75 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War (Soviet-Finnish War) began. The winter war was almost unknown to the inhabitants of Russia for quite a long time. In the 1980s and 1990s, when it was possible to blaspheme the history of Russia-USSR with impunity, the point of view dominated that "bloody Stalin" wanted to seize "innocent" Finland, but the small, but proud northern people rebuffed the northern "evil empire". Thus, Stalin was blamed not only for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, but also for the fact that Finland was "forced" to enter into an alliance with Nazi Germany in order to resist the "aggression" of the Soviet Union.
Many books and articles denounced the Soviet Mordor, which attacked little Finland. They called absolutely fantastic numbers of Soviet losses, reported on the heroic Finnish machine gunners and snipers, the stupidity of Soviet generals, and much more. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the Kremlin were completely denied. They say that the irrational malice of the "bloody dictator" is to blame.
In order to understand why Moscow went to this war, it is necessary to remember the history of Finland. Finnish tribes for a long time were on the periphery of the Russian state and the Swedish kingdom. Some of them became part of Russia, became "Russians". The fragmentation and weakening of Russia led to the fact that the Finnish tribes were conquered and subjugated by Sweden. The Swedes pursued a colonization policy in the traditions of the West. Finland did not have administrative or even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish, it was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated population.
Russia , having taken Finland from Sweden in 1809, in fact, gave the Finns statehood, allowed the creation of basic state institutions, and the formation of a national economy. Finland received its own authorities, currency and even an army as part of Russia. At the same time, the Finns did not pay general taxes and did not fight for Russia. The Finnish language, while maintaining the status of the Swedish language, received the status of the state language. The authorities of the Russian Empire practically did not interfere in the affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The policy of Russification in Finland was not carried out for a long time (some elements appeared only in the late period, but it was already too late). The resettlement of Russians in Finland was actually prohibited. Moreover, the Russians living in the Grand Duchy were in an unequal position in relation to the local residents. In addition, in 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included the lands that Russia recaptured from Sweden in the 18th century. Moreover, Vyborg was of great military and strategic importance in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire - Petersburg. Thus, the Finns in the Russian “prison of peoples” lived better than the Russians themselves, who bore all the hardships of building an empire and defending it from numerous enemies.
The collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland its independence. Finland thanked Russia by first entering into an alliance with Kaiser Germany, and then with the powers of the Entente ( Read more in a series of articles - How Russia Created Finnish Statehood; Part 2; Finland allied with Imperial Germany against Russia; Part 2; Finland is in alliance with the Entente against Russia. First Soviet-Finnish war; Part 2 ). On the eve of World War II, Finland was in a hostile position towards Russia, leaning towards an alliance with the Third Reich.
For the majority of Russian citizens, Finland is associated with a "small cozy European country", with civilians and cultural residents. This was facilitated by a kind of "political correctness" in relation to Finland, which reigned in the late Soviet propaganda. Finland, after the defeat in the war of 1941-1944, learned a good lesson and made the most of the benefits of being close to the huge Soviet Union. Therefore, in the USSR they did not remember that the Finns attacked the USSR three times in 1918, 1921 and 1941. They chose to forget about this for the sake of good relations.
Finland was not a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia.The separation of Finland from Russia was not peaceful. The Civil War began between the white and red Finns. White was supported by Germany. The Soviet government refrained from large-scale support for the Reds. Therefore, with the help of the Germans, the White Finns prevailed. The victors created a network of concentration camps, unleashed the White Terror, during which tens of thousands of people died (during the hostilities themselves, only a few thousand people died on both sides).In addition to the Reds and their supporters, the Finns "cleaned up" the Russian community in Finland.Moreover, the majority of Russians in Finland, including refugees from Russia who fled from the Bolsheviks, did not support the Reds and the Soviet government. Exterminated former officers of the tsarist army, their families, representatives of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, numerous students, the entire Russian population indiscriminately, women, old people and children . Significant material assets belonging to the Russians were confiscated.
