It's no secret that Iosif Vissarionovich began his career by robbing banks and collectors. Before each raid, he wrote a statement about leaving the party, so that in case of arrest he would not discredit it. And then he re-applied for admission. Then the party banned robberies, but Comrade Stalin did not always obey party decisions ... Take, for example, the Spanish robbery of 1936. After all, they took 600 million dollars!

Spanish gold

Ali Baba's Cave

At night, a convoy of 20 trucks left Cartagena. We drove without turning on the headlights. There was a car ahead. In addition to the driver, two were sitting in it: Orlov, the chief adviser to the Spanish government on intelligence, counterintelligence and guerrilla warfare, and a high-ranking official of the Spanish state treasury, whose name history has not preserved.
We arrived at our destination in total darkness. We stopped among the hills, turned on the headlights in the passenger car. Their light pulled out of the darkness a huge armored gate, sunk into the hillside. It was a secret warehouse of the Spanish naval forces. Armed men in uniform opened the gate and the trucks drove right into the hill.
Wooden crates lined the walls of the huge vault in endless rows. They stored not ammunition, not gunpowder and shells, but real gold. Thousands and thousands of boxes of gold bars and coins...
These were treasures that were brought from overseas colonies for three or four centuries. It is possible that gold mined by the Aztecs, Incas and Mayans was stored here. No, Ali Baba's cave was far from the local treasures.
Alexander Orlov came to take all this to Moscow.

"Top secret"

On July 17, 1936, a counter-revolutionary rebellion broke out in Spain, and three months later, the troops of General Franco encircled Madrid. The Republican government, concerned about the fate of the gold reserves, decided to ship it to some safe place. The most secure, thought the ardent revolutionaries, was to take the gold to the Soviet Union, which from the very first days of the rebellion expressed its support for the republic. The proposal was sent to Moscow, the consent came immediately.
The transfer of gold to the Land of the Soviets was issued retroactively. The place of storage was not specifically indicated in the decree, the document only ordered the Minister of Finance to find "a safe place at his discretion" for storing gold. This question was to be considered in the Cortes (Parliament), but for reasons of secrecy, the deputies were not informed of what was happening.
Orlov, meanwhile, received a radiogram from Moscow marked "top secret." The deciphered text read: “Agree with Prime Minister Largo Caballero on the transfer of Spanish gold to the Soviet Union. The cargo must be delivered only on Soviet ships. Maintain the strictest secrecy. If the Spaniards demand receipts, refuse. Explain that all documents will be handed over to them in Moscow after receiving the gold. You are personally responsible for the operation. Ivan Vasilievich. The signature meant that the order came personally from Stalin.
Alexander Orlov understood what kind of game Iosif Vissarionovich started. The scout also understood that his own life was at stake.

Trusting Caballero

Orlov invited the Spanish finance minister to the Soviet embassy. Already the first minutes of a conversation with him encouraged the Chekist. "A typical soft-bodied intellectual," the adviser decided. And in general, I was not mistaken. Juan Negrin, a member of the Socialist Workers' Party, rejected communism as a doctrine, as a way for the development of society, but he treated the Soviet Union with respect. Negrin was a physiologist by education, but the lack of personnel loyal to the republic forced him to take up finances. The Spanish caballero, true to his word, he believed every word of the representative of a great country - the only one in Europe that supported Spain in its just struggle.
Orlov asked where the gold was. Negrin answered: near Cartagena, in a deep cave. It was a great success. Several Soviet warships were constantly in the port of Cartagena. It was necessary to act with lightning speed until rumors leaked out that the gold reserves were being taken out of Spain. In this case, the danger would have increased many times over. On the way to Odessa, the valuable cargo could be intercepted by Italians or Germans. And even the Spaniards themselves, with all their internationalism, might not like such an adventure: friendship, of course, friendship, but letting gold out of the country ...
The next day, Orlov went to Cartagena. His friend, naval attache Nikolai Kuznetsov, was already there, his task was to bring the Soviet ships, which had just unloaded weapons and ammunition, into full readiness. The problem of transporting gold to the port was also successfully solved. The Soviet tank brigade under the command of Colonel Krivoshein had just arrived there. It was he who allocated 20 trucks for the cause and gave his best drivers. They were dressed in the uniform of Spanish sailors. The 60 Spaniards accompanying the convoy (like the Russian drivers, by the way) had no idea what exactly they were to take out. The crews of the Soviet ships, which were to deliver the cargo to Odessa, did not know this either.

