Yudenich's campaign against Petrograd. Yudenich's second campaign against Petrograd

The material reflects the official Soviet point of view. P. Pozern, I. V. Stalin, R. I. Berzin) and the Baltic Fleet (head of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea A. P. Zelenoy, member of the Revolutionary Military Council A. V. Baranov, V. I. Zof) to protect Petrograd from White Guards and interventionists in May - November during the Civil War 1918-20.

The capture of Petrograd was an important part of the strategic plans of the Entente and the White Guards, this task was entrusted to the White Guard troops formed on the territory of Estonia and Finland and led by General N. N. Yudenich.

The beginning of the offensive against Petrograd was planned for the summer of 1919, but in connection with the defeat of Kolchak's troops as a result of the counter-offensive of the Eastern Front in 1919, the Entente forced the White Guards to advance in the northwest. On May 13, the Northern Corps, under General A.P. Rodzianko (about 6 thousand bayonets and cavalry), with the support of the 1st Estonian division (about 6 thousand people) and the English squadron of Admiral Cowen, went on the offensive in the Narva direction. An auxiliary strike in the Gdov-Pskov direction was delivered by the White Guard detachment of S. N. Bulak-Balakhovich and the 2nd Estonian division. On the Olonets direction in April, the Finnish, the so-called Olonets Volunteer Army, began active operations. The troops of the 7th Soviet Army (15.5 thousand bayonets and sabers, commander A.K. Remezov), scattered on the 600-km front from Onega to Lake Peipsi, despite heroic resistance, could not hold back the onslaught of the enemy, who managed to get out on the approaches to Gatchina and Krasnoye Selo. The White Guard underground in Petrograd was preparing a strike from the rear, and on June 13 the White Guards mutinied at the forts Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse, Obruchev and the minesweeper Kitoboy.

The revolutionary military council of the Baltic Fleet addressed the rebels with an ultimatum - to immediately stop the rebellion. The garrison of the fort "Obruchev" arrested the instigators and declared obedience to the Soviet government; the forts "Krasnaya Gorka" (25 guns of caliber from 76 to 305 mm) and "Grey Horse" (8 guns of caliber 120-152 mm) refused to fulfill the requirement of the RVS, counting on the support of the British fleet. On June 13-14, the artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet (2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers) and the Rif fort fired on the rebellious forts. On June 15, the coastal group (up to 4.5 thousand people) under the command of Sannikov, with the support of 2 armored trains, 2 armored cars and 2 destroyers, went on the offensive and knocked out the rebels (500 people) from positions on the outskirts of Krasnaya Gorka. The command of the rebellious forts, headed by the commandant of the Krasnaya Gorka fort, the former lieutenant Neklyudov, fled, and on June 16 the forts surrendered.

In the face of a serious danger hanging over Petrograd, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the Defense Council under the leadership of V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin) took urgent measures to strengthen the defense of Petrograd. On May 21, the Central Committee approved the appeal "To defend Petrograd", decided to mobilize communists and workers of the northwestern provinces to the Petrograd sector of the front, and on June 10 recognized it as the first important sector of the Western Front and suggested that the Commander-in-Chief be guided by this when distributing reinforcements. In pursuance of the instructions of the Central Committee, troops were sent to defend Petrograd, including those from the Eastern Front, as well as detachments of Petrograd workers. A group of senior officials arrived in the city, headed by I. V. Stalin, the extraordinary authorized representative of the Defense Council. The active detachment of the Baltic Fleet (41 ships, including 3 battleships, 1 cruiser, 10 destroyers, etc.) repelled repeated attacks by British torpedo boats and submarines and prevented landings on the coast of Koporsky Bay. On June 16, the combined actions of the ground forces and the navy, with the support of aviation, put an end to the mutiny in the forts. In the city, with the help of work detachments, the Chekists arrested counter-revolutionaries and confiscated over 6,000 rifles and other weapons. All this allowed the troops of the 7th Army on June 21 (about 23 thousand bayonets and sabers, commander since July 1 S. Matiyasevich) to launch a counteroffensive against the White Guard North-Western Army (16.5 thousand bayonets and sabers), deployed from the Northern corps, the 7th Army occupied Yamburg on August 5, and the troops of the 15th Army operating in the Pskov direction (commander A. I. Kork, from August 12 S. D. Kharlamov) liberated Pskov on August 26. During the Vidlitsk operation of 1919 in late June - early July, the Olonets Volunteer Army was defeated by Soviet troops. Yudenich's troops managed to hold the Narva-Gdov bridgehead and, with the material assistance of the Entente, to bring their combat strength to 18.5 thousand bayonets and sabers by the end of September. A new strike by Yudenich's troops, supported by 18,000. the Estonian army and the English squadron was supposed to contribute to the offensive of the troops of General A.I. Denikin on Moscow. On September 28, the White Guards struck at Struga-Belye - Luga against the left wing of the 7th Army (25.6 thousand bayonets and cavalry, commander from September 24 S. D. Kharlamov, from October 17 D. N. Reliable), and after distractions of part of its forces went on the offensive in the main Yamburg direction and on October 16 they occupied Krasnoe Selo and Gatchina, reaching the near approaches to Petrograd. On October 15, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) decided: "Do not surrender Petrograd." On October 19, V. I. Lenin’s appeal “To the Workers and Red Army Soldiers of Petrograd” was published with a call to fight to the last drop of blood for every inch of land. Significant reinforcements arrived from other fronts (including over 4,500 communists). In fierce battles, the troops of the 7th Army stopped the enemy, and on October 21 they went on the offensive in the Gatchina-Volosovsky direction. On October 25, the troops of the 15th Army (commander from September 24 A. I. Kork) began an offensive in the Luga-Volosovsky direction with the aim of deep coverage and encirclement of the main enemy grouping. After stubborn battles, the Whites were defeated and the Soviet troops liberated Yamburg on November 14. The remnants of the White Guard army managed to escape to the territory of Estonia, where they were disarmed by the Estonian government in early December. On February 2, 1920, a peace treaty was concluded with Estonia. The heroic defense of Petrograd and the defeat of Yudenich's troops were an important factor in ensuring the decisive victories of the Red Army over the combined forces of internal and external counter-revolution in 1919.

Sources: History of the Civil War in the USSR, vol. 4, M., 1959; Rybakov M.V., From the history of the civil war in the North-West in 1919, M., 1958; The heroic defense of Petrograd in 1919. (Memories of participants), L., 1959.

In September-October 1919, Yudenich organized a second campaign against Petrograd. On September 28, the Northwestern Army, together with the Estonian troops, broke through the defenses of the Red Army. On October 12, Yamburg fell, then Luga, Gatchina, and Krasnoye Selo were captured. The Whites entered the suburbs of Petrograd. But already on October 21, units of the Red Army first stopped the advance of the Whites, and then broke through their defenses. At what cost this was done, now it is even impossible to imagine. In November, Yudenich's troops were first pressed against the border, and then crossed into Estonian territory. There they were disarmed, interned and destroyed by the Estonians.
Employees of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, it is probably interesting to know that during Yudenich's campaign against Petrograd, the estate was destroyed Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov Ust-Ruditsa. In the village there was a manor complex and a factory for the production of colored glass and smalt that he opened.
Great books are being published these days. A book of memoirs by N. Reden “Through the Hell of the Russian Revolution. Memoirs of a midshipman. The book was published in the USA, the original title is The Unmaking of a Russian. Agree, a completely different name! Let's leave it on the conscience (if any) of the translator.
Youthful memories give, probably, a true picture of the tragic events. And the author of the memoirs himself evokes sympathy, primarily for his purposefulness, active position, intransigence towards enemies (Reds). From the book you can learn how Kolchak commanded the Black Sea Fleet, how the captured Red Army soldiers were treated, about the first blockade of Petrograd (1918-1919), about the tragic fate of Russian soldiers in Estonia after the defeat of the North-Western Army. The author's opinion about what forces could defeat the Bolsheviks is interesting.
I will limit myself to one passage, which describes the events of 90 years ago. The author tells how, sitting in a tank, he mowed down the defenders of Red Peter with machine-gun fire.

Pokazeev K.V.

Unloading British tanks in the port of Reval


“I was not surprised when I received an order to transfer from an armored train to a newly formed tank battalion. Parting with fellow officers and the crew of the armored train, of course, saddened me, but the prospect of service in a tank unit turned out to be tempting. In my case, the transfer to another military unit was influenced by two factors: firstly, the desire of my naval friends, who were already with the tanks, that I serve with them; secondly, my knowledge of English is at a working level.
Three large heavy tanks and two light tanks represented a significant Allied contribution to the Northwestern Army*. Being the latest weapons not yet used in Russia, the tanks arrived accompanied by 40 British officers and soldiers. The idea was that until the Russians learned how to drive cars, their crews would be formed half of the British ...
The Russians paid tribute to the motives that prompted the British officers to voluntarily join the fight against the Bolsheviks, the British, in turn, treated the Russians sensitively and tactfully ...
During the training, the tank battalion only once made a test sortie to the front, where it took part in one secondary attack. The rest of the time we spent in a military camp on the outskirts of Narva ...
The details of the offensive plan and the specific date were kept secret, but no one doubted its ultimate goal. In some inexplicable way, every soldier in the army felt that the command had decided not to be careful anymore and put everything on a sudden rush to Petrograd. If the attack on Petrograd failed, this would inevitably entail the collapse of the hopes of the White movement in northern Russia and the death of most of our soldiers ...
The tank battalion was intended to take part in a frontal attack on the Red trenches in front of Yamburg. Immediately after dark we unloaded our tanks about a mile from our positions and moved closer...
It seemed incredible that the next few days would decide the course of events. I asked myself with pain in my soul, will I really not live to see the victory of the White Cause. I would like to see with my own eyes how the White troops will enter Petrograd. Imagination drew tanks roaring along the familiar streets of Petrograd ...
As soon as our tank crossed the line of trenches occupied by our infantry and moved on, the armored door was tightly closed. We, eight tankers, were isolated from the outside world ... The presence of the enemy was not observed, but I knew that the Reds were ahead and were firing at us. Every few seconds, fountains of black earth rose up in our path. The Red artillery fired barrage, but inside the tank we heard nothing but the noise of the engines. When we reached the middle of the field, the Red machine guns focused their fire on us. Several minutes passed before I realized that the dull, harmless thud was being produced by bullets bouncing off the armored plate in front of me ...
But then I felt that some movement began among the trees. The machine gun rumbled in my hands and rattled...
Yamburg passed into the hands of the Whites. On the first day of the offensive, the Red front was broken through in many places. The White troops were moving towards Petrograd like a tidal wave...
Our next unloading point was the Gatchina station - one of the large suburbs of Petrograd ...
When I counted the remaining kilometers, I could not suppress my feverish excitement. The triumphant, self-confident White Army stood at the gates of Petrograd, and nothing could stop it...
One of our goals was to capture the village, which was defended by the red cadets. They were eager to repel the attack, but were powerless against the advancing tanks. We approached the cadets so close that I could make out their facial expressions, the fanatical gleam in their eyes, and the movements of their lips. They held their positions alone and in groups, firing point-blank at our tanks until they were overwhelmed by machine-gun fire.
Immediately after the first attack, the tanks were transferred south and sent into battle on the same day for the second time. As soon as the enemy resistance was suppressed, we headed for the third sector of the front ...
The next morning the offensive resumed, but as the fighting continued, it became more and more obvious that the ranks of the Reds were replenished as quickly as the Whites were decreasing ...
In the evening, everyone already understood that the North-Western Army had ceased to exist ... ".

Note. Ch. editor: Denikin's use of English tanks can be found in the book of memoirs by G. Chebotarev "The Truth about Russia" from the same series "Witnesses of the Epoch".