The Finns were going to put a German king on the throne of Finland. However, Germany's defeat in the war led to Finland becoming a republic. After that, Finland began to focus on the powers of the Entente. Finland was not satisfied with independence, the Finnish elite wanted more, claiming Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and the most radical figures made plans to build a "Great Finland" with the inclusion of Arkhangelsk, and Russian lands up to the Northern Urals, Ob and Yenisei (the Urals and Western Siberia are considered the ancestral home of the Finno-Ugric language family).
The leadership of Finland, like Poland, was not satisfied with the existing borders, preparing for war. Poland had territorial claims to almost all its neighbors - Lithuania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the Polish lords dreamed of restoring a great power "from sea to sea". This is more or less known in Russia. But few people know that the Finnish elite raved about a similar idea, the creation of a "Greater Finland". The ruling elite also set the goal of creating a Greater Finland. The Finns did not want to get involved with the Swedes, but they claimed Soviet lands, which were larger than Finland itself. The appetites of the radicals were boundless, stretching all the way to the Urals and further to the Ob and Yenisei.
And for starters, they wanted to capture Karelia. Soviet Russia was torn apart by the Civil War, and the Finns wanted to take advantage of this. So, in February 1918, General K. Mannerheim declared that "he would not sheathe his sword until East Karelia was liberated from the Bolsheviks." Mannerheim planned to seize Russian lands along the line of the White Sea - Lake Onega - the Svir River - Lake Ladoga, which was supposed to facilitate the defense of new lands. It was also planned to include the region of Pechenga (Petsamo) and the Kola Peninsula into Greater Finland. They wanted to separate Petrograd from Soviet Russia and make it a "free city" like Danzig. May 15, 1918 Finland declared war on Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, Finnish volunteer detachments began to conquer Eastern Karelia.
Soviet Russia was busy fighting on other fronts, so she did not have the strength to defeat her arrogant neighbor. However, the Finnish attack on Petrozavodsk and Olonets, the campaign against Petrograd through the Karelian Isthmus failed. And after the defeat of the white army of Yudenich, the Finns had to make peace. From July 10 to July 14, 1920, peace negotiations were held in Tartu. The Finns demanded that Karelia be handed over to them, the Soviet side refused. In the summer, the Red Army drove the last Finnish detachments out of Karelian territory. The Finns held only two volosts - Rebola and Porosozero. This made them more accommodating. There was no hope for Western help either; the Entente powers had already realized that the intervention in Soviet Russia had failed. On October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Finland. The Finns were able to get the Pechenga volost, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, and most of the Sredny Peninsula and the islands, west of the boundary line in the Barents Sea. Rebola and Porosozero were returned to Russia.
This did not satisfy Helsinki. The plans for the construction of "Greater Finland" were not abandoned, they were only postponed. In 1921, Finland again tried to solve the Karelian issue by force. Finnish volunteer detachments, without declaring war, invaded Soviet territory, the Second Soviet-Finnish War began. Soviet forces in February 1922 fully liberated the territory of Karelia from invaders. In March, an agreement was signed on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border.
But even after this failure, the Finns did not cool down. The situation on the Finnish border was constantly tense. Many, remembering the USSR, imagine a huge mighty power that defeated the Third Reich, took Berlin, sent the first man into space and made the entire Western world tremble. Like, how little Finland could threaten the huge northern "evil empire." However, the USSR 1920-1930s. was a great power only in terms of territory and its potential. The real policy of Moscow then was extra-cautious. In fact, for quite a long time, Moscow, until it got stronger, pursued an extremely flexible policy, most often giving in, not climbing on the rampage.
For example, the Japanese plundered our waters near the Kamchatka Peninsula for quite a long time. Under the protection of their warships, Japanese fishermen not only fished out all the living creatures from our waters worth millions of gold rubles, but also freely landed on our shores for repair, processing of fish, obtaining fresh water, etc. Until Khasan and Khalkin-gol, when The USSR gained strength thanks to successful industrialization, received a powerful military-industrial complex and strong armed forces, the red commanders had strict orders to contain Japanese troops only on their territory, without crossing the border. A similar situation was in the Russian North, where Norwegian fishermen fished in the internal waters of the USSR. And when the Soviet border guards tried to protest, Norway took warships to the White Sea.
