The staggering number of human lives lost during the two Chechen wars was made public on Monday by the head of the State Council of Chechnya, Taus Dzhabrailov - "150-160 thousand people." This includes the loss of federal military personnel, and killed militants, and civil servants, and civilians.

The data I mentioned was made by adding information about all the losses in the republic over the past 15 years, Taus Dzhabrailov, head of the Chechen State Council, told Izvestia. - We received information from all participants: the military, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, from the regions. For the Ichkerian period, our data are based on official documents that I received from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the CRI, as an employee of the press service of the Mufti of the Republic. And the losses at that time were no less than now or during the counter-terrorist operation.

Dzhabrailov did not cite separate figures for the losses of federal servicemen and killed militants, but noted that 30-40 thousand ethnic Chechens were killed in the two Chechen campaigns. The remaining victims are "representatives of different nations." Today in the republic, according to the head of the State Council, there are up to a thousand active militants, including about 100-150 foreign mercenaries. No one can say how close these data are to reality: such estimates differ greatly. Two years ago, in July-August 2003, five federal and Chechen government officials cited data on the number of militants, which ranged from one to three thousand people.

The figures named by Dzhabrailov yesterday also raised doubts among experts.

Last week, the Russian Ministry of Defense posted on its official website new data on losses during the second Chechen campaign - since September 1999, 3,459 servicemen of the Ministry of Defense have died and 32 people have gone missing. Losses of internal troops are obviously much higher, although neither the press service of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs nor the press service of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs could give the corresponding figure yesterday, referring to the fact that these data "need to be clarified." Previously, such data had only been made public once: in May 2001, the office of presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky reported that from October 1, 1999 to May 16, 2001, 3,096 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs died in Chechnya. Nevertheless, the information about the losses of the feds differs from the data of the Chechen politician by two orders of magnitude.

“Initially, it was supposed to draw up lists of those who died during the two Chechen campaigns, but it was not carried out,” Georgy Kunadze, deputy head of the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, told Izvestia. “In general, according to estimates by human rights organizations, the number of dead civilians and military personnel is 90 thousand people. Where Dzhabrailov got such data is not clear."

Aleksey Malashenko, an expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center, sees a national-political intrigue in the Chechen leader's statement:

Chechens, and especially Chechen politicians, want to show maximum losses - they, as a nation that has suffered, overestimate them. The direct losses in Chechnya are, of course, enormous: most often the figure is 40,000 people, but they also say 60,000, they say 70, and more than 150 is, as a rule, a figure that comes from the Chechens themselves. Of course, in addition to direct losses, there are also indirect ones: unborn children and so on. But direct losses are much less than 160,000.

Experts suggested that the data cited by Dzhabrailov may be an element of Grozny's "psychological pressure" on the Kremlin - the Chechen leaders are seeking to conclude an agreement with the federal center on the delimitation of powers, including granting the republic some exceptional benefits (including the status of a special economic zone), and Moscow with the signing agreement is not rushed.

"This document is being played with incomprehensibly to me. Dozens of times it was ready for signing, but was constantly postponed," Dzhabrailov said. In July of this year. Chechen President Alu Alkhanov said that the new Chechen parliament would sign the treaty on behalf of the republic, so "we have time."

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for November of this year, and the election campaign has actually begun. According to Iosif Diskin, co-chairman of the National Strategy Council, Dzhabrailov's loud statements fit perfectly into it.

The fact that the death toll is much lower has long been known," Diskin told Izvestiya. - Dzhabrailov's statement is connected with the upcoming elections to the Chechen parliament, he wants to show that he cares more about his compatriots and will be able to protect their interests both in parliament and at a higher level. Pressure on the Kremlin will be the next stage - those who get into parliament will be its active participants. But for the time being, it is premature to "push" because not all the possibilities to reach an agreement with Moscow have been exhausted.

The Kremlin also agrees with this - "the agreement will be signed in due time," sources who wished to remain anonymous told Izvestia.

Life and death statistics

In February-March 1944, 496.5 thousand people were deported from Checheno-Ingushetia. Of these, Chechens - 478 thousand.

The population of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, according to the last Soviet census (1988), was 1 million 260 thousand. In the mid-90s, an estimated 600 thousand people lived in Chechnya (statistical information stopped coming in 1993), and according to the "Ichkerian" census of 1997, - 981 thousand people.

According to the results of the population census in 2002, Roskomstat presented a figure that surprised experts: 1 million 88 thousand inhabitants were found in Chechnya. Earlier, the State Statistics Committee and other sources called the figure from 350 to 600 thousand. However, soon after the census, the then Minister for Chechen Affairs, Vladimir Yelagin, doubted the results of the census - he believed that there were 850,000 inhabitants in Chechnya. According to the minister, during the war years more than 200,000 people left the republic (not counting 68,000 refugees in the Ingush camps).

The total number of victims of terrorist acts directly related to Chechnya - in Budyonnovsk, Kizlyar, Mozdok, Moscow, Beslan, Buynaksk, Volgodonsk, Essentuki, Kaspiysk - is more than 800 people (1995-2004). Of these, more than 300 people died in Beslan, and about 150 people died on the Nord-Ost. The first terrorist attack - in Budyonnovsk - claimed the lives of 130 people.

War of Independence in Algeria (1954-1962)

The loss of the French army - almost 18 thousand killed and 65 thousand wounded. Losses among European colonists - more than 10 thousand people (including 3 thousand killed). Partisan losses - 141 thousand. As for the losses among the Algerian civilian population, the numbers here vary greatly - from 30 thousand to a million people.

Vietnam War (1946-1954; 1965-1975)

The losses of the French army during the first Vietnam War amounted to 92,707 people, the Vietnamese resistance lost more than half a million fighters, about 250 thousand Vietnamese civilians died.

The losses of the American armed forces during the second Vietnam War - 58,226 were killed or missing, 153,303 troops were injured.

During these years, about 1.1 million partisans and soldiers of North Vietnam died. And almost two million civilians - in the North and South.

War of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Losses of Soviet troops - 15 thousand killed, more than 53 thousand wounded. The losses of the Afghan side are about 90 thousand dead (mujahideen plus government troops) and 90 thousand wounded.

US and NATO operation in Afghanistan (2001 - present)

Data on the dead civilians vary greatly. By some estimates, the US invasion of Afghanistan cost the lives of between 20,000 and 49,600 Afghans. But there are also completely different figures - according to American sources: from 1067 to 1201 people.

US invasion of Iraq (2003 - present)

Losses of the US armed forces - 1847 dead, 13,657 wounded.

Losses among the civilian population - from 23,209 to 26,264. According to other sources, the death toll may exceed 100 thousand people.

What is Dzhabrailov driving towards?