At the end of January 1916, the Trebizond operation developed by N.N. Yudenich began, the purpose of which was to capture the city and port of Trebizond (Trabzon). In its course, the troops of the Caucasian Army, with the support of the Batumi detachment of the Black Sea Fleet, again inflicted a serious defeat on the 3rd Turkish Army in the direction of Trebizond. In early March, the Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Caucasian Front, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, returned from Petrograd. First of all, he arrived in the defeated Erzurum. Seeing what powerful fortifications the Caucasian army crushed and overcame, he went to the square to the soldiers lined up on it and took off his hat in front of them. And then he turned to the commander and bowed low to him, proclaiming, turning to the soldiers: “Hurray to the Hero of Erzerum, General Yudenich!” Then he conveyed to N.N. Yudenich the deep gratitude of Nicholas II, as well as his wish to supplement the success achieved with an attack on Trebizond. “I think we can handle it,” the army commander answered unequivocally, “the Primorsky detachment, in cooperation with the ships of the Batumi base ... is able to defeat the Turks on the coast” 11 . The general kept his word, as always. Already in early April, Russian troops captured Turkish positions on the Karader River and took Trebizond, which became an important supply base for the Caucasian army and part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet.
In the next, Ognot operation (July-August 1916), developed under the direct supervision of N.N. Yudenich, the plan of the Turkish attack on Ognot and Bitlis was thwarted. In heavy oncoming battles, the Russian troops, pushing the enemy, reached the line of Ognot, Erzinjan, Lake Van by the end of August. Here the commander created a strong line of defense. As a result of the successful completion of the Ognot operation, a strategic pause was reached on the Caucasian front.
Wasting no time, N.N. Yudenich began to develop a plan of action for the upcoming campaign of 1917. He prepared two offensive operations for the spring. The first - on the Mosul direction, the second - on the left flank of the army. In other directions, he proposed to conduct an active defense. This plan was fully approved by the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.
At the end of January 1917, a representative of the British command arrived at the front headquarters in Tiflis. He expressed to Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and N.N. Yudenich the wishes of his command in the near future to put pressure on the flank and rear of the 6th Turkish army, located in Persia. Taking into account the requests of the allies, Russian troops in February went on the offensive in the Baghdad and Penjvin directions. The 1st Caucasian Army Corps reached the borders of Mesopotamia (Iraq), and the 7th Caucasian - to Penjvin. Using the success of the Russian troops, the British units occupied Baghdad.

During the fighting on the Caucasian front in 1914-1917. troops under the command of N.N. Yudenich did not lose a single battle and occupied a territory larger than modern Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan combined. Summing up the Caucasian period of the military activity of the commander, the quartermaster-general of the headquarters of the Caucasian Front, Major-General E.V. over the enemy ... Anyone who carefully examines the last Russian-Turkish war will notice that all the operations of the Caucasian army, led by General Yudenich, have always rested on the basic principles of military art ... The same researcher will note the enormous importance that was attached to Caucasian spiritual element in battle. That is why the battle always begins with the defeat of the enemy’s imagination by the surprise of a blow, and always by prolonged tension to the limit of the strength of the fighters in extremely stubborn and continuous attacks, an increase in the impression was created that shocked the enemy, and he surrendered ... All imbued with activity, only seeing it in the manifestation of an extreme degree decision, General Yudenich recognizes the offensive as the best way to wage war, and maneuver as the most advantageous means of the latter. In accordance with the spirit of activity, General Yudenich possessed extraordinary civic courage, composure in the most difficult moments and determination.
On the morning of March 2, 1917, the headquarters of the Caucasian Front received the manifesto of Nicholas II on the abdication of the last emperor from the throne and his order to return to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich (later not approved in this position by the Provisional Government). On the same day, the Grand Duke left the headquarters of the front in Tiflis and went to Headquarters in Mogilev. Instead of him, N.N. Yudenich was appointed commander-in-chief of the troops of the Caucasian Front on March 5. Officially, he also continued to remain in the post of commander of the Caucasian army until April 4. The very next day after the appointment, N.N. Yudenich had to take urgent measures on a telegram from the commander of the expeditionary corps, cavalry general N.N. Baratov, who was in Persia. The point was that the parts of the corps that advanced into the valley of the Diyala River experienced acute difficulties in food. In addition, the tropical heat season was approaching. The mood in parts of the corps became unstable. The commander-in-chief of the front decided to stop the offensive and from March 6 to go over to positional defense. Simultaneously with the corps of N.N. Baratov, the 1st and 7th Caucasian army corps, located in Persia, stopped the offensive. By order of N.N. Yudenich, they were assigned to areas with better bases. Such actions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front were negatively received by the Provisional Government. Several telegrams followed from Petrograd demanding a resumption of the offensive in Persia. Deeply convinced of the validity of the decision, the general sent a reasoned report to the Provisional Government on the state of affairs on the Caucasian front and the possible prospects for the troops entrusted to him. This report provoked a storm of indignation in Petrograd. Yudenich was accused of "ignoring the demands of the moment" and doing nothing for the "resolute offensive of the revolutionary army." After serving as commander-in-chief for two months, N.N. Yudenich was removed from his post on April 25 as "resisting the instructions of the Provisional Government" and summoned to Petrograd.

Handing over to his successor General of Infantry M.A. Przhevalsky, N.N. Yudenich knew that his conscience was clear: the troops under his command fought with dignity and fulfilled their duty to the end. This was confirmed by the well-known military scientist who emigrated to France, Lieutenant-General N.N. Golovin, in his work “Russia's Military Efforts in the World War” published in Paris in 1939. Using such an indicator of military sociology as moral resilience (the ratio between the losses of killed and wounded and the losses of prisoners), the author showed that he was the best on the Caucasian front even in the critical final period of the war. The results of military operations on the Caucasian front during the First World War speak for themselves. Thus, the Turkish army lost 350 thousand people there, of which 100 thousand prisoners, and the Russian army - 22 thousand killed, 71 thousand wounded, and only 6 thousand prisoners. Russian troops lost 8 guns in battles, and 650 captured ones were taken.
N.N. Yudenich arrived in Petrograd in the second half of May. In the Ministry of War, he received the task of "getting acquainted with the mood" in the Cossack regions. Then he went to Moscow, and then visited Headquarters in Mogilev. N.N. Yudenich could not fully fulfill the assigned task, and, most likely, he did not really strive for this. In August, he took part in the work of the State Conference in Moscow. Apparently, the general's attempts to influence the political development of the country belong to this time. His support for the speech of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Infantry General L.G. Kornilov showed that his sympathies are completely on the side of those who consider it possible to restore Russian statehood and the army through a military dictatorship.

A.A. Deineka.
Defense of Petrograd.
Fragment. 1928

N.N. Yudenich found himself in Petrograd again at the end of October 1917, after the overthrow of the Provisional Government. Immediately going underground, he, using the connections he had left in the guards environment and the headquarters of the Petrograd Military District, devoted a lot of time to organizing the anti-Bolshevik underground. After a year of illegal activity, having lost faith in the possibility of an armed anti-Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd, in November 1918 he and his wife arrived in Finland by train, using false documents. Here, N.N. Yudenich wanted to assess the prospects for the creation of Russian volunteer units and find out the attitude of the Finnish government to this issue. He began to negotiate with the regent of the Republic of Finland, a former lieutenant general and a good friend of his from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, K. G. Mannerheim. Repeated conversations with him finally convinced N.N. Yudenich of the need to organize here, abroad, the struggle against the Bolsheviks. Russian emigrants were to become the backbone of the future army. At that time there were more than 20 thousand of them in Finland, including about 2.5 thousand officers.

N.M. Kochergin.
Enemy at the gate.
All for the defense of Petrograd.
1919

At the end of November 1918, in Helsinki, a group of prominent white émigrés created the Russian Political Committee with the support of K. G. Mannerheim. In January of the following year, this committee supported the idea of ​​​​N.N. Yudenich on the formation of the White Army and nominated him as the leader of the anti-Bolshevik movement in the North-West of Russia. Soon, N.N. Yudenich received permission from K.G. Mannerheim to form White Guard units in Finland. He also pinned great hopes on the Northern Corps, which had settled in Estonia, which was part of the former Northern White Army, defeated by the Reds at the end of 1918 near Sebezh and Pskov. While preparations were underway for hostilities, the Northern Corps, under the command of Major General A.P. Rodzianko (a relative of the last chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko) on May 13, 1919 independently launched an offensive against Petrograd and was soon defeated.
The change in the military-political situation in the anti-Bolshevik movement of the North-West hastened the rise of N.N. Yudenich to power. However, it was not careerist, ambitious plans that attracted him. After all, there was little hope of success. But to retreat, to quit what has been started is not in the character of a general. On May 24, he created in Helsinki (since July 29 in Tallinn) a Political Conference, the basis of which was the Russian Political Committee. The political conference was actively supported by the leadership of the Entente. As its head, N.N. Yudenich in June negotiated with K.G. Mannerheim on the terms of the military cooperation of the Finnish government in the joint struggle against the Bolsheviks. On July 10, N.N. Yudenich was appointed by A.V. Kolchak "Commander-in-Chief of all Russian land and sea armed forces operating against the Bolsheviks on the North-Western Front." Thus, the units of the Northern Corps headed by A.P. Rodzianko, the detachments of Colonel S.N. Bulak-Balakhovich, who operated in the Pskov province, and parts of the Western Volunteer Army under the command of Major General P.M. Bermondt-Avalov were formally subordinate to him . Soon, N.N. Yudenich made an inspection trip along the front, got acquainted with the commanders of units and formations. On June 19, the Northern Corps and other local White Guard formations were renamed the Northern, and on July 1 - the North-Western Volunteer Army.

At the end of August, N.N. Yudenich and his wife moved from Finland to Estonia. The general lived first in Narva, then in Tallinn, leading the troops concentrated in the Narva direction, and participating in the work of the Political Conference in the Estonian capital. In early September, he came to grips with the development of an offensive operation in the Petrograd direction. The general was faced with the question of the direction of the main attack. Rejecting all the options proposed at the military council, he firmly stated that it was necessary to attack in the "shortest direction." Only in this case, swiftness, surprise strike can ensure victory. The correctness of the decision made by the general was subsequently confirmed by Soviet military historians. Indeed, given the small size of the army and the need to capture Petrograd as quickly as possible, there could be no other choice. The plans for the attack on Petrograd were the embodiment of the strategic style of N.N. Yudenich, which was so clearly manifested in military operations on the Caucasian front in 1914-1916. It was still the same strategic calculation typical of him for the speed and continuity of the offensive, for the strength and surprise of the strike. Only the goal this time was not just the successful capture of some, even a very important, settlement, but the mastery of the former capital of Russia - Petrograd. The stake was too high, and any, even the smallest mistake could lead the army to disaster. "White Sword" - under this name the operation of the North-Western Volunteer Army entered the history of the Civil War in the fall of 1919.
In making his decision, the general also took into account the mood in the units and formations of the army. The officers and soldiers, who received good weapons and uniforms, for the most part believed in the success of the offensive. The spirit of the army was quite high, especially since official reports enthusiastically reported on the successes of Denikin's and Kolchak's troops near Tula and on the Tobol River. If the offensive had been delayed, there could have been a change of mood in the army, and not in favor of continuing the struggle against the Soviet regime.

