A Japanese non-professional corporal exits a bus in Indonesia, being greeted by a female driver (foreground) in the manner required by the occupiers in Asia. The corporal is dressed in a khaki summer shirt, on the collar on the left you can see a patch with insignia, above the right breast pocket there is a horizontal zigzag patch in the color of the type of troops. Under the khaki shirt, a white undershirt is worn, the collar of which is turned outward. Riding breeches are worn, apparently, with a cavalry belt belt. (Netherlands, Institute for Historical Documentation)

In the second period of the war, the division of Type B (Otsu) remained the standard infantry division - a “triangular” type formation, built on the basis of three infantry regiments of a three-battalion composition and supplemented by auxiliary units. By 1944, the total number of personnel of the division was reduced from 20 to 16 thousand people. The actual combat strength varied greatly depending on local conditions. Divisions were often given various parts of the reinforcement - this was done in the presence of the appropriate forces and, if necessary, by order of the highest commanders.

Standard Infantry Division Type B 1944

Total: 16,000 men, 3,466 horses or mules:

3 infantry regiments- 2850 people in each

1 field artillery regiment - 2360 people

1 reconnaissance regiment- 440 people

1 engineer regiment- 900 people

1 transport regiment - 750 people

Armament: 6,867 rifles, 273 light and 78 heavy machine guns, 264 50mm mortar/grenade launchers, 14 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns, 18 70mm battalion guns, 12 75mm regimental guns, 36 field guns and howitzers 75- , 105- and 150-mm, 16 armored vehicles or tanks.

Please note that the standard division did not have mortars: they may have been considered unnecessary, introducing into each infantry regiment a company of 75 mm cannons (4 guns) and a two-gun platoon of 70 mm cannons in each battalion. Mortars of different calibers were widely used, but, as a rule, as part of separate mortar battalions, reporting directly to higher command. In some situations, however, mortars were attached to (or replaced by) guns in divisional artillery regiments.

The battle schedules also included numerous independent infantry or mixed brigades. Commanded by major generals, these teams could be assigned a variety of tasks, from performing limited operations on the front line in Burma and the Pacific sector to performing garrison duty in the relatively calm regions of occupied China. The number of brigades could vary from 3 to 6 thousand people, armed either only with small arms or reinforced with artillery. In some cases, they could be assigned mortar, artillery, tank and air defense units.

US intelligence data gives the following examples of brigades composition and strength:

Separate infantry brigade

Total: 5580 people:

5 infantry battalions - each 931 people (4 rifle companies and 1 company of heavy weapons; 36 light machine guns; 36 50-mm mortars / grenade launchers; 4 heavy machine guns; 4 20-mm cannons).

1 artillery unit- 360 people (2 artillery or mortar companies, each with 4 75- or 105-mm guns, or 4 150-mm mortars, or 8 90- or 81-mm mortars).

1 engineering company- 180 people.

1 communications company - 178 people.

Separate mixed brigade

Total: 3800 people, including:

5 infantry battalions - 580 men each (3 rifle companies and 1 heavy weapons company; 12 light machine guns; 16 50mm mortars/grenade launchers; 8 heavy machine guns; 2 37mm anti-tank guns; 2 70mm guns).

1 artillery unit- 415 people (3 companies, each with 4 75- or 105-mm guns).

1 engineering company- 221 people.

1 communications company- 128 people.

BATTLE SCHEDULE

For all the armies that participated in the Second World War, the combat schedule of the units involved in solving combat missions as part of certain operations was much more important than a simple list of units and subunits included in the divisions. As an example, here is a list of combat units that were part of the Japanese 18th Army operating in the southwestern sector of the Pacific Ocean in early 1943. This list, given by George Forti in his Handbook of the Japanese Army 1939-1945, is a quotation from US Army manual TM-E 30-480. The list includes three divisions, parts of the fourth and one separate mixed brigade; in addition to them, the army included units of non-divisional subordination: one anti-tank, two mortar and six field artillery battalions; two companies of automatic guns, four companies of air defense and six searchlight companies; an engineering group and ten engineering regiments, as well as smaller sapper groups for various purposes; two naval bases and four garrison supply units; in addition, numerous units of communications services, transport, military construction, ammunition, sanitary and medical and others. In a book of such length as this one, one can only give a "snapshot" of such combat schedules, it will inevitably remain at the level of divisions, brigades, and sometimes - units of the regimental level. The list below refers to the combat schedule for the period of active defensive battles of the Japanese army, formally - as of September 1945. The materials of our list are taken mainly from the detailed tables given by Richard Fuller in the book "Sho-kan - Hirohito Samurai", dedicated to the most outstanding generals and admirals of Japan during the Second World War.

SPECIAL PARTS

military police - Kempei-tai

The infamous military police of the Imperial Japanese Army - Kempei-tai- in general, performed the same functions as the military police of other countries, but had much greater rights, and its power spread more widely. In addition to performing the usual duties of controlling and maintaining discipline among the soldiers, the Japanese military police, since their creation in 1881, also controlled the population of the occupied Asian territories. By 1937, the number of Kempei-tai increased to 315 officers and about 6,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. As the empire captured more and more territories, its military police forces grew: in 1942 they reached about 35 thousand officers and soldiers, of which about 10,700 were stationed in Japan, 18,300 in Manchukuo, China and Korea, 480 in Indo-China, 1100 in Malaya, 940 in Siam, 830 in the Philippines, 1080 in the Dutch East Indies and Borneo, 745 in Formosa (Taiwan) and 90 in the Pacific Islands.

The duties of the Kempei-tai included monitoring all prisoners of war from the countries of the anti-Japanese coalition and interned civilians; the military police thus performed a number of duties of local concentration camp administrations. Kempei-tai was also responsible for identifying and eradicating all forms of anti-Japanese activities among the local population; for the activities of spy networks; for issuing permits for movement within the territory of the empire; for the requisition of valuables and means of production; and also for supplying women to army brothels. Being responsible for conducting counter-guerrilla operations and punitive actions in China and throughout Southeast Asia, the Japanese military police actively recruited allies among the local population and forced them to cooperate by various methods. It should be noted, however, that the Japanese invaders were extremely harsh on the local population, and "foreigners" recruited into the Japanese army or auxiliary units could not receive a rank higher than so-sho (senior sergeant).