The head of the State Council of Chechnya, Taus Dzhabrailov, speaking on Monday at a press conference in INTERFAX, constantly returned to the theme of the forthcoming November elections to the republic's parliament. In particular, he ruled out the possibility of nominating the current First Deputy Prime Minister of the Chechen government, Ramzan Kadyrov, to the future Chechen parliament. "Ramzan Kadyrov has repeatedly stated that he does not make any political ambitions or demands," the head of the State Council recalled.

Dzhabrailov also touched upon the problem of unemployment in Chechnya and its consequences. "Today, 80% of the total working-age population is unemployed," he said. "This is a common problem that needs to be dealt with." The politician recalled that "there are now 467,655 unemployed in the republic" - a huge source of social instability and replenishment of the ranks of militants: "it is not difficult to recruit several hundred people from there."

According to Dzhabrailov, thanks to the efforts of the administration of the republic, 600-700 militants laid down their arms and returned to peaceful life in the last year alone. He rejected the suggestion that most of the former militants go to work in the power structures of Chechnya. "Basically, they are returning to civilian peaceful life. These people need to be given jobs, jobs, a serious investment program is needed," Dzhabrailov said, noting that the funds earmarked for the social sphere in Chechnya are not enough.

On August 31, 1996, the Khasavyurt Accords were signed, ending the First Chechen War. Journalist Olesya Yemelyanova found the participants in the First Chechen campaign and talked to them about the war, their life after the war, Akhmat Kadyrov and much more.

Dmitry Belousov, St. Petersburg, senior warrant officer of OMON

In Chechnya, there was always a feeling: “What am I doing here? Why is all this necessary? ”, But there was no other work in the 90s. My wife was the first to say to me after the first business trip: “Either me, or the war.” Where will I go? We tried not to get out of business trips, at least there we paid our salaries on time - 314 thousand. There were benefits, "combat" paid - it was a penny, I don’t remember exactly how much. And they gave me a bottle of vodka, it was sickening without it, in such situations you don’t get drunk from it, but it helped to cope with stress. I fought for a paycheck. The family is at home, it was necessary to feed it with something. I did not know any background of the conflict, I did not read anything.
Young conscripts had to be slowly soldered with alcohol. They are only after training, it is easier for them to die than to fight. Eyes run wide, heads are pulled out, they do not understand anything. They will see the blood, they will see the dead - they cannot sleep.
Murder is unnatural for a person, although he gets used to everything. When the head does not think, the body does everything on autopilot. Fighting Chechens was not as scary as fighting Arab mercenaries. They are much more dangerous, they know how to fight very well.

We were prepared for the assault on Grozny for about a week. We - 80 riot police - were supposed to storm the village of Katayama. Later we learned that there were 240 militants there. Our tasks included reconnaissance in force, and then the internal troops were supposed to replace us. But nothing happened. Ours also hit us. There was no connection. We have our own police radio, tankers have their own wave, helicopter pilots have their own. We pass the line, artillery strikes, aircraft strikes. The Chechens got scared, they thought they were some kind of fools. According to rumors, the Novosibirsk OMON was originally supposed to storm Katayama, but their commander refused. Therefore, we were thrown from the reserve to storm.
Among the Chechens, I had friends in the opposition areas. In Shali, for example, in Urus-Martan.
After the hostilities, someone drank himself, someone ended up in a madhouse - some were taken directly from Chechnya to a psychiatric hospital. There was no adaptation. The wife left immediately. I can't remember a good one. Sometimes it seems that it is better to erase all this from memory in order to live on and move forward. And sometimes you want to speak up.
Benefits seem to be, but everything is only on paper. There are no levers on how to get them. I still live in the city, it’s easier for me, but it’s impossible for rural residents. There are arms and legs - and that's good. The main trouble is that you are counting on the state, which promises you everything, and then it turns out that no one needs you. I felt like a hero, received the Order of Courage. It was my pride. Now I look at everything differently.
If I were now offered to go to war, I would probably go. It's easier there. There is an enemy and there is a friend, black and white - you stop seeing shades. And in a peaceful life, you need to twist and bend. It's tiresome. When Ukraine began, I wanted to go, but my current wife dissuaded me.

Vladimir Bykov, Moscow, infantry sergeant

When I got to Chechnya, I was 20 years old. It was a conscious choice, I applied to the military registration and enlistment office and in May 1996 I left as a contract soldier. Before that, I studied at a military school for two years, at school I was engaged in bullet shooting.
In Mozdok we were loaded onto a Mi-26 helicopter. There was a feeling that you see footage from an American movie. When we arrived in Khankala, the fighters, who had already served for some time, offered me a drink. They gave me a glass of water. I took a sip, and my first thought was: “Where would I throw it out?”. The taste of "military water" with bleach and pantocide is a kind of point of no return and understanding that there is no turning back.
I didn't feel like a hero, and I don't. To become a hero in a war, one must either die, or commit an act that has become public knowledge, or be close to the commander. And commanders, as a rule, are far away.
My goal in the war was minimal casualties. I didn't fight for the Reds or the Whites, I fought for my guys. In war there is a reassessment of values, you begin to look at life differently.
The feeling of fear begins to disappear after about a month, and this is very bad, indifference to everything appears. Each of them came out in their own way. Some smoked, some drank. I wrote letters. Described mountains, weather, local people and their customs. Then I tore these letters. Sending was still not possible.

Psychologically, it was difficult, because it is often not clear whether you are a friend or an enemy. It seems that during the day a person calmly goes to work, and at night he comes out with a machine gun and fires at roadblocks. During the day you are on good terms with him, and in the evening he shoots you.
For ourselves, we divided the Chechens into lowland and mountainous. Plain more intelligent people, more integrated into our society. And those who live in the mountains have a completely different mentality, a woman is nobody for them. You ask the lady for documents for verification - and this can be perceived as a personal insult to her husband. We came across women from mountain villages who didn't even have passports.
Once, at the checkpoint at the intersection with Serzhen-Yurt, we stopped the car. From it came a man who had a yellow ID card in English and Arabic. It turned out to be Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov. We talked quite peacefully on everyday topics. He asked if there was anything he could do to help. We then had difficulty with food, there was no bread. Then he brought two trays of loaves to us at the checkpoint. They wanted to give him money, but he did not take it.
I think that we could end the war in such a way that there would be no second Chechen war. It was necessary to go to the end, and not conclude a peace agreement on shameful terms. Many soldiers and officers then felt that the state had betrayed them.
When I returned home, I threw myself into my studies. I studied at one institute, at the same time at another, and also worked to keep my brain occupied. Then he defended his PhD thesis.
When I was a student, I was sent to a course in psychosocial care for survivors of hot spots organized by a Dutch university. I then thought that Holland had not been at war with anyone lately. But I was told that Holland participated in the Indonesian war in the late 40s - as many as two thousand people. I suggested that they show a video cassette from Chechnya as educational material. But their psychologists turned out to be mentally unprepared and asked not to show the recording to the audience.