On September 28, the North-Western Volunteer Army launched an offensive against Petrograd, and on October 2, N.N. Yudenich became its commander (instead of A.P. Rodzianko). Only forward, with the highest possible speed of advance - this is the main motive of this operation. N.N.Yudenich refused the convoys. Armored trains got stuck behind Luga (bridges were blown up), tanks fell behind. But in spite of everything, the offensive continued successfully. Parts of the 7th Red Army retreated. On October 13, the whites occupied the Luga junction station. In the second half of October, Gatchina, Krasnoye Selo, Detskoye Selo, Pavlovsk, Yamburg, Ligovo were left in red. The advanced units of the North-Western Army reached the Pulkovo Heights, and patrols of scouts even reached the Narva outpost of Petrograd. N.N. Yudenich moved his headquarters closer to the front line, to Detskoye Selo. The commander was informed that “the enemy is using up the last reserves - companies of cadets. They climb on tanks with bayonets at the ready, fall in ranks from destructive fire, but do not leave.
The White Guard newspaper Svoboda Rossii wrote these days: “We now calculate time not in months or even weeks, as before, but in days, hours ... The names of different cities and villages flash by, and the ear catches every sound, every rustle more intensely, looking for the cherished words in them: “Petrograd is taken”” 14 . The governor of Petrograd, Major General P.V. Glazenap, had already been appointed. Russian printing houses in Finland printed leaflets appealing to the inhabitants of Petrograd with an appeal to "greet the valiant liberators with the ringing of bells."
In fierce battles, the Red Army stopped the onslaught of the Whites. Having received fresh reinforcements (15th Red Army), the Red command prepared for a counteroffensive. The strategic plan boiled down to the following: it was supposed to deliver two blows in converging directions from Petrograd - from Tosno and Luga. Groupings of the Reds, uniting in Yamburg, were supposed to completely surround the North-Western Volunteer Army, chained in the battles near Pulkovo.
On October 21, the 7th Red Army, with the support of the Baltic Fleet, launched a counteroffensive, and already on October 23, its troops occupied Pavlovsk and Detskoe Selo, and on October 26, Krasnoe Selo. Five days later, on October 26, the 15th Red Army launched an offensive and on October 31 drove the Whites out of Luga and began to advance towards Yamburg. Threatened by deep envelopment from the south, Yudenich's army began to retreat. During the pursuit of the Whites, the 15th Red Army took Gdov on November 7, and Yamburg on November 14. In late November - early December, the remnants of the North-Western Volunteer Army retreated to the territory of Estonia. On November 28, N.N. Yudenich handed over command of the army to Major General P.V. Glazenap. Soon, on December 31, 1919, Estonia signed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia. The Soviet government recognized the independence of the republic, but at the same time, a separate clause stipulated that Estonia refused to provide its territory for anti-Bolshevik governments and the White armies. Peace between Soviet Russia and Estonia meant the end of the White movement in Northwest Russia. By order of the Estonian government, units and formations of the North-Western Volunteer Army were disarmed, and soldiers and officers were sent to special camps. Here, they were formed into working teams and sent to logging and peat extraction.

In such a political situation, N.N. Yudenich had no choice but to leave Estonia. On February 24, 1920, he left Tallinn for Riga and then for England. He soon moved to France. For some time the general lived in Paris, and then settled in Nice. He refused any political and military struggle against Bolshevism. In emigration, the former army commander constantly showed concern for the disabled of the North-Western Volunteer Army and their families. Being a member of the Society of Zealots of Russian History and other educational organizations, N.N. Yudenich provided them with material assistance. The general also gave lectures on the First World War on the Caucasian front and, as contemporaries emphasized, he never exaggerated his role in this theater of operations. Thanks to timely assistance from N.N. Yudenich, Major General E.V. Maslovsky, after spending a year with his comrade in Nice, completed and published in 1933 in Paris the book “The World War on the Caucasian Front”.
N.N. Yudenich died on October 5, 1933 in the small town of Saint-Laurent du Var and was buried in Cannes in the tomb of an Orthodox church in the name of St. Michael the Archangel, not far from the grave of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Alexandra Nikolaevna Yudenich survived her husband for a long time, having died in 1962. She saved and then transferred to the USA, to the Hoover Institute for War, Revolution and Peace, a family archive containing a considerable number of documents on the history of the White movement in the North-West of Russia. After her death, a part of “Memoirs of the Spouse” was published in the emigrant magazine “Sentry”, reflecting mainly the biography of the general during the First World War and the initial period of the Civil War (1917-1918).

NOTES

11 Portuguese P.M. etc. Decree. op. S. 237.
12 Tsvetkov V.Zh. Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich // Questions of history. 2002. No. 9. P. 41.
13 Rudnev D. Yudenich, General of Infantry // Politics. 1990. No. 1. S. 110.
14 There. S. 110.

Sergey BAZANOV,
Doctor of Historical Sciences

Smolin A.V. White movement in the North-West of Russia (1918-1920). St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1999.
Rutych N.N. White Front of General Yudenich: Biography of the ranks of the North-Western Army. Moscow: Russian way, 2002.
Portuguese R.M., Alekseev P.D., Runov V.A. World War I in the biographies of Russian military leaders. M.: Elakos, 1994.
Rudnev D. Yudenich, General of Infantry // Politics. 1990. No. 1.
Pronin A.V. General of the Suvorov School // Independent Military Review. 2000. No. 44.
Tsvetkov V.Zh. Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich // Questions of history. 2002. No. 9.

October-November 1919

1919 year, October 8-10. Northwestern Russian Army N. N. Yudenich, 18.500 bayonets and sabers (57 guns, 500 machine guns) with the support of 4 tanks, 4 armored cars, 6 aircraft, 4 armored trains and the minesweeper Kitoboy, begin an attack on Petrograd along the Yamburg-Petrograd line. The Germans help arm the army N. N. Yudenich.

The Russian army strikes with forces gathered into a fist. Offensive ongoing 7 columns. There is no solid front line. There are no people on the solid front line.

1919 year, 10 October. Russian army under command N. N. Yudenich captures river crossings. Meadows.

Rodzianko A.P.(commander of the 4th column) treacherously blows up the bridge across the Luga, as a result of which the Russian army was unable to receive fire support from armored trains and tanks and lost time. Crossing over the river Luga was built only on October 20, 1919.

1919 year, 13 October. Russian troops ( N. N. Yudenich) take Luga, Plus, Serebryanka.

As a punishment to the fleeing units, the bloody ghoul Bronstein nicknamed Trotsky L.D. uses decimation - every 10th Russian soldier is shot.

Columns No. 1 (Colonel Lebedev), 2 (prince Dolgorukov and Bulak-Balakhovich), 3 (general Dzerzhinsky) maneuver in the Luga and Pskov directions, preventing the counterattack of the Red Army on the right flank;

Column No. 4 Major General D. R. Vetrenko should cut the Nikolaev railway (Petrograd-Moscow) in the area of ​​the station Tosno;

Column #5 ( M. V. Yaroslavtsev) is advancing on (Tsarskoye Selo) Pulkovo;

Column number 6 on Strelna- Ligovo;

Major General D. R. Vetrenko(column No. 4) does not follow the order N. N. Yudenich, and does not blow up the railway in Tosno, as a result of which the red leper sect throws reinforcements along it. Bronstein nicknamed Trotsky L.D. along this unexploded railway, Petrograd-Moscow, throws against N. N. Yudenich troops from the east and south of Russia, and even the Kremlin guard regiment, creating a multiple superiority (5/1) in manpower in the breakthrough area.

English squadron support site offensive N. N. Yudenich goes to shell the Russian troops(Western Army) Colonel P. R. Bermond-Avalova, which brings with it 52,000 Russian warriors in the district of Riga;

Permykin(column No. 5) arranges a parade in Tsarskoe Selo, instead of cutting the railroad to red armored trains. As a result, the assault on the Pulkovo Heights was thwarted;

During the assault on the Pulkovo Heights, 10,000 red servicemen were destroyed. In total, more than 50,000 Reds were destroyed.

1919 year, 25 October. Detachment N. N. Yudenich, 18.500 warriors, takes Ligovo station. Russians see the dome of St. Isaac's Cathedral in Petrograd.

Bronstein nicknamed Trotsky L.D. throws against the Russian army N. N. Yudenich 40.000 warrior with 453 guns, 708 machine guns, 6 armored trains, 23 aircraft and 9 armored vehicles. The attacks of the Reds, who have a superiority in manpower by 2-3 times, are carried out in 4 (four) chains, one after the other, followed by reserves. The red fighters are excited by cocaine, which is specially given out to the advancing. Machine gun fire mows down crowds of drugged red zombies. Machine guns overheat, not enough ammo.

The size of the Russian army N. N. Yudenich grows up to 25.000 warriors due to the mobilization of captured Red Army soldiers and the influx of volunteers from the liberated lands of Russia.

Against the Russian army Bronstein nicknamed Trotsky L.D. collects 59,000 warriors, 2,000 sabers (total 61.000 ), 243 guns, 1.297 machine guns!

1919 year, 30 October. Failure to fulfill an important task (order) by a major general D. R. Vetrenko, lack of sufficient ammunition, open direct hostilities of the British against the Russian army of the general N. N. Yudenich, as well as gangs of internationalists Bronstein nicknamed Trotsky L.D. stopped the Russian army on the very outskirts of Petrograd.

The retreat began. In the Estonian camps of Russian warriors from the army N. N. Yudenich Those who refuse to surrender their weapons are shot from English machine guns.

World War II

(See the book "Glory to Russia! Russian explorers" - "East Prussia")

(Eastern Block, ATS - Warsaw Pact)

Cold War (1945-2013)

“Before the Russian national economy and science, we always pose one important question, what else should they give so that the Russian people, the Russian army are armed better and stronger than anyone in the world.”

1945. AT USA accepts Directive No. 432/D, readiness to drop 50 atomic bombs on 20 Russian cities. Rusichi are strengthening air defense, aviation and armies standing in Europe and the Far East.

Eastern Block (1946)

1946 year. The Eastern Bloc includes: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR(Eastern part of Germany), Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia. Later, cooperation with the block begins: Mongolia, Vietnam, North Korea, China and Cuba.

Sleeves of George (Bosporus and Dardanelles)

Russian Constantinople = Istanbul (Turkey)

1946 year. Russians demand Turkey return Black Sea straits, Sleeves of George (Bosporus and Dardanelles ) and they are going to send their troops there, to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bTsargrad (Istanbul). This is prevented by the leper sect in the UK and US governments.

1948 year. The US plans to drop 200 atomic bombs on 70 Russian cities.

1953 year, May. Russian bomber with radar transponder friend or foe” (obtained by Russian intelligence) reaches strategic NATO facilities in the UK and Norway. He is not noticed.

The hunt for NATO technical innovations is carried out by the 2nd Russian paramilitary structures of the GRU GSh (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) and the scientific and technical intelligence of the KGB.

ATS (1955)

1955 year, 14 May. On the basis of the "Eastern Bloc" Russia (USSR) founded Warsaw TreatyATS, military alliance. It included: the USSR (Rus), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Germany (East Germany), Albania, Hungary.

1955 year, 12 August. The Russian army has 4.815.870 warriors. In the European part of the ATS has 130 divisions.

Irbensky Strait

1957 year. During exercises in the Baltics battalion of floating tanksPT-76 crosses the Irbensky Strait, breaking 30 km from the island of Saaremaa and proving the ability to force the English Channel.

1963-1986 gg. Under GRU Colonel-General Pyotr Ivashutin, along with undercover intelligence, technical means are widely used.

1970 year. Conducted exercises " Dnieper». For the first time in the world, a tank division in full strength forces the Dnieper on the move. 330 tanks passed underwater 500 meters to a depth of up to 4 meters. Several thousand tanks near Kyiv are taking part in the oncoming battle.

1970 year. Russians undergo large-scale exercises " Dvina».

Maneuvers "Ocean"

1970 year. maneuvers « Ocean". Ships of the Northern, Pacific, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, which entered the Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic and Indian Oceans under the leadership of S. G. Gorshkova. The exercises show the world the growth of the power of the Russian naval force.

1978 Berezina».

1979 year. For 1 year, Russian intelligence obtained 140 samples of military equipment and 3,500 documents.

1980 year. Military exercises are underway Soyuz-80».

