant losses on them in the material part, damaged and 60 guns and mortars were destroyed.”

However, this was where the successes of the day ended for Steiner's troops. The neighboring XXXIX Tank Corps did not make progress and, under the influence of counterattacks by Soviet troops, went on the defensive. Also on the morning of February 18, a counterattack followed on the flank of the Fuhrer Grenadiers and Fuhrer Escort divisions in the Nantique area. On the afternoon of February 19, the Führer Grenadiers division attempted to resume the offensive and stormed Libenow. But these were already the convulsions of Operation Solstice. On the evening of February 19, an order was issued from the headquarters of Army Group Vistula to stop the offensive. Exactly the same order to go on the defensive followed on the other side of the front. On the evening of February 19, P.A. Belov orders the 23rd Rifle Division to relieve units of the 7th Guards. cavalry corps and go on the defensive throughout the entire army zone. The 80th Rifle Corps, which stormed Arnswald, also went on the defensive. To continue the street battle to capture the city, assault groups were allocated from the first echelon divisions.

On the evening of February 21, under the influence of intense artillery fire, which destroyed up to 90% of the city's buildings, Arnswald was abandoned, and the Germans retreated northward. From Arnswald the Germans retreated north to the line of the Ina River. The III Panzer Corps was followed by the XXXIX Panzer Corps. After retreating to their original positions, the 11th SS Panzer Army ceased to exist. At the beginning of February, the control of the 3rd Panzer Army, led by Colonel General Erhard Routh, was removed from East Prussia. On February 24, the troops under the control of the 11th SS Panzer Army became subordinate to the 3rd Panzer Army. Initially, it was planned to transfer part of the forces to Steiner's army under the control of Routh's army, but ultimately the control of one army was replaced by the control of another. “Solstice” was conducted by Steiner, and it was Routh who had to deal with the consequences of this attack.

Simultaneously with the change of command, the dismantling of the Solstice strike group began. The control of the XXXIX Panzer Corps left for Saxony. The crisis that arose in connection with the formation of a bridgehead on the Oder by the troops of the 69th Army required the strengthening of the 9th Army. The Schlesien Panzer Division was sent to the Frankfurt-on-Oder area. On February 25, the Frundsberg division began being sent to the Frankfurt-on-Oder area.

Units of the 61st Army began pursuing units of the enemy's now 3rd Tank Army. P.A. Belov ordered units of the 80th and 89th Rifle Corps, 7th Guards. cavalry corps at 10.00 on February 23 to go on the offensive with the aim of reaching the river. Ina and capture of bridgeheads. During February 23, two rifle and cavalry corps reached the southern bank of the Ina. Attempts to seize bridgeheads on the first day were unsuccessful. During February 1945, the 212th Rifle Division of the 80th Rifle Corps lost 1384 people (410 killed, 864 wounded and 110 for other reasons), the 356th Rifle Division - 2257 people (720 killed, 1439 wounded and 98 for other reasons ), 415th Infantry Division - 2353 people (443 killed, 1805 wounded, 105 for other reasons). The 311th Infantry Division was also seriously damaged, losing 1,636 men (376 killed, 1,165 wounded, 95 from other causes). During the encirclement of Arnswald from February 4 to 10, 1945, the 80th Rifle Corps lost 280 people killed, from February 10 to 20 - 656 people killed and 1,571 people wounded. The reinforcements received by the divisions of the 61st Army fighting for Arnswald did not cover the losses even to a first approximation. The 212th Infantry Division received 139 people, the 356th - 350 people, the 415th - 477 people and the 311th - 301 people. By March 1, 1945, these divisions numbered 4,361, 3,868, 4,418, and 3,817 men, respectively. The 12th Guards, which came under attack from the “Police” The rifle division lost 2,291 people in February 1945 (588 killed, 1,469 wounded, 234 from other causes). The total losses of units and formations of the 61st Army in February amounted to 3,748 people killed, 9,721 wounded, 1,217 from other causes, and a total of 14,686 people.

Nevertheless, the capture by P.A. troops. Belova bridgeheads on the river. Ina at the end of February 1945 was already a matter of time. On the night of February 28, battalions from the 311th and 234th rifle divisions crossed the river and went on the offensive at 8.00. At 12.00 the crossing of Ina was carried out by two reinforced battalions from the 415th and 212th rifle divisions of the 80th rifle corps. During the day, the leading battalions were followed by the main forces of the divisions. 2nd Guards Until February 24, the tank army surrendered its positions to the rifle corps of the 47th and 61st armies and concentrated in the second echelon of the 61st Army. The 1st Mechanized Corps was left subordinate to the 47th Army. March 1, 61st and 2nd Guards. The tank army had to go on the offensive. But not to Berlin.

The Pomeranian Wall (Pommernstellung) is the northern part of the eastern border fortifications of the Third Reich, adjacent to the OWB defensive line in the south. The defensive line ran from north to south along the line Baltyk - Bialy Bor - Szczecinek - Walcz - Tuczno - Santok. Its length was 275 km.

Since the Polish military doctrine developed in 1920 assumed aggression against Germany in the Gdansk corridor and Upper Silesia, by 1930 the Reichswehr decided to expand the protected 70-kilometer section of the border to 300 km. Initially, it was planned to build field wood-earth fortifications to contain the enemy for two weeks, until the main forces approached the border after mobilization. The structure of the line had to be heterogeneous. In places where it was possible to use natural obstacles in the form of rivers, streams, lakes and swamps, a linear series of bunkers with strength class “C” (0.6 m of reinforced concrete and 60 mm of armor) were designed. It was assumed that in the areas where the fortifications intersect with the main roads, class “B1” bunkers (1 m of reinforced concrete and 100 mm armor) would be built. It was decided that operational corridors and places convenient for breaking through defenses would be fortified with class “B” bunkers (1.5 m of reinforced concrete and 200 mm armor, an armored turret 250 mm thick), which could withstand artillery fire from 210 mm guns.