Andrey Amosov, St. Petersburg, SOBR major

That I would be an officer, I knew from the third or fourth grade. My dad is a policeman, now retired, my grandfather is an officer, my brother is also an officer, my great-grandfather died in the Finnish War. At the genetic level, this has borne fruit. At school, I went in for sports, then there was the army, a special forces group. I always had a desire to give back to my homeland, and when I was offered to go to a special rapid reaction unit, I agreed. There was no doubt whether to go or not, I took an oath. During the military service, I was in Ingushetia, it was clear to me what kind of mentality awaits me. I understood where I was going.
When you go to SOBR, it's stupid not to think that you can lose your life. But my choice was conscious. I am ready to give my life for my country and for my friends. What are the doubts? Politics should be dealt with by politicians, and combat structures should follow orders. I believe that the entry of troops into Chechnya both under Yeltsin and under Putin was correct so that the radical theme would not spread further into Russia.
For me, the Chechens have never been enemies. My first friend in the technical school was a Chechen, his name was Khamzat. In Chechnya, we gave them rice and buckwheat, we had good food, but they were in need.
We worked on the leaders of gangs. We captured one of them with a fight at four o'clock in the morning and destroyed it. For this I received the medal "For Courage".

On special assignments, we acted in a coordinated manner, as a single team. Tasks were set different, sometimes difficult. And it's not just combat missions. It was necessary to survive in the mountains, to freeze, to sleep in turns near the potbelly stove and to warm each other with hugs when there was no firewood. All boys are heroes to me. The team helped to overcome fear when the militants were 50 meters away and shouted "Surrender!". When I remember Chechnya, I imagine the faces of my friends more, as we joked, our unity. The humor was specific, on the verge of sarcasm. I think I underestimated it before.
It was easier for us to adapt, because we worked in the same unit and went on business trips together. Time passed, and we ourselves expressed a desire to go to the North Caucasus again. The physical factor worked. The feeling of fear that adrenaline gives had a strong influence. I regarded combat missions as both a duty and a rest.
It would be interesting to look at modern Grozny. When I saw him, he looked like Stalingrad. Now the war is periodically dreaming, there are disturbing dreams.

Alexander Podskrebaev, Moscow, GRU special forces sergeant

I ended up in Chechnya in 1996. We did not have a single conscript, only officers and contractors. I went because the homeland should be defended by adults, and not by young puppies. We didn’t have travel allowances in the battalion, only combat ones, we received 100 dollars a month. I did not go for money, but to fight for my country. “If the homeland is in danger, then everyone should go to the front,” Vysotsky also sang.
The war in Chechnya did not appear out of the blue, it is Yeltsin's fault. He armed Dudayev himself - when our units were withdrawn from there, all the warehouses of the North Caucasian Military District were left to him. I talked with ordinary Chechens, they saw this war in the coffin. They lived normally, life suited everyone. Not the Chechens started the war and not Dudayev, but Yeltsin. One solid base.
Chechens fought some for money, some for their homeland. They had their own truth. I didn't feel like they were absolute evil. But there is no truth in war.
In war, you are obliged to follow orders, there is no getting around, even criminal orders. After you have the right to appeal them, but first you must comply. And we carried out criminal orders. That's when, for example, the Maykop brigade was brought into Grozny on New Year's Eve. The scouts knew that this could not be done, but the order was from above. How many boys were driven to death. It was betrayal in its purest form.

Take, for example, the cash-in-transit KamAZ with money, which was standing near the headquarters of the 205th brigade when the Khasavyurt agreements were signed. Bearded guys came and loaded bags of money. The FSB members allegedly gave money to the militants for the restoration of Chechnya. And we didn’t get paid, but Yeltsin gave us Zippo lighters.
For me, the real heroes are Budanov and Shamanov. My chief of staff is a hero. While in Chechnya, he managed to write a scientific work on the rupture of an artillery barrel. This is a man due to whom the power of Russian weapons will become stronger. The Chechens also had heroism. They were characterized by both fearlessness and self-sacrifice. They defended their land, they were told that they were attacked.
I believe that the emergence of post-traumatic syndrome is highly dependent on the attitude of society. If they say “Yes, you are a killer!” in your eyes all the time, it can injure someone. There were no syndromes in the Great Patriotic War, because the homeland of the heroes met.
It is necessary to talk about the war from a certain angle so that people do not engage in nonsense. There will still be peace, only part of the people will be killed. And not the worst part. There is no sense from this.

Alexander Chernov, Moscow, retired colonel, internal troops

In Chechnya, I worked as the head of a computer center. We left on July 25, 1995. There were four of us: I, as the head of the computer center, and three of my employees. We flew to Mozdok, got off the plane. The first impression is wild heat. We were taken by turntable to Khankala. By tradition, in all hot spots, the first day is non-working. I brought with me two liter bottles of White Eagle vodka, two loaves of Finnish sausage. The men put out Kizlyar cognac and sturgeon.
The camp of internal troops in Khankala was a quadrangle surrounded by barbed wire. A rail hung at the entrance in case of artillery raids to raise the alarm. The four of us lived in a trailer. It was quite convenient, we even had a refrigerator. The freezer was full of water bottles because the heat was unbearable.
Our computer center was engaged in the collection and processing of all information, primarily operational. Previously, all information was transmitted via ZAS (classifying communications equipment). And six months before Chechnya, we had a device called RAMS - I don’t know how it stands for. This device made it possible to connect a computer to ZAS, and we could transmit secret information to Moscow. In addition to internal work such as all sorts of information, twice a day - at 6 am and 12 midnight - we sent an operational report to Moscow. Despite the fact that the volume of files was small, the connection was sometimes bad, and the process dragged on for a long time.
We had a video camera and we filmed everything. The most important filming is the negotiations between Romanov (deputy minister of internal affairs of Russia, commander of internal troops Anatoly Romanov) and Maskhadov (one of the separatist leaders Aslan Maskhadov). There were two operators at the talks: from their side and from our side. The secretaries took the cassette from us, and I do not know its further fate. Or, for example, a new howitzer appeared. Romanov told us: "Go and film how it works." Our cameraman also filmed how the heads of three foreign journalists were found. We sent the film to Moscow, where it was processed and shown on television.