1981 year. Military exercises are underway West-81". Takes part in the Zapad-81 exercises 100.000 warriors, aircraft carrier "Kyiv", strategic bombers "Tu-22", 128 radio-controlled tanks, which deal an attacking blow and are destroyed. 1,000 guns strike, firing 100,000 rounds at targets. 200 helicopters strike with missiles. 1200 shelters were opened for 100% coverage of tanks, 38 km of trenches, 480 shelters, 600 km of roads, 2 km of canals were laid.

(Military-industrial complex)

Russian power!

The Russian military industry employs 8,000,000 people. In the USA 2.200.000 people. (1/4). Russian military spending is 200,000,000,000 c.u. e. (20% of the gross national product), in the USA 6.5%, in Japan 1%.

« Uralvagonzavod”is the largest military plant in the world, listed in the Guinness Book of Records. It produces the largest number of tanks in the world.

Production

1985 year. Russian military factories produce 4.5 times more tanks, 5 times more armored personnel carriers, 9 times more artillery pieces, 3 times more nuclear submarines, 2 times more bombers than the United States.

1988 year. During the year, the factories of Russia (USSR) produce: 3,500 tanks, 5,000 armored vehicles, 2,000 guns, 800 combat aircraft, 9 submarines, 250 ballistic missiles.

1988 year. All NATO countries taken together produce only 925 tanks (1/4), 1950 armored vehicles (1/2.5), 275 guns (1/8), 772 combat aircraft (1/1), 29 ballistic missiles ( 1/9). Russian military-industrial superiority is obvious.

/ Magazines "Soviet military power" - USA, "Military balance" - Great Britain/.

“2-and we write 3-and in the mind!”

tanks

1990 year, January 1st. Russia (USSR) is armed with 3 types of main battle tanks - T-64, T-72 and T-80. In service with the ATS is 63.900 tanks, 76.520 combat vehicles. The biggest army in the world. Russians have more tanks than all the countries of the world combined.

80% of India's weapons are Russian-made.

"Russians are coming!"

NATO

Leper Sect Army!

1947 year, March. High-ranking sectarians from the governments of 5 (five) states sign a common defense treaty in Brussels (NATO headquarters): Belgium, UK, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France. The official languages ​​of NATO are English and French.

1949 year, 4 April. Based NATO(NATO). Washington Treaty signed. The defense of 12 states has been formalized: Belgium, UK, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Portugal, USA, France.

1952 year. The new NATO treaty came into force. NATO introduced Greece and Turkey(14 states).

1955 year. NATO introduced Germany(15 states).

1966 year. France left NATO. She returned in 2009.

1974-1980 gg. Greece does not participate in NATO.

Countries that left NATO began to establish friendly relations with Russia (USSR).

1982 year. NATO introduced Spain(16 states).

1985 year. NATO deploys 1,600 military bases in 34 countries around the world, where 500,000 US troops are stationed.

1999 year. NATO introduces: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland(19 states).

Afghanistan

2001 year, October 7th. NATO troops (84.150 soldiers) invade Afghanistan where they are to this day.

2003 year, 20 March. NATO has decided to invasion of Iraq. NATO troops are still in Iraq.

By 2013 in Iraq more than 15,500 Anglo-Saxon warriors killed and wounded from USA.

2004 year. NATO introduces: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia(26 states).

“Although there are many dogs with the herd,

Yes, the shepherd himself is a fool;

And where the shepherd is a fool, there the dogs are fools.”

/AND. A. Krylov/

2012 year. Subject to NATO army rules 28states: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, USA, Turkey, France , Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia.

Worldview and ideology

Information war for "minds" and hearts!

Modern conditions have improved the methods of warfare. There was a special financial intelligence, units of special management, special units of the media (Mass media), special operations units affecting the "non-military" sectors. The war is waged with the help of the deadliest and most effective weapons: ideological, ideological ( information war), implicated in faith and feelings, chronological (the chronicle of the world is being rewritten for the needs of the leper sect), war with the help of money, genetic weapons (alcohol, cigarettes, drugs). Conventional weapons recede into the background as the weakest means, the last argument when all other methods have been suppressed (the right of force).

International criminals from the sect of rootless lepers who control financial flows and the media (Mass Media) of the leading countries of the world, with the help of the dollar and their watchdog, the NATO army, are waging war against all free and independent states of the world. The sect of lepers are trying to impose their new world order on all the peoples of the world.

The plans of the sect of lepers include the division of Russia into a number of weak, dependent, externally controlled states and the complete destruction of the Russian people.

“You are gray, and I, buddy, are gray,

And I have long known your wolf nature;

That is why my custom is:

With wolves, otherwise do not make the world,

Like skinning them off.”

At the end of September 1919, in the days of the most stubborn battles on the Southern Front, when Denikin's troops were rushing towards Moscow, the imperialists of the Entente countries moved Yudenich's North-Western Army into a new offensive against Petrograd.

The organizers of the second anti-Soviet campaign put a lot of effort and money into restoring the combat effectiveness of Yudenich's troops, which had suffered a severe defeat in the summer.

Only the generous help of the capitalist states - mainly England - which provided Yudenich with weapons, equipment, food, allowed him to move again in the autumn to Petrograd.

The White Guard regiments were not only re-armed, but also replenished with people. A significant part of these replenishments were forcibly mobilized residents of the Yamburg and Gdov districts. Representatives of the Entente in Germany also organized the forcible recruitment of former Russian prisoners of war. The units created in this way were delivered to the North-Western Army. On British ships, Russian White Guard detachments, formed in England, arrived in the Baltic states. Under pressure from the leaders of the British military mission in the Baltic States, Generals March and Gough, the bourgeois government of Estonia allowed Yudenich to mobilize among the Russian population on Estonian territory. Yudenich's troops were also given an American volunteer detachment, a French legion deployed from Arkhangelsk through Revel, and a battalion of Narva boy scouts.

On August 26, 1919, a meeting of representatives of all counter-revolutionary forces in the Baltics was held in Riga. This meeting was chaired by General Marsh, and among the main participants were General Desino from Yudenich's headquarters, General Laidoner from Estonia, Kalshsh and Ulmann [from Latvia. The result of the meeting was an agreement on a general offensive on the North-Western Front.

The White Guard North-Western Army was hastily reorganized, preparing for a new attack "on Petrograd. Entente representatives hurried Yudenich with the start of the offensive. The Inter-Allied military mission in the Baltic states assured the White Guard command that the troops of Estonia and Finland would march together with the North-Western Army. General Rodzianko wrote in of his In Memoirs:

“Referring to the fact that we received equipment, guns, guns, etc., officers from the British Military Mission and on behalf of the gene came to my headquarters almost daily. Marsh demanded that we immediately go over to the offensive ... the British became more insistent and promised to provide serious support with their fleet, occupying Krasnaya Gorka and Kronstadt as we advanced.

Denikin's successes in the south created a favorable environment for attacking the Soviet republic from the northwest. At the same time, Yudenich and his masters, the Entente imperialists, were very worried about the Soviet-Estonian peace negotiations that began in September 1919. The signing of a peace treaty between the RSFSR and Estonia would have made the very existence of the Northwestern White Army impossible: Yudenich’s army was connected with the Entente powers through the Estonian ports, there were supply bases for the White Guards on Estonian soil, and new units were being formed. Finally, as long as bourgeois Estonia fought in alliance with the White Guards, the latter could be more or less calm about their rear. The White Guards could only prevent the conclusion of an agreement between the RSFSR and Estonia by resuming hostilities. Only a successful offensive could make the Estonian bourgeoisie once again believe in the combat readiness of the White Army, in the possibility of relatively easy capture of the territories on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, which tempted the capitalists and landlords of Estonia. In addition, starting the offensive in September, Yudenich counted on the help of the English fleet, which could only actively operate until the freeze-up.

By the end of September, the Northwestern Army was already a serious military force.

According to the data cited in his "Memoirs" by General Rodzianko, the combat strength of the North-Western Army in late September - early October 1919 was 18,500 bayonets and sabers with 57 guns, 4 armored trains, 6 tanks, 2 armored cars. But the total number of this White Guard army far exceeded the indicated figure. Some sources even speak of 50 thousand soldiers and officers.

Troops of the North-Western and White Estonian armies were deployed between Koporsky Bay and the city of Ostrov. On the narvek section, that is, directly in the Petrograd direction, the 1st Corps of the White Guards, the strongest formation of the North-Western Army, operated. The right flank of the enemy troops was made up of parts of the 2nd Corps, based on Gdov. At the beginning of the operation, a separate 1st Infantry Division operated together with the 2nd Corps.

The attack on Petrograd from the sea was to be carried out, just like a few months ago, by the ships of the English and White Estonian fleets.

The White Guard command based all its calculations on the fact that the Petrograd operation would be short-lived, that the offensive of the North-Western Army and the White Estonian troops would steadily develop at a paralyzing pace. Any more or less prolonged delay in the course of the offensive could lead to disastrous consequences for the Whites. This stemmed, firstly, from the low morale of the extremely motley White Guard and interventionist troops. Great stamina and endurance from them could not be expected. Secondly, the participants in the attack on Petrograd had every reason to doubt the strength of their rear. The Estonian workers and peasants received the news of the Soviet-Estonian peace talks with great satisfaction. They looked forward impatiently to the establishment of normal relations with Soviet Russia, and they hated their country's participation in the intervention. Therefore, the breaking of the peace talks by the Estonian government and its cooperation with Yudenich in a new campaign against Petrograd were bound to entail serious internal political complications for the Estonian ruling circles. The craving of the Estonian people for peace with the Soviet Republic created instability in the rear of the Northwestern Army.

The position of the counter-revolutionary forces in the Baltic was also unstable because it was precisely here that acute contradictions emerged between American-Anglo-French imperialism and revanchist circles in Germany. Von der Goltz's German troops continued to be in Latvia and behaved as if the Treaty of Versailles did not exist. Von der Goltz openly stated that since his troops consisted of "volunteers" and were not subordinate to the Berlin government, the terms of the Treaty of Versailles could not be applied to them. spread. All the behavior of the command of the German "volunteers" indicated that the German monopolists who maintained these troops set out to strengthen their positions in the Baltic states in order to at least compensate themselves for their earlier defeats.

Under the leadership of the German military in Latvin, a large Russian White Guard unit was formed - the “corps named after Count

Keller" - under the command of Colonel Vermont-Avalov. Count Keller, whose name the corps bore, was one of those White Guard generals who actively collaborated with the German occupiers in Ukraine in 1918. He then sought the assistance of the German command in the creation of the White Guard formations in the north-west of Russia and expressed his readiness to lead them, but was killed by the Petliurists in Kyiv. The name Keller in the name of the Bermont-Avalov corps symbolized devotion to the alliance with German imperialism. Command posts in the corps were occupied by pro-German White Guard officers. In material support, the troops of Bermont-Avalov were completely dependent on the German imperialists. With their help, reinforcements were recruited in the camps of Russian prisoners of war in Germany. The number of the corps reached 10 thousand people with 16 guns, 100 machine guns, 12 mortars and 12 airplanes.

The activities of the German militarists and the White Guard forces under their control in Latvia caused alarm in the Entente camp. Germany did not cease to exist as a military rival of the Entente powers in the Baltic region. In September 1919, the Entente demanded the withdrawal of von der Goltz's troops to Germany. The German command, with the consent of the right-wing socialist government in Berlin, embarked on an ingenious trick. Von der Goltz was recalled to Germany, his troops were disbanded and in full strength, with all weapons and technical means, were transferred under the command of Bermont-Avalov as "German volunteers". On this basis, the so-called Western Russian-German Volunteer Army arose, consisting of four-fifths of the Germans. In its ranks in the fall of 1919, there were more than 51 thousand soldiers and officers.