Of course, in Finland they no longer wanted to fight the USSR alone. Finland has become a friend of any power hostile to Russia. As the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhufvud noted: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland." Against this background, Finland made friends even with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for training. In Finland, as in Poland, they were afraid of any strengthening of the USSR, since their leadership based their calculations on the fact that a war of some great Western power with Russia was inevitable (or a war between Japan and the USSR), and they would be able to profit from Russian lands . Inside Finland, the press was constantly hostile to the USSR, conducted almost open propaganda for attacking Russia and seizing its territories. On the Soviet-Finnish border, all kinds of provocations constantly took place on land, at sea and in the air.
After the hopes for an early conflict between Japan and the USSR did not come true, the Finnish leadership headed for a close alliance with Germany. The two countries were linked by close military-technical cooperation. With the consent of Finland, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center (the Cellarius Bureau) was created in the country. His main task was to carry out intelligence work against the USSR. First of all, the Germans were interested in data on the Baltic Fleet, formations of the Leningrad Military District and industry in the northwestern part of the USSR. By the beginning of 1939, Finland, with the help of German specialists, built a network of military airfields, which was capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. Very indicative is the fact that even before the start of the war of 1939-1940. The identification mark of the Finnish Air Force and armored forces was the Finnish swastika.
Thus, by the beginning of the big war in Europe, we had a clearly hostile, aggressive-minded state on the northwestern borders, whose elite dreamed of building a “Great Finland at the expense of Russian (Soviet) lands and was ready to be friends with any potential enemy of the USSR. Helsinki was ready to fight with the USSR both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and with the help of England and France.
The Soviet leadership understood everything perfectly and, seeing the approach of a new world war, sought to secure the northwestern borders. Of particular importance was Leningrad - the second capital of the USSR, a powerful industrial, scientific and cultural center, as well as the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Finnish long-range artillery could fire on the city from its border, and ground forces could reach Leningrad in one jerk. The fleet of a potential enemy (Germany or England and France) could easily break through to Kronstadt, and then to Leningrad. To protect the city, it was necessary to move the land border on land, as well as to restore the distant line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, having received a place for fortifications on the northern and southern shores. The largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had a single base - Kronstadt. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could be hit by long-range coastal defense guns in Finland. This situation could not satisfy the Soviet leadership.
With Estonia, the issue was resolved peacefully. In September 1939, an agreement on mutual assistance was concluded between the USSR and Estonia. A Soviet military contingent was introduced into the territory of Estonia. The USSR received the rights to create military bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago, in Paldiski and Haapsalu.
It was not possible to agree with Finland in an amicable way. Although negotiations began in 1938. Moscow has tried literally everything. She offered to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance and jointly defend the Gulf of Finland zone, give the USSR the opportunity to create a base on the Finnish coast (Hanko Peninsula), sell or lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland. It was also proposed to move the border near Leningrad. As compensation, the Soviet Union offered much larger areas of Eastern Karelia, preferential loans, economic benefits, etc. However, all proposals were categorically refused by the Finnish side. It is impossible not to note the instigating role of London. The British told the Finns that it was necessary to take a firm stand and not succumb to pressure from Moscow. This encouraged Helsinki.
Finland began a general mobilization and evacuation of the civilian population from the border areas. At the same time, left-wing activists were arrested. Incidents have become more frequent at the border. So, on November 26, 1939, there was a border incident near the village of Mainila. According to Soviet data, Finnish artillery shelled Soviet territory. The Finnish side declared the USSR to be the culprit of the provocation. On November 28, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Pact with Finland. On November 30, the war began. Its results are known. Moscow solved the problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet. We can say that only thanks to the Winter War, the enemy was not able to capture the second capital of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.
Finland is currently drifting towards the West, NATO again, so it's worth keeping a close eye on it. The "cozy and cultured" country can again recall the plans of "Great Finland" up to the Northern Urals. Finland and Sweden are thinking about joining NATO, and the Baltic states and Poland are literally turning into advanced NATO springboards for aggression against Russia before our very eyes. And Ukraine is becoming a tool for war with Russia in the southwestern direction.