May 1996, the airfield of the military base in Khankala

The war was very unprepared. Drunken Grachev and Yegorov sent tankers to Grozny on New Year's Eve, and they were all burned there. Sending tanks to the city is not quite the right decision. And the staff was not prepared. It got to the point that the Marines were removed from the Far East and thrown there. People should be run in, and then the boys were almost immediately thrown into battle from training. Losses could have been avoided, in the second campaign they were an order of magnitude smaller. The truce gave a little respite.
I am sure that the first Chechen one could have been avoided. I believe that the main culprits of this war are Yeltsin, Grachev and Yegorov, they unleashed it. If Yeltsin had appointed Dudayev as Deputy Minister of the Interior, entrusted him with the North Caucasus, he would have put things in order there. The civilian population suffered from the militants. But when we bombed their villages, they rose up against us. Intelligence in the first Chechen worked very poorly. There were no agents, they lost all agents. Whether there were militants in the destroyed villages or not, it is impossible to say for sure.
My friend, a military officer, his entire chest in orders, took off his shoulder straps and refused to go to Chechnya. Said it was the wrong war. He even refused to issue a pension. Proud.
My sores worsened in Chechnya. It got to the point where I couldn't work on the computer. Another such mode of operation was that he slept only four hours, plus a glass of cognac at night to fall asleep.

Ruslan Savitsky, St. Petersburg, Private of Internal Troops

In December 1995, I arrived in Chechnya from the Perm region, where I had training in an operational battalion. We studied for six months and went to Grozny by train. We all wrote petitions to be sent to the war zone, not to be forced. If there is only one child in the family, then in general he could easily refuse.
We were lucky with the staff. They were young guys, only two or three years older than us. They always ran ahead of us, they felt responsible. Of the entire battalion, we had only one officer with combat experience who had gone through Afghanistan. Only riot police directly participated in the cleansings, we, as a rule, held the perimeter.
In Grozny, we lived in a school for half a year. Part of it was occupied by the OMON unit, about two floors - by us. Cars were parked around, the windows were covered with bricks. In the classroom where we lived, there were potbelly stoves, stoked with firewood. Bathed once a month, lived with lice. It was undesirable to go beyond the perimeter. I was taken out of there earlier than the others for two weeks for disciplinary violations.
Hanging out at school was boring, although the food was normal. Over time, out of boredom, we began to drink. There were no shops, we bought vodka from Chechens. It was necessary to go beyond the perimeter, walk about a kilometer around the city, come to an ordinary private house and say that alcohol was needed. There was a high probability that you would not return. I went unarmed. For one machine gun alone, they could kill.

Destroyed Grozny, 1995

Local banditry is a strange thing. It seems like a normal person during the day, but in the evening he dug up a machine gun and went to shoot. In the morning I buried the weapon - and again normal.
The first contact with death was when our sniper was killed. He fired back, he wanted to take the weapon from the dead, he stepped on the stretch and blew himself up. In my opinion, this is a complete lack of brains. I had no sense of the value of my own life. I was not afraid of death, I was afraid of stupidity. There were a lot of idiots around.
When I returned, I went to work in the police, but I did not have a secondary education. I passed the exams externally and came again, but they gave me a ride again, because I got tuberculosis in Chechnya. Also because I drank a lot. I can’t say that the army is to blame for my alcoholism. Alcohol in my life and before it was present. When the second Chechen war began, I wanted to go. I came to the military registration and enlistment office, they gave me a bunch of documents, it discouraged my desire a little. Then another conviction for some garbage appeared, and my service in the army was covered. I wanted courage and buzz, but it did not work out.

Daniil Gvozdev, Helsinki, special forces

I ended up in Chechnya on a conscription. When the time came to go to the army, I asked my coach to arrange me in good troops - we had a special-purpose company in Petrozavodsk. But at the assembly point, my surname sounded with those who go to Sertolovo to become grenade launchers. It turned out that the day before, my coach had left for Chechnya as part of a combined SOBR detachment. I, along with the whole “herd”, got up, went to the train, spent three months in the training unit. Nearby was a part of the paratroopers in Pesochnoye, he repeatedly wrote applications there to be accepted, he came. Then I realized that everything was useless, I passed the exams for the radio operator of the command and staff vehicle of the 142nd. At night, our captain and officers got us up. One walked with tears, said how he respects and loves all of us, the second tried to warn. They said we were all leaving tomorrow. The next night it was so interesting to look at this officer, I did not understand why he shed tears in front of us, he was less than I am now. He cried: “Guys, I will worry about you so much!” One of the guys said to him: "So get ready and go with us."
We flew to Vladikavkaz via Mozdok. For three months we had active studies, they gave me the 159th radio station behind my back. Then they sent me to Chechnya. I stayed there for nine months, I was the only signalman in our company who more or less understood something in communication. Six months later, I managed to knock out an assistant - a guy from Stavropol, who did not understand anything, but smoked a lot, and for him Chechnya was a paradise in general.
We performed different tasks there. Of the simple ones, they can dig up oil there with a shovel and they put such devices: a barrel, gas or diesel heaters under it, they drive the oil to a state where gasoline is obtained at the end. They sell gasoline. They drove huge convoys with trucks. ISIS, banned in Russia, is doing the same in Syria. Some won't come to an agreement, they hand over their own - and their barrels burn, and some calmly does what is needed. There was also constant work - we guarded the entire leadership of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, we guarded Shamanov. Well, reconnaissance missions.
We had a task to capture a militant, some language. We went out into the night to search on the outskirts of the village, saw that cars were coming there, pouring gasoline. We noticed one comrade there, he constantly walked around, changed the heating under the barrels, he has a machine gun, well, if a machine gun means a militant. He had a bottle; The task of capturing the language has gone by the wayside, you must first capture vodka. They crawled through, found a bottle, and there was water! This made us angry, we took him prisoner. This guy, a militant, so thin, after interrogation in the intelligence department, was sent back to us. He said that he used to do Greco-Roman wrestling and did a handstand with a broken rib, I respected him greatly for this. He turned out to be the field commander's cousin, so he was exchanged for two of our soldiers. You should have seen these soldiers: 18-year-old guys, I don’t know, the psyche is clearly broken. We wrote this guy on a green handkerchief: "Nothing personal, we do not want war."
He asks, "Why didn't you kill me?" We explained that we were wondering what he was drinking. And he said that they had one Russian left in the village, they didn’t touch her, because she was a sorceress, everyone went to her. Two months ago, she gave him a bottle of water and said: "You can be killed, drink this water and stay alive."