At the end of August and in September 1919, the military mission of the Entente in the Baltic repeatedly tried to force Bermont-Avalov to go over with his troops to the submission of Yudenich and take part in his second offensive against Petrograd. Bermont-Avalov was invited to participate in the Riga meeting on 26 August. At the same time, he was informed that by order of Yudenich he was appointed to the post of commander of all the White Guard armed forces in Lithuania and Latvia. Literally on the eve of the offensive, on September 27, Yudenich sent an order to the headquarters of the "corps named after Count Keller" to march to Narva to join the troops of the North-Western Army. However, all attempts to subordinate the corps to the military leadership of the Entente failed completely: it did not move from Latvia, did not leave German custody and did not join Yudenich's army.

All this created a tense situation in the Baltic States. Nevertheless, the command of the North-Western Army and the military representatives of the Entente were intensively preparing for the Petrograd operation. They counted on the fact that the Red Army would not be able to simultaneously defend Petrograd and repulse Denikin, who was rushing towards Moscow.

By the beginning of the enemy offensive, the Soviet 7th Army opposing the Whites consisted of 24,850 bayonets, 800 cavalry troops with 148 guns, 6 armored trains and 9 armored cars. Its troops were stretched along the front about 400 kilometers along the southeastern shore of the Koporsky Bay from the village of Gora Valdai, through Yamburg, along the Luga River to Lake Krasnogorskoye, further along the Verduga and Zhelcha rivers, along the eastern shore of Lake Pskov and southwest of the latter to the mouth of the Kudsb River, where the dividing line with the 15th Army passed. The 7th Army at that time included four rifle divisions: the 6th, which occupied the sector from Koporsky Bay to Yamburg; 2nd - from Yamburg along the Luga River to Lake Syabersky; 19th - in the area of ​​​​the city of Luga and to the south; 10th - in the Pskov region.

In addition to the 7th Army, Petrograd was defended by the garrisons of Kronstadt, the Krasnoflotsky (formerly Krasnaya Gorka) and Advanced (formerly Gray Horse) forts, the active detachment of ships of the Baltic Fleet. At the moment of the greatest danger for Petrograd, teams of sailors and cadets of the naval command staff school were thrown onto the land front, in total up to 11 thousand soldiers and commanders.

The Petrograd garrison in September 1919 consisted of the 54th Rifle Brigade, the Bashkir Cavalry Brigade, the Tula Fortress Regiment, and several rifle units. On the outskirts of the city there was a system of fortifications that were part of the Petrograd fortified region.

The condition of the Soviet troops in the Petrograd direction was difficult. The 7th Army, exhausted by the fighting in the summer of 1919, received no reinforcements; a number of formations of the Petrograd Military District went to the Southern Front. Parts of the 7th Army were extremely small, in many regiments there were only 150-300 bayonets. For one kilometer of the front, Soviet troops had an average of 65 bayonets, while the enemy had 124 bayonets.

The defenders of Petrograd experienced great difficulties due to the lack of food and uniforms. In the autumn of 1919, there was hunger in Petrograd. The Red Army ration was reduced to the limit: at the front they were given half a pound of bread a day, and in the rear - a quarter of a pound. The cold came in October, and most of the Red Army did not have overcoats and strong shoes.

The Baltic Fleet experienced no less difficulties than the 7th Army. On the ships, there was an acute shortage of personnel. Many Baltic sailors fought on land fronts or performed various tasks of party and state bodies in other parts of the country, but no replenishments were received. The material support of the fleet was scarce: there was not enough fuel and lubricants.

The difficult situation of the 7th Army and the Baltic Fleet was aggravated by the fact that quite a few enemy agents who survived the defeat in the summer of 1919 were operating in their rear. As in the period of the first offensive against Petrograd, the enemy hoped to undermine the city's defenses from within, to carry out the operation in such a way that the strike of the 7th Army from the front would be combined with a mutiny in its rear.

Under the direct supervision of foreign intelligence agencies, the activities of members of the Petrograd branch of the "national center" who had escaped arrest in the summer were resumed. Agents of the "national center" made their way to responsible posts in the 7th Army and the Baltic Fleet. So, for example, the spy Lupdekvist was the chief of staff of the 7th Army, the spy Berg was the head of the Oranienbaum air battalion.

The White Guard spy agency supplied the interventionists and Yudenich with information of a military and political nature. The traitor Lundekvist worked out his plan for the capture of Petrograd by the Northwestern Army and forwarded it to Yudenich. With the approach of the White troops to Petrograd, the conspirators intensified their preparations for an armed rebellion. They manage to win over to their side several hundred officers, decomposed sailors, anarchists and criminals.

While developing the plan of attack on Petrograd, the staff of Yudenich and Rodzianko had detailed information about the state and strength of the Red Army troops. The Lundekvist plan was also largely used.

In its final form, the plan of the White Guard command was as follows. The main blow was supposed to be delivered along the Yamburg-I Atchina-Petrograd highway. It was to be carried out by the 1st White Guard Corps in cooperation with the British and Estonian ships. The primary task of the corps was to capture Yamburg. The ultimate goal of the operation - the capture of Petrograd - was supposed to be achieved through a general offensive of the entire North-Western Army "

The main blow was to be preceded by an offensive operation against the left flank of the 7th Army in the directions of Struga White (Struti Red), Pskov and Luga. It existed as a 2nd White Guards Corps and a separate 1st division. This auxiliary blow, firstly, provided the right flank of the White Guard army; he should have been. according to the plans of the fighter, to overturn parts of the 19th and 10th rifle divisions and give the opportunity to firmly seize the initiative. Secondly, a successful offensive against the left flank of the 7th Army would divert part of the Soviet troops from the Narva direction, leading directly to Petrograd. important communications connecting Petrograd with other sectors of the Western Front and with the center of Russia.

At dawn on September 28, the 2nd corps of Yudenich's army, with the assistance of British tanks, unexpectedly for the Soviet units, went on the offensive on Struga Belye, Pskov, and then on Luga. The front of the 10th and 19th divisions was broken through, and the Whites began to rapidly move forward. The very next day they reached the rugbezh of the Zhelcha River. On September 30, the Whites captured the crossing over the Plyussa River near the villages of Skvorets, Vysokaya, and Matveeva. On October 4, the enemy broke into the Struti Belye station and cut off the Petrograd-Pskov railroad. Headquarters 7th ar- | mines lost contact with the 10th and rkf divisions.

In the battles on the left flank of the 7th Army, the enemy's advantage was revealed both in numbers and in armament. Nevertheless, the retreating Soviet troops stubbornly resisted. On October 6, the 19th DIVISION, thrown back behind the LINE of the Petrograd-Pskov railway, tried to launch a general counterattack. Yo, due to a clear lack of strength, this pop ka was not crowned with success.

The command of the 7th Army, ill-informed about the situation, mistakenly regarded the offensive of the White Guards in the sector of the 10th and 19th divisions as the main blow, the chain of which was the capture of Pskov and the restoration of contact with the White Estonian troops. In connection with this, the transfer of units from the Yamburg direction near Pskov began. Thus, the calculation of the enemies was justified. The transfer forever from the most important operational direction of the 7th Army was one of the main results, which, according to the plans of the enemy, was to be achieved by the actions of the 2nd Corps.

On October 10, the enemy launched the main attack with the forces of the 1st Corps in the general direction of Yamburg and Volosovo. Gatchina. The offensive of the North-Western Army unfolded. On the sector of the Soviet 2nd Rifle Infantry Division, the enemy crossed the river Luta near the village of Muraveino. At the same time, the White Guards broke through the front of the 2nd division near the villages of Sabsko and Redezh * and delivered several blows on other sectors of the front

The next day, after heavy artillery preparation, the Whites, under cover of British tanks, attacked the positions of the 6th Rifle DIVISION west of Yamburg and broke through the front. Soviet troops under the onslaught of superior forces were forced to leave Yamburg.

Until the last "minute, the retreat of units from Yamburg was covered by an armored train No. 6 named after Lepin, where the commissar was the Bolshevik worker Bolshevik KIISH Gaza. The White Guards, who broke into the railway station, decided to destroy the armored train. the death of an armored train. At the command of I. I. Gaza, the armored train began to retreat, and when the locomotive got close enough, gunfire was opened on it. With well-aimed hits, the locomotive was damaged. The danger, it would seem, had passed? The enemy's samopets bombed the train several times.For three days, from October 12 to October 15, the heroic team of the armored train, without rest, without food, fought off the pressing enemies.That ri business had to restore the tracks destroyed by the enemy, water and firewood for the locomotive had to be taken from With great difficulty] the armored train managed to get out of the enemy ring.

The advancing troops of Yudenich at every step met fierce resistance from the working people. In many places, partisan detachments arose, which made bold attacks on the rear of the enemy, which, led by the Communists in the cities and industrial centers of the Pskov, Petrograd provinces, together with the Red Army, fought for every inch of Soviet land, not sparing your life.

On October 13, the Whites approached Luga. In the battles for non-communists, local residents fought alongside the Red Army, primarily the communists. Even at the beginning of the enemy offensive, the Luga district "committee - RCP (b) announced a party mobilization and began to form two communist detachments. Many non-war volunteers also joined these detachments

Lugzha communist detachments, together with units of the Red Army, defended the city to the last possible. Decided to leave Lutu on October 16, they continued to fight stubbornly, using every convenient line to slow down the advance of the enemy. During the retreat to the formation, the Batetskaya ambush of the enemy captured two armored cars from the retreating Red Army soldiers with a sudden raid. .It was a big loss for the Soviet troops. One of the Luga communist detachments with a bold counterattack recaptured the armored vehicles from the Whites.

Simultaneously with the offensive on the Pskov, Puzh and Yamburg directions, the enemy began military operations on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here, the positions of the Soviet troops were suddenly attacked by the White Estonians, who violated the truce without any warning. The attack on this section I was carried out with the task of capturing the forts of Peredovaya and Krasnoflotsky in order to ensure the passage of the English squadron directly to Kronstadt. On October 14, White-Estonian troops landed from British warships in the area of ​​Koporsky Bay. Its core was a detachment of boy scouts - Kuglak sons - organized and trained by US Army officer Reissar

On October 15, the paratroopers were already 10-12 kilometers from the forts. Expeditionary detachments of Soviet sailors attacked here. The advance of the enemy was halted. However, the White Guards did not calm down. Their flock aviation

raid forts daily, dropping bombs and firing machine guns. On October 16, another enemy landing force landed, seizing the villages of Uda and retreating.

On the approaches to Krasnoflotskoye and Peredovoye, stubborn booms began to boil. The enemy threw more and more forces into the offensive. But the Soviet soldiers staunchly defended their positions. On one of the most important defense sectors - in the early junction of Lendovshchina and the villages of Vepsha, Kovashi - a special-purpose battalion, CONSISTING OF sailors, operated for several days, he repelled all attacks of the pressing enemy. Enemy artillery now and then carried out fire raids on the front line of the Soviet defense. The weather was cold, it rained continuously, the trenches were flooded with water, and the sailors were dressed in shabby pea coats, many did not have strong shoes. But no dangers and hardships could break the morale of the Soviet sailors.

On October 24, the Whites, with the support of artillery, launched a particularly fierce attack, trying to break through the line of barbed wire. But this time the Baltics withstood the onslaught with honor. The enemy retreated, having suffered large losses. Considerable merit in organizing the rebuff to the enemy belonged to such valiant commanders and political workers of the 1st Petrograd Special Purpose Battalion as the battalion commander Borisov, the battalion commissar Zverev, the company commander Fedoseev, the commissar of the Forty Krasnoflotsky company and the advanced glorious sailor detachments firmly detained the enemy on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. All attempts by the White Guard and White Estonian units to break through and capture the forts were unsuccessful.