On September 2, 1945, Japan signed an act of unconditional surrender, thus ending World War II. Although some Japanese soldiers continued to partisan for many years, and according to the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines, they may still be fighting in the jungle. The fighting spirit of the Nippon army was amazing, and the readiness to give one's life was respectable, but cruelty and fanaticism, together with war crimes, arouse extremely contradictory feelings.

We talk about what the army of Imperial Japan was like in World War II, what kaiten and Oka are, and also why hazing was considered a moral duty of the commander.

For the Emperor, wash the heels of a sergeant - training in the Japanese army

The Japanese Empire in the late XIX - early XX centuries cherished ambitions to expand the living space, and, naturally, it needed a powerful army and navy for this. And if on the technical side the Japanese did a lot, turning the backward army into a modern one, then on the psychological side they were greatly helped by the militant mentality that had developed over many centuries.

The bushido code demanded from the samurai unquestioning obedience to the commander, contempt for death and an incredible sense of duty. It was these features in the imperial army that were developed to the maximum. And it all started from the school bench, where the boys were inspired that the Japanese are a divine nation, and the rest are subhuman, which can be treated like cattle.

The young Japanese was told that he was a descendant of divine ancestors, and his whole life was a path to glory through military exploits in the service of the Emperor and higher officers. Here, for example, is what a Japanese boy wrote in an essay during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905:

I will become a soldier to kill Russians and take them prisoner. I will kill as many Russians as possible, cut off their heads and present them to the emperor. And then I'll throw myself into battle again, I'll get even more Russian heads, I'll kill them all. I will become a great warrior.

Naturally, with such desires and support from society, the boy grew into a ferocious warrior.

The future soldier learned to endure hardships from an early age, and in the army this skill was brought to perfection not only with the help of jogging and exercises, but also through bullying by colleagues and seniors. For example, a senior in rank, who felt that the recruits did not give him a military salute well enough, had the right to line them up and give each one a slap in the face. If the young man fell from the blow, he had to immediately jump up, stretching out at attention.

Such a harsh attitude was complemented by currying favor with higher authorities. When, after a tiring march, a senior in rank sat down on a chair, several soldiers at once raced to unlace his shoes. And in the bathhouse, a queue literally lined up to rub the officer's back.

As a result, the combination of the most powerful propaganda and education, coupled with difficult conditions of service, created fanatical and hardy soldiers, extremely disciplined, persistent and monstrously cruel.

Kamikaze and a war that stretched for decades

Fierce kamikaze on the battlefield was met first by the Chinese, and then by the Russians and the Americans during the Second World War. Japanese soldiers, throwing themselves under tanks with magnetic mines and fighting in hand-to-hand combat to the end, were almost impossible to capture.

An example is the capture of the island of Saipan, where soldiers, on the last orders of Generals Saito, Igeta and Admiral Nagumo, who had shot themselves, launched a banzai attack. More than three thousand soldiers and civilians, armed with bamboo pikes, bayonets and grenades, first drank all the alcohol they had, and then rushed screaming at the American positions.

Even the wounded and one-legged rode on crutches after their comrades. The Americans were shocked that their ranks were broken through, and the attackers ran to the artillery, but then more experienced Yankees appeared and killed all the suicide bombers. But the worst thing came before the Americans later - they saw how the remaining soldiers with women and children undermined themselves with grenades or jumped into the sea.

The famous kamikaze armband

The practice of suicide attacks was very common in the Japanese army at that time. It was partly based on the readiness to die for the emperor, nurtured from an early age, partly - it was a forced measure due to the serious superiority of opponents on sea, land and air. Such suicides were called - kamikaze, which means "divine wind" in translation. The name was given in honor of the typhoon, which in ancient times drowned the armada of the Mongols, sailing to conquer Japan.

Kamikazes at the beginning of WWII used planes with huge bombs that they directed at American ships. Later, they began to use manned winged projectiles, which they called Oka (sakura flower). "Flowers" with explosives, the weight of which could reach a ton, were launched from bombers. At sea, they were joined by manned torpedoes called kaiten (changing fate) and boats loaded with explosives.

Only volunteers were recruited in kamikaze, of which there were many, since serving in suicide squads was a very honorable thing. In addition, a decent amount was paid to the family of the deceased. However, no matter how effective and terrifying the suicide attacks were, they failed to save Japan from defeat.

But for some soldiers, the war did not end even after Japan surrendered. On numerous islands in the jungle, several dozens of Japanese partisans remained, who staged sorties and killed enemy soldiers, policemen and civilians. These soldiers refused to lay down their arms because they did not believe that their great emperor had conceded defeat.

For example, in January 1972, Sergeant Seichi Yokoi was discovered on the island of Guam, who had been living in a hole near the city of Talofofo all this time, and in December 1974, a soldier named Teruo Nakamura was found on Marotai Island. And even in 2005, 87-year-old lieutenant Yoshio Yamakawa and 83-year-old corporal Suzuki Nakauchi were found on the island of Minandao, who were hiding there, fearing punishment for desertion.

Hiroo Onoda

But, of course, the most sensational case is the story of Hiroo Onoda, a junior lieutenant of Japanese intelligence, who, first with his comrades, and after their death and alone, partisaned on the island of Lubang until 1972. During this time, he and his associates killed thirty and seriously wounded about a hundred people.

Even when a Japanese journalist found him and told him that the war was long over, he refused to surrender until his commander canceled the order. I had to urgently look for his former boss, who ordered Onoda to lay down his arms. After being pardoned, Hiroo lived a long life, wrote several books, and trained youth in wilderness survival skills. Onoda died on January 16, 2014 in Tokyo, a couple of months before the age of 92.

Chopping heads for speed and the Nanjing Massacre

The harsh upbringing that exalted the Japanese and allowed them to consider other peoples as animals gave them reasons and opportunities to treat captured soldiers and civilians with unimaginable cruelty. Especially went to the Chinese, whom the Japanese despised, considering soft-bodied subhumans, unworthy of human treatment.

Often young soldiers were trained, forcing them to slaughter bound prisoners, and officers practiced cutting heads. It even came to competitions, which were widely covered by the Japanese press of that time. In 1937, two lieutenants staged a contest to be the first to slaughter a hundred Chinese. To understand the madness that was going on, it is worth reading the headline of one of the Japanese newspapers of the time: "A stunning record in the decapitation of a hundred people: Mukai - 106, Noda - 105. Both second lieutenants start an additional round." As a result, the award nevertheless found "heroes" - after the war, the Chinese caught them and shot them.