We were constantly located in Khankala, and worked everywhere. The last we had was a demobilization chord, they released Bamut. Have you seen Nevzorov's film "Mad Company"? So we went along with them, we were on the one hand along the pass, they were on the other. They had one conscript in the company and it was he who was killed, and all the contract soldiers are alive. Once I look through binoculars, and there are some bearded people running around. The commander says: "Let's give them a couple of cucumbers." They asked me on the radio station, they tell me the coordinates, I look - they ran in, waving their hands. Then they show a white whale - what they wore under camouflage. And we realized that it was ours. It turned out that their batteries did not work for transmission and he could not transmit, but he heard me, so they began to wave.
You don't remember anything in combat. Someone says: “When I saw the eyes of this man ...” But I don’t remember this. The battle has passed, I see that everything is fine, everyone is alive. There was a situation when we got into the ring and caused fire on ourselves, it turns out that if I lie down, there is no connection, and I need to correct so that they don’t hit us. I wake up. The guys shout: “Good! Lie down." And I understand that if there is no connection, they will cover their own.
Who came up with the idea of ​​giving children weapons at the age of 18, giving them the right to kill? If they gave it, then make sure that when people return, they will be heroes, and now Kadyrov's bridges. I understand that they want to reconcile the two nations, everything will be erased in a few generations, but how can these generations live?
When I returned, it was the dashing nineties, and almost all my friends were busy with something illegal. I came under investigation, a criminal record… At some point, when my head began to move away from the military fog, I waved my hand at this romance. With the guys veterans opened a public organization to support war veterans. We work, we help ourselves, others. I also paint icons.

\"Through the Chechen meat grinder, which was not even given the status of a war, despite the recognition of the ongoing hostilities, a huge number of people have passed in recent years. The "attraction" called "war" is, first of all, money. From various budgets, only payment of the so-called "fighting money", colossal sums were spent over the years. But the money was "written out", but the recipients never reached. A huge amount of budget money was "stuck". And they continue to "spin" in favor of "financial interceptors" until now providing "financial happiness" to some at the expense of others. To whom is war, and to whom - mother is dear. To someone, letters painted with bronze paint on the common monument of the dead, to someone a beggarly handout in the form of "monetized benefits", and to someone new "cottage palace" and a comfortable life until the end of days.

War calls for work

After the explosions in Moscow in 1999, the indicator of people's hatred went off scale. The country wanted war. And she was desired by many. From an economic point of view, war is a profitable enterprise. And like any business, you need an initial investment. The people were recruited with money. 1,000 - 1,300 rubles a day "combat", and queues stretched to the military registration and enlistment offices. Changes have also taken place in the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. From combat units such as municipal police and private security forces, the people fled to units that are traveling on business trips to Chechnya. Who ran, who was recruited.

Personnel officers of the same riot police compensated for the shortage of personnel for beggarly salaries by the guys who were interested in getting rich soon, going to get a job at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They were “taken away” directly from the corridors of military medical commissions, where young people were tested for fitness for work. He came with a referral from the teaching staff regiment, left with a successfully passed medical examination to work in the riot police. Recruiters-personnel officers of the OMON were on duty in the buildings of the VVK daily. It was not difficult to find people for the war. The main "hook" is money.

The country needs heroes

In the morning, near the OMON building, recently arrived from Chechnya, the fighters demonstrate to each other the purchased used foreign cars. Colleagues from ordinary departments are walking past to work, thinking how to turn out the pocket of which alcoholic at the post today in order to buy home at least a pack of pasta. Contrasting. Think about it.

And if earlier, in order to get into the riot police, it was necessary to work for at least 3 years in the bodies, go through a special commission, and an unofficial “run-in” in sparring with the healthiest fighters, then by 2001, the riot police began to “row” immediately after the army. The people reached for the "long fighting ruble." And the country just needed "heroes". And there was no shortage of them by the beginning of the second Chechen one.

Pinpoint detentions

Until 2000, the same riot police received 20,000 travel allowances "immediately" and about 60,000 on arrival - "combat" ones for 3 months in Chechnya. In mid-2000, one of the “financially responsible” comrades “made a mistake” and the policemen were not paid extra about 20 thousand for a business trip. The fighters were explained this way: “the money hasn’t arrived, it’s being delayed.” The “mistake” was subsequently very liked by the “financially responsible” and “delays” became regular.

Moreover, the capital's riot police were "detained" much less than their regional counterparts. Perhaps because they were serving in Khankala, guarding just those very “detainers”.

The arrears began to increase. But selectively. No one withheld money from the officers at the headquarters of the group in Khankala. The former chief of staff of one OMON, who was on a business trip to Khankala from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, told his ex-colleagues that they had no problems with non-payment of combat.

Deceleration of disturbances

It can be concluded that the Ministry of Internal Affairs received budgetary money. But where did they hang out?
The mechanism in those years was as follows. The detachment that arrived to serve was provided with travel allowances from the budget of its Internal Affairs Directorate (after receipts from the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Further, on a monthly basis, the personnel service of the seconded unit submitted to the headquarters of the group in Khankala combat operations logs, according to which each soldier, depending on the position and rank, was assigned combat.

These magazines were signed in Khankala, and from there data on the amounts were received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These amounts were distributed among the budgets of the regional ATCs.

Upon arrival, the "Chechens" received combat in the accounting departments of their units.
Money could “hang” in this chain in Moscow, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or in the regional Department of Internal Affairs. But in view of the subsequent powerful confrontation when suing money from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, regional ATCs can be discarded. By 2001, direct commands "from above" about "slowing down disturbances" in the regions were already open.

Special operation "Cash out"

By May 2001, the abolition of "daily combat" was announced. In connection with the end of hostilities. As in that joke, when, during the shelling of a column of paratroopers by militants, an ensign crawls out of the BMD and yells: “Tell the Czechs, they announced on TV:“ we have already won the war!

Instead of money for every day they spent in Chechnya, the fighters were told that combat would now be awarded only for participation in special operations. Special operations are: sweeps, ambushes, secrets, protection of important people, etc. Everything that the units were doing on a daily basis. As for the conscripts, their combat soldiers have practically disappeared altogether.

For contract soldiers and the same riot police, it was like this: every month personnel officers come from Khankala and announce: so many days have been “closed” to us in a month. It could be from 10 to 20 days a month, which had to pay, on average, about 1,300 rubles a day for sergeants. Why so many - no one knew. They could submit data on 20 days of cleansing, approved by the commandant’s office, which subordinated the unit, and receive “closure” only for 10.

Then the detachment comes home, they say: “guys, the money has not arrived.” But! The amounts were approved in the DB accounting logs, the data was sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and confirmation of the "cashing out" of the sent requests was received. Where's the money, Zin?

Command - block

Spending half a year a year "in the south" (as the riot police put it) and getting money for only a month and a half of them is "unpleasant." Even though they paid money. The detachment arrived - get 8 thousand, then 15 thousand, are you supposed to 50? The money didn't arrive!

People started quitting. In mid-2002, the fighters plucked up the "arrogance" for the trial.
Although until 2002 it could not have occurred to a policeman to defend his interests in court against the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

An interesting story came out. The same police colonel who transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the regional OMON bought a new car in 2002 (when they did not pay accrued combat vehicles at all). He said that in the Khankala headquarters, officers receive not only combat missions for every day, but also weekly bonuses of 3-5 thousand rubles. Having added only the bonuses, the second combat ones are obtained. And they didn't have any delays.

The fighters told this to the lawyer. He advised - collect papers.