Combat forces of the parties:
1. Finnish army:
A. Manpower
By the end of November 1939, Finland had concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.
The land army interacted with and was supported by the Finnish navy and coastal defense forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were connected to the army's payroll of 337 thousand people as a military force:
The paramilitary formations of the Shutskor and "Lotta Svärd" - 110 thousand people.
Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.
The total number of human forces involved in the war from Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.
The 150,000-strong Anglo-French Expeditionary Force to help Finland was also preparing and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - the beginning of March 1940, the arrival of which only thwarted the conclusion of peace.
B. Armament
The Finnish army was well armed, possessed everything necessary. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 warships of the Navy.
During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent her weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million rounds of ammunition.
90% of the financial aid came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavia.
B. Fortifications
The basis of Finland's military power was unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its prefloor, main and rear lanes and defense nodes.
The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bedding) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, channels) of Finland, combined with high-tech engineering structures to create a line of defense capable of giving multi-layered fire on the advancing enemy (at different levels and at different angles), along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.
The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, blockages, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and floors of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. A forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.
On all three lanes of the "Mannerheim Line" there were over 1,000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.
The space between the fortifications, as well as the foreground in front of the entire "Mannerheim Line" were literally covered with solid military engineering structures.
The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for every square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire barriers, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete gouges. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, all roads for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were arranged - funnels 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 mines were set for each linear kilometer. Forest blockages reached 250 m in depth.
D. Finnish War Plan:
Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the approach of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the line of the White Sea - Onega lake
E. Directions of hostilities and the command of the Finnish army:
1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).
2. To the north of it, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Kyakisalmi) - Sortavala - Laymola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.
3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later he was replaced by E. Heglund).
4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.
5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.
Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the active army of Finland.
Chief of Staff of the Headquarters - Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.
The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is General of the Swedish Army Ernst Linder.
II.Soviet army:
In the fighting on the entire 1500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, at the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.
The regular strength of the ground forces: 916 thousand people. They include: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal and engineering troops.
The ground forces were supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.
The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.
Thus, up to 1 million people of the personnel of the Red Army and the Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary replenishment during the war to replace the dead and wounded, over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:
11266 guns and mortars,
2998 tanks,
3253 combat aircraft.
A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:
1. Arctic:
14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three "D" type boats, seven "Shch" type boats, six "M" type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.
2. Karelia:
a) North and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).
Army Commander - Commander M.P. Dukhanov.
b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).
Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.
3. Karelian Isthmus:
7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).
Commander of the 7th Army - Commander of the 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.
The 7th Army was supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.
The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.
Nevertheless, the fortifications and the defense in depth of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not enough not only to break through them, but even to destroy the deep and extremely difficult fortified and, as a rule, absolutely mined forefield during the fighting.
As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they did not manage to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally intended, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.
Another factor hindering the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely severe winter of 1939/40, with its frosts down to 30-40 degrees.
The lack of experience in warfare in conditions of forests and deep snow cover, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (and not standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army's operations.
The course of hostilities
Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:
First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. fighting until the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line.
Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. combat operations to break through the "Mannerheim Line" proper.
In the first period, the most successful was the advance in the north and in Karelia.
1. The troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.
2. Troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses in North and Central Karelia, i.e. slightly, but still went beyond the state border. Further progress could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.
3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia went deep into enemy territory up to 80 km, but were also forced to suspend the offensive, since some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well acquainted with the area.
4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of hostilities:
5. Waging heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the "Mannerheim Line", which happened in different sectors of the offensive from 2 to 12 December. During the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terioki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.
During the same period, the Baltic Fleet took possession of the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, Soomeri.
In early December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and exit to the rear of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications.
Despite the crossing of the river and heavy losses in the battles on December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the "Mannerheim Line" on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army had reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to the huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended on virtually the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.
The Soviet command decided on a radical restructuring of military operations.
6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy's defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of a group of commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.
7. A restructuring of command and control and a change of command was carried out.
Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from the control of the Leningrad Military District and passed directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army.
Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (date of formation: January 7, 1940).
Front commander: commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko.
Chief of Staff of the Front: Commander of the 2nd rank I.V. Smorodinov.
Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.
Commander of the 7th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov (since December 26, 1939).
Commander of the 8th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern.
Commander of the 9th Army: Commander V.I. Chuikov.
Commander of the 13th Army: Commander V.D. Grendal (since March 2, 1940 - commander F.A. Parusinov).
Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.
Commander of the 15th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev (since February 12, 1940).
8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and reinforced:
a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 RGK artillery regiments, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 10 air regiments).
b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 RGK artillery regiments, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).
9. The main task during this period consisted in the active preparation by the troops of the theater of military operations for the assault on the "Mannerheim Line", as well as in the preparation by the command of the troops of the best conditions for the offensive.
To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the foreground, secretly clear mines for the foreground, make numerous passes in the rubble and wire fences before attacking directly the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" itself. Within a month, the Mannerheim Line system itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began by methodical daily artillery fire.
Only on the 43-kilometer sector, the 7th Army daily fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy.
The destruction of the front line and the depth of the enemy's defense was also caused by aviation. During the preparation for the assault, the bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and the fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.
10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (Budyonnovka, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflaps, sheepskin coats, felt boots. The front received 2,500 mobile insulated houses with stoves.
In the near rear, the troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.
As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft.
11. The front troops were tasked with breaking through the "Mannerheim Line", defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.
It began with a powerful two-hour artillery preparation at 0800, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 1000 and broke through the enemy defenses by the end of the day in a decisive sector and by February 14 wedged into the depth of the line by 7 km, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions 123 sd. (lieutenant colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire "Mannerheim Line". To develop success in the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.
12. The Finnish command pulled up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important knot of fortifications. But as a result of 3-day battles and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karhulsky knot of resistance, while the neighboring Khottinensky knot had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanjärvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves node, also went on the offensive.
Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, inner line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that one more such breakthrough - and the outcome of the war could be decided.
13. Commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General H.V. Esterman was suspended. On February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. was appointed to his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.
On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the enemy's rear, inner defense line, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.
14. The Finnish command expected that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and in the conditions of the coming spring it had a unique system of flooding the foredfield for 30 km, Finland would be able to drag out the war for at least a month and a half, which would enable England and France to deliver to Finland 150 thousandth expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. Lieutenant General K.L., Chief of the Main Staff of the Finnish Army, was appointed Commander of the Vyborg District. Ash, which testified to the confidence of the Finnish command in their forces and the seriousness of their intentions to hold back a long siege of the fortified city.
15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army advanced on Kexholm and st. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola,
Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to cross the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.
The offensive of the Soviet troops began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.
By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, the Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a northeasterly direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 23:00, and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.
16. At that time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, all hoping that Western assistance would come in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government that had entered into negotiations would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position made it necessary to wage war until the last minute and led to huge losses, both on the Soviet and Finnish sides.
Side losses*:
A. Losses of Soviet troops:
From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter
What was in the fortieth year
Killed in Finland on the ice.
Lying somehow clumsily
Childishly small body.
Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew off.
It seemed that the boy was not lying,
And still running
Yes, the ice held the floor ...
In the midst of a great war cruel,
From what - I will not apply my mind -
I feel sorry for that distant fate,
As if dead, alone
Like I'm lying
Frozen, small, dead,
In that war, not famous,
Forgotten, small, lying.
Alexander Tvardovsky
Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.
Of those killed - 65,384 people.
Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.
Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.
Prisoners - 5567 people.
Total: the total loss in the troops during the period of hostilities - 391.8 thousand people. or, rounded, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!
B. Losses of Finnish troops:
Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).
(The Finnish "Blue and White Book" of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)
Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.
Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war is 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.е. 20%, while Soviet losses are 40% of those involved in operations, or, in other words, 2 times higher in percentage terms.
Note:
* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and losses from 1990 to 1995. reduction of Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Apothecary in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while the data of the Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.
Baryshnikov V. N. From the Cool Peace to the Winter War: Finland's Eastern Policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state un-t. - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.
Winter war 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ros. acad. Sciences, Inst. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Resp. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehvilyainen. - 381s.