Robbery, and more!

Orlov looked at the booty: about 10,000 boxes, 72 kilograms of gold each. More than 700 tons ... So, late in the evening of October 20, the operation began. The Spaniards who accompanied the cargo, two by two, took the box and carried it to the back of the truck. And during the rest they played cards - almost all were desperate gamblers. This behavior amused Orlov: they rejoice at the few coppers won, sitting on boxes with millions!
The nights were dark and moonless - this Russian was lucky. The trucks were moving with their headlights off. Most of all, Orlov was afraid of running into Republican patrols. After all, none of the drivers knew a word of Spanish. They could be mistaken for German spies, arrested, opened the boxes. Then everything would open up. But by the end of the third night, three-quarters of all the gold (that is, about 540 tons) was safely delivered to four Soviet ships.
When the last box was shipped, Orlov experienced for the first time something like shame. The treasury official asked him for a receipt. Trying not to look into the eyes of the Spaniard, sore from three days of lack of sleep, Orlov cheerfully said: “Companiero, I am not authorized to issue receipts. Do not worry, you will receive this document in Moscow at the State Bank, when everything has been calculated and weighed. He was seriously agitated: so, they say, things are not being done. But what could he do? After all, the cargo was already on board the Russian ships! Then the Spaniard made a decision: he was going to Odessa! I took three more with me, so that on all four ships there would be a person who would monitor the cargo until it was handed over on receipt. “It would be better if you stayed at home,” Orlov sighed.

Leader's joke

Orlov stayed in Spain. And in Odessa, gold met a huge number of NKVD officials from Moscow and Kyiv. For several nights they, like simple loaders, dragged boxes. The gold was loaded onto a special train, the echelon was also accompanied by hundreds of armed enkavedeshniki.
The Spanish government, having received the news that the gold had been safely delivered to Moscow, stopped worrying about the fate of the valuable cargo. When, after a while, Orlov asked the Ministry of Finance whether those four who left with the gold for the USSR returned, they answered him in surprise: “No, and they don’t even answer letters. Maybe the guys were just hanging out.”
And in Moscow, after the gold was handed over to the State Bank, Stalin arranged a reception for NKVD officers and members of the Politburo. The leader was in a great mood. Still, 700 tons of gold! About 600 million dollars at the then exchange rate! Comrade Stalin approached People's Commissar Yezhov and whispered to him quietly: "The Spaniards will not see this gold as their ears." And they both laughed out loud.
And the Spaniards really didn’t see their gold anymore.

80 years ago, a civil war broke out in Spain between the Falangists and the Republicans. How does the Spanish society evaluate its results today? What role did the Soviet Union play in this war? About thistheir eventsinlive video studiowebsite said the Spanish writer, author of the book "Deep in gold: How Stalin got his hands on the gold reserves of Republican Spain" Boris Gutierrez Simorra.

Spanish Republic and Stalin. Who helped whom?

- A 30,000-strong Italian volunteer corps fought on the side of the Falangists, and the total number of Soviet military personnel, mostly technical, amounted to only about 2.5 thousand people during the entire war. Why did Stalin get involved in the war, but at the end of 1938 he quickly left it?

— I am a Spaniard with Russian culture in my head and in my soul. I was born in Moscow. My parents emigrated from Spain when the war ended. My father was a republican, a communist of the time, a romantic and an idealist. He was a very famous journalist, editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Mundo Obrero" - "Working World". It is the official organ of the Spanish Communist Party. And until the last day, while the republic resisted, he was in Madrid and on the fronts near Madrid.