In the spring of 1931, surveying teams appeared, updating maps and determining the course of future defensive lines on the border of Western Pomerania. A year later, construction of about 20 reinforced bunkers began at the intersections near Stranna, Prusinow and Strzalin. At the same time, light observation structures and combat bunkers were built on the isthmus between lakes Zdbiccio and Dobre.

Mass construction began in 1934 and by the end of 1937 about 800 objects had been built. Among them were 24 class B strength objects, which were located individually or connected by underground communication tunnels, forming fortified areas (URs). The remaining bunkers were of strength class B1 or C. In addition to combat bunkers, a significant number of unarmed reinforced concrete structures were built to shelter troops from air raids and artillery shelling. The largest fortified group "Werkgruppe" was built in the area of ​​Gure Visilec.

Reinforced concrete fortifications complemented the anti-tank barriers and minefields that protected the narrow spaces between the numerous lakes, swamps and forests. Mobile road barriers or concrete blocks with sockets for attaching steel rails were installed on all roads. In 1939, the fortified line was used to accumulate troops before the invasion of Poland.

The line's typical bunker belonged to strength class "B" and was equipped with an MG-08 heavy machine gun. To observe the battlefield there was a periscope on the roof. Some bunkers were modernized and had a 20P7 type six-hole armored turret on the roof, in which two MG-34 machine guns were installed. To protect the entrance to the structure, an armor plate with an embrasure was installed, allowing the use of small arms.

In 1942-1943, the line was partially disarmed and dismantled with the removal of structures for the construction of the Atlantic Wall. However, in 1944-1945, the Wehrmacht command was forced to begin restoring the defense capability of the structures. The defensive line was extended north to the Baltic Sea and modernized, receiving the designation line “D-1”. On the line: Kołobrzeg, Białogard, Połczyn Zdrój, Choszczno, Gorzów Wielkopolski, a second semi-fortified line was created, designated “D-2”. During this period, a significant number of bunkers of the R-58c “Tobruk” type were installed on the Pomeranian Wall, which were mass-produced by Todd Organization (OT) factories and assembled in positions from ready-made sections. The density of fortifications in the fortified areas reached 5-7 pillboxes per 1 km, which was ensured by the need to build them only on small stretches of land (400-1000 m) between a dense network of lakes, swamps and forests. Individual bunkers of the “B-werke” type were equipped with artillery pieces.

In addition, dozens of hydraulic structures on rivers and lakes were restored, making it possible to regulate the water level in them, thereby, if necessary, flooding large areas of the foreland. In tank-hazardous areas, ditches were dug, trenches were prepared for the infantry, and tens of kilometers of barbed wire were installed. In addition to the bunkers, various civilian structures with advantageous locations were adapted for defense. Thus, barricades were built on the streets and squares, the windows of houses were blocked with bricks, leaving loopholes for shooters, and “slots” were opened near the roads for soldiers armed with Faustpatrons.

To carry out construction work on the Pomeranian Wall, from August 1944, men aged 15 to 65 years and women aged 16 to 55 years living near the objects under construction, as well as prisoners of war and prisoners of labor camps, were forcibly recruited. Their number amounted to tens of thousands and, according to various sources, in certain periods reached 100 thousand.

The battles for the Pomeranian Wall (February 5 - 20, 1945) in the Szczecinek - Walcz area.

The assault on the Pomeranian Wall as part of the East Pomeranian operation was carried out by troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The 1st Army of the Polish Army also took part in the battles. The fighting lasted from January 31 to February 10, 1945. It should be noted that the command of the Red Army did not have reliable intelligence information about either the structure of the defense of the Pomeranian Wall or the number of troops occupying it. Therefore, the battles went straight away, crushing them “massively”, suffering quite high losses. And only by bringing tank armies into battle was the resistance suppressed. Often, Gdansk, Gdynia and other parts of Pomerania are mistakenly included in the Pomeranian Wall. However, they are located significantly east of the rampart itself, although they were among the targets of the East Pomeranian operation. It is because of this that confusion arises among historians and researchers.

It must be emphasized that the main disadvantage of the Pomeranian Wall was not outdated structures and weapons, but the simple lack of a sufficient number of troops, not to mention those specially trained to fight in fortified conditions. Often not all line fortifications were filled, and key support nodes were staffed by small garrisons of reservists, or the remnants of units defeated at the front. As a result, many positions were surrendered without a fight, and some Soviet troops were simply bypassed without an assault. Almost at the time of the assault on the defensive line, there were only garrisons of fortifications, separate battalions and units being formed from reserves and remnants. There were no full-fledged units of the regular army in the positions. Thus, the rampart was defended by some units of the 15th SS Division, the 260th Security Battalion "Pfenning", units of the 31st Infantry Division, combined into the "Jochim" group, the "Rode" regimental group, the "Merkisch Friedland" divisional group, formed on base of the Grossborne Artillery School, two anti-tank destroyer battalions - "Friedrich" and "Emil" and the 201st artillery division. The length of time it took to overcome the Pomeranian Wall is explained by the preoccupation of Soviet troops with the defeat of Army Group Vistula in the northeastern part of Pomerania.

In connection with the above, a significant number of fortifications of the Pomeranian Wall have survived to this day, photographs of which are given below.

However, most of the fortifications were blown up after the war and now diligently serve the wildlife, most often colonies of bats.