In the summer of 2002, riot police secretly filed the first class action lawsuits against the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information leaked "up". From there came the command: "block".

The fighters of one detachment came to the personnel department for a copy of the database accounting log (where the accrued amounts are registered). The personnel officer says: “Guys, I didn’t see you, you didn’t ask anything.” It turned out that the commander of the detachment took all the magazines on orders from the Internal Affairs Directorate, and everyone "interested" in them - to the commander, then "on the carpet" in the Internal Affairs Directorate. For clarification. Nobody hid anything - the command is "from above".

Then the fighters were "bred" to refuse to participate in the lawsuit. It is not difficult to pick up a serviceman - to whom the position shines, to whom a pension is on the nose. As a result, some of the fighters “changed their mind” to sue. However, at the end of 2002, the first trials nevertheless took place. And they were won by the fighters.

After the first successes, the courts took on the character of an epidemic - throughout the country. The Ministry of Internal Affairs began to lose ground. Even the commanders of the detachments, who had previously blocked their fighters, having seen their success, began to draw up claims.

Rare "lucky ones" received the first money on open accounts.

A mountain of writ of execution

In 2002, the procedure for receiving money was as follows - the court made a decision, but in order to receive money, you still need to work hard. According to the law, writ of execution flocked to the capital's bailiff service, at the location of the defendant - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia on Zhitnaya Street, 16.

But when the fighters began to ask the bailiffs about the fate of the execution of the court decision, they stumbled upon a problem.

The guys came to Moscow, came to the bailiffs, they opened a room for them, littered to the ceiling with court decisions on combat: “look for yours, you will find it - lucky.” The bailiffs were not ready for such flows of papers. Those who found their writ of execution themselves sent them to the federal treasury - on the advice of bailiffs. Someone was lucky, they got the money. But they were few. Then it didn't happen at all.

How the decision of the Russian court is carried out: the story of one lawsuit from the riot police

On December 22, 2004, I send a package of documents (a writ of execution, a court decision, an application) to the Federal Treasury. In autumn 2005 (!) papers from the Treasury come back. They "floated" for almost a year.

At the end of the "polite message" they offer me to send all these papers to their own treasury department - Spec. OFC. Why were my papers studied for almost a year simply not transferred to another department of the same department? Sending to Spec. OFC. October 5, 2005. On the stamp of incoming this department is the date of receipt - October 11. By February 23, 2006, they send a “gift” from there for Defender of the Fatherland Day: February 2 Special. The OFC writes an answer - more than 3 years have passed since the court decision, call us, we will not give you your money!

BUT! It is written: “... the return of the writ of execution to the recoverer is not an obstacle to the new presentation of the specified document .... The writ of execution with the documents attached can be re-submitted for execution after the above deficiency has been eliminated.”

I'm going to my native court to Judge Miroslav Shevchuk. World man! He admitted that he was “pressed” “from above” so that he would not make decisions in our favor, but he is principled. He gave money to all the guys. Then he was removed.

The judge, having examined the papers, issued a verdict: "The decision of the Treasury is illegal."

The documents arrived, according to their own stamps, on time, even before the expiration of the 3-year period. They did not have the right to send them back, but were obliged to transfer them to the OFC for execution. The way out is to apply to the district capital court for Spets. OFC, appeal their decision. Or do you just need to talk to them differently? Drive the tank to the entrance of Spec. OFK on the nice Moscow street Verkhnyaya Radishchevskaya, turn the gun in their direction and put a writ of execution with a court decision at the entrance. And give 3 minutes for execution. This time is more than enough - press the computer keyboard a couple of times and transfer money from one account to another. So we have no such legal right! The enemy can be "wet in the toilet", the militants can be shot in the green, but you can't touch the hook-makers!

The disadvantage, according to their version, is the fact that the documents came after the expiration of a 3-year period from the date the court decision came into force. HOW DO I REMOVE IT? SUBMIT DOCUMENTS YESTERDAY?

Answered for Putin

At the end of 2006, I wrote a letter to President (then) Putin, saying, how much is possible? An answer comes, signed personally by the treasurer of Russia:

“On behalf of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for Work with Citizens’ Appeals, the Federal Treasury, having considered your appeal to the President of the Russian Federation on the issue of execution of executive documents on the recovery of monetary compensation for participation in hostilities on the territory of the North Caucasus region of Russia, reports the following ... »
The answer is the same - eliminate the shortcomings. Unsubscribed on three beautiful stamp sheets.

Judicial "humor"

I'm suing for reinstatement. A young lady judge, on the forehead: “Do you know that we no longer award combat?” I know, I say, but I just need to restore what was already judged in 2002. Then she, with a representative of the defendant from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, closes in her office. They giggle. A young lieutenant from the legal department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs goes out into the corridor. Suitable:

Did they give you the command to "knock me down"?
- Well something like that.
- Put yourself in my place. I wore the same epaulettes. And I don't ask someone else.
- Yes, I understand, but I have to work. I'm sorry.

At the “trial”, the judge addresses the defendant:

If I restore the terms to him, you can file a protest. Will you give?
- In terms of?
- Well, if I decide in his favor (a nod in my direction), you can protest.
- How?
- Fir-trees-sticks (sighs evilly), I say - if I now restore the terms for him, you take it and file a protest against my decision!
- BUT! Yes Yes...

The lawyer and I are watching the dialogue between the judge and the policeman and round our eyes.
But despite all the comical nature of the trial, which took place in a small judicial room, the deadlines were restored. The police lawyer did not file a protest. Hopefully deliberately.

Disappearing papers

I send a package of documents with the restored terms and an inventory of the attached papers by registered mail with notification to the Special. OFC. A few months later, the answer comes, they say, everything is fine, but there are not enough bank details for your account, and according to the law ...

The documents sent back to me lack an inventory of the papers being sent and the same bank details (although they were additionally indicated in the sent application). AND THERE WAS DELIVERED! They were simply taken out and thrown away, returning the papers back! I send the papers again, with a notarized list of applications. Silence.
The day before, I called SpetsOFK at 915 - 56 - 27. Question: “At what stage is the execution of the court ruling to restore the procedural period on my claim for the recovery of 47,900 rubles from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for 2001, sent by a package of documents last year?”

The response of SpetsOFK: “We can’t find your documents.”

A simple mechanism for avoiding payment. Taking into account the timing of receipt of responses from Spec. OFK - from 9 months to one and a half years, the next 3 years will soon end, during which it is necessary to fulfill the court decision. And so - in a circle.

At the end of December, with his own hands, he took all the papers to the Spets.OFK on Verkhnaya Radishchevskaya Street. A girl came out, accepted the papers according to the inventory, putting a seal and signature in the list of documents to be transferred. I noticed one oddity - she did not take an application with bank details. He asked again, they say, exactly this paper is not needed? She confirmed, no, they say, there are separate papers with your bank details.