When the war ended, he emigrated on the instructions of the Communist Party. She scattered the losers in different countries, because not everyone was accepted. The French, as it were, accepted the Republicans and immediately sent them to concentration camps in Africa. And then, by some means, other countries took them away from these camps, for example, to Latin America.

My father came to the Soviet Union because he was a famous propagandist, along with the leaders of the Spanish communists. In Moscow, my father headed broadcasting to Spain for 38 years, he was its soul, he devoted himself to the fight against Francoism already outside of Spain. Therefore, it became possible to return only when Franco died.

How did you come to deal with this topic?

— The themes of the civil war and cooperation between Russia and Spain have always worried me. Although I graduated from the Aviation Institute, it so happened that it was very difficult for me to get a job in my aviation profession. Here my last place of work was Moscow Radio, Latin American edition. I first introduced Julio Iglesias to the Russians. But when I first came to Spain, I was not yet engaged in literary affairs.

But then I decided to take up journalism, books, and around 2000 I started writing. I wrote the book "Voice from the Cold", it's about the voice of the Spanish Moscow radio, the voice of my father, reaching Spain from the cold. In Russian, we gave this more romantic name "Hidalgo in the side of the cold." He not only spoke out against Franco, but also told how good it was in the Soviet Union. Over time, this note changed somewhat, but to the end he remained true to this idea, he believed that it was simply not implemented correctly.

During the study of all kinds of materials, the topic of gold arose. I grew up here on the myth that helping Spain was disinterested. Yes, indeed, the people perceived this battle with fascism in this way, people gave away their savings, worked whole shifts to help the Spanish Republicans, and so on. But behind all this romanticism was also the colossal drama of Stalin and his regime.

Stalin and Hitler were taken by surprise by the uprising and civil war in Spain. Because the popular front that came to power in Spain in February 1936 seemed unbreakable. As if poor, but honest Spain, all for the left, the communists, against these right, the conservatives. It seemed that when the people took power into their own hands, they would not give it up. But the rebellion led to civil war. A confrontation began throughout Spain, one against the other. And Franco was just the commander in chief.

Hitler decided to help Franco. Stalin took the position of the Republicans - after all, the Comintern. Stalin did not have special funds, the country needed foreign currency, because there were few of its own technologies, a lot had to be bought in Germany for gold. Therefore, someone apparently reported to Joseph Vissarionovich that it was possible to help Spain, they have a very good gold reserve. I think that he immediately liked this idea very much, and he finally decided that he needed help in order to get this gold.

It was an operation, of course, developed by the NKVD, and by very smart and gifted people. This is one of the most brilliant operations in the history of intelligence all over the world, when not only the entire gold reserve was taken out of the Bank of Spain, but also the government itself contributed to this and gladly gave it away.

But in the government there were not only communists, but also socialists, anarchists. Not all of them unambiguously referred to the Soviet Union. But the gold sailed away, literally and figuratively, on ships. It's fantastic. Everything was improvisation to some extent, but on the other hand.

Now, oddly enough, the right turned out to be the bulwark of the interests of the state, and Spain, in a sense, is returning in a spiral to that situation. God forbid this should happen again. Let's hope that now common sense will prevail, but there is no need to build any special illusions.

Now Spain is having a difficult time and a difficult government. And most importantly, it is not clear what will happen in the next elections, what will be the alignment, and how the people will behave. Democracy in action does not always lead to good.

There are times when it is difficult to do without dictators. It's not the dictator who chooses the people, but the people who choose dictators when different groups cannot agree. So it was in Republican Spain. The main thing for any government to remember is that if you win, come to power, then that's not all. Further it is necessary to manage and agree.

Interviewed by Lyubov Lyulko

Preparedfor publicationYuri Kondratiev

The love for gold in Spain has not faded since the time of the conquistadors. Many popular brands make gold jewelry, gold-encrusted payment cards are paid in the service sector, and particles of gold dust are even added to bread.

Ordinary Spaniards also love gold. Married couples give it to each other throughout their life together. By the fifth ten, women can accumulate a whole arsenal of jewelry. Each quarter has its own jewelry store where you can buy a weightless gold chain or ring from 90 euros.