["Winter War" 1939-1940]: A selection of materials //Rodina. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons from a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- S. 29-31
Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Russia, Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999
Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999
Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: by doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541s. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Names. decree: p. 517 - 528.
Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. confrontation Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [per. from English. V. D. Kaidalova]. - M. : Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.
Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa : talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla:, 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: S. 109 - 184
Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.
Used materials from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Russia, Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999
Used materials from the book: Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999
Another old record of mine hit the top after 4 years. Of course, I would correct some statements of that time today. But, alas, there is absolutely no time.
gusev_a_v in the Soviet-Finnish war. Losses Ch.2
The Soviet-Finnish war and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through the minefields, in tight ranks and holding hands. Any Russian person who has recognized the incommensurability of losses, it turns out, must simultaneously admit that our grandfathers were idiots.
Again I will quote the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim:
« It happened that the Russians in the battles of early December marched with songs in dense rows - and even holding hands - into the minefields of the Finns, not paying attention to the explosions and the accurate fire of the defenders.
Do you represent these cretins?
After such statements, the loss figures named by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24923 people killed and died from wounds of the Finns. Russian, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.
Why pity these Russes?
Finnish soldier in a coffin...
Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book "Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940". with reference to Nikita Khrushchev, they give the following data:
"Out of a total of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR's losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment ... "
Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with "meat".
Finnish military cemetery...
About the reasons for the defeat, Mannerheim writes as follows:
"At the final stage of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower."
Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such meager losses, Finland began to lack manpower?
Something doesn't add up!
But let's see what other researchers write and write about the losses of the parties.
For example, Pykhalov in The Great Slandered War claims:
« Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded. The primary source of this figure is the translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff of Finland Helge Seppäl, published in the newspaper “Za rubezhom” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish edition of “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost in the “winter war” more than 23,000 people killed; over 43,000 people were wounded. During the bombing, including of merchant ships, 25,243 people were killed.
The last figure - 25,243 killed in the bombing - is in doubt. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to read the Finnish original of Seppälä's article.
Mannerheim, as you know, estimated the losses from the bombing:
"More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice as many were injured."
The largest numbers of Finnish losses are given by the Military History Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army in it amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official figures, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.
And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 captured
As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Losses. In the number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet, even those with whom relatives cut off contact in 1939-1940 are taken into account.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers ranked these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Red Army soldiers examine captured Boffors anti-tank guns
Who and how considered the Finnish losses is absolutely incomprehensible. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the strength of the Armed Forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war, Finland experienced a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even insignificant losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished ”Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to the calculation of Aritz, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 increased by 238 thousand people!!!
At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves up to the age of 45, which did not happen in any of the countries, not even in Germany.”
Funeral of Finnish skiers
What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. In Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses in the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
In total, 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish site http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died in the period 1939-1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not converge.
Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR claims that hot Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army casualties. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as shutskor, were not included in the general statistics of losses. And they had a lot of paramilitaries.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.
"Fighters" of the "Lotta" formations
Whatever the case, two explanations arise:
The first - if the Finnish data on their losses are correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they "raised their paws" almost without suffering losses.
The second - if we consider that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply underestimated their own losses on a large scale.
The Finnish war lasted 105 days. During this time, over a hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were injured or dangerously frostbite. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor, and whether the losses were unjustified.
look back
It is impossible to understand the causes of that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Prior to gaining independence, the "Land of a Thousand Lakes" never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.
The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860, its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known wars - until 1901, the Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality grows from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.
After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the "whites" won; chasing the "reds", the hot guys crossed the old border, the First Soviet-Finnish War (1918-1920) began. Bloodless Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, preferred to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: according to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.
How historically fair such a verdict turned out to be is difficult to say; The Vyborg province that fell to Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the times of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps, among other things, as a token of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.
The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.
Geography is judgment
Look at the map. The year is 1939, Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea lanes will be blocked by another member of the Axis, Japan.
Thus, the only potentially protected channel for exports, through which the Soviet Union receives the gold so necessary to complete the industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, is the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round not freezing harbors of the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was being laid, even under the tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on different sides barricade). Moreover, at a distance of three days from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.