Assessing the effectiveness of the fortifications of the Pomeranian Wall, it should be noted that from a military point of view, at the time of its assault, it did not have the necessary defensive power to deter the attack, even if we do not take into account the absence of troops at the time of its assault. Firstly, both the structures and weapons were outdated, and there was no artillery at all. Secondly, the entire defensive line at the time of its assault was no longer an obstacle to Berlin, since the OWB defensive line adjacent to it from the south had long been broken through and the defense of the Pomeranian Wall made no sense. Thirdly, the anti-tank defense of the rampart was very weak, which the enemy tank armies took advantage of. However, the Pomeranian Wall also played a positive role in 1939, where the invading army was concentrated behind it. If we were to hypothetically allow a pre-emptive strike from Poland against German troops, the fortifications would probably play a positive role.

By the beginning of February 1945, the following situation had developed in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. During the Vistula-Oder operation, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of I.S. Konev and the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov inflicted a severe defeat on the German forces in the Berlin direction. During the campaign, they managed to break through the German defenses along the Vistula River and reach the Oder River on a broad front. The enemy armies occupying the defensive between the Vistula and Oder rivers suffered serious losses. There were no more than 100 kilometers left to Berlin.

At the same time, the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky reached the Baltic Sea and cut off the East Prussian enemy group from the main forces of the Wehrmacht. However, despite a series of severe blows, the Reich leadership still hoped to stop the Red Army's advance on Berlin. For these purposes, the German command took a number of measures, in particular, significant reserves were deployed to the line of the Oder River, and the Vistula Army Group was formed from the forces that had withdrawn to Eastern Pomerania. The German troops were personally commanded by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler.

For Nazi Germany, the region of Eastern Pomerania was of the greatest economic and transport importance. The region had a developed network of railways and airfields, which, together with many seaports, made it one of the largest transport hubs of the Reich. In addition, industry was well developed in Pomerania, including the military, and there were a large number of warehouses and arsenals. And the main forces of the German navy were based at the naval bases of Danzig, Gdynia and Stettin, which allowed the Reich to control a significant part of the Baltic and carry out large transfers of troops and equipment by sea. Due to the importance of the region, the German command deployed all possible forces to maintain control over it.

Under these circumstances, despite the proximity of the German capital, a decisive attack on Berlin looked quite risky. Mainly due to serious fears that the enemy would try to launch a powerful flank attack on the rear of Zhukov's front. This development of events seemed quite likely due to the difference in the pace of advance of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, between which a serious gap of 250 kilometers had formed, where there were practically no Soviet troops. German forces in Eastern Pomerania hung over the right flank of Zhukov's front, and the Wehrmacht command was hardly going to miss the opportunity to strike from there. Thus, for the successful conduct of the Berlin operation, it was necessary to eliminate the threat represented by Army Group Vistula.

In early February, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to turn part of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front to the north to close the gap between the fronts and at the same time entrusted Rokossovsky’s troops with the task of eliminating the enemy’s East Pomeranian group.

As it became clear later, this step was the right one.

The initial plan for the East Pomeranian operation was reflected in the Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 11021 of February 8, 1945.

The main tasks that the command set for the troops of the Rokossovsky front were as follows: no later than February 20, 1945, to capture the line of the mouth of the Vistula River, Dirschau, Berent, Rummelsburg, Neusch-Tettin. After this, developing the offensive, clear the entire Baltic coast up to the Pomeranian Bay. Also, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had to liberate such large cities as Danzig and Gdynia. The front was supposed to begin the offensive on February 10, 1945, that is, less than two days were allotted for preparation.

So that the front command could fully concentrate on actions in Eastern Pomerania, the 2nd Belorussian Front was released from participation in the East Prussian operation, and all of its right-flank armies were reassigned to the 3rd Belorussian Front.

The 2nd Belorussian Front was reinforced by the 19th Army of General G.K. Kozlov, but they could not complete its deployment by February 10th. In fact, by the beginning of the offensive in Eastern Pomerania, the front had four armies: the 2nd shock (I.I. Fedyuninsky), the 65th (P.I. Batov), ​​the 49th (I.T. Grishin) and the 70th (V.S.Popov). The front also included three tank corps, one mechanized and one cavalry. Air support for Rokossovsky's forces was provided by the 4th Air Army of General K.A. Vershinin.

Speaking about the composition of the front, it is worth noting that after fierce fighting in East Prussia, most units and formations experienced a serious shortage of personnel. The average number of rifle divisions in the armies did not exceed 4,500 people, with the exception of the 19th Army that had not yet arrived, in which the divisions consisted of 8,400 soldiers and officers. The front also suffered from a lack of equipment. Almost half of the regular tanks were under repair.

In fact, as of February 10, the 2nd Belorussian Front had at its disposal about 370,000 people, 10,000 guns and mortars, 263 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, as well as 450 aircraft.

The Vistula Army Group, consisting of four armies, including one tank, as well as the 2nd Army of the Wehrmacht, which included 13 infantry and 2 tank divisions, 2 brigades, and 6 battle groups, acted against Rokossovsky’s forces. Germany began building defensive structures in the region back in 1933. The hilly plain, with areas of forest, rivers and lakes, which is Eastern Pomerania, was covered with a network of trenches, various engineering structures, minefields, barbed wire, and anti-tank ditches with water. In addition, along the Pomeranian Wall - the main line of German defense - there were fortified cities (Stolp, Rummelsburg, Deutsch-Krone, Schneidemuhl, Neustettin), each of which was fully prepared for defense and street battles.

Even a cursory glance at the balance of forces is enough to understand that the firepower of the 2nd Belorussian Front was clearly insufficient. The weather added to the difficulty - in muddy conditions, the swampy terrain in some places became an insurmountable obstacle.

Thus, the operation had to begin in extremely difficult conditions, with insufficient forces and time to transfer them.