Editorial with the "exploits" of lieutenants

When the Japanese army took Nanjing, some of the Chinese believed that order and peace would come with disciplined foreign troops. But instead, on the orders of a member of the imperial house, Prince Asaka, a massacre broke out in the city. According to Chinese historians, the invaders killed from three hundred to five hundred thousand inhabitants, many were brutally tortured, and most of the women were raped. The most striking thing is that the main culprit, Prince Asaki, who gave the monstrous order, was not brought to justice, being a member of the imperial family, and lived quietly and peacefully until 1981.

Another no less monstrous side of the Japanese army was the so-called "comfort stations" - military brothels, where Korean and Chinese girls were forcibly driven into prostitution. According to Chinese historians, 410,000 girls passed through them, many of whom committed suicide after being abused.

It is interesting how modern Japanese authorities try to deny responsibility for brothels. These stations were allegedly only a private initiative, and the girls went there voluntarily, as announced in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe. Only under pressure from the United States, Canada and Europe did the Japanese finally have to admit their guilt, apologize and start paying compensation to the former "comfort women".

And, of course, one cannot help but recall Detachment 731, a special unit of the Japanese army engaged in the development of biological weapons, whose inhuman experiments on people would make the most seasoned Nazi executioner turn pale.

Be that as it may, the Japanese army in World War II is remembered as examples of endless courage and following a sense of duty, as well as inhuman cruelty and disgusting deeds. But neither one nor the other helped the Japanese when they were utterly defeated by the troops of the allies, among whom was my great-uncle, who beat the samurai in Manchuria in forty-five.

Japan in World War II. Photos from the fronts.