But that's another half of the geographical troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which has concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is located within a radius of one march-throw of a potential enemy. A metropolis, on the streets of which an enemy shell has never fallen before, can be fired from heavy guns from the very first day of a probable war. The ships of the Baltic Fleet are deprived of their only base. And no, up to the Neva itself, natural defensive lines.
friend of your enemy
Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in a joke. But three quarters of a century ago, when forced national building continued in Suomi on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, you would not be in the mood for jokes.
In 1918, Karl-Gustav-Emil Mannerheim pronounces the well-known "sword oath", publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called while serving in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.
Of course, Finland was not going to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do it alone. The ties of the young state with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of their native Scandinavia. In 1918, when intense discussions were going on in the country that had just gained independence about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, the brother-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm, Prince Friedrich-Karl of Hesse, was declared the King of Finland; for various reasons, nothing came of the Suom monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guards” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, moreover, that the total number of local "reds" and "whites", significantly inferior to the Germans in combat qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).
Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. The ships of the Kriegsmarine freely entered the Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the "Country of a Thousand Lakes" were modernized to receive heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project ... It should be said that subsequently Germany already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) really used the territory and water area of Suomi for laying mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombing Leningrad.
Yes, at that moment the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of the 1939 model did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The assets include the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army by Poland during the Western campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful reflection of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were rated very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are not comparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, was not going to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. The field marshal had enough of one Karelia.
Negotiation
Stalin was anything but a fool. If in order to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, it should be so. Another issue is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved by military means alone. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of the 39th, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guards” - not out of revenge for the old defeat, no, in politics, following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a fight with a real enemy, small in number, but drilled by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us ...
But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a man of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki have been neither shaky nor fluctuating; in the fall of the 39th they were transferred to Moscow. Instead of the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of "Western partners"), and on November 13 they departed for home. Two weeks left before the Winter War.
On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; according to the Soviet side, about a dozen fighters and commanders were killed and wounded. Was the Mainil incident a deliberate provocation (which is evidenced, for example, by the absence of a list of names of the victims), or did one of the thousands of armed people who stood tensely for long days opposite the same armed enemy finally lose their nerve - in any case , this incident served as a pretext for the outbreak of hostilities.
The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible "Mannerheim Line", and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but they did not like to remember all this for a long time. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was heavy.
1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, known in Finland as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.
Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a large area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.
The Finnish government believed that the acceptance of Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state, lead to the loss of neutrality by Finland and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.
The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) was only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.
The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Mainil incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Allegedly, three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the government of Finland and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.
The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was not feasible, because then the Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.
On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was presented with a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the troops of the Leningrad Front received an order to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyösti Kallio declared war on the USSR.
During the "perestroika" several versions of the Mainilsky incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret NKVD unit. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary evidence.
From the very beginning of the war, the advantage in forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1476 tanks and about 1200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.
The grouping of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The rest of the troops covered separate areas from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.
The main line of defense of Finland was the "Mannerheim Line" - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of the Mannerheim line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.
"Mannerheim Line" had a frontal width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers away from the main one, and the rear (Vyborg) line of defense. Over two thousand long-term firing structures (DOS) and wood-earth firing structures (DZOS) were erected, which were combined into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 item). The main line of defense consisted of 25 nodes of resistance, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. The strongholds were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). Between the strongholds and nodes of resistance were positions for field troops. The strongholds and positions of the field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Only in the security zone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.
All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.
On November 30, 1939, after a long artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and launched an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, they overcame the zone of operational obstacles in separate directions and reached the main strip of the Mannerheim Line. For more than two weeks, unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued.
At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.
The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. Troops have been replenished. As a result, the Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. The Finnish side by the beginning of February 1940 had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.
On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.
Having broken through two lines of defense, on February 28, Soviet troops reached the third. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to start a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg grouping of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, cut the highway to Helsinki.
The fall of the "Mannerheim Line" and the defeat of the main grouping of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult position. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace.
On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.
In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the sea area around it were leased by the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.
As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the West.
The losses of the Soviet troops in the war amounted to: irretrievable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops - about 23 thousand people, sanitary - over 43 thousand people.
(Additional