However, despite all the difficulties, on the morning of February 10, 1945, the front troops went on the offensive. The East Pomeranian operation began.

Coming. operation of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belarus. fr. with the assistance of part of the Balt forces. fleet, held on February 10. - April 4 As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945 Soviets. troops reached the Oder River and captured bridgeheads on its west. shore. Direct part of the forces of Army Group "Vistula" (2nd and 11th A, 16 infantry, 4 tanks, 2 motorized divisions, 5 brigades, 8 separate groups and 5 fortress garrisons, in reserve 4 infantry and 2 motorized divisions, Reichsführer SS Himmler) held the East. Pomerania and prepared a blow to the rights. wing of the 1st Belorussian troops. fr. 8 Feb. The Supreme Command headquarters, taking into account the current situation, released the 2nd Belorus. fr. (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) from further participation in the East Prussian operation of 1945 and set the task of defeating the east. Pomeranian grouping, to take possession of the East. Pomerania and clear the Baltic coast. m. from Danzig (Gdansk) to the Pomeranian Bay.

10 Feb troops of the center and the lion. wing of the 2nd Belorussian. fr. (65th, 49th, 70th A, 1st Guards Tank and 8th Mechanized Corps, 4th VA) with the assistance of Balt. fleet (Adm. V.F. Tributs) launched an offensive from a bridgehead on the river. Vistula, north of Bydgoszcz, in the general direction of Stettin. In the difficult conditions of muddy roads and wooded-lake terrain, overcoming the fierce resistance of the pr-ka, based on a deeply echeloned defense, they reached the end of February 19. advanced 40-60 km, but were stopped at the line Wrath, Chojnice, Ratzebur. 16-20 Feb. The project launched a counterattack with the forces of 6 divisions from the area southeast of Stettin, pushing back the troops of the 47th A of the 1st Belorussian. fr. at 8-12 km. However, the troops of the 1st Belorussian. fr. (Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) repelled the counterattack of the pr-ka and inflicted it on him. damage. The pr-k went on the defensive along the entire front from the Vistula to the Oder and began to strengthen the East Pomeranian group. To defeat it, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to also attract troops of the 1st Belorussian Army. fr. The idea of ​​the owls. command provided for the delivery of two strikes: one by the forces of the 2nd Belorus. fr. from the Sempulyu district in the direction of Keslin and the second - by law forces. wing of the 1st Belorussian. fr. from the Arnswald region to Kolberg with the goal of reaching the Baltic. m., dissect the East Pomeranian grouping of the pr-ka and destroy it in parts. Balt. The fleet had to disrupt the sea by the actions of aviation, submarines and torpedo boats. messages pr-ka in the south. parts of Balt. m., as well as to promote Land. troops in capturing the Baltic coast. m. On the fronts in the attack directions, it was possible to create the necessary superiority in forces and means.

24 Feb The 2nd Belarusian went on the offensive. fr. (2nd Shock A, 65th, 49th, 70th, 19th A, 4th VA), and on March 1 - the strike group of the 1st Belorussian. fr. (1st A of the Polish Army, 3rd Shock, 61st and 47th A, 1st and 2nd Guards TA). Having broken through the defense of the avenue, the owls. By March 5, troops reached the Baltic. m. in the districts of Koslin and Kolberg, dividing the grouping of the pr-ka (29 infantry, 3 tank and 3 motorized divisions, 3 separate brigades) into two parts. 3rd German-Fasc. TA (replaced 11th A on February 25) was almost completely destroyed. Balt. The fleet carried out a blockade from the sea of ​​the avenue, surrounded in the Danzig region, and acted on the sea. communications in the south parts of Balt. m. Aviation inflicted massacres. attacks on troops and military. pr-ka objects. By March 10, the troops of the 1st Belorussian. fr. in the main completed the liberation of the Baltic coast. m. from the Kolberg district to the mouth of the river. Oder. On March 18, the 1st A Polish Army (Lieutenant General S.G. Poplavsky) captured Kolberg. Troops of the 2nd Belorussian. fr. On March 28, they occupied Gdynia, and on March 30, Danzig. Remains of 2nd A Avenue, blocked in the Gdynia region, April 4. were defeated by the forces of the 19th A. Pressed to the sea, the grouping of the pr-ka in the region east of Danzig capitulated on May 9.

As a result, V.-P. O. Polish Polish Pomerania with large cities and important ports was returned to the people. The exit of the owls. troops to the Baltic coast. m. reliably provided the flank of the main. strat-tag. Sov groups. Armed Forces operating in the Berlin direction. Balt's basing capabilities have expanded. fleet, which increased the effectiveness of its combat operations. St. were defeated. 20 divisions and 8 brigades of the pr-ka (6 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed). Only the 2nd Belarusian. fr. captured approx. 63.6 thousand soldiers and officers of the pr-ka, captured 680 tanks and assault guns, 3470 guns and mortars, 431 aircraft, 277 ships and many other military units. equipment and property. After completion of V.-P. O. troops of 10 armies were released to participate in the Berlin operation of 1945. A number of Soviet formations and units. and Polish troops received honorary names. "Kolberg", "Pomeranian", etc.

The East Pomeranian offensive operation took place at a time when two large groups of German troops were surrounded and destroyed in Courland and East Prussia. The enemy command continued to hold in its hands the coast of the Baltic Sea in Eastern Pomerania, as a result of which between the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, which reached the Oder River, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main forces of which were fighting in East Prussia, in early February 1945 year, a gap of about 150 km was formed.