Yudenich's headquarters, planning an offensive on the coastal sector, counted on the previously promised support of the English fleet. However, in the midst of the struggle, the White Guards discovered that only a few warships were interacting with them. The main part of the British fleet was far away - in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Gulf of Riga. This happened, firstly, because the enemy naval command, remembering their unsuccessful experience of the summer campaign, readied to keep the best part of the fleet away from the zone of action of the Soviet Baltic fleet. . In addition, a serious obstacle to the active operations of enemy ships in the Gulf of Finland were minefields, installed by Soviet sailors. Secondly, just on the eve of Yudenich's attack on Yamburg, the German military began to carry out a revanchist plan to gain dominance in Latvia. On October 9, the Western "volunteer" army of Bermont-Avalov unexpectedly moved from Mitava to Riga, without any difficulty breaking the resistance of the troops of the bourgeois Latvian government. The government of Ulmanis fled to Venden (Cēsis). The German-Russian White Guard troops came very close to the outskirts of Riga. The Inter-Allied Military Mission tried through its representatives to negotiate with Bermont-Avalov to stop the offensive. Bermont-Avalov's answer was truly anecdotal: this warrior declared that he was inclined to regard the Entente's intervention in his actions as a manifestation of "sympathy for the Bolsheviks", against whom he, Bermont-Avalov, was fighting.

Since the negotiations did not lead to anything, the main part of the English squadron moved from the Gulf of Finland to Riga. On the night of October 14-15, British ships began shelling the positions of the Bermont-Avalov troops. Part of the White Estonian troops was also pulled up to the Latvian border.

Thus, the contradictions among the imperialist forces were directly reflected in the events near Petrograd.

The lack of support from the sea, although it confused the calculations of the Whites, did not stop their offensive. On October 12, that is, the day after the fall of Yamburg, enemy units approached the Volosovo station. Between Soviet 6-

1st and 2nd divisions formed a gap. All communication between them was lost. Commander 7-

With the th army, S. D. Kharlamov (appointed to this post instead of M. S. Matiyasevich at the end of September) tried to eliminate this breakthrough by regrouping and launch a counterattack with the regiments of the 6th and 2nd divisions. But it was impossible to carry out this operation with the available forces.

The entire 7th Army was driven from the front. Its divisions rolled back in divergent directions. A wide gap formed between the right-flank (6th, 2nd) and left-flank (10th, 19th) divisions. The headquarters of the 7th Army lost the ability to control the actions of troops on the left flank. Therefore, on October 16, the command of the Western Front ordered the transfer of the 10th and 19th divisions to the 15th Army. By the same order, the 7th and 15th armies were instructed to immediately go on the counteroffensive. But this demand was impossible at that moment: the 7th Army, exhausted in battles, had not yet received reinforcements, the 15th Army had not completed the regrouping of its units.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops continued. On October 16, the Whites occupied Krasnoye Selo. A few hours later the enemy entered Gatchina. By the end of the day on October 17, the front of the 7th Army passed from the village of Gora Valdai to Tsarskaya Slavyanka, only 15 kilometers from the Nikolaevskaya railway - this most important highway linking Petrograd with Moscow. In some places, the enemy approached Petrograd within a cannon shot.

The enemy rejoiced. The rulers of the imperialist powers who organized the second anti-Soviet campaign, and Yudenich himself with his generals, had no doubt that the capture of Petrograd was now a matter of the very near future. The English bourgeois newspaper The Daily Chronicle, in its issue of October 13, under the headline "Near Moscow and Petrograd," joyfully reported:

"General Yudenich ... declares that the capture of Petrograd by his troops will only be a matter of "two or three weeks."

Victory reports filled the English, French and American newspapers. Choking with delight, corrupt hacks described the "exploits" of the White Guards, painted bright prospects for a close victory, and desperately lied about panic and confusion in the Soviet rear. The same "Daily Chronicle" on October 14, referring to reports from Berlin and Paris, puffed duck about the evacuation of Moscow. On October 18, the English newspaper The Times wrote:

"A message has been received about the encirclement of Kronstadt and the entry of General Yudenich's troops into Petrograd."

In Petrograd, a handful of conspirators, led by the "national center", were completing their final preparations for an armed uprising against Soviet power. The conspirators wanted to come out at the moment when Yudenich's troops broke into the outskirts of Petrograd. The general leadership of the rebellion was entrusted to Lundekvist. With the help of foreign agents, another "government" was formed in the counter-revolutionary underground, headed by the former State Councilor Bykov. This government was openly Black-Hundred in its composition: the "ministers" were recruited entirely from former tsarist officials and the military, whose extreme reactionaryness was beyond any doubt.

But even the events of the next few days showed that the joy of the enemies of the Soviet country was premature. The courage of the defenders of Petrograd was invincible. They selflessly defended every line, at the slightest opportunity turning into counterattacks, even if there were much more enemies.

Two companies of the 3rd battalion of the 51st regiment of the 6th rifle division, which consisted almost entirely of St. Petersburg workers, held the defense in one of the villages near Peterhof (Petrodvorets). All weapons of the fighters consisted of rifles; there were no machine guns. On October 17, an enemy attack suddenly fell upon them: a battalion of White Guards and two White Estonian companies advanced. The forces were clearly unequal; besides, the attackers had machine guns. But the Soviet warriors did not flinch - they accepted the battle. Even the cooks took up rifles. The actions of the Red Army were skillfully directed by the battalion commander Smorodin, the company commander Kuzmin and Commissar Fedorov. After a stubborn battle, the enemy was repulsed with heavy losses for him.

The glorious 3rd Battalion also suffered a heavy loss: Kuzmin and Fedorov died heroically in the battle.

On another sector of the front, near Ligov, on October 18, one of the platoons of the cadet battalion of the naval command staff school distinguished itself. The enemy cavalry cut off this platoon from the battalion .. In order to join their own, the sailors approached the village where the battalion had previously been located. But there were already white people there. The sailors, led by Commissar Kostin, decided to drive the enemy out of the village with a bayonet charge. When the battle began, a huge numerical superiority of whites became clear. Despite this, the cadets continued to fight heroically. The machine gunners Gren, Kirilyuk and Snitko caused heavy damage to the enemy. And in the midst of the battle, help unexpectedly arrived ^ several sailors - scouts from the battleship "Andrew the First-Called", who happened to be nearby, hurried to the rescue of their comrades. Whites were driven out of the village. Soviet sailors captured prisoners and trophies.

With the same stubbornness and steadfastness, Soviet soldiers repelled enemy attacks in other sectors of the front.

By the 20th of October, the pace of the advance of Yudenich's army slowed down sharply. Its further advance met with more and more stubborn resistance from the Soviet troops. Parts of the 7th Army, which were reinforced by Petrograd communists and workers, regained high combat capability. At the same time, the enemy's combat power was decreasing: both the exorbitant expansion of the bridgehead and the losses suffered in battles had an effect. The White Guard command clearly underestimated the strength and capabilities of the Red Army, which relies on the support of the working people.

The fighting took on a particularly fierce character. Yudenich, in an effort to break the courage of the defenders of Petrograd, threw aircraft against them. On October 19, enemy airplanes made four raids on units of the 7th Army, bombarding them with machine guns. But Soviet aviation rose in posture. Soviet pilots showed examples of military prowess in these battles. In the areas of Krasnoe Selo and Gatchina, they made eighteen sorties, subjecting enemy infantry, armored vehicles and convoys to machine-gun fire and bombing. Often the raids were carried out at a very low altitude - 100-200 meters, which was associated with great risk, but it ensured the greatest effectiveness of the shelling. Valuable assistance was provided by reconnaissance pilots. Their reports on the movements and forces of the enemy made it possible to delay the advance of the Whites in some sectors and even to encircle individual parts of the enemy.

On October 20, having pressed the regiments of the 6th division, the whites approached the Strelya base and the suburb of Ligovo. These were the points closest to Petrograd that the White Guards managed to reach. The next day, units of the 1st Corps of the White Guards, after stubborn fighting, occupied Pavlovsk, Tsarskaya

Slavyankug and Detskoe Selo (former Tsarskoe Selo, now the city of Pushkip).

Further actions of the whites were aimed at cutting the Nikolaev and Northern railways. However, the enemy could not advance further than the village of Yam-Izhora. He was stopped here by the reserve units of the 7th Army, concentrated in Kolshsho. On October 21, Yudenich ordered the occupation of the Pulkovo Upland, the last natural frontier separating the front from the southern outskirts of Petrograd.

The decisive moment came in the battle for Petrograd.

The danger looming over the city was all the more great because some of the leading officials of the Petrograd Party and Soviet bodies, in particular Zinoviev, sowed confusion and uncertainty around themselves with their contradictory actions. At a time when Yudenich's troops broke through the front of the 7th Army, Zinoviev assured the population of the city that Petrograd was not in serious danger. When the White Guards found themselves on the outskirts of the city and quick and decisive action was required to avert the immediate threat, Zinoviev and some senior officials of the Petrograd Soviet and the headquarters of the Petrograd Fortified Region succumbed to the papika and, together with Trotsky, who had arrived from Moscow, began to talk about the possibility of surrendering Petrograd.

But the St. Petersburg Communists and the vast majority of workers, Red Army men and sailors did not for a moment succumb to confusion and despair. They were determined to defend Petrograd to the last drop of blood, knowing how great the importance of this city for Godina. The heroic defenders of Petrograd believed that in a difficult moment the whole country would come to their aid.

On October 15, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) adopted a special resolution on the Petrograd Front, in which it demanded: "Do not surrender Petrograd!" The Politburo pointed out the need for the defense of the Petrograd region to transfer the maximum number of people from the Northern Front and to assist Petrograd with cavalry.

However, Trotsky and Zinoviev continued to act contrary to the instructions of the party. They even decided to begin preparations for letting Yudenich's army into Petrograd, asserting that it would be easier to crush the enemy on the streets of the city. In reality, the implementation of such a plan would entail the mass extermination of communists and workers of the city, the destruction of many industrial enterprises that produced important defense products. Needless to say, the very fact of the entry of the White Guards into Petrograd would be a heavy moral blow for every defender of the Republic of Soviets. My opponent would have received a serious gain in moral and political terms. So the adoption of an adventurous plan

I "We won't give up Petrograd!" 1U1U (Poster art. A. Awum.)

Trotsky-Zinoviev would be a betrayal of the interests of the defense of the Soviet country.

On October 16, Trotsky, in his own name and on behalf of Zinoviev, telegraphed to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) about their decision to open the gates of Petrograd to the enemy. Upon learning of this, on the night of October 16-17, B. I. Lenin convened a meeting of the Defense Council, and at 7:30 am on October 17 transmitted the following via direct wire to Petrograd:

".First. The decision of the Council of Defense of October 16, 1919, gives, as a basic instruction, to keep Petrograd at all costs until the arrival of reinforcements, which have already been sent.

Second. Therefore, defend Petrograd to the last drop of blood, not yielding one span and waging a fight on the streets of the city.

Thus, the Council of Defense decisively rejected the plan of Trotsky and Zinoviev, which opened access to Petrograd for the Whites. And in the event that the enemy for some reason managed to break into the city, the troops and workers had to be ready to continue the fight on the streets of Petrograd.

Significant reinforcements were sent near Petrograd. Among other formations and units, the following were sent to fight Yudenich: a brigade of cadets from Moscow, the 3rd brigade of the 18th rifle division from Kotlas, the 3rd brigade of the 21st rifle division from Tula, the 479th rifle regiment from the North from 6th Army, 8th Infantry Regiment from Lodeynoye Pole, 3rd Bashkir Regiment from Belebey, 6th Reserve Regiment from Kineshma, six armored trains.

For the 7th Army there were echelons with various military supplies and food. In various cities and villages of the Soviet country, on the initiative of the party and Soviet bodies, money and food were collected to help Petrograd. Thus, the peasants of the Sergachsky district of the Nizhny Novgorod province collected a thousand poods of grain for the defenders of Petrograd. The peasants of the Shadrnsky district of the Yekaterinburg province sent a block train - 29 wagons of wheat flour. Nine thousand poods of wheat and rye were sent by the peasants of the lower reaches of the Volga.