But not strategically. For the next three years, the Japanese defended the occupied territories with incredible tenacity, which shocked everyone who was forced to fight with them. For 14 years, from September 1931 to September 1945, the Japanese Imperial Army fought endless battles in a vast area from the frozen expanses of Northern China and the Aleutian Islands to the tropical forests of Burma and New Guinea. As an instrument of imperial ambitions, it seized the vast territories of Asia, and millions of people from China to the remote islands of the South Pacific became subjects of the Japanese emperor. The first flight of pilots of the Special Kamikaze Strike Force was made in October 1944 in Leyte Gulf in the Philippines. Japan by this point, after the defeat at the Battle of Midway, had lost the initiative in the Great East Asian War. On July 15, 1944, the Americans captured the island of Saipan, one of the key bases in the defensive system of the Japanese Empire. This gave the US the ability to launch air raids on the main Japanese islands using long-range B-29 bombers. Then, logically, the capture of the Philippine Islands by the Americans, which were also supposed to be the base for attacks on Japan, should have followed. In addition, the fact that the Philippines is located between Japan and the territory of the oil fields of Southeast Asia in Sumatra and Borneo was strategically important. On October 17, 1944, US forces began landing on the island of Suluan, which lies at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. The next day, the Imperial Headquarters of the Supreme High Command announced the launch of Operation Sho No. 1 (Sho 勝 - Japanese "victory") to defend the Philippines. Admiral Kurita's fleet, stationed in Borneo, was tasked with attacking Leyte Gulf and destroying US forces. Admiral Ozawa's fleet was tasked with diverting the attention of the enemy. The fleets of Admirals Nishimura and Sima were assigned the role of mobile forces. Support for the operation was entrusted to the First Air Fleet. However, by that time, the First Air Fleet had only 40 aircraft, of which 34 were Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, 1 reconnaissance aircraft, 3 Nakajima B6N Tenzan torpedo bombers, 1 Mitsubishi G4M type 1 bomber and 2 Yokosuka P1Y1 Ginga medium bombers. In order to enable the mobile forces to destroy the American ground forces in Leyte Gulf, it was necessary to stop the advance of the operational formations of the enemy fleet. The task of the First Air Fleet was to contain the squadrons of Americans approaching the Philippines, but with 40 aircraft this was impossible. In this difficult situation, the First Air Fleet formed the Kamikaze Special Strike Corps for the first time. The commander of the First Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Onishi Takijiro, went down in history under the name of the "father of the kamikaze." Vice Admiral Onisi was assigned to Manila on October 17, 1944. Two days later, he arrived at the headquarters of the 201st Naval Air Corps, where a historic meeting was held. Gathering the officers, the vice admiral proposed the tactics of suicide pilots. He said that, in his opinion, in combat operations against the US fleet, which began landing on the Philippine Islands on October 17, 1944, there is no other way but to load a 250-kilogram bomb into an aircraft and ram an American aircraft carrier on it. This would put the ships out of action for at least a week, thus giving time for an operation to defend the Philippines. The proposal sparked a debate. The commander of the 201st Air Corps, Commander (Captain 2nd Rank) Asaichi Tamai, who was to become responsible for the formation of kamikaze detachments, objected to Vice Admiral Onishi that he could not make such decisions in the absence of his immediate superior captain (Captain 1st rank) Sakai Yamamoto, who at that moment was in the hospital. Onishi stated that he had already discussed everything with Captain Yamamoto and received his consent, which was not true. Commander Tamai asked for a moment of reflection and withdrew with his assistant, Lieutenant Shijuku, to discuss the Vice Admiral's proposal. Finally, Tamai agreed with the vice admiral's arguments and reported his agreement to him. The decision to create a special kamikaze strike squad was made. After lining up 23 pilot cadets who were trained under his personal supervision, Commander Tamai asked if there were any volunteers to make a suicide attack on the ships of the American fleet. All pilots raised their hands. The 23-year-old lieutenant Seki Yukio, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was appointed commander of a special kamikaze strike detachment. From the very beginning, he did not share the views of the command on the use of kamikaze tactics, but the order for a Japanese officer is sacred. When Commander Tamai asked Seki if he was willing to accept the assignment, the lieutenant briefly closed his eyes and stood with his head down. Then he looked at the commander and replied that he was ready to complete the task. Thus, the first 24 suicide pilots were selected. At the same time, the squadron of suicide pilots was officially given the name "Simpu" - "Wind of the Gods" (神風). In the European tradition, a different reading of this combination of hieroglyphs has taken root - "kamikaze". The reason for the discrepancies was the Japanese features of reading hieroglyphs. In Japanese, there is actually a Japanese version of reading hieroglyphic writing (kun'yomi) and a Chinese version (on'yomi). In kun'yomi, 神風 is read as "kamikaze". According to onyomi - "simpu". Also, units of Japanese suicide pilots were called tokko-tai 特攻隊 - special squad. It is short for tokubetsu ko:geki tai 特別攻撃隊 - Special Strike Force. The squadron consisted of four units - Shikishima 敷島, Yamato 大和, Asahi 朝日, Yamazakura 山桜. The names were taken from a poem by the Japanese classical poet and philologist Motoori Norinaga, who lived in the 18th century: If someone asks about the native Japanese (Yamato) spirit of Japan (Sikishima) - These are mountain sakura flowers (Yamazakura), fragrant In the rays of the rising sun (Asahi ). Shikishima no Yamato-gokoro wo hito towaba, asahi ni niou yamazakura bana. The first sorties of the suicide squadron were unsuccessful, they could not even find the enemy. Finally, on October 25, 1944, Seki Yukio's squadron, consisting of five A6M2 Model 21 Zero fighters, each carrying a 250-kilogram charge, once again took off on a mission from the Mabalakat airbase. Escort was carried out by a detachment of four fighters, among which was the famous ace Hiroyoshi Nishizawa. Seki Yukio's squadron located and attacked four escort carriers from Task Force Taffy 3 under the command of Vice Admiral Clifton Sprague. As a result of this attack, the aircraft carrier St. lo (CVE-63). On the aircraft carrier Kalinin Bay (CVE-68), the flight deck was seriously damaged, an ammunition depot was blown up, and until January 18, 1945, the ship was under repair at the San Diego docks. The damage to the other two ships was less significant. It was the first successful attack by suicide pilots. Seki Yukio became the first kamikaze to successfully complete a combat mission. According to Hiroyoshi Nishizawa (who died the day after the first kamikaze attack), Seki Yukio attacked the aircraft carrier St. Lo. His plane fell on the ship, the bomb pierced the flight deck and exploded below, in the hangars, where refueling and repair of aircraft took place. Fuel flared up, followed by six explosions, including torpedo and bomb storage. The fire engulfed the ship and it sank within half an hour. Before the flight, he gave an interview to the correspondent of the imperial news agency Domei. In it, Seki Yukio said: "The future of Japan is unenviable if it makes its best pilots die. I'm not going on this mission for the sake of the Emperor or the Empire... I'm going because I was ordered to!" any battering ram and would return back. "During the flight, he said in a radio exchange:" It is better to die than to live as a coward. that I must "fall" [a euphemism for death in battle; referring to the fall of cherry blossoms] before I could do more for you than I did. As a military wife, I know you were ready for that outcome. Take good care of your parents I'm leaving, and countless memories of our lives pop up in my memory. nie, Yukio dedicated a poem: Fall, my disciples, My cherry blossom petals, How I fall, Having served our country. Seki wrote to his parents: Dear father and dear mother! Now the nation is on the verge of defeat, and we can overcome this problem only if everyone personally pays his debt to the Empire for her good deeds. In this regard, those who have chosen the path of the military are deprived of any choice whatsoever. You know that I attached myself to the parents of Mariko [Seki Yukio's wife] with all my heart. I cannot write to them about this grave news. So please let them know about everything yourself. Japan is the Great Empire, and they require me to make a suicide ram to repay the Imperial Grace. I've come to terms with it. Submissive to you to the end, Yukio Sources: 1. Albert Axell and Hideaki Kase. Kamikaze. Japan's Suicide Gods. Pearson Education, London, 2002 2. The Sacred Warriors: Japan's Suicide Legions. Denis and Peggy Warner with Commander Sadao Seno Van Nostrand Reinhold. 1982. Translation: Takamatsu 1945 Instruction for Kamikaze Pilots In May 1945 Major Hayashino, Commander of the Shimoshizu Aviation Unit stationed near Tokyo, issued a Manual for Kamikaze Pilots called "Basic Instructions for Tokko Pilots" The 88-page book explained in detail how to cause maximum damage to an enemy ship, what to do and what to think during the approach to the target and in the last few seconds before the collision.Manual says that after a heroic death, kamikaze pilots will enter the host of Shinto deities kami, like their comrades who died earlier, the meeting with which the kamikaze will be beyond the death line. The instruction was issued to the pilots. He was ordered to be kept in the cockpit in case there was an urgent need to inquire about something. Here are the most interesting excerpts from the document. Page 3 Tokko Squad Mission Transcend the boundaries of life and death. When you drop all thoughts of life and death, you can completely neglect your earthly life. You will also be able to focus on destroying the enemy with unwavering determination, while strengthening the excellence of your flying skills. Show all your best qualities. Defeat enemy ships both at the pier and at sea. Drown the enemy and thereby prepare the way for the victory of our people. Page 12: Take walks around the airfield Pay attention to your surroundings during these walks. This airstrip is the key to the success or failure of your mission. Give all your attention to her. Study the soil. What are the characteristics of the soil? What is the length and width of the runway? If you are taking off from the road or in a field, what is the exact direction of your flight? At what point do you expect to get off the ground? If you take off at dusk or early in the morning, or after sunset, what are the obstacles to remember: an electric pylon, a tree, a house, a hill? Page 13: How to fly a fully equipped aircraft that is so dear to you Before takeoff. By bringing the aircraft to the starting position on the runway, you can draw in your imagination your target in detail. Take three deep breaths. Mentally say: yakyujo, 野球場 (Translated from Japanese - baseball field. Even before the war, baseball was played in Japan, while the game was seen as a martial art that strengthens the spirit and body. The thought of baseball was supposed to contribute to strong-willed concentration). Start straight ahead on the runway or you could damage the landing gear. Immediately after takeoff, circle over the runway. It should be done at a height of at least 200 meters, at an angle of 5 degrees, keeping the nose pointing down. Page 15: Principles Everyone Should Know Maintain your health in the best possible condition. If you are not in the best physical shape, then you will not be able to achieve complete success in a suicide ram (tai-atari). Just as you can't fight well on an empty stomach, you can't skillfully control a plane if you're suffering from diarrhea, and you can't coolly assess a situation if you're tormented by a fever. Be always pure in heart and cheerful. A faithful warrior is pure in heart and a loving son. Achieve a high level of spiritual preparation. In order to reach the top of your abilities, you need to actively work on yourself internally. Some say that spirit is more important than skill, but this is not true. Spirit and skill are one. These two elements must be improved together. The spirit supports the skill, and the skill supports the spirit. Page 21: Mission Abort and Return to Base In the event of bad weather, when you cannot locate the target, or other adverse circumstances, you may decide to return to base. Do not give up. Don't sacrifice your life too easily. Small emotions should not own you. Think about how you could best protect your homeland. Remember what the air wing commander told you. You must return to base with a light heart and no remorse. Page 22: Reverse Course and Landing at Base Drop the bomb in the area designated for this by the commanding officer. Fly in circles over the airfield. Carefully study the condition of the airstrip. If you feel nervous, urinate. Then find out the direction and speed of the wind. Do you see the holes on the runway? Take three deep breaths. Page 23: Attack Attack with one aircraft. Upon reaching the target visibility, remove the safety pin (bombs). Head towards your target at full speed. Pique! Take the enemy by surprise. Don't give the enemy time to retaliate. Attack! Remember: the enemy can change course, be prepared for an evasive maneuver from the enemy. Be alert and avoid enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire. Page 33: Dive attack The option depends on the type of aircraft. If you approach the enemy from 6000 meters, adjust your speed twice. If from a height of 4000 meters - adjust the speed once. When you begin your dive, you must match the altitude at which you launch your last attack with your speed. Avoid overspeeding and too steep dive angles that make the aircraft's control systems less responsive to your touch. However, too small an angle of attack will result in reduced speed and insufficient impact in a collision.