The East Pomeranian offensive operation took place at a time when two large groups of German troops were surrounded and destroyed in Courland and East Prussia. The enemy command continued to hold in its hands the coast of the Baltic Sea in Eastern Pomerania, as a result of which between the armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, which reached the Oder River, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main forces of which were fighting in East Prussia, in early February 1945 year, a gap of about 150 km was formed. This strip of terrain was occupied by limited forces of Soviet troops.

Even during the Vistula-Oder operation, the German command began to take measures to organize defense on the Oder River and strike from there against the Soviet troops advancing in the Berlin direction. In his testimony, the former chief of the German general staff, Keitel, wrote: “... in February - March 1945, it was planned to conduct a counter-operation against the troops advancing on Berlin, using the Pomeranian bridgehead for this. It was planned that, having taken cover in the Graudenz area, the troops of the Vistula Army Group would break through the Russian front and, reaching the valley of the Netze and Warta rivers, would reach Küstrin from the rear.”

In this regard, on January 26, the German command, instead of the defeated Army Group A, created Army Group Vistula, initially consisting of the 2nd and 9th Armies. At the beginning of February, the 11th Army, consisting of the 39th Panzer Corps and the 3rd SS Panzer Corps, was transferred from the reserve to this group of armies, and the control of the 3rd Panzer Army was hastily transferred from the East Prussian group.

By February 10, Army Group Vistula included the 2nd, 11th, 9th, and 3rd Tank Armies. The 2nd and 11th armies operated in Eastern Pomerania, the 9th Army, deployed along the western bank of the Oder River, covered Berlin from the east, the 3rd Tank Army formed the reserve of the Vistula Army Group and prepared defenses along the western bank of the Oder River from Stettin to Schwedt.

Of the total number of formations against the right wing of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts between the Vistula and Oder rivers, there were: 16 infantry divisions, 4 tank divisions, 3 motorized divisions, 4 brigades, 5 fortress garrisons, 8 battle groups.

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky), in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, continued to destroy the encircled East Prussian enemy group. In front of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the 4th German Army operated, which by this time was pressed to the Baltic Sea and cut into three parts, one of which, consisting of eight divisions, was thrown back to the Zemland Peninsula, the other, the largest - up to 20 divisions , pressed to the shore of the Frisch-Gaff Bay, and the third is blocked in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bKonigsberg (Kaliningrad).

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) reached the coast of the Frisch Gaff Bay and the lower reaches of the Vistula. The troops of the left wing of the front successfully crossed the Vistula River northeast of Bydgoszcz and, advancing along the left bank of the Vistula in the northwest direction, expanded the captured bridgehead. The German 2nd Army, which was part of Army Group Vistula, acted against the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Troops of the 1st. The Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) with formations of its right wing fought in the southern part of Eastern Pomerania on a wide front from the Vistula to the Oder. The troops of the center and left wing reached the Oder River and captured a bridgehead on its western bank in the areas of Küstrin and Frankfurt an der Oder. The 11th Army and part of the forces of the enemy’s 2nd Army, which were part of the Vistula Army Group, defended against the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, and the 9th Army, which was part of the Army Group, defended against the troops of the center and left wing "Center".

The situation dictated the need to accelerate in every possible way the preparations for the final blow of the Soviet troops in the Berlin direction. When the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts reached the Oder, their further advance to the west was hampered by the threat of the enemy from the south - from Silesia and from the north - from Eastern Pomerania. And the main danger loomed from the north, from where the newly created Army Group Vistula sought to strike in the rear of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front to disrupt their attack on Berlin and gain time to strengthen the defense on the approaches to Berlin.

Initially, the Supreme Command Headquarters assigned the task of defeating the enemy's East Pomeranian group to the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. In a directive dated February 9, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front to transfer the troops of the right wing with the sectors they occupied to the 3rd Belorussian Front (troops under the command of generals A.V. Gorbatov, I.V. Boldin, N.I. Gusev ), and with the forces of the center and left wing to defeat the opposing enemy forces. On February 10, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were supposed to go on the offensive west of the Vistula River and no later than February 20 to capture the line of the mouth of the Vistula River, Dirschau, Berent (50 km southwest of Danzig), Rummelsburg (50 km south of Stolp), Neustettin ; in the future, with the approach of the 19th Army, develop an offensive in the general direction of Stettin, capture the area of ​​Danzig, Gdynia and clear the coast of the Baltic Sea from the enemy up to the Pomeranian Bay.

By the beginning of the operation, the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) had 45 rifle divisions and three fortified areas. It should be noted that the front formations suffered significant losses during the East Prussian operation. The number of divisions, with the exception of the divisions of the 19th Army, was 4100-4900 people.

By this time, directly in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 2nd German Army was operating, consisting of 13 infantry and 2 tank divisions, 2 brigades, 6 combat groups and 3 large garrisons of fortresses.

On February 10, having virtually no time to prepare a new operation, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front from the line Graudenz, Zempelburg (10 km north of Wenzbork) launched an offensive, which developed extremely slowly. During the day, the front troops advanced from 5 to 10 km. Subsequently, due to the increase in enemy resistance, as well as the influence of the harsh conditions of lake-swampy terrain and spring thaw on the course of offensive operations, the rate of advance of our troops did not exceed 3-8 km per day. As a result of intense offensive battles in the period from February 10 to 19, the front troops advanced only 50-70 km.

On February 15, in order to better organize the offensive, the commander of the Belorussian Front reported to Headquarters a plan for the front's further actions. He proposed deploying the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps on the left wing of the front and on February 22-23 strike in the direction of Kezlin, reach the Baltic Sea coast and cut through the enemy’s Pomeranian group. Headquarters approved the proposals of the commander of the 2nd Front. On February 19, in order to bring up reserves to strengthen the advancing troops and carry out some regroupings, the front command temporarily suspended the offensive of the troops.