Also popular among the Spaniards and tourists is jewelry, which is called "Toledo gold", or "damaskin" (damasquinado de Toledo). This is a special technique of gold stamping on blackened steel, which originated in the city of the same name near Madrid. On the treated surface, the master engraves a drawing, which is then inlaid with a thin wire or plate using gold (or silver, if we are talking about silver embossing).

In addition to decorations, this technique also creates a lot of things for the home. So, from Spain, you can also bring caskets, watches, a set of chess, a chandelier and other souvenirs as a gift.

In search of high quality jewelry, prestigious gems and world-famous designers, you will have to get out to the central streets of Madrid or Barcelona. There are shops selling branded jewelry. Among the prestigious Spanish brands, such names as Carrera y Carrera, Masriera, Aristocrazy, Yanes and others stand out.

A ring from a prestigious boutique will cost up to 80 euros per gram, given that an ordinary jeweler will never ask for more than 30. In Spain, it is mostly customary to make jewelry from 750 gold. This gives the products a light yellow, slightly greenish tint, in contrast to the usual reddish tint, more familiar to Russians.

Some vanguards of the jewelry market even bring white gold and platinum to the fore. In their opinion, large diamonds, combined with the cold icy brilliance of these metals, look nobler.

And if you want to become the owner of your own gold reserves and transfer your capital into heavy bullion, in Spain this can be done in several large banks.

For purchases, conclusion of commercial transactions and organization of individual shopping tours in Barcelona and other cities of the country, please contact the specialists of the Center for Services for Business and Life in Spain "Spain in Russian". We will be happy to consult on any issue related to your stay in Spain. For you - more than 100 types of services ! Call us at the numbers listed on the site.

The revolution is not only troublesome, but also expensive. It takes a lot of money to organize it. When there is nowhere to legally take them, for example, to rob a bank. As you know, I.V. was responsible for such operations among the Bolsheviks. Stalin. They say that he did not change his habit even after the revolution.

Spanish gold

According to an established legend, before each robbery, I.V. Stalin wrote a statement asking him to be expelled from the Bolshevik Party. In the event of a successful completion of the criminal event, he immediately asked to be accepted back into the party again. This was done so that in the event of an arrest, not to cast a shadow on comrades in the struggle. T

When the revolution happened and the cannonade of the Civil War rumbled, and the country again needed gold, I.V. Stalin did not disdain to apply the old methods. True, now he acted as a leader, and not an executor of the event. The most famous was the operation to seize the gold of Spain. A consignment of precious metal worth more than 600 million dollars (in the prices of those years) was secretly imported into Russia! This event happened due to the civil war that broke out in Spain. On July 17, 1936, the legitimate government was overthrown and replaced by General Franco. Fearing that the country's vast gold reserves could be irretrievably lost, representatives of the republican government asked the USSR to take the precious metal for safekeeping. Stalin agreed.

Take gold: do not give receipts

Soon 20 heavy trucks arrived at a secret storage facility near Cartagena. The soldiers briskly loaded boxes of gold, after which the precious caravan set off. The transfer of gold to the territory of the USSR went smoothly, in the normal mode. Documents with the Spaniards decided to draw up retroactively. The representative of Soviet intelligence Orlov, as well as the captains of Soviet ships that transported gold to the Soviet Union (to the port of Odessa), were strictly forbidden to give the Spaniards any receipts for the receipt of the cargo. The order came personally from Joseph Vissarionovich. At the same time, it was necessary to maintain the strictest secrecy, since the ships of other interested states could recapture the valuable cargo: Italians or Germans. Therefore, neither the soldiers loading the boxes from the vault nor the captains of the ships knew what they were dealing with. The Soviet intelligence officer in charge of the operation counted 10,000 boxes. Each of them contained 72 kg of gold. In total, 700 tons of precious metal were accumulated. Gold was transported to Soviet ships for three nights in a row. Incognito caravans were not revealed.

Receipt? Receipt later...