In Petrograd itself, as during Yudenich's first offensive, all the forces of the party organization and the working class were being mobilized. On October 19, Petrogradskaya Pravda published an appeal by V. I. Lenin “To the workers and Red Army men of Petrograd”:

“Comrades! The decisive moment has come. The tsarist generals once again received supplies and military supplies from the capitalists of England, France, America, and once again they are trying to take red Peter with gangs of landlord sons. The enemy attacked in the middle of peace negotiations with Estonia, attacked our Red Army soldiers who believed in these negotiations. This treacherous nature of the attack partly explains the enemy's rapid successes. Krasnoye Selo, Gatchina, Vyritsa were taken. Two railroads were cut to

Peter. The enemy seeks to cut the third, Nikolaevskaya, and the fourth, Vologda, in order to take Peter by starvation.

Comrades! You all know and see what a huge morning has hung over Petrograd. In a few days the fate of Petrograd is decided, which means half the fate of Soviet power in Russia.

There is no need for me to speak to the Petrograd workers and Red Army men about their duty. The entire history of the two-year Soviet struggle against the bourgeoisie of the whole world, unparalleled in difficulties and unparalleled in victories, has shown us on the part of the St. Petersburg workers not only a model of fulfillment of duty, but also an example of the highest heroism, revolutionary enthusiasm and self-sacrifice unprecedented in the world.

Comrades! The fate of Petrograd is being decided! The enemy is trying to take us by surprise. He has weak, even insignificant forces, he is strong in speed, arrogance of officers, equipment and weapons. Help for Peter is close, we moved it. We are much stronger than the enemy. Fight to the last drop of blood, comrades, hold on

for every inch of land, stand firm to the end, victory is not far off! victory will be ours!" 3.

The Petrograd proletariat, the soldiers of the 7th Army and the Baltic Fleet unanimously responded to the call of the party - to defend red Petrograd at all costs! Rallies were held at plants and factories, in military units and on ships. Thousands of workers and workers, Red Army men and Red Navy men declared their readiness to fight to the last drop of blood.

Similar decisions were taken with enthusiasm by the workers of the Vyborg side, Vasilyevsky Island and other districts of St. Petersburg. At such large enterprises as the Finland Shipping Company, the Westinghouse plant, the Skorokhod factory, the Nevsky shipbuilding plant, the Okhtensky plant, workers after meetings voluntarily signed up for detachments, declared themselves mobilized, and moved to the barracks. On October 17, at a general meeting of two factories - the Golodaevskaya stationery and the former Guka - the workers adopted the following resolution:

“The White Guard gangs think that the hungry St. Petersburg workers are no longer able to repulse the enemy, but know, White Guard pack, we are no strangers to White Guard threats. We are hungry, but revolutionary blood flows in our veins.

Get your dirty hands off!" four.

The practical actions of the working people of Petrograd were affected by the results and experience of the Party's enormous work done in May-June in repulsing Yudenich's first offensive. As a few months ago, the formation of work detachments to be sent to the front began at the plants and factories. The mobilization of Petrograd workers between the ages of 18 and 40 took place with great patriotic enthusiasm. Many volunteers who were not subject to conscription due to age came to the formation points with a request to send them to the front. More than 14,000 women took part in the defense of Petrograd, of which more than 11,000 were employed in rear and trench work, about 3,000 joined active units as nurses, signalmen, and machine gunners. The following fact eloquently testifies to the active participation of female workers in the defense of their native city. After the Whites occupied Krasnoe Selo, several women workers suggested that the Soviet command send them to reconnaissance behind enemy lines. Under the guise of local peasant women, they penetrated into Krasnoe Selo and found out the number and location of enemy troops, their weapons. On the way back, the brave scouts had to hide in the forest for two days, sitting in a hole, without a piece of bread, in the cold autumn rain. But in the end they managed to cross the front line and deliver valuable information about the enemy to the Red Army.

Almost all Petrograd communists capable of bearing arms went to the front. During the troubled October days of 1919, the party organization of Petrograd gave the front more than 3,000 communists as fighters, commanders and commissars. The party organizations of the Petrograd province in only six days, from October 17 to October 22, sent 1,168 communists to the front. The Sestroretsk and Kolpino organizations of the Communist Party announced a total mobilization and carried it out in one day. The communists of the Shlisselburg gunpowder factory and Detskoye Selo were also conscripted to the army.

Together with the communists, Komsomol members went to the front.

During the first six hours from the beginning of the mobilization announced by the Petrograd Committee of the RKSM, 450 Komsomol members signed up as volunteers. 150 girls then went to sanitary courses. The Yamburg, Detskoselskaya, Gatchina organizations of the RKSM went entirely to the front. Shlisselburg, Zvankovskaya, Novoladozhskaya, Sestroretskaya, Peterhof, Kronstadtskaya and other Komsomol organizations of the Petrograd province also almost in full strength entered the regiments of the 7th Army. The Petrograd city organization of the RKSM provided the front with up to 1,200 young fighters. Komsomol members were part of the Combined Combat Detachment of the Petrograd Committee of the RKSM and the district detachments - Nevsky, Obukhovsky and others. The Komsomol detachment of the 1st City District, numbering 260 people, guarded the Peter and Paul Fortress. A detachment of Komsomol members of the Nevsky District selflessly fought with the White Guards near Detskoye Selo, a Komsomol scooter company participated in the battles for Krasnoye Selo.

Detachment after detachment left Petrograd for the front, which was already in the immediate vicinity of the city. And at the Petrograd plants and factories, work was in full swing. The remaining workers worked 12-16 hours a day, overcoming fatigue and hunger. Labor productivity has risen sharply. Increased production of shells and ammunition. Repair of armored trains, steam locomotives, armored vehicles, trucks was carried out many times faster than it was supposed to according to technical standards. So, the armored train No. 6 was repaired by the workers of the Putilov plant in just a day instead of several days, provided according to the plan. The car workshop of the plant produced more than 25 cars after repair in 25 days instead of the prescribed 6 months. The artillery department of the plant overhauled 72 guns and 8 armored trains within a few days.

These days, the Putilovites gave the front the first five Soviet tanks. These were ordinary armored vehicles put on caterpillar tracks, but the very fact of their appearance at the front was of great importance. After all, before that, the defenders of Petrograd could not oppose Yudenich's English tanks.

Izhora plant continued to carry out military orders even when the Whites

LG* "*-*(. SG-**" b-?..* *!"*-^ if**"**?

4 ^TT-TR-- ^-^ K^JC/

SCSI*"" i^AҐp,

The first page of the manuscript of V. I. Іenna “To the workers and Red Army men of Petrograd”. October 17, 1919 (Photocopy.) Were one and a half kilometers from the plant, i After work in the shops, the Izhora went to dig trenches. Many of them directly participated in the battles, being in a working combat detachment, which! ry was formed by the Kolpino Committee of the RCP (b). Kolpino workers as part of the sanitary detachment also took part in the struggle at the front.

The workers of the 1st State Garment Factory in the days of the most fierce fighting near Petrograd produced but two thousand overcoats a day. In normal performance time! factories did not exceed a thousand overcoats.

Tens of thousands of Petrograders worked on the construction of defensive lines on the near approaches and in the city itself. Within the territory of

22 I. G. V., v. 4.

Petrograd built three main defensive lines.

The first defensive line (external) ran along the southern outskirts of the city. The fortifications here were erected by workers of the Krasny Putnlovets, Carriage Building, Electrosila factories, the Skorokhod shoe factory and other enterprises located in the area. The work went on around the clock. The entire population of the workers' outskirts went out to dig trenches, build machine-gun nests, and wire fences. The second frontier was a fortified strip between the Obvodny Canal and the Moika River. The third frontier stretched along the southern coast of Vasilyevsky Island, along the embankment of the Petrograd and Vyborg sides and further up the right bank of the Neva.

A rally at the Shlisselburg gunpowder factory dedicated to the organization of a communist detachment to defend Petrograd.

To strengthen the defensive lines were | | used warships of the Baltic Fleet - the battleship "Sevastopol" and several destroyers. They were supposed to cover the flanks of the first and third lines with their fire. For this, the Sevastopol with several destroyers was anchored at the entrance to the Petrograd Commercial Port, and the destroyer Samson was escorted up the Gieva to the village of Rybatsky.

Several lines of defense were also created on the northern outskirts of the city - in case of an attack by the White Finns.

Barricades were erected on Petrograd streets and near bridges. The windows of the houses were equipped with machine-gun nests. Stations and public buildings turned into strongholds of all-round defense. At the intersections of streets, on the squares, armored towers for guns were installed.

In just a few days, Petrograd again, as in the summer of 1919, turned into an impregnable fortress. The Council of Internal Defense of Petrograd, headed by D. N. Avrov, played an important role in creating defensive lines, in forming work detachments, and in monitoring order in the city. He was subordinate to the district headquarters of internal defense, created by the district committees of the RCP (b) and the executive committees of the Soviets.

Consolidated combat detachment, formed from the Komsomol members of Petrograd. November 1919 (Photo)

In the forefront of the working people of Petrograd, who rose to defend their native city, were, as always, the Communists. With their selfless devotion to the cause of the revolution, they rallied the ranks of the defenders of the heroic city and strengthened their will to win. Thousands of statements about the desire to join the ranks of the party were clear evidence of the close connection of the party organizations of the city with the broad working masses. They testified to the enormous authority of the Communist Party, to the fact that the working people had boundless faith in their Party. With an exceptional upsurge in October 1919, the second "party week" passed, during which 13,572 people joined the party in Petrograd, Petrograd province, in the troops of the 7th Army and on the ships of the Baltic Fleet.

The feeling of high responsibility of the working people for the fate of Petrograd also found expression in their increased vigilance against the intrigues of the enemy. Precisely because thousands of Soviet people were on the alert, it was possible to timely expose and liquidate the counter-revolutionary conspiratorial organizations - the "national center", the German espionage organization of the "fraternal white cross", the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik "Renaissance Union" and others that were preparing a blow in the back to the defenders of Petrograd.

The timely discovery and arrest of the conspirators meant the failure of all the enemy's plans for a mutiny in the path of Petrograd. The exposure of a group of spies and traitors among military experts improved the work of the headquarters of the 7th Army and the Baltic Fleet.

Meanwhile, new reinforcements began to pour into the 7th Army. Echelons with troops arrived one after another, Petrograd workers' detachments approached. The party stratum increased sharply in the troops. In addition to members of the Petrograd party organization, about 1,500 communists from other cities and regions of the Republic arrived to fight Yudenich.

How great was the help provided by the whole country to the 7th Army, was evidenced by the growth of its numbers. During October - November, more than a hundred echelons with troops arrived in Petrograd. By October 29, the 7th Army had grown to 37,292 bayonets, 2,057 sabers, with 659 machine guns and 449 guns. And by November 11, despite heavy losses, the 7th Army already had 43,380 bayonets, 1336 sabers with 491 guns, 927 machine guns, 23 aircraft, 11 armored vehicles and 4 armored trains.

While organizing emergency assistance to Petrograd, the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government at the same time constantly had in mind that the offensive of Yudenich's troops was only an auxiliary blow in the second campaign of the Entente, and the main and decisive events were unfolding on the Southern Front. Therefore, assistance to Petrograd should not have weakened the Soviet armies of the Southern Front; it was necessary to make maximum use of the human and material resources of the northwestern provinces. As early as October 14, in a telegram to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, V. I. Lenin wrote:

“It is clear that the White offensive is a maneuver to divert our onslaught in the south. Repulse the enemy, strike at Yamburg and Gdov. Carry out the mobilization of workers to the front” 6.

The same thought permeated the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party of October 15, which stated that the question of the northern and western fronts should be considered only from the point of view of the security of the Moscow-Tula region in the first place, Petrograd - in the second place.