Meanwhile, the enemy, having concentrated six divisions in a narrow area in Eastern Pomerania, launched a counterattack on the 1st Belorussian Front on February 16. The 47th Army, not prepared to repel it, retreated 8-12 km. However, the Germans were unable to achieve more and on February 20 went on the defensive along the entire front from the Vistula to the Oder.

The German command, continuing to strengthen its East Pomeranian group, by February 20 transferred four infantry divisions (93, 126, 225 and 290) by sea from the Courland group to reinforce Army Group Vistula. The enemy intended to transfer the 6th Tank Army to Eastern Pomerania from the Western Front. However, the catastrophic situation in which German troops found themselves on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front forced them to abandon this and send the 6th Panzer Army to the Budapest area.

The troops of the German Army Group Vistula, having failed to achieve success in launching a counterattack in the Stargard area and having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive along the entire front from the Vistula to the Oder.

A significant part of the enemy navy was based in the ports of Danzig, Gdynia and Kolberg. The enemy fleet, operating in the central part of the Baltic Sea, carried out operational transportation and assisted its defending ground forces.

Although, as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the south of Eastern Pomerania in January and early February 1945, a significant part of the “Pomeranian Wall” was bypassed or captured, however, during the fighting in February and March, certain sections of these lines, as well as long-term structures that existed near large settlements and cities were widely used by the enemy to strengthen defense.

The defense system of Eastern Pomerania also included the Gdynia-Danzig fortified area, which had internal and external defensive contours (with a total depth of up to 15 km). When creating a fortified area around Gdynia, the enemy used old Polish fortifications. The city of Danzig on the southeastern side was covered by a canal, inaccessible terrain and a system of old forts. Danzig and Gdynia were prepared for street battles, for which basements and buildings were prepared in advance for defense. In addition, in case of withdrawal from Gdynia to the north, the Oxhewt bridgehead (north of Gdynia), as well as the Hel spit, were prepared for defense.

The presence of a large and increasingly strengthened enemy group in Eastern Pomerania created a serious threat to the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, as a result of which the need arose to quickly defeat this enemy group.

Assessing the position of our troops operating in the Berlin direction, and based on the need to quickly eliminate the threat to their right flank, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to continue the offensive in Eastern Pomerania with the forces of not one, but two fronts.

The plan of the Supreme High Command Headquarters was to strike with the forces of the adjacent flanks of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts to cut through the East Pomeranian enemy group and reach the Baltic Sea coast in the area of ​​Kezlin and Kolberg. Then, striking with the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the eastern direction, and with the forces of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in the western direction, destroy this group in parts.

In accordance with this decision, the Headquarters, in its directive of February 17, 1945, ordered the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts to defeat the enemy Vistula Army Group with a swift blow, and then concentrate the main forces of the 1st and 2nd in the Berlin direction. Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The 2nd Belorussian Front received the task of delivering the main blow with its left wing in the direction of Kezlin and, in cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, to cut through the enemy group, reach the Baltic Sea, and then, advancing in the direction of Danzig, defeat the troops 2nd enemy army and organize the defense of the Baltic Sea coast.

The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to advance with the troops of the right wing on Kolberg and, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, reach the Baltic Sea and cut through the enemy group. Subsequently, advancing on Kammin, Gollnow, Altdamm, destroy the formations of the enemy's 11th Army and reach the coast of the Pomeranian Bay, the Gulf of Stettin and the Oder River.

On February 15, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, at the direction of Headquarters, presented an operation plan for the troops of the right wing of the front. The headquarters approved this plan. According to the plan, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 3rd Shock Army, the 61st and 47th Armies, the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were involved in the operation. The front commander decided to strike from the area south of Arnswald on Kolberg and Gollnow, dissect and destroy piece by piece the troops of the enemy's 11th and 3rd tank armies and reach the Baltic Sea coast and the Oder River from Kolberg to Zeden. The start of the offensive was scheduled for February 19, 1945. Subsequently, due to the fact that the transition of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the offensive was scheduled for February 24, and also because the enemy launched a counterattack south of Stargard against the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, the offensive of the front troops was postponed to 25 -February 26. By this time, the front commander intended to exhaust and bleed the advancing enemy in defensive battles, and then go on the offensive.

The short operational pause between the first and second stages of the operation (from February 19 to 24) was used by the command and headquarters of both fronts to comprehensively prepare troops for the upcoming offensive actions. During this period, the troops were reinforced by formations received from the reserve, troops were regrouped and secretly concentrated in the directions of the main attacks.

On the morning of February 24, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, after a short but powerful artillery preparation, resumed the offensive. The main blow was delivered from the area southwest of Chojnice in the direction of Kezlin by the forces of the left wing of the front, the troops of generals G.K. Kozlov and V.S. Popov. On the very first day of the battle, the advancing troops, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, broke through his defenses in an area 12 km wide and fought to a depth of 10-12 km. The enemy, repeatedly launching counterattacks with infantry, supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft, made desperate attempts to stop our offensive. But all his attempts were unsuccessful, and he was forced to retreat. The next day, February 25, the front troops, successfully continuing the offensive, advanced another 10-12 km, expanding the breakthrough front to 30 km. Due to poor meteorological conditions, front aviation did not participate in the battles on the first day of the offensive, but from the morning of February 25, it worked closely with ground troops and provided them with air support. By the end of February 27 (over four days of the offensive), the front troops had advanced up to 70 km, captured important communication centers and strong enemy strongholds.