When the last box was in the hold of the Soviet ship, an official of the Spanish treasury timidly asked Orlov for a receipt. But the Soviet representative only looked insinuatingly into the Spaniard's eyes and answered honestly that he was not authorized to sign any papers. Seeing the official's round eyes, he hastened to add that there was no need to worry, since all the papers would later be processed in Moscow, when the gold was in the Gokhran. An employee of the Spanish Treasury did not believe him. However, it was dangerous to take the gold back to the vault, it could be recaptured by Franco's troops. Then the Spaniard made a fatal decision for himself. He stated that he would personally accompany the gold to the USSR. He took three people with him. Thus, on each of the four ships there was one representative of the republican authorities. When the valuable cargo arrived in Moscow, the Spanish government was informed that everything went well. But the four Spaniards who accompanied the gold disappeared somewhere. Forever and ever. Of course, the Spanish government did not receive any receipts. The most interesting thing is that the fate of this gold has since been covered with a veil of secrecy. But it never made it back to Spain...

The fate of the Spanish gold reserves, part of which ended up in the Soviet Union at the end of 1936, is directly connected with Operation X. Until now, this "dark story" (in the words of some Russian and foreign authors) continues to excite historians. She gave rise to many rumors, myths and speculation. Until now, publications with sensational headlines appear in Spain and Russia, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that Moscow "warmed up its hands" on Spanish gold. Based on the fundamental research of Spanish specialists, as well as Russian archival sources, we will try to answer the question of what happened to Spanish gold.

THE WAY TO MOSCOW

To begin with, let us quote a report from a Polish intelligence agent dated November 24, 1936, found among captured documents in the Russian State Military Archive:

"When the new Spanish ambassador Pasqua was sent to Moscow, he received: the broadest powers to conclude a secret agreement with the USSR on the further supply of Spanish red weapons. Such an agreement was signed on the third day after Pasqua's arrival in Moscow. Its essence was that that the Spanish government of Caballero undertook to keep in Moscow a gold fund in the amount of not less than two hundred and fifty million pesetas (half a billion francs), on account of which Moscow undertook to supply weapons to the Spanish Reds. just an element of the purest commerce, because Moscow, thanks to the help of the Spanish gold fund, got the opportunity, by no means unimportant in the face of possible international complications, to increase its gold fund. Having received Spanish gold, Moscow began huge and regular shipments of weapons to Spain.

In fact, military specialists and weapons from the Soviet Union began to arrive on the Iberian Peninsula much earlier than the Spanish gold ended up in the USSR. The first military advisers were sent to Spain on the 20th of August 1936. And by October 22, 50 T-26 tanks with fuel and ammunition, a squadron of SB high-speed bombers (30 units), and small arms were delivered on five ships. By the end of the month, 60 armored vehicles, a squadron of I-15 fighters, artillery systems with ammunition, etc., arrived. And the decision to send part of the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain to the Soviet Union was made by Prime Minister Caballero and Finance Minister Negrin at the hour of ultimate danger - the threat of the capture of Madrid by the Falangists . It seemed to many then that the days of the republic were numbered. Fierce fighting was already going on in the city itself. And the Francoist radio daily transmitted to Madrid a pre-prepared program of the solemn entry of the nationalists into the capital.

Most likely, the republican government had no choice in those troubled days. Caballero announced the decision to evacuate the government from Madrid to Valencia. It was these circumstances that influenced the decision to send part of the Spanish gold reserves to the USSR. There are at least two versions of how the Spanish gold was exported. According to the first, the Spanish government made this decision under pressure from Stalin. At the same time, arguments are given that are not supported by archival documents, so they cannot be considered sufficiently convincing. But in order to get a complete picture, we present these testimonies.

On October 15, 1936, the deputy chief military adviser in Spain for counterintelligence and guerrilla warfare in the rear A. Orlov (Swede) received from Moscow a cipher telegram from People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N. Yezhov: "I am giving you a personal order from the Master (Stalin. - Approx. Aut.) "Together with Plenipotentiary Rosenberg, organize, in agreement with Caballero: the shipment of Spain's gold reserves to the Soviet Union. Use a Soviet ship for this purpose. The operation should be carried out in absolute secrecy. If the Spaniards demand a receipt from you, refuse, I repeat, refuse to sign any there was a document and explain that a formal receipt will be issued by the State Bank in Moscow. You are personally responsible for the success of this operation. Rosenberg, accordingly, was notified. Ivan Vasilyevich (Stalin's pseudonym. - Approx. Aut.) ".