Of course, in some cases, at the most critical moments for the 7th Army, it was necessary

Detachment of the Soviet marines at the Winter Palace. Petrograd. 1919 (Foil.) to transfer for her parts taken "from the reserve of the Southern Front, from Tupa. But this was done as an exception.

“I was somewhat“ embarrassed ”by yesterday’s demand by the chairman of the Yetrosovet for new regiments,” wrote V. “GG. LENIN to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on October 22. -

I nevertheless handed it over to Sklyansky, and the order to send it from Tula (again from Tula!) was given.

We must put an end to Yudenich soon; then we will turn everything against Denikin.

It is now, in my opinion, dangerous to take from the Southern Front: an offensive has begun there, it is necessary to expand it. They were given the task of putting an end to Yudenich's army as quickly as possible.

“We sent you a lot of troops, the whole point is the speed of the attack on Yudenich and his encirclement. Lean as hard as you can to speed up. A huge uprising in the rear of Denikin in the Caucasus and "our successes in Siberia allow us to hope for a complete victory if we furiously hasten the liquidation of Yudenich" 8.

The preparation of the troops of the 7th Army for the counterattack took place at an accelerated pace. In accordance with the directive given on October 17 by Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, within a few days in the Kolpino-Tosno area, a strike group was created under the command of S. D. Kharlamov. E. A. Rakhya was appointed military tumissar. The size of the group reached 76 (Yu bayonets, 531 sabers, 147 machine guns S 33 guns (of which 12 were heavy). The troops were mastered by two tanks made at the Putilov factory. The area where the strike * group was concentrated was convenient for delivering a decisive flank attack to the enemy.

The troops of the 6th division were concentrated in the area of ​​the Ligovo station. The 2nd division held the defense on the front of Tuipola - Shushary.

On October 20, the new commander of the 7th Army, D. NL Zadezhny, ordered the troops to go on the offensive with the immediate goal of defeating the White Guards near Pulkovo and Detsky Selo and capturing Gatchina. The Soviet command intended to pin down the enemy in the center and inflict a strong blow on his flanks. On the right flank, the 6th division struck with the task of capturing J inieS Ropsha - Krasnoye Selo. In the center of the 2nd division was the first time yiiopnoil defending the position of Tuipola, Shushary tie down parts of the enemy. On the left flank, the Kolsh-Tosno group was to attack the enemy and go beyond the Krasnoye Selo-Gatchina line.

The troops of the 6th division and the Kolpino-Tosno group were reinforced by reinforcements that arrived in Petrograd. The 6th division was to be supported by the artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet.

Such was the plan of the Soviet command at the first stage of the operation to defeat Yudenich's army. At the same time, the command of the Western Front outlined a plan for a general counteroffensive of the 7th and 15th armies. In accordance with this plan, the 7th Army was to continue the offensive in the direction of Gatchina-Volosovo - Yamburg, inflicting a frontal attack. At the same time, the 15th Army struck at the right flank of the North-Western Army on the Luga-Pskov front and entered the enemy's lines of communication. But the joint offensive of both armies could not begin before October 25, since the 15th Army needed time to prepare.

At 6 am on October 21, units of the Kolpino-Tosno group went on the offensive. Fighting broke out on the front of the 6th division. From the sea, the guns of the battleship "Sevastopol" hit the enemy positions.

However, the success of the Soviet troops was not immediately determined. The enemy resisted desperately. Trying to hold on to the reached line, he continuously threw large forces into counterattacks. The Kolpino-Tosno group had to endure heavy fighting. The concentration of all its units on the starting line had not yet been completed when the offensive began. Therefore, the fighters had to engage in battle directly from the marpia. In particular, the 5th Latvian regiment went on the attack immediately, unloading from the echelon. The Red Army soldiers fought fearlessly and stubbornly. The enemy in some areas began to retreat. The White Guards were driven out of the Yam-Izhora trees and driven back across the Izhora River. The Soviet units captured the villages of Voiskorevo and Putrolovo. Pavlovsk and Detskoye Selo changed hands several times.

On the front of the 6th division, the whites managed to prevent the offensive. They even pushed back the Soviet units in the area of ​​the villages of Ust-Ruditsa and Kuznitsa. But this last tactical success of the enemy was soon eliminated. By the evening of October 21, parts of the 6th division were able to move forward.

A detachment of cadets of the Novgorod Command Staff Courses near Petrogradov. 1!) 19 (Photo.)

The White Guards began to hastily regroup their forces in the area of ​​Krasnoye Selo and Pavlovsk. But already on October 23 they were driven out of Pavlovsk. In the battle for Pavlovsk, the Red Army soldiers, commanders and political troops of the 188th and 189th regiments of the 21st rifle division and the 4th separate battalion of the 5th Lettish regiment especially distinguished themselves. On the same day, October 23, units of the Kolpii-Tosno strike group and the 2nd division (headed by S. I. Odintsov) occupied Detskoye Selo. During the liberation of Pavlovsk and Detskoye Selo, many prisoners and weapons were captured.

Retreating from Detskoye Selo, the White Guards entrenched themselves in the area of ​​Aleksandrovskaya station. Here they offered particularly stubborn resistance. Soviet armored trains named after Lenin and Volodarsky were moved to the battlefield. The armored train named after Lenin, already close to the station, came under fire from enemy artillery and received nine holes. The locomotive was damaged. The heroic team of the armored train repaired the damage under enemy fire. The armored train made its way to the station and joined the battle. At the same moment, Soviet reluctance rushed to the attack. The Whites were forced to leave Alexandrovskaya.

Simultaneously with the Kolpino-Tosno group and the 6th division, the 2nd division also advanced.

Fierce fighting broke out on October 25 near Krasnoye Selo. Parts of the 1st Corps of the Whites, together with the White Estonians, tried to launch a counterattack in the direction of Detskoye Selo - Pavlovsk. Yudenich ordered them to take control of the Pulkovo Heights. Fearing to lose the initiative, he even decided to transfer his 1st division from under Luga to the Petrograd direction.

But at this time, units of the 6th division, interacting with the 2nd division and Kharlamov’s group, broke through the enemy’s front west of Krasnoe

Villages and occupied a number of settlements in the rear of the Krasnoselskaya group of whites. In these battles, detachments of cadet sailors distinguished themselves. One of the detachments operating west of Krasnoe Selo received information that the White Guards had taken a detour of the right flank of the Soviet units advancing from the Ligovo station to Krasnoe Selo. The detachment swiftly attacked the elite Livensky nolk of the enemy. In a night bayonet battle, the hero cadets almost completely destroyed the White Guard regiment. Only its pitiful remnants fled. For the battles near Krasnoe Selo, all cadets of the detachment were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

The breakthrough of units of the 6th division brought confusion into the ranks of the enemy. On the night of October 26, the White Guards hastily cleared Krasnoye Selo. In the morning, Soviet troops entered there. On the same day, the Tsarskaya Slavyanka was also liberated. The Red Army won the battle at Pulkovo Heights. The immediate threat to Petrograd was over.

All the time these battles were going on, V. I. Lenin followed the actions of the 7th Army with unremitting attention, tirelessly caring about the timely satisfaction of all its needs. So, on October 20, V. I. Lenin telegraphed the following request to the Petrograd Soviet:

“Have measures been taken to establish a solid radio link between the Kharlamov group and the headquarters of the 7th Army? Is this connection sufficient? The same for all other LI

see f a e^l SrjSf f-jP^t-Tj^

Li J/ . . a t" " .-i .

Telegram from V. I. Lenin to the Petrograd Committee of the RKI(b), October 18, 1919 (Photocopy.) to the groups. If you need our help, please call 9.

On October 25, V.I. Lenin asked the Military Commissariat of Soviet Latvia whether the order to send reinforcements to the 7th Army had been fulfilled. V. I. Lenin emphasized the special urgency of this task 10.

The unsuccessful outcome of the battle for the Whites on the near approaches to Petrograd put the Northwestern Army in the face of a heavy defeat. Yudenich and his Anglo-American-French masters built all their calculations on the rapid capture of Petrograd. Now it became clear that heavy, protracted booms were coming, for which the Northwestern Army was not prepared.

The White Guards could only hope for help from outside, and the help of Finland was especially important for Yudenich. But the Finnish government was in no hurry to resolve the issue of taking the side of Yudenich. True, Finland's position could not be called neutral: the White Finnish army stood along the border, threatening the Soviet Republic, its individual detachments even invaded Soviet territory, Finnish ports served as bases for the Entente fleet, acting against Petrograd. However, the White Finns did not dare to open hostilities on a large scale. This was largely due to the uncertainty of relations with

Kolchak and Denikin, who did not give Finland any guarantees of independence in the event of the victory of the counter-revolution. Yudenich could not give such guarantees either, since formally he was subordinate to the Kolchak government.

The defeat of the Northwestern Army on the near approaches to Petrograd forced Yudenich to once again turn to the government of Finland, begging for help. For a whole week in Helsingfors the question of an armed uprising against Petrograd was discussed. The conditions under which the Finnish government considered it possible to negotiate with Yudenich on this issue were as follows: recognition of the independence of Finland; £4 million financial support guarantee; accession to Finland of Pechenga and a significant part of Karelia to the Murmansk railway.

However, while the Finnish bourgeoisie was negotiating with Yudenich's representatives, the situation on the Petrograd front changed even more. The Northwestern Army was on the verge of complete defeat. Under these conditions, the Finnish government did not even want to get involved in the war. On November 4, it finally refused to help Yudenich.

On October 26, a joint counteroffensive of the 7th and 15th armies began, the ultimate goal of which was to encircle and finally destroy the Northwestern White Guard Army. While units of the 7th Army were fighting in the Gatchina direction, the troops of the 15th Army under the command of A. II. Kork hit the White Guards from the south - the 19th division and the 1st brigade of the 11th division of this army moved from the east and south to Luga with the further task of occupying the Volosovo station. With part of its forces, the 11th division advanced through the impenetrable area of ​​\u200b\u200bLake Samro, in order to then go south of Yamburg. Exceptional heroism and selflessness were shown by the 94th, 96th and 97th rifle regiments of this division. After capturing the highway and the Pskov-Luga railway, with heavy fighting they fought their way to the middle course of the Narva River and captured enemy strongholds in the area, the villages of Kriushi and Niza. For the brilliantly carried out operation, each of these regiments was awarded the honorary revolutionary Red Banner.

The Soviet 10th division attacked the enemy on the outskirts of Gdov, in order to then strike from the rear but the Yamburg group of whites and cut it off from Estonia. The task of the 15th Army was somewhat facilitated by the fact that the White Guard command transferred significant forces from the Luga and Strugibel sectors near Gatchina.

At the same time, on the front of the 7th Army, the White Guards increased resistance, going over to counterattacks in order to return Krasnoye Selo and Detskoye Selo. In some places, the enemy even managed to push the Soviet units. On the left flank of the 7th Army, the Whites managed to break through in the direction of the Chudovo station of the Nikolaev railway.

A fierce three-day battle took place west of Krasnoye Selo near the village of Vysotskoye. Many times the parties threw themselves into bayonet charges. Finally, with the help of reinforcements, the Whites succeeded in driving the Red Army men out of the village. For a long time, strong enemy machine-gun fire did not allow the Red Army chains to rise in a counterattack. An armored car could have helped the Soviet soldiers, but there was none. Then, instead of an armored car, an ordinary truck was sent into battle, in the back of which two heavy machine guns were installed between bags of earth. At a close distance from the village, the car turned its body towards the enemy, and the machine gunners opened fire. The White Guards, hiding behind the houses, fired furiously. One by one, the brave Soviet machine gunners perished. The last of them fought an unequal battle until he lost consciousness from a severe wound. But while the enemies were busy shooting at the truck, the Red Army men jumped into the attack and knocked out the whites with a swift blow)