Good World Evil (Myth)

The Japanese small arms of the Second World War period are little known outside the Land of the Rising Sun itself, although many of these samples are extremely interesting because they are an original mixture of peculiar national traditions formed under the influence of foreign samples.

By the beginning of the war, Japan came up as the most industrialized country in Asia. In those years, the Japanese arms industry, which was formed in 1870-1890, included both state arsenals and private arms firms. But the beginning of active hostilities in 1941 revealed a sharp lag in production volumes from the needs of the army and navy. It was decided to expand the production of weapons by connecting a number of civil engineering and metalworking firms to the military program. Speaking about the weapons production in Japan of that period, it is necessary to mention: the backlog of the technical base led to the fact that when all industrialized countries switched to new technologies in the manufacture of small arms (stamping parts from sheet steel, welding, etc.), the Japanese continued to use traditional methods of processing on metal-cutting machine tools, which constrained the growth of output and affected its cost.

The experience of waging war in China and the battles at Lake Khasan forced the Japanese command to bring its concept of combat in line with the requirements of modern warfare. In October 1939, a new field manual for the Japanese army was adopted, which became the guide for the ground forces until the end of the war in 1945. It noted that the main type of hostilities is the offensive, which had the goal of "surrounding and destroying the enemy on the battlefield." The charter gave priority to the infantry over other branches of the military. For a more effective solution of tasks on the battlefield, its maximum saturation with automatic weapons was assumed.

In 1941, the Japanese rifle division was armed with: rifles - 10369, bayonets - 16724 (some infantrymen were armed only with bayonets), light machine guns - 110, PTR - 72. The cavalry brigades were armed with: carbines - 2134, sabers - 1857, light machine guns - 32, heavy machine guns - 16, heavy machine guns - 8. This, perhaps, was enough for the war in China, but by that time it was clearly not enough.

One of the main miscalculations made during the war years by the Japanese military command can also be attributed to the fact that, having made the main bet on machine guns as the most important means of infantry weapons, in time it could not appreciate the full significance of new types of small arms for modern warfare - submachine guns and self-loading rifles. The lost time, as well as the heavy losses of personnel in the infantry units, suffered by the Japanese in the battles for the islands in the Pacific theater of operations in 1942-1944 were caused precisely by the lack of much-needed infantry support weapons.

Speaking of Japanese weapons, it is necessary to dwell in more detail on its complicated designation. It, as a rule, consists of a two-digit number - according to the last years of the adoption of this model for service. The chronology in Japan began from 660 BC and was carried out according to the periods of the reign of emperors. Emperor Meiji ruled from 1868 to 1911, so the designation of the rifle "type 38" corresponds to the 1905 model. From 1912 to 1925, Emperor Taisho ruled, in accordance with this, the Type 3 easel machine gun is a model adopted by the Japanese army in 1914. Since 1926, the throne of the Land of the Rising Sun was taken by Emperor Hirohito. Under him, the name of small arms samples received a double interpretation. Thus, weapons adopted in 1926-1940 had a designation according to the last years of the common Japanese calendar, i.e. began in 2588 (1926). In 1940, in the 16th year of the Showa era (reign of Hirohito), the Japanese calendar turned 2600 years old, therefore, in order not to be associated with a multi-digit complex designation, it was decided to consider the year 2600 as 100, and when identifying weapons, omit the number for simplicity "10", leaving "0". So, the 1940 model submachine gun was called the "type 100", and the type 5 rifle became the 1944 model.

In Japan in those years, the development of small arms was led by the army weapons department, which subordinated all research institutes and institutions working on the creation of weapons. The designers tried to make the most of the achievements of Western countries in weapons, combined with the features of the national identity inherent in the Japanese. In developing new models of weapons, they sought to minimize their weight and size characteristics, first of all, the specific conditions of future theaters of military operations were taken into account. As confirmation of this, one can cite the fact that all Japanese machine guns developed in the 1920-1930s had an air-cooled barrel, enhanced by the use of multi-tiered transverse cooling fins, since it was supposed to fight in the waterless semi-desert spaces of China.

By the beginning of World War II, the armament of the Japanese army consisted of both outdated small arms, which were used mainly to equip the territorial units of the occupying forces on the continent and in the metropolis, and the latest models, which were mainly in service with the line units.

SHORTS

Japanese tanker with a pistol
"Nambu" "type 14"

The personal weapons of the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War were diverse.

Among other examples of short-barreled weapons, one of the oldest models was the Hino revolver, created at the end of the 19th century. Numerous advantages of the mechanism of automatic extraction of spent cartridges of the Smith-Wesson system served as the basis for the creation of many copies and analogues on this basis. In Japan, after a thorough study of European and American designs of small arms, the Smith-Wesson revolver of the 3rd model was taken as the basis for the development of the first modern sample of short-barreled weapons. A new, quite perfect for its time, 9-mm revolver was adopted in 1893 by the imperial army under the designation "type 26" (26th year of the Meiji era). The mechanism for extracting spent cartridges was turned on when the frame was opened and the barrel was tilted down. However, the designer Hino improved the analogue of the American revolver in a very peculiar way, almost completely changing its assembly and disassembly. The Japanese revolver received the left cheek of the frame, reclining on a hinge, which greatly facilitated access to the firing mechanism. Thus, when disassembling this revolver, it was not necessary to unscrew a single screw, which affected the high service and operational qualities of the weapon. Hino revolvers were produced by the Koshigawa arsenal in Tokyo until the beginning of this century. In total, more than 50,000 revolvers were produced.