A few days later I received a letter from Spets.OFK refusing to consider the documents. The reason is no... applications with bank details! I call, swear, I say - your girlfriend quite consciously did not take the application - there is an inventory of accepted documents and moreover - I kept a hidden audio recording of our conversation. Answer: “It cannot be that our employee does not accept the necessary documents from you.”

In January, after the New Year holidays, I again take a pile of papers to Spets.OFK. They took the documents, forcing them to rewrite some papers on which there was no longer a “living place” from the seals put after each acceptance of the papers by mail. They took the papers. They promised to provide a response within 3 months. I'm waiting. And silence. I hope so far.

Each OMON fighter, on average, "hangs" money for 3-5 business trips (end of 2000 - 2003). Of these, money was sued - 60 percent. They received part of the money awarded (for some business trips) - 40 percent. Received everything sued - 20 percent. They sued for indexation (non-payment for 5-7 years) of amounts - 5 percent. Of these, they received indexation - 3 percent. OFC - 40%.

They continue to sue and send writ of execution to the treasury - about 5%.
Applications for filing a claim to the European Court of Human Rights - 1 person.

How much?

Until 2002, the period of business trips to Chechnya for employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was 3 months. One OMON detachment of 50 people "visited" Chechnya 4 times in two groups. Each fighter - 2 business trips per year.

The approximate number of regional riot police is about 80. The figure is approximate, because only several detachments went to Chechnya from the Moscow region.

For one business trip, the sergeants of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "unsubscribed" for an riot police officer, on average 50 thousand.

We consider: 50,000 (debt) X 50 people (detachment) \u003d 2,500,000 rubles - they did not pay one detachment for one business trip.

2,500,000 X 80 (regional riot police) = 200,000,000 rubles - a debt to all regional detachments for one business trip.

200,000,000 rubles X 4 (business trips per year) = 800,000,000 rubles - not paid to all detachments of the country for the year.

"Turnover":

We take the amount of the debt for the year to each OMON of Russia - 800 million rubles and transfer it to a fixed-term deposit for only a year. We take a low average rate - 12% per annum.

We receive 96 million rubles a year. "Bonuses".

Clarification:

1 - the exact number of riot police is not known. We count one per region. Although in large regions there are at least 2 of them - regional and city. (and in the Moscow region + Sergiev Posad and Podolsky)

2 - we are talking only about riot police. How many consolidated police detachments (SOM) - from 50 to 100 employees, special detachments of SOBR and OMSN - an average of 20-30 fighters each, units of internal troops (VV) from several hundred to several thousand fighters each, assembled from regional temporary policemen departments of internal affairs (VOVD) 50-100 employees, not counting the Temporary military reserves of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (basically the same explosives) and others, have been in Chechnya since 1999 - it is difficult to calculate. And this is not to mention the units of the GRU and the FSB. And several thousand people from the Ministry of Defense.

3 - “combat debts” we considered in “medium sergeant weight”, for officers these amounts are two or more times more.

The scale of the financial attraction called "combat" is colossal. We can probably talk about billions of rubles “written off” from the budget, but never issued to the fighters. Many people never saw their money during their lifetime. On the monuments of those who died in Chechnya, a greater number of names are from the list of statements of claim.

The day before, President Medvedev announced that in connection with the events in Ossetia, it is necessary to improve the financial situation of the army. In the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, they are discussing that they promise to pay combat soldiers sent to Ossetia.\"

USSR and Russia in the slaughter. Human losses in the wars of the XX century Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

First Russian-Chechen war, 1994-1996

The invasion of Russian troops into Chechnya, which at that moment was actually an independent, but unrecognized state, began on December 11, 1994. The purpose of the operation was to restore the supremacy of the federal center over the rebellious republic. Contrary to expectations, the troops met stubborn resistance. The Chechen capital Grozny was taken only on February 22, 1995, and the Chechen separatists were ousted from all other large cities only in June. Chechen formations switched to guerrilla warfare. The fighting was completed in August 1996, when Chechen detachments recaptured Grozny from Russian troops, and on August 31, the Khasavyurt agreements were signed to end the war and the parties were ready to resolve the conflict peacefully. The question of the status of Chechnya was postponed until the end of 2001. By the end of 1996, all Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnya.

According to official figures, the loss of the Russian army amounted to 3602 people killed, dead, missing and captured, including 538 officers. Of this number, 78 people were missing or captured, including 26 officers. The losses of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs amounted to 1551 people killed, dead, missing and captured, including 197 officers. Of this number, 187 people were missing, including 11 officers. Employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (policemen) killed 311 people, including 134 officers and 1 civilian officer who went missing. In addition, another 36 policemen were missing, including 8 officers. FSB losses amounted to 47 people, including 39 officers. The Federal Border Service lost 38 killed and dead, including 11 officers. 1 soldier of the railway troops and 2 FAPSI employees, including 1 officer, also died.

On August 7, 1999, with the invasion of Chechen troops into Dagestan, the Second Russian-Chechen War began, during which Russian troops occupied the entire territory of Chechnya. In partisan form, this war continues to this day, covering the territory of almost all the republics of the North Caucasus, with the exception of North Ossetia. It is too early to sum up its results, including losses. A total of 5,528 people were killed or missing, including 1 civilian. 24 people, including 5 officers, returned from captivity alive. Among the 486 - remaining missing - are 279 unidentified corpses of military personnel who, as of June 1, 1999, were in the 124th Central Medical Laboratory for Identification Research of the Ministry of Defense.

4,513 Russian servicemen, including 784 officers, were killed in action or died during the sanitary evacuation stages. 338 people, including 63 officers, died of wounds in hospitals. 191 people died from diseases and accidents, including 22 officers. Losses in the wounded, burned, shell-shocked and injured amounted to 16,098 people, including 2,920 officers, and 35,289 people fell ill, including 3,821 officers. In total, the total sanitary losses amounted to 51,387 people, including 6,741 officers. It is not known whether the official losses of the Russian troops include the losses of the Chechen formations fighting on the side of the federal forces. Most likely, they are not included in Russian official losses.