The next day, Orlov and Rosenberg briefed Finance Minister Negrin on Stalin's proposal. He agreed to send gold to the USSR. Later, in the commission of the US Senate, Orlov (after escaping to America) admitted that he and Rosenberg "were simply dumbfounded" how quickly he allowed himself to be persuaded. As Orlov believed, the ground for such an agreement had already been prepared by the efforts of the Soviet trade representative in Spain, A. Stashevsky. But today it was not possible to double-check these facts according to the documents of the archives.

According to the version of the Spanish scientist A. Vinas, on October 15, 1936, Caballero and Negrin officially turned to the Soviet Union with a request to accept about 500 tons of gold for storage. We find confirmation of the fact of this appeal of the republican government in the "Special Folder" of the protocols of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Here is the resolution of the meeting of October 19, 1936:

"[...] 59. Question from Comrade Rosenberg.

Instruct Comrade Rosenberg to reply to the Spanish government that we are ready to accept the gold reserve for storage and that we agree to send this gold on our ships returning from ports, on the condition that the gold will be accompanied by representatives of the Spanish government or the Ministry of Finance and that our responsibility for the safety of gold begins from the moment it is handed over to the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR in our port.

The telegram with the decision of the top political leadership of the USSR arrived in Madrid on October 20. By this time, the gold had been taken from Madrid to Cartagena and stored in old powder magazines near the port. About 510 tons (to be precise, 510,079,529.3 grams) of gold, packed in 7,800 standard-type boxes (65 kg each), were distributed among four Soviet ships that delivered weapons and ammunition to Cartagena. Gold was in ingots, bars, coins, including rare numismatic specimens. Ships were loaded at night from 22 to 25 October: on the Neva - 2697 boxes; "KIM" - 2100; "Kuban" - 2020; "Volgoles" - 963. Everything happened in the deepest secrecy. For the purposes of conspiracy, A. Orlov was called "Mr. Blackstone from the National Bank of the United States," who allegedly was personally sent by President Roosevelt himself to Spain to transport gold to Washington. Only seven people in all of Spain were then initiated into the operation, two from the Soviet side were aware of the matter - Orlov and Rosenberg.

The Republican fleet was drawn up to guard the proposed route of the "golden caravan". This is confirmed by a summary of the military situation in Spain dated October 20, 1936, prepared by the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army: "The government fleet, which left the Bay of Biscay on October 13, arrived on October 18, 1936 in the Mediterranean Sea and concentrated in Cartagena." The ships departed at daily intervals. The Soviet naval attache and senior naval adviser in Spain, N. Kuznetsov, provided security for transports in the base and at sea. The route of the "golden caravan" was carefully planned. Having passed through the Mediterranean and Marmara Seas, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, the Black Sea, on November 2, the transports arrived in the USSR. There was one representative of the Bank of Spain on each ship. In the port of Odessa, the gold was loaded into a special train and delivered to Moscow under heavy guard.

On November 3, 1936, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov, sending his proposals for accepting gold to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov, wrote: "Final execution is possible only after receiving the draft exchange of letters requested from Madrid. Moscow to write us a letter asking us to accept the gold, but since he is unable to indicate either the weight or the value, such a letter is devoid of legal significance. ".

By November 6, the gold was placed in storage at the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR. Later, an act was drawn up on the acceptance of gold, which was signed in early February 1937 by the Ambassador of the Spanish Republic M. Pasqua, the People's Commissar for Finance of the USSR G. Grinko and the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs N. Krestinsky. A copy of the act sent to the Republican government. On April 24, 1937, A. Stashevsky from Valencia informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. Rozengolts by cipher telegram: "I found out for sure that the Moscow act of accepting gold was handed over to Caballero, and he, in turn, handed it over to Baraibo, the Deputy Minister of War, a very dubious person." After the end of the civil war, this copy of the act was kept by Negrin, and after his death was transferred to the government of Franco.