Soon the pistol replaced the revolver in the Japanese army. The first Japanese pistol of its own design was the 8mm pistol, created by General Kijiro Nambu. It had two names: the Nambu "type A" automatic pistol and the "type 4" pistol. This sample served as the basis for the creation of a number of new Japanese pistols. Automation pistol "type 4" worked on the principle of using recoil with a short stroke of the barrel. The barrel bore was locked by a swinging latch. The peculiarity of this pistol is an automatic fuse installed in the front wall of the pistol grip. In accordance with the ideas of that time, the Nambu pistol, as a model of a military weapon, had an attached holster-butt with a telescopic clip for mounting in the pistol grip. During the Second World War, type 4 pistols were used only by soldiers and non-commissioned officers, who, according to the state, were given personal weapons. The main short-barreled weapons of personal self-defense of Japanese officers of all branches of the armed forces in the 1930-1940s were 8-mm pistols "type 14" and "type 94".

The Type 14 8mm pistol (1925) was created by the small arms design section at the Tokyo arsenal in Koishikawa under the direction of K. Nambu. This weapon had a fairly thoughtful and rational design with a simplified manufacturing technology. The automation of the pistol worked on the principle of recoil with a short barrel stroke. There were two types of fuses - external, flag type, and internal, locking the trigger with the magazine removed. Its main difference from the previous sample "Nambu" "type A" is two return springs, symmetrically located on the sides of the bolt, instead of one, asymmetrically installed in the "type 4" pistol. The weapon was designed to use a special 8 mm Nambu pistol cartridge. In 1937-1938, taking into account the experience of combat operations in Manchuria, the type 14 pistol was modernized. He received an enlarged so-called "winter" trigger guard for shooting with gloves and a stronger magazine locking mechanism.

The Type 94 8mm pistol (1934) was developed by Lieutenant General Kijiro Nambu to equip pilots and tank crews. Until the early 1940s, this pistol had a good finish, but during the war, the requirements for exterior finishes dropped sharply, some parts began to be produced from low-grade materials.

The Japanese Air Force unofficially used the 7mm Baby Nambu pistol, based on the Type 4 pistol. This sample was released in an amount of just over 6500 pieces.

RIFLES

Japanese infantryman with a rifle
"Arisaka" "type 99"

The main weapon of the Japanese infantry during the war years continued to be Arisaka magazine rifles with a longitudinally sliding bolt, which were the main weapon of the infantry of the Japanese army for half a century. In 1896-1897, the Japanese weapons designer Colonel Nariake Arisaka, who worked at the Koshikawa Imperial Artillery Arsenal in Tokyo, took the design of the Mauser rifle, model 1896, as the basis for creating a new model. rifle and cavalry carbine "Arisaka" "type 30" (mod. 1897), developed simultaneously with a 6.5-mm rifle cartridge with a semi-flange sleeve. These weapons belonged to magazine rifles with a sliding bolt with a turn. The bolt largely copied the bolt "Mauser". Locking was carried out by two lugs located on the stem of the shutter. In 1899, the Koshikawa arsenal began production of 6.5 mm Arisaka rifles and carbines. Despite the good ballistic qualities, all the advantages inherent in the Arisaka rifles were nullified by the capricious and unreliable locking mechanism, since it gave frequent failures at the slightest contamination or dusting of the shutter. A lot of complaints were caused by a complex bolt trigger, which consisted of small parts, the design of the fuse was significantly degraded compared to the German prototype. But the "Arisaka" "type 30" rifles continued to serve for many years. If during the Russo-Japanese and First World Wars they were used as a standard model, then during the Second World War they were in service mainly with training and auxiliary units stationed in Korea and China.

The thirties were a time of extensive renewal of the arsenals of the Japanese army and the modernization of weapons in accordance with the requirements of modern mobile combat. In 1937, the army received a modernized version of the Type 38 rifle - a 6.5-mm Type 97 sniper rifle (Model 1937), which differed from the standard model by the presence of a 2.5x optical sight mounted on the forearm light wire bipods to stabilize the weapon when firing and a bolt handle bent down.

Japanese paratrooper with a rifle
"Arisaka" "type 02" for the Airborne Forces

At the same time, the Japanese military industry began producing Type 38 carbines for the airborne troops. The development of military art and the emergence of a new concept of combat tactics for a new type of troops led the Japanese to the need to create specialized weapons and equipment, including light and compact small arms. The simplest way out of this situation was the modernization of existing standard weapons. A 6.5-mm Type 38 carbine for the Airborne Forces also belonged to a similar weapon. Due to the specifics of the application, it had a folding butt, which rotated on a hinge around its axis by 180 degrees and adjoined the forearm on the right side. These carbines were widely used during the landing operations of the Japanese airborne units of the Navy in the Pacific Islands in 1941-1942.

The large-scale war in China, which the Japanese waged since 1931, clearly showed the advantages of modern Western weapons, which were in service with Chiang Kai-shek's army, over many samples of Japanese small arms. In order to equalize the capabilities of the opposing sides, Japanese gunsmiths, after a series of scientific studies, began to develop a new, more powerful cartridge of an increased caliber - 7.7 mm. In 1939, another design of the 7.7 mm flangeless rifle cartridge "type 99" (sample 1939) appeared. Arsenals in Nagoya and Kokura began to create new rifles and carbines for these cartridges. At the end of 1939, the Ordnance Department chose from a variety of designs submitted for the competition a weapon system designed by the Toriimatsu factory from the Nagoya weapons arsenal. It consisted of 7.7 mm long and short Type 99 rifles. To fully standardize all infantry weapons in the Japanese armed forces in 1942, a new Type 99 sniper rifle was adopted.

submachine guns

Japanese Marine with
submachine gun
"Bergmann" model 1920

For quite a long time, little attention in Japan was paid to such a promising type of automatic small arms as submachine guns. In the early twenties, in order to study the best practices in the use of the latest models of small arms by European armies, the Japanese purchased a small batch of Bergmann submachine guns mod from the Swiss arms company SIG. 1920 chambered for the 7.63mm Mauser pistol cartridge. Especially for Japan, this weapon was equipped with a magazine with an increased capacity of 50 rounds.