The 1st Belorussian Front launched an offensive on March 1, breaking through the defenses with troops of the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies under the command of Generals N.P. Simonyak and P.A. Belov. As part of these troops, the 1st Army of the Polish Army also advanced. Then the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies of M.E. Katukov and A.I. Radzievsky entered the battle. During March 2-4, fierce fighting took place in the central part of Eastern Pomerania. During this period, the offensive actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were the most rapid. The mobile troops of the front, overcoming fire resistance, engineering obstacles and repelling enemy counterattacks, advanced 90 km forward in two days of fighting. Combined-arms formations, taking advantage of the success of the tankers, advanced up to 65 km during the same time.

The enemy, knocked down from the main defensive positions, tried to use the rough terrain, inter-lake defiles, forests and groves and put up stubborn resistance to our advancing units. The advanced mobile units and formations of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, skillfully maneuvering on the battlefield and continuously interacting with each other, crushed the enemy's manpower and equipment and rapidly advanced to the coast of the Baltic Sea.

The enemy offered the most fierce resistance when our troops captured strongholds and the cities of Rummelsburg, Neustettin, and Bellegarde. Tank guards under the command of generals Katukov, Bogdanov, Panfilov, cavalrymen of generals Oslikovsky and Kryukov, acting boldly, quickly captured one populated area after another. The advanced mobile units made extensive use of night operations, as a result of which the enemy was constantly under the influence of attacks from our advancing troops and was forced to abandon position after position. The rifle units and formations acted just as skillfully and decisively. They consolidated the lines captured by tankers, eliminated remaining pockets of resistance and cleared the occupied territory of German troops.

As a result of the rapid entry of mobile troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts into the Kezlin area and south of Kolberg, by the end of March 4, in the area southeast of Bellegarde, it was possible to encircle the enemy group with a force of up to four divisions, which was liquidated on March 7 by the troops of the 1st Belorussian front. In the middle of the day on March 4, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front captured the city of Kezlin, and the advanced tank units of General A.I. Panfilov reached the Baltic Sea coast in this area in an area 20 km wide. The first to reach the Baltic Sea on March 4 was the 45th Guards Tank Brigade of Colonel N.V. Morgunov. By the same time, tank formations of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Kolberg from the south.

With the access of our troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea and the capture of the city of Kezlin - an important communications hub and a powerful stronghold of the enemy’s defense on the routes from Danzig to Stettin - the enemy Army Group Vistula found itself cut into two parts and isolated from the rest of the forces by land. Thus, the task assigned by the Supreme High Command to the advancing troops to dismember and isolate the main forces of the East Pomeranian group was completed.

By March 10, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front cleared the lower Oder of the enemy. Having cut the East Pomeranian group, Marshal Zhukov's troops turned west - towards the Oder.

The armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front broke through to the Danzig Bay on March 21. By the end of the day on March 1, they defeated the enemy in the area of ​​​​Danzig and Gdynia. Rokossovsky began regrouping on the Oder to participate in the Berlin operation.

The Supreme Command Headquarters, coordinating the actions of both fronts and achieving continuous and close interaction between them, with the access of our troops to the Baltic Sea, clarified the tasks previously assigned to the troops.

In the Headquarters directive of March 5, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were ordered to advance in an eastern direction and, having defeated the main forces of the enemy’s 2nd Army, capture the cities of Danzig and Gdynia and reach the coast of the Danzig Bay. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, according to the directive of the Headquarters, were to advance with the forces of the right wing in a western direction and, having completed the defeat of the 11th enemy army, reach the Gulf of Stettin and the Oder River. In order to speed up the defeat of the enemy and quickly capture Danzig and Gdynia, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front to temporarily transfer the tank army under the command of General Katukov to the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Upon reaching the Baltic Sea, both fronts were ordered to organize a strong anti-landing defense along the entire captured coast.

In the period from March 10 to 13, the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, continuing to pursue the retreating enemy, advanced another 75-80 km in four days of fighting and approached directly the defensive lines of the Danzig-Gdynia defensive region. By the end of the day on March 13, the front troops, having pressed the retreating enemy group (2nd Army) to the Danzig Bay, were located 15-20 km from the coast of the bay along the entire front from the mouth of the Vistula River to Red. Part of the forces of the enemy group was blocked from land on the Hel Spit.

During 8 days of offensive operations, the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front of the front fought up to 100-150 km with an average pace of about 12-20 km per day; troops of the right wing - up to 40-0 km with an average pace of 5-10 km. Having reached the Danzing-Gdynia fortified area, they were stopped by the enemy, who managed to occupy previously prepared lines and organize defense. Attempts by the approaching forward units to overcome enemy positions on the move were unsuccessful.

From March 5 to 13, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought with scattered and surrounded formations of the enemy's 11th Army. In the area southeast of Bellegarde on March 5-7, they eliminated the encircled four enemy divisions that were part of the 10th SS Corps. At the same time, in order to eliminate them, some formations of our troops that reached the sea were turned to the south. Some of the troops fought with enemy units and formations surrounded in Kolberg, which offered stubborn resistance. By the end of the day on March 7, the troops advancing on Kammin reached the strait in this area and captured the city of Kammin, as well as the entire sea coast from Kolberg to the strait.

From the area southeast of Kammin, units of the Red Army struck to the southwest and south, with the goal, in cooperation with troops advancing from east to west and from south to north, to defeat the largest part of the forces of the 11th Army, which had retreated to the Altdamm area and offered fierce resistance to our troops. The most combat-ready units of the enemy retreated here. Intense fighting took place in this area on March 9-12. Around Altdamm the enemy had fortified lines stretching about 30 km. The attempt of our troops to capture Altdamm was unsuccessful.

As a result of the fighting, by March 13, troops from both fronts reached the Baltic Sea coast. The entire East Pomeranian group was fragmented into pieces and each one was destroyed individually. In the area of ​​Danzig and Gdynia and on the Hel Spit, formations of the enemy's 2nd Army were surrounded from land by troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. In the areas of Kolberg and Altdamm, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front blocked the remnants of the troops of the 11th German Army.