OPERATION "X" PRICE

According to the famous English researcher A. Beevor, at a banquet in the Kremlin on January 24, 1937, Stalin, being in a good mood, allegedly unexpectedly said: "The Spaniards will never see this gold as their own ears."

Indeed, Operation X was not gratuitous, weapons and equipment were supplied on a commercial basis. The republic paid for Soviet military assistance on account of gold deposited in the State Bank of the USSR. In addition, Spain paid for the supply of military equipment and weapons from third countries purchased there on instructions from the Soviet government; assistance of the USSR in the creation of the military industry of the republic; sending Soviet people to Spain and their participation in hostilities (salary); allowances and pensions for the families of those killed in the war; training in the USSR personnel for the Republican army.

It should be noted that funds for operation "X" were issued by the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks even before the arrival of gold in Moscow. The 1,910,000 rubles and 190,000 dollars allocated on September 29, 1936 were not enough, and on October 13, "additional funds were allocated for the purchase in Czechoslovakia on a special assignment, in addition to the already released 400,000 US dollars, another 696,347 US dollars."

On October 17, the Politburo decides: "1) Approve the dispatch of people and goods to "X" according to the lists submitted by NPOs ... 3) Release NPOs from the reserve fund of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR 2,500,000 rubles to cover expenses on a special task." By November 15, 2,300 thousand rubles and 190 thousand ammo were spent to send 455 people and 9 transports with weapons to Spain. dollars. At the meeting of the Politburo on November 22, an additional 3,468.5 thousand rubles and 48.5 thousand US dollars were allocated. dollars to finance the dispatch of 270 people and 5 ships.

Other examples of allocations by the USSR government of funds for operation "X" can be cited. The total amount of materiel supplied from the USSR from September 1936 to July 1938 was $166,835,023. And for all shipments to Spain from October 1936 to August 1938, the republican authorities fully paid the entire amount of the debt to the Soviet Union of $ 171,236,088. All these figures are contained in the reference notebook of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. Voroshilov with the inscription "Operation X" on the cover .

Adding the cost of military equipment sent in late 1938 - early 1939 to Spain from Murmansk via France ($55,359,660), we get the total cost of military-technical supplies. It varies from 222,194,683 to 226,595,748 dollars. Due to the fact that the cargo of the last delivery was not completely delivered to its destination and part of it was returned to Soviet military warehouses, the final figure for the cost of military cargo delivered to Republican Spain is 202. $4 million

The calculations for sending people and goods were rather complicated, since they included not only salaries, but also travel to Spain and back, maintenance in Moscow, equipment, daily allowances, loading in ports, etc. For example, moving one person by rail through Europe it cost 3,500 rubles and 450 dollars, by sea - 3,000 rubles and 50 dollars, loading transport and providing the team with food - 100 thousand rubles and 5 thousand dollars (advance payment to the head of the team). Until January 25, 1938, 1,555 volunteers were sent from the USSR to Spain, the expenses amounted to $1,560,741.87 (6,546,509 rubles and $325,551.37).

The total cost of operation "X" also took into account the allowance paid to Soviet military specialists in Spain. Their salaries were different, pilots received the most. Since January 1937, the families of Soviet servicemen who died in Spain, with the sanction of the Politburo, were given a lump sum of 25,000 rubles and pensions. Thus, the family of the commander of the 12th International Brigade M. Zalka (Lukach), who died in June 1937, received a pension of 1,000 rubles. In total, during the civil war in Spain, more than 200 Soviet citizens died, of which 158 were sent only through the military department.