With the adoption of this weapon for partial armament of the Japanese armed forces, it did not end up in the ground forces, where, in theory, it should have brought the greatest benefit, but in the fleet. For a long time, Bergmann submachine guns were in trial operation. Their first combat use refers to the war in China, where they were used only by reconnaissance and sabotage units of the Marine Corps. The advantages and disadvantages of submachine guns for a long time were not fully disclosed by the Japanese high command.

Japanese paratrooper
with
submachine gun
"type 100" for
Airborne

The lack of demand by the ground forces for such powerful automatic weapons as submachine guns led to the fact that the pioneers in their mass introduction in the mid-1930s were the newly formed troops - the airborne and marines. Only after repeated appeals to the high command of the Japanese armed forces to adopt submachine guns, the army weapons department in 1935 developed tactical and technical specifications for the creation of a new type of weapon. After a series of studies, Nambu presented a modified sample of the Type 3 submachine gun. Ground tests confirmed the conclusions of the weapons control commission on the compliance of this modernized model with the tasks set, and already in 1940 it was adopted by the Marine Corps under the designation - 8-mm submachine gun "type 100" (1940). Its design features include a relatively low rate of fire - 450 rounds per minute, which made it possible to control the weapon when firing, which was achieved due to the rather large mass of the shutter.

It was this quality, which influenced the high accuracy of fire from the Type 100 submachine gun (unlike many other samples of this weapon), that immediately appealed to the Japanese soldiers, who highly appreciated it. During the war, the submachine gun underwent two modifications. For the Airborne Forces, its compact version was developed with a butt folding on a hinge, and for the infantry - with a non-folding butt and wire bipods attached to the barrel casing. But this submachine gun never became a weapon that fully satisfied all the requests and wishes of the army. After a number of works on improving the weapon, based on the study of the combat experience of its use, in 1944 it underwent a deep modernization, although it retained the same "type 100" index. The submachine gun of the 1944 model was distinguished by an increased rate of fire - 800 rounds per minute, the presence of a permanent diopter sight instead of an open sector sight, the introduction of a new part - a compensator - into the design of the barrel casing, as well as a protrusion-tide for installing a bayonet instead of the previous underbarrel cylinder. This weapon was used quite effectively by the Japanese Marine Corps in battles in Southeast Asia at the final stage of World War II.

MACHINE GUNS

The main type of collective small arms in the Japanese army during the Second World War were machine guns. The first machine gun adopted in 1902 in Japan was the Hotchkiss machine gun mod. 1897. It was the basis on which almost all Japanese machine guns were subsequently created.

This machine gun was modernized by General Nambu in 1914, and under the designation "6.5-mm heavy machine gun" type 3 "(1914)" since then it has been used in almost all aggressive wars undertaken by the Land of the Rising Sun, until the end of the Second world in 1945.

Japanese machine gunner
with light machine gun "type 99"

In 1922, the first 6.5 mm "type 11" light machine gun (sample 1922) of Japanese design was adopted by the Japanese army. This machine gun has many peculiar features. His automation worked on the principle of removing powder gases from the bore. Locking was carried out by a wedge moving in a vertical plane. To enhance heat transfer, the barrel and barrel casing had numerous transverse cooling fins.

In the mid-1930s, a new type 97 machine gun (1937) was created, which became the main tank machine gun of the Japanese army during the Second World War. Its design largely copies the Czechoslovak ZB-26 light machine gun.

In the course of the war, the urgent need to create a special weapon that meets all the requirements of the airborne troops was revealed. Japanese paratroopers needed special types of light, compact, but at the same time quite powerful weapons. The Arsenal in Nagoya developed a modification of the 7.7 mm Type 99 light machine gun (mod. 1943) for the Airborne Forces. Its main feature was the possibility of easy disassembly into several parts: the barrel, gas system, receiver unit, stock and magazine. This was done at the request of the command of the Airborne Forces, because. automatic weapons were dropped in containers, separate from the paratroopers. To reduce the size, the pistol fire control handle in the transport position was folded under the trigger guard, and the additional emphasis on the butt was folded forward. The disassembly and assembly of these weapons was carried out very quickly, allowing the paratroopers to bring their weapons into combat position in a matter of minutes after landing.

ANTI-TANK GUN AND HAND ANTI-TANK Grenade Launchers

The rapid development of armored vehicles around the world forced the command of the Mikado army in the 1930s to look for effective means of countering the armored fists of their potential opponents. The imperial army at that time did not actually possess weapons suitable for confronting the new danger. The task was set to develop in the shortest possible time reliable infantry melee weapons suitable for anti-tank defense.

easel machine gun "type 92"

At first, the design of a universal heavy machine gun seemed to be the most promising, which could be used to fight both armored ground targets and enemy aircraft. Already in 1933, the 13.2-mm Type 93 heavy machine gun and its modification, the Type 92, were adopted by the Japanese army (it was installed as the main on-board weapon on tanks). It was, in fact, only a slightly modified French heavy machine gun "Hotchkiss". However, the great difficulties encountered in establishing the production of this complex and expensive model forced the Japanese to abandon the development of a line for the development of universal heavy machine guns.

A different fate awaited anti-tank guns. At somewhat lower costs in the production of anti-tank guns, they had no less, if not equivalent, efficiency of use than anti-tank machine guns. After a series of studies, the Japanese took the design of the Swiss 20-mm Hispano-Suiza aircraft gun as the basis for the new self-loading PTR. On its basis, an original sample of a heavy self-loading anti-tank rifle was soon created. And already in 1937, the 20-mm Type 97 anti-tank rifle was adopted by the Japanese infantry.

The first combat use of anti-tank rifles "type 97" refers to the war in China, and then they were used in battles with the Red Army near Lake Khasan (1938) and on the river. Khalkhin-Gol (1939). But the advantages and disadvantages of anti-tank rifles for a long time were not disclosed by the Japanese high command. According to Soviet sources, a 20-mm anti-tank rifle pierced 30-mm armor at distances up to 400-500 m. infantry practically unarmed in close combat. The changed conditions of the battle required new approaches for an extraordinary and urgent solution to the problem that had so suddenly arisen before the Japanese command.

Work on the creation of truly effective anti-tank weapons began to be carried out in Japan too late, and with the exception of a few, in fact, experimental models of anti-tank rifles and grenade launchers, nothing was created until the end of the war.