Despite the extremely unfavorable meteorological conditions, aviation provided great assistance to the ground forces in their pursuit of the retreating enemy. She struck at retreating units, destroyed bridges and crossings of the enemy, in every possible way complicating his withdrawal. Aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation carried out strong attacks on military targets in the area of ​​​​the cities of Danzig, Gdynia and Stettin, as well as on enemy warships at sea and in naval bases.

Subsequently, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were engaged in the liquidation of enemy troops surrounded and blocked from land. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, including the 1st Army of the Polish Army, fought continuous battles for Kolberg on March 14-18. As a result of stubborn street fighting, on March 18 they defeated the enemy garrison and captured the city and port of Kolberg.

From March 16 to 20, intense battles took place to eliminate the enemy in Altdamm. The command of the 1st Belorussian Front, having established that the enemy had occupied previously prepared lines and organized a strong defense, pulled up reserves and on March 16, after a short but powerful artillery barrage, resumed the offensive. Having delivered a strong blow, the combined arms formations, in cooperation with tanks and with the support of artillery, broke through the enemy’s defenses in several sectors and, having finally broken the enemy’s resistance, captured the city of Altdamm on March 20, defeating the enemy group of six divisions.

Thus, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having completed the task assigned to them, ended combat operations in the East Pomeranian operation on March 20 and began preparing for the Berlin offensive operation.

The liquidation of the enemy group, blocked from land on the western coast of the Bay of Danzig, took on a more protracted nature. In front of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was the largest part of the East Pomeranian group - the troops of the enemy's 2nd Army, which managed to retreat and take up previously prepared defenses in Danzig, Gdynia and on the Hel Spit. This group was supported by ships of the enemy navy, which held the Bay of Danzig in its hands and had active sea communications connecting the 2nd Army with the East Prussian and Courland enemy groups.

The actions of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front from March 14 to 22 were characterized by stubborn and fierce battles, during which decisive actions were taken to crush the encircled enemy troops. The defenders held their positions at the cost of huge losses. The enemy launched up to twenty counterattacks per day with battalion-to-regiment strength supported by tanks. The actions of the enemy ground forces were also supported by aviation, which was based at airfields immediately adjacent to Danzig and had about 100 combat aircraft. Enemy aircraft with continuous raids on the battle formations of our troops delayed their advance. In addition, the enemy's naval artillery provided significant assistance to its ground forces.

The command of the 2nd Belorussian Front took the necessary measures to quickly and successfully complete the liquidation of the encircled enemy. To ensure the actions of our troops from the air, it was ordered to destroy enemy aircraft based in the Danzig area. The pilots of General K. A. Vershinin's formation suddenly launched a powerful air strike on enemy airfields, as a result of which 2/3 of all enemy aircraft were destroyed or disabled. Our artillery organized a successful fight against enemy ships, as a result of which the German fleet suffered significant losses. Thus, on March 22 and 23, a submarine, a warship, and a self-propelled barge were sunk by artillery fire, and a transport with a displacement of 10 thousand tons was seriously damaged.

In order to speed up the liquidation of the encircled Danzig-Gdynia enemy group, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front decided to fragment it and destroy it piece by piece. In accordance with this decision, the troops were ordered to strike in the direction of Zoppoto and, reaching the coast of the Danzig Bay, cut through the enemy group, and then strike at Danzig and Gdynia.

On March 23, troops under the command of generals I. T. Grishin, V. S. Popov and V. V. Romanovsky struck a strong blow in the direction of Tsoppoto, captured this point, reached the shore of the Danzig Bay and thereby cut the Danzig-Gdynia enemy group into two isolated parts. The largest of them, the Danzig group, included units and units of the 18th Jaeger Corps, 23rd, 27th, 20th Army Corps and 46th Tank Corps. The Gdynia group included units of the 7th and 46th tank corps. On March 24 and 25, front troops continued intense battles with the isolated Danzig and Gdynia garrisons of the enemy.

On March 26, troops under the command of generals I.I. Fedyuninsky, P.I. Batov, I.T. Grishin, V.V. Romanovsky, advancing on Danzig, approached the city and started fighting on its outskirts. On March 28, the troops of the left wing of the front, operating against the Gdynia enemy group, stormed an important enemy naval base and a major port on the Baltic Sea - Gdynia. In the battles for the city of Gdynia, front troops captured up to 9 thousand German soldiers and officers, and also captured a lot of weapons and military equipment. A small part of the Gdynia group was blocked north of Gdynia on the Oxheft bridgehead, which was finally liquidated on April 4.

Two days after the capture of Gdynia, as a result of fierce street fighting, on March 30, our troops completed the defeat of the 2nd German Army and captured the city and the large naval port of Danzig. During the liquidation of the enemy group, more than 10 thousand soldiers and officers were captured in the city alone, 140 tanks and assault guns, over 350 field guns and other weapons were captured. The remnants of the enemy's 2nd Army, blocked from land on the Hel Spit and in the Vistula River delta area, southwest of Danzig, capitulated on May 9, 1945.

The elimination of the enemy's East Pomeranian group was of particular importance. The enemy, having suffered huge losses, not only lost a bridgehead convenient for operations against our troops preparing for an attack on Berlin, but also a significant part of the Baltic Sea coast.

As a result of the defeat of the enemy's East Pomeranian group, the Baltic Fleet, having relocated its light forces to the ports of Eastern Pomerania, took advantageous positions on the Baltic Sea and could provide the coastal flank of the Soviet troops during their offensive in the Berlin direction.