An important item of expenditure was the cost of training national personnel for the Spanish Republican army in the USSR. Unfortunately, the final figures for the cost of education have not yet been found. Only a few components are known. Thus, the cost estimate for the construction and maintenance of the 20th military pilot school in Kirovobad for the training of pilots for the Spanish Air Force amounted to 4,022,300 rubles or 800 thousand dollars (this is without the cost of aviation equipment, vehicles and other expenses). Republican pilots who studied in 1938 at the Lipetsk military aviation improvement courses received a monthly salary: captain - 1000 rubles, lieutenants - 750 rubles each. The cost of only food and uniforms for 100 cadets who studied for 1.5 months at the Ryazan Infantry School, Sumy Artillery School (30 gunners), Tambov School (40 people) and Gorky Tank School (30 tankers) amounted to 188,450 rubles or 37,690 dollars.

An important feature of Operation X is that, starting from March 1938, it was carried out on credit. First, the Soviet government provided the Spanish government with a loan in the amount of $70 million for a period of three years, and in December 1938 a new loan in the amount of up to $100 million. Legally, everything was formalized as a loan from the Bank of Spain, which the republican authorities undertook to repay after end of the civil war.

WAS SECRETITY NEEDED?

All events related to the movement of gold from Spain to another country took place in the strictest secrecy. Prepared by the 3rd Western Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, "A Brief Review of Domestic and Foreign Political Events in Spain in the Third Quarter of 1938" there is no mention of the fact that the Soviet Union provided military assistance to Republican Spain, and there is not a word about the fate of Spanish gold.

For many years, everything related to the gold of Spain became a taboo topic in the USSR. Moreover, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on January 14, 1937, it was proposed that "comrade Maisky (the USSR plenipotentiary in Great Britain and the Soviet representative in the Committee on non-intervention in the affairs of Spain. - Approx. Aut.) Resolutely object to the discussion by the London Committee question of Spanish gold. This was the reaction of the Kremlin to the fact that "on January 12, the delegates of Germany and Italy in the London Committee raised the issue of exporting the gold reserves of the Spanish Bank." In a secret message dated April 23, 1937, the adviser to the USSR embassy in Great Britain, S. Kagan, informed the head of the 3rd Western Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, A. Neumann: accurate data on the amount of Spanish gold exported after July 18, 1936 (where this gold is located and to what extent it is listed on the deposits of the Spanish government and other institutions of Republican Spain) is caused by the fact that one of the directors of the Spanish Bank who defected to Franco began in French court proceedings in order to obtain a decision on the illegality of the export of the gold reserve or part of it from Spain abroad.The main difficulty of this director is that he cannot in any way obtain the exact data he needs to conduct the process on the amount of exported gold and where this gold is in. This is where the Italians, having no other way to obtain this data, and tried through a commission of experts to get this data. According to Castellano, the French government is not currently interested in having these data provided, and, for its part, does not intend to give the information at its disposal on this issue.

In March 1939, the Spanish Republic was defeated. The memory of the civil war in the Iberian Peninsula was eclipsed by the Second World War, more terrible and cruel. Spanish gold was "forgotten" for a while. Naturally, no one was going to calculate the overall balance, let alone make any payments of loans or interest on them. Much later, the Spanish scientist A. Vinas concluded that all the gold of the Bank of Spain sent to the Soviet Union was not appropriated by Stalin, but was completely spent on military assistance (that is, on Operation X).

For many years, no one knew about the operation to export the Spanish gold reserves to the USSR. Only in 1953 was the book published in the United States by A. Orlov, who fled from Spain in July 1938, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, in which he spoke about the export of Spanish gold. It is now clear that it was hardly right to hide the fact that the Spanish gold reserves were sent to Moscow, this only later served as grounds for various speculations. Of course, one cannot ignore the enthusiasm with which people in the USSR and throughout the world reacted to the call to raise funds to help Republican Spain. It is possible that the Soviet leadership thought that the announcement of the export of Spanish gold to Moscow could deprive the USSR of the aura of a "disinterested defender" of revolutionary ideals. At the same time, the legally elected government of the Spanish Republic had every right to dispose of the country's gold reserves at its own discretion and use it to suppress the fascist rebellion. If this had been declared openly, then there would have been no accusations that the republican government exists on the money of the Comintern - a thesis that was actively promoted by the Western press at that time.