The Second World War clearly revealed the weaknesses inherent in the economy of militaristic Japan, showing the impossibility of meeting the growing needs of the armed forces without overcoming internal contradictions, including those between the army and navy. The Japanese army was inferior to the armed forces of many belligerent states in terms of the level of technical perfection, in terms of the degree of saturation of the troops with automatic weapons.

On August 23, 1939, the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union. Less than a year later, on April 13, 1941, another treaty was signed in Moscow, now on neutrality between the USSR and Japan. The purpose of the conclusion of this pact was the same as at the conclusion: at least for a while to delay the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Second World War, both in the West and in the East.

At that time, it was also important for the Japanese to prevent the beginning with the USSR until the moment that they (the Japanese) would consider favorable for themselves. This is the essence of the so-called “ripe persimmon” strategy. That is, the Japanese always wanted to attack the Soviet Union, but they were afraid. They needed a situation where the USSR would be involved in a war in the West, weaken, withdraw its main forces in order to save the situation in the European part of the country. And this will allow the Japanese, with little bloodshed, as they said, to grab everything that they aimed at back in 1918, when they made the intervention.

The Japanese logic actually worked: Germany attacked the Soviet Union, there was a clash, but the Japanese never carried out their aggressive plans. Why?

On July 2, 1941, an imperial meeting was held at which the question was decided: what to do next in the conditions of the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union? Hit the North, help Germany and have time to capture what was planned, that is, the Far East and Eastern Siberia? Or go south, because, as you know, an embargo was announced, and the Japanese faced the prospect of an oil famine?

Japanese infantry during the attack on Hong Kong, December 1941. (pinterest)

The Navy was in favor of going south, because without oil it would be extremely difficult for Japan to continue the war. The army, traditionally aimed at the Soviet Union, insisted on one in a thousand chances, as it called it, to take advantage of the Soviet-German war in order to achieve its goals against the USSR.

Why couldn't they? Everything has already been prepared. The Kwantung Army, which was located on the border with the Soviet Union, was reinforced, brought to 750 thousand. A schedule was drawn up for the conduct of the war, a date was set - August 29, 1941, when Japan was to treacherously stab the USSR in the back.

But, as they say, it didn't happen. The Japanese themselves recognize this. Two factors intervened...

Yes! Why was 29 August set as the deadline? Because then autumn, thaw. Japan had experience of winter warfare, which ended extremely unfavorably for her.

Hitler's Blitzkrieg: Strategy Failure

So, the first thing is that he did not fulfill his promise to carry out a blitzkrieg and capture Moscow in 2-3 months, as planned. That is, "the persimmon is not ripe." And the second, most important thing, is that he nevertheless showed restraint and did not reduce the number of troops in and in Siberia as much as the Japanese wanted. (The Japanese planned for the Soviet leader to reduce the troops by 2/3, but he reduced them by about half. And this did not allow the Japanese, who remembered the lessons of Hasan, to hit the Soviet Union in the back from the East).

Leaders of the "Big Three" of the anti-Hitler coalition. (pinterest)

Note that from the side of the allies, that is, from the side of the Third Reich, pressure was exerted on Japan. When Matsuoko, the Japanese Foreign Minister, visited Berlin as early as April 1941, Hitler believed that he could easily deal with the Soviet Union and would not need the help of the Japanese. He sent the Japanese south, to Singapore, to Malaya. For what? In order to pin down the forces of the Americans and the British there so that they do not use them in Europe.

And yet, in February 1945, at the time, Stalin violated the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact: the USSR entered the war with militaristic Japan at the urgent request of its allies.

Interesting fact. The day after, Roosevelt turned to Stalin with a request to help in the war with Japan, to open a second front in the Far East. Naturally, Stalin could not do this then. He very politely explained that, after all, Germany was the main enemy for the USSR at that time, he made it clear that let's first defeat the Reich, and then return to this issue. And, indeed, they returned. In 1943, in Tehran, Stalin promised, after the victory over Germany, to enter the war with Japan. And that really encouraged the Americans. By the way, they stopped planning serious ground operations, expecting that this role would be performed by the Soviet Union.

But then the situation began to change when the Americans felt that they were about to have an atomic bomb. If Roosevelt was completely "for" the second front and repeatedly asked Stalin about it, then Truman, having come to power, was anti-Soviet. After all, it is he who owns the phrase said after Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union: "Let them kill each other as much as possible ...".

But Truman, having become president, found himself in a very serious position. On the one hand, the entry of the Soviet Union into Japan for political reasons was extremely unfavorable for him, since this gave Stalin the right to vote in settling affairs in East Asia. And it's not just Japan. This is a huge China, the countries of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the military, although they counted on the effect of the atomic bomb, were not sure that the Japanese would surrender. And so it happened.

Soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army surrender. Iwo Jima, 5 April 1945. (Pinterest)

It is worth noting that Stalin did not know the date of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima. In Potsdam, Truman outside, let's say, the framework of the conference, somewhere during a coffee break, in agreement with Stalin, approached Stalin and said that the United States had created a bomb of enormous power. Stalin, to the surprise of the American president, did not react at all. Truman and Churchill even thought that he did not understand what was at stake. But Stalin understood everything perfectly.

But the Americans knew very well about the date of entry of the Soviet army into the war against Japan. In mid-May 1945, Truman specially sent his assistant Hopkins to the USSR, instructing Ambassador Harriman to clarify this issue. And Stalin openly said: "By August 8, we will be ready to begin operations in Manchuria."

Kwantung Army. Is it a million?

A few words about the Kwantung Army. Quite often, politicians and historians use the term "million-strong Kwantung Army". Was it really so? The fact is that the word "million strong" means, in fact, the Kwantung Army, plus 250 thousand troops of the puppet regime of Manchukuo, created on the territory of occupied Manchuria, plus several tens of thousands of troops of the Mongol prince De Wang, plus a rather strong grouping in Korea, troops on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Now, if all this is combined, then we will get a millionth army.

In this regard, the question arises: “Why did the Japanese lose? They're not the worst fighters, are they?" It must be said that the victory of the USSR over Japan was the highest manifestation of the operational art and strategy that had been accumulated by the Soviet Union during the years of the war with Nazi Germany. Here we must pay tribute to the Soviet command, which brilliantly carried out this operation. The Japanese simply did not have time to do anything. Everything was lightning fast. It was a real Soviet blitzkrieg.