There is also a higher estimate of Russian irretrievable losses in the First Russian-Chechen War. The Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia estimates the number of dead and dead in Chechnya in 1994-1996 at 14,000 Russian servicemen, including both conscripts and contract soldiers, as well as officers. This estimate was obtained by extrapolating data from individual Russian regions to the entire population of conscripts who served in Chechnya. Such an estimate may not be particularly accurate and may either overestimate or underestimate the death toll. Obviously, the assessment of the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers did not include the dead policemen and employees of the FSB and FAPSI. With the addition of irretrievable losses of these categories of military personnel, the total number of deaths, using the estimate of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, should be increased to 14.4 thousand dead and missing. In addition, this number certainly did not include the losses of the Chechen formations that fought on the side of the federal forces. At present, it is impossible to say which of the estimates, the official one of 5,528 dead and missing, or the estimate we have corrected by the Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers of 14,400 dead and missing, is closer to the truth. It is possible that the true death toll lies somewhere between the two estimates mentioned. The Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers draws attention to the discrepancy between the data of the military authorities and the number of "funerals" actually received in the regions; to the data obtained from the Center for Forensic Medical Examination in Rostov, indicating a discrepancy between the officially recognized casualties for each day and the number of bodies of the dead arriving at the laboratory for identification; on the imperfection of the system of accounting for human losses in Russia. Since the primary documents on Russian losses in the First Russian-Chechen War have not yet been published and are inaccessible to researchers, it is not possible to more accurately determine the size of these losses.

There are no reliable data on the losses of Chechens, both anti-Russian armed formations and civilians. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said at the beginning of 2000 that 2,870 military and militias and up to 120,000 civilians were killed on the Chechen side in the First Russian-Chechen War. Probably, the figure of military casualties is minimal and, most likely, underestimated, since Maskhadov hardly had information about the losses of all Chechen detachments, given the partisan nature of the war. The figure of 120,000 dead civilians seems to be overestimated, with the proviso that we do not have reliable data on the losses of the civilian Chechen population in 1994-1996.

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Book One First Patriotic War

photo: one of the last Russian residents of Grozny meets the Russian army

Perhaps the most authoritative expert on civilian casualties in Chechnya today is Sergei Maksudov, the author of the book Chechens and Russians: Victories, Defeats, Losses, which was presented last summer in Moscow. Alexander Babenyshev (Maksudov is his pseudonym) now lives in the USA, but, as they say, a man in the subject is far from his first professional book about the Chechen wars. After its publication, the author was condemned by some human rights organizations, and some, on the contrary, supported. Regardless of political preferences, the book "Chechens and Russians" is perhaps one of the most complete generalizations of data on those who died in Chechnya.

I used various data to write the book. And the official ones - from all the warring parties, and the research of the Memorial society, - Alexander Babenyshev commented on the sources of the documentary of his work. - However, I do not always consider the latter to be the most objective. The story is yet to be sorted out.

Nevertheless, Babenyshev was able to analyze information about the size of the Chechen people from the beginning of the 19th century to the present day. And the officially registered number of Chechens at the beginning of the 19th century was 130 thousand people. Let's remember this number...

A little more arithmetic. The estimated number of Chechens in 1859 is already 172 thousand (natural population growth is comparable to similar indicators in European Russia, the Stavropol Territory and Georgia). Their losses during the Caucasian War for 16 years (from 1859 to 1875) amounted to 27 thousand people, another 23 thousand emigrated to the Ottoman Empire. The Russian army from 1816 to 1864 lost in the Caucasus 23 thousand killed, 62 thousand wounded and 6 thousand died from wounds. Highlanders suffered greater losses than regular troops - because of artillery fire, the tactics of infantry squares, and the bayonet was preferable to the saber in close combat.

We continue to work with the calculator. The 1926 census already speaks of a population of 395,248. By 1943, there were already 523,071 of them. In 1958 - 525,060. The years from 1944 to 1948 went into negative territory, when losses, including from deportation and the participation of Chechens in the war and uprisings (there was such a thing), outnumbered the birth rate.

Well, the most interesting part of Sergei Maksudov's research is the period from 1991 to 1997, which included the first war and the massive outflow from the republic (and partly the extermination) of the Russian-speaking population. Until 1994 - the facts of forcing Russians to leave Chechnya. With robberies, murders and rapes. There are hundreds of them in the book. “No one was specifically involved in collecting such information,” writes Alexander Babenyshev. “The list contains data from various publications that do not claim to be complete, these are just individual examples, random elements of the overall picture ... However, it can be assumed that the sample reflects well the typical situations in which Russian residents found themselves at that time.”

Then the Russians became slaves - more than 10 thousand throughout Chechnya. The slave trade in the center of Grozny was a common occurrence, which the Chechen authorities turned a blind eye to. The road to Georgia through Itum-Kale (between the first and second Chechen wars) was built by Russian slaves. According to some estimates, there were 47 thousand!

On November 26, 1994, when the Russian army entered Grozny, it was not yet the infamous New Year's assault. A little more than a month separated the nightmare of the Chechen war... But it was a nightmare for the Russian army, for the Russian-speakers in Chechnya. Losses of peaceful Chechens were incomparably less!

Even at the beginning of the first Chechen war, Memorial's human rights activists counted 25,000 dead civilians in Grozny and, extrapolating these data to the whole of Chechnya, began to talk about 50,000 dead. In Western publications, this figure has grown to 250,000 Chechens who died in two wars (of which 42,000 are allegedly children). Duhvakha Abdurakhmanov, speaker of the Chechen parliament, once claimed that 200,000 people were killed and another 300,000 were missing. According to Babenyshev's calculations, for every 200,000 killed, there should be 600,000 wounded - the average ratio for military operations - which means that every Chechen had to be either killed or wounded!

Memorial's calculations, according to Babenyshev, are, to put it mildly, unconvincing. The author of the book estimates the military losses of the Chechens at 20,000 people, another 8,000 civilians. The losses of Russian servicemen and policemen are approximately the same - 25-30 thousand.

These figures are calculated mostly in a mathematical way, - admits Babenyshev. But I think they are close to the truth.

WHO WIN THE LAST CHECHEN WAR?

What are the results of these considerable losses? The political goals set by the Russian and Chechen leaders have been practically achieved, although all the participants found themselves in a noticeably worse position than before the start of the conflict. Russia kept Chechnya within its borders, but got a black financial hole that absorbs huge amounts of money. Xenophobia is growing in Russia due to the fact that the young generation of Chechens, brought up in the last two wars, suddenly began to splash aggressively into Russian cities.

But Chechnya has received completely different results - it has become de facto free. Freed from the Russians. The Russians were ousted not only from the ethnographic territories where the Chechens settled, they were expelled from the original Cossack lands - the plains along the left bank of the Terek. Russian-speaking citizens are excluded from political, social and even city life. Full Chechen control has been established in the republic - now under the auspices of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Chechnya has established peculiar relations with Moscow. Chechens are not drafted into the Russian army, they practically do not pay taxes. Russia, on the other hand, pays all Chechen expenses, supplies gas and electricity, builds and restores buildings in Chechnya at its expense, reconstructs roads (luxurious!), pays salaries to officials, police, teachers and doctors. They pay pensions, scholarships, allowances ... It is noteworthy that for all this, the inhabitants of Chechnya do not feel gratitude, considering the huge money that comes to them free of charge from Russia, almost as an indemnity due to the winners, or compensation for recent (or centuries-old